[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]
Monday, September 25, 1995
[English]
.1855 
The Joint Chairman (Senator Oliver): I would like to call this meeting of the Special Joint Committee on a Code of Conduct to order.
This meeting was called to begin at 6:30 this evening in room 237-C of the Centre Block. It is now 6:55 p.m., and the reason for the delay is that there was a series of votes taking place in the other place and the joint chairman, Mr. Peter Milliken, is now in the House answering a question. When he does come, he will take over the chairmanship of tonight's meeting.
We are very, very honoured and deeply privileged this evening to have as our witness, in this our second formal meeting of the committee, the Hon. Mitchell Sharp, P.C., O.C., from the Prime Minister's Office.
Mr. Sharp, I understand you don't have a formal presentation to make or a written paper that you're handing out, but we would be delighted to hear some of your remarks. Following that, a number of us would like to put questions to you based upon your widespread knowledge and experience in this area.
The floor is now yours.
Hon. Mitchell Sharp (Prime Minister's Office): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is a very unusual meeting, or shall I say the time is very unusual for a meeting. My wife was the principal objector; however, I had dinner with her before I came, so I think I can stay for a while to try to answer your questions.
As you have said, Senator, I do not have an opening statement. I have been following your discussions. Maybe I could make one or two informal remarks.
First, I have been an ordinary member of Parliament, as they say, and I have been a cabinet minister. So I have seen this question from both sides. I add this comment, that when I entered politics and was elected in Toronto I was immediately appointed to the cabinet. So my experience as a member of Parliament came after I had been a minister and in the period just before I resigned from Parliament.
I remember thinking to myself, as I left the cabinet, what a relief I didn't have to attend any more of those meetings of cabinet and cabinet committees. I was now free to act as a member of Parliament.
The biggest change, of course, was that I didn't know any government secrets. I was a member of Parliament. It was not my function to govern the country; it was my function to operate as a member of Parliament and to discuss the legislation that was placed before the House and to vote on it.
This is an important distinction, and if I may say this, I have seen and read an account of your discussions, particularly the evidence presented by Mr. Wilson, the ethics counsellor. I find myself in general agreement with him in the sense that I think it is a great mistake to treat members of Parliament as if they were professionals or as if they were employees. I think the genius of our system of government is that members of Parliament are free to express their views. They may be constrained by party views; they may be constrained by one thing and another, but not by law.
I think the fewer regulations there are on members of Parliament, the better the public will be served. What we need from members of Parliament are their views about public issues, which they learn from their participation in Canadian life. I'm one of those who believe there should be very minimum restrictions on the activities of members of Parliament.
.1900
The other point I would like to make before I try to answer your questions is that there is a tremendous difference with respect to conflict of interest between ministers and members of Parliament. To make one perhaps rather small point but one that I think illustrates the principle, we ordinarily take the view that members of the cabinet have to be in Parliament. This is not so. In the past there have been several cases where the government appointed ministers who never sat in either House because they couldn't get elected.
I remember, for instance, General McNaughton. General McNaughton was appointed by Mackenzie King as Minister of National Defence at the time of the conscription crisis. He operated as a minister without being a member of the House. It was very awkward indeed for him, but it was not illegal in any sense.
I say this because sometimes I hear it said that members of the government or parliamentary secretaries or ministers of any kind are somehow just elevated members of Parliament. It isn't so. There have been cases where members of the administration were not members of Parliament or in either House. Now, it's very awkward to operate that way, but it's not illegal.
I think it's important to bear this in mind to avoid what I think is a rather non-constructive attitude towards members of Parliament and ministers, that somehow this is just a process of going up to the top of the ladder. It isn't. Ministers are appointed to do official things. They're public office holders; members of Parliament are not. It is very important, in my mind, to keep this distinction very clear.
I look upon members of the government as public office holders. They have a function in government. Members of Parliament have a function in Parliament, one of which is, if necessary, to defeat the government. The administration remains in office because it has the confidence of the House of Commons, and therefore the members of Parliament have a very important function in how the system of government works in Canada, but they are not members of the government.
Some years ago when I was the President of the Privy Council, I took a group of parliamentarians from Canada to Britain to watch their system in operation. We were very well treated. We were entertained by the government, by the Speaker, by everyone else, and one day we were invited to talk to a group of back-benchers on both sides of the House. There were two parties; the Conservatives and the Labour Party had some back-benchers, and they spoke to us.
One member of the Canadian group said, don't you get frustrated being back-benchers? Don't you feel you should be doing more, making laws or doing that sort of thing? One of them spoke up and said, not at all. We're not governing this country; we're members of Parliament. We act on behalf of our constituents when necessary, helping them. From time to time we'll take part in the debate. From time to time we vote. So we're not frustrated. Moreover, there are some 650 of us. If more than 200 took an active part, the place would break down.
.1905
Now, we don't have anything like that. Our Parliament buildings are large enough to accommodate what we have. But the principle is the same and I think must be kept very clearly in mind.
I noticed that recently, as Mr. Wilson pointed out, they've been having an inquiry into questions of conflict of interest and ethical conduct. The head of that commission has emphasized so clearly that members of Parliament are not public officials, they are members of Parliament. They have a special function to perform, and it is very important that they should be very actively involved in the whole community. There should be as few restrictions on their activities as possible.
Mr. Chairman, that's my opening statement.
The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): Thank you very much, Mr. Sharp. I know that several of the members have indicated they have questions for you, and if others choose to do so, we'll try to watch.
I will start with Senator Gauthier, please.
Senator Gauthier (Ontario): Mr. Sharp, I appreciate the clarification you just put, because I think the perception out there is that members of Parliament are indeed governing the country and indeed are part of Parliament, and I thoroughly agree with the distinction you've made.
But if there's a perception out there, Mr. Sharp - and there is one - that members of Parliament should follow a certain behavioural conduct in terms of being publicly elected officials, and I take it that one of the reasons we are meeting to prepare a code of conduct, as we say in English....
[Translation]
In French, we're referring to a code of ethics. I don't know why there is a difference between the two languages but we might see why later.
[English]
Maybe the translation here is going to be helpful, but I thought there was a difference between ethics and conduct. I know a lot of people who conduct themselves in a variety of manners but who are not very ethical. But anyway, we'll come to that later on when we find out exactly what we're dealing with.
My main question to you is, if indeed we are to look at a code of conduct for members of Parliament, is it your advice to us that we should legislate this code or should we just pass a resolution in both Houses making public what a code of conduct is for members of Parliament? That's my first question.
Mr. Sharp: Well, Mr. Chairman, the same question has come up in connection with ministers. During the time I was a minister I participated actively in those discussions, and when Michael Starr, who had been a minister in the Diefenbaker government, and I were members of a task force on conflict of interest we looked at the question again.
Our view at that time in our task force was that it was partly statutory and partly regulator under the auspices of the overall legislation. We thought there was a good deal to be said for Parliament approving a set of principles for ethical conduct applying to ministers, to members of Parliament, to civil servants, to everybody. But then within that would be the power to make regulations by the government dealing, for example, with conflict of interest for ministers. We never did contemplate that members of Parliament would have regulations dealing with them in the same sense, because we didn't think conflict of interest applied in the same way to members of Parliament as it did to ministers.
So my advice at the present time is that unless you want to legislate in an overall sense, the principle should apply to the conduct of everyone who has anything to do with Parliament or the government. It would be better not to box yourselves in too tightly. Even in the proposal we had of having this overall set of principles, we allowed the government to regulate under that the rules applying to ministers.
.1910
The other problem, too, I think, is that if you legislate.... It isn't a problem, but it's an observation I would like to make, because I have been thinking about the questions that have been raised already. This is not going to be government legislation. This would be legislation that arises out of the work, say, of this committee. It would be a recommendation. The government isn't insisting, as far as I know, that there should be regulations dealing with the conduct of members of Parliament. As I understand the situation, this committee is together because you are concerned about the public perception of the conduct of members of Parliament.
There's a great difference between the government legislating with respect to the conduct of ministers and the other kind of legislation that arises out of the work of a committee like this in which legislation is proposed by the committee. It doesn't take any precedence because it is a government proposal; this would be something that the members of Parliament want to apply to themselves.
I would have thought it doesn't make very much difference whether it is legislated or not. If you legislate it, you can always leave flexibility for regulations to be issued under the statute.
So I don't think a great deal rests on the answer to that question. The more I have thought about it the more I have thought also of what has been done by governments so far with respect to ministers.
There has never been very strong objection to the present situation in which the kind of rules that are applied to ministers or to parliamentary secretaries or to senior civil servants.... There hasn't been much criticism of the fact that this is done by the government and not by Parliament. The general attitude of the public and Parliament is known. The government acts within this to regulate the conduct of ministers - there's no doubt about that - and they should be doing it.
While at one time I thought you could have this overall statute dealing with ethics and from this have regulations applying to the various participants in the process, I'm not sure it is very important. The main thing is to have the principles and to apply them.
Senator Gauthier: I'd like to ask a supplementary to that. If, in the wisdom of this committee, a code was reached or dressed up and presented to the House, who would be the best to administer that? Mr. Wilson, the last time he was here, said the Clerk would be the individual to do that. Would you agree with that?
Mr. Sharp: Yes.
Senator Gauthier: You would?
Mr. Sharp: I do.
Senator Gauthier: Even though the Clerk is the secretary of the Board of Internal Economy?
Mr. Sharp: Yes. It really depends on the nature of the rules you are going to apply. The big issue, as I understand it, is whether members of Parliament should be required to disclose their assets or their activities; if it's a matter only of disclosure, what would be investigated. Surely it's a question only of finding out whether a member forgot something or something of that kind. It wouldn't be an investigation of improper conduct unless it's fraud or it affects his operations as a member of Parliament because -
.1915
Senator Gauthier: We have that legislation now.
Mr. Sharp: We turn that over to the police.
Senator Gauthier: That's right.
Mr. Sharp: So why would you have an investigative body? The police are there to deal with fraud. What else is there?
Senator Gauthier: Thank you.
[Translation]
The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): Mr. Bellehumeur, please.
Mr. Bellehumeur (Berthier - Montcalm): I will take up less time than expected because the senator has asked the questions I wanted to raise regarding the legislation and the application of the code we are in the process of studying.
Mr. Sharp, I read a summary which the task force presented to the government regarding a mandate you received from Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau in 1983 to study conflicts of interest.
You listed a series of subjects, which you called nine unethical types of conducts, and you described five of them in detail. Do you think these subjects should be included in the code of conduct?
Let me give you a few examples. There is mention of self-dealing, benefiting from private sources - and you almost provide a definition which could be included in some kind of code - , information passed on to corporations or individuals by former public office holders, their relationship with the government, and so on. There are five detailed subjects. Do you think they should be included in some kind of code of conduct?
[English]
Mr. Sharp: I want to be clear on this. I had thought we were talking about members of Parliament, not ministers and government officials. As I recall the situation, all of these subjects are already the subject of rules. I don't think that we avoid it...I don't mean ``we''. Perhaps when I was a member of the government I could talk about ``we'', but in the subsequent years I've had nothing to do with it.
But the government has laid down very strict rules relating to those very subjects. I don't think there's any great gap such as the hon. member has referred to. I certainly don't think you would want to include in any conflict of interest for ordinary members of Parliament any such subjects, because I don't see how members of Parliament get involved. Their members talk about dealing with themselves. What is it we're talking about?
I remember in the last Parliament I gave some testimony before a committee, and a member of Parliament was very insistent that there should be a conflict of interest code for members of Parliament. I said to him during an exchange, what do you know that I don't know? I'm nobody; I'm just an individual. You're a member of Parliament. What do you know about public business that I don't know? He said, I guess I don't know anything more. I said, then why do you want to have these rules? Why do you want to suggest to the public that you could make money by putting your private interests ahead of your public interests when you don't have an opportunity of doing that? You're just a member of Parliament. You just vote, you debate, you decide, but you do not have inside information such as ministers have. To that, his answer was perhaps the answer that many people around this table might give: well, then they can't accuse us of hiding anything.
It wasn't a point of view that appealed to me particularly. I didn't want to impose upon the ordinary citizens of this country who want to stand for Parliament a regime such as we apply to ministers when they don't have responsibilities like that. When they became ministers they would certainly have to do that, but not while they were ordinary members.
.1920
I want them to be as free as possible to have businesses in their constituencies, to follow their professions, if they have any time for it. I'm not suggesting they should put their private interests in time ahead of their responsibilities as members of Parliament, but I want them to be very much participants in the community. That ministers cannot be; they cannot be making decisions about private matters while they are ministers and have access to the secrets of government.
This wasn't always so - if I may just add one word. At one stage in my career I was deputy minister to C.D. Howe, who at the time - this goes back to the 1950s - was probably the most powerful minister in the Government of Canada. The attitude at that time towards government was very different from what it is today.
C.D. Howe had been in charge of the provision of munitions and supply during the war. He had one of the vital jobs in the Canadian government. After the war he was minister of reconstruction, minister of trade and commerce - I forget some of them. He was called ``the minister of everything''. Every week, I saw him review his investment portfolio. If anything like that happened today, there would be a public outcry, that here was the minister looking after his private investments while he held this great job in the Canadian government and had access to all the information that goes with it.
In fact, no one, and I least of all, would have accused him of putting his private interests ahead of his public responsibilities, and that was the attitude of the public. It's no longer the attitude of the public and that's why we're all gathered here. There has been a change. The public is no longer content to say that he's an honest man and we do not require all of this.
I don't think, for example, that in any ministry I've been in the fact that ministers have to put their investments into trusts of one kind or another ever affects their actions. They are either honest or they're not. It doesn't matter what rules you lay down; if a man is going to be dishonest, he'll get around those rules.
This is the best we can do. It's really a signal to the public that members of Parliament and ministers do have a regard for the public interest. This is evidence. It doesn't mean they've changed their actions because they have to comply with these.
[Translation]
Mr. Bellehumeur: The order of reference states that a special joint committee of the Senate and the House of Commons be struck with a mandate to develop a code of conduct destined to help senators and members reconcile their official responsibilities with their personnal interests, including their relationships with lobbyists.
I'm trying to understand what you have told us. Am I to understand that you are against a code of conduct for senators and members of Parliament? Do you believe we don't need such a code?
[English]
Mr. Sharp: There may be something to be said for a code of ethics for members of Parliament. What I was pointing out is that there isn't very much by way of action that members of parliaments can take that would place their private interests ahead of their public interests. What is it we're talking about?
As the rules are now - this doesn't require any further action - the general rule under the Parliament of Canada Act, I think it is, is that if a member of Parliament is asked to vote on a bill in the House of Commons that might raise a conflict of interest because he owned an investment in a company that would benefit, for example, from the legislation, he must declare his interest and not vote. That is the rule now, so we don't need to do anything about that particularly except to clarify it.
.1925
A member of Parliament now cannot get a payment from the government, enter into a contract with the government, any of those kinds of things. That's all forbidden. There may be clarification of the rules.
There are issues, however, that arise that I think maybe would justify some sort of a code, although I'm not quite sure about it. Gifts also are forbidden, in a sense. You cannot accept a bribe. That's against the law now. So you don't need any new legislation for that purpose.
There are peculiar cases, and I know when I was external affairs minister I chided some of the members of my party for accepting gifts of transportation to go to countries that wanted to persuade Canadians to give them better treatment. The best case I know of is Taiwan. The Taiwanese government offered money to anybody who would come to visit them, particularly members of Parliament, so they could say this member of Parliament agreed with them that they should be recognized as the government of China. I told them they could go, that there was nothing in the law against it, but if they wanted me to pay any attention to their views on this matter they wouldn't accept such hospitality.
Now, those kinds of issues do arise. There may be something to be said for having rules about gifts, how you define them and so on, but I don't think these are great issues.
In general, members of Parliament, it seems to me, should be as free as possible to go about their business. The merit of having a code is that it helps to define a little more carefully the kinds of situations that arise unexpectedly when you're offered a gift of some kind, directly or indirectly, and you wonder whether you should accept. Maybe a guidance on that side might justify having a code of conduct. But we're not talking about the same thing as the responsibilities of ministers of the Crown.
[Translation]
The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): Mr. Bellehumeur, have you completed your questions? Yes? In that case, you have the floor, Senator Stollery.
[English]
Senator Stollery (Bloor/Young, Toronto, Ontario): Mr. Sharp, it was very interesting to hear your opening remarks about the role of the member of Parliament, because I agree with you. I think people, including some members of Parliament, don't understand that the role of a member of Parliament is to receive legislation from the government, discuss it, and vote on it. That goes back to the reform acts in Great Britain in the 1830s. The essential role is to vote the expenses of the government.
Of course, ministers are members of the government and they're quite different. It has seemed to me since we started this discussion.... I look through the law as it exists in the Parliament of Canada Act, and it's pretty tough stuff. Section 41(1) says:
- 41. (1) No member of the House of Commons shall receive or agree to receive any
compensation, directly or indirectly, for services rendered or to be rendered to any person either
by the member or another person,
- (a) in relation to any bill, proceeding, contract, claim, controversy, charge, accusation,
arrest or other matter before the Senate or the House of Commons or a committee of either
House; or
- (b) for the purpose of influencing or attempting to influence any member of either House.
- That's pretty Draconian stuff.
.1930
There was an Australian group touring around here a couple of months ago. They got into this - and I went to the meeting - and they tied themselves into such knots that they had actually impacted on the role of a member of Parliament. If you take away the freedom of a member of Parliament, who is a member of the community that he or she comes from, to perform their role in Parliament by tying them up in some oddball way, aren't you actually running the risk of damaging our parliamentary system?
Mr. Sharp: A few months ago I was asked to give a lecture at McGill on integrity in government, and for that purpose I went back in history, back to John A. Macdonald's time. Now, John A. Macdonald was a scoundrel, he was unscrupulous, and the reason he got away with it was the great contribution he made to the establishment of Canada. But, let me tell you, the methods he used to get support for a federation wouldn't be countenanced today.
This is an important point, because back in those days, at the time of John A. Macdonald, ethical standards were quite different as seen by the public. What we are doing now is really reacting to public pressures. In those days there were no such pressures. It was assumed that when a party won an election they could therefore proceed as they wished. They could fire everyone who was in office and replace them with their supporters. They could appoint judges on the basis of party affiliation. They could bribe, and they did. Today this would not be so. We now demand very much higher standards of our ministers.
When you look back at the relationship between ministers and members of Parliament, it is very interesting, because before the First World War members of Parliament came to Ottawa for a couple of months each year, as was said by Senator Stollery, to grant supply, to pass any legislation that was necessary. They got a pass on the railway, and I think they got some sort of a stipend, but it wasn't very much - they certainly couldn't live by it - and they were all in business. Every member of Parliament, unless he was rich, carried on his business. Being a member of Parliament was a part-time occupation.
But it illustrates the point that the main contribution of the member of Parliament in those days was to bring knowledge of the community to bear on the debate in Parliament. They were all in business. They could speak with authority on that side.
Since that time, of course, members of Parliament have got paid salaries. Since I was a member of Parliament...I don't think they were excessive. I think nowadays I look at things a little differently.
However, one of the things that has happened is that because salaries of members of Parliament are more adequate and a person can live on those salaries, the idea has emerged that therefore members of Parliament ought to devote all their time to their functions as members of Parliament and should not continue to have business relationships and things of that kind. That, in a way, is a pity, because I think it is important that our members should be very active in the community and should as far as possible maintain their connections - not only for that reason but also because it is a temporary job and it's a good thing for the member if he can continue operating as a private citizen when he gets out of Parliament.
.1935
But apart altogether from that, I think it is due to the fact that members of Parliament now get a sort of living wage that the pressures have grown to turn them into professionals. I don't think that's a good idea, and neither in Britain do they think so.
The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): Mr. McWhinney, please.
Mr. McWhinney (Vancouver Quadra): Mr. Sharp, your observations - not simply tonight but based on your career and the observations you've made over a lifetime - are based, I think it's correct to say, on a functional distinction between the role of a cabinet minister and a member of Parliament, which is really the law in action today.
Our previous witness recognized that precedents from the United States that relate to congressmen of the United States are not relevant in Canada because of the different functional nature of a congressperson in the United States as compared to a member of Parliament. Following this logic through - and by the way, it applies even more strongly in other western parliamentary systems - I have a friend who was a Dutch foreign minister for a number of years, but he had to resign his seat in Parliament to become foreign minister. When his cabinet broke up, he ceased to be foreign minister and didn't have a seat in Parliament. But it's simply a rendering into positive law form of the distinction you're speaking of.
Would it follow from this, though, that conflict of interest rules - and there is a sort of common law of parliamentary conflict of interest rules - are not relevant to the situation of a member of Parliament? They have been developed for cabinet ministers. Would it be a correct summation of your evidence that conflict of interest rules, particularly the rules of disclosure, are not relevant to the function of a member of Parliament today; that we're making a distinction, in other words, for the purposes of our committee, between conflict of interest and code of conduct in the strict sense?
Mr. Sharp: Yes. I think it's more appropriate to talk about a code of conduct for members of Parliament than conflict of interest rules, because the conflicts of interest are few and far between for a member. I was an ordinary member for only a couple of years, but I didn't encounter any of these conflicts of interest in my function as a member of Parliament.
A code of conduct is a bit different. It gets back to the point about gifts and hospitality, travel accommodation and so on. There I think it helps to give the public confidence that members of Parliament, when they vote or when they debate, are expressing views that are not influenced by their private interests. That's a rather different thing - not so much a conflict of interest as a feeling that if a member of Parliament goes to Taiwan at the expense of the Taiwanese government, he is not going to be influenced by the fact that he received that hospitality when it comes to debating or considering what the attitude of the Government of Canada should be towards the government on Taiwan. That's not so much a conflict of interest as it is a kind of code of conduct that you could lay down in more general terms.
It is the same with minor hospitality, which is always a troublesome one - should you accept an invitation to dinner and all that sort of nonsense. I don't think that should be put into a conflict of interest code; it should just be a sort of code of conduct that you don't accept hospitality unless it's customary and very small amounts. That's the sort of thing, it seems to me, that matters for members of Parliament.
.1940
When this government took office, the Prime Minister asked me to speak to our caucus. At the time there was a lot of consideration going on to lobbying activities, which of course was the subject of a committee in this Parliament. I said to them, you're all now going to become lobbyists; that will be your function. You will be asked and it will be your responsibility to speak on behalf of your constituents, if you are persuaded by them, in your representations on their behalf. I told them I had only one word of advice: do not under any circumstances accept any compensation. That's what you're paid for; that's what your parliamentary stipend is all about, to pay for your expenses in acting on behalf of your constituents.
You will notice that in some of the rules that have been talked about here this is made very clear - in whatever acts Senator Stollery was pointing out. There are very strict limitations on how a member of Parliament can act. But that isn't quite the conflict of interest that we're talking about when we deal with ministers. It doesn't arise out of the fact that they are officers of the government.
Mr. McWhinney: The examples he cited there were really situations to which the ordinary law of fraud and other aspects of the Criminal Code would apply.
Coming back to this basic issue of disclosure, though, if, as the evidence we had last week tends to confirm, members of Parliament today are not involved actively in making the policy, in the balancing of conflicting interest or the drafting of legislation - they are basically ratifying - then the case for disclosure becomes a very weak one. I thought your example from C.D. Howe was a very persuasive one. I'm amazed to learn that even as late as 1950 one could get away with it.
For example, the issue of a blind trust or the disclosure of shares held would be irrelevant if members of Parliament were not in fact actively shaping legislation in its drafting stages, and that is the evidence we have been led....
What about parliamentary secretaries? They are in a rather twilight position, aren't they?
Mr. Sharp: Yes. I think of my parliamentary secretaries, and I treated them like ministers in training. They were subject to rules. It depended a good deal upon what their function was. For instance, the present Prime Minister was my parliamentary secretary when I was Minister of Finance, and I included him in my morning meetings with the deputy minister or the governor of the bank, so that he was privy. When he first encountered that, he said he didn't understand a bloody thing; however, when he learned English better, he recognized that he was part of the team.
It is important, and I hope governments continue to subject parliamentary secretaries to appropriate rules on conflict of interest so there is no suspicion that they are making use of private information to advance their -
Mr. McWhinney: So you would assimilate them really to the same rules as those for cabinet ministers.
Mr. Sharp: Yes, they are officials.
Mr. McWhinney: Would it then be a fair redefinition of our agenda in each committee - a royal commission has this right so to do - to say that the code of conduct should be our prime objective?
Mr. Sharp: I would think it a little more appropriate, but that's for members to say. As I say, I don't think you are going to find any member of the government coming to give you advice in these matters. It seems to be that a very healthy attitude is that the members of Parliament decide what they think is appropriate for their own conduct, that it's not being imposed from the outside, but simply the members trying to decide just what kind of code there should be and how they should protect themselves against charges of putting their private interests ahead of their public interests.
.1945
Mr. McWhinney: As the corollary, just to complete the point, perhaps we should drop the conflict of interest issue as not relevant to the definition of the function of members of Parliament today.
Mr. Sharp: I'm very puzzled about what the nature of the conflict of interest is. I think there's a tendency on the part of the public to think somehow they're being governed by members of Parliament. Those of us who have been around know that is not true. But the public doesn't make these kinds of distinctions.
As I say, when I was having this discussion in the last Parliament with a member of Parliament he said to me, the purpose is to show we have nothing to hide. It didn't have any function other than so he could say, I have revealed all my assets - he didn't have any - and all I have is on the table, so you can't accuse me of hiding anything. He was a very poor member of Parliament, I might add.
Mr. McWhinney: Thank you, Mr. Sharp.
The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): Mr. Epp, please.
Mr. Epp (Elk Island): Thank you, Mr. Sharp, for being here.
You indicated at the beginning that you did get dinner with your wife. I'd like to make you aware that in fulfilment of my duties as a full-time employee of the people of Canada I have had but twelve hours of sleep in the last three days and I have not yet had dinner today.
An hon. member: We're all in the same boat.
Mr. Epp: We're all in the same boat in that.
I want to get down to some real nitty-gritty here. About twelve years ago you were involved in this review that you co-chaired, and here we are again; and there have been various committees and studies in between. I'd like to ask you to state as candidly as you can why you think we're here. Why are we here?
Let me just enlarge on that a little. Both the Liberals and the Reform Party ran on platforms of more integrity in government. Why would the Liberals or Mr. Chrétien, the Prime Minister, and the leadership of that party decide to put into the red book that they were going to bring in more integrity, more honesty, more openness if in fact there were not a problem?
I am hearing from you today, and I heard from Mr. Wilson last week, that there is no problem; the problem is with the perception of the people. They think something is wrong when in fact nothing is. Where did they get that idea that something was wrong?
Mr. Sharp: I'm tempted to give a partisan reply.
Mr. Epp: Please do, if that's what you feel. I want your honest response.
Mr. Sharp: The fact of the matter is that under the previous government many members of Parliament were prosecuted; and if I may say so, in the governments in which I was involved, I don't remember a prosecution. So there was a deterioration during those years, and I think the public expected there would be a return of the integrity they hoped for.
If I may use my own case as an example, I was with the Prime Minister before he was Prime Minister. He had just come through a successful election, and he said, Mitchell, here's a list of my prospective ministers; I want you to interview them and tell me if there's anything in their record that is going to rise to haunt them or me, and report to me.
This had never been done before. Why was it done? It was done for exactly that reason. I didn't consult with him about it. He just asked me if I would do it. He was recognizing that when he took office that was one of the things the public expected, that the government would be more honest than it had been and there would be greater integrity.
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When I became a minister in Mr. Pearson's government, no one was designated by Mr. Pearson to come to talk to me about my private affairs before I was asked to join the cabinet. This was an extraordinary thing to have done.
Symbolically, it was extremely important. It said to the public, I intend to have very, very high standards of integrity in my government and I've asked Mitchell Sharp to interview them before they become members. After they became ministers, they went through Howard Wilson's procedure to be sure everything was correct and that people did put their investments into trusts, divested themselves, so there was no appearance of a conflict of interest.
As I said previously, these rules are not for the purpose of making people honest. You don't hire people, you don't put them in the cabinet, if you think they're dishonest. What they do is give evidence to the public that there are strict rules applying to conflict of interest. You're not suggesting that without those rules any of them would ever have engaged in anything that involved putting their private interests ahead of the public interest.
Let's take Paul Martin's case. I can talk about this one because everything is on the record.
Here is a man who is a rich man. It's well known what his interests are. He's been subject to all these rules. He's complied. He's gone even beyond anything that anybody ever did before in making clear there's no conflict of interest in the decisions.
But why is he trusted? Not because of those rules. It's because they feel he's an honest man. The rules are there to show this was what he was prepared to do to demonstrate that.
Mr. Epp: I point out, and I think it's important for committee members to remember this, that the Starr-Sharp report was in 1983, I believe, which was the year before the onslaught of the nine years of ``infamy'' we experienced - I am talking now of your partisan answer. In other words, there was a need for it way back then too, or else you would not have been commissioned.
It seems to go on and on. We're honoured to have you here, because probably you are one of the greatest walking authorities on government ethics, conflict of interest, and things like that, because you've been involved in this particular sphere for so long.
I would like to ask you a very pointed question. You said before, and some members on the other side of the table have pointed out, that the present rules already cover a lot of the things that can go wrong. I've two questions. First, is it your allegation that in the last nine years, or the nine years before the 1993 election, there were people who were in breach of the rules that already existed but they were never hauled on the carpet? Second, are there now things that in your opinion MPs or particular ministers can do and that you would consider unethical or wrong but that are not covered in the present rules?
Mr. Sharp: Let's go back first to your comment about the appointment of the task force. What led to the appointment of the task force was an allegation that a former minister in the Trudeau government, Alastair Gillespie, had, a short time after leaving the government, entered into discussions involving a company he was forming in Nova Scotia and the department of which he had previously been in charge.
That was the allegation. It led the Prime Minister to say, let's go back and look at the rules to see whether they are adequate.
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The strange thing about it was that we were given no responsibility for Mr. Gillespie's case. That was one thing we weren't to do. We were not to investigate his case. We were to look at the rules to see whether they should be changed.
The rule, as I recall it at the time, was that there had to be two years - I've forgotten if it was one or two years; there was some change over the period - before he could have business dealings with the department he had been head of at one time. But there was no allegation of any fraud or anything of that kind. It was simply a question of whether he had broken the rule about the time within which he could have discussions with...and nothing had happened. The investment was never made, and so on.
That was the occasion. There was no allegation other than that the Prime Minister felt the time had come to bring these rules up to date. We spent quite a lot of time, and there was a big book, discussing this.
You put a general question about why you are holding these meetings. I think the answer is that there still is a public perception that things go on that could be questioned and so on. It's a sort of hold-over. As I say, that's why I thought the Prime Minister was so wise to have begun by saying, I'm going to see my ministers, or people I can appoint, without there being any charges about their behaviour.
It's a very curious situation. It's a pity these kinds of ideas continue to prevail. I think it interferes, in a way, with the parliamentary system. This is the ultimate tribunal. This is the place where the country meets to discuss public business. It is a place where there should be very high standards.
My view is that there are. I can't think of any country in the world...and we had a good look at them when we were going over this report in 1983. When I look at the British system, my goodness, we would never condone the conduct of members of Parliament in Britain. Members of Parliament there accept money to make their representations. There's the famous case of the member of Parliament who was paid to ask a question in the House of Commons. That sort of thing to us is just unthinkable. We don't have anything like that, and we don't have particular rules against it. We just don't practise that way.
Now, members of Parliament in Britain don't get paid as well as they do here, and their justification is...they say, well, we have to supplement our income. So they engage in these kinds... They put themselves out for sale, in a way. They say, come to us and we'll help you get this from the government.
Mr. Epp: Mr. Sharp, I want to ask you this, if I may interrupt. Do you think, then, it is acceptable for a parliamentarian in Canada to be receiving remuneration, aside from his parliamentary salary, expense benefits, and so on, to offer assistance and help to individuals and businesses at the same time as he is receiving a full-time salary? Is that right or is it wrong?
Mr. Sharp: It depends on what he is expected to do. If he is being paid to make representations to the government on behalf of somebody, whether a constituent or otherwise, I don't think that should be condoned, no. If he is being paid to give professional services as a doctor or as a lawyer, or to run a factory or to be a member of a board of directors of a company that's not doing business with the government, that's fine. I think that's excellent. That's the kind of member we want.
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Mr. Epp: If there is a member who is receiving money, would you think the reason for that receipt should be made public? For example, let's say there's a parliamentarian who, it is found out, earns $5,000 a month as a retainer, but nobody can ever find out what he did for that specifically. Under the present rules it's not required that it be disclosed. Should it be required that it be disclosed?
Mr. Sharp: Well, now, is it relevant? Are you suggesting there is a feeling he is doing something contrary to the rules of Parliament?
Mr. Epp: There's a public perception that something wrong is going on here because this person is receiving this money, but there's no answer to the allegations, so the perception grows, and we land up in this committee because the public out there thinks things are going on that aren't right. Why don't we just solve that problem by saying, look, if a parliamentarian discloses all his sources of income - these are the reasons, and they are given in detail - then in fact if nothing is wrong it's clarified, and if something is wrong it's exposed? What would be wrong with that approach?
Mr. Sharp: I think what you're doing, of course, is treating them as if they were somehow employees. These are members of Parliament, elected by Canadians.
Mr. Epp: No, not all of the parliamentarians in this place are elected. Some of them are totally unaccountable.
Mr. Sharp: Right. I'm sorry. I'm talking about members of Parliament; that is, members of the House of Commons.
Mr. Epp: I'm talking about parliamentarians. This is a joint committee.
Mr. Sharp: Yes. I'm sorry, I had forgotten about the other side of it. I'd been thinking in terms of elected members of Parliament.
What would the allegation be, such that there could be a misuse of the $5,000, and abuse of it? What is it that you're getting at? Is it that a senator has a contract of some kind for services rendered, advice and so on - nothing to do with government, just -
Mr. Epp: It's alleged it has nothing to do with government, but it's not clear. There are suspicions that could be alleviated if it were disclosed.
What I'm asking you specifically is whether you would favour a disclosure regime - not so much a regulatory regime as a disclosure regime.
Mr. Sharp: I would not object too much, providing you didn't require the disclosure of private information that has no purpose other than to satisfy the curious. I'd like to know the reason why. I think all this kind of a procedure does is to raise questions about what that person is doing for a living.
Mr. Epp: But that's what people do: they raise questions.
Mr. Sharp: That's all right for his constituents, but why do you raise it?
Mr. Epp: I raise it on behalf of the people who elected me to represent them here.
Mr. Sharp: Yes, but why?
Mr. Epp: Because I want an answer.
Mr. Sharp: For what reason?
Mr. Epp: For the simple reason that if there is collusion, if there are things that are untoward here, they ought to be exposed if they're wrong, and they ought to be clarified and justified if there is no wrongdoing. I think we err on both side here, because over and over in the context of these meetings, and also on Bill C-43 before, I've heard, you know, there's nothing wrong; that the perception is wrong is much greater.
Last week Mr. Wilson, when we met him, gave some interesting testimony, and then one of the hon. senators, whom I won't name, entering into the debate, said, over all the years I don't think I came across 10% of members who did anything that was in any way suspicious. Well, 10%...that means around 45 of the current crop of parliamentarians on the Hill might possibly be guilty of something that's untoward.
Senator Stollery: Probably you're referring to me. It will be on the record. I think I said 3 people out of possibly 1,500.
Mr. Epp: Somewhere, Mr. Chairman - I stand corrected -
Senator Stollery: I'm sure it will be in the minutes.
Mr. Epp: I stand corrected, but I remember someone saying 10%. I stand corrected. My apologies.
Whatever the number, the principle still stands. What are we going to do? The problem has to be solved. I don't think it's sufficient for us here in this committee to come to the conclusion that in fact nothing is wrong and nothing ever has been. You admitted yourself there was probably a great amount of truth in the allegations of the nine years from 1984 to 1993.
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Mr. Sharp: I cited examples where the police found them guilty. It wasn't anything like what you're suggesting. This is where there was actual evidence of fraud.
This is a very difficult matter, Mr. Chairman. I can understand the member raising this kind of question. It does, however, suggest that somehow you have to know - that everyone has to know, not just the people who elect this member, but everyone in Canada ought to know - the private business of every member of Parliament. I don't think this is any encouragement to people to enter politics. It would discourage me.
Surely the other side is that in the House of Commons we want to have a representative membership of people who are in business, who are in the professions, who know what's going on in the country, who are not dependent on experts, who can judge for themselves on many of these issues. If we want that, we have to make it a reasonably attractive thing to do, and not one where people who enter politics are immediately going to be exposed to - I don't know what to call it - an examination of their private lives.
Mr. Epp: I think when you become a public person, you do in fact accept a certain degree of that.
Mr. Chairman, I'm dominating here. I'm sorry. If someone else wants to question I will gladly give up the floor.
The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): Mr. Epp, I don't think you've taken unduly long. If you have another question, go ahead. We have another person who wants to ask a question, but if you have another question for the witness I'd be happy to hear it.
Mr. Epp: Okay. In fact I do.
Two or three months ago you were quoted, Mr. Sharp, in one of the local papers as having said - and I have it written down here - the Prime Minister's ``conflict-of-interest rules are already tough enough but...some cabinet ministers aren't following them''.
Mr. Sharp: Me!
Mr. Epp: That's what it says.
Mr. Sharp: Where is this?
Mr. Epp: June 12, The Ottawa Sun.
Mr. Sharp: It's in The Globe and Mail, I'm sure.
Mr. Epp: Maybe the paper isn't reliable. Maybe you just want to deny you said that and to say they misquoted you -
Mr. Sharp: They must have misquoted me. I wouldn't have said that.
Mr. Epp: Okay. So you had no specific ministers in mind.
Mr. Sharp: No.
Mr. Epp: I have one last question. You're probably one of the few people aware of the contents of the Prime Minister's guidelines - not the code of conduct for public office holders but the other one. That thing is being kept secret, and I would like to know why. What could it possibly contain such that when it was made public it could not serve to increase the public's trust, in which case it should be made public?
I would like to ask you to comment on that. I'm going to be so bold as to ask you, would you undertake to table them for the benefit of this committee?
Mr. Sharp: You're asking me for a revelation of the actions taken by ministers pursuant to -
Mr. Epp: No, I'm asking for the code of conduct, that secret code of conduct we keep hearing about, which the Prime Minister has and which applies to cabinet ministers. I would like to know what it contains. If it's really good stuff, I would think public disclosure of it would increase public confidence.
Mr. Sharp: The principles are very simple. A minister, when he enters the ministry - not only the cabinet but the ministry - has to divest himself, by putting in trust or by selling, whichever way it is, of his interest in investments in the stock market, and investments in companies he has shareholdings in even if they aren't on the stock exchange.
Let's see what else there is. I'll take Paul Martin's case, which of course is the big one. Paul Martin has been subjected to extra precautions at his own request so people wouldn't think he was ever doing anything affecting his private interests while he's a cabinet minister. That was the essence.
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Now, what more do you want to know? That is the essence of it.
Mr. Epp: This is what is contained in the conflict of interest code for holders of public office.
Mr. Sharp: Yes.
Mr. Epp: I'm asking if there is an additional set of guidelines and rules in the secret Prime Minister's guidelines.
Mr. Sharp: I don't know of any. Howie Wilson is the ethics counsellor. He administers these, and the essence of them is as I've described it, to separate the minister from his private investments.
Mr. Epp: So they're just a duplication of this conflict of interest and post-employment code for holders of public office, which is public?
Mr. Sharp: That's public, yes. Those are the principles.
Mr. Epp: So there is nothing else in the other one.
Mr. Sharp: I don't want to be caught out on something, but I can't think of what else there would be. Why would the Prime Minister have anything else?
Mr. Epp: If that's the case, Mr. Chairman, then I really don't understand why we don't make this public. It really ought to be.
Mr. Sharp: What would you want to be made public?
Mr. Epp: The Prime Minister's code.
Mr. Sharp: But there it is. There is the code. What more does the member want to know? Do you want to know what the application is in each individual minister?
Mr. Epp: No, I don't think so.
Mr. Sharp: I don't understand it. I don't know what it is. The Prime Minister doesn't have any secret about this. The ethics counsellor, who administers the guidelines, has access to the private affairs of the ministers because they have to come before him and show that they have lived up to the principles. That's what it's all about. I don't know of anything else.
When I was a minister, fortunately I didn't have very much - or unfortunately, either way. I sold off some stocks and bonds that I had. I owned some government securities, which I didn't have to disclose, since there was no way of gaining anything at the public expense, and I owned one group of shares in a company, of which I had been a founding member. I decided that I couldn't go to my partners and say, here, buy me out, because I didn't know if they were worth anything. So I put them in a trust, and when I finally emerged from the cabinet I found they'd increased in value. It was a very valuable experience, but that was all there was to it.
Ms Catterall (Ottawa West): Having listened to the discussion last time and this time, there are a couple of things that I want to put on the written record.
It's the first opportunity to point out that not all members of Parliament are ``him''s and ``he''s.
Second, I would like to challenge a point of view that has been put on the record both by Mr. Wilson and tonight by Mr. Sharp - and with no disrespect at all - that it's important for members of Parliament to remain fully involved in their communities. I couldn't agree more. The problem is that both witnesses have put that in the context of being paid for what you do, through either your profession or your business. That has tended, I'm sure unwittingly, to underestimate the role that millions of Canadians play without remuneration in their communities as volunteers or doing unpaid work as mothers.
I just want to put it on the record, Mr. Chair, both of you, that we shouldn't get too far carried away, as the British House of Commons did when it reported on this matter, in treating paid remuneration or paid professions as somehow being more in touch with one's community than many things that people do without pay. Nobody knows that better than Mr. Sharp does.
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One thing that perhaps needs to be clearer both to members of Parliament and to the public is just what restrictions now exist on what members of Parliament may and may not do. Frankly, I think a large proportion of our colleagues are not aware, Mr. Chair, and perhaps that's something this committee should take in hand as a first step.
But I wonder if I could explore another element with Mr. Sharp. He mentioned that cabinet ministers have access to information they could use to their personal benefit if they chose to, and that's why it's important to separate their public and private affairs. The other thing they have access to is decision-making - administrative or executive decision-making that could potentially influence their own personal financial interests.
Where I see this perhaps linking with the role of members of Parliament is that what members of Parliament have that most Canadians don't have is access to those ministers on a very personal and day-to-day basis. I think that's whence springs some of the public concern about the behaviour of members of Parliament: that they are perceived, rightly or wrongly, to be in a position to influence what ministers do. I wonder if Mr. Sharp has given any thought to that connection.
Let me give a couple of other examples. Members of Parliament have an opportunity to influence public policy through caucus meetings, through direct personal contact with ministers, ultimately through how they vote on legislation. Have you given any thought to that, Mr. Sharp, and to how that might relate to the job in front of the committee?
I am sorry for the long preamble.
Mr. Sharp: It is true, of course, that members of Parliament who support the government have more contacts with ministers than do those in the opposition. That follows from the nature of our party system.
Mr. Epp: You have that right.
Mr. Sharp: The Liberals who are members of Parliament support the ministers and the ministers are friendly with them for that reason. I think that's inescapable.
The question of whether the members are thereby in a position to benefit themselves from it is quite a different question. You get back to the nature of our political system. To the extent that a member of Parliament influences a minister in support of his private project, which is perhaps to help the dairy farmers in Quebec, for example, that helps him to get elected in his constituency. That's the nature of the political activity in all countries I know of. But I don't think it raises ethical questions. That's just the nature of politics.
It certainly doesn't help the members of Parliament who are in the opposition. They look forward to the day when they are in office and they can do the same thing. That's how our system works.
I don't think it raises ethical questions in any other way. There was a time, of course, and not so long ago, as I said, when it was assumed when a new government took office it would fire all the people and replace them with their friends and do all sorts of things. That no longer happens. In the beginning of this century, I think in the 1920s, we established the Public Service Commission, and all of that virtually disappeared. The only kind of political patronage now available to governments is very limited.
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The previous government did take advantage in an extraordinary way of appointments in ministers' offices, what were called ``exempt staff''. I've heard of cases where ministers had fifty people on their exempt staff in their offices. One of the first things this government did was to limit very much the number of appointments that could be made.
We've now come a long, long way. As I say, by the impression we had after having a good look at what was going on in the rest of the world, we came to the conclusion that while we weren't faultless, obviously, and always things can be improved, we have relatively high standards in government and in Parliament. I think it's something we should be proud of - not that it can't be improved. This committee, I guess, is evidence that there's going to be an effort to see if it could not be improved still further.
Ms Catterall: I come back to an issue Mr. Wilson raised the last time he appeared before us, and that was related to my second point this evening, the issue of paid versus unpaid activity in society. He seemed to suggest that if one were travelling on business and accepted having one's transportation paid to some other part of the world, that was okay, but if one accepted an offer to have one's transportation paid simply out of an interest in learning more about an issue or a location, that was not okay. I know you've read Mr. Wilson's testimony, and I wondered if you had any comments.
Mr. Sharp: I was talking to the ethics counsellor today on this very issue, not in the light of any difference I might have with him but because of the nature of this issue.
It's not an easy one. As I told you, when I was the foreign minister, I used to lecture the members of the Liberal caucus about accepting hospitality from foreign governments, whether they were the Israeli government or the Syrian government or the Egyptian government or the Taiwanese government. Whatever the government was, if you accepted hospitality, your judgment was going to be suspect.
On the other hand, the member has raised a very difficult problem, and that is how you restrict that. I'm puzzled about it. Perhaps, as we were saying earlier, some sort of principle ought to be laid down. But to apply it in particular cases is very difficult indeed.
There was a case some months ago, you may recall, when some member of Parliament accepted a trip to a foreign country paid for by a commercial organization. He wanted to use this as a means of improving his business. Boy, that one seemed to me to raise some questions.
On the other hand, if some philanthropist who was interested in improving knowledge of some particular part of the world he was interested in and felt was not being understood said, look, I'll pay your way; there are no conditions; you just go and look at the situation and come back and tell me about it - well, I'm not sure.
These are very, very difficult questions. This is why I think it would be a mistake to try to legislate things like this. I think it would be better to lay down principles, to put them in terms that give some guidance to the member. Other than that, I think the less that is put in writing the better.
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Ms Catterall: I'm fortunate enough to have an assistant who occasionally reminds me that the main guideline is, how would you like to see it on the front page of The Globe and Mail tomorrow? I wouldn't mind your comments on whether that might be as far as we should go with guidelines.
Mr. Sharp: There's something to be said for this. When I was a minister and had to chastise some of my supporters, I often said, you know, it's not going to do your reputation any good to have that reported in the paper. And sometimes it worked.
Senator Gauthier: On disclosure, the present system, if I understand it, still operates so that a member who accepts travelling or accommodation from a third party has to declare on a register at the Clerk's office the date and the name of the organization that gave him or her the ticket or whatever advantage it was. Do you think that is sufficient?
Mr. Sharp: I learned about the existence of this register more recently; it didn't exist when I was a member of Parliament. I would have thought it was a good step, because then at least the constituents of the member of Parliament could see what he was doing, where he was going, and why.
As I say, if you get down to particularizing too much what is ethical and what isn't, then you get yourself caught in a very difficult problem. It's another reason why, when I hear of the idea that there should be some person who would make a judgment on these things, I am not very enthusiastic.
It seems to me that if you had a clerk of a committee or something like that who was involved with the members of Parliament on an everyday basis and with the workings of committees and so on, then it would be better to have those people be in charge of the register and give advice as to whether there were infringements of the code.
I get worried about putting this into the hands of a single individual, or even a committee of people, unless they're members of Parliament themselves. Therefore, it is much the same as just letting them report to a committee and, if there are some allegations going on and they want them to be examined, having a meeting of the committee to look at them.
The idea that you would have an investigator to investigate members of Parliament doesn't appeal to me very much. I think they should set their own standards and administer them and that this should not be done by somebody else.
Senator Gauthier: If public disclosure becomes something this committee is interested in and wants to expand upon, I think I remember your position on spouses or families. You were against spousal or family disclosure. Are you still of the same opinion, or have you changed your mind?
Mr. Sharp: Apparently my opinion has not prevailed.
Senator Gauthier: No. I know. John Crosbie's wife thought of that.
Mr. Sharp: That's right.
I'm of two minds. I understand the reasons. For example, if I may use Paul Martin's case again, if it didn't apply to the spouses, how easy it would be - so the public would think. But since Paul Martin is an honourable man, he wouldn't engage in those things. At any rate, if the public was interested, then it would say, he could easily transfer his properties to his wife and get out of all this sort of regulation.
It's a very dicey one. I think we've got to the point where we look upon women as having just the same rights to privacy as men, and not just as spouses, and one has to be very careful not to infringe on that principle.
Senator Gauthier: Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, may I ask you a question?
The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): Certainly.
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Senator Gauthier: Mr. Chairman, may I ask you a question? I understand the steering committee will be reporting back to the committee. I take it that's the usual practice, to report to the whole committee.
The second point is could we have a briefing on the Parliament of Canada Act by somebody who understands the act and who will be doing that for the benefit of members? Tonight I was listening to the comments. I sat two years reviewing that Parliament of Canada Act, as you know, Mr. Chairman -
The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): I know, Senator Gauthier.
Senator Gauthier: - and I find it frustrating that members of Parliament are not aware of the Parliament of Canada Act and its implications.
The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): Senator, on Thursday the witnesses we have before us will be dealing exactly with that issue.
Senator Gauthier: Good.
The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): That's to be looked after.
I was planning to deal with some of the matters from the steering committee, but we've lost a quorum for voting motions, so I see little point in proceeding with that tonight. We'll do it on Thursday and hope members stick around late enough.
Senator Gauthier: If they come in time, Mr. Chairman, if they start on time.
The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): Unfortunately we had a problem with a vote in the House tonight, as you may be aware.
Senator Stollery: On the same point of order, Mr. Chairman, would the steering committee be so good as to inform us of the schedule of meetings?
The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): The next meeting is scheduled for Thursday at 3:30 p.m. I believe another one is planned for Monday. The steering committee will likely meet on Thursday morning this week, to clarify certain matters that were raised at the last meeting and apparently not settled.
Senator Gauthier: I'll come back to my point. We'd like to know in advance so we can plan. We have other committees that meet and there may be conflicts.
The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): That's a common problem for us all.
Senator Gauthier: Yes. The Senate has committees. They sit every day. I'd like to know exactly where we stand on this committee. I've been told by your co-chair that we were going to sit three times a week.
The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): Yes.
Senator Gauthier: That's a decision of the steering committee, but it hasn't been endorsed by the whole committee, has it?
The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): No, because we don't have a quorum to endorse it. So we'll try to deal with that on Thursday.
Mr. McWhinney: Thursday from 3:30 p.m. till when, 5:30? And next Monday, is it 6 p.m. till 10 again?
The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): I don't know. We'll settle that on Thursday morning.
Mr. McWhinney: Thank you very much.
Senator Gauthier: What time is the committee on Thursday morning?
The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): I think it's going to be at 11 a.m.
Senator Gauthier: You think?
The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): Well, we have to consult, but our plan is to call it for 11 a.m.
Ms Catterall: May I make one comment to the steering committee? If we're going to meet Monday evenings, there should be a break for dinner before we meet.
The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): The steering committee will bear that in mind.
Thank you very much for your attendance, Mr. Sharp. We appreciated your comments very much.
I declare the meeting adjourned.