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EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Monday, June 5, 1995

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[English]

The Chair: I wish to call the meeting to order. We are continuing with our consideration of Bill C-68, an act respecting firearms and other weapons. We are continuing with the clause-by-clause consideration.

Last week we completed up to and including clause 101 of the bill. This morning we will start with two amendments that propose new clause 101.1. While the Bloc Québécois amendment BQ-8 proposes new clauses 101.1, 101.2 and 101.3, government amendment G-46 proposes new clause 101.1. These proposed clauses have to do with offences and penalties under the bill.

[Translation]

I will give the floor to Mrs. Venne, who will explain her amendment, BQ-8.

Mrs. Venne (Saint-Hubert): The purpose of clauses 101.1, 101.2 and 101.3 is to decriminalize the non-registration of firearms, only in the case of non-restricted and non-prohibited long guns.

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This amendment would replace the criminal offence with an indictable offence involving a minimum fine. It also covers repeat offences.

The best thing to do is to look at the clauses in question. Subclause 101.1(1) describes the offence and subclause 101.1(2) describes the fine. The offence is the failure to have a license to possess a long gun. We're thinking particularly of hunting guns and failure to have a registration certificate for the firearm.

So this offence would be punishable on summary conviction and the person would be liable to a fine of not more than $1,250 and not less than $500.

For a second offence, the maximum fine would be $2,000, and the minimum fine would be $1,250. For a third or subsequent offence, the maximum fine would be $2,000 and imprisonment for six months.

Subparagraph (3)(a) explains that no offence is committed when a person who possesses the firearm is under the direct supervision of someone who lawfully possesses it.

Subparagraph (3)(b) states that the offence and the punishment do not apply to the person who comes into possession of the firearm by the operation of law. This refers to people who have just inherited a firearm.

Subclause (4) defines "firearm" as it is used in this provision. It refers to firearms that are neither prohibited nor restricted. Thus the definition remains the same as it is at the moment in Bill C-68.

Clause 101.2(1) reads as follows:

These amendments are consequential to the ones we have just moved. You will notice that we refer in this clause to 2001. This refers to a clause we have already passed, which actually made the registration system effective as of January 1, 2001.

I will now move immediately to subclause 101.2(3) and tell you that it should be corrected. On line 4 of the French version and on line 5 of the English, the reference should be to January 1, 1996, and not 1988 in French and 1998 in English.

The purpose of these corrections is consequential on amendments we have already requested, namely that the system come into effect in January 1996 and end in 2001. So, on the fifth line from the bottom of the clause in the French version, and on the fourth line from the bottom in the English version, the reference should be to 2001, rather than 2003.

Subclause 101.3(1) is new, in that it provides that a person convicted of an offence be deemed not to have been convicted of a criminal offence.

Subclause (2) states that this type of offence does not constitute an offence for the purposes of the Criminal Records Act.

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All of this, of course, so as to avoid a criminal record for a person who did not store his hunting weapons. More specifically, those are the ones targeted.

At subclause (3), despite subclause (1) that states that the person is said to not have been summarily convicted of a criminal offence, it is stated that the Criminal Code provisions concerning offences punishable by summary conviction are nonetheless applicable even to offences under paragraph 101.1(2)(a) and (b).

At subclause (5), we state the following:

To conclude, subclause (7) stipulates that:

I wanted to explain quickly the content of this amendment. If you have any other questions, we are here to answer. In the meantime, we would like to hear parliamentary secretary MacLellan's remarks.

[English]

Mr. Russell MacLellan (Parliamentary Secretary to Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada): On their face, the proposed clauses seek to decriminalize the offence created by new clause 101.1 of BQ-8, that is, to be in possession of a firearm other than a restricted or prohibited firearm without being the holder of the appropriate documents.

Unfortunately the drafters lifted the wording from the Contraventions Act without importing the general scheme created by the act. The proposed clauses are quite similar to section 63 of the Contraventions Act. What they merely mean is, one, the person convicted is deemed not to have been convicted of a criminal offence, and two, the person convicted cannot rely on the Criminal Records Act. In the first case it's unclear what benefit is drawn from not having been convicted of a criminal offence.

In the context of the Contraventions Act, the law specifically states that the purpose of the act is to ``alter or abolish the consequences in law of being convicted''. It also states that making an offence for which a ticket is issued ``reflects the distinction between criminal offences and regulatory offences''.

Not being supported by the whole Contraventions Act scheme, the effect of proposed subclause 101.3(1) is merely to declare that one has not been convicted of a criminal offence, and if asked that very question, one could truthfully answer that one has not been convicted of a criminal offence. However, it's far from clear that no record would be constituted and that the person found guilty could not benefit from the remedy provided by the Criminal Records Act.

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As for proposed subclause 101.3(2), not constituting an offence for the purpose of the Criminal Records Act denies someone found guilty of an offence pursuant to proposed clause 101.1 of BQ-8 the benefit of the Criminal Records Act. In other words, the unintended effect of proposed subclause 101.3(2) is to make it impossible to get a pardon pursuant to the Criminal Records Act.

I think proposed subclauses 101.3(1) and (2), taken without the support of the scheme created by the Contraventions Act, Mr. Chair, do not produce the intended results. On the contrary, they work to the disadvantage of the person convicted under proposed clause 101.2 of BQ-8 by denying that person the possibility of being granted a pardon.

Also, on the question of the penalties and the first-offence fine being between $500 and $1,250, $500 being the minimum, and the second-offence fine being between $1,250 and $2,000 and $1,250 being the minimum, oddly enough, subsequent offences are not punishable by a minimum penalty but are punishable as any other summary conviction offence.

It's unclear to me what would happen if the person found guilty and sentenced to a minimum fine of $500 or $1,250 refuses to pay. The amendment is silent as to what happens, other than to say in proposed subclause 101.3(3) that the code provisions of summary conviction will apply. If that is to be the case, is the person to be sentenced to prison if in default, and if so, for how long? Given the size of the fine, how many cases will there be where the person does not have the financial means to pay? Will they all end up in prison for not paying what is, by all accounts, really a substantial fine?

If the code provisions were to apply to BQ-8, we would end up with a minimum penalty of $500 and $1,250 for the first two offences, with imprisonment of up to six months in prison if found guilty, if that person is in default of payment. It would seem that the person would be in better shape the third time around because he or she does not have to cope with a minimum and is only faced with a maximum of six months in jail.

Also, proposed subclause 101.3(5) prevents the disclosure of the very record for which a pardon cannot be obtained. There are records, of course; they're not on CPIC, but there would be records.

So there are two ways they wouldn't be able to get a pardon: first, there wouldn't be a record available for which to pardon; and second, the Criminal Records Act would not apply. Furthermore, how will subsequent offences to proposed clause 101.1 be proven if the record of the first offence cannot be disclosed?

So I would say there are some problems with BQ-8. We have an amendment that we feel is much more satisfactory. It does what we feel needs to be done without creating the problems that BQ-8 would create.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. McLellan.

Before I give the floor to others, I want to remind the committee that we have a lot of work to do today and consequently I intend to keep members to the relevancy of the clauses we're discussing. In other words, if any member starts to discuss clauses other than the one that's before the committee at any given time, I will rule them out of order. I want you to concentrate on the clauses we have before us in each case.

So with that, I have a list of Mr. Wappel, Mrs. Barnes, and Mr. Langlois.

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Mr. Wappel (Scarborough West): I haven't read the Contraventions Act, but I've read the amendment. Obviously, some thought went into it - some considerable thought went into it - and I have some sympathy for it, but I have no sympathy for two- and three-time losers on something very simple; that is, registration, or compliance with the firearms act.

I listened very carefully to Mr. MacLellan, because I wanted to hear what the government had to say. I am not persuaded that there is some fault in not having the Criminal Records Act available for a pardon, because who cares? This is not a criminal offence. If it's not a criminal offence, who cares if you have a pardon? So I don't see any problem with the Criminal Records Act.

I do see a problem, however, with unnecessary leniency. I think a person certainly can be given the benefit of the doubt in the appropriate circumstances the first time, but once the system is in place, if you're a second-time offender, I think you should have a criminal record, because you have knowingly done something you're not supposed to do.

So I can't support the BQ amendment.

Mrs. Barnes (London West): Mr. Chairman, in light of your comments I also will be extremely brief.

I recognize that the Bloc has put a lot of effort into drafting this legislation. One point I want to bring out, though, concerned me when I reviewed this over the weekend. That's the fact that by giving a minimum penalty on a first offence, the provision in section 736 of the code that allows for conditional or absolute discharges at the discretion of the judge will not be available on a first-time situational offence.

I think there could be occasions in this enforcement of the legislation where we absolutely would want the judge to have the discretion to give an unconditional or an absolute discharge, even when the offence is found to occur. For that reason alone I would not support this.

Later on today I will be moving another amendment on a similar area. I did carefully examine this area. I see some of the things you're moving toward and some of the ideas, and I respect those, but I can't support it on this absolute and conditional discharge being absent from the minimum penalties that are mandatory under your provision.

That's all I wish to say.

[Translation]

Mr. Langlois (Bellechasse): Mr. Chairman, I would be grateful if you could recognize Mrs. Venne before me, and I would ask the clerk to reinsert my name in the list of questioners.

Mrs. Venne: I just want to make a comment on what Mr. MacLellan said. He told us that he had a number of questions about the various sections and subsections which we proposed. I wonder why we in the Bloc Québécois were not consulted so as to determine the exact meaning of these proposals. If technical details needed improvement, we could have worked on them.

I think there is something underlying all of this, and it should be stated clearly. It is not really the technical side of things that bothers the government here. Rather, I think it is the substance, and this should be clearly stated.

Mr. MacLellan said there was a problem because the whole record could not be disclosed. You would not know, for example, how many times the person had reoffended. However, subsection (6) states that the file can be shown to someone in authority. I mentioned this just to respond briefly to Mr. MacLellan's observations.

Mr. Langlois: The point I want to make is similar to Mrs. Venne's. This amendment was tabled exactly one week ago today. It wasn't just by chance that the Bloc Québécois tabled all its amendments. We have not tabled any others since them, so as to ensure that the committee could consider those that were tabled. I find it somewhat strange that there were no consultations about them.

That is why I shall probably move later that the section be allowed to stand, so as to enable the various parties to consider it more thoroughly.

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I appreciate the argument raised earlier by Mr. Wappel, namely that it would apply only to a first offence. However, that could perhaps be discussed in an informal framework rather than going around the table. Therefore, it might be helpful to postpone consideration of this section and possible amendments so as to enable us to discuss them.

I would like to point out quite simply and in a friendly way that earlier Mrs. Barnes said it would not be possible to apply section 736 of the Criminal Code concerning absolute discharge. I must point out that section 2(3) of the Criminal Records Act stipulates that a person discharged absolutely shall be deemed to have been convicted of the offence. The person is deemed to have been convicted within the meaning of section 2(3) of the Criminal Records Act. I would just like to read this slowly so as to allow for interpretation. The subsection reads:

This leads to article 3 which states that a person who has been convicted of an offence under an Act of Parliament or a regulation made thereunder may apply to the Minister for a pardon in respect of that offence.

Mr. MacLellan said earlier that it would be very regrettable if amendment BQ-8 were adopted, because nobody could benefit from the absolute discharge provided under the Criminal Records Act. Although I see that somewhat differently, if the person is not deemed to have a criminal record, pursuant to the amendment it is obvious that the person does not need to use the provisions of the Criminal Records Act to seek a pardon for an offence which he or she has not committed. This could be considered differently.

Apart from that, is this to be applied to the first offence? Is it to be applied to the first two offences, to just one or to the first three? On this point there is probably some possibility of flexibility. We could think about this together, and come back to it later today.

In amendment BQ-8, I think that there is an attempt to reach a compromise in a difficult situation. Our meetings have shown that there are two main currents of thought: one in favour of the bill and another, which is also important, against the bill. Some of us agree with one side, some with the other.

Society is able to accept certain changes, but we must be sure that it is able to absorb all the changes that we want it to accept.

With our proposal for section 101.1 and the changes that will come from this, we can probably reconcile those two currents of thought, and that is what we have been working towards. We want the registration of firearms, while ensuring that people who in good faith did not register their weapons would not, on a first offence, be considered criminals.

Therefore, we are not dealing here with the Criminal Records Act and the requirement to state on job applications that you have a criminal record. It is also impossible to implement section 21 of the Criminal Code, and this is very important because this particular section talks about parties to an offence.

When you criminalize, you are not just criminalizing the person who failed to register his or her weapon; in many cases, you are also obviously criminalizing their spouse. You will be criminalizing those children old enough to distinguish between right and wrong, because they could also be parties to the offence. At first sight, they will also be accomplices, and I find it very regrettable that so many people should be involved.

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In the case of a criminal offence, the attempt to commit the offence is covered as well as the conspiracy in view to commit it. For the first offence, and maybe for the two first offences, there is room for discussion, Mr. Wappel, and with other colleagues, I think we could reach an agreement on that.

We could try to make two currently opposing schools of thought converge in the same direction. I think we are heading in a very bad direction. We are giving rise to social confrontation among those who have opposing views and values. A case can be made one way or another. I cannot however share the extremist views held by either camps.

That is why, Mr. Chairman, that I support amendment BQ-8 as it stands. It might be possible to improve it technically as far as the scope of the amendment is concerned. But concerning the pith and substance of BQ-8, I think it can greatly improve the bill.

Instead of dividing those who will have to work with this bill and who will have to live with the act once it is passed, this amendment will help to heal some wounds by making the bill more acceptable to a lot of people who are not totally opposed to it. That is our aim in submitting this amendment.

The Chair: Thank you.

[English]

Mr. MacLellan: I agree with Mr. Wappel that a lot of work has gone into it. It's very interesting, and it requires a lot of thought and consideration, which we've given to it. But we feel that the penalties are severe. We wanted the first offence of the non-registering of a long gun to be in the firearms act. That was the intention, but not to go further.

We feel that offence under the firearms act does provide a very equitable solution. The penalties are not onerous. There's no fingerprinting because it's a summary conviction. Therefore, it won't be on CPIC unless the person has a prior conviction, an indictable offence, or has committed other offences at this time. So there won't be a registration under CPIC.

The Criminal Records Act was initiated mainly for the purposes of pardons. There is going to be a record. It's not going to be on CPIC. But somewhere there's going to be a record if this person is proceeded with before the courts summarily. There has to be, or else we don't know whether an offence is a subsequent offence. You have to leave the person the right to have that other record done away with.

Also, Mrs. Venne mentioned BQ-8 proposed subclause 101.3(6). The concern I would have there is around who the prescribed persons are. I would assume they would be judges.

As I say, Mr. Chair, it's a very interesting amendment, and I think it has a lot of advantages. I just don't think that, with discussion, we would be able to come to an agreement as to what we consider as the disadvantages because some of the disadvantages are very material points of BQ-8.

[Translation]

Mr. Langlois: I forgot to make a brief observation earlier, but Mr. MacLellan is giving me now the opportunity to make it. Let's take the case of a person who would have committed what is considered a very minor criminal offence like not having registered a firearm, and who would be called as a witness during criminal proceedings. As it is normal, that person would be asked if he or she has a criminal record in order to undermine his or her credibility. Were you ever found guilty of a criminal offense? The person will necessarily answer yes, since he or she was found guilty.

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Let's take the case of a person who was found guilty of not registering a long gun. Let's imagine it is a farmer who, without any bad intent or by negligence, did not register his firearm and gets a criminal record. He's a witness before the court and he is asked: were you ever found guilty of a criminal offense? His answer must be yes.

This person just lost part of his credibility since the judge or the jury can by association think that because he has not declared a firearm, he can potentially be violent. What conclusions will be drawn from this by the judge or the jury?

I find the consequences absolutely excessive for a person who simply omitted, in good faith or by negligence, to declare that he or she owned a long gun. I want to be clear on this. We are not talking about restricted firearms or prohibited firearms. We are only talking about what constitutes in my mind the traditional hunting weapon. We are not even thinking about the owners of AK-47s or bazookas who would want to roam the streets of metropolitan Toronto. We are far from that.

So we are targeting a special group, a special group that does not warrant criminalization, at least for the first offense. And I believe there is some elbow room between the first and the third offense, as we mentioned earlier. Thank you.

[English]

Mr. MacLellan: This is just in reply to Mr. Langlois on the question of a person who was called as a witness or indeed has been charged before a court and asked if they have a criminal record. The modern rule is that it's not sufficient any more; they'd have to be asked what the record is and what the conviction was for. There would be nothing to attribute to the morality or the honesty of the person, unless it was a charge relating to dishonesty.

As you know, Mr. Chair, a charge under the firearms act for a first offence for the non-registration of a long gun is not a conviction for dishonesty. It states clearly that it's somebody who has inadvertently forgotten or neglected to register a long gun. So there's not a question of dishonesty. An offence under this clause would not affect a person's standing before the court or a question of their honesty or character.

The Chair: Shall amendment BQ-8 carry?

[Translation]

Mr. Langlois: I advised the committee earlier that I would ask for this amendment to be stood. That's what I am doing now.

[English]

The Chair: It's been requested this amendment be stood. There's no agreement for it to be stood; consequently, I'll have to put the amendment.

Amendment negatived [See Minutes of Proceedings]

The Chair: Next we have amendment G-46, which would also provide for a new clause 101.1 to deal with penalties and offences.

Mr. Bodnar (Saskatoon - Dundurn): Mr. Chairman, I so move amendment G-46. This particular clause, which is a new clause, would require anyone, after having given reasonable notice, to show his or her guns to a firearms officer for the purpose of verifying the registration information and the serial number on the firearm.

This power would not allow firearms officers to go into homes unless an owner expressly consented. Otherwise, the owner could bring these firearms to the local police station or whatever. This, I suggest, is a reasonable manner of dealing with this so the inspector can perform his or her duties and yet not infringe on the rights of the individuals who own the firearms.

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The Chair: Mr. MacLellan, do you have anything to add?

Mr. MacLellan: Yes. This is cross-referenced with a subsequent government amendment, G-48. One of the reasons for this is that it's an option for not going into the home of the owner. The police have expressed a concern about members of the public travelling across town with firearms in their cars for purposes that...the firearms officer or the police officer may want to examine. So we feel this is an important amendment and is very helpful.

The Chair: Mr. Ramsay.

Mr. Ramsay (Crowfoot): When we had the RCMP witnesses before the committee, the reason they supported the mail-in registration system was to avoid the danger they saw in having the firearm owners bring their firearms in to be registered, in the same manner as the handgun registration system requires now.

What this clause or amendment would do is in fact have long gun owners bring their firearms in to be checked. If this bill is going to go forward and we are to set up a registration system, it ought to be one with information that has been verified. This, of course, would be a step in that direction.

I am very much opposed to the mail-in registration system because of the fact the identifying features on a firearm are not verified when it goes into the system. A registration card will be issued on the basis of the information received, which might be faulty, and that means that faulty registration cards may be issued. Inasmuch as there is an offence, and a pretty serious offence, for having a firearm that is not registered, that poses a problem for me.

This tends to be inconsistent with what we heard from the deputy commissioner of the RCMP when he appeared before the committee and embraced the mail-in system and justified that by his concern about the hazard that might be created if there are hundreds of thousands of people moving firearms into police stations and so on. So perhaps the mover might address that bit of inconsistency that I see between what the deputy commissioner of the RCMP has said and what this amendment would provide for.

Mr. Bodnar: The proposed clause says that the firearms inspector may require the person to produce the firearm in the manner specified by the inspector. The firearm doesn't have to be brought to the police station, but in a small community he may call up and ask for that. But it's for a manner prescribed by the inspector. It might be simply the inspector coming to the door and asking to see your gun just to check the serial number on it, right at the residence. This allows for a tremendous amount of flexibility, and for that reason it is quite reasonable because it will fit the circumstances and be a reasonable way of dealing with the situation.

Mr. MacLellan: I just want to support what Mr. Bodnar has said. Also, Mr. Chair, this is not a provision that would be used frequently. It would be used primarily in a situation where a serial number sent in through direct mailing was obviously wrong. For instance, it had a number that the computer would reject, because the various levels of serial numbers for various manufacturers are fed into the computers, and if this serial number could not fit within the line of serial numbers that, for instance, Smith and Wesson had issued, then it would obviously be wrong and there may then be a request to see the particular firearm.

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But as Mr. Bodnar said, it gives a great deal of flexibility, and it is a provision the firearms officers and the police feel would be very effective. In fact, requiring the person to bring that gun across town, as Mr. Ramsay said, is something the police want to avoid in a lot of circumstances. This flexibility would allow them to avoid that.

Mr. Ramsay: I have one short comment. I understand the intent of the amendment. From a purely technical point of view, the amendment refers to the serial number. Of course, as we've heard a number of times, thousands and thousands of firearms out there do not have serial numbers. I'm wondering if instead of ``serial number'' we could say ``identifying features'' of the firearm. This is just a suggestion.

I have concerns about this whole area, but I see difficulties in the fact that we have not only hundreds of thousands of firearms with no serial numbers, but as well, according to RCMP figures they've provided us with, in the handgun registration system alone 370,000 handguns have the same serial number.

That's just a point I want to make.

The Chair: Mr. MacLellan, do your officials have the actual number of firearms without registration numbers? It was just stated that there are hundreds of thousands. Is that correct?

Mr. MacLellan: It would just be a guess, Mr. Chairman. There is really no way of knowing.

I would like to say, though, that I think Mr. Ramsay has made a very helpful suggestion. If we perhaps added, after ``serial number'', the words ``or other identifying features'', it probably would strengthen the amendment.

The Chair: You're proposing a subamendment wherein the fourth and fifth lines of the English version of the amendment would read:

Is there further discussion or comment?

Subamendment agreed to

Amendment agreed to on division [See Minutes of Proceedings]

Clauses 102 to 104 inclusive agreed to on division

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On clause 105 - Punishment

The Chair: Amendment G-47 is moved by Mr. Bodnar.

Mr. Bodnar: Mr. Chairman, this particular clause is being amended for certainty's sake, or for clarity. I'll let Mr. MacLellan explain further, if he has any comments.

Mr. MacLellan: It adds the underlying words, ``who contravenes subsection 28(1)''. It's a punishment provision. It relates to operating shooting clubs without provincial ministers' approval, and is cross-referenced with G-18.

Amendment agreed to [See Minutes of Proceedings]

Mr. Wappel: I'd like to ask Mr. MacLellan about clause 105 and the last line of the chapeau, I guess it would be called, which says, ``an offence under paragraph 110(o)''.

This is a situation where the offences have not yet been created but the punishments have. It's my understanding that it's generally the case, although certainly not always the case, that certain matters are not appropriate subjects for delegated legislation; rather, they should be dealt with by Parliament itself.

I was wondering what your views would be in answer to those who would say that the enactment of provisions affecting the liberty of the subject are usually matters such as those where you would have Parliament and not officials decide what will be offences that might deprive the person of their liberty.

Was that kind of thinking discussed? If so, I'm wondering what your response might be to those who would say it's inappropriate for anybody other than Parliament itself to create offences whereby a person may be deprived of their liberty.

Mr. MacLellan: Really, Mr. Chairman, the thinking was that these would be under the regulations and that the regulations would be coming before Parliament for approval. I agree that it isn't in the act as such, but it would be in the regulations.

Mr. Wappel: I don't wish to belabour the point, but I just wish to be clear that a regulation may prescribe an offence that currently is not prescribed by the act, the breach of which regulation may result in a person being imprisoned for up to five years in a penitentiary.

As we will see when we get to the regulation review mechanism - and Mr. Chairman has cautioned us to be relevant to the clause, but you mentioned it - there really is no review by the committee, or any committee, in reality, which we'll get to.

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I'm a little concerned that we are delegating to the officialdom the ability to deprive a person of their liberty without Parliament having averted its mind to it. If that's what we intend, then let us know, and state that this is what we intend. Perhaps that would be an additional factor to be considered by the government in ensuring that regulations are reviewed by the House of Commons.

Mr. MacLellan: I'd like Mr. Mosley to comment further on this. I think he has some more information.

Mr. Richard Mosley (Assistant Deputy Minister, Criminal and Social Policy Sector, Department of Justice): I think Mr. Wappel has spoken to the point that I did wish to make, that of course these regulations would be presented to Parliament so that the new offences created under the regulation would be subject to parliamentary scrutiny.

I think the point is that it might be helpful if we could stand the matter and obtain a little bit more information about other examples where the regulations themselves actually...commit offences in addition to the statute. We agree with Mr. Wappel that the normal case is for the offence to be created under the statute for contravention of the regulations. In these circumstances, however, it's somewhat unusual to have regulations that themselves will be submitted to Parliament for its consideration.

We may be able to respond to the concern by pointing to specific examples where this has been used elsewhere. For that purpose, I would ask if the matter could be stood, and we'll come back to it when we have that information.

The Chair: I'm going to be very strict now. The request to stand an article must be made by a member of the committee. Mr. MacLellan may request it, but I want to remind the committee that we will have to come back to, today, any article stood today. We don't have another week or an additional number of days.

Mr. MacLellan, are you asking that clause 105 be stood?

Mr. MacLellan: Mr. Chair, I'd leave it for Mr. Wappel to determine if that would be helpful.

Mr. Wappel: I would ask for the committee's unanimous consent to stand the clause so that we can see if there are other provisions in other acts that may be similar, which might alleviate some of the concerns I've raised.

The Chair: There's a request to stand clause 105. Is that agreed to?

Mr. Ramsay: I haven't addressed that. I think Mr. Wappel brings out a very important point. In support of what he is saying, what we are seeing in this clause - and in others, but I'll address this clause - is the power to create regulations, and in this case, an offence, that we don't have an opportunity to examine. The suggestion that we will be able to examine these regulations in Parliament is not that clear to me.

We will clear that up when we get into that area, but I think Mr. Wappel has brought up an important point.

The Chair: We are discussing whether we shall stand clause 105. If we decide not to stand it, you can continue discussion on it. If we decide to stand it, the discussion, such as we've just had - and I didn't rule you out of order, Mr. Ramsay - we could have later.

Does the committee agree to the request to stand clause 105?

Some hon. members: No.

The Chair: Is there any further discussion or comment on clause 105?

Mr. MacLellan: For the benefit of the committee, we will provide that information anyway.

Ms Meredith (Surrey - White Rock - South Langley): On the concern Mr. Wappel brought up, could we ask legal counsel if they have a quick comment as to whether there's some validity to it?

The Chair: Does legal counsel wish to respond to the request made by Ms Meredith with respect to the matters raised by Mr. Wappel?

Ms Diane McMurray (Legislative Counsel): No, I don't think we have anything to say on this matter.

.1000

Mr. William Bartlett (Committee Researcher): I spent five years on the joint committee that reviews regulations, when it was under a different name. In fact, I think I served on that same committee with Mr. Wappel.

It is not at all uncommon for regulations to create offences and for the penalty to be in the act itself. I can't give you any specific examples just from memory, but I can assure you that I have seen many such examples.

The Chair: In any case, we now will deal with clause 105 as amended.

Clause 105 as amended agreed to on division

Clause 106 agreed to on division

On clause 107 - Punishment

The Chair: We've received two amendments to clause 107. We also have a further amendment to create two new clauses.

We shall first deal with the two amendments to clause 107. The first one is LW-17, which I believe is an amendment proposed by Mr. Wappel.

Mr. Wappel: I'm amused to note that the Bloc and I have brought exactly the same amendment. I won't be proceeding with mine for the reasons I gave when I talked about clause 100.

The Chair: Very well. Then I go to the Bloc Québécois for amendment BQ-9.

[Translation]

Mrs. Venne: The BQ amendment was consequential to the passing of section 101.1 and the following, that you rejected this morning.

Since you rejected the sections 101.1, 101.2 and 101.3 that we submitted, I withdraw the amendment BQ-9.

[English]

Clause 107 agreed to on division

The Chair: I move to amendment G-48, which would provide for new clauses 107.1 and 107.2.

Mrs. Barnes: I am pleased to move that Bill C-68 be amended by adding new clauses 107.1 and 107.2, which you've had notice of. They affect page 45 of the bill.

Just to put it into context, there has been an awful lot of discussion around having only offences found in proposed sections 91 and 92 of Bill C-68, which amend the Criminal Code. This is especially directed at those who might inadvertently break the law by having a firearm in their possession without having the proper documentation.

When we started discussion back on April 24, 1995, when the minister came he said he would consider some relaxation in this area. He gave us some guidelines on the amendment.

Just to review that, there were four guidelines I think it's important to look back at now: that we look at this as a relaxation for long guns only; that it means the possession of restricted and prohibited firearms will not be sanctioned by a new offence; that it couldn't apply to those who wilfully defy the law; and neither could it apply to those whose intent is truly to commit a crime, such as a robber on his way to the bank. We're not trying to deal with that situation; it was so that the registration of firearms could not become optional by the law having an ineffectual offence.

So I am pleased to move G-48. After discussion with my colleagues and the government, I think new clauses 107.1 and 107.2 of the firearms act satisfy the four conditions the minister placed before us and posed to us to rectify.

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The offence, in essence, applies only to those found in possession of long guns without the proper documentation. All other cases will be governed by sections 91 and 92 of the Criminal Code as amended by this bill.

Similarly, those who defy the law, even with respect to the long guns, could still be prosecuted under sections 91 and 92 of the Criminal Code. The robber on the way to a bank with a shotgun will not escape lightly, because he'll be prosecuted vigorously under those sections.

Finally, being found guilty under proposed clause 107.1 will not be so trivial that it would bring the administration of the registration system into disrepute. The message has to remain - and will remain - that you must register. We have to be very clear with that.

The proposed clauses themselves are quite straightforward. I'll review them. It is an offence to be in possession of the firearms, other than prohibited and restricted. The onus to prove that one is the holder of the required registration certificate is on the accused, if only because he or she is the best person to produce the document that has been issued to the holder.

There are exceptions to the application of the offence provisions provided in proposed subclause (2) as well as one transitional provision. The offence that would be created by the addition of proposed clause 107.1 to the firearms act - not the Criminal Code - will be a summary conviction offence. This should provide the balance that many people have been talking about and looking for. It's somewhere between the harsh reality of a conviction under the Criminal Code and the trivializing of an offence to the point of rendering it meaningless.

We've created a summary conviction offence. We are introducing some needed flexibility. This is to go to the public. We've heard testimony that says people don't want to break the law, that there have to be some allowances for those people who make inadvertent mistakes, and that they don't want to be placed under the Criminal Code.

There's always going to be flexibility for the Crown and the police in enforcing this new regime created by Bill C-68. I think it's necessary to put it on the record now because as I read media reports, I've seen errors on what's involved with a summary conviction offence.

I might ask for some clarification in a minute from Mr. MacLellan, but there were a few things I wanted to point out.

The first is with respect to fingerprinting. With a summary conviction offence there's no mandatory fingerprinting under the Identification of Criminals Act. Fingerprinting is allowed with consent of the individual.

Under CPIC - this gets at some of the concerns expressed by the Reform Party colleagues around this table - where there are no fingerprints taken, references to a criminal record will not likely appear in the automated criminal conviction records retrieval system maintained by the RCMP because of the difficulty of identification without fingerprints. That should be made clear.

With respect to summary conviction offences, under our current law you cannot proceed on a summary conviction offence unless it's within six months after the event took place, and this will be the case for proposed clause 107.1.

Crown discretion should be talked about a bit because charges do not have to be laid in every case. If laid, charges don't necessarily have to be pursued. For instance, the Crown may, in its discretion, not prosecute a matter and be satisfied with a warning.

I do need some clarification with respect to discharges. I still believe that under section 736 of the Criminal Code, even if there is a prosecution under the firearms act for summary convictions, trial judges would have the discretion to grant absolute or conditional discharges. I think that is available. If that's granted here, then the individual will be deemed not to have been convicted. Again, it is another sort of escape hatch for those people in those specific situations I think people are most concerned about, such as forgetting to register the gun because they hadn't even thought about it for a number of years, or whatever.

I think the penalty on summary convictions should also be reviewed. A lot of people who are non-lawyers don't understand the differences in general terms, and I think this is the appropriate place to talk about them.

Summary conviction offences carry lesser penalties. Where not specifically provided by law, they can be punishable by up to $2,000 and/or six months in jail. It signals to the court that this matter is less serious where the maximum penalty is not as high. As I said before, the trial judge can impose the suspended sentence and a fine before he or she resorts to imprisonment, and he usually will do so.

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For the sake of the Criminal Records Act, I also believe the application for pardon is still available after three years. Pardon shall be issued if there is no conviction during that three-year period. So if you have a conviction under a summary conviction and you apply for a pardon after the passing of a three-year time period, those records will be expunged.

If I've misstated anything I would like the government to correct me just for clarification, because this is the government amendment that was basically brought about by all of us after conferring on all of our various amendments and concerns. I think this goes a long way to alleviating the concerns of the public, Mr. Chair. I'll just pass it over.

Mr. MacLellan: Mr. Chair, nothing remains to be said. Mrs. Barnes has done an excellent job of setting forward the amendment. She's also correct on what she said about the judge's right to discharge under section 736.

[Translation]

Mr. Langlois: I would like to ask Mr. MacLellan how he can avoid answering the comments of Mrs. Barnes when the Criminal Records Act says that conditional discharge, according to the meaning of this term under the Criminal Records Act, is deemed to be a conviction. How can he refrain from answering when Section 34 of the Interpretation Act considers as a criminal offence disclosures made following a summary conviction under Section 34(2)?

One is trying to manage, and I understand it well, by saying: it's criminal, but it's less criminal. It is like being pregnant, Mr. Chairman: you cannot be a little pregnant.

Is it a criminal offence or not? The offence in G-48 is a criminal offence that does not, obviously, entail the taking of fingerprints, the use of the Bertillon Signaletic System or the taking of pictures, but it creates an offence under the Criminal Records Act and the Interpretation Act that sees to it that the Criminal Code be applied.

It is all nice and well to say that you decriminalize, but that is not what you are doing in Section 107.1. You criminalize. Fingerprints are not taken, but the person gets a criminal record. You cannot have it both ways; when you try to have it both ways, you confuse everyone.

I ask this question, Mr. MacLellan: Would a person that would be convicted of the offence described in Section 107.1 be deemed to have committed a criminal offence? I could ask this to Mr. Mosley, but it will be faster this way.

[English]

The Chair: I would ask Mr. MacLellan to answer that.

It's my understanding that under the firearms act it would be a criminal conviction. If it wasn't criminal, our jurisdiction as the federal government might otherwise be in question, so it has to be criminal law. Is that not correct? And you might answer Mr. Langlois' question at the same time.

Mr. MacLellan: Yes, you're correct, Mr. Chair. Taking this first offence for non-intentional failure to register a long gun out of the Criminal Code does various things.

First of all, I think it makes it a summary offence. If it's not under the Criminal Code there is a much, much, much greater possibility the person won't be charged all. Because it's a first offence the officials may decide not to bring any charge at all. They might just say, look, would you please register this and I'll check back in a month's time to see that this firearm is registered. That's a possibility.

There's also the possibility, as Mrs. Barnes has said, that there would be a discharge. Now, the discharge, of course, under no circumstances can be on CPIC or any record like that. There would still certainly be a local record of discharge, but it isn't an offence. You cannot say it isn't a criminal record if a person is found guilty under this summary conviction.

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We are saying that under the Criminal Records Act this can be deleted even from local records. Certainly, because it's a summary conviction no fingerprints are required, as Mrs. Barnes has said, and they will not be registered on CPIC unless the person agrees to have his or her fingerprints taken. That's up to the individual. But this goes a long way toward reducing the offensive nature of someone being charged under the Criminal Code for the inadvertent failure to register a rifle or a shotgun.

[Translation]

Mrs. Venne: I would like the officials here to tell us what is the specific difference between proposed section 107.1 and subsection 91(1), apart from the punishement. I would like to know what is the difference between those two.

[English]

Mr. Mosley: Effectively there's no difference. The two offences would exist parallel to each other. Substantively, there is no additional element that the Crown would have to prove in the offence under the Criminal Code.

[Translation]

Mrs. Venne: What guarantee do we have that the Crown prosecutor will proceed this way or another, that he will criminalize or not?

[English]

Mr. Mosley: There are no guarantees that can be provided. But I would like to draw the analogy, as the minister did when he appeared, to the offence of theft, which applies to automobiles, and the offence of joy-riding, which Parliament in its wisdom chose to create, and is effectively the same. There's really no substantive difference between the two. But the one offence, joy-riding, has been used for many years with the discretion of the police and the Crown as the lesser offence. Certainly it has a lesser penalty and is used instead of attaching the offence of theft to an individual, which carries a somewhat greater stigma.

So the expectation is that in the case of someone who has failed to register his or her long guns, the police and the Crown will choose to make use of the offence under the firearms act rather than going the route of the Criminal Code.

[Translation]

Mrs. Venne: To conclude, I would simply like to note that, in amendment 107.1(3), it says the year 2003. If you want it to correspond to what has already been adopted, it should read 2001. The amendment BQ-7 has been passed. So I think it should read 2001 and not 2003. This is not a major change. At any rate, you could review it and change it later.

[English]

The Chair: Now is the time to do it if we're going to do it.

Mr. MacLellan, what about the year 2003 as opposed to 2001?

Mr. MacLellan: Here we're talking about registration only. Because the registration doesn't finish until January 1, 2003, 2003 is the only date we could use.

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Ms Meredith: I want to follow up on a couple of comments that were made by my colleague across the way, Mrs. Barnes, that fingerprints would not be taken unless by consent. Will the people who are brought to charge be warned or advised that they do not have to give their fingerprints in this case?

The other thing I'd like to bring up is your comment ``not likely to appear''. I think it should be made quite clear what you mean by that. Will it appear or will it not appear?

The Chair: Appear where?

Ms Meredith: Appear in CPIC. Will these records appear as criminal charges or not? Yes or no? This ``not likely to appear'' is not very convincing and certainly not very satisfying to the people who are out there.

I would like you to comment further on the chairman's question as to whether or not, if there isn't a criminal charge for first non-compliance, the federal government has any jurisdiction in this matter of registration.

The Chair: To be clear, I said it was my view that in the firearms act it was a criminal offence, although a lesser one. Otherwise, if it was not a criminal offence, it may undermine the jurisdiction of the federal government. I believe it is a criminal offence, but it's up to you to answer.

Mr. Mosley: On the second question, clearly it's a criminal offence. More importantly, it's an offence under an act of Parliament, which is justified by the criminal law power of the federal Constitution.

With regard to the fingerprints issue, I think it's important to comment on how fingerprints are normally taken in this country. They're normally taken in two circumstances. One is when somebody has been physically arrested, i.e., the police have taken them into custody and taken them to the police station. I can't really conceive of any circumstances under which that would possibly happen in the case of the offence under the firearms act.

The second circumstance is when they're issued an appearance notice to show up for the purposes of being fingerprinted under the Identification of Criminals Act. Since this will be a summary conviction offence, the police would not have the authority to issue an appearance notice for that purpose. So the only legal circumstances in which they might possibly take the fingerprints is if they had made an arrest, but again that is a highly unlikely, extremely remote situation.

Again, I would stress that it's unlikely that a decision would be made to charge where compliance could be achieved through some other means, i.e., telling the person to secure the firearm properly and having the inspector check on it again later. But if the decision is made to charge, the most likely scenario is that the officer would lay an information and ask the justice of the peace to issue process, i.e., a summons to appear in court to answer to the charge. That doesn't involve an arrest. It doesn't involve physically taking the person to the police station. In those circumstances, it would not involve a situation where they might be asked to provide their fingerprints on consent.

Ms Phinney (Hamilton Mountain): I have two questions. I'm not a lawyer and most of the people who will be reading or trying to understand this bill also will not be lawyers. I would like to know what I can tell my constituents. What is the actual clause or where is it where it says this is going to be a summary offence? That's my first question to Mr. Mosley.

My second question is that when you're first arrested, how will the individual or the police know...? Who's going to tell who? Who's going to decide whether the charge is going to be under proposed subsection 91(1) or under the firearms act and therefore a lesser offence?

Mr. Mosley: Mr. Chair, I will answer the second question first. It's unlikely that an arrest would be made, as I was suggesting in response to the question from Ms Meredith. The police are given considerable guidance under the Criminal Code with respect to when an arrest should be made for a summary conviction offence. It's really only in circumstances in which they can't prevent the continuing commission of the offence, so there would be a repetition and so on, or where it's necessary to identify the individual.

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With respect to the first question, if you would look at motion G-51, it is an amendment to create a new clause 108.1. It's on page 167.

The Chair: It deals with a new clause 108. That's where it says summary offence.

Mr. Ramsay: I have real difficulty when our committee is being told that arrests will be unlikely under these conditions. The fact of the matter is that from my understanding of this bill a person can be arrested under section 92, or looking at the penalty, simply a person who has knowingly failed to register his or her firearm can be arrested. Whether that is the case or whether evidence can be brought forward to establish that or not in a court of law is a different matter.

A person can be arrested for that because it's an indictable offence and the person can be fingerprinted. I don't know now, and it's been a long time since I've been involved in this kind of thing, but I do know the charge can then be reduced to the summary conviction offence. I'm not sure what happens with those fingerprints. Back in my day, once you got the fingerprints into the system they were there and you couldn't get them out.

I'm very concerned when I hear comments that although we're going to put the law into this bill, or the powers to arrest for certain offences, we don't have to worry about it because arrests are going to be very rare and unlikely. I've already mentioned an actual situation where a lady who was over 50 years of age failed to store her firearms. She had the rifles hanging on the wall and was making a living by delivering papers. Someone looked through the window, saw the firearms on the wall and reported it to the police. She was stopped on the road by two police cruisers, arrested and spent the night in jail. When she got home her door had been smashed in, her house was a mess, her fridge was overturned and the firearms were gone. It took her a year to get them back. This had to do with a very minor offence of failing to properly store firearms.

I caution the members of the committee that when we hear those kinds of comments, yes, the law is there, but we don't expect arrests to be made, or we don't expect charges to be laid.... If you don't want charges laid don't put it in the act. If you put it in the act, you'd better believe peace officers are going to be laying charges. I just have those general comments, Mr. Chairman.

We've talked about discharge. I would like to know the definition of a discharge. When we talk about discharge, does it mean the same as an absolute discharge, or are there two different types of discharge?

The Chair: Maybe we should deal with those questions before we go Mr. Langlois.

Mr. Mosley: There are two types of discharges, absolute and conditional, under section 736 of the Criminal Code.

With regard to the arrest question, I'll try to be a little more specific, if it's helpful. Section 495 of the Criminal Code governs arrest without warrant by a peace officer. Subsection 495(2) is very clear:

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The Identification of Criminals Act is the only authority in Canadian law for taking fingerprints from an accused person. That act makes it quite clear that you can only do so when the person is charged with either an indictable offence or a hybrid offence, i.e., an offence that may be prosecuted either by way of indictment or on summary conviction.

Amendment G-51 speaks of an offence punishable only on summary conviction. There would be no authority in Canadian law to take fingerprints with regard to the proposed offence in relation to the new clause 107.1.

The Chair: Mr. Ramsay.

Mr. Ramsay: This is a supplementary.

The fact of the matter is that a person can be in custody under a summary conviction offence. As we were told here earlier this morning, as I've known for years and as any lawyer knows, the police can ask and take fingerprints with consent. The fact is that at the time the person is in custody, if they do not know their rights, it is very possible they will consent to give fingerprints and that fingerprints will be on file.

The Chair: Do you have any response to that, Mr. MacLellan?

Mr. MacLellan: As Mr. Mosley said, Mr. Chair, under summary conviction and under a situation such as this, the person would not be arrested. If they're not arrested and not in the station, the fingerprints won't be taken. They just won't be there to give the fingerprints.

[Translation]

Mr. Langlois: Regarding section 107.1, and given Mrs. Venne's questions and the legitimate concern that Mr. Wappel expressed earlier, I would like to move two sub-amendments, and I will give a copy of them to the Clerk. These subamendments would add a new subsection 107.1(1.1) after subsection 107.1(1), and it would read as follows: ``A person...''

The Chair: Just a moment. What line of section 107.1 are you moving a sub-amendment to? I have the French version here.

Mr. Langlois: It's a question of adding two subsections to section 107.1 in the French version, and they would be numbered 107.1(1.1) and 107.1(1.2). Which line? Immediately before the word ``exceptions''.

The Chair: Fine. Is this the first sub-amendment or both of them?

Mr. Langlois: I can move both of them together, since they are somewhat consequential. So, 107.1(1.1) would read as follows:

The new subsectioun 107.1(1.2) would read as follows:

It seems to me that by tabling this amendment, I am responding to a concern from Mr. Wappel, who wanted to...

The Chair: Excuse me for a moment. It seems to me that your sub-amendments are more or less intended to amend the same part as your BQ-8 amendment. Amendment BQ-8 was defeated. For the time being, you can continue giving your arguments, but first of all I'd like to determine whether your sub-amendment is in order. For the time being, I doubt it, but I haven't yet taken the decision. Go ahead with your arguments.

Mr. Langlois: Mr. Chairman, I hope that you will give me a reasonable chance. I do think that there's a major difference here, because amendment BQ-8 dealt with three cases: the first offense, the second offense, and the third or subsequent offenses. In this case, we're just dealing with the first offense, which in keeping with what Mr. Wappel was saying a few moments ago.

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If that is not the essence of what he said, I hope he will correct me.

Now if paragraphs 107.1(1.1) and (1.2) are agreed to, not only will we be assured that there shall be no finger printing, no photo taking and no inscription in the registry, but we will say it clearly: it will be only if a person has not previously been found guilty. That is within clauses 91 and 92.

If I haven't understood Mr. Wappel correctly, I hope he will set me straight. I feel that all ambiguity would be lifted if we agreed to those amendments.

[English]

The Chair: I've considered the proposed subamendment, and giving the benefit of the doubt to Mr. Langlois, I rule it's in order. There are enough differences between it and BQ-8 to rule it in order, so the subamendment to G-48 is on the table.

Mr. Wappel: Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I might ask that the amendment be placed in writing, please, and submitted to the clerk.

The Chair: The chair has it in writing; whether it can be photocopied.... The fact that amendments are in writing - and I stand to be corrected - is not a rule of the committee. It's helpful and it's a courtesy. On a complicated amendment it's very helpful. We've had other subamendments or amendments made at the last minute that refer only to a few words and are easy to grasp.

Can the clerk quickly photocopy them? If not, we'll just have to reread them.

Mr. Wappel: I agree with you. I did not mean to suggest it was a rule. It would be helpful to me to see them in writing.

The Chair: I'm sure it would, and to many other members of the committee.

Mr. MacLellan: I think we're dealing here with the same request generally that Mr. Langlois wanted under BQ-8, that this not be a criminal offence.

I think what Mr. Langlois wants to do is to take the wording under the Contraventions Act and apply it to this firearms act, without having the analogous regime of the Contraventions Act applying. That's extremely difficult and really counter-productive.

The only way something could be done would be if you made this offence one of the offences to apply under the Contraventions Act, which would mean an amendment to the Contraventions Act, and thereby this would be a ticketing provision. But the minister is not prepared to do that at this time. He feels this is not the way to go. He feels that the offence we are proposing here under new clause 107.1 of the firearms act is the proper procedure. He is prepared to look at it later on, but not at this time.

Also, to say this isn't a criminal offence would really put the constitutional right for this provision under question. If we are concerned about a constitutional challenge from a province, then we would be causing our case considerable difficulty by saying something like that.

It's not that I don't understand what Mr. Langlois is saying and have some sympathy with his position, but I want to explain that those are the concerns we have for the request he has made and, as a result, will not be supporting those subamendments.

Mr. Wappel: Could I ask if legislative counsel has any comments with respect to the subamendments as put?

Ms McMurray: As far as the constitutionality of it is concerned, with great respect I disagree with Mr. MacLellan. The provinces do not have criminal law power, but the courts have most certainly upheld their right to enforce their own acts.

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If the federal government chooses to use the criminal law power to enforce its act, it may do so under its section 91.27 head of power. That doesn't mean, however, that if it chose not to use the criminal law power and simply chose to use another method to enforce a statute, it would not be entitled to do so constitutionally in the same way as the provinces have a right to enforce their statutes.

It's just that the federal government, for whatever reason, usually chooses criminal law powers to enforce its statutes but it need not do so, and if it chose to use some other form, such as a ticketing offence, and make it non-criminal, that is most certainly, in my opinion, constitutional.

The Chair: By ``constitutional'' you mean -

Ms McMurray: Within its power.

The Chair: - in regard to the federal government's power in that field.

Ms McMurray: Absolutely. If the federal government has the right to enforce a statute using the criminal law power, I would say it certainly has the right to say I'm going to punish in this way but I'm deeming it not to be a criminal offence. I don't see any constitutional problem there.

The Chair: Are there any further questions or comments with respect to the subamendment proposed by Mr. Langlois?

Subamendment negatived

Is there any further discussion with respect to government amendment G-48, which would provide new clauses 107.1 and 107.2?

Amendment agreed to [See Minutes of Proceedings]

On clause 108 - Failure to deliver up revoked licence, etc.

The Chair: On clause 108 we have received two amendments: one is G-50, and the other is R-0015. G-52 provides for a new clause 108.1 and will be dealt with after G-50 and R-0015.

I'm advised that if G-50 is adopted, then R-0015 cannot be put. On the other hand, if G-50 is defeated, R-0015 can be put and considered.

Who will move G-50? Mrs. Barnes.

Mrs. Barnes: This is clause 108, page 45, and basically this amendment would be consequential on the new clause 108.1. What I am trying to say is that it might be a better order.

The Chair: You have Mr. Ramsay's amendment. You can simply give notice that you're going to -

Mrs. Barnes: I will deal with it now and turn it over to Mr. MacLellan. It's on clause 108, page 45, that clause 108 of Bill C-68 be amended by striking out lines 3 to 8 on page 45 and substituting the clause 108 here.

The Chair: Mr. MacLellan, do you have anything to add?

Mr. MacLellan: It is a consequential amendment. The penalty is taken out of clause 108 and put into new clause 108.1.

The Chair: Which you hope will carry.

Mr. MacLellan: Yes.

The Chair: In due course. This amendment G-50 is consequential upon an amendment that we will have before us shortly.

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Amendment agreed to [See Minutes of Proceedings]

The Chair: This means we cannot put R-0015.

Mr. Ramsay: I'm very disappointed.

The Chair: I know there are many disappointments in this committee. It's very difficult for the chair. Sitting here, I'm also sometimes disappointed at not being able to say very much.

Clause 108 as amended agreed to on division

The Chair: We now have G-52, which is to provide a new clause 108.1.

Mrs. Barnes.

Mrs. Barnes: I move it. This is, as Ms Phinney was talking about earlier, where we see that the new offences under new clauses 107.1 and 107.2 or clause 108 are summary conviction offences. It basically follows through on the amendments we carried earlier.

Mr. MacLellan, did you wish to add anything to that?

Mr. MacLellan: No. I think Mrs. Barnes has stated the reasoning.

Amendment agreed to on division [See Minutes of Proceedings]

Clause 109 agreed to on division

On clause 110 - Regulations

The Chair: Clause 110 is the famous clause relating to regulations. I have received so many amendments I can't count them without stopping for a minute. We have R-9, R-10, R-11, R-12, R-13, R-14, R-15, R-16, R-17, R-18, R-19, R-20, R-21, BQ-10, BQ-11, R-22, BQ-12, R-23, G-53, G-54 and maybe a few others that came in late.

We will start with the Reform amendments. I give the floor to Mr. Ramsay for R-9.

Mr. Ramsay: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

This simply changes the word ``respecting'' to ``regulating''. As we looked at this, we found that there had been a change from ``regulating'' to ``respecting'', and we wondered about that. My information is that the word ``respecting'' carries much broader connotations than the word ``regulating''. We think the word ``regulating'' is an error of focus.

I would like to make that presentation to the committee for the change. Also, I would like, if possible, to have the opinion of legal counsel with regard to the difference that exists between these two words, ``respecting'' and ``regulating''. If we could have that, I would appreciate it, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: Does the legislative counsel wish to respond to that question?

Mr. Louis-Phillippe Côté (Legislative Counsel): On that issue I would like to bring attention to the French and English versions.

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In the present Criminal Code, in section 116, we have a series of enumerations for the regulation power. Four of them use the word ``regulating''. This word has been translated in French by the word régir, which means déterminer.

In Bill C-68, régir is still in clause 110 but it has been translated with the word ``respecting''. Respecting is one of the widest authorities to do something. Respecting means with respect to, in relation to, or relating to. For instance, those are the words used in sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution of Canada. It is a very wide authority to do something.

I am wondering if there's not a problem between respecting, which is a wide power, and the word régir in French, which probably has a more narrow perspective.

The Chair: Mr. MacLellan, do you want to respond to any of that?

Mr. MacLellan: Mr. Chairman, we have no major concern with this. If it's the wish of the committee to use the word ``regulating'' rather than respecting, I don't think there is any problem with that. I just want to check with the officials, if I may.

We feel we could make that change. The wording may not be as elegant, Mr. Chair, but it's certainly every bit as functional. It has been used before, as Mr. Ramsay and the legislative counsel have said, so we can go along with this.

Amendment agreed to [See Minutes of Proceedings]

The Chair: Jack, you're on a streak.

Mr. Ramsay: I don't know how to handle this, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: Next is amendment R-10.

Mr. Ramsay: With respect, Mr. Chairman, it is just striking out words that we feel are unnecessary and perhaps redundant. Perhaps the officials could comment on the need for the words that are being deleted.

The Vice-Chair (Mrs. Barnes): Mr. MacLellan, did you wish to comment?

Mr. MacLellan: Madam Chair, it would seem that amendment R-10 requires that we delete with reference to the bureaucrats. It doesn't want to leave these matters in their hands. We feel we can certainly trust them to perform these functions. We need the regulations for the necessary specifics.

The Vice-Chair (Mrs. Barnes): Ms Meredith.

Ms Meredith: Madam Chair, as you are well aware, I have been very concerned with precisely that, that this bill does put aside to the bureaucrats an awful lot of empowerment and is taking it away from Parliament.

When you say we can trust them, I'm not so sure Canadians are prepared to trust civil servants to write law. This is precisely what we have done throughout this bill, and what we are doing one more time by having a prescription of circumstances in which a person may or may not hold a licence. We don't have any opportunity here to talk about who is not going to be able to hold a licence.

.1055

I have real difficulty with handing over power and authority to bureaucrats to in fact write law. I want to be on record as having said that.

The Vice-Chair (Mrs. Barnes): By saying it, you're on record, Ms Meredith.

Ms Meredith: Exactly. That's why I said it.

The Vice-Chair (Mrs. Barnes): Mr. MacLellan, did you wish to respond?

Mr. MacLellan: With respect to the firearms acquisition certificates, there are existing regulations now that are similar. They are Order in Council regulations and will be examined by the House.

Mr. Ramsay: We have had the officials assure us on a number of occasions, Mr. Chairman, that the regulations prescribed by the Governor in Council will be scrutinized by Parliament. Although this is leaping ahead - because this forms part of the justification in their argument - I'm not sure Parliament is going to be able to debate the regulations as they come through. We know they can be sent to committee and committee can, if they wish, examine them and they'll go back to Parliament. But again, I don't know whether there will be a debate in the House on these issues.

So I wonder if we could ask the officials about that without violating the rule you set this morning about getting too far away from the clause we're dealing with, Mr. Chair.

The Chair: Well, if Mr. MacLellan or his officials wish, they may respond. I'll listen to the answer, and if it gets too far away from this amendment, we'll have to call it to order.

Mr. MacLellan: I'll be very brief.

The usual procedure is that the House refers these regulations to the committee for discussion, for the calling of witnesses, and for consideration, and they report to the minister on their opinion of these regulations. With the agreement of all parties, there's certainly nothing to stop Parliament from debating this in the House. It's just that in most cases it isn't considered to be feasible. It's considered to be much more efficient to call witnesses and review it in committee.

The Chair: I should point out, though, that if an opposition party feels very strongly about it, they can use these issues on their opposition days - even opposition days with a vote - and the opposition days, of course, are spread throughout the year.

[Translation]

Mr. Langlois: But the problem is that clause 111 prevents us from reviewing the full regulations in committee since it says that after a 30-day waiting period, the government can make whatever orders it wants. The only restriction is that it has to wait 30 days. Passed that time, committees have no powers whatsoever. The Bloc québécois has given notice that it will propose amendments on that clause. Mr. Wappel has said the other day that he will also move one. The power to make regulation here is without precedent. The good King Henry the VIIIth would have acted in the very same way. I feel that it is not acceptable at this point to forego Parliament's supreme authority.

[English]

The Chair: Just one second here. Now we're onto clauses 111 and 112, and the arguments you're making are really against the provisions in clauses 111 and 112. I don't mind them being referred to briefly, but I do not want to debate now the merits of the short delay that you bring up, which certainly should be debated and discussed because there's a wide range of opinions on it.

.1100

Right now we're dealing just with clause 110 and very specifically with amendment R-10 to clause 110. While you may briefly refer to the clauses that follow which permit Parliament to overturn regulations or not or the delay in doing that, that should be discussed when we get to those clauses. I will only permit brief references to that because we should be debating these mini-amendments, which I already referred to, under clause 110.

[Translation]

Mr. Langlois, you still have...

Mr. Langlois: I was in fact finished. But we must absolutely make the link between clauses 110 and 111 to see what power Parliament will have on those regulations. Regulations are all fine and dandy, but since there are no checks and balances between the executive and the legislative side, given the many regulating powers that this act includes, Parliament becomes strictly a rubber stamp for the governor in council's decisions.

[English]

Ms Meredith: I was advised by the government that there were regulations in place that set out who could and who could not possess or hold licences, but I cannot find it in the consolidated regulations pertaining to part III of the Criminal Code. Could you tell me where I would find it and what those conditions are?

Mr. Mosley: There are existing regulations pertaining to part III of the Criminal Code respecting the firearms acquisition certificates. They relate primarily to the persons, other than individuals, to whom a firearms acquisition certificate may be issued under the existing provision of the code. That's filling a gap that's in the current statute. An example of how this provision would apply to what's in this bill is in clause 9 on page 9 of the bill.

Subclause 9(1) reads:

Ms Meredith: Are you suggesting then that paragraph 110(a) is only dealing with persons who are going to be tied in with businesses, and not individuals?

Mr. Mosley: ``Persons'' in the context of paragraph 110(a) is broad enough to encompass businesses and individuals.

Ms Meredith: But my question or my impression was that the prescribed circumstances in which persons are or are not eligible to hold licences to me implies individuals. I don't see anything in here that sets up what individual will or will not qualify. It talks about classes of persons other than individuals, but it doesn't talk about individuals themselves. Will this be added to in order to establish what individual singular persons will or will not be eligible for licences?

Mr. Mosley: Wherever the word ``person'' is used in this bill, it has to be read as encompassing both individual persons and corporate persons. Where the bill seeks to distinguish or to make it clear that it's not talking about corporate persons, it does use the word ``individual'', as in subparagraph 110(c)(i), where it says:

Ms Meredith: In that clause it says ``prescribing the circumstances in which an individual''. When I asked earlier, you suggested that there were regulations already in place. What I'm asking you is will we be adding new regulations specifying which individual persons will or will not be eligible for licences?

.1105

The Chair: It seems to me that when you're dealing with regulation-making powers, it's hard to predict whether there will be no regulations under those powers, many regulations, or a few regulations once the law has been passed. But unless you already have some in mind that you're going to introduce, once the law is passed, it's passed and is there for a long time until it's rescinded. Future governments might bring in regulations.

Mr. Mosley.

Mr. Mosley: As you suggest, Mr. Chairman, it's difficult at this point in time to predict what the content of the regulations that may be presented to Parliament may be. I've referred to one example where it may be necessary to prescribe circumstances relating to the eligibility of businesses with regard to individuals.

An example may be determining what it means to be a sustenance hunter. That kind of fine detail is not found in the bill but it would be helpful, both for the general public and for those who will be administering the statutes, if it's set out clearly in the regulations.

Mr. Wappel: This is perhaps a very fine legal question - and I don't mean fine in terms of an adjective describing the nature of the question. I mean a very precise legal question.

I understand what the mover of the motion is after. Mr. Mosley, you almost answered my concern when you referred to clause 9. But I might also point out that there is a requirement under clause 7, which deals with persons, that being paragraph 7(4)(a), dealing with prescribed circumstances. So as you quite rightly point out, the regulation would be broad enough to deal with persons as well as businesses, and there is a requirement in clause 7 that there might be a need to prescribe circumstances dealing with an individual. So I accept that.

My problem is this: clauses 5 through 10, roughly, set out in statutory form the general and specific requirements in order to hold a licence. In law, can a regulation change a statute?

What I mean by that is this. Could a regulation state that you have to be 26 instead of 18 when the statute says 18? Or could a regulation change any of the substantive provisions of clauses 5 through 10? I believe the answer would be no, but I'd like some confirmation on that. If that is the case, if the answer is no, then the substantive rights, if I can put it that way, are set out in the statute. There are certain circumstances, such as a business, in which regulations may be required, such as paragraph 7(4)(a), which would require the use of the words currently in paragraph 110(a).

I think it's correct to say that my friend in the Reform Party is concerned that somehow some faceless bureaucrat in some small office in some building somewhere in Ottawa, acting on their own, would at some point be able to slip one by us and change the act. I hope your answer would be no, a regulation cannot change an act.

Mr. Mosley: I would simply agree with Mr. Wappel's statement. A regulation can't be inconsistent with the act from which its authority is derived.

Amendment R-10 negatived

The Chair: Your streak was like the San Diego Padres'.

R-11, Mr. Ramsay.

Mr. Ramsay: R-11 is the same as the former one with regards to replacing the word ``respecting'' with the word ``regulating''. The same rationale underlines this amendment, Mr. Chairman, and I don't have much further to say about that.

.1110

Amendment agreed to [See Minutes of Proceedings]

The Chair: Do you move R-12, Mr. Ramsay?

Mr. Ramsay: There is the same argument and rationale.

The Chair: I'm told that there's a new government amendment after R-11, which is G-53. These are the subamendments that have come in a bit later. G-53 is on page 187 of your package. It seems it was put in the wrong place originally. It's supposed to come in after R-11.

Ms Phinney: What number did you say for this big bundle of amendments?

The Chair: It's page 187. It's just a bit further on.

Who's going to move G-53?

Mr. Wappel: Mr. Chairman, just before we get there, I have a point.

The Chair: Mr. Wappel, what is this? Is this a question?

Mr. Wappel: This is just a brief and hopefully moderately humorous intervention. I note that R-11 and R-12 were pretty well the same and that would have resulted in a streak of two. I'm trusting that G-53 will not, in your view, interrupt the streak of two.

The Chair: I didn't want to do that. But I understand I'm supposed to deal with the amendments as they go, line by line. Since G-53 comes before R-12, well, I've no sympathy with the same San Diego Padres. In any case, we're on G-53, and who's moving G-53?

Ms Phinney: I move amendment G-53, that the English version of clause 110 of Bill C-68 be amended by striking out lines 25 and 26 on page 48 and substituting the following:

The Chair: Have you made an amendment to the English version?

Ms Phinney: Yes.

The Chair: Mr. MacLellan, do you have anything to add?

Mr. MacLellan: It's consequential, Mr. Chair. It's the wording we used when we passed G-17, so it's more or less to have G-53 correspond with G-17.

Amendment agreed to on division

The Chair: We now go to R-12.

Mr. Ramsay: Mr. Chair, I move this motion with the same rationale as before. It's replacing the word ``respecting'' with the word ``regulating''. That's all I have to say, Mr. Chairman.

Amendment agreed to [See Minutes of Proceedings]

The Chair: Now we have R-13, Mr. Ramsay.

Mr. Ramsay: Mr. Chairman, I'll not move this amendment R-13.

.1115

The Chair: Let us go to R-14.

Mr. Ramsay: It's the same with this amendment, Mr. Chairman. I'll not move this amendment.

The Chair: On R-15 -

Mr. Ramsay: It's the same rationale; we're changing the word ``respecting'' to ``regulating.''

Mr. MacLellan: It's still the same wording, Mr. Chair. This is fine.

Amendment agreed to [See Minutes of Proceedings]

The Chair: I understand R-16 is the same.

Mr. Ramsay: Yes, and R-17, R-18 and R-19.

The Chair: I want to make sure people have a chance to look at them, and R-20, too.

R-15 to R-20 inclusive are all on the same issue, to change the word ``respecting'' to ``regulating.''

Mr. Wappel: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order - it may not be a point of order, but I hope it is - Mr. Ramsay has brought this to our attention and has passed it in each and every paragraph except paragraphs 110(f) and 110(g) because he was at one point going to move to strike them - lines 1 through 6. He hasn't proposed an amendment to change the word ``respecting'' in each of paragraphs 110(f) and 110(g), which if we agree to R-15 through R-21 would leave us having each and every paragraph of clause 110 read ``regulating'' except paragraphs 110(f) and 110(g), which would still read ``respecting,'' I believe.

If that's the case, could we then have a friendly amendment that the word ``respecting'' in paragraphs 110(f) and 110(g) be changed to ``regulating'' - and paragraph 110(e), it would appear? Otherwise, we're going to have inconsistency in the drafting.

I simply bring that to your attention, and I trust it's a point of order.

The Chair: Yes, it is. It's up to somebody to move, in order to be consistent, that the word ``regulating'' apply to those paragraphs as well when we get to them.

We have carried R-15 already. R-16 deals with subclause 110(h).

Amendment agreed to [See Minutes of Proceedings]

The Chair: R-17 deals with paragraph 110(i).

Mr. MacLellan: I want to check the wording and the number, Mr. Chair, if you don't mind.

Yes, it's agreed.

Amendment agreed to [See Minutes of Proceedings]

The Chair: R-18 deals with paragraph 110(l), so we've missed paragraph 110(k).

Mr. Wappel: There's no ``respecting'' there.

Amendment agreed to [See Minutes of Proceedings]

The Chair: R-19 deals with paragraph 110(m) in the proposal.

Mr. MacLellan: Yes, agreed.

Amendment agreed to [See Minutes of Proceedings]

The Chair: R-20 deals with paragraph 110(n). It's the same sort of amendment.

Amendment agreed to [See Minutes of Proceedings]

.1120

The Chair: Before I move to R-21, which is of a different nature, Mr. Wappel, in order to make this matter in this clause consistent, do you want to move that we also use the word ``regulating'' in those two other paragraphs?

Mr. Wappel: Exactly, Mr. Chairman - in the three paragraphs (e), (f) and (g), replacing the word ``respecting'' by the word ``regulating'', for consistency.

Amendment agreed to [See Minutes of Proceedings]

The Chair: Now we go to R-21, Mr. Ramsay. This is a bit different from the others.

Mr. Ramsay: Yes. Because of a former amendment that did not carry, I will not move this amendment.

The Chair: R-21 is not put.

Now we go to BQ-10, Madame Venne.

[Translation]

Mrs. Venne: The purpose of this amendment is to prescribe the fees payable to Her Majesty under paragraph 110(p). Such fees are for the issuance of licences, registration certificates, authorization, approval of transfers and importations of firearms and confirmation by customs officers of documents under this act. There are all those fees which, currently, would be prescribed by regulation.

Under our amendment, those fees would not be increased by an amount greater than the percentage increase of the Consumer Price Index. Such is the main purpose of this amendment, the effect of which would be that we would know what raise to expect, and such raise would not be extravagant, as we said earlier, and without any relation with what goes on in the world in general.

Such is our amendment. I think it is fair enough. If you have any questions, we can answer them.

[English]

The Chair: It's very clear that this would put into the law a limit on the amount by which one can increase the fees.

Mr. MacLellan, do you have a response?

Mr. MacLellan: I can understand what Madame Venne wishes to do, but it's now the policy of the federal government not to use indexation in matters trying to control costs. So this would run counter to government policy.

Mr. Bodnar: I am wondering if Mr. MacLellan can indicate whether such an amendment would have the effect of obviously controlling the costs for the users of the system, but if the costs of the department go out of hand and increase too much, then to save costs or to break even on such a system, instead of increasing the costs to the hunters or the users of the system, the government would be obliged to make the department more efficient.

Mr. MacLellan: What we want to do is keep the costs down. The minister has stated that and he has given his assurance that it will in fact happen. He has stated quite carefully what he expects to see in the future with respect to costs under this. As Mr. Bodnar has said, every attempt is going to be made to keep the costs down, including departmental costs.

[Translation]

Mr. Langlois: Mr. MacLellan, will the fees collected under 110 (p) go to the Consolidated Revenue Fund for the administration of any system? Is that a tax measure or is it specific to the implementation of the Firearms Act?

.1125

[English]

Mr. MacLellan: Yes, Mr. Chair, the majority of it will be returned to the provinces and the part that remains with the federal government will be used to offset the costs of administration and the actual operation of the registry.

[Translation]

Mr. Langlois: If I understand well, Mr. MacLellan, it will then be through the Consolidated Revenue Fund of Canada that these amounts will be returned to the provinces or that the administration of the system will be paid for.

[English]

The Chair: Are you answering yes or no to that question?

Mr. MacLellan: Mr. Chair, that was dealt with by the minister when he tabled his document on the financial aspects of the bill. If Mr. Langlois wants further information, I could ask Mr. Mosley to give him details.

Mr. Mosley: Members of the committee may recall that this document, which was tabled by the minister, contains a clear explanation of the financial framework for the administration of the act.

In a nutshell, as Mr. MacLellan has indicated, the greater part of the revenues generated by the fees will be returned or, in actual fact, held by the provinces to offset the costs of the administration of the firearms act within the provinces. That portion, which is then retained by the federal government, will of course go into the Consolidated Revenue Fund, as with any government revenues, but will be accounted for by the federal departments concerned in terms of the costs for the administration of the act.

The Chair: Are there questions or comments?

[Translation]

Mr. Langlois: May I draw a conclusion from the responses that I got. I thank Mr. Mosley for the accuracy of his response. Every time an amount of money is collected and goes to the Consolidated Revenue Fund, there is always the danger that the government use the taxation of permits or licences for purposes other than the implementation of an act.

We, in Quebec, had the dubious pleasure to see, for instance, the various governments use registration fees for contracts, notaried or not, but which are heavily taxed, for other purposes. One was to be used to redo the cadastre of Quebec. Actually, the cadastre is not redone? The money goes to the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the province.

Mrs. Venne is moving an amendment with which I have no problem since the fairly frequent use made of these licenses and permits, the fees of which are raised without raising other taxes. The government raises the fees for various permits or for the implementation of a given act knowing that all this money will go to the Consolidated Revenue Fund. With amendment moved by Mrs. Venne, I think that we at least have a safeguard.

[English]

Mr. Mosley: As I'm sure many members of this committee know better than I, as a general rule the government is not entitled to take a profit on revenues generated by fees. The Standing Joint Committee for the Scrutiny of Regulations has, on a number of occasions, closely questioned departments as to how the correlation between the costs of administering the statute or regulations and the revenues that are generated under provisions such as this. That tends, I may suggest, to keep departments very closely tracking the actual costs associated with the administration of the statute.

Amendment negatived [See Minutes of Proceedings]

The Chair: We move move to BQ-11, Madame Venne.

.1130

[Translation]

Mrs. Venne: The purpose of BQ-11, on page 48, is simply to strike out lines 2 to 3 dealing with museums. We have to be consistent here since we do not want museums to be included in this act.

I am beginning to wonder if I would not simply withdraw my amendment since you voted down my first amendment dealing with the exclusion of museums. Just one moment, please.

[English]

Mr. MacLellan: I think I agree with Mrs. Venne. By voting against amendment BQ-10, we've already stated that museums are going to be included for purposes of registration of their firearms.

The Chair: I'm not clear on your answer. Amendment BQ-11 proposes striking out lines 1 to 3 on page 48, which is paragraph (q), which she says relates to museums. Did you say you were in favour of her amendment?

Mr. MacLellan: I thought Madame Venne offered to withdraw the amendment, Mr. Chair.

[Translation]

Mrs. Venne: I was wrong, Mr. Chairman. I thought that dealt with museums, but it's not that at all. This deals rather with (t), and it's about fees to be prescribed. We are talking about exemption provisions or a reduction of payable fees.

We already said that this paragraph had been included for aboriginals. It is for that reason that we want it to be struck out so that we have a level playing field for everyone.

[English]

The Chair: So this has nothing to do with museums?

[Translation]

Mrs. Venne: Nothing at all.

[English]

The Chair: Okay.

[Translation]

Mrs. Venne: Sorry I mislead you.

[English]

The Chair: That happens.

Mr. MacLellan.

Mrs. Barnes: I have a point of order. Just so I'm clear on this, it was never moved so it doesn't have to be withdrawn. It's just not laid on the table.

[Translation]

Mrs. Venne: No, I am actually tabling it.

[English]

The Chair: Now you are moving it?

Mrs. Venne: Yes.

The Chair: She's moving amendment BQ-11.

[Translation]

Mrs. Venne: I want everybody in Canada to be treated equally. With this paragraph, we will be providing exemptions or reductions of payable fees to some category of people whom we don't know yet.

[English]

The Chair: It's pretty clear what the purpose of this amendment is. Are there further questions or comments?

Amendment negatived

The Chair: I'm told that the order is being corrected. We should go to amendment G-54 before amendment R-22. Amendment G-54, which is also an amendment to clause 110, is the last amendment in your agenda, on page 188.

Who will move amendment G-54? Ms Phinney.

Ms Phinney: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I move that clause 110 of Bill C-68 be amended by adding, immediately after line 3 on page 48:

The Chair: I don't think you have to read it; everybody has it.

Ms Phinney: Okay.

The Chair: Do you have an explanation or would you like Mr. MacLellan to comment?

Ms Phinney: No, Mr. MacLellan might have a comment.

Mr. MacLellan: This is requested by Customs Canada, to complete the definition or description of their role and also to deal with the question of cost recovery.

.1135

Amendment agreed to on division [See Minutes of Proceedings]

The Chair: I now go to amendment R-22.

Mr. Ramsay: This is another very simple amendment, changing the word ``respecting'' to ``regulating'', with the same rationale and reason as I've given in all the others.

Amendment agreed to [See Minutes of Proceedings]

The Chair: I now go to amendment BQ-12.

[Translation]

Mrs. Venne: We want to strike out, on page 48, lines 15 to 19 on the French side, and 22 to 26 on the English side. Again, this is for the purpose of the quality, so that everybody be treated equally. This paragraph says which provisions and to what extent this act will apply to the aboriginal peoples of Canada. The implementation of the provisions of the act are adapted here.

It is obvious that the government wants to provide an exception for aboriginal peoples here. The Bloc québécois wants everybody to be treated equally in Canada.

[English]

Mr. Wappel: I would like to express some concern about this clause, and I would do so under the rubric of the proposed amendment.

The Chair: The clause or the amendment?

Mr. Wappel: The amendment. Well, we're moving paragraph (t).

I might be supportive of removing paragraph (t), but perhaps not for the same reasons as the Bloc. I want to put my concerns to the officials and get their response, which hopefully will allay my fears, and then we could go from there. I think this is the appropriate time to raise it.

There is something known in drafting as a Henry VIII clause. It's called a Henry VIII clause because of that particular monarch's penchant for absolutism and rule by proclamation. A Henry VIII clause can be defined as a provision that permits a statute to be amended or repealed by way of delegated legislation. Delegated legislation in this case is regulations. Such provisions are, by their very nature, controversial and have generally been seen to be objectionable as constituting a usurpation of the powers of Parliament.

The provision in paragraph (t) that would offend, or would perhaps arguably offend, is that the regulations would regulate the manner in which not only regulations but also any provision of this act - of course, this means the statute - deal with or apply to aboriginal peoples of Canada. That means that it's not just regulations that would be, shall we say, ameliorated in certain circumstances, but possibly the entire statute itself or portions thereof, thus resulting in potentially one segment of society being treated in a different way from other segments of society by the same statute.

The objections to provisions that would be commonly known as Henry VIII clauses are numerous and long-standing.

It's important, I think, Mr. Chairman, with your permission, that I put this matter on the record. Then I'm going to ask for comment not only from the government but also from legislative counsel and possibly from research staff.

Going back to 1932, the Donoughmore committee on ministerial powers in the United Kingdom recommended that the conferral of such powers be abandoned entirely. In the United Kingdom such powers have been abandoned virtually entirely. There have been concerns raised in both the U.K. and Australia over the increased reliance on such provisions, and a recent report of the United Kingdom Hansard Society for Parliamentary Government concluded that Henry VIII clauses are, of their nature, undesirable and should not be resorted to unless absolutely necessary.

.1140

In 1991 the Third Conference of Australian Delegated Legislation Committees passed the following resolution:

It could therefore be argued that because there is no requirement that Parliament approve regulations - as we will see when we get to clause 111 and clause 112 - that under this clause certain clauses of the bill itself could be in effect overruled by the regulation-making authority without the houses of Parliament having the opportunity to review the regulations and require that they be approved. Thus, it could be argued that this is a classic Henry VIII clause, which should not be proceeded with - or certainly not proceeded with in the words that it currently has.

Therefore, I would like some clarification and comment on my comments, first, if I may, from the government and the officials; second, from legislative counsel, if they have any such comments; and third, from Mr. Bartlett of our research staff, if he has any such comments.

The Chair: Before I go to Mr. MacLellan and the officials, I should point out that the following amendment, R-23 from the Reform Party, is exactly the same at BQ-12, so whatever we decide with respect to BQ-12 will be decided for R-23.

Mr. MacLellan, would you answer the questions put by Mr. Wappel. You might start by telling us whether the government believes this to be a so-called Henry VIII clause and, if it is, why you believe an exception should be made here.

Mr. MacLellan: The government doesn't perceive this to be a Henry VIII clause, although perhaps it could be interpreted that way. But certainly there's no intention of changing the bill, and what we're saying is that we want the regulations to apply in the manner that will coincide with the treaties and the provisions that we've agreed to with the aboriginal people. If we don't have this, then we won't be able to carry on our negotiation and our consultation process with the aboriginal people, as we said we were going to do and as they have indicated they want us to do.

As we've said before on other occasions, it's not the intention of the government to have this bill apply to some people in Canada and not to others, or to exclude any particular region of Canada. But there are unique circumstances in the land claims and in the various treaties with the aboriginal people that have to be looked at, and this gives the power to government to adapt the regulations and the implementation of the bill to those agreements we've already made.

It is not an attempt to make special regulations for aboriginal people or in any way to change the bill, as I suppose a Henry VIII clause would allow.

[Translation]

The Chair: Mr. Langlois

Mr. Langlois: I am waiting for the legislative counsel's response.

The Chair: Very well.

[English]

Legislative counsel, if you wish.

.1145

Mr. Côté: I just have one comment. As I read the clause, we talk about respecting the manner in which any provision of this proposed act or the regulation applies. I want to remind the committee that the provisions of this proposed act could be changed as well as the regulations made under this act.

Perhaps my colleague has something to add to this.

Ms McMurray: Mr. Wappel did an excellent summary of Henry VIII clauses. I don't think I could have done it better myself.

This is what I would call a modified version of a Henry VIII clause.

Mr. Wappel: Henry VII.

Mr. McMurray: Yes, exactly.

It's a somewhat modified version in that it doesn't actually say you are going to go in and change the provision, but it says you can change the manner in which the provision is applied. You and I both know that there can be a million variations on the theme, and if you go far enough you can change the manner of something so that, for all intents and purposes, while something applies to you it does so in such a limited way that you might not even bother having it apply to the person in the first place.

The modified Henry VIII clause could be used to expand the power to such a point that the applications to the aboriginal peoples would be all but meaningless in terms of any application of the act. That is one way it certainly could be used.

As for the courts' interpretation of Henry VIII clauses, I'm aware of only one case that has placed any constraints on a Henry VIII clause, and that case came out of the B.C. Court of Appeal, the majority decision of Mr. Justice Lysyk, Waddell v. Schreyer, in which he looked at a Henry VIII clause - it was very broad - and said that it must not be used to change the policy direction of the act. As long as the Henry VIII clause acted within the parameters of the policy that was set out in the act, the clause would be upheld. If, however, the Henry VIII clause was used to make the new policy, if you want to put it in that way, change policy direction, then the clause would be struck down. That's the only case I'm aware of where the Henry VIII clause has actually been judicially interpreted. There may be others, but I'm not aware of any.

Mr. Bartlett: I would agree, Mr. Wappel, that this is a Henry VIII clause, perhaps a modified one. However, I would note that it not only allows the government to make regulations respecting the manner in which any provision of this act applies to any of the aboriginal peoples of Canada and adapting any such provision for the purposes of that application. So it certainly does fit within the classic definition of a Henry VIII clause, albeit perhaps not some of the more objectionable Henry VIII clauses that have been dealt with in the past.

I would also agree with his general comments that Henry VIII clauses are generally considered to be objectionable, have been condemned at a number of points in the past, should be very carefully considered by parliamentarians, and should be considered an exception and there should be some exceptional reasons for them.

In my former incarnation as counsel with the regs and stats committee, I probably would have stopped there. I should probably add, however, that I did a paper on Henry VIII clauses a few years ago in which I found that although they seemed virtually to have disappeared from Canada, they seemed to have made a bit of a resurgence and there have been at least three of them in the last six years. Nonetheless, it remains something that should be given special consideration.

The Chair: Mr. MacLellan, it seems to me - and I don't know whether your advisors have this information - that this kind of an exception for aboriginal people is made quite often in many pieces of legislation in Canada because of our new relationship with aboriginal peoples in recent years. For example, since 1982 we put a clause, clause 35, in our Constitution in which we recognize certain rights of aboriginal peoples, which includes Indians, first nations people, Métis and Inuit. Is it not correct that, because of the constitutional status of our treaties and aboriginal rights, we have certain exceptions of this or other kinds in many pieces of legislation?

I have a recollection of such things, but I don't know whether you have examples handy.

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Mr. MacLellan: Mr. Chair, we heard from the Grand Council of the Cree. That is a very strong agreement and they do have certain rights under that agreement. We want to abide by those rights and we feel we need the powers to go over this with them to adapt this legislation, as it would be, to what we've agreed to give them, using them as an example under their agreement. I think this is vital for the government to be able to carry on those negotiations. If we don't have this right, then the consulting process and the negotiations with the aboriginal people would be absolutely toothless.

The Chair: Mr. Langlois.

[Translation]

Mr. Langlois: Mr. Chair, I share obviously the concerns voiced by my colleagues as to the excessive powers given to government. If Parliament must legislate, we must be able to do it knowing the provisions and the consequences of the legislation.

As to devolving to government powers which will enable him to change the act and to implement it in a different way so that we could have, through regulations, an entirely different piece of legislation which could be even bulkier than the one we have now, but which would apply to a particular category of Canadians, I quite agree with what Mrs. Venne said a moment ago.

Besides, when we heard the aboriginal chiefs, I asked Chief Erasmus if he thought that the federal Parliament of Canada had the necessary legislative power to legislate on matters concerning the aboriginal people as regards the Firearms Act. His answer was quite clear: No! Under their inherent rights, the aboriginal people have a power to regulate themselves in that area.

Such provision could be rejected for several reasons - clause Henri VIII, equality of citizens or vision of Chief Erasmus or the Chiefs of the First Nations who appeared here - because the Parliament of Canada does not have the powers to legislate in their regard.

If we keep that provision, the aboriginal people are going to fight it anyway saying that we do not have the powers to legislate in their regard. If we do not have the powers to legislate, we cannot put anything in the act that concerns them. If the act applies to everybody and that ``everybody'' excludes aboriginal people, the latter will claim, under a given reading of section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, as you said a while ago, that, in some circumstances, one could use the Sparrow Decision to assert one's claims before the courts or to ensure beforehand a special treatment before the courts decide whether ``everybody'' includes the aboriginal peoples of Canada.

And I think that it means resorting to justice before making law. Either ways, there are at least three good reasons for rejecting paragraph (t) of section 110; and for one or the other of those three reasons, I will therefore vote against section 110(t), that is in favour of amendment BQ-12 which states what other colleagues have proposed. Thank you.

[English]

Mr. Ramsay: The whole bill, and particularly this clause, causes me a great degree of concern.

I understand from the testimony presented before the committee, particularly from the aboriginal groups, that the onus was upon the government to initiate consultations with them prior to the creation of the proposals as well as of the legislation. By way of constitutional appendages - and I refer particularly to the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement and the recently passed Yukon Indians agreements - consultation must take place before certain aspects of their traditions and culture can be impacted upon by federal legislation, or provincial legislation in the case of Quebec.

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I wonder why the government didn't do that, and why we had the aboriginal people appear before our committee and reject certain aspects of this bill - not all of it, but certain aspects of it. They supported the criminal aspect of it and getting tougher on the criminal use of firearms, and smuggling, and so on.

I wonder why the government wouldn't do that. Mr. Chairman, had they done that, they would have then realized that those aboriginal people would have rejected the licensing aspect of this bill, the registration aspect of this bill, and the penalizing aspect of this bill for people who failed. I'm sure they would have done that because they did it here when they did appear. That would have set a benchmark for the government that they could not very well override, certainly not politically.

What I would have done in order for the government then to set up this kind of a structure for the rest of Canadians...it was very evident that it was going to be a two-tier system of law: one law for the aboriginal peoples because they're protected by their constitutional agreements with the federal and provincial governments; and the other law for the rest of Canadians. That would have been awfully hard to sell.

So what the government has done, in my respectful opinion, is that it has not consulted first with the Indian people, as they have said before this committee. It has gone forward and created the law, and now it has a loophole under paragraph 110(t) that will allow it to go back to the aboriginal people and make special exemptions and considerations for them under this particular clause.

I think this is absolutely unacceptable, and when I look at the requirement for consultation prior to the creation of legislation, and when I look at what the national chief Ovide Mercredi said in his letter that he tabled with us.... He said to the justice minister, you have not even met the Sparrow test for consultation and you have already introduced a piece of legislation that will be contrary to the rule of law. He asked, must I remind you that our treaty and aboriginal rights are a part of the rule of law?

As a couple of comments, the authority for consultation with aboriginal groups is not contained within Bill C-68. It's contained in their constitutional agreements with the Government of Canada. That's where the authority, and not only the authority but the requirement for consultation, comes into play.

It's my submission, Mr. Chairman, that these provisions within those constitutional agreements have been violated as a result of a lack of consultation, and I suggest the reason is clear as to why.

I have to ask myself this. We have been told it is not a right to own a firearm in this country, but a privilege. My question to the officials is, is it a right or a privilege for an aboriginal person to own a firearm? I'll tell you from what I have seen of their submissions and their constitutional agreements. There is no question that they have a right to own firearms. It is not a privilege that can be denied them by the government of this country or by the government of any province.

If that is the case, then we do indeed have emerging through Bill C-68 a two-tier system that is going to be established through this particular clause, and I cannot support this clause.

I think we ought to go back to the drawing-board, and the benchmark that's set for all Canadians must be set with the aboriginal groups as far as the registration and the licensing of firearms is concerned. It must be. Otherwise, we're going to have the situation where we're going to have one law for the aboriginal people of this country and another law for the rest of us.

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The Chair: Mr. MacLellan, do you wish to respond?

Mr. MacLellan: Yes, Mr. Chairman, I do.

Mr. Ramsay can't have it both ways. Either he wants to help the aboriginal people within the framework of this bill or he doesn't. The fact is that what we're doing is setting out in this paragraph the wherewithal to be able to negotiate and consult with the aboriginal people so their concerns can be adapted under the firearms act. Now, we have to be able to do this. We have to have the provision to do this.

The fact of the matter is that there's no obligation for the federal government to reach an agreement with the aboriginal people on these provisions prior to bringing this bill forward before Parliament. There is an obligation to reach an understanding, or at least to consult in a very meaningful way, before this bill is put into effect. This is what we said we're going to do and this is what the government is doing at the present time. There are very extensive negotiations going on right now with the aboriginal people.

In this bill we're not talking about the right to have firearms or the privilege to have firearms. What we're saying is there is going to be a lawful use of firearms and no one would ever quarrel with that or no one would ever think that should not be an occurrence in this country. What we're saying is yes, we're going to be using firearms lawfully for hunting. The aboriginal people have the right to be included in the lawful use of firearms for hunting.

Also, Mr. Chair, I want to mention that this is a provision under the firearms act for the purpose of negotiating and consulting with the aboriginal people about the application of the firearms act to their concerns and their treaties and their way of life. It is not an exclusion of the aboriginal people from the registration of firearms. It is not an exclusion of the aboriginal people from the provisions of the Criminal Code, nor could it possibly be. There is no intention of that effect.

The intention is to deal with the concerns of the aboriginal people and the treaties we have so we can adapt and interlock the two; that is it. There are no special privileges intended under these provisions.

The Chair: Mrs. Barnes and Mr. Lee.

Mrs. Barnes: Actually, Mr. MacLellan summed what I was going to say in his first few words. You can't have it both ways, colleagues. If you want to ensure that we have aboriginal consultation, if you vote against this clause you won't have it.

I just want to clarify that if anybody votes against paragraph 110(t), then the aboriginal discussion - There is no other area within Bill C-68. For those people who are concerned that this discussion continue and move forward, where else do we go? I just want that verified, Mr. MacLellan.

Mr. Lee (Scarborough - Rouge River): I think most colleagues on the committee, if not all, will recognize the challenge in the future of making the provisions of this bill, which deals with firearms, square with the circumstances of the aboriginal Canadians, who have by treaty and otherwise acquired certain hunting rights. Practically speaking, there will be a clash. The way we've drafted this bill guarantees that there will be a clash somewhere down the road between an aboriginal Canadian who has either a treaty right or an existing constitutional right to hunt in a certain fashion. So I generally see the need for a provision like this, notwithstanding its characterization here as a Henry VIII clause, which it is.

Now, I want to address another aspect of this and get the government's view on the record. As most of us will be aware, it would be illegal for the government to grant a dispensation from the general law. That applies to any legislation. Such illegal dispensations are prohibited in our Constitution - and with specific reference to the English Bill of Rights of 1689, which is incorporated into our Constitution.

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Now, the reason I want to ask about this is that if it were to be the intention of the government to dispense or exempt from the application of this law, it would be necessary for Parliament to grant that right to dispense from the application of the law. If Parliament didn't grant it, then any purported dispensation would be illegal.

There was an incident in the last Parliament that I think reflects very clearly issues surrounding purported illegal dispensations. In any event, could I ask if it is the intention of the government to legally dispense, as the case may require, from the application of this statute? If that is the case, does the government believe the wording of this subsection is adequate to allow that kind of dispensation?

The Chair: Would you give us an answer to that first before I go to Ms Meredith?

Mr. MacLellan: Yes.

Mr. Chair and Mr. Lee, it's not a question of legally excluding. It's a question of adapting. There's not to be any way of contravening this act by doing something that would be illegal, and Mr. Lee has mentioned that. That's certainly not the intention, nor is it the intention to arbitrarily exclude the aboriginal people from any provisions under this act.

The question is how do we adapt what we have to do to what the arrangements and the treaties are with the aboriginal people? If we find we have something that is going to change and give the aboriginal people special privileges, special powers and special dispensation, then we'll have to come back to seek an amendment.

Ms Meredith: I have no question about what the intentions of this clause are or that the intentions may be very honourable. But what you are in fact going to be doing is to treat the aboriginal peoples of Canada differently than the non-aboriginal peoples.

I would like to ask a simple question. I have four boys, two of whom have legal documents that would classify them as being aboriginal. The other two do not. Will my four children be treated in the same manner under Canadian law with this particular clause in place?

The Chair: Before you answer the question, the bells are ringing for a vote. It's a thirty-minute bell. We were scheduled to adjourn at 12:30 p.m. If we finish this clause before 12:30 p.m., we will adjourn. If not, we will adjourn at 12:30 p.m. and we will be there in good time for the vote. The vote will be at 12:40 p.m.

Mr. MacLellan: Mr. Chair, I guess the best way of explaining it would be to say that this paragraph is not giving any rights, or any privileges, or any powers. The privileges the aboriginal people have, they have already without this bill. All we're saying is that we want to adapt this bill to those special circumstances of the aboriginal people, which they already have through their treaties.

If Ms Meredith's sons have different privileges, then they have them now. What we want to do is recognize them as this bill applies to them, and that's all.

Ms Meredith: Mr. Chair, for clarification, there are aboriginal peoples who do not have treaties negotiated at this time. Are you saying, then, that only those aboriginals who have treaties in place to guarantee them those rights will be treated in a manner different from any other Canadian?

Mr. MacLellan: Mr. Chair, you know that sometimes the treaties are in writing and sometimes they're not. I think what we have to do is realize that they are recognized. We're not going to be making up new ones for the purposes of this act.

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We have stated and the minister has stated that this bill is not going to give any special privileges to any people or any section of this country, nor is any specific group of people or any specific region of this country going to be excluded from the powers of this bill. We are just coordinating what is already there with this legislation, not giving anything new.

Ms Meredith: Mr. Chairman, 93% of the respondents, or about 2,500 in my constituency, stated that they did not want special consideration for aboriginal persons; they wanted all Canadians to be treated equally under Canadian law. I think that sends me a very clear message about what the people whom I represent feel, and they would be opposed to this particular clause of this legislation.

Mr. MacLellan: If there are powers that the aboriginal people have that mean this bill has to be adapted to suit those privileges, then those privileges are there now. We're not creating them under this bill.

The Chair: They're in section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. They apply to both aboriginal rights that are entrenched in treaties and aboriginal rights that aren't entrenched in treaties.

Mr. Wappel: I want to thank the government, and I want to thank legislative counsel and research staff for their answers to my queries. In specific reference to amendments BQ-12 and R-23, I've listened carefully and I cannot support them because they would strike the entire clause.

My concern is with a Henry VIII clause, which is a provision that permits a statute to be amended or repealed by way of regulation. Regulations can repeal or revise regulations. My concern is that a statute could be amended or repealed by way of delegated legislation.

Parliament can amend any act any time it wants. Parliament can exempt any Indian band any time it wants from any part of this bill by passing an act. For example, if we were implementing a treaty, the provision of the treaty could say, if Parliament so wished, that any and all provisions of Bill C-68 do not apply to the particular band under this treaty.

The point is that it is Parliament speaking under a statute and not the regulations, and that's my concern with respect to a Henry VIII clause. I do not have a problem with a statute that applies to all, but the regulations adapt the provisions to certain prevailing circumstances and certain prevailing places at certain times. I have no difficulty with the Governor in Council regulating the manner in which regulations apply to the aboriginal peoples of Canada; let me make that crystal clear.

Therefore, having heard all the arguments I cannot support either of these provisions. But that leaves us with only three possibilities. We can leave the clause as is, and we've heard that it is a Henry VIII clause, whether we like it or not. Whether it's a modified Henry VIII or not, it is a Henry VIII clause, which therefore could permit a statute to be amended or repealed by way of regulation. If we do that, let's at least know we're doing that and that it goes contrary to the weight of all parliamentary democracies in the entire world. I want to remind you that the United Kingdom government has undertaken that in all legislation that includes Henry VIII provisions, those regulations would be made subject to approval by Parliament. We don't have that in this bill.

We can either leave paragraph 110(t) as it is, change it, or require approval by Parliament in clause 111 or clause 112. Neither of those clauses currently requires approval by Parliament.

So I want to advise the committee that I can't support amendments BQ-12 or R-23 because they're too broad in scope. Therefore, assuming they don't pass, I will move an amendment to paragraph 110(t) to remove the words ``this Act or''.

This would mean the government and any government could regulate the manner in which regulations apply to aboriginals, but it would take out the Henry VIII aspect of it so it could not change the statute.

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If that particular amendment, when I move it, fails, we are left with only two things. We either leave an admitted Henry VIII clause the way it is, contrary to the weight of all parliamentary authority in the world, or we will have to deal with it in clauses 111 and 112, requiring Parliament to give specific approval to regulations made, which might change the statute itself.

I just want to flag for the committee what I will be doing after we deal with BQ-12, which I will be voting against.

Mr. Ramsay: I want to sum up my concerns about what has happened in this process. This bill, I submit, should reflect the concerns of the aboriginal people now. The consultation process should have taken place and their concerns should be reflected in this bill now so that we, as parliamentarians, could examine it, if that is going to be done through this paragraph 110(t).

I also want to make one final quote from Mr. Ovide Mercredi's letter. He said this on the last page:

They've made it very clear that what they're talking about are the registration and licensing requirements and making their stand outside of and contrary to the law, simply through the stroke of a pen.

The justice minister from the Northwest Territories advised this committee, as well, that even at this time the provisions for the FAC are not being complied with in the Territories by many of his people.

My submission is that, yes, we're stuck with this thing now, and it is a mess. I don't know how we can get around this. I've listened to what Mr. Wappel has said, and he is indicating something that might open the door to remedy this, but I'm saying that the government has put the cart before the horse on this issue. It ought not to have occurred, and it would not have occurred if it had engaged in the proper consultative process, demanded and guaranteed under the Constitution, that those aboriginal people enjoy.

The Chair: Are you ready for the question on BQ-12?

[Translation]

Mr. Langlois: Please -

[English]

Mr. Wappel: No subamendment?

[Translation]

The Chair: No, he said he was against the provision, and that he intends to propose another amendment later, but not here.

Amendment BQ-12 negativated

Amendment A-23 negativated

[English]

Mr. Wappel: I would like to move that Bill C-68 be amended on page 48 in paragraph 110(t) at line 23 by removing the words ``this Act or''.

The Chair: You've already made your arguments in favour of that amendment.

Are there any questions or comments with respect to the proposed amendment?

Mr. MacLellan, do you have any comments?

Mr. MacLellan: I can't agree with that, because the adaptation has to apply to the act as well as the regulations because we have to adapt the treaties not only to the regulations but to provisions of the act. It's not changing the act. It's not excluding aboriginal people from the act. It's saying just what we're saying. We want to adapt. We're not giving anything that isn't there right now, but we have to consult and we have to try to get a consensus from the aboriginal people, and get them to consent to abiding by the act and find ways by which we can adapt the act to their concerns.

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This is in no way saying that they are going to tell us how the act is going to be applied, or that they have the right to change the act. That just is not there. It's a consultation process. If we don't have a consultation process, frankly, the treaties, written and non-written, are meaningless.

The Chair: Mr. Wappel's amendment applies to page 48, line 23, where he proposed removing the words ``this Act or''. It would read ``in which any provision of the regulations applies''.

Amendment negatived

The Chair: We now come to clause 110 as -

Mr. Wappel: Mr. Chairman, perhaps committee members might vote in favour of this. I would like to move that for the purposes of consistency, we change the word ``respecting'' to ``regulating'' in paragraph 110(t).

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

The Chair: It's proposed by Mr. Wappel that in line 22 the word ``respecting'' be changed to ``regulating''.

It's brought to my attention that the French in this instance uses the word

[Translation]

``prévoir'' rather than ``régir''. I don't know if these words mean something different. Perhaps Mr. Roy or someone else can tell us if there is a difference in meaning between the words ``régir'' and ``prévoir''. The English version has to keep ``respecting to'' rather than ``regulating''.

[English]

Perhaps legislative counsel could interpret this for us.

Mr. Côté: Perhaps it should be one of the cases where the word ``respecting'' should stay in the legislation in order to grant those powers. If you do change to ``regulating'', I don't know what's going to happen with the word prévoir. My advice would be to leave it as is and keep the word ``respecting'' in the bill.

Perhaps my colleague would like to add something.

Ms McMurray: The reason I think the government absolutely does not want to take out the word ``respecting'', Mr. Chairman, is that from what I've seen today, it would seem you are having major problems as it is with consultation with aboriginals. You want to give yourself as much power as you possibly can to adapt those provisions when you do consult with the aboriginals. If you limit your power to regulating, you may also limit your power to consult. I don't think you want to do that. You seem to be having enough problems in that area already.

[Translation]

Mr. Yvan Roy (senior counsel, Criminal Law Policy, department of Justice): Mr. Chairman, while the word ``respecting'' might be more appropriate in English because it gives the existing system a certain amount of flexibility, I think it might also be better, as my colleague opposite said, to keep the same word in French. It translates into ``prévoir'' rather than ``régir''.

[English]

Mr. Wappel: Mr. Chair, I don't even know who would move such a silly amendment, but I'll certainly be voting against it.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh.

Mr. Wappel: Mr. Chairman, I'll withdraw that proposed amendment.

Amendment withdrawn

Clause 110 as amended agree to

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The Chair: Members of the committee, we had scheduled this meeting to adjourn at 12:30 p.m. There is a vote in 12 minutes. I propose that we adjourn now and that we resume our sitting this afternoon at 2 p.m. as scheduled.

The meeting stands adjourned.

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