[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]
Monday, June 10, 1996
.1641 
[Translation]
The Chairman: I would like to welcome to the committee Mr. Enrique ter Horst, Special Representative of the Secretary General in Haiti. I believe you have prepared a presentation, and after reading it you will be willing to answer the questions of committee members.
Thank you very much for coming and welcome.
[English]
If you would like to go ahead, sir, we will have questions afterwards.
[Translation]
Mr. Enrique ter Horst (Special Representative of the Secretary General in Haiti): Thank you very much. I'm very pleased to be here this afternoon. I feel very honoured to have this opportunity to make a few comments to you on the situation in Haiti.
[English]
I understand that the text I had prepared has been circulated to you, so I will only touch on some issues and not bore you with reading what you already have.
I would like to stress that at this time Haiti is slowly turning the corner, so to say. It has a long history of violence, of absence of the state, and in particular in these last four years, the 29 years of the Duvaliers and the 10 years of assorted military régimes and instability, has steadily moved backwards while the rest of Latin America, with all of its problems, has been moving forward.
At this time Haiti is at a crossroads that provides an exceptional opportunity, and President Préval is making every effort to seize this opportunity. He faces an enormous challenge in trying to establish and secure stability and democracy while at the same time pursuing sound fiscal policies.
The day after tomorrow, in Washington, the Minister of Finance will be signing an agreement with the IMF, which then will be taken up by the board of directors, once the Haitian Parliament proceeds to approve a number of laws that are required for this agreement to work.
.1645
Our main objectives as a peacekeeping mission at this stage are twofold. One is to help the Haitian government ensure a stable and secure environment, and the second is to professionalize the police. In a way, these are two sides of the same coin. As the civilian police become more professional in carrying out their duties, naturally the military presence will become less critical. At this stage, we have 300 civilian policemen and 1,900 military, and we have about 100 Canadian police. We have 100 French police and the rest are from a number of countries, Mali being the third contingent in importance.
On the military side, you are well informed, I think, that we have three contingents: the Canadian, the Pakistani and the Bangladeshi contingents. The Canadians are somewhat over 700, and the Pakistani and Bangladeshi 525 each.
[Translation]
As you know, the Canadian military component is very well liked in Haiti, as is Canada in general. There are very close links between the two countries, going back a long time. There is no doubt that Haiti and the Haitian people have always known that they could count on the support of Canada in promoting the cause of democracy.
As you are fully aware, very soon after the coup, in 1991, Canada became one of the pillars of international support for President Aristide and his fight to restore the constitutional order of Haiti. Many initiatives are due to the government of Canada and its representatives in Haiti, who have consistently defended the interests of the Haitian people within international organizations.
My brief also contains a list of the Canadian police forces working in Haiti: the QPP, the OPP, the Police Service of the Montreal Urban Community, the Ottawa-Carleton Regional Police Service, the Aylmer Police Service, the Gatineau-Metro Police Service and the Brossard Police Service, as well as the RCMP, which does of course provide the largest Canadian police contingent.
I will move on directly to the end of my presentation since we began a little late, to allow more time for questions.
I would like to say in conclusion that there is now an opportunity to move forward along the path of democracy and development.
[English]
Two seemingly insurmountable hurdles have been crossed. I referred to them at the beginning: the 29 years of the Duvalier dictatorship and the fact that the armed forces, which had become an almost criminal organization in Haiti - in fact I do not hesitate in calling it that - has been dissolved, which has liberated extremely scarce resources for development. It has probably put aside the main threat to the instauration of democracy.
Ensuring this transition will require close collaboration with the international community. In that context, Canada's long-standing commitment to Haiti will continue to prove crucial.
At the same time, as the help of others is mobilized to share the burden over the coming years, I would like to take this opportunity to put on record again the deep appreciation of the United Nations for the enlightened and generous help of Canada in this operation of helping Haiti stand on its own two feet.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman: Thank you very much, Mr. ter Horst.
Madame Debien.
.1650
[Translation]
Mme Debien (Laval-East): Mr. ter Horst, good afternoon and please allow me to welcome you to our committee. I have two short questions seeking information and I would particularly like to have your opinion on one of them.
Some officials of the Canadian government informed us that it would take about five years to train a professional Haitian peace force. What is your opinion on that?
My second question concerns the group to whom Canada has provided training as part of its program to help young Haitians wishing to contribute to the restoration of democracy in Haiti. Since the Haitian Constitution does not allow police officers from other countries, who are not Haitian citizens, to discharge their policing responsibilities in Haiti, the young people concerned were not able to do their job.
A number of them came back very disappointed about having followed a training program which they are not able to put in practice. I know that discussions have taken place with officials, as my colleague will be able to confirm. It also seems that discussions have taken place between certain Haitian ministers and Members of Parliament to try to provide assignments for the young people who have stayed in Haiti.
I don't know whether you had that information, but I would be grateful if you could first answer my initial question concerning the training of a professional Haitian police force.
Were you aware of the problem I raised in my second question? How could it be resolved?
Mr. ter Horst: Thank you very much. There is a five-year institutional development program for the police. To date, we have worked out the details for the next 18 months. This program has four main components: training, operations, human management and equipment.
Fortunately, Canada, France and the United States have all confirmed their support for this five-year program. However, we must distinguish between the technical assistance aspect, which will probably be needed for the full five-year period, and the peacekeeping operation being undertaken in Haiti at the present time.
In other words, the peacekeeping operation will not necessarily be needed for five years, until the police force is fully established. The aim of this program, after five years, is not just to have a Latin American police force, but to have one of the best police forces in Latin America.
At the moment, the military component, in addition to providing a safe and stable climate in cooperation with the government, serves to protect quite a large number of UN civilian peace officers. As I said at the beginning, there are some 300 such officers there.
.1655
Most of these police officers should be staying until the end of the year. There will probably be a small reduction early next year and police training will continue with a total of 100 policemen from international forces as from the middle of 1997 until the end of the year. Therefore, if we can suppose that there will be one third coming from Canada, one third from France and one third from other contingents, it will be possible to continue police training and technical support with about 35 or40 Canadian police officers as from July of next year.
The situation of the young Haitians trained in Regina is due to the fact that it has only been since March that the Haitian police have had a director general who is beginning to take control of the situation. Before March, there were all sorts of groups: there were former members of the military, young people who joined directly in Haiti and young people trained in Canada. Unfortunately, these young people - and I will not use the word "clique", although to some extent they are a clique - , united by a feeling of solidarity, constituted within the police force a group which sometimes feels discriminated against. It is a fact that membership of such a group has sometimes been used to get rid of these people or make life more difficult for them.
The new leadership of the police force is aware of this problem. They have decided to keep all the good police officers, regardless of where they come from and I have every reason to believe that many of the officers trained in Regina, who are very good policemen, will be integrated into the force.
The Chairman: Thank you.
[English]
Mr. Mills.
Mr. Mills (Red Deer): I have a series of questions. Let me just put them all to you. I think you may be able to combine some of them.
First, I have a concern that there are approximately 75 very wealthy families in Haiti, at this point, who contribute nothing to the rebuilding of Haiti. In the long term that has to be of great significance.
Secondly, I see the whole situation in Haiti as being a very long-term generation kind of thing, where you have 85% illiteracy, where you have a real lack of leadership at most levels, where you have judges who are just now being trained.
Thirdly, the feeling of a return of a dictatorship seems almost imminent.
The police force that I heard you describe and the police force that I saw are certainly two different things. I saw a police force where 60 people were staying in a compound, where only through literally begging could two of them be encouraged to come out on a night-time patrol for fear of being killed. I saw some members of the police force who were not wearing uniforms any more because they hadn't been paid for six weeks. I saw a police force that very quickly could have been promised things, but they really felt betrayed by their bosses.
Fourthly, I'd like to know how the negotiations with China are progressing in terms of what chances there might be that the UN may in fact not be participating in Haiti after June 30. Then, of course, the question comes: which countries and how many in the OAS are going to participate, and what is going to be their financial contribution to this whole exercise?
.1700
Mr. ter Horst: Let me see how I can put together some of these questions.
There is no doubt that there are still a number of very wealthy Haitians who are not entirely committed, to use a diplomatic expression, to investing in their country at this stage, but I think the process of reconciliation is proceeding. President Préval is making an enormous effort to reach out precisely also to these people.
The fact that there has been now an agreement with the IMF and the World Bank on a program of adjustment augurs well in the sense that this attitude of prudence and not investing until things are a little bit clearer will quickly, hopefully, turn into one in which all Haitians will start believing in their country.
I agree with you that there is a long-term effort that might take a generation, maybe somewhat less. I would add that this effort probably will require the continued assistance of the international community for some time until really a dynamic of development sets in.
We're working now in the UN at putting into place a longer-term effort that will be a sort of successor to the peacekeeping operation and that will associate closely maybe 20 to 25 countries of the region and of the industrialized world to allow for this continuity to be ensured in helping Haiti turn the corner in an irreversible manner.
As to your point on the eventual return of a dictatorship, personally, I don't see such a thing happening any time soon.
The army has been demobilized. Out of 6,000 troops, 4,000 have undergone training in new professions. It's a question, naturally, of the economy picking up in order for them to find gainful employment. Also, we are initiating a program that will provide credit to former soldiers for setting up micro-enterprises and helping them earn a living without having recourse to violent methods.
On the present state of the police, the picture you have painted is a real one. There's no doubt about that. We have a situation at present where between the director general, his immediate staff and the basic policemen, there are no middle officers to speak of. We have engaged in five-week accelerated training. We have now 45 commissaires, who have three weeks of theoretical training and two weeks of practical training, and who should be deployed within the next two weeks all over the country.
At the same time, we will have in place before the end of this month a full telecommunications system that will allow the quartier général to be in touch with all of its commissariats in the countryside.
The U.S. government, and the UN as well, have already and will continue to provide slightly more then 200 vehicles to complete the fleet that has been donated in the last eighteen months.
.1705
We are setting up repair shops and we are also providing for much closer cooperation between our own CIVPOL and these new commissares who will be in place before the end of the month. They will be going on a joint five-day seminar together - this is particularly for all those who will be commissares - in order for them to leave and go back to a countryside with a common vision and some very precise instructions on how they have to work together.
Payments are slowly starting to be made. Last week I heard that about half of the police force received their April salary. This week, supposedly, they will be receiving the other half for the month of April. That will at least partially correct the situation.
It also shows that in addition to a very grave cashflow problem the government has had over the last six weeks, this police force continues to be without systems and procedures. The entire management of the force is still very much in a preliminary stage, so to speak. Everything that relates to budgeting, personnel and logistics should be up and working in the month of September, according to the plan we have set up.
With regard to China, I would not at this stage speculate in any way how the present negotiations on an extension of UNMIH or on the setting up of a new operation might go in the end.
There is very solid support from the whole of Latin America on an extension of UNMIH or on an operation very similar to it. Last week in Panama, the OAS approved a resolution practically endorsing the continued presence of the international community under the framework of a peacekeeping operation. It is now an issue of negotiating hard and skilfully.
Mr. Mills: No budget or anything has been put in place, has it? Budgets with a U.S. contribution, a Mexican contribution or one from Brazil, one from Chile...
Mr. ter Horst: All peacekeeping operations have a particular peacekeeping operation budget.
Mr. Mills: But if it goes to OAS... Have any of them committed dollars?
Mr. ter Horst: I'm very doubtful that it will ever become a peacekeeping operation under the OAS. In the OAS there is a very strong reluctance to engage in or even to endorse military peacekeeping operations.
Mr. Mills: I guess, then, that's the concern for the China-Taiwan connection, that it be solved before June 30.
Mr. ter Horst: Yes. It is also, I think, an issue for all members of the Security Council to recognize: this is a country that is in particular need of this type of operation for a period of time that is not all that long. We're speaking maybe of six months at the most, maybe until the middle of next year. There is no way there will be an extension beyond this, but it is a support that is critical at this time. It would be tragic, in more than one sense, if at this particular juncture in the history of Haiti we could not provide them with that support.
Mr. Mills: Thank you.
The Chairman: Mr. Flis.
Mr. Flis (Parkdale - High Park): Thank you. I too welcome our visitor. It gives us an opportunity for an update as to what is happening in Haiti.
I had the privilege of being in Haiti on October 15, 1995, for the anniversary of Aristide's return to power. I took advantage of being there to see some of the projects out in the field. I had an opportunity to visit the two health clinics that are already functioning, one in Bero and one in Montrouis. Children and their mothers are coming there. They have to pay a small registration fee if they can afford it. The second time they go they don't have to register. So these are the beginnings of a health system in action.
.1710
I visited a school, actually a co-op, Centre d'éducation pour la co-operation internationale, which Montreal helped build and renovate. I took a tour of the school. I saw a chalkboard and wanted to write a message on it; unfortunately, the teacher couldn't find any chalk. The principal said she'd get one for me, went scurrying around the school and came back very apologetic. She could not find a piece of chalk in the whole school. But at least there's a school, with classrooms, and the beginnings of a school system.
In St-Marc we visited road construction, with technology being taught by the Mennonites and so on. We also in St-Marc visited the Palais de justice, which Canada is helping to restore. The roof is caved in, there are no windows and a door is on its hinges, but we actually saw justice in action. There was a judge, newly trained police brought in the accused, who had a lawyer to defend him, and the public was able to witness this. Again, there was an appearance of justice in the process here.
Looking back now at the medical needs, the educational needs, the road construction needs and the justice needs, who is putting together the priorities? Is it just going on all fronts, and are certain countries specializing in certain areas? Is there someone coordinating all of this? Maybe you could bring us up to date on what is happening there in the areas of health, education, justice, road construction, communication and so on.
The Chairman: There were a lot of questions there, and a couple of other people would like to ask some as well.
Mr. ter Horst: Very quickly, there is coordination, very close coordination, particularly in the police and justice sectors. In the police sector we agreed two months ago on work programs. We have 13 working groups, which go from logistics to operations to inspector-general. These are trilateral working groups, trilateral meaning the government is present, naturally, as are the friends of Haiti, either all six countries that are friends or just one or two of them, and the United Nations.
We have under each of these programs established specific tasks with deadlines, and people with first and last names who are responsible for these tasks to be accomplished within a certain given timeframe. We're not working in Sweden, and some of these deadlines do get readjusted, but I think they are an indication, and they do provide a frame, for people to carry out these tasks in a certain limited period of time. That is what allowed me say previously that we have 18 months in front of us to really carry out most of these functions.
We're doing much the same thing on the justice sector. There the Minister of Justice has led a group, together with MICIVIH, our sister organization, the civilian mission in Haiti, which mainly takes care of human rights and development of the justice sector, to provide the government and the international community with a tool that would be similar to the one we have established in the police sector.
.1715
With regard to health, education, public works, etc., UNDP carries out coordination, almost on a weekly basis, with all the UN agencies, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. It is then up to the government, naturally, to take the decisions and sign the contracts, but I think these specialized UN agencies do provide all the groundwork for the government to be in a position to take the policy and political decisions required.
We're still very much at the beginning of this government. Everything has been slightly on hold, waiting for these negotiations with the IMF and the World Bank to be concluded. I think we will be seeing a much quicker pace in all of what you've referred to.
[Translation]
The Chairman: Mr. Paré.
Mr. Paré (Louis-Hébert): Some of the information already given might provide a partial answer to my questions, but I would like to have further details.
When I think of the situation regarding Haiti over the past five or six years, I remember the very long time the international community took before intervening in response to the 1991 coup d'État. That is the main thing I remember, and I feel rather ashamed about it.
The second think I recall is no less shameful. When the military junta left - and we should not forget that they were offered a fortune to go - , we had the impression to some extent that they were being rewarded for what they did, in view of the way in which they left.
We then heard the President of Haiti talking to us at length about reconciliation. Is reconciliation possible with complete impunity?
In that regard Haiti is not unique. In recent years when there have been serious conflicts - for example in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia - , we have too often seen that the international community seems unable to do anything at all to bring the people responsible to justice. Therefore, how can reconciliation be achieved on the basis of impunity?
You said that the army had been immobilized. In the context which I describe, where the armed forces were disbanded but the former members who could be almost described as ex-criminals were not disarmed, how can you argue that the country is really protected from another coup d'État, since such a course of action seems to pay off?
Mr. ter Horst: Mr. Paré, your first question, which addressed the issue of reconciliation with impunity, is a very difficult one.
Such impunity will continue until Haiti has an effective legal system and police service; we are not talking here about an international tribunal, as is currently the case with the former Yugoslavia.
In any event, it is very difficult to reconcile with criminals, because most of them are outside the country. They have fled.
.1720
Once the country has developed, with the assistance of the international community, an effective legal system, it will then be up to the Haitians themselves to ensure that such impunity no longer creates a situation which could allow others to embark on the same course of action. On that point, I share many of your concerns.
As regard to your second question dealing with demobilization of the army, it is correct that there was no formal disarmament. Many people returned home with their weapons. It is also true that many former soldiers voluntarily handed in their weapons because they did not feel very comfortable having them. It is also true that the United States implemented a buy-back program, through which some 30,000 weapons were recovered. Some of them were not in very good condition, some were rusty, but the fact is that over half of them were in good working order.
Some measures have been taken, but it is true that there are probably still too many weapons in Haiti and that an effort must be made to reduce the number.
[English]
The Chairman: Mr. Godfrey.
Mr. Godfrey (Don Valley West): Knowing our time is brief, I want to talk a little bit about the friends of the Secretary General for Haiti. It's an interesting roll call - Argentina, Canada, Chile and so on. They seem to be helping, or being friendly, if I may put it that way, specifically on police and security matters.
What determined who they were? Who came forward? Was it a combination of sympathy for Haiti and a certain expertise in police matters? For example, in El Salvador was there a similar group of friends who had some expertise in this area? I'm particularly interested in the countries from Latin America, such as Argentina, Chile and Venezuela. Did they make a specialization of being a friend to the Secretary General for hemispheric security matters? What brings these particular countries together?
Mr. ter Horst: In both cases they started off, as is the case now with Guatemala as well, providing political support in the course of the negotiations between the two parties in conflict. In the case of Haiti, they became particularly active in the course of negotiations for the Governors Island agreement. In the case of El Salvador it was also in the course of the peace negotiations that the Chapultepec peace agreement resulted. In the case of Guatemala, it's now more or less the same situation.
Regional powers have an interest in trying to ensure a peaceful settlement of conflicts close by, and in many instances afterwards providing the financial and economic support and, in the case of Haiti in what regards police, a particular expertise in setting up new institutions.
Mr. Godfrey: Are they the same countries that tend to be found each time there's another exercise, whether it's El Salvador, Guatemala or Haiti? In other words, Chile and Argentina are not exactly in the same region as Haiti. Venezuela is closer. Is it usually the same countries that become involved in these exercises, or does it vary?
Mr. ter Horst: It's sometimes a question of luck or circumstances. In the case of Chile and Argentina, it's because they were members of the Security Council at one time. Chile is still a member of the Security Council and provides political support for negotiations - for example, the present one on the extension of the peacekeeping operation.
.1725
They can become a group of advisers to the Secretary General in the course of political negotiations in New York, a role that translates into assisting the government of Haiti, in this case, on a number of other issues that go beyond the strictly political negotiations in New York.
It is always a flexible arrangement. It doesn't mean that any particular country has a hold on this type of situation. I think it's determined by the region, by the commitment the country has towards the principles of the UN Charter, and by the particular foreign policy objectives it set itself at one point in time.
Mr. Godfrey: Thank you.
The Chairman: Mr. Dupuy.
[Translation]
Mr. Dupuy (Laval-Ouest): There is a Haitian institution which, I think, should play an important role in the return to democracy, namely the Parliament of Haiti. How can you have a democracy if Parliament is not playing its role?
We hear a lot about the police, the judicial system, negotiations with the International Monetary Fund and the fiscal situation. What do you think about the way Parliament is working? Is it involved as it should be? Is it playing its role with respect to the presidency, or is it a very fragile institution needing help?
Mr. ter Horst: Mr. Dupuy, I am very pleased to see you again after so many years. Mr. Dupuy and I have known each other since 1975. We met 21 years ago, at the Paris Conference, which was jointly chaired by Canada and Venezuela.
The Chairman: We will have to decide whether that was a good thing or not after hearing your answer.
Mr. ter Horst: In answer to your question, Mr. Dupuy, I would say that the Parliament is quite dynamic, vigorous but not very disciplined. It is a new Parliament with new members. When the Venezuelan Parliament was inaugurated in 1947, the Speaker stated at a constituent assembly that you can never be sure which of the two makes the most noise: an old car or a new Member of Parliament.
This is somewhat the case with the Haitian Parliament at the present time. It is very strongly influenced by the Lavalas political organization, which has the vast majority of seats, and the members are chosen from the grassroots. That is the major difference at the present time. In most cases, these people are very young, have very real links with the grassroots and are not manipulated by the leadership of any political party. They have their own opinions. It is true that they still probably have a lot to learn. And there is an education process taking place at the present time, in which the members are very interested and actively involved.
But there have been some situations that seemed very strange. For example, a month and a half ago, they rejected a proposed legislation approving a loan of 17 million dollars from the Inter-American Development Bank. They are now beginning to realize that it might not have been the wisest thing to do.
.1730
They are looking at the whole situation again. Mr. Iglesias will come to Haiti sometimes during the next month and I have no doubt that, towards the end of next month, the legislation approving the credit agreement will be adopted. Furthermore, the terms of the agreement are very favourable.
Sometimes they all go in one direction because someone has said something which sets someone else thinking, but we shouldn't be surprised about that sort of thing happening in a new democracy.
This is a Parliament which also takes itself very seriously. Even the Speaker sometimes has a lot of difficulty in effectively controlling things. This is not a docile Parliament. There is a lot of contact between the executive and legislative branches, but in the final analysis that is a very good thing. They are learning what is involved in democracy.
[English]
The Chairman: I would like to close the session with a quick question, Mr. ter Horst, because our time has come to an end.
I'd like to follow up on Mr. Mills' question, because you answered that now would not be the time to withdraw and leave Haiti on its own. You seemed to indicate that this was not a Cyprus-type operation. Canadian troops were in Cyprus for 22 years, I believe. The Americans withdrew from Haiti because they didn't intend to be there for a long time. I think they recalled being there in the 1930s, or earlier, for a long period of time.
If you were to give your best estimate as to how long Canadian troops would be necessary in order to guarantee a smooth transition, how much time would we be talking about?
Mr. ter Horst: This is only a guesstimate, and a guesstimate on the long side at that. Clearly this is not a situation like Cyprus. A police force is being established that should be able to assume its responsibilities sooner rather than later. If the international community left, I think it would be tragic, because...
I understand that we're in a closed session here.
The Chairman: It's a public meeting.
Mr. ter Horst: If the peacekeeping operation is closed on June 30, we might run the risk that this relatively large number of young policemen - some 6,000 of them - without proper leadership and still in need of having an internal disciplinary process being carried out, and with perhaps some undesirable elements still in need of being weeded out... We might have a situation similar to the former one, with the armed forces taking ahold of the country and transforming itself into a force that will become a burden on the establishment of the rule of law and the economic development of the country.
The international community will have to ensure that this police force turns the corner and reaches a stage in its development where it will be able to perform the role it was meant to provide. As I said in the beginning -
The Chairman: Is there a guess as to when that transition moment arrives? Just from looking at the state of preparedness -
Mr. ter Horst: My earliest guess would be mid-1997. My latest guess would be the end of 1997. This does not mean the police force will suddenly be transformed from a force that has not risen to its responsibilities into one that will, sometime in the last half of 1997. Clearly, this is an ongoing process, and that international presence will be phased out more quickly or less quickly, but sometime in 1997.
.1735
The Chairman: I never should have asked that question, because I've piqued Mr. Mills' interest.
Only if it's a very short one, Mr. Mills, because you were the one who was looking at the clock a while ago.
Mr. Mills: Wouldn't it be better to be honest and say that if we really want to rebuild this country, it needs infrastructure, it needs education? They don't have that.
You need to start from ground zero. Maybe you can get the police force ready in another year, but a police force is not what that country needs. The country needs to be rebuilt. It needs to have a positive future. It needs to have jobs. Tourism could be a major business for the country. They need to start to believe in themselves and rebuild themselves. You need to get investment from the local people. You need to get investment from Haitians who live outside Haiti. There's so much to be done. Why not just be up front and say it will take a generation, and maybe we don't need military involvement, but we need involvement for a long time? To me that's the honest answer. I just don't see one year as being realistic.
The Chairman: I don't know if there is a short answer to that question.
Mr. ter Horst: I don't think Mr. Mills and I disagree on this. I think I was speaking about a peacekeeping operation with emphasis on police development. I agree with you entirely. I think the international community will probably need to continue to help Haiti over the next 10, 15 or 20 years, but for that type of effort I think you will be able to enlist a much larger number of countries. One could probably think of 20 to 25 countries that would be in there for the long haul, and it would be necessary because it will probably be the only way... Periods of political paralysis in one can be compensated for by active government in another.
The Chairman: But that would take the form of the more normal type of bilateral or multilateral aid that we're familiar with, whether the World Bank or educational relationships.
Mr. ter Horst: Absolutely.
The Chairman: Mr. ter Horst, thank you for your helpful comments today. We appreciate it. On behalf of the committee, I wish you every success in your delicate and difficult mission in Haiti. We certainly wish the United Nations success, and I think we in this room would like to see the United Nations strengthened by a positive result in its Haitian operations. Thank you for coming before us.
Mr. ter Horst: Thank you, Mr. Graham.
The Chairman: We're adjourned.