[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]
Tuesday, May 7, 1996
.1530 
[English]
The Chair: Order.
Ladies and gentlemen, before I welcome the minister and his officials, I would like to make a correction to the official record of the committee respecting the meeting of March 27, 1996.
During questioning of the Deputy Minister of Veterans Affairs, Mr. David Nicholson, he replied: ``The Korean War Veterans went through their eligibility through the same act.'' It should read: ``The Korean War Veterans went through their eligibility through a separate act.''
The deputy minister was noting that both merchant navy veterans and Korea veterans gained legislative access to their veterans benefits in the same way: through their own special piece of legislation. He was implying that Korea veterans had never felt disadvantaged by having a separate act, while some merchant navy advocates do. Korea veterans were given access to veterans benefits through the Veterans Benefit Act. Merchant navy veterans have the Merchant Navy Veteran and Civilian War-related Benefits Act.
The second piece of business is with regard to a symposium taking place in Halifax two blocks from my door. It would be very easy for me to attend. The Centre for Foreign Policy Studies at Dalhousie University is sponsoring the Symposium on Multinational Naval Co-operation and Foreign Policy into the 21st Century, from May 21 to 23, 1996. The chair and any other member of the committee have been invited to attend. A motion to cover registration fees is required.
The motion reads:
- That the committee authorize the payment of registration fees for the Chair and any other
Member to attend the Symposium on Multinational Naval Co-operation and Foreign Policy in
Halifax from May 21 to 23, 1996.
Motion agreed to
.1535
The Chair: If anyone else would like to attend, please let our clerk, Mr. Rumas, know. Thank you.
That being done, welcome, Minister Collenette, to the committee. We're delighted to have you and your officials, one of whom is already known to me.
Admiral, it's nice to see you.
It's nice to see you all, actually.
Without further ado, I believe the minister has an opening statement. We would be delighted to hear it.
Hon. David Collenette (Minister of National Defence): Thank you, Madam Chair. First, I'd like to congratulate you on the assumption of your duties as chair of the committee. I think it's a very good choice by the members, given the fact that you do represent Halifax, a great navy town, in the House. That's why I brought the vice-chief today, so that you would feel at home.
I will introduce those with me. Vice-Admiral Murray is the vice-chief of defence staff, who in effect is the chief operating officer on a day-to-day basis with the Canadian Armed Forces. Major-General de Faye is the chief of force development, and works with him on all of these matters. Major-General Linden is the chief of reserves and cadets. Colonel Bujold is the director general of reserves and cadets. Both these gentlemen are reservists, so we have a good balance here today.
I do welcome the opportunity to appear to discuss an issue of great importance to the government and to the Canadian forces. The reserves are a mirror of Canada's history and values. The militia, of course, dates back centuries to the period of New France. Through the American revolutionary war, the War of 1812, and other conflicts, large and small, it established a proud and illustrious reputation.
[Translation]
In this century, the Reserves have carried on this splendid tradition, particularly in the First and Second World Wars. In both cases, they formed a vital part of Canada's major contribution to Allied victory.
And today, the Reserves continue to play an important role in the Canadian Forces as part of the Total Force. They are serving with distinction, and they remain a vital link between the Canadian military and society at large.
[English]
I've had many opportunities in my time as Minister of National Defence to meet with reservists at home and abroad, on peacekeeping and other duties. Their skill and commitment continue to impress me. They deserve our praise and, perhaps most important of all, our support.
The reserves, like the rest of Canada's defence organization, must adapt to meet new domestic and international circumstances. This means, above all, increasing their operational- and cost-effectiveness. Both the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy, some of whose members I recognize here today, and the subsequent 1994 defence white paper were clear on this point. That's why in April of last year I created the Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves, to examine and make recommendations concerning the role, structure and employment of the reserve force. The commission, after extensive public consultation, issued its report last October, on time and under budget. I'd like to underscore that particular fact.
I'd like to congratulate the commission members - Chief Justice Brian Dickson, formerly of the Supreme Court of Canada; retired General Charles Belzile, former commander of the army; and Professor Jack Granatstein of Toronto - for carrying out their challenging mandate in such a thorough and professional manner.
[Translation]
I am also grateful for the comments and recommendations of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs and the Senate Sub-Committee on Veterans Affairs.
I know both committees worked to very tight deadlines. I would like to thank you all for a job well done.
The Government, in keeping with its usual practice, has consulted far and wide on this major policy issue. We have listened to the views expressed, and we are now ready to move forward.
[English]
I'm here today to give you an interim report on the progress being made by the department and the Canadian forces in responding to the reports I've just mentioned. I believe we're well on our way to creating a streamlined and more efficient reserve force.
Over the last three months, the department and the Canadian forces have carefully analysed the recommendations of the three reports, keeping in mind that the special commission's study was our starting point. We have also taken into account an internal review of the total force concept, which of course looked at the reserves in detail, as well as the comments and recommendations of the reserve community, which has been consulted widely.
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First of all, I'd like to begin by announcing that the government accepts the vast majority of the recommendations found in all four reports. In terms of the special commission's report - the key document - we support 36 of the 41 recommendations, including five subject to minor modifications. There are three recommendations that we are still examining, while there are two that we do not support.
[Translation]
Of the two Special Commission recommendations we do not support, the most controversial deals with job protection legislation for Reservists. However, we do accept the recommendation of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs that the Government can improve its policies covering public servants who are Reservists. The Canadian Forces Liaison Council will make the examination of this issue one of its top priorities, and will continue to work with the private sector employers to encourage their support of Reserve activities on a voluntary basis.
Some of the supported recommendations are straightforward and will be easy to implement. At this time, we are ready to move ahead with about 25 of the Special Commission recommendations that we accept. In fact, implementation has already begun in some cases.
[English]
Others, however, are more complex. Their implementation will require further detailed analysis and planning in terms of costs and other factors. The reserve community will be closely involved with the department as this planning is carried out.
I want to stress that reserve restructuring is still on schedule and that we expect to begin full implementation of all supported recommendations by the end of this summer. The chief of reserves and cadets will monitor the implementation process.
Let me take a few moments to discuss some of the key recommendations that we have accepted in the four reports and give you a sense of where we're heading in the months coming up. First of all, let me address the concerns voiced by many with respect to the primary reserve force strength of 23,000, as set out in the white paper.
We understand this figure simply will not be enough to meet operational requirements. The paid ceiling of the primary reserves will therefore be increased from the planned reduction figure of 23,000, to a level that could, with increased efficiencies, allow for an actual primary reserve strength of around 30,000. The militia will be the beneficiary of this increase as its paid ceiling will rise from 14,500, the original figure with which the special commission had to work. The militia will be organized into brigades, the exact number to be determined after further study by land force planners and, again, consultations with the reserve community. All along in this piece, Madam Chair, the reserve community will be active participants and advisers and work with the forces.
[Translation]
Returning to the Reserve component as a whole, we do not intend to enroll automatically all trained personnel in the Supplementary Ready Reserve on their departure from the Forces. However, we will step up our efforts to encourage these individuals to join the SRR voluntarily.
With an expected 20,000 personnel in a reorganized SRR, Canada will have, in effect, a potential Reserve mobilisation force of 50,000 which could augment the 60,000 Regular Force members in case of emergency.
[English]
So, Madam Chair, what I have to emphasize is that with a revitalized primary reserve and a revitalized supplementary reserve, when this is all done - hopefully in mid-1997 - we will have a pool of 50,000 people in the reserves who could supplement the regular forces of 60,000 in cases of national emergency. I think that is a major step forward, and it's a step that is attributable to the hard work of members of this committee, the Senate committee and, of course, the commission, as well as the representations made by the reserve community and others across this country in the last couple of years.
I'd like to talk about mobilization for a minute, because the increase in strength of the primary reserves reflects our appreciation of the critical role the reserves play in force augmentation, sustainment and mobilization.
We see mobilization as a raison d'être of the reserves. At the same time, we acknowledge that augmentation of the regular force will be their main employment. Within the framework of the current mobilization policy defined in the 1994 white paper, we accept the special commission's recommendation that a national mobilization plan be drafted and put in place as quickly as possible. Work on that plan was suspended while the special commission was preparing its report, but we have now recommenced it.
.1545
The specific roles and tasks of the reserves will be clearly defined in command level mobilization plans, and naturally the reserve community again will be involved in setting out these roles. Indeed, their suggestions have already been noted.
I'd like to make particular mention of the group called Reserves 2000, which has done a remarkable job in pulling together the reserve community across the country. In discussions with me it has certainly been very helpful in arriving at some of the conclusions we're outlining today.
Militia restructuring is, of course, one of the most important issues surrounding the reserves, and we accept the special commission's guidelines and factors for meeting this challenge. This is an area where National Defence and the forces are currently focusing much of their efforts to improve the efficiency of the reserves.
As recommended by the special commission, by this committee, and by the Senate Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs, we intend to eliminate militia districts and set up a militia brigade structure.
Once detailed implementation planning is completed this summer, decisions will be made in cooperation with the reserve community on the precise number, structure and locations of brigade headquarters, the need for militia headquarters and signal squadrons as well as other personnel, training and support issues.
I do recognize, Madam Chair, that there is some difference of opinion among the reserve community, and indeed among members on this committee, as to the appropriate brigades that will actually be put in formation, but I think that whatever the final solution is, it has to be one that is operationally viable and answers the true needs of the Canadian forces. We will approach this question, as we do others, with the utmost flexibility.
[Translation]
The actual impact on individual units as a result of restructuring will become clearer as implementation plans develop.
However, we hope to eliminate as few units as possible and, in the process, maintain the proud tradition and heritage of the Reserves.
[English]
So, Madam Chair, we will strive to reduce and eliminate the fewest number of reserve units as possible, because these units have proud traditions. They are the footprint of the Canadian forces across the country, and we will do everything in our power to make sure that we rationalize as few as possible.
[Translation]
The Senior Reserve advisor to the Commander, Land Force Command, is responsible for militia restructuring. He will carry out all his work with the participation of the broader Reserve community.
[English]
The important role of the reserves in Canadian society is, of course, a matter that we'll be paying close attention to. We must accept the fact that the relationship between the Canadian forces and the public is changing, and with regular forces becoming smaller and more concentrated, Canada's military has become less visible to the society it serves.
Under these circumstances, the role of the reserves has become more critical than ever. The reserves link the Canadian forces to communities across the country. In this sense, they strengthen the forces as a national institution and help foster national unity. If anything, we want to make this link even stronger and we are exploring various options to that end.
As we devolve more responsibility and accountability within the department and the forces, both regular and reserve units and formation should have more control over their budgets. They will need guidelines to help them in this respect, but the goal must be to streamline bureaucracy and improve operational efficiency.
My recent visits to Lévis, Saint John, Barrie and Cornwall, and that of the parliamentary secretary to Halifax, has convinced me, above all, that militia units and local communities must have greater control over their armouries.
I shall be continuing my tour of reserve units next week by visiting Alberta.
[Translation]
The whole issue of the control and use of armouries, including the concept of shared use, will only be decided after further analysis. We have yet to rule out any option.
However, the National Defence Act and Treasury Board guidelines may need to be modified to give local militia units greater responsibility for the management and administration of armouries.
.1550
The Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders in Cornwall, in particular, have put forth some innovative ideas in this respect. We encourage other members of the Reserve community to come forward with proposals.
[English]
Within the context of the reserves and Canadian communities, National Defence and the forces welcome the special commission's recommendation that the Canadian rangers program be enhanced. We have in fact already established a ranger enhancement that will provide radios and navigation systems to the rangers north of 60 degrees. We also intend to create 11 new patrols.
For the past two years, the forces have also conducted a youth rangers program trial in Paulatuk in the Northwest Territories. The results have been impressive and we are now developing a national program.
The young rangers would provide an alternative youth program stressing traditional native culture in those northern communities that are too small to support the cadet movement. The program would be open to youngsters between the ages of 12 and 17 and it would be a joint venture, with costs shared by Defence and the forces, other federal departments, and provincial and territorial governments. We will also be relying on active community support and guidance to ensure the program's success.
[Translation]
The Department of National Defence is also committed to supporting the Cadet program. We have produced a business plan for the Canadian Cadet Organization and the Cadets Instructors Cadre.
In recent years, we have worked hard at strengthening the Cadet movement, building new Cadet camps at CFB Valcartier and, starting this summer, at CFB Borden, as well as establishing a Cadet space course at CFB Saint-Jean. We are also looking into ways to increase the parade strength of the Cadets from 53 000 to 60 000.
[English]
So, Madam Chair, we're trying to get the number of cadets up to 60,000. This is an organization that is vital to the country.
[Translation]
I should underline that there is tremendous support for this movement in the province of Quebec. It is very encouraging because cadets, like other units of the Canadian Forces, are an asset for Canadian unity.
[English]
Last week I was in St. Stephen, New Brunswick, and I presided over the change of ceremony for the leadership of the cadets of three communities. There were 300 cadets, including the band from Dieppe just outside Moncton, and the local community was there in full force.
Madam Chair, that's what the cadet movement means to Canada, to small communities across the country, and to big communities like Toronto, where I'm from. But that can be said for the reserve units as well.
Finally, the special commission, this committee, and the Senate subcommittee on Veterans Affairs identified the need to conduct a complete costing of the reserves. We acknowledge that the current portrayal of expenditures in support of the reserves presented in part III of the estimates is not sufficiently clear in identifying specific expenditure elements. They also recognize that the relationship between expenditures that directly support the reserves and those that represent the fair distribution of departmental overhead is not readily apparent.
In order to address this lack of clarity, we have revised part III of the estimates for reporting of reserve expenditures. This new format will be in place for the 1997-98 estimates. It will provide more detail on those operating expenditures that are incurred in direct support of the reserve program and it will provide a distinction between the direct costs and those that represent a share of department overhead. This format was used recently to brief members of the reserve council and the special commission. It will also be used to brief members of the reserve community in the coming weeks.
If required, we would also be prepared to have an independent audit of our costing methodology carried out. Madam Chair, we have to have everybody comfortable. The members of this committee and the members of the reserve community must be comfortable on the costing data. If there needs to be clarification, if there needs to be an independent review, I've told reserve units that we are prepared to do that.
In conclusion, I'd like to say that we've made excellent progress in our efforts to improve the operational and cost effectiveness of the reserves, and the department and the Canadian forces will not relax those efforts. We wish to keep Parliament informed of all major developments.
We're on schedule and expect that full implementation of supported recommendations should be under way by this summer, and I hope they'll be in place by mid-1997.
As we move ahead, we will continue to consult with the reserve community. We appreciate their concerns and we will not stop listening. We view them as partners rather than adversaries.
Indeed, let's not forget that reserves and regulars are members of the same team. They have a common goal to produce a strong and efficient defence force to meet the challenges of the next century, and I'm sure if everyone works together, we will achieve that goal.
Thank you.
.1555
The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Minister. Your remarks were as cogent as I expected them to be. Now a number of our members would like to ask you questions. So I would remind you, gentlemen and lady on both sides, the five-minute rounds will commence with the government and with Mr. Bertrand.
I just would like to tell the member for Saint John that I've put your name on the list.
Mr. Bertrand.
Mr. Bertrand (Pontiac - Gatineau - Labelle): Merci beaucoup, madame le présidente.
Mr. Minister, it's nice of you to be here this afternoon.
The special commission found the supplementary reserves are valuable resources that have been neglected and need to be revitalized.
The commissioners argued that an updated and improved supplementary ready reserve, coupled with a mobilization plan, could ensure a smooth transition from peace to crisis.
You mentioned, Mr. Minister, that National Defence could not accept a special commission suggestion for updating the ready reserves and also the holding reserve list. However, in your remarks and in the documentation the committee just received, we also find the supplementary reserve will be reorganized and will complement the primary reserves.
Mr. Minister, could you tell the committee what the main goals of a reorganized supplementary reserve will be? Secondly, how will these goals be achieved? When can we expect this plan to be made public and implemented? Thirdly, the 1994 white paper called for zero funding to the SRR. Does the minister believe a restructured SRR might merit some extra funds?
Mr. Collenette: Madam Chair, in reply to Mr. Bertrand, the only point on which we disagree with the special commission is on the recommendation about compulsory re-entry from the regular force to the reserves that they came forward with. This is a force of compulsory service, or conscription, if you will, which is illegal in Canada. We do not have the legal basis to enforce this.
It's my view - and I'll let some of the people in uniform talk, especially the two regulars to my right - that many people in the armed forces, when they leave, do want to maintain their commitment and their linkage with the armed forces. So they would be ready to assist.
This is a relatively new planning development I've been discussing with officials. I hope to have more to say on this over the summer, certainly by September or October, when the House comes back. So when I come back again, we'll have a better idea for you. As to whether or not there will be cost implications, we'll have to get this information for you once we analyse this particular proposal and see how it is going to work.
In the 1994 budget, we did eliminate the $300 annual payment and, I believe, the free uniform. But that was very modest. We found we weren't really getting much for our $300. I think those people who want to be part of the supplementary reserve don't really need the money, but they may wish to keep the uniform or have some other kind of assistance with respect to equipment.
Perhaps the vice-chief would like to fill you in on that.
Vice-Admiral L.E. Murray (Vice-Chief of Defence Staff, Department of National Defence): Yes, sir.
In terms of the main goals of the supplementary reserve, they are transfers from both the primary reserve and the regular force. Effectively, the aim is to capitalize on the skills they can bring from their previous training and experience.
I think the real issue here, sir, is to capture in an adequate manner an up-to-date database. This is what we are striving to do in terms of the revitalization of the supplementary ready reserve in particular and then the holding reserve. At the moment, we actually have 47,000 names on the holding reserve and the supplementary. Twelve thousand of those are on the ready reserve. It will be our intention to both update the database in a computer system and then devolve it down to the command level, in fact as far down the system as we can, so these people are actually affiliated with a unit and with a role. We're working on that now.
.1600
We would hope to be in a position, as the minister said, to have this process updated by the summer of 1997 in line with the rest of the program.
In terms of funding, we have established some funding to the supplementary reserve. But we need to finalize the plans and then sort out what makes sense. At the moment, they will retain their uniforms. But it's really a question of breathing life back into this program. As a result of the special commission and other recommendations, this is what we're striving to do.
The Chair: Thank you. Monsieur Jacob, you have five minutes.
[Translation]
Mr. Jacob (Charlesbourg): Welcome, Mr. Minister, and officers.
I have listened closely to your presentation, where you mentioned that a majority of the recommendations made by the Special Commission, by the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs and by the Senate Sub-Committee have been accepted and that 25 of them have already been implemented.
My first question deals with the costs of the Reserve. Towards the end of your presentation, you told us that stakeholders agree costs are not sufficiently clear and that it is difficult to identify specific elements and that a new format would be in place for the 1997-98 Estimates.
But our committee recommended, with the support of the Bloc québécois to determine clearly and exactly how much the Reserves cost at the present time before proceeding with the recommendation of the special commission. You stated earlier that you would start the implementation during the summer, without knowing the precise cost of the Reserves.
The third recommendation of the committee suggested an impact study in order to determine the cost and the implications of the recommendations of the special commission, before proceeding with their implementation.
During our discussions following the special commission's report, everybody agreed that implementation shouldn't proceed until we have a clear idea of the present and future costs of these recommendations. I would like you to explain why you are proceeding with implementation without really knowing the present costs and the future cost impacts.
Mr. Collenette: I appreciate your question and I want to stress that in the last couple of months we have undertaken an analysis of all costs of the Reserves. National Defence Headquarters has finished this study and concluded that we can proceed with the changes and implementation of our plan.
The Reserves community and members of this committee can rest assured that present costs are both accurate and justified. I mentioned earlier that if, following the briefings one of our soldiers in our departmental Finance Section is presently giving throughout the country, doubts subsist as to the costing methodology used, we are prepared to have an independent audit carried out.
We are prepared to have an organization, maybe one chaired by the former Auditor General of Canada, to undertake an audit.
.1605
The Department has done its own costing analysis. It has identified the costs and will be able to have the new format in place for next years' Estimates. If the Reserves community and this committee are not satisfied with the results, we will be prepared to have an independent audit carried out.
Mr. Jacob: In this audit, did the Department of National Defence also look at the impact of the changes and of the recommandations of the special commission? What will be the impact of implementing these recommendations on the budget of the Reserves?
Mr. Collenette: Yes, we have looked at the overall impact but it has been impossible to cost the total impact because we still need to determine the training needs throughout the country as well as the exact number of brigades, units and armouries the Department will maintain. The Chief of Reserves and Cadets has given me assurances that he'll be able to provide the final costing data sometime in the summer, in July or August.
My statement today is not the last word on the matter; it is only a first step towards a solution. It will be followed this summer by discussions between the Canadian Forces and members of the Reserves throughout the country. I will be happy to come back in the fall to brief you about precise costs.
[English]
The Chair: I think your time is up. We can come back to you, as there will be another round.
Mr. O'Reilly.
Mr. O'Reilly (Victoria - Haliburton): Thank you, Madam Chair.
Thank you, Mr. Minister, for attending. I noticed during your speech that you used one of my favourite words. I guess I have to come back to that.
I think everyone around the table agrees that the reservists represent a vital link between our armed forces and the rest of Canadian society. When our committee reviewed the special commission report, I expressed my concern that the reorganization of the reserves didn't just leave a footprint in many rural communities, as has happened in the past. We had some fun with that word, because I consider a footprint to be something that you leave when you've left. It therefore became a point that we all agreed upon: we wanted to eliminate that word, but not eliminate the presence of the militia.
We all understand the need to improve efficiency and that some military units may not be viable in the long run, but for reservists who already have a sixty-minute drive from small communities to a parade or to a function, they take great pride in their militia units. I therefore wanted to ask the minister if he could give the committee some assurance that amalgamation and restructuring will not result in a disproportionate loss of units and their armouries for rural Canada. I'm talking about rural Canada because we've lost a lot of armouries there, and the plan appeared to have that component in it. Are there any specific steps being taken to consider the importance of maintaining a strong presence in rural areas?
My concern is that in the name of saving a few bucks, the Canadian forces may also lose a vital link to Canadian society. In the end, everyone on this committee is concerned that the Canadian forces have to leave more than just a footprint for Canadians.
Mr. Collenette: I'd say to Mr. O'Reilly, Madam Chair, that while we strive for perfection in this process, it will not be perfect. There will be reserve units and communities that are disappointed, but I want to keep that to a minimum.
In some cases, we are in rented accommodation. In some cases - most cases, I guess - we own our own facilities. In very many of those instances, the buildings are in a great state of disrepair. But I think the key question to be answered initially is what the brigade structure is. What makes sense operationally for the mobilization of our forces?
.1610
It's true that rural Canada does contribute a disproportionate number of reservists. I know that's true for rural Ontario, and especially for the Atlantic region. In fact, when I was in Saint John the other night, one of the honorary colonels said they contribute as many reservists in Atlantic Canada as there are in the western provinces. I didn't want to challenge that, and I know Mr. Frazer and Mr. Hart will be interested in that.
Mrs. Wayne (Saint John): That's very interesting.
Mr. Collenette: That's right, we were down there. In fact, I said nice things about you, Elsie. Unfortunately, no one heard them.
Some hon. members: Oh, oh!
Mr. Collenette: But I'm glad you're here today.
The Chair: What can I say? If a tree falls in the forest...
Mr. Collenette: It will not be perfect, but we will work with the local members of Parliament, because you have to live in those communities. This is not a political exercise; it is a military operational exercise, and in some cases members will have to help us sell the plan.
We hope to leave that footprint - you don't like to call it a footprint; I call it a footprint because my parliamentary secretary, Mr. Richardson, was formerly head of the reserves in Ontario and he never keeps quiet about it. I sometimes feel he has left footprints on me after some of the discussions, so I certainly have good advice right there.
Mr. O'Reilly: Thank you, Mr. Minister.
The only other two points that I wanted to make are that, in places like the small village of Fenelon Falls, for instance, a cadet unit is formed and it doesn't have an armoury, it doesn't have a place out of which to operate. It has, for instance, a training facility that may be provided by the Royal Canadian Legion. To look at the cadets... I've been trying to get an answer on how I could get a supply of the surplus band equipment that's around in case they want to form a band. I looked for a military sword, a sabre, a naval sword, for the cadet group in the village of Coboconk, which I know you drive through on the way to Haliburton. I've found some of the cadet corps are just not quite equipped in the way that they should be, and I wondered if that was going to be addressed.
Mr. Collenette: One of my colleagues may like to discuss the equipment in the reserves. I'm not familiar with the issue.
Mr. O'Reilly: In the cadet area.
Mr. Collenette: In the cadet area, yes.
VAdm Murray: I can't talk specifically about equipment. I can tell you - and I think the minister's speech alludes to this - about moving the cadet program to business planning this year, and also about protecting the cadet budget as a distinct budget. This is the first year in which we've done that, and I think it's about $93 million. It will take us a few years to work our way through it. The fundamental intent, however, is to ensure that money intended for the cadet program does make it to the cadets and, in the context of other rationalizations that we are doing, that we don't with the best of intentions somehow have an indirect impact on the cadet program.
I don't know whether the chief of reserves and cadets or DGRC would like to talk to the equipment issue specifically.
Colonel Luc Bujold (Director General, Reserves and Cadets, Department of National Defence): In order to understand the problem of equipment in the cadet corps, you have to understand that the cadet movement is a movement co-managed by the Canadian forces and the cadet leagues. Each cadet corps also has a civilian sponsoring body. All cadet corps and all cadets get from us exactly the same amount of equipment. What you see in some cadet corps that you don't find in others is paid for by their sponsoring body. The richer the sponsoring body, the more flamboyant the cadet corps will look, and that's where you find some of the biggest discrepancies. But we provide the same set of equipment to all cadet corps.
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. O'Reilly.
Mr. Collenette: I'd just like to say, Madam Chair, that I know Mr. O'Reilly's riding quite well. I know many of those small communities. It's a lovely part of the country, and I'll make special note as we go through this in the next few months.
The Chair: Hear, hear! And maybe the committee should decide whether or not Mr. O'Reilly should have a sword.
Mr. O'Reilly: I don't want it.
The Chair: Mr. Hart.
Mr. Hart (Okanagan - Similkameen - Merritt): Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Welcome, Mr. Minister. I asked you a question in the House of Commons today regarding $250,000 that was spent for a retirement parade and party.
The Chair: Excuse me, Mr. Hart, but the -
Mr. Hart: This is directly related to the reserves.
The Chair: Well, then, get to the reserves, Mr. Hart. Thank you.
.1615
Mr. Hart: Madam Chairman, it is pertinent to the question of reserves because we are talking about increased efficiency and cost effectiveness. The special commission on the restructuring of the reserves mentioned that we want to stove-pipe the funds, to make sure they get to the armouries' floors, and to make sure that our reservists are getting the training they require, with the funds that are available.
When we see something like this $250,000 being spent on a parade, it makes many people - and I imagine reservists too - wonder what commitment this government has to making sure funds are spent in an appropriate manner.
Could the minister elaborate on what he said today and offer some assurance to reservists and to the Canadian Armed Forces that that money will be stove-piped - the term that was used - to make sure we get the adequate training and the equipment that's required to maintain a reserve force in this country?
Mr. Collenette: Obviously, it's very important to make sure that the money we allocate is spent properly, generally throughout the forces and especially in terms of the reserve.
On the specific example, I answered that in Question Period, and it really is not directly germane to the latter part of Mr. Hart's question, which is about making sure that money gets to the armoury floor.
I think there has been too much money that seems to just seep away and not get to the armouries. One way we can correct this is by changing our way of doing business, by changing the way Treasury Board and National Defence administer the moneys, and by giving the local militia units more control over the management and administration of the armouries so there can be efficiencies.
I mentioned in my speech that when I went to Cornwall I was really impressed, because they came up with savings of about $250,000, I believe. That's about 40% or 50% of the budget in that particular community. The plan was put together by a foundation the militia there organized.
So I think a combination of greater latitude in the rules of National Defence and innovation by the local units can achieve the objective that Mr. Hart and everybody wishes for.
Mr. Hart: We've heard a little bit about the money that is supposed to be getting to cadet units, for instance, and I'll give you an example. In the Pacific region, we have now heard that the actual dollar amount that's going to be allocated to cadets in the Pacific region is less, although the white paper says you've increased the commitment to cadets. Is there a new formula for funding that would prevent the reduction of the number of dollars going to cadets in the Pacific region?
Mr. Collenette: I think Mr. Hart has to appreciate - and I'm sure he does, because his party has been at the forefront in talking about deficit reduction - that all institutions, and certainly the Canadian forces, have had to undergo reductions in budgets. In some cases, it means you have to do with less, or at least do more with less funds. What I am concerned about is ensuring that the cadet movement grows, that it is modestly increased. If we could have the funds to increase it on a large scale, I would do that, but I think this is certainly the first step.
On the specifics with respect to the Pacific region, I think Vice-Admiral Murray can answer that.
VAdm Murray: Yes, Madam Chairman. A minute ago, I mentioned the movement towards business planning and a separate operating budget for cadets. This year, at the moment, it would be $93 million, direct to cadets. You will appreciate that going from quite a different system to that system has wrinkles with it that will take us a few years to work out.
Quite frankly, we believe that the direct funding to cadets was previously about $65 million, because of the difference between what cadet units and corps across the country got indirectly from bases, commands, and that sort of thing. We tried to square that in the $93-million figure, and we are getting inputs from each of the regions and from the northern region to come to grips with this issue, so that over the next few years we turn this into what it is intended to be, direct funding to the cadets that is not accessible for other purposes.
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It's really a question of adjusting from a very indirect funding process to a direct funding process and trying to capture what were indirect costs in the west, where CFB Esquimalt probably provided buses and that sort of thing, which weren't visible. In terms of the Pacific region as well as the other regions, we are getting those inputs in for this year. We're wrestling with them and adjusting them to try to ensure that this thing moves forward in a sensible manner.
Mr. Hart: Is there a funding formula, though? Apparently they have received less money than they received in the last budget year in the Pacific region.
VAdm Murray: In a direct sense, we believe they did better. Their feedback would indicate that they didn't. What we're trying to square now is the difference between what they received directly and indirectly. Clearly the intent is to ensure that this thing starts off sensibly, so we're taking those inputs and trying to bring that to something that's reasonable. It's not just in the Pacific region; there are ups and downs across the country. Certainly we will not do anything that would adversely affect cadet programs in the Pacific region or anywhere else as we work our way into this process.
I think the leagues in two annual meetings have strongly supported what we're trying to do here. It's just a question of working our way through the wrinkles, not just in the cadet program, but actually throughout the institution, as we re-engineer, restructure, and get the funds down to a level where people can make the most sensible decisions.
I don't know whether the DGRC wants to say anything else on the specifics.
Col Bujold: The answer to your question is yes, there is a new funding formula. What we are now doing is trying to even out $1 going to a cadet in Halifax and $1 going to a cadet in Victoria. When we looked at it in last year's budget, we did not have an even distribution of money per capita. What has happened is that in doing it on a per-capita basis, certain factors were dropped, like the number of national camps in a given region, for instance, which is one of the problems we have in B.C. As the admiral said, we have given ourselves a two-year period to iron it out.
Mr. Collenette: Are you saying, Colonel, that the west has been getting more than their fair share?
Col Bujold: I didn't say that, but yes.
Mr. Collenette: The west is getting more than their fair share, and I know Mr. Hart andMr. Frazer would certainly want to be fair to all regions of Canada.
The Chair: Particularly for the chair's riding.
Thank you, Mr. Minister and Mr. Hart.
Mr. Cannis.
Mr. Cannis (Scarborough Centre): Thank you, Madam Chair.
Minister, welcome. Let me say I thoroughly enjoyed your presentation. Welcome to the officers as well.
Minister, as you are well aware, the concept at the core of your regular army's reserve force is mobilization. This holds true even though the ongoing role of the reserves right now is augmentation. When this committee reviewed the special commission's report, we took note that the militia in particular needs restructuring to meet the needs of national mobilization. At the same time, the commission indicated that the overall mobilization plan itself needed some work.
Minister, starting from the 1994 white paper, can you please tell the committee what are the parameters from the new mobilization plan that is being put in place, including when that plan will be finalized, and within that new plan what the 1994 white paper referred to as stages three and four of mobilization? Can you please indicate what will be the specific tasking that has been defined for the reserves?
Mr. Collenette: That's a very good question. I think General de Faye is probably a better person to answer that.
Major-General T.F. de Faye (Chief, Force Development, Department of National Defence): Thank you, Minister and Madam Chair.
As you said, sir, the 1994 white paper was rather seminal in that for the first time in decades, it actually set out a mobilization plan for the Canadian forces. Following the issuance of the white paper, the staff began work on the four stages of mobilization that were set out in that document, those being force generation, force enhancement, force expansion, and national mobilization. That process was temporarily suspended while the standing committee on the restructure of the reserves undertook its important work. In fact, we have now been given approval to continue this mobilization planning process.
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In terms of tasking for the reserve, we envisage that each reserve unit in Canada, as a part of the mobilization planning process, will be given specific tasks that will relate to the four stages of mobilization.
This way we expect to be able to bring a very sharp focus to the training programs and a very sharp focus to exactly where Canada needs to go at various stages of mobilization should events causing that to happen occur.
Mr. Cannis: Thank you, Madam Chair.
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Cannis. Monsieur Leroux.
[Translation]
Mr. Leroux (Shefford): Mr. Minister, you said in your presentation that you rejected two of the commissions' recommendations. Could you tell us why you feel that job protection for the Reservists is not important to you?
What is the second recommendation you rejected? I would like you to tell us what incentives might encourage government employees at various levels of government to join the Reserves? How would you encourage more people in the private sector to join?
Mr. Collenette: I have been told that it would be difficult to implement a job protection system in Canada as the commission recommended, since manpower and labour are exclusively under provincial jurisdiction. I believe, and I stand to be corrected, that it would require legislation in each of the provinces and at the federal level. You know how difficult it is to amend the Canadian Constitution and to have legislation passed in every province. There is a risk that some employers might discriminate against Reservists. If I inform my employer that I'm a Reservist and that the law requires him to give me two or four weeks off for training every year, he might want to discriminate against me and ask me to resign. It is a form of discrimination. We prefer a voluntary system where the private sector is encouraged to make arrangements to accommodate Reservists. The Canadian Forces Liaison Council, which is chaired by Mr. John Craig Eaton, president of Eaton's of Canada Ltd, is getting lots of support from other employers and industry representatives. He is one of the volunteers trying to encourage companies to allow weeks off for training. We might increase funding for this Council in order to expand the programs of this Council.
Mr. Leroux: What is the second recommendations you didn't agree with?
Mr. Collenette: I will ask Vice Admiral Murray to answer.
Vadm Murray: The second recommendation we didn't accept is the one that was already discussed regarding the compulsory transfer of members of the Primary Reserve and of the regular forces to the Supplementary Reserve. The issue is again a legal one; it is a matter of Canadian law. There can be no compulsory military service.
Mr. Leroux: I remember that this was a very important issue during our discussions. There was a consensus on both sides of the House, of the Liberal Party and the Bloc québécois.
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This is a major element of the reform that is being dropped because you're unable to find ways to make it acceptable and feasible. I believe these are interesting elements and that young people who would be interested to join the Reserves and to serve will not be able to do so because their employer or their boss won't give them a leave. This is a major dimension, in our view, that you seem to be setting aside.
Mr. Collenette: Do you suggest, Mr. Leroux, that the federal government should impose a national regime throughout the country?
Mr. Leroux: Mr. Minister, I think the federal government should hold discussions in order to find a consensus acceptable to all, don't you think?
Mr. Collenette: Yes, but as I said, it is difficult in the context of federal provincial relations to reach an agreement with all provinces of this country on this issue.
Mr. Leroux: It would probably be easier with some provinces than with others.
Mr. Collenette: Can you name a few?
Mr. Leroux: Ontario, for instance; since it's your province, it should be easy for you, as a minister, to discuss -
Mr. Collenette: How about Quebec?
Mr. Leroux: It would seem possible to me to do something on such a major issue. I'm told there is already some kind of agreement with the New Brunswick public service. I think it would be worthwhile for the Canadian forces to think further about this in order to find ways and means.
Mr. Collenette: Maybe I should suggest to the Prime Minister to raise this issue at the constitutional conference in the framework of the discussions on manpower jurisdiction. Maybe he could reach agreement with the provinces. They might be willing to trade one for the other. It's an intriguing idea.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you. Perhaps, Mr. Minister, the Government of Quebec might indeed want to cede that particular power back to the federal government.
Mr. Wood.
Mr. Wood (Nipissing): Thank you, Madam Chair.
Mr. Minister, for the past couple of years, many companies and government departments have saved costs by outsourcing work to other firms and individuals.
It has been suggested by some of the witnesses before this committee that the reserves could be used as an outsource for the regular force. I think the reservists make 55% of what a regular soldier makes. So, for example, if they perform certain tasks that a regular soldier does, the reservists could handle outsourcing, as has been suggested, for such areas as transportation, medical services, logistics, communication and recruitment. Money could be saved.
Mr. Minister, how do you feel about outsourcing services to the reserves, and how do you think this would be perceived by or accepted by the regular force?
Mr. Collenette: I found the regular force quite innovative and adaptable to certain changes. This is perhaps something that could be done upon occasion. We don't rule it out, but perhaps one of my friends would like to...
VAdm Murray: I can begin, and then maybe General Linden, who is a reservist himself, might wish to say a few words.
In the context of all three services, I think, we have moved a long way. Indeed, significant numbers of the troops that have served in peacekeeping missions in the last few years have been reservists. In the case of the navy, the maritime coastal patrol vessels are being manned virtually entirely - and quite successfully - by reservists.
So we are moving on this. The air force is doing it on the air engineering side and on the air crew side, so I think we're trying to move in that direction as quickly as we can.
I would like to use this opportunity to indicate the only other clarification. You mentioned 55% of the regular pay. One of the recommendations of the special commission was that we do implement the recommendation to get reserve pay and benefits up to 85% of the regular pay. The minister has directed us to do that as quickly as we can, and we're moving on that one. Rick may want to talk to the other issues.
Major-General E.W. Linden (Chief, Reserves and Cadets, Department of National Defence and Veterans Affairs): I have just one additional point. One of the recommendations of the report of the special commission on the reserves, which has been adopted by the minister and the department, is that the regular force should first attempt to meet its specialist needs by considering the availability of such individuals from the reserves and hire reservists rather than civilians. So in fact that is one of the thrusts we're adopting.
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It has long been a policy to try to have reservists do things where it makes economic sense to do so. I think the only thing preventing it from going farther is the fact that one does need a critical mass of regular force people, who are now down to 60,000, because you have to have a fighting force ready to go at a few moments' notice. There's a danger in contracting out too much from the military, because you simply have to keep that core capability there. Other than that, we're moving to reservists as broadly as we can.
Mr. Wood: Mr. Minister, many witnesses have expressed frustration with the administration of the reserves, such as long delays in receiving reserve pay, complex recruitment requirements and forms to fill out, and an excess of headquarters personnel at the expense of the reserve soldier. Can you outline how you plan to address these concerns and recommendations?
Mr. Collenette: I'll leave that largely for the vice-chief and General de Faye, but in my speech you'll see we have agreed to reduce, as we're doing with the regular force, headquarters personnel; the heavy administrative layer. We will be working on that.
Obviously the final solutions to these problems, now that we've made the announcement, made it public, and we can work with the reserve units openly, will not be arrived at fully until later in the summer. We'll probably be able to answer your question more specifically in September. But Admiral Murray may have something on that.
VAdm Murray: Suffice it to say that has been a concern of many of the witnesses the special commission heard, this committee did, and so on. It's a fair criticism. Pay is one issue, but I think all of them are accurate, and we're coming to grips with that as quickly as we can.
In the pay area, there was a particular concern in Atlantic Canada because of a system that was set up there to automate and improve the reserve pay and didn't. That system will be fixed by this summer. In fact, the minister and the chief have given very clear direction on that. Once that system is fixed, we hope to migrate that across the country, to have a better system across the country until 1998, when regular and reserve pay will actually be done in much the same way, using the same systems. In administration pay and all those areas that's the direction we're heading in, to true total force, so if pay is screwed up, it's screwed up just as badly for everyone and not just reservists.
But it is a fair criticism. We're moving on it. As we come back and report update on this, that is an area where you should hold our feet to the fire, quite frankly.
Mr. Collenette: I have cracked the whip on that internally. I was told the new software is coming in on the pay. But as Admiral Murray says, if we don't have our house in order by the end of the summer we're going to have to do something quite radical, because it's not acceptable for volunteers to be jerked around with payment. It's something we just can't accept.
Madam Chair, I notice General Belzile is here in the audience today. I know everyone appreciates the great work he and Justice Dickson and Professor Granatstein did.
The Chair: General Belzile.
Mr. Frazer.
Mr. Frazer (Saanich - Gulf Islands): One of the absolutely agreed commitments made by the commissions, whichever ones they were, was the requirement for identification of the costs of the reserve, Mr. Minister. You mentioned to us in your address that in fact there is a new reporting procedure and this will better identify it. You offer in the closing stages that you're prepared to have an independent audit of our costing methodology. This is such an important item, that we do accurately recover the costs of the reserve. Have you considered doing that now, before the system is actually in, to see if there are any glitches in it that might be covered before they actually occur?
Mr. Collenette: We hope the reserve community will accept the costing methodology developed by the department and the improvements that have been made in recent months. As I said earlier, one of the people from the finance section at Defence is now meeting with the reserves. I know they've met with the people in Toronto. I think they're going out west.
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We could have a special briefing on this for the members of this committee. Then, if there's no satisfaction and if there are questions unanswered, we can certainly bring in an outside group such as the bureau of comprehensive audit - I think it's called that - which is run by the former Auditor General, Ken Dye. It could be a non-profit outfit like that. So we don't have to go through any tendering process, which would take ages to go through. We can get a volunteer group, a non-profit foundation, to do the work and satisfy everybody that the costing methodology is appropriate.
Mr. Frazer: I don't know about you, Madam Chair, but I would certainly support such an offer or taking up such an offer if the committee was for it.
The Chair: Absolutely. I'll ask the clerk to take note. Thank you, Mr. Frazer.
Mr. Frazer: I don't know how much attention you paid to the minority report that we submitted, but in an effort to involve this committee more directly - that means to get some more parliamentary involvement in the department - we recommended in our third recommendation that the production of a thorough cost analysis for the reserves be made a priority for DND and that this must be presented to SCONDVA before any reductions in the size and budget of the primary reserve force took place. Have you considered this and would you be willing to let this committee become more involved in defence department proceedings?
Mr. Collenette: Madam Chair, we have accepted many of the recommendations that were put forward by this committee and also some that were put forward in the minority report. Some, like the structure or number of brigades, are things that have to be determined. So I think that we've certainly been guided by the minority report, as well as the main report.
What Mr. Frazer is really asking is not something that is really a part of our system of governance with the fact that the department has to run its affairs, while the parliamentarians set policy and make suggestions. The committee itself is not charged with the administration of policy; the government is so charged, and the minister is responsible for that.
But what I've said is that we are certainly prepared to have this costing done if the reserve community feels dissatisfied with the information they're getting now. The problem we have is that we're not going to put everything on hold, as we have to deal with this issue.
Most of the changes in the budget affecting defence were dealt with in 1994 and 1995. We have deliberately postponed decisions on the reserves precisely to get the kind of input we've had through the hearings, the commission, the parliamentary committee, and public debate.
Everybody has had letters written to them by their communities. I think we've fostered a very good national debate, and I think we're responding to that.
To, in effect, put it on hold while we go through a long costing process I don't think would be the right way to go. I think what we have to do is get the reserve community to buy in - we won't get them all to buy in to the cost - and realize that we're not trying to pull the wool over anyone's eyes.
If an independent assessment is helpful, then we'll do that. If you want the officials back to talk about costs, they'll come back.
Mr. Frazer: Mr. Minister, my concern was that once a unit is disbanded, it's very difficult to reconstruct it and get it back. If this is done on erroneous information that later reveals a mistake was made... You said that it would be necessary to get away from politics and deal with individual members of Parliament with regard to units and organizations within their areas. It strikes me that to proceed blithely down the path without having accurate information on exactly what we're doing may be doing a disservice to the reserve force.
Mr. Collenette: I think the way we have to approach this is that members of Parliament should be in touch with their local militia units and lobby on their behalf, as Bob Kilger did in Cornwall. He got me down there. I was exposed first-hand to their costing analysis. I think that's the way we have to go.
I don't think this committee as such, with great respect to the members here, can be the implementing committee, as that's the responsibility of the department under my direction. I have to be the one who is held accountable.
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What I'm concerned about is getting the right input, whether it's from MPs or obviously the militia units.
Mr. Frazer: Are you going to get John O'Reilly his sabre, Mr. Minister?
Mr. Collenette: It might be easier to give him a sabre than keep an armoury.
Mr. Frazer: I have one last question, if I may. You mentioned that the raison d'être of the reserves is mobilization, but you didn't really get into explaining how the reserves will be involved in this mobilization process. Will there be a permanent reserve cell in NDHQ that will be responsible for either doing this or contributing to it? What involvement do you see for the reserves in this aspect?
The Chair: General de Faye will answer that one.
MGen de Faye: We see the planning taking place in the army, navy and air force to define exactly what the reserve units will be doing at each specific stage of mobilization. As I mentioned a moment ago, there are four stages of mobilization. With the level of the regular force we have today, as a result of the fairly tight fiscal envelope we have to operate in, as has been emphasized many times, we're very reliant on reserve forces.
The first phase of mobilization is almost a continuing process for us. By the first phase of mobilization, I mean the ability to bring a reservist onto a mission for United Nations service in the army, navy or air force.
For example, my experience in western Canada for three years was that we sent 4,500 soldiers on UN duties, of which 1,000 were reservists. We proved the concept of force generation. That is the reality of today.
We move from there to force enhancement, which is a slightly more robust form of providing individuals.
We then get to the third stage, which is force expansion. This is where you will actually bring up formed elements of the reserve from the reserve order of battle onto the regular order of battle in order to perform a specific task.
I will give you an example. For instance, we have total force air defence units that are manned by regulars and reservists. In times of tension, it would be conceivable that those units would have to be brought to full-service status in order to meet a threat, such as to protect an airfield or be deployed to the field. That is the third stage of mobilization.
The fourth stage, of course, is national mobilization. We would bring all of the reserves to active status. They would fit into formations that have been devised in the planning process for the army, navy and air force for the various tasks that will be precisely defined by the capability components of those elements.
We see that a tremendous amount of work is necessary to do this, but I assure you, Madam Chair, we are prepared to take this on and give the precision that Mr. Frazer is obviously interested in seeing us achieve.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
Just before I call on Mrs. Wayne, I want to say that I think it's too bad that other members of this committee couldn't have been present along with me and well over a thousand people from Halifax and tourists who saw the change-of-command ceremony of Land Force Atlantic last summer. We watched the service strut their stuff and saw the way, in particular school children and others, were brought in to see what was going on and what our reservists were doing. It was really a tremendous experience. Perhaps next time the committee might take advantage of that.
Mrs. Wayne: Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
I have to say, Mr. Minister, that I'm one of those who very strongly supports the reserves, as well as the cadets. I'm wondering if you have a program whereby you're looking at cutting back on the number of reserves and you can monitor the impact of that in the community.
I say that because the young people of today, when you take them and have them in the cadets or reserves, are away and off the streets. They have comradeship and discipline and respect is taught to them. They are totally different people when they are there.
I have major concerns for a city like my own where we have high unemployment and a lot of lost young people. When I see them on the street, I would like to be able to direct them to join the cadets or be part and parcel of the system.
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Do you have a program to monitor this? I know you have to cut because of the budget, but is it going to have a negative impact on the communities where you have to cut? I am hoping my armouries and the new HMCS Brunswicker are going to remain there and open. They play a major role in the community. I am wondering if you have something planned to monitor that.
Mr. Collenette: The first thing I should say - and I'm surprised the members haven't really zeroed in on it - is that we today have announced a fundamental change from the 1994 white paper where we were talking about a paid strength of 23,000. We are now talking about that paid strength being increased, and with all the efficiencies, having about 30,000 people in the reserves. In specific answer to your question, that means more and not less in terms of the number of young people or people generally in the reserves. If we had gone the original white paper route, we certainly would have had to cut back more.
That doesn't mean that every armoury is going to be kept. It may mean that some units will have different formations, and perhaps General de Faye can expand on this. Some communities just may not be able to sustain a company; they may only be able to sustain a platoon. There may be some units that will not be able to parade anyone and will just be kept on the order of battle. That means that the unit still exists and can be there for mobilization, but it really doesn't have any militia activity.
You could ask what good that does in the context of your question. It doesn't really address your question, but it does at least preserve the institution and the tradition in those communities. If you're not going to parade anyone, it makes it tougher for a community to justify keeping an armoury open. The communities are going to have to get involved with the local militia units to try to make sure that revenues are generated to keep these facilities going.
I don't know, General de Faye, if you want to talk about that kind of concept.
We are not going to promise you a panacea here. We're not going to come here and mislead you. There will be changes and things won't necessarily be the way they were, but under the thinking that was planned earlier, we were looking at whole communities, whole units being thrown to the wolves. We are trying not to do that. We are trying through the brigade structure to keep units. In some cases they will be smaller in certain communities. In other cases they will be big.
A young fellow told me on the weekend when I was doing the army cadet parade here that there are 300 in the Cameron Highlanders in Ottawa. I don't know whether he was bang on, but that's pretty big. A city like Ottawa can maintain that. I was in Saint John the other night and there must have been at least 200 or 250 there, largely from the militia and a few from the naval unit. That's a pretty good size for a community like Saint John. Not all communities can support that and it won't necessarily make operational sense.
MGen de Faye: Madam Chairman, there is no question about it - the land force staff who will be doing this detailed work are extremely sensitive to the traditions and importance of the reservists. We've recently had that reinforced by their operational participation. As the minister says, we have to strike a balance between the traditions and the links and the efficiencies we have to achieve in a very accountable framework.
The work in detail will be done in the land force staff. I am speaking with regard to the militia. I hope you will be reassured by the fact that the reserve adviser for the land forces, Brigadier-General Robie MacDonald, a former commander of the Land Force Atlantic area, carries that responsibility on behalf of the commander to bring those plans to the level of detail where they can be presented to the CDS.
I should also mention in terms of the process, without wanting to be drawn too far down, that these detailed plans are for presentation to the minister, for the minister's consideration before implementation. Of course we would be awaiting final approval, final instructions in that regard.
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Mr. Collenette: But before they get to me, they are going to be reflective not only of the planning done by land forces but also of the consultations and the work with the reserve units themselves.
In the last six months in Toronto, Major-General Stephenson, the commander of Land Forces Central, has been working with the reserve units. They've been particularly prickly there, and I'm sensitive to it since I'm from Toronto. I can tell you that there has been a change in attitude. They are working together cooperatively because they both have the same goal.
In some cases a consensus may not be able to be arrived at and then I'll have to take some tough decisions. But I can assure you that I will take decisions in the best interests of the forces and will not let politics get in the way.
Mrs. Wayne: I would just like to say that I'm also very pleased that you are looking at and doing something about the situation of the payment of our reservists. I had one man call me who had been waiting for six months for his pay cheque. You know, as you stated, that in the Atlantic region you really did have some problems. Thank you very much.
The Chair: Mr. Jacob.
[Translation]
Mr. Jacob: I'll be returning to my previous questions.
Recommendation 11 of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs proposed creating a committee composed of an equal number of commissioners, officers from the Regular Force and Reserve officers, with a member from the Auditor General's office, that would be tasked with evaluating impacts and supervising implementation.
In view of your statement, of your answers and of those of your officers, you seem to mainly have accepted the recommendations of the special commission. You didn't mention considering our recommendations nor intending to implement them soon, although our committee spent at least ten meetings going over the commission's report.
Did you consider recommendation 11 of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs and did you reject it or will it be accepted?
How about our recommendation 12 asking the Minister of National Defence to submit a written report on implementation of the recommendations of both the special commission and the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs?
Mr. Collenette: I think I already answered that question - maybe you were out of the room - on Mr. Frazer's question who referred to the same recommendation and asked for a costing analysis.
I said that the Department had done an analysis a few months ago and that we are presently providing explanations to Reserve units throughout the country. If the units are not satisfied with our format, I'm quite willing to ask for an independent evaluation of this program.
However, it is impossible to wait before proceeding with the restructuring; we need to make changes immediately.
I said that we did not only accepted the commissions' recommendations, but also those of this committee. The report we're presenting today is only a progress report; I will provide a written final report in the coming months.
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Mr. Jacob: That was not my question; Mr. Frazer talked about an impact study. I was here and I remember clearly. The Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs had suggested to set up an implementation committee composed of members of National Defence, of the Regular Force, of the Reserve Force as well as a member of the Auditor General's office. My question was specifically if you were considering setting up such a committee or if you reject the idea outright. I'm not asking about the financial impact as Mr. Frazer did in his supplementary to my question. We were asking at that time if, as per our recommendation, the Department or yourself would submit a written report on implementation to the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs.
Mr. Collenette: As I said, I'm undertaking to submit a written report on the recommendations of this committee. As for implementing recommendations, this is the government's responsibility. In the Canadian parliamentary tradition, it is the government's responsibility to implement policy.
I'm interested in getting advice from members of Parliament, from Reservists and members of the Regular Force. As Major-General de Faye told you, other recommendations on the future of the units will be forthcoming. I will make the final decisions in consultation with the officials.
So the short answer to your question is no.
Mr. Jacob: Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you. Merci, Mr. Jacob. Mr. Bertrand, please.
Mr. Bertrand: Does the Department agree with the suggestion to give a medal to Reservists for their voluntary service?
[English]
Mr. Collenette: Perhaps General Linden will answer this question for you.
MGen Linden: There was not much support among the reserve community. The medal for service in the forces is the Canadian forces decoration. Because it is a total force, most reservists want to wear the same decoration as the regulars. So this is one thing that would not have been well received by reservists and it was intended to be in their interests.
The Chair: Mr. Hart.
Mr. Hart: Thank you very much, Madam Chair. I just want to go over some of the numbers again to make sure I have it clear. The paid ceiling is going to be reduced by 25%, so there is going to be a reduction to the reserve.
Mr. Collenette: No, the paid ceiling is going to be increased from the 23,000 announced in the white paper. The precise paid ceiling will have to be worked out during the next few months. But the end result is, effectively, to have 30,000 people in the reserves. The 25% figure we talked about was for headquarters reductions for National Defence as a whole announced in the 1995 budget - correct me if I'm wrong, Admiral Murray - and this is what we're applying with respect to headquarters functions related to the reserves.
VAdm Murray: Actually, in terms of the headquarters reductions, the white paper targeted a 33% reduction by 1999 at higher level headquarters. We're striving internally to do better than this and get close to 50%. But this is separate from the reserve; it's really the headquarters infrastructure across the country.
Mr. Hart: Then what is the paid ceiling for the militia?
Mr. Collenette: The paid ceiling, as advertised and given to the special commission, was 14,500. Obviously, this is going to be closer to 20,000. When we come back we'll certainly be able to give you an exact figure.
The difference between the 23,000 paid ceiling, which may have resulted in 24,000 to 25,000 actual reservists, and the 30,000 is largely going to be up in the militia.
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Accurate figures will be given to you in the fall. I believe the key figure to emphasize is that we hope to be able to have a way with efficiencies and an increase in the paid ceiling to actually have a strength of 30,000 in the reserves.
Mr. Hart: The Auditor General has pointed out some deficiencies today in the Department of National Defence. My concern here is why we aren't, with a great degree of certainty, able to say exactly how many militia we need in order to meet our strategic commitments. Why aren't we able to do this?
Mr. Collenette: We are. We're saying we're going to have a total of 30,000. We're talking about a paid strength in the militia higher than the 14,500. It will be closer to 20,000. The exact figure will be made known to you. So I don't think there's any mystery to it.
We feel we have to increase the reserve because, with the declining numbers of the regular force, we will need to supplement the regular force. As has been said, perhaps 20% or 22% of many peacekeeping missions have been made up of reservists. Right now, we're not overly taxed with respect to peacekeeping because we only have about 750 in Haiti and 1,000 in Bosnia. But at one point, when we came into office, we were running into 3,500. So we assume this will be required in future as we take on other peacekeeping assignments. But we don't know what they are.
Mr. Hart: I believe Land Force Command has suggested the number they need is22,500 militia. So it seems we're still going to fall short of the number Land Force Command is saying we need.
Mr. Collenette: Well, I don't know. General de Faye, if you can confirm Land Force Command has said they need 22,500 - and we're talking about the paid ceiling - certainly it may very well mean an effective strength in excess of 20,000.
MGen de Faye: Sir, probably there have been a number of different figures quoted from different sources. But we're not at the point right now where we have received a detailed planning proposal from Land Force Command. In fact, the next staff action after this committee meeting is to issue the implementation directive to get on with this planning. We expect those detailed plans to be presented about the end of June.
One thing that will happen in terms of the specifics you're inquiring about is that the army will be moved onto a total army establishment model. We're obviously talking about the militia here rather than the army or navy because I think this is the largest part of the problem. So you'll know exactly and we'll know exactly what a militia unit should consist of in terms of positions by line and by rank for each militia unit. This fits into the overall mobilization plan I explained to your colleague Mr. Frazer a little bit earlier.
What you could find is that some of those line positions with the establishment could be restricted as they often are in regular units. But it's a very precise tool that is going to be available and is going to be developed by the army commander. When this plan is presented in detail, I think we'll be able to say with a great deal of precision just exactly what the requirements are.
I think, as you're probably aware, what does lead to some confusion in this area are the two terms ``paid ceiling'' and ``effective strength'', which you're obviously familiar with. To give you the extremes, you can have one person for 365 days or 365 people for one day, or you can saw it off anywhere in between. Of course, this saw-off has to be taken in terms of operational efficiency and what you want to achieve in training terms. If we give a specific operational task to a unit, we have to give the necessary number of training days to achieve the task and the specific standard that is set for that work in terms of battle task requirements.
I don't want to be drawn any further into this unless you wish more detail. But I assure you we are working hard to develop the precision you rightly point out is required.
Mr. Collenette: Madam Chair, if we are looking to get 30,000 operational, it's quite conceivable that there will be an excess, as I said earlier, of 20,000 in the militia. If that falls at 20,500, 21,000, 21,500 or 22,000, as General de Faye says, that has to be determined based on the consultations that will go on, but we couldn't really start the detailed planning and get the hard numbers without first doing you, the members of the committee, the courtesy of responding. We couldn't start going out there and consulting across the country. You would say ``What gives? We don't know what your plan is.''
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We've given you the plan. Now the consultations will start with the reserve community, and when we come back in September you'll know whether it's 20,000, 21,000 or 22,000.
The Chair: Mr. Minister, I thank you very much. We look forward to hearing, after the consultations with the reserve community, just where we will be going from there. We'll look forward to hearing that, I assume, in September.
Mr. Collenette: Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you very much, and I thank the members of the committee.
We are adjourned.