[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]
Thursday, March 6, 1997
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[English]
The Chairman: Order. Could everyone find their place at the table, please? We have a quorum, so we'll get the meeting under way.
I welcome everyone to the committee this morning, both those at the table and the others in the room. The business before the committee, and the primary and principal business of the committee over the next number of weeks, will be Bill C-72, an act to amend the Canadian Wheat Board Act.
Just to lay out to the committee and others the work plan of the committee as we see it now, the initial presentation will be given by Mr. Pickard, the parliamentary secretary, with the officials, today, followed next Tuesday by presentations from the Prairie Pools and the Canadian Federation of Agriculture. The following week, ten members of the committee will be travelling to western Canada. We will be going to five locations in western Canada over that five days: Winnipeg, Regina, Saskatoon, Calgary, and Grande Prairie.
There may be other witnesses who between now and then indicate that they wish to make a presentation before the committee, and if so, we will do our best to hear them following the return of the House in April. Then we will move into a period - whatever is required - for probably having the officials back for clarification and for further questions and comments from committee members. Then we will move into the normal procedure of clause-by-clause as we deal with the bill.
I need not point out the importance of this bill to everyone and to the industry - the industry we're all part of in different ways.
So over the next weeks we have a challenge and an opportunity ahead of us, as committee members and as participants in the industry. I trust and I know that we will all give it our best shot for the betterment of the industry.
With that, I again thank you for attending this morning.
I will call on Mr. Pickard, parliamentary secretary to the Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food, for his opening comments.
Welcome, Jerry.
Mr. Jerry Pickard (Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I would first like to introduce two gentlemen from the department who will be here to make a brief presentation and to answer questions with regard to Bill C-72: Howard Migie and Victor Jarjour.
We've been looking at the Canadian Wheat Board and it has been rather an interesting time. First, I would like to suggest that the Canadian Wheat Board has, over the last sixty years, served farmers in Canada extremely well. Over that sixty-year period, it's developed a reputation for top quality, for reliability, and for giving the best returns to Canadian farmers and Canadian industry that they could possibly get.
They certainly have been working in an environment that has been very positive. Over the last few years we've seen quite a change to that environment. We have greater competition with all our markets. There's no question about that. There are liberalized markets. There's no question that consumer demands are changing. Subsidization has been reduced in many ways. New technology has made a tremendous change, particularly in the biotechnology area. Value-added products are being developed all the time.
So today's grain sector is different from the grain sector that we've seen historically. However, in order to be competitive in that grain sector, we've had to be innovative, self-reliant, and responsive to those markets in order to remain competitive.
We know there's been a tremendous debate for several years about the Canadian Wheat Board and about problems that have been perceived and things that need to be done to change that system. The purpose of looking at the amendments coming forth in this bill are to act upon those suggestions, concerns, and difficulties, and upon the changes that have occurred in our system.
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There's no question we need to make certain, above all, that we still have that guarantee of a reliable, responsive service, and that single best selling is also a very important part of the bill. We must make certain that the industry is well positioned in the future to be competitive and to be a leading market industry as we have had in the past.
Before preparing the legislation several steps occurred. There were very extensive hearings, as all of you know. The minister appointed the Western Grain Marketing Panel. They had a tremendous amount of dialogue between the farm community and all the stakeholders within the industry itself. The panel has done an excellent job in trying to get information forward, and it is listening to everyone involved. Open hearings have been very clearly done. Without question it's been the most extensive consultation in the history of grain marketing, at least in the modern history of grain marketing here in Canada.
They had town hall meetings that went across Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta looking at opportunities, ideas that could be used. They certainly took a look at the current system and alternatives to the current system, which may make a better system in all. Twelve days were spent in hearings in Regina, Winnipeg, and Edmonton. During those 12 days, 69 briefs were presented. They also had written submissions from those who couldn't get to the marketing system. Some 78 written briefs were presented.
Minister Goodale heard the report from the Western Grain Marketing Commission last summer. He summarized their suggestions and put forth to the community itself a list of those suggestions and asked for comments to be returned. Those comments raised some 12,000 individual and group responses to the minister and the ministry. They went through those responses, looking very carefully at solutions that may provide a better direction for grain marketing. The result is what you see today in Bill C-72, and it's a compilation of putting together as many of the suggestions and recommendations as possible.
At this point I would like to turn the floor over to Howard and have him go through a brief background of what this bill is actually doing.
Howard.
Mr. Howard Migie (Director General, Adaptation and Grain Policy Directorate, Department of Agriculture and Agri-Food): Thank you very much, Mr. Pickard.
I'm pleased to have the opportunity to explain the reasoning behind Bill C-72. I don't plan on reviewing every clause in the bill right now, although we do have an expanded clause-by-clause that can be made available to the committee. I propose to deal with the three major components of the bill.
The first one, which people tend to call the governance issue, is the role of government and the role of producers in terms of the decision-making of the Canadian Wheat Board.
The second one revolves around the tools to provide more flexibility to the Canadian Wheat Board.
The third component relates to the mandate of the Canadian Wheat Board.
Turning first to the governance issue, currently the Canadian Wheat Board is a crown corporation and an agent of Her Majesty. The Government of Canada appoints the commissioners who are responsible for the management of the Canadian Wheat Board.
One thing that's been pointed out very clearly through all the discussions and debate is that farmers want more influence and control over decision-making of the Canadian Wheat Board. In order to do that, it's important that producers sit at the table where the decisions are being made and not simply as advisers to those who are making the decisions. In developing the governance structure that's in Bill C-72 it was important that the board of directors of the Canadian Wheat Board be a powerful board with decision-making authority and that there be a mechanism for farmers to select the majority of the members of that board of directors.
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One issue we faced in preparing Bill C-72 was how to retain the financial benefits that the Canadian Wheat Board now receives in large part for being a crown corporation and an agent of Her Majesty. It's not a question of the initial payment guarantee, because we provide an initial payment guarantee to the Ontario Wheat Producers' Marketing Board, for example. The Government of Canada does not have any involvement in the management or appointments to that board, although the value of the guarantee is much greater for the Canadian Wheat Board.
A second financial benefit is the guarantee behind the credit grain sales program, but even that is not tied that closely to the Canadian Wheat Board, being a crown corporation. The Export Development Corporation does offer similar benefits to other exporters, although no other group has a special credit program as does the Canadian Wheat Board. However, there is a third type of guarantee provided, which is very important to the Canadian Wheat Board. It's tied very closely to the Canadian Wheat Board, being a crown corporation and an agent of Her Majesty, and it occurs when the Canadian Wheat Board borrows funds. I might add that it's a very significant borrower for Canada. It has the authority to borrow more than $6 billion per year.
When the Canadian Wheat Board borrows funds as an agent of Her Majesty, the Canadian Wheat Board is essentially saying, we are Canada and we would like to borrow these funds. They don't have to really go any further than that. It's fully backed as if it was the Bank of Canada, the Department of Finance, or any other authorized body that's an agent of Canada.
In its recent issue of grain matters, the Canadian Wheat Board indicated that interest earnings in the 1995-96 crop year were in the order of $80 million. That's higher than normal, but it's a very substantial amount in any year. This ability to act as an agent of Her Majesty is something the Government of Canada does not offer any private corporation. It's provided to only a select number of crown corporations.
If we have one member of a board of directors who is not appointed by the Government of Canada, then the Canadian Wheat Board would no longer be a crown corporation. If we truly want to have a board of directors with a majority elected by farmers and have the board responsible for decision-making, it's not possible for the Canadian Wheat Board to remain a crown corporation or an agent of Her Majesty for the purpose of borrowing amounts of around $6 billion a year.
So the way in which this is addressed in Bill C-72 is that there are provisions in the bill whereby the borrowings of the Canadian Wheat Board are guaranteed by the Minister of Finance, once we go through a certain number of steps. These are the same steps that crown corporations like the Export Development Corporation need to follow. This is not offered to any body that is not a fully fledged crown corporation. Given the amount of funds involved in terms of borrowing and the benefit that farmers received from this provision, it was extremely critical that this be worked out in a satisfactory way. We think that has been achieved in Bill C-72.
The Canadian Wheat Board is essentially using the government's credit card. The question that comes up is that you may feel comfortable having a family member use your credit card; you have enough confidence in them, you know them well enough, and you let them use your credit card. But it's pretty rare that you would, for example, allow your next-door neighbour access to your credit card. In a way what we're doing in Bill C-72 is...even though the Canadian Wheat Board will be managed by a board of directors of which a majority will be selected by farmers, the Government of Canada is prepared to continue to provide a guarantee on all the borrowings of the Canadian Wheat Board, without any additional safeguards or steps than those normally applied to the current list of crown corporations.
In Bill C-72 the board of directors has the responsibility to, and I quote, ``direct and manage the business and affairs of the Corporation''. That is very similar to the language in the Canada Business Corporations Act, which would apply generally to most private corporations. We've added this section, and I quote, ``and it's for those purposes vested with all the powers of the Corporation'', which even strengthens the provision.
It's envisioned that there will be one year where the Canadian Wheat Board remains a crown corporation. After that year there would be an election process defined and some of the directors will be elected to the board by farmers. As a matter of policy, the government has stated that there will be a majority of farmers or farmer-elected members on the board of directors. A number of people have wanted the legislation to require that majority. Right now Bill C-72 enables it to take place, but it could be made specific. One thing that would have to be considered is how far to go in the legislation.
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Although there was strong support for election of directors, there has been very little discussion on exactly who can run for election, exactly how many members of the board would be up for election, or whether there would be electoral boundaries by province or not. None of this was developed in terms of the Western Grain Marketing Panel or the debates at that time.
There are a lot of details that haven't been worked out, and it was envisioned that would be one task for the interim board of directors. Bill C-72 provides for the election rules to be put in regulations, and then the board of directors would conduct the elections.
In addition to the substantial financial guarantees that the government provides to the Canadian Wheat Board, there are a couple of other very important reasons why the Canadian government needs to have some involvement with respect to the management and direction of the board.
One is the control the Canadian Wheat Board has over export licences across Canada. If we're going to have a board of directors that is managed by farmer-elected directors from the prairies and yet have a Canadian Wheat Board that has control over export licences outside the prairie region, then it's important to have some federal government involvement.
In the Canadian Wheat Board Act there is currently a provision where the Governor in Council can give direction to the Canadian Wheat Board, and that provision is retained in Bill C-72. It is something that has been used rarely. To my knowledge, it has only been used twice in the last 20 years. One was in connection with an embargo on exports to the former Soviet Union, a situation where it may not be in the interest of prairie farmers but there was some overriding government interest at stake. The second occasion was with respect to ordering the board to provide an export licence for barley in Ontario in one instance in the early 1980s.
The authority to control exports is clearly an important power that the Canadian Wheat Board has. It's not a power that the government normally delegates to private enterprises or to enterprises where the board of directors is controlled by the private sector, which is what the Canadian Wheat Board would be once it becomes a mixed enterprise. Therefore it is important that the government retain some authority or influence, if necessary, with respect to the export licences.
Another concern taken into account was the responsibility the minister has to Parliament with respect to the Canadian Wheat Board. Since the minister is responsible to Parliament for the actions of the Canadian Wheat Board, there is a desire to have the ability to have some influence over that operation. It is important that the minister be informed, be provided with advice, so that when an issue comes up such as the one we have right now in terms of problems moving wheat and barley to port position, the Canadian Wheat Board will provide the minister with information so that he can fulfil his responsibilities to Parliament to answer questions that may be raised.
Despite all of these reasons for some government involvement, the arguments for producers having control over the operations were so overwhelming that it was felt the board of directors should have strong powers and the board of directors should not be under the control of the government. Therefore, in Bill C-72 the government only appoints a minority of the board members. It does appoint the chairman of the board as well as the president and CEO, but it's clearly expected that the Canadian Wheat Board, in terms of how it exercises its power and in terms of its marketing effort, is going to be independent of government to a very large extent.
I know I have focused remarks so far on why the government needs to have a role, because I know you'll hear from many other witnesses the reasons why it's important that producers have a much greater role than they have had in the past or have currently. That is well recognized in C-72. We felt the best way to do that was to have a majority elected by producers on that board of directors and give the board of directors the same type of responsibilities that would exist in a private corporate setting.
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There are three specific governance provisions in C-72 that I wish to highlight, because to some degree there has been some misinterpretation of the intent of those provisions.
The first is the provision regarding removal of elected directors. There is a provision in C-72 that provides for regulations respecting the removal of elected directors. It's intended that the regulations would specify that the removal would be for cause. If, for example, an elected director felt that any information he or she received as a director should be made public, including information that is commercially sensitive, then the board of directors could not function properly. There would have to be some process to remove an elected director. There is clearly a process for any of the appointed directors, because they're clearly at pleasure.
A second provisions states that directors, officers, and employees shall comply with any directions given pursuant to this act. As I mentioned earlier, the current Canadian Wheat Board Act provides for the Governor in Council to give directions to the Canadian Wheat Board. It's something very rare, but the directors would be obliged to implement those directions even if they felt it was not in the interest of wheat and barley producers. It was felt that since the directors didn't make the decision, it seemed reasonable to specify that they shouldn't be accountable for any consequences for implementing that type of decision, such as a grain embargo, and really, it is the government of the day that would be accountable for that type of decision.
The third and last governance provisions I wish to highlight are those related to liability limits and indemnification of directors, officers, or employees. It's important to attract good people to work for the Canadian Wheat Board, and therefore these provisions provide liability limits and indemnification to individuals at the Canadian Wheat Board similar to what would be provided to crown corporations or to private corporations under the Canada Business Corporations Act. In fact, the wording in this bill is virtually identical to subsections 122(1) and (2) and subsection 123(4) of the Canada Business Corporations Act.
Mr. Chairman, I'll turn to the second major component of Bill C-72, which relates to the tools for flexibility. The bill provides a number of tools to make the Canadian Wheat Board more flexible in its operations. The Western Grain Marketing Panel made 13 recommendations regarding governance and flexibility for the Canadian Wheat Board. Bill C-72 allows all five of the recommendations on governance I have just talked about to be implemented, as well as all eight of the recommendations on flexibility.
The more important recommendations that would make the Canadian Wheat Board more flexible are the following, which are straight from the panel report: permitting the CWB to make cash purchases; permitting the CWB to purchase grain from other than an elevator or rail car or from other origins; allowing for pool accounts to be terminated and paid out at any time following closure of the pool; and allowing for the assignment of negotiable producer certificates.
The thirteenth recommendation the panel made has only been implemented partially in Bill C-72. The panel recommended that a mechanism be established that would make it possible for the Canadian Wheat Board to begin development of a capital base. In Bill C-72 there is a contingency fund that has similarities to a capital base, but it's not quite identical. The contingency fund relates to two of the powers: the cash trading one, and there's a provision that adjustments to initial payments would no longer be guaranteed at some point.
Right now when the Canadian Wheat Board wants to have the initial payments raised, as happened just a few weeks ago with malt barley, the board makes a decision, sends a recommendation to the minister, and it takes a least three weeks to get approval to have an increase in the initial payments. The reason for that is that when we're adjusting the initial payments, the Government of Canada is taking on what's referred to as a contingent liability. There's the possibility that the government will have to pay out more money. Whenever that occurs in government we have to go through a number of steps. Not only does the Department of Agriculture have to assess the risks; so does the Department of Finance. It has to go to cabinet ministers for approval after the Minister of Agriculture has approved it, and in government that usually takes a couple of months, not a few weeks.
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Although in most instances we're able to do it in a few weeks, it was felt that it would be a lot better to have the Canadian Wheat Board make the decision in one afternoon and announce it that evening. The next day the adjustment would take place, which would mean that farmers could get their money right away. If the reason for an adjustment was to attract more barley, for example, that would occur right away rather than waiting for several weeks.
It was felt that the risk of a deficit as a result of an adjustment to the initial payment is so minimal that it was certainly worth having this added flexibility. It's a way for the Wheat Board to be more responsive to market conditions.
The second power that relates to the contingency fund is cash trading. The Canadian Wheat Board has recognized that in some instances it would be very advantageous to have the power to operate somewhat outside the pool system, perhaps as an adjunct to the pool. Perhaps some have argued that it could be completely separate from the pool.
The ability to cash trade in Bill C-72 is unrestricted. It's going to be up to the board of directors to decide if they'll use it to complement the pool or use it on an ongoing basis, for example, for feed barley.
In either instance, one issue that does come up, though, is that when the Wheat Board will be undertaking cash trading there's the possibility that there may be a loss in terms of trading on the futures market. The Wheat Board would presumably want a hedge on any cash purchases. It's not possible to have a perfect hedge, so there might be profits or losses.
In one approach, you could cover potential losses from cash trading, or if there was a loss from an adjustment to the initial payment, you could do that either through the current pool or future pools by using profits from borrowing operations, or you could raise funds in the bill through a check-off. There are several options available.
Depending on what option the board of directors and the Canadian Wheat Board wish to take, that will determine how large a contingency fund the board would need. It might be possible to have a contingency fund that is extremely small. However, the board of directors may choose to have several million dollars put aside in case of contingencies.
I know that in the case of the Australian Wheat Board, they developed a very large contingency fund and many have assumed that might happen in Canada. But in Australia that was to prepare for two things. One was the loss of the borrowing guarantee and the other was to make capital purchases. Neither of those two purposes are envisioned in this legislation.
The third area in Bill C-72, Mr. Chairman, relates to mandate changes. The Western Grain Marketing Panel made a number of recommendations, such as the recommendations that organic wheat should be sold outside the Canadian Wheat Board system or that unregistered varieties of wheat should not be under the Canadian Wheat Board's jurisdiction. As you know, the policy decision was not to implement those recommendations that came from the Western Grain Marketing Panel in this legislation, but to implement a process for making those kinds of decisions.
For example, if the board of directors wishes to have organic wheat marketed outside the Canadian Wheat Board, they could make that recommendation and the Canadian Grain Commission would have to certify that there's a mechanism in place to ensure that the organic grain isn't commingled and that the quality of our system is protected. The government could then take that step by Order in Council. If the board of directors felt that it was a really significant change, it could go to a vote.
I might add at this point that there was one concern raised in Bill C-72 that relates to the governance clauses that might have affected the ability of farmers to sell feed wheat or feed barley outside the Canadian Wheat Board. We've looked at it and we feel that Bill C-72 does not change the situation with respect to the domestic feed market. The provisions that were used for those regulations are still in the bill and it's clearly the policy of the government not to change that situation. However, if for any reason there is any doubt on that matter when the committee is reviewing the bill, that is a great opportunity to make it crystal clear in the legislation.
There are two other clauses in Bill C-72 that I wish to refer to briefly because they didn't come out in the policy statement. It's really the first clause in the bill. One thing it does is alter the definition of the designated area by not requiring that the Creston-Wynndel area of B.C. be part of the designated area. There are no elevators and only about 10 permit holders. The area could be designated by order of the Canadian Wheat Board if that was appropriate at any time in the future.
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The second clause in Bill C-72 states that the act is binding on Her Majesty in right of Canada or a province. This is considered to be the case now, but that view is being challenged by the Government of Alberta and therefore Bill C-72 makes it explicit.
One other provision in Bill C-72 that I wish to mention is clause 24, which refers to implementing the North American Free Trade Agreement. Right now the Canadian Wheat Board is subject to the NAFTA provisions that are in the Financial Administration Act, and it is subject to those provisions because it's a crown corporation. But in this legislation it's envisioned that the Wheat Board will become a mixed enterprise, and unless we move that section into the Canadian Wheat Board Act, they would no longer be subject to that particular provision. So the clause that's in Bill C-72 with respect to NAFTA is the exact same language the Canadian Wheat Board is now subject to.
There are many other clauses in the bill that I've not mentioned, but we do have an expanded clause-by-clause explanation and we can leave a number of copies with the clerk of the committee, Mr. Chair.
In closing, I wish to emphasize that the changes to the structure and management of the Canadian Wheat Board are probably the most important changes that are in Bill C-72. The flexibility provisions are important, but more so the structure and management changes. The management decisions of the Canadian Wheat Board will be the responsibility of a board of directors. Farmers on the prairies will have the opportunity to elect a majority of that board of directors.
The financial benefits the Canadian Wheat Board now receives by virtue of its current crown corporation status have been retained, and the partnership between prairie wheat and barley producers and the federal government will be much better reflected in the structure and management of the Canadian Wheat Board under this legislation.
Thank you very much. I'll turn it back to you, Mr. Pickard.
Mr. Pickard: Thank you very much, Howard. It's very well outlined and presented.
I guess that will open questions, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman: Thank you very much, Mr. Pickard.
We'll go first to Mr. Hoeppner.
Mr. Hoeppner (Lisgar - Marquette): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll work in the reverse here. I'd like to start with proposed section 39.1, on page 16, which is the cash purchase of wheat. We just had a barley vote, where we had to vote either open market or single desk. Why would you put cash purchases of wheat under these conditions when the Wheat Board can buy it from any person or entity outside the farming industry? Are you not actually giving us a new marketing system?
The Chairman: I just want clarification. Is it section 39.1?
Mr. Hoeppner: It's proposed section 39.1, ``Cash Purchases of Wheat'' on page 16 of the bill. It's clause 20.
I read there:
- contract with a producer or any other person or entity for the purchase and delivery of wheat or
wheat products
- We could have the Wheat Board importing grain from the U.S., fulfilling needs, and our grain is
in the bins.
Mr. Hoeppner: Wasn't that a quarter of what our producers would produce?
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Mr. Migie: That particular provision was later in the recommendations. But when people say the act should be enabling, in many ways the powers that are there right now are in fact enabling powers. They are not really restricted. There's a fair bit of flexibility on how the Canadian Wheat Board can exercise those powers. The amendments in Bill C-72 are really in that same spirit. They give a tool to the Canadian Wheat Board.
Let me give you one example of a situation that could happen, because it did happen a couple of years ago. The Wheat Board may not be able to meet a contract and be paying very large penalties because they couldn't supply the product to meet a contract. It might be that they couldn't attract it since they couldn't raise the initial payment because there would have been a risk of a deficit. Yet there was a contract there. In theory you could have a situation where it would be worthwhile for the board of directors and the Wheat Board to say they would like to meet that contract rather than the farmers paying a penalty. Therefore, they might in fact want to purchase a small quantity of grain elsewhere to meet that contract.
That's clearly not going to happen very often, but when you start trying to anticipate all the circumstances when a power might not be used, that's very difficult.
The principle behind this legislation is that there will be a board of directors and farmers will elect a majority of the board. They will be making the key decisions. If it's in the interests of prairie farmers to make a purchase, then they would have the authority to do it rather than just suffer a loss and not have any flexibility. We can't see farmers in the prairies saying they could use it to buy huge amounts of another country's crop. That's clearly not the intent of the provision, and there's no reason to believe it would be used in that way.
Mr. Hoeppner: I'm not quite sure I want to accept that on that basis. I think this bill is probably trying to legalize a lot of things that have been happening in the Wheat Board outside the Wheat Board Act up to now and we're trying to cover our rear ends a little bit. That's my impression of it.
I want to go back to proposed section 3.93, which is on page 6. Proposed subsection 3.93(3) reads:
- (3) Directors, officers and employees are not liable for a breach of duty under subsection (1) or
(2) if they rely in good faith on:
I can buy that. But then you go to proposed paragraph 3.93(3)(b), where it states:
- (3) Directors, officers and employees are not liable for a breach of duty under subsection (1) or
(2) if they rely in good faith on:
I've had my legal people look at this and they say you can drive a truck through this - and a train and a steamboat. They say you will never prosecute anybody, no matter what, as it's beyond the courts with that type of a clause.
I have quite a bit of expertise in farming, and if I tell the Wheat Board this is what they should be doing and it's wrong, they can't prosecute.
Mr. Migie: As I mentioned, the reason for the clause is that we felt the people who work for the board, or the directors, do need some type of protection. In finding the words, we went to the Canada Business Corporations Act, and those same words in paragraph 123(4)(b) refer to relying in good faith on:
(b) a report of a lawyer, accountant, engineer, appraiser or other person whose profession lends credibility to a statement made by him.
A similar or identical provision also applies in the Financial Administration Act, so those provisions are there now. If anything, a number of people feel that directors need a little bit more protection from suits or for their personal well-being. We decided we wouldn't go any further than what's currently in the law that applies right now to both either crown corporations or corporations under the Canada Business Corporations Act. We didn't develop any new language. It's just that these are the standard provisions that apply to give that type of protection to directors.
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Mr. Hoeppner: Let me ask you this question. As a farmer, would you market to a corporation that has this kind of protection and the farmer has none?
Mr. Migie: It's really protecting the directors, admittedly, from a suit that might occur. They have their personal property on the line. They need some protection from various suits. If as directors they are acting in good faith, based on either the statements they're presented with or...this gives them more flexibility, and if they're relying on reports by professionals and making those decisions based on good faith, they would then in fact be getting indemnification that they would get the support. They and others would have legal help in that type of suit.
Mr. Hoeppner: Let's go down to proposed section 3.94:
- 3.94 The corporation shall indemnify a present or former director
- I asked this question the other day. Does that mean this thing is retroactive?
Mr. Migie: Let me answer by saying that if you look at the Canada Business Corporations Act - and this is general practice - it has the same words: A corporation may indemnify a director or officer of the corporation, a former director or officer of the corporation.... It's the same language. It's the type of protection that people need before they would reasonably be expected to volunteer to be a director on a board, making the kinds of decisions the Canadian Wheat Board is making.
All we and this legislation are providing is a comparable type of protection that you have in private corporations or under the Financial Administration Act for crown corporations.
Mr. Hoeppner: But in private corporations, such as Canadian Airlines, the board of directors resigned because they could have been held responsible for the way they managed it.
These directors aren't going to be responsible for anything, and if they make a mistake, I, as a farmer, am going to pay for it.
Mr. Migie: But in giving them some legal protection in terms of support legally, there still is a risk of a suit. There's no doubt this is just some protection that's there. They'd have to demonstrate that they acted in this way, and if they did, there's some protection.
Mr. Hoeppner: If I go back to proposed section 3.93 and see that on the advice of anybody with a bit of professional expertise...they could have given the wrong advice, and I pay for it. This is very thin ice.
Mr. Migie: I don't know the situation of that particular corporation, but most large corporations have virtually identical language and protection. It's not something that's extraordinary that we're doing for the Canadian Wheat Board that isn't available to crown corporations and to corporations under the Canada Business Corporations Act. If we did less, we'd really be saying that any director or employee would have much less protection than is normal.
Mr. Hoeppner: Why are you changing it from the present situation?
Mr. Migie: It's because right now they're a crown corporation. We don't need to have special clauses for the Canadian Wheat Board, and that will be true for one year. What happens after there is an election of one director? After that point, the Canadian Wheat Board is no longer a crown corporation and no longer an agent of Her Majesty. That means it's something else, and it's something else as determined by the Wheat Board Act only because they wouldn't be subject to the Financial Administration Act provisions.
We had to take the NAFTA provision and put it in this bill because the Wheat Board is a mixed enterprise. It's not a private corporation, it's not owned by farmers, and yet it's not a crown corporation. It's in this mixed area, where there's a fair bit of government involvement and government characteristics, but it has a private sector majority board of directors determining its future direction. So we needed to duplicate some of the provisions that were in the Financial Administration Act and bring them into the Canadian Wheat Board Act just to provide them the same type of guarantees.
Mr. Hoeppner: I don't know if I want to buy all that.
The Chairman: One more question, Mr. Hoeppner.
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Mr. Hoeppner: I want you to clarify why you would put proposed section 3.94 in there when it says ``shall indemnify a present or former director''. A former director would have nothing to do with this new act.
Mr. Migie: The same provision is in all these other pieces of legislation, where it says ``a former director or officer''. It's really saying that even if that person had a three-year term and they left the corporation and two years later there is a lawsuit or some type of a legal charge...we're giving that person some type of financial support to defend themselves and some type of backing. Even if it's for a former director, that could still occur after they're no longer a director. Why shouldn't they be entitled to some assistance legally and similar types of protection?
Mr. Hoeppner: I do not have that much experience. I want an answer as to when this comes into effect, because that will make a big difference for present or former directors. When I let my legal people look at this, they just say I'm crazy if I allow this bill to pass.
Mr. Pickard: If I may, Jake, it comes into effect in a year, but ten years from today we may have a group of directors who have served time and they have relinquished their position or been voted out of office and there are other directors there. This bill is always going to be in place. I think this is protecting past directors down the line, those people who have served on the board, but ten years from now it will have been in the past.
Mr. Hoeppner: Can you include that in the clause so that it points that out? It's very unclear, as are a few of the other clauses.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman: Mr. Hoeppner, you used an example of some people who retired from a board of directors of a corporation in Canada, and it might be worthwhile having somebody check it out. If the Canada Business Corporations Act is applicable there, although my understanding is that even though they are retired from the board of directors they would be covered by that indemnity, I don't know whether that is the case. I believe it is the case for just about every Canadian business out there. It might be interesting if someone followed up on that.
Mr. Easter, then Mr. Chrétien.
Mr. Easter (Malpeque): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I could solve Jake's problem, Mr. Chairman, by just leaving the commissioners there instead of going to a board. Keep them there, appointed for their expertise in marketing.
Gentlemen, thank you for coming. The Canadian Wheat Board, without question in my mind, is the cornerstone of agricultural policy to a great extent in the country, and decisions that are made in this one are extremely important.
Before I go to a series of questions, currently I want to know how the system is going to work in terms of maximizing back to producers, the maximum out of the international marketplace. Currently we appoint commissioners for their expertise in marketing, who in effect also manage the affairs of the board. Those commissioners travel the world. They have specific countries in which they are expert, in terms of knowing the players and indeed selling Canadian wheat into those markets. How is that end of the system going to be looked after with this new structure? First I want to know that, and then I'll go to my questions.
Mr. Migie: The legislation itself creates a chief executive officer and a board of directors. For a one-year period, when that interim board is in place, that is when some of these plans would be laid out in terms of how the Wheat Board would be structured. It's not in the bill. Once there are elected members, the boards of directors can certainly be changed or confirmed. There might be vice-presidents who have the same commissioner-type role and status for certain areas of the world, and you can retain executive vice-presidents full time who have that type of marketing role and marketing expertise, and they can be appointed by the Canadian Wheat Board.
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Right now, the current legislation doesn't require the person who's appointed to have marketing expertise. It's possible that if you had five commissioners, one might have good management skills for dealing with other issues and three of them might be strong on marketing, but with a different mix.
Again, this legislation is enabling. The government appoints. It has been the tradition for the last number of appointments that people have had those skills, but it's not a requirement in law.
So it very well may be that they pick a corporate structure whereby the vice-presidents take on those exact same roles but focus only on the marketing side. That's really going to be up to the chief executive officer and the board - first the interim board and then the board that's elected.
Mr. Easter: Howard, that's the most important function really of the workings of the board in terms of how it's working now. We have to be assured in the future that this is going to remain, somehow.
Basically, the Wheat Board operates on three main pillars. My question is going to be: what are the implications of this legislation on the three main pillars on which the Canadian Wheat Board now operates. The first pillar is single-desk selling. Second, there's price pooling. Third, there are government guarantees and credit. Can you give me those implications?
You mentioned the government guarantee and credit, so you can ignore that one. I have a question on it, though: what are the implications?
Mr. Migie: There's no change on the single-desk selling. There still are the same controls on the export side in the bill. It's untouched, and that's as a matter of policy.
The tool that's in there on cash trading gives a lot of flexibility such that you have some of the attributes, but you would always have to maintain that export monopoly. You can have a lot more flexibility with cash trading. The single desk is not affected by Bill C-72.
There is a slight change on the price pooling. The bill allows for adjustments to be no longer guaranteed at some point. It doesn't require that, but it allows that to occur. As mentioned, there's very little risk of a loss on adjustments, but that is an impact on the price-pooling issue. The government would guarantee the initial payment when it's set, but then the Canadian Wheat Board, on its own, would handle adjustments. They wouldn't have to get Orders in Council for various payment provisions, as they do now.
Mr. Easter: So the guarantee is really initially and not on the adjustments.
Mr. Migie: The bill makes that an option.
Mr. Easter: Okay, I understand that.
But take the price pooling and the pooling system. Go to clause 20, which is proposed subsection 39.1. This is the ability to have cash purchases. The Western Grain Marketing Panel in its recommendations.... The impression certainly left 25%, although they do say that this limit should not be less than 25% of total farm deliveries.
Here's the concern I have on the pooling system versus the cash purchase. We're saying that we're going to protect price pooling, but say a board went in there and, in its wisdom, decided they would gamble for a year on the cash market, which can happen. And say you're talking 100%, not a minimum, which was, as I think we had originally talked about, 25%. You could, in effect, lose the pooling system in one year. What protection is there from doing that?
Mr. Migie: I guess the first point is that the panel recommended that at least 25% be cash-traded, so it could have been 100% too.
The Canadian Wheat Board Act, as mentioned, is enabling in many ways. Right now, in theory, the Government of Canada could set the initial payment at $1 per tonne and completely subvert the pooling system.
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That isn't the intention of legislation. The ability to cash-trade means the board of directors could decide under this legislation that in the case of feed barley, if barley remains with the Canadian Wheat Board after the vote - and it's an open question now - they would use cash-trading a lot. But that would be a decision that the board of directors, which has a majority elected by farmers, would have to make.
I guess you're right; in that instance it is possible that a board of directors could make a decision that would emphasize cash-trading much more than pooling for feed barley, for example. Right now those powers, though, are in the act in an enabling way, and it's up to the board to make the decision.
Mr. Easter: There's a big difference, though, between a board of directors and the Government of Canada. The Government of Canada and its elected opposition and government members are responsible for the public good of Canada.
Let's be honest about a board of directors. It's a popularity contest. That's what it is. Popularity sometimes can be based on advertising and who runs the best campaign. The grain industry is big bucks when you get to Cargill, Bunge, and so on. If they want to put a push on to put their people in place via a board of directors, they in fact could do that.
So you're dealing with an altogether different situation. The protections are not in the legislation, as I see it, in terms of the fundamental principles of the pooling system to protect against that kind of danger. In the pooling system, regardless of where you live or when you ship, your returns are the same.
I want to somehow find ways to weigh against that danger.
How am I for time?
The Chairman: You can ask one more question.
Mr. Easter: Howard, you've indicated that the government guarantee and credit is there. As we move down through this system - and I understand the difference we're moving with - where specifically are we assured via the legislation that the government guarantee will remain? I'm not 100% sure on that, so I want to be sure that's there.
Mr. Migie: Victor is just looking at the clause, but it really says it is guaranteed by the Minister of Finance once we go through a certain number of steps. It doesn't say it may be guaranteed by the Minister of Finance; it says it is, once we go through the steps.
Right now the Minister of Finance can say no for any crown corporation that comes forward. They don't have to allow the Wheat Board or any crown corporation the borrowing authority. That is still retained; they have that flexibility. But once the decision is made, the Wheat Board knows, and more importantly the lender knows, it is guaranteed by the Minister of Finance.
Mr. Victor Jarjour (Director, Grains and Oilseeds Division, International Markets Bureau, Market and Industry Services Branch, Department of Agriculture and Agri-Food): Clause 11 of the bill, which amends section 19, begins on page 9, although the relevant part is on page 10. Proposed subsection 19(5) says:
- The repayment with interest, if any, of money borrowed by the Corporation in accordance with
the terms and conditions approved under subsection (4) is guaranteed by the Minister of
Finance.
If there's another round, I'd like an opportunity, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Easter.
Mr. Chrétien.
[Translation]
Mr. Chrétien (Frontenac): I would like us to get back to the composition of the board of directors. The Governor in Council would appoint the president of the board, and farmers would form the majority of the board of directors that would be elected. There has been no clear definition of the ridings or provinces where the farmers appointed to the board of directors by their peers would come from. Could you describe a typical board of directors that we may see once this bill is passed?
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[English]
Mr. Migie: There would be a board of directors appointed by the federal government for one year. That's the policy intention. The board would be made up of 11 to 15 members. During that one year, the rules would be developed for electing members to that board by the farmers in the prairies. Those election rules would be put into regulations.
So it is envisioned that during that year, if, for example, the bill were passed before the next crop year, there would be a new board of directors appointed in the first instance by the government, and one of the jobs of that board of directors would be to recommend an election process. If there were going to be elections, they would recommend whether there should be election boundaries, or elections across the prairies. It might be a combination of the two.
You might have elections every year if you were only going to appoint, for example, nine out of fifteen elected by producers. You might have three a year for three-year terms.
Those are the types of decisions that haven't been made because there wasn't very much discussion or debate on them. The government didn't really have anything to work with at the time the bill was being drafted.
[Translation]
Mr. Chrétien: That's precisely what I don't like: all your answers are conditional or hypothetical. Nothing has been decided. I would like you to tell me that the director general will be hired by the board of directors, whereas the president and vice-president will be appointed by the government. You referred to 11 to 15 representatives, which I find acceptable. We can always live with 11, 12, 13 or 15 representatives. But how many of these representatives will be elected by the farmers? You're telling me it would be a majority. Would it be a majority by the skin of their teeth or a large majority?
[English]
Mr. Migie: That's a concern that's been raised by a number of groups. You'll hear a lot from them. There's been a policy statement that says a majority. At the moment, we have one year after the bill is passed to work out those details.
The alternative is to specify in the bill that a certain number, either by percentage or not, or by specific number - it might be seven, or it might be at least a certain percentage - would be elected by producers. Then, as I mentioned, you have to spell out who can run. Could a lawyer from the prairies run for election even though farmers would be the only eligible voters? Who exactly would get to vote? Would the vote be by province or by subprovince or maybe prairie-wide?
Unfortunately, at the time we were developing the bill we didn't have recommendations that had been discussed and debated. The panel itself recognized that we should have a year period so there would be what's referred to sometimes as an ``interim'' board of directors until we can have the elections that would start the process of changing the governance. Then the decisions would be made on exactly whether the board should be 11 or 15, how many would be elected by the producers, how many appointed.
What is in the bill, though, is that the chairman of the board of directors and the president and CEO would in fact be appointed by the government.
[Translation]
Mr. Chrétien: Since the Canadian Wheat Board has an impact on all of Canada, have you provided for the election perhaps not of a majority, but of at least one representative from the region of the three central provinces?
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[English]
Mr. Migie: There has been discussion of having one of the appointed members of the board. Let's say you have a board of 15, for example, and 10 are elected by prairie producers. That would leave 5 other appointments. One possibility is that you could have someone who is appointed from the Ontario or Quebec industry.
It would seem very difficult to envision elections by producers in Ontario and Quebec to the Canadian Wheat Board, for example. But usually in a board of directors there are some positions where you are seeking different kinds of expertise, whether it's financial expertise or maybe some background in Ontario and Quebec. The Canadian Wheat Board Act applies across the country, to a certain extent - that is, the export licences apply across the country.
[Translation]
Mr. Chrétien: You mentioned that a board similar to our own exists in Australia. Are there also similar boards in other grain producing countries and, if so, could you name them?
[English]
Mr. Migie: Really, Australia is the only one I know of that is close.
Is there any other one, Victor, that you would say?
Mr. Jarjour: No. In the grain sector, I think, the Canadian Wheat Board and the Australian Wheat Board are typically the two major single best sellers. In other commodities, such as dairy, the New Zealand Dairy Board operates very similarly to the Canadian and Australian wheat boards.
[Translation]
Mr. Chrétien: This question may seem simplistic to most of my colleagues, but I haven't been able to pinpoint it yet. You said many times in your presentation that the government should appoint a certain number of representatives to the board of directors of the Canadian Wheat Board in order that it remains a Crown Corporation. Once again, could you explain this issue in plain language so that I can get a better grasp of it?
[English]
Mr. Migie: In the Financial Administration Act they do define a crown corporation. One of the requirements is that where there's a board of directors, the government appoint all of the members of the board of directors. So there would have been a possibility of amending the Financial Administration Act to change the definition of a crown corporation.
Barring that possibility, we took the definition of crown corporation as it exists in that legislation. It didn't give us the flexibility to have elected board members. They had to have been appointed by the government or else it would not be a crown corporation.
[Translation]
Mr. Chrétien: The Canadian Wheat Board has the Canadian government's credit card - to use your expression - and thus has a line of credit on the order of 5 to 6 billion dollars. I heard 6 billion once and 5 billion another time. Let's imagine a very negative scenario. You pay farmers cash for their products and prices crash. Will you be allowed to recover those advances from farmers or would the Canadian Wheat Board have to absorb this dramatic drop in prices?
[English]
Mr. Migie: The initial payment program is really left unchanged in that if grain prices fall, whether it's because of export subsidies or some other reason - grain prices fall in the middle of a crop year - then the Government of Canada will guarantee that initial payment and make up the full difference, just as it does for the Ontario Wheat Producers' Marketing Board if prices fall there.
That's a separate program that is still going to continue in the case of Ontario. In the case of the Wheat Board, it's in the legislation that for prices, we still give that guarantee. But in terms of the Wheat Board, when they're borrowing $6 billion and giving that kind of a guarantee, it is possible that there could be some financial losses that could occur once the Wheat Board is no longer a crown corporation.
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The Department of Finance raises some of these possibilities from time to time. It's a concern that we have to be careful of and watch out for. The Canadian Wheat Board has a very good track record on the management side, but it's always possible when you're working in futures markets that there could be some very large losses that might come about. Therefore the guarantee is quite important to the overall operations of the Canadian Wheat Board.
The Chairman: Just before I move to Mr. Benoit, I would like to remind the committee members of the Information that was circulated by the clerk. It was the minister's statement in an industry conference on January 21, 1997. I'll just repeat some of it. This is concerning what flexibility the committee could possibly have in the process we're in.
At one point he said a number of farm groups appear to want the new law to be more precise in this area by specifying the date by which directors will be elected, by confirming that the number of directors so elected will constitute a majority, and by making this governance change irreversible unless by future amendments. Then he went on to say he had no difficulty with these ideas.
Later in the same paragraph he said that if the arguments presented to the legislative committee were clearly to the effect that farmers would be more comfortable with the new law being more precise and less flexible with respect to the election of producer directors, then he would be happy to entertain the appropriate amendments to bring that about.
With that statement on January 21, 1997, the minister indicated to us and the industry that his views may be subject to some change.
I'm just going to stray for a second from the usual practice of the committee. I mentioned at the beginning that there were a number of people in the room this morning, other than at the table, who are interested in this bill and this industry.
There's one gentleman here who I think you will appreciate my pointing out, a gentlemen at the back of the room by the name of Mr. Alf Gleave. Mr. Gleave was a member of this committee from 1968 to 1974 as the NDP agricultural critic. He was the member for the riding of Saskatoon - Biggar, and he is joining us to observe how we behave this morning. He's under the watchful eye.... see behind him Vic Althouse.
Mr. Gleave, we welcome you here. We're glad to see you're still interested in this incredible industry that we're all involved in. Please feel free to join us again.
Mr. Benoit.
Mr. Benoit (Vegreville): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, gentlemen, and welcome.
Mr. Migie, you said a majority of directors will be elected. There's been some questioning of this and you haven't backed away from that position. Would you just show me where in the legislation it says a majority of directors will be elected.
Mr. Migie: It's not in the legislation; it's in the government's policy statement. The legislation enables that to occur, but the legislation does not require it. I've mentioned that this is something the committee may want to address.
Mr. Benoit: What policy statement are you talking about now? Just the public statement? That's it? Why wouldn't that have been put into the draft legislation?
Mr. Migie: Then you're getting into the question of how many.
Mr. Benoit: It's pretty easy to put that in. Just say a majority.
Mr. Migie: You could have. The whole thrust of the bill itself, and the panel recommended this as well, was to be enabling. Therefore the legislation gives the flexibility to make that occur.
Mr. Benoit: Wouldn't you want at least to clarify that the majority would be elected? Do you think that would be automatically in the legislation?
Mr. Migie: It's in the policy statement. It's a little similar in some ways. I'll give you the example on the initial payment level. It would be ridiculous to set it at a dollar per tonne, but the law doesn't prevent that from happening. It's an enabling type of legislation and it assumes that there's reasonableness.
Mr. Benoit: In your discussions with the government, have you indicated they're going to put that in with their own amendments? You haven't heard that?
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The Chairman: I've told you what I just read, Mr. Benoit. The committee probably has some flexibility, as indicated by the minister. As I said at the beginning, we have some opportunities and challenges as a committee, and it behoves us all to do what we can.
Mr. Pickard: Mr. Chairman, I'd just like to take a moment to note that this bill has not been through second reading and is not approved, in principle, at this point. That means the members of this committee and others who are coming forward to testify as groups and individuals...we have more flexibility than we normally would at second reading. Therefore we are looking for those recommendations, and that's one of the purposes of putting the bill through as it is and not going to second reading and getting more input.
The minister has also made a very clear indication that he's looking very carefully at recommendations and suggested amendments coming forward to this committee. What the minister is actually doing is trying to open up to everyone the opportunity to make those recommendations in the form of amendments so that those can be handled in a way that you feel comfortable with.
Mr. Benoit: In theory, this legislation going to committee before second reading should lead to that more open approach. In fact, we've seen very little change in it. What we've seen is a limiting of debate. It's actually been a real drawback, and we've seen that it hasn't worked. That's a concern in this case as well.
Surely the legislation that is presented initially would have some of these very basic things included in it, and there are some others. In terms of the cash purchases, Mr. Migie, you referred to the fact that the panel had recommended cash purchases, but you failed to mention that the panel also recommended an open international market on barley. That's a critical difference. The board being able to make cash purchases in this closed market, where only the board has control over export of barley, is an entirely different situation from having cash purchases in an open international marketing system. I've had the Canadian Cattlemen's Association and other groups come to me very concerned that this will put so much uncertainty into the feed grain market that they fear what it could do to their industry.
I find it offensive, quite frankly, that you would try to portray what is done here in any way as representing what the panel actually proposed; it's an entirely different situation.
Mr. Migie: I'd like to respond to that. Really there are two parts to what the panel proposed. The Canadian Wheat Board dealt with powers and with governance in their recommendations on the institutions. On that score that's where they had the general statement about permitting the board to make cash purchases.
As I've said, in terms of the mandate of the board, the government did not follow their recommendations. In the case of wheat marketing, for example, they would also have something with respect to cash trading. That was not implemented. There's no requirement that more than 25% be utilized.
Mr. Benoit: Does the point add uncertainty to the feed grain market here? I'd just like you to respond to this concern that livestock feeders have expressed to me. Because we don't have the open export market in feed grains, this cash purchase allowed to the board just puts so much uncertainty into the market that it's absolutely frightening. It is frightening to them, and that's the way they presented it to me.
Don't you see the potential there for a lot of instability in the market because of this?
Mr. Migie: The extent to which the Canadian Wheat Board will use this power is something that I just don't know now. It's going to be the decision of the farmer-elected majority. They might use it. When the Wheat Board made their presentation to the panel, they focused on the fact that it would periodically be something that would be used as a way to minimize some losses and as an adjunct.
You may recall that when Mr. Beswick was the commissioner, he had a view that was much greater for the cash-trading power, which would in fact be a lot more sensitive to the livestock industry.
Mr. Benoit: He also had a view of an open barley market on the export side too.
Mr. Migie: I don't recall that.
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Mr. Benoit: You keep saying this elected board will have all of these powers. When you look at it, first of all, we don't know that it will be a majority elected. We know there are so many restrictions put on this board that really what power do they have? You can dismiss a director, even an elected director, without cause. The replacement directors will be appointed in the interim, so clearly I would like to know what power this board really has.
The second thing is when it comes to power to actually change the structure of the board, we know that in fact they're extremely limited. They really can't make changes to the board's mandate. For example, if this panel decided they wanted to end the single-desk purchasing powers of the board on feed grains, where others could purchase farmers' grain as well for export, they couldn't do that.
Even much smaller changes than that...because of the step that has to be gone through of having the Canadian Grain Commission, which is a minister-controlled organization, approve any of the changes...the minister has complete control. Clearly, they can't make changes to the structure of the board in any meaningful way at all.
So what power do these directors have? Even if the minister follows through on his statement that a majority would be elected, which isn't in the legislation, what power do they have? It's really so limited that I think it has to be changed.
The Chairman: Let Mr. Migie respond, to be fair, and in the second round, after Mr. Migie responds, we'll move on to Mr. Collins.
Mr. Migie.
Mr. Migie: The board of directors has all the power to manage the Canadian Wheat Board in terms of how they use those tools. We've just talked about different examples with cash trading. It is a very powerful -
Mr. Benoit: With all the restrictions -
The Chairman: Let Mr. Migie respond, please.
Mr. Migie: - board of directors.
On the question of mandate, you're quite correct that on those mandate issues the recommendations from the panel were not implemented as the panel put forward; instead, there is a process that's laid out. The Canadian Grain Commission's role, though, is limited to where they have the expertise. It's not a question that they have to approve it, yes or no; it's focusing on whether or not our quality system is protected adequately. So that is somewhat limited.
Perhaps I can come back to the question of the directors who are elected. The provision is that there would have to be regulations. It's hard to imagine regulations coming forward that wouldn't spell out what the conditions would be for removal. As I mentioned, the intention is that it be for a cause. If that's in doubt, as I say, it has to be in the regulations, so you'd have to spell out whatever it is.
It would be hard not to be for a cause, but that could be spelled out, because in the case of the appointed directors, they're clearly at pleasure and they could be removed. For the elected ones, there is a different process, and it would be put in the regulations to give some comfort to people that it wouldn't be just because the government of the day didn't like -
Mr. Benoit: That's pretty easy to put in legislation.
The Chairman: We have to move on, Mr. Benoit, because others wish...and I'm trying to be fair and equal with the time.
Mr. Collins.
Mr. Collins (Souris - Moose Mountain): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
On the point of indemnifying board members, let me assure you that in the profession I was in, I was indemnified, and I expected that. If I came on a board, I would also expect that. You have to have some protection. These people are going to come in; they're going to make a big commitment.
Let me quickly go back to what Mr. Easter said. On behalf of all of us on this side, he said that we are committed to the Canadian Wheat Board. In no way, shape, or form are we going to waiver on that commitment. That has to be first and foremost.
With regard to serving on the board, they mention a three-year term. Do you suspect they're going to be rotated so we don't have three going off and then a complete change? I think that's really a concern that was raised.
With regard to what Wayne mentioned, when I travelled through Saskatchewan, they looked at 25% on the cash as maximum, not minimum, and they didn't want to see that get expanded to a point where there was some doubt about it.
On the concern about back-stopping of payments, because it hasn't been used that frequently, they would like to see that stay there and that the Government of Canada would do this. It hasn't been accessed that many times, so why would we want to continue to do that?
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As the chairman said, there is flexibility within the framework of what the minister has said. I'm certainly prepared, and I'm sure this committee is prepared, to make sure that maximum is in there, at least for farmers; that the majority would be there as farmer representatives. I think that's a commitment we want to make, and I'm sure we're going to put that in the legislation.
But I think we have to be careful that we don't write everything in stone, and then we start trying to undo or unravel what is not in there. That's why I think there was flexibility built into this in the first place.
I wonder if you wouldn't mind responding to some of those questions.
Mr. Migie: On the question of the three-year terms - and there could be three three-year terms for nine years - it certainly is not desirable to have a large number of people leave a board in one year. The consequence then might be.... There's an election somewhere every year. That's something that would have to be worked out, or if it was put in the bill it would have to be decided very soon.
That's why it was envisioned that we would take time, the board of directors would consult on it, and that could still be in place well before elections start next year. It certainly is desirable to phase it if you're going to have elections.
On the question of the 25% figure, I just want to say that it was the panel that recommended that 25% be a minimum. I know some people thought they recommended a maximum, but the panel itself recommended a minimum.
But that hasn't been accepted by the government. The bill does leave a lot of responsibility with the farmers to make the right choices in the elections. The election process has to be a really good one so that people will in fact want to run, and get the best people on that board.
On the question of the adjustments, the guarantee, it's really the question of a trade-off. There seems to be almost no risk, and yet the Wheat Board could be a lot more responsive. As I mentioned, one afternoon they could make a decision, announce it that night, and the next day they could be starting to send out cheques to farmers, or raise the price to attract more product if that's what they needed.
That would happen with very little risk and maybe no cost at all to farmers as long as the board continues to act the way they have in the past. If we retain it, I think there will be at least a three-week delay.
Treasury Board, the Department of Finance, and the government just have to treat it as an increase in the contingent liability of Canada under the current system. The bill does streamline the role of always having to go to cabinet and get approval. That's really the question of a trade-off: is it worth taking a little extra risk to have the flexibility?
The Chairman: Mr. Breitkreuz.
Mr. Breitkreuz (Yellowhead): Good morning, gentlemen.
Mr. Migie, the more you speak and explain the provisions of Bill C-72, it seems the more real changes to the board are indeed explained away. You strip Bill C-72 of this embellishment, and really you don't have any change to the operation and the control of the board at all. From what we can make of it, there are really no changes.
Let me get back to governance, because governance is one of the things prairie farmers were talking about. The other thing, of course, was flexibility in terms of opening up the board to selling across the border.
In terms of government, once directors are elected by farmers, does the minister retain discretion on whether to appoint these farmers to the board?
Mr. Migie: Do you mean in terms of not appointing them?
Mr. Breitkreuz: In terms of not appointing them.
Mr. Migie: There is one point in the bill where a decision is made to go the route of elected directors. Then once they're elected, they would be appointed.
The question, though, comes up about removal, but it's not a discretion to refuse. I could check the bill, but there's no discretion to refuse an elected member from starting the.... Where the discretion exists is on that first elected member. There's an explicit decision on that first elected member. Once that occurs, then the Canadian Wheat Board is no longer a crown corporation or an agent of Her Majesty, and that triggers a lot of provisions. That's something quite explicit.
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But the policy certainly envisions that the elected members will take their place, and there's no discretion to say we don't like that person. There is a provision for regulations that would spell out the removal of an elected director, and it was intended to mean for cause.
Mr. Breitkreuz: The way we understand it is that the minister can refuse to appoint an elected director -
Mr. Migie: I'll check on that to make sure.
Mr. Breitkreuz: - and also can remove without cause.
Now, once this board of directors is assembled and in operation and they make a decision, is the minister given the entitlement to override a decision of the elected board of directors?
Mr. Migie: The minister isn't given the entitlement. The way the bill is worded currently, and it continues on, is that the Governor in Council - really a cabinet directive.... It would be official, if you will. There could be a government directive to the board of directors, which they would have to carry out.
As I mentioned, as far as I know, it's only been used twice, and it has been used in extraordinary circumstances. I think that would continue in the future. There's no provision for the minister herself or himself to give that kind of directive to the board, or tell the board what to do, because the board of directors has the full responsibility for managing the Canadian Wheat Board.
Mr. Breitkreuz: But a government Order in Council could override.
Mr. Migie: That could happen. As I say, there currently is that provision. It was used for the grain embargo, and I believe it was used at one time because an export licence for barley from Ontario was refused by the Canadian Wheat Board in the early 1980s. It's been used very rarely, but that authority would be there.
One of the reasons for that kind of authority is that the Canadian Wheat Board has a power that wouldn't ordinarily be delegated to a board of directors on which the government doesn't control a majority, that is, export licences outside the prairie regions where the elections will take place. That's one important reason.
Mr. Breitkreuz: So I'm given to understand that you have an elected board of directors, of whom hopefully - we don't know for sure - the majority will be farmers.
A voice: Elected by farmers.
Mr. Breitkreuz: And it's paid for by prairie farmers. Yet the government can override whatever this board of directors might decide.
Mr. Migie: It's possible for a direction to come from the Governor in Council. That's in there now, and it's always been in there. It's rarely used, but it's possible.
Mr. Hoeppner: So much for governance by democratically elected farmers.
The Chairman: My comment to Mr. Breitkreuz is that if the producers were interested in giving up the government guarantee on initial payment, an alternate method might be looked at for this. I guess I raise the question: are the producers interested in giving up the government guarantee?
Do you have any further questions, Mr. Breitkreuz?
Mr. Breitkreuz: Just to say that they're finally given the right to have a vote. Of course, you can question the questions on that vote as well, so that's a step in the right direction. I can hardly visualize them having some say on this particular guarantee you mentioned.
The Chairman: Mr. Calder.
Mr. Calder (Wellington - Grey - Dufferin - Simcoe): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'm going to go at this from an eastern perspective, as Mr. Chrétien did before this. I'm curious to know what provinces are involved in this process, taking into consideration that Ontario itself produces wheat, too.
You're saying that the Canada Wheat Board regulations would apply to a certain extent. That was your statement. I'm curious as to what area it does not cover, and does that affect Ontario?
You have a board of either 11 or 15 members. I'm wondering what percentage of those board members are going to be elected. They'll probably be elected from out west. How is that going to affect eastern Canada? Could there be a situation where western Canada could put restrictions on grain flow in eastern Canada?
.1045
Mr. Migie: The first part of your question really relates to the designated area of the Canadian Wheat Board, in other words, the provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and the Peace River district in British Columbia. Right now there's one other district, and it doesn't apply to Ontario. The Ontario Wheat Producers' Marketing Board has its own board. It has expressed no desire yet to become part of the Canadian Wheat Board system, and that's not envisioned.
However, the Canadian Wheat Board does have authority over export licences that do extend beyond the designated area. But for everything else it's only the wheat grown in the designated area, and by extension, barley. So for the most part it applies in the prairies.
There is this one provision, though, the export licence, which is national in scope. Only that particular provision is the one really at issue. Generally it is not a problem in terms of the Ontario board getting a licence to export. I'm not aware of any instances where the Ontario board has had a problem, but it's possible.
There was one instance in the early 1980s when there was an issue of barley. As I mentioned, that's one reason the Government of Canada would want some authority, if necessary, because it is a little odd that you would have....
The elections would be just in the prairie region. It was not envisioned that there would be any elections outside the designated area. But it was felt that because of this power, which is national in scope, and a board of directors whose majority would be selected by prairie farmers...there was this reserve power - if I can call it that - or this authority the Governor in Council, not just the minister, would have to exercise where they could give a directive to the board.
Mr. Calder: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman: Monsieur Chrétien.
[Translation]
Mr. Chrétien: The more we progress in the explanations and development of the objectives of Bill C-72, the more disappointed I become, especially following the answer you just gave my colleague from the Reform Party to the effect that a decision by the board of directors could be reversed by the government. If I understood your answer correctly, this is doubtful. As you probably know, right now and for the past several years, there has been discontent. We waited a very long time for changes to the Canadian Wheat Board and I'm wondering if these corrective measures being proposed in Bill C-72 will succeed in appeasing that discontent. Because if it was only 10% of the people grumbling, perhaps we could overlook it, but it would seem to be much more widespread. At the very least, we should obtain the results of the referendum soon. I hope that the results will be broken down, not necessarily by federal riding but at least by province, and that the results obtained in British Columbia, which will be participating, will be specified.
Mr. Migie, do you believe that the corrective measures being brought to bar right now at the Canadian Wheat Board will end this discontent and the illegal exports? The Canadian Wheat Board does not even enforce the law right now; it seems that every day trucks cross the borders and everyone turns a blind eye. You're saying that there would be a majority of farmers. When Leon Benoit asked you where this is specified in the bill, you answered that it's not written anywhere, but that it's a statement of principle from the government.
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The government could lose the election in the spring and the following government could well forget the principles of the previous one. When you have any courage, you write it into the bill.
Let me get back to my question: do you believe that these corrective measures will put an end to this discontent, and that the defiance of the law that still exists at this moment will stop and that you will finally enforce the legislation that prohibits illegal sales?
[English]
Mr. Migie: Perhaps the most important provision here is that farmers will have the opportunity to elect a majority of the board of directors. We have every reason to expect that that board of directors, with a farmer majority, will be making decisions that will allow the Wheat Board to be very responsive to where grain farmers want to take it.
Bill C-72 does not address the mandate issues, which a number of farmers have raised. It does not change the export monopoly. It gives a lot more flexibility for the Canadian Wheat Board to evolve, and they may use some of these powers to evolve in a way that becomes more responsive to many of the farmers who right now are unhappy, but the legislation envisions that the farmers themselves will determine the future of the Wheat Board. Through elections, a majority of those farmers will decide how the tools and powers are used.
There's no guarantee that a minority who don't want to follow the law will change their minds based on this legislation. That wasn't the purpose. It was responding to what the vast majority of farmers felt they wanted. They had no direct voice in decision-making. It was indirect at best. This gives a strong voice. The powers are very strong for the board of directors.
As for the question of the majority being farmer-elected, it was in the policy statement that the government put out. That could be made clear in legislation at this stage, if that is a concern.
[Translation]
Mr. Chrétien: How do you explain that the law is not currently enforced?
[English]
Mr. Migie: Some individuals wish to not follow the law. They feel they can do better. I'm afraid this debate about open market versus a collective approach to marketing has been there since the Wheat Board began. It has continued on through the years. Sometimes it becomes very strong and sometimes it becomes more accepted.
I hesitate to draw an analogy with dairy and poultry, but there are some farmers who would prefer to be on their own and sell outside of the Chicken Marketing Agency, and there are others who are quite prepared to follow and be part of the collective system. In the case of the Wheat Board, some farmers have chosen not to follow the law or to export without a licence of that sort, but it's a similar type of principle.
Right now if the individual farmers want to export, they must work through the Wheat Board for wheat, and yet they have no voice directly in the decision-making on the board of directors. That is addressed in this bill. They will have a majority on the board of directors. But there will still be some farmers who certainly will feel that Bill C-72 does not answer their concerns.
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[Translation]
Mr. Chrétien: A referendum is going on right now. My colleague Jerry may be in a position to confirm this. Do you think you are in a position to give us the results of this referendum? If so, when can we obtain it region by region or province by province?
[English]
Mr. Pickard: It's pretty difficult to project where things are going to come. The exercise here, in my opinion, is to try to get all of the different viewpoints. You were expressing viewpoints from people you've talked to. The Reform is, the Liberal Party is - and there's no question that this exercise is not to predict what might happen after a referendum is held. The exercise is to listen to the viewpoints that we're having on the Wheat Board and try to encourage those viewpoints to be put forward from the committee to the bill and to the minister so that those recommendations can be dealt with.
So we're talking about a process here of trying to integrate all of the concerns you're raising and all of the concerns you're going to hear over the next few weeks, to bring those forward to make this bill a better piece of legislation if that can be done.
What I'm suggesting directly back to you is that in terms of all of the comments and concerns, there is a process here in order to improve upon what is there. If there is a tremendous amount of concern about specific numbers, recommendations, if there is concern that the one-year process that's been put in place by the board that will sit and hopefully look at the recommendations as to how the vote would occur, where the vote would occur, how the board would be structured after the vote, the numbers of people on the board - all of those questions will be either taken into account by recommendations and amendments that come back or by the year that people are dealing with it.
I'm suggesting back to you that this is a process whereby we're trying to glean as much information as we possibly can and put those recommendations in this bill through your amendments.
[Translation]
Mr. Chrétien: But Mr. Pickard, will we get the results broken down by province?
[English]
Mr. Migie: If you're referring to the barley vote, the vote that's just been completed, the expectation is there will be a prairie-wide result for the barley vote sometime before the end of March, but we don't have the results now.
The Chairman: Mr. Chrétien, with regard to the question you're asking, about the changes and the actions and reception - if I could use that - to amendments to the Wheat Board, are you asking the officials if they have any indication of how they will be received in the different provinces? Is that what you're asking? Or are you asking how it will be received overall in the west?
[Translation]
Mr. Chrétien: Can we obtain the results province by province rather than an overall result?
[English]
The Chairman: If you're referring specifically to the barley vote, as Mr. Migie has said, it's my understanding - and I think he made it clear - that it will be a result for all those who are eligible to vote in the eligible area; one result.
[Translation]
Mr. Chrétien: All right, thank you.
[English]
The Chairman: Mr. Culbert, then Mr. Benoit.
Mr. Culbert (Carleton - Charlotte): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to approach the questions from perhaps a slightly different perspective, from the administration and management perspective, the whole thing.
First of all, as a general statement and overview, I would say Bill C-72 does nothing to operate the Canadian Wheat Board, but it establishes the guidelines under which it will operate. Would that be generally a true statement? That's really what we're looking at here. The board, of course, has its own set of by-laws and regulations under which it operates.
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I'm thinking of some sort of flow chart. Mixed into this whole bill we have the minister, the Governor in Council, the commissioners, the chair of the commission, the president, the advisory board, directors, the chair of the advisory board, and the vice-chair of the advisory board. Can you give me some sort of view of what there would be for a flow chart? As I said, I'm speaking from the administrative point of view. If I was the administrator of this, I'd want to know where it's coming from and where it's heading. Who appoints or elects each of those bodies? Obviously, I know who elects the minister and who elects the Governor in Council. I'm not concerned with that, but the other part.
Mr. Migie: Bill C-72 really is covering two quite different situations. That's why I think it is confusing. Within a year it's expected there will be a board of directors for which farmers will elect some of the board members. Once that occurs, the current advisory committee really won't be there after the end of their term. So they would no longer exist in that final management structure.
You would have a minister responsible for the Canadian Wheat Board, a board of directors for which farmers would appoint a majority, and you would have a chief executive officer who is a member of the board of directors. The government would appoint that chief executive officer.
In this interim period, for a period of roughly one year, the Wheat Board still remains a crown corporation, and all of the rules that apply to crown corporations are there. The government would appoint an interim board of directors - all of the appointments. The government has said it would still have a majority of farmers, but the government would do the appointing for that first year.
The advisory committee would continue for its term, because it would seem odd not to have any elected representatives in any capacity, and the normal rules that apply would apply in terms of governance for that first year. So we really have two structures in this bill. First, there is a one-year structure, which is where the Wheat Board stays a crown corporation, but they move away from three to five commissioners appointed by the government to a broader board of directors and a chief executive officer format.
After that year, it's envisioned that you will have a farmer-elected board of directors with some appointments from the government, but a minority.
Mr. Culbert: Is it possible, Mr. Chair, to get a spreadsheet or a flow chart to all committee members outlining this and the progression of it, as you indicated? Some are effective now with the passage of this bill. Some wouldn't be effective until a year after. If we had a spreadsheet outlining that, or a flow chart, it would simplify it, it would seem to me, for all committee members as we review the various clauses of this bill. I think it would be very important to us.
The other point I wanted to make, Mr. Chair, was relative to the area of protection - and I would call it protection - for board members. I would see that as pretty standard. I think the important thing to look at there would be to go back to proposed paragraph 3.93(1)(a). They're talking about how:
- (1) The directors, officers and employees of the Corporation in exercising their powers and
performing their duties shall
If you at the other proposed subsection 3.93(3), it reads:
- (3) Directors, officers and employees are not liable for a breach of duty under subsection (1) or
(2) if they rely in good faith on
- Then it talks about the various people.
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Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Culbert.
We do have this room for a few minutes more. I'm going to go to Mr. Benoit and Mr. Hoeppner for a brief question. If we can keep quorum here we do have a subcommittee report. It would be nice if we could do that before we adjourn.
Leon.
Mr. Benoit: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have questions in two other areas. One is the area that has been brought up before, the clause that repeals paragraph 46(b) of the existing act. That's the section that specifically states that the board doesn't have control over grains that it doesn't market and that opens the door to the board's authority over interprovincial trade.
You've said already that your lawyer is quite convinced that the clause in fact won't change the way it is now under the current act. But one major farm group has had their lawyers examine this. Their lawyers have said that they are quite certain that in fact it does change and that it could again give the board control over interprovincial trade and grains.
Commissioner Hehn, speaking at the Western Canadian Wheat Growers Association convention, said it's just an ``administrative error'' and the clause should be removed. Farm groups have said it should be removed.
Do you have any comments on that, Mr. Migie?
Mr. Migie: We did have a meeting with a number of the grain companies and farm leaders and passed out the regulations used to have the authority. They did not use that particular section of the Wheat Board Act for their authority. That was the main reason that we felt the bill itself wasn't changing the situation.
Since then, some people would say that even though Bill C-72 may not change that situation, why not make it clear? That's a possibility for the committee to do in any case. It was clearly our view that this particular removal of the clause wasn't the one used for the authority, but if some people really have doubts, the committee can make it clear.
Mr. Benoit: I hope that's the case, because there is some concern about that.
Under the area of indemnity - and we're looking under the indemnity clause, and proposed section 3.93 - you said that the wording in these clauses is identical, really, to the wording under the Canada Business Corporations Act.
Mr. Migie: Yes. It's virtually identical.
Mr. Benoit: ``Virtually''. What changes were made to it?
Mr. Migie: I think where we say ``shall'' indemnify it used to say ``may'' indemnify.
Mr. Benoit: One change I have noticed, though, unless it's put in some other way that I can't see, is that in this bill employees are added to the list, and employees aren't put in with directors and officers in the Canada Business Corporations Act.
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Mr. Migie: Victor, do you have both acts, the Financial Administration Act and the...?
Mr. Jarjour: I have both here, yes. The language that we actually drew from to incorporate into this bill is from the Financial Administration Act, not from the Canada Business Corporations Act, although they are very consistent.
Mr. Benoit: It has employees included? Not that having them included in one would....
Mr. Migie: We'll check on that and find out why that was added, if it's not in the words here. It might be that they're covered because they're crown corporation employees, but we'll find out.
Mr. Benoit: I have a question for you about this indemnity clause. Could this legislation give to past commissioners who are no longer working at the board any additional protection from prosecution - any protection they don't have now?
Mr. Migie: That's something I'd like to ask our lawyers to find out whether or not that's the case. So if I can take that one under advisement, I'll get back to you.
Mr. Benoit: I'd really appreciate it if I could get a written response to that question.
Mr. Migie: Okay.
The Chairman: We'll move on briefly, Jake, so we can get a chance to do the steering committee report.
Mr. Hoeppner: I won't be very long, Mr. Chairman.
In proposed paragraph 3.93(1)(a) it says, ``in good faith with a view to the best interests of the Corporation''. Why doesn't it say ``the best interests of the farmers''? There's a big difference to me.
Mr. Migie: When it says ``the Corporation'', it means the Canadian Wheat Board.
Mr. Hoeppner: That doesn't mean the farmers.
Mr. Migie: That's right, and it's really taking from the legislation, the regulations, and the by-laws for the corporation, which means, again, the Canadian Wheat Board.
Mr. Hoeppner: Well, going one step further, I would like to point something out to you. You said by regulation the Wheat Board has the authority to set the initial payment of $1 a tonne.
Mr. Migie: No, I didn't say that. The authority of setting the level isn't fixed in law. So in theory, if you really wanted to subvert the intent, it could be set at a ridiculously low level, but that's not the way the act has worked in the past.
Mr. Hoeppner: I want to read to you from an appeal hearing. I don't know if you know of the Canadian Grain Commission court case, which was Econ Consulting. The judge ruled and the Federal Court of Appeal sustained the trial decision and affirmed the right to sue a government agency on the basis of a common law of duty and to recover pure economic loss where the legislation was aimed to protect from the kind of financial loss sustained.
The Canadian Wheat Board Act spells out very clearly that the Wheat Board has the duty to recover the pecuniary benefits that can come out of that product, and if you don't do that, you are liable, and you're trying to get away from that.
Mr. Migie: But we're talking about the individuals and their personal liability.
Mr. Hoeppner: What's the difference?
Mr. Migie: Well, if an individual director potentially could lose their home and all their savings, that's quite different from possibly having the corporation liable in a certain instance to pay an individual for some activity. There is quite a difference for the risk of a director, if they knew they might lose all of their savings and all of their wealth and didn't have that kind of protection. But that still doesn't mean a corporate entity might have to pay that bill.
Mr. Hoeppner: It would be the farmers again. They'd pay it themselves.
Mr. Migie: Collectively, yes.
The Chairman: Mr. Hoeppner, could I get a point of clarification? You certainly are an active farmer. Would you be personally interested, if you had the opportunity, in being a director on a future Canadian Wheat Board?
If you did, would you like some personal protection if you made decisions, with the astuteness you have, on behalf of farmers and the Wheat Board collectively or on behalf of farmers? Or would you be satisfied to be personally liable for absolutely any decision you might make?
Mr. Hoeppner: If I were elected as a director and we as a group of directors did something criminally wrong, I should be held responsible.
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The Chairman: Yes. We all agree to that, to being criminally wrong and being held responsible -
Mr. Hoeppner: But it doesn't say that in here. It says criminally or...you're protected both ways.
The Chairman: Okay. As we said, maybe it's something we need to clarify -
Mr. Hoeppner: I haven't seen a corporation where somebody's convicted of a crime and he isn't held responsible, and it doesn't say that in this act.
The Chairman: You pointed out that there's a desire by some to clarify that. As I said at the beginning of the meeting, we have some challenges and opportunities in getting the bill after first reading. We will certainly be together in various forms and combinations with a number of people over the next few weeks.
With that, I think we've had a pretty full discussion this morning.
I thank Mr. Pickard, Mr. Migie and Mr. Jarjour for being with us this morning. I'm sure we will cross paths again as we proceed. Thank you, gentlemen.
If we could move to the tenth report of the subcommittee on agenda and procedure, this is a report that came forward from the steering committee earlier this week. It deals partly with the travelling of the committee out west.
The number one item, the draft press release, was approved by the steering committee on Tuesday and has been published. The rest of it is pretty self-explanatory. We know there will be continuing requests from individuals and/or groups to come before the committee, and the steering committee agreed the other day that we were going to have to be as accommodating, as flexible, and as fair as we can possibly be in giving as many as possible the opportunity to express their views.
Could you look at this report? The first six items refer basically to committee travel. The seventh item is an item that was brought forth by the steering committee. There was an indication from the steering committee that we request an update from the Departments of Agriculture and Health on the status of BST and its process, wherever it is, for some time this spring.
Are there any comments on the steering committee report before us, or is there direction for the chair?
Mr. Reed (Halton - Peel): I move adoption of the report.
The Chairman: All those in favour of adopting the report?
Motion agreed to
The Chairman: I thank you.
Committee members, I will see you Tuesday morning at 9 a.m., when we will hear from the Canadian Federation of Agriculture and the Prairie Pools.