EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Thursday, December 14, 1995

.0907

[English]

The Chairman: I call the meeting to order.

I wonder if I could ask Professor Ihonvbere to join our colleagues at the table.

On behalf of the committee, I'd like to thank you all for coming this morning. I think you will appreciate that this committee has taken a considerable interest in this subject.

At the instruction of the members of the committee, I wrote a letter in support ofMr. Saro-Wiwa, and we were extremely distressed to hear of his death. We can, like many others in the international community, only hope it will serve to produce positive results in this situation.

When we were examining the Commonwealth and its role, we heard what is happening there. We feel we should have a look at what we in Canada can do to bring a positive result, both for the people of Nigeria and also in the greater context of the African community, which is very concerned with the development of human rights and democracy in Africa.

We're very pleased to have with us this morning the Hon. Christine Stewart. She's accompanied by Michael Kergin and Claude Laverdure from the department.

We have the Hon. Flora MacDonald with us. Ms MacDonald, in addition to her many other attributes, is one of those who went to Nigeria and conducted an examination there on behalf of the Commonwealth.

We're also very pleased to have with us the Hon. Edward Broadbent, president of the centre.

From the University of Texas, we have Professor Julius Ihonvbere, who presently lives in Texas but comes from Nigeria.

Thank you very much for coming from Texas to join us, Professor.

Unfortunately Professor Kim Nossal is trapped in a snowstorm, which only seems appropriate in this climate in this country.

I would suggest the following order of procedure. The minister must leave by 10 o'clock, and I would suggest it would be helpful if she were to hear what the other members of our panel have to say, with your permission, members. Maybe we could get ten-minute opening statements from all the members of the panel and then have a few minutes to ask questions of the minister. Then she could leave and we could continue our questions with the other members.

Would you be good enough to start, Minister?

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Hon. Christine Stewart (Secretary of State (Latin America and Africa)): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Colleagues, guests, it's a pleasure to be here this morning. I'm very pleased you're addressing the issue of Nigeria, which is a situation that I believe threatens the stability of fragile democracies in many parts of the world, but especially in Africa.

Not only does the situation there set an example for other democracies, but the deterioration of the situation in Nigeria has the potential of creating a lot of chaos within not only Nigeria but the region where Nigeria is in west Africa.

I have a paper in both languages, which I will table with you. I don't want to read it, but it's there for your information and background. I'd like to speak to you in general terms about the federal government's position and what we have been doing vis-à-vis Nigeria.

In June 1993 Nigeria had democratic elections, which Canadians went to observe. We as a government were very concerned when shortly thereafter the results of that election were overturned and Abiola, the winner of the election, was put in jail, where he languishes to this day, although I think he's under house arrest right now. My experts on all sides of me will provide all the details.

The situation, as far as we're concerned, has continued to deteriorate on a regular basis, but in 1993, in response to the jailing of Abiola, the Canadian government withdrew its high commissioner from Nigeria. We curtailed all exports of arms to Nigeria, we stopped all high-level dialogue in Nigeria, and we took actions to curtail the granting of visas to members of the military powers that be in Nigeria. That particularly became a significant process around the Commonwealth Games. Several generals from Nigeria wished to attend those games and they were not granted visas by the government.

Pursuant to that, Prime Minister Chrétien spoke to Secretary General Anyaoku of the Commonwealth about democracy and about the Commonwealth's role in developing and promoting democracy. The Commonwealth had held a meeting in 1991 in Zimbabwe and came out with the Harare declaration, which spoke very specifically to the Commonwealth support for democratic principles. They weren't necessarily being stated to reflect the living out of all of those principles in member countries of the Commonwealth - there are 53 members of the Commonwealth - but these were the ideals the Commonwealth strove to enhance.

However, that declaration, coming as the result of a lot of action around South Africa and bringing about democracy with free and fair election in South Africa, remained little more than words. Yet we saw in Africa, for example, newly emerging democracies, but fragile democracies, and we saw the deterioration of some situations, such as Nigeria.

The Canadian government felt it was very important to try to put some meat on the bones of the Harare declaration. So the Prime Minister spoke to the Secretary General about this, and he agreed.

Diplomatically, for the year and a bit preceding the Commonwealth heads of government meeting in Auckland, New Zealand, Canada took a lead role with the Secretary General in quietly going around to member countries of the Commonwealth to get them to agree to put this as the uppermost item on the agenda of the Commonwealth meeting in Auckland, New Zealand.

For my part, I lobbied around this personally to Caribbean country members of the Commonwealth and southern African and Ghanaian members of the Commonwealth. It was an interesting process.

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In speaking to members of the Commonwealth in southern Africa, I found their main preoccupation was that General Abacha should attend the Commonwealth heads of government meeting and that we should be very cautious about being overly critical of Nigeria. They said if we were overly critical, especially Canada, General Abacha would not come to the Commonwealth heads of government meeting, although most of them acknowledged that probably he wouldn't come anyway, but at least the foreign minister might get there.

When we got to Auckland, their opinion changed quite dramatically because of the Nigerian government's confirmation of sentence against Ken Saro-Wiwa and the other eight who had been sentenced for a so-called conspiracy in Nigeria. Ken Wiwa, the son of Ken Saro-Wiwa, was at the Commonwealth conference. I had met him in Ottawa some months earlier and our Prime Minister met with him in Auckland.

Given the circumstances, our Prime Minister, as you know, was outspoken in his opening statement about the situation in Nigeria. The Prime Minister's statement and then the carrying out of the sentences against Ken Saro-Wiwa and the other eight really caused the southern African member states of the Commonwealth to change their attitude towards Nigeria quite dramatically.

As you know, President Mandela of South Africa, leading the way, was very outspoken. The President of Zimbabwe was also very outspoken in those very informal but direct meetings that take place between heads of government at these Commonwealth meetings. As a result of that, as you know, the Commonwealth suspended the membership of Nigeria in the Commonwealth and agreed that Nigeria would be expelled within two years' time if it didn't show significant progress in moving towards democracy.

A few weeks ago our Prime Minister attended a meeting of the Francophonie, which is worthy of comment as well. It was much more difficult to get the western African countries to agree to say anything about Nigeria, even to acknowledge there was a problem there.

It's important to understand western African nations' sensitivities to Nigeria. They are dependent on the Nigerian economy for their own well-being, plus Nigeria's a country of almost 100 million. They all border on Nigeria, and they know if there is a breakdown of society there, they are going to be overrun with refugees. They felt that was a great possibility. The problem is that could happen anyway. But they were very reticent to say anything other than to encourage Nigeria to come into the Commonwealth, or at least to improve their democracy.

I will be going to the Commonwealth foreign ministers committee meeting in London, England, next week - a new committee set up by the Commonwealth - to discuss particularly the issue of Nigeria. The Commonwealth members of that committee felt it was important that we meet as urgently as possible so that the momentum around Nigeria is maintained.

We recalled our chargé d'affaires, our acting high commissioner, from Nigeria following the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and the other eight. He has returned to Nigeria with the explicit mandate to work with civil society and those groups within Nigeria that will be working to try to promote democracy, the rule of law and so on in Nigeria. Canada has put in place a fund to support those activities, both in Nigeria and in Sierra Leone and Gambia, other military regimes in the area.

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This kind of support to civil society would not be possible without the presence of our acting high commissioner in Nigeria. For that reason, he is there.

I think, Mr. Chair, I'll leave my comments at that. I'm very interested in hearing other expert views around this table. I'll welcome questions afterward.

The Chairman: Thank you, Minister.

Ms MacDonald.

Hon. Flora MacDonald (Individual Presentation): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ladies and gentlemen, members of the committee, it's nice to be back here in a somewhat different role than I had in the past.

I'm particularly pleased to be asked to come to this special session of the committee, looking at the situation in Nigeria. I do so for a couple of reasons.

One is my continuing interest in what happens within Commonwealth countries, of which Nigeria has always been a key player. The second is because of a special mission that I headed last summer. It's about this mission that I want to speak this morning.

Last July, at the urging and invitation of several pro-democracy and human rights groups in Nigeria, the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative organized a three-person fact-finding mission to Nigeria.

The Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative is a Commonwealth NGO that was set up in 1989. It has conducted seminars, conferences, and investigations into various human rights matters within the Commonwealth. But it also prepares for the biennial heads of government meeting, which is a review of what the situation is generally on human rights within Commonwealth countries. It had decided, at the urging of these groups in Nigeria, that a mission should be sent to that country.

The objective of that mission was really fourfold. First, it was to investigate the situation of those asserting and protecting human rights. Second, it was to review conditions in Nigeria in light of that country's long-established membership in the Commonwealth and its support of the Harare Commonwealth declaration. Third, it was to assess the prospects for democracy, protection of human rights, and the rule of law. Fourth, it was to make recommendations to the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative as to what steps could be taken in a Commonwealth context to assist the advancement of human rights in Nigeria.

May I say that this was not an easy mission to undertake. I really don't think it would have come off as successfully as it did without the considerable backing of the Canadian government, particularly the Department of Foreign Affairs - I'm glad to see Dan George here this morning, who was of great help to us - with the financial backing of CIDA. That wasn't the only contribution, but it did help immensely. There was also the on-site, day-to-day support of our acting high commissioner in Nigeria, Gerry Ohlsen, who did a superb job in helping the mission carry out its responsibilities.

The members of the mission were: Dr. Enoch Dumbutshena, the former chief justice of Zimbabwe; Dr. Neville Linton, a long-time senior official with the Commonwealth Secretariat; and me.

In September, the group issued its report, which went to all heads of government in the Commonwealth prior to their meeting in Auckland, New Zealand, in November. I have a copy of that report. Unfortunately, I don't have copies to distribute to everybody, but I would be glad to leave a copy of the report, Mr. Chairman, with you so you could have it distributed to members of the committee.

The Chairman: I'm sorry to interrupt, Madame MacDonald, but our efficient committee staff are ahead of you, as they've circulated a copy of the report, in both official languages, to all members of the committee.

Ms MacDonald: Great.

The members will know, then, that the report listed 12 recommendations urging action to pressure the Government of Nigeria to release immediately the political detainees or to charge and try them before an independent court, not a military tribunal. It also recommended a wide range of trade and financial sanctions and, as well, steps to facilitate Nigeria's transition to democracy with particular emphasis on strengthening civil society. I'm glad to hear the comments of the ministers to the steps that are being taken to lend support to that goal.

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I led the mission to Nigeria. For almost three weeks we travelled widely throughout the country and met with representatives of the government, human rights and pro-democracy groups, trade unions, churches, the judiciary, women's organizations, the media, and concerned individuals. We went from Lagos to Abuja, north to Kano and Kaduna, south to Port Harcourt, and through Ogoniland.

Given the history of successive oppressive military regimes in Nigeria, the annulment of the 1993 general election, the imprisonment of Chief Moshood Abiola - he's the man widely believed to have won the election - the incarceration and trial by a military tribunal of prominent Nigerians, including former President Obasanjo, and the continuing human rights abuses, it was not surprising that time and again we heard such statements as: Nigeria is cruising headlong down the precipice; it is now a place of accelerating drift; act now to prevent another Rwanda; and, Nigeria has perhaps two years to escape disaster.

While human rights violations in Nigeria were a matter of record and something with which we had familiarized ourselves before travelling to Nigeria, nevertheless our group was appalled to see the extent to which the infrastructure necessary to support the country's legal, social and economic programs had disintegrated. Social services, education, health and environmental programs had deteriorated substantially. Nigeria, Africa's most populous and wealthy state, with oil revenues amounting to $40 million a day, is seemingly unable to support even the most minimal services. We found this to be the case when we were in Nigeria in July. That was evident to us.

Just a few days ago Larry Diamond, the senior research fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, addressed the American standing committee on foreign affairs. He used these words, and I want to quote from this because this is something he has just written in the last few days:

With the execution on November 10th of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight co-defendants from Ogoniland, Nigeria has drawn further to the precipice of large-scale political violence and possible state collapse. Already, Nigeria finds itself in a state of creeping anarchy. The society, the economy and the very fabric of political order are disintegrating. During the past twelve years of military rule, institutions of all kinds have been decimated: the schools, the health care system, public transportation, the civil service, the police, even the military itself, whose professionalism and corporate integrity have been ravaged by corruption and factionalism.

He finished with this comment:

The political, economic, social and ethnoregional dynamics of Nigeria today point soberly to the growing danger of some kind of collapse of political order into deadly political conflict. The situation is so precarious that it would be foolish to deny the possibility that concerted international action could precipitate actions, by regime or opposition, that would push the country over the brink. But the risks of doing nothing are far greater. Time is running out for a peaceful resolution of Nigeria's political crisis. The crisis can only be resolved through frank and free dialogue and negotiation from the country's ethnic, regional, religious and political factions. And that can only occur under civilian rule. Nigeria will not return to anything approaching political stability unless the military can be induced to withdraw in favour of a civilian-led management of the process of political reconstruction. And Abacha and his clique will not withdraw peacefully and fully unless they are compelled to do so through international pressure that is unified, intelligently targeted, forcefully conveyed and sustained.

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Larry Diamond has been writing about the political situation in Nigeria for the past 15 years. I quoted from his testimony at length because he sees an urgency to this situation that, unfortunately, is not widely reflected in international circles today. That urgency and imminent danger is the impression our mission gained when we were in Nigeria, and it has only been strengthened in the weeks and months since.

A few days after our group left Nigeria, our co-worker and associate and the man who helped set up many of our meetings in Nigeria, Dr. Beko Ransome-Kuti, who is head of the Campaign for Democracy in Nigeria and a long-serving member of the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, was picked up by the military police, tried before a military tribunal for criminal felony, and sentenced to 15 years in prison. He is now being held in chains in a prison in northern Nigeria, and his family is unable to communicate with him.

When I mention the ongoing state of abuse in Nigeria, I have to ask myself what can really be done. I hope that at the meeting the minister will be attending in London they will be able to put some definite plans on the table and take a detailed look at the recommendations that our committee made to Commonwealth countries. But I hope we will go beyond the Commonwealth countries to draw in other nations, including some of the Nordic nations and non-Commonwealth African countries, to form a wider group of countries that would support targeted sanctions and pressure against Nigeria.

I think one of the most effective ways to do this, and we saw this with South Africa, is to look at ways in which a sports boycott can be implemented. Nothing would have more impact on the people of Nigeria, and they in turn on their government, than to see Nigeria boycotted from taking part in either the World Cup or the Olympic Games. I think there are a number of things like this that jointly have to be put together to bring pressure to bear on the Government of Nigeria to abdicate their present position, and not in three years' time, as Abacha seems to indicate, but as soon as possible - early in 1996.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Ms MacDonald.

Mr. Broadbent.

Hon. Edward Broadbent (President, International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development): Mr. Chairman, I'd like to begin with a few words from Ken Saro-Wiwa. He wrote:

My brothers my sisters, dance, dance, dance. Dance your angers and your joys. Dance, my people, for we have seen tomorrow and there is an Ogoni star in the sky.

As we all know, he's not going to write that kind of poetry again.

[Translation]

Honourable members, other guests, I am pleased that the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade has called this meeting.

Canada must take advantage of the growing international momentum to take constructive action on Nigeria. Although Nigeria is not one of those countries in Africa which the International Centre concentrates its work on and can speak about with some specified authority, it is a country whose government's atrocities compel all to speak out.

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[English]

I would simply add, confirming what both the minister and Flora MacDonald have said, that the centre sent the Hon. Walter MacLean, a former minister of the Government of Canada, to Nigeria recently. He returned just last week with a report that confirms exactly what Flora MacDonald has just said in quoting Larry Diamond. There is an extraordinarily serious crisis within the country, and according to serious people, it could implode at almost any time.

To illustrate the barbarism of this regime, just last year our centre awarded its International Freedom Award to the Campaign for Democracy. As Flora just mentioned, CD president Dr. Beko Ransome-Kuti, a non-violent, innocent man, has been given a sham trial and sentenced to 15 years in prison.

The world's attention has been called to Nigeria because of the recent execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and other innocent people. Not only did the military regime seize power two years ago to stop the democratic will of the Nigerian people and imprison the man they elected, it has since beaten down all opposition and calls for change with military terror, and made a mockery of its own judiciary by shutting down newspapers and literally killing its opponents. All of this has been well documented recently, and I urge the members to read Flora MacDonald's report on her mission with the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I would like to concentrate my comments today on what democratic governments, including our own, should try to do to influence Nigeria to move towards peaceful democratic change. I then want to spend a minute or two on what the private sector can do, which, due to the controversial activities of Shell in Nigeria, has become a matter of serious international concern.

Canada has already undertaken many constructive actions with regard to Nigeria, including refusing visas to senior military officials and ministers, receiving members of the democratic opposition, stopping the export of military equipment, and speaking out against human rights violations.

On the multilateral front, the Commonwealth statement has been a useful beginning, but I think at this point not much more than that. I'm encouraged by the forthcoming meeting that the minister has referred to in London, and I hope something specific will come from that.

Nigeria has been suspended from the Commonwealth and will be expelled in two years if there's no improvement. A lot can happen in two years. Two years is too long to wait for change from General Abacha's regime. He has had two years since he nullified the most democratic elections in Nigeria's history. He has responded with violence against anyone daring to criticize his government. We should work out with other countries sympathetic to the need to isolate Nigeria, a series of steps that should be imposed if there's no action soon. We should consider all options - the denial of visas, banning of cultural and sports events, and the freezing of assets.

Personally, I believe we need something much more substantial. We need a comprehensive oil embargo, one that will be imposed at a specific time, say, within three months. The murderous rulers of this country must know that the world is watching and is prepared to cut off its lucrative pipeline if they do not free political prisoners and guarantee them and all others the right to a fair civilian trial, as well as commence a serious and open dialogue with the opposition on a peaceful transition to democracy.

When Femi Falana of the Campaign for Democracy accepted the International Freedom Award in Montreal last year, he said the international community had maintained ``a curious silence'' on Nigeria, and called the west ``hypocritical''. He was alluding, in good part, to oil. The silence has now been broken, but it's time to put our money where our mouth is. A few years ago we joined other countries in imposing tough economic sanctions on South Africa. Now it is South Africa's remarkable president, Nelson Mandela, who is calling for comparable action on Nigeria.

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The European Union has imposed an arms embargo, and six countries - Germany, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway and Denmark - are in favour of an oil embargo. We too, I believe, should adopt such a policy. Last year Canada imported $634 million worth of Nigerian oil. It is time to give notice that we will buy this oil elsewhere. Of greater importance, I believe, is the need to persuade the United States to do the same. The U.S. is the largest purchaser of Nigerian oil.

We know well from the Haitian experience, where democracy was similarly aborted in order to install a reign of terror, an embargo could have been effective but was not universally applied until it was too late, making military intervention a necessity. We should explore using our economic might now, before any kind of military intervention might become necessary.

Together, the European Union and the United States import 80% of Nigeria's oil, which in turn accounts for about 95% of the regime's foreign revenue. An effective embargo on this one commodity - and I repeat, give, say, three months' notice for them to begin to clean up their act - could, I believe, produce effective results. The military dictator must be made to understand that he cannot, literally, get away with murder.

Sanctions are sometimes criticized for being blunt, but conventional diplomacy over the past few years simply has not worked. Everyone knows he flaunted the Commonwealth meeting by murdering people right when the Commonwealth was meeting. Words simply are not working. Economic sanctions should only be used in exceptional situations, and if there has ever been an exceptional situation, this is it.

The recent publicity around Shell's involvement in Nigeria, and particularly its relationship to the execution of nine Ogoni environmental rights activists, has also stimulated desired discussion of business ethics and responsibility in the global economy.

Shell said, in a statement following the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and the eight others, that ``a commercial organization like Shell cannot and must not interfere with the legal processes of a sovereign state''. This statement is factually misleading and morally offensive. Has Shell, I ask, hesitated to involve itself in private and public discussion in Nigeria on tax policy, labour laws, environmental concerns and a host of other related self-interestedly pertinent matters?

Indeed, Shell had recourse to using the Nigerian military themselves, and used their vehicles for a raid on the village of Korokoro in October 1993, which ended with the death of a 17-year-old boy who had been shot in the back of the head and the severe wounding of a 74-year-old man.

If Shell has been part of the problem in the past, as it has, it is now time it became part of the solution. Shell produces half of the country's oil output. Having tolerated fraud and violence in the past, it must now use its influence to put an end to summary executions and the violation of every principle of the rule of law. If the president of Shell spoke up, does anyone think that General Abacha would not listen? Just when will Shell and the other oil companies be prepared to speak out? Only self-interested hypocrisy justifies saying governments should be influenced only when profits are a concern, but not when human lives are at stake.

All companies doing transnational business must work with a variety of governments. Everyone understands that. Some of them are democratic and some are not. Many, like Shell, wield tremendous influence with governments who are sorely in need of their services. They do not hesitate to offer advice when it comes to liberalizing foreign investment or trade regimes; indeed, there are many international business organizations devoted exclusively to dispensing such advice. But it is only when it comes to human rights that we hear the argument from such companies that they should not interfere.

The business of business is making money - we understand that. But that should not happen at the expense of human lives and human dignity. Like all citizens, people working in corporations have responsibilities as well as rights. I believe now is the time in Nigeria that these responsibilities should be exercised. Now is the time for democratic governments - and hopefully those at the Commonwealth meeting in London - to tell Shell what they expect that company to do.

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Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, at the end of the Cold War, democratic leaders claimed they would work to make the world safe for markets and safe for democracy. Only the former has been in any sense achieved, with all governments now claiming some form of commitment to the market economy. Nigeria, tragically, is illustrating the results of separating moral concern with rights from commercial concerns with profits. To apply a phrase used in a different time and different context, capitalism with a human face requires morality as well as profits, otherwise it's a contradiction in terms. Thank you.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Broadbent.

Now Mr. Ihonvbere. Again, thank you for coming to join us from Texas. You can be the ``sweep-up'' man, if that's all right with you.

Professor Julius Ihonvbere (Department of Government Studies, University of Texas): I have a prepared a short paper, which I have submitted. But I will just speak to it.

The Chairman: Thank you very much; I'd appreciate that. Then we'll have some time for questions of the minister before she leaves.

Prof. Ihonvbere: I would like to begin by thanking everyone here for their concern with the problems of Nigeria. I speak both as a Nigerian and as someone who is deeply involved in the struggle for democracy in Nigeria. I am currently president of the Organization of Nigerians in the Americas and the co-coordinator of the global network of Nigerian organizations which brings together popular organizations in Europe and the United States.

I just want to re-emphasize some of the points that have just been made, because maybe coming from a Nigerian they might be taken a little more seriously.

If very serious and decisive actions are not taken now, this committee will be meeting again very soon, not to discuss democracy in Nigeria but to debate how to handle the massive massacres that will be taking place in Nigeria, the flood of refugees that will find their way here one way or the other, and to discuss also situations that will make even Somalia and Liberia look like child's play.

I want to say that one ethnic group in Nigeria has ten times the firepower of the so-called warlords in Somalia, both in terms of determination and the capacity to cause unthinkable havoc. I also want to say that Abacha has no plans whatsoever to go anywhere. What has not been discussed at all is the psyche and character of Abacha as a leader and of those who work with him. We're dealing here with somebody who makes Saddam Hussein look like an infant, an amateur, when it comes to brutality and total disregard not just for the popular will but for rational thinking.

Abacha is not on record anywhere as having made a single rational statement as a leader - anywhere. You cannot find a page in which he has articulated any reasonable thinking. Even when you write a speech for him, he's incapable of reading it coherently. So we're dealing with a very uncouth, brutal, visionless, extremely corrupt and violent individual here. To make it worse, he's working with a group of Nigerians who have no regard whatsoever for democracy, and this includes the current foreign minister, who claims to be a former chairman of a political party.

The situation is degenerating so rapidly that while I agree that sanctions are important, I think there is a need to go a little beyond sanctions right now. As someone who is in the forefront of the opposition, I know that in another six months, if a coup does not take place in Nigeria, it will have a major uprising. That coup is not going to be the usual ``fellow Nigerians, I have taken over''. It's going to be a coup that will systematically eliminate those who are seen as enemies of the country. The bloodshed is going to generate ramifications beyond what we can contemporarily contemplate.

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I also want to say that within civil society in Nigeria there is a very deep frustration with the possibility of adopting rational strategies for opposing or resisting the government. The Campaign for Democracy has its president and secretary in jail. The National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers, NUPENG, has its secretary and president in jail. The National Democratic Coalition has most of its members either detained or in exile. The National Association of Nigerian Students remains banned. We do not have any group that can operate openly and visibly adopting rational strategies for resisting the military government. This is forcing many Nigerians to go underground and to adopt extralegal strategies for resisting the government.

Previously we had a plane hijacked by the Movement for the Advancement of Democracy, which is called MAD. We had a bombing in Kwara state. But I do know that there are more organizations and individuals who are saying we should bring down the system once and for all.

The groups I work with and represent advocate that nothing short of a major, comprehensive embargo on Nigerian oil would make Abacha think twice. So I support the statements made earlier, and of course disagree with my colleague Professor Nossal, who thinks sanctions will play no role.

Nigeria depends almost completely on the sale of oil for foreign exchange [Inaudible - Editor] That is why it has in place decrees that prescribe death by firing squad for any oil worker who engages in strike actions under the petroleum production and essential services decrees in 1976, which is still in force. Any international action that affects the ability to export oil and collect foreign exchange of $40 million a day will tell this government that the world is serious.

I want to quote a minister of Abacha who unfortunately was a colleague of mine when he was president of the Academic Staff Union of Universities at the University of Jos. He later became the elected president of the senate in the third republic and unfortunately became the minister for education under Abacha: Dr. Iyorchia Ayu. He told me that Abacha does not read newspapers and does not watch television, so you can write what you like and you can say what you like. Basically, Abacha's decisions do not in any way try to accommodate public and popular opinion.

I think the only way to get around Abacha and his government is to take very seriously the question of imposing sanctions, particularly on oil imports. This has to be heard immediately and it has to be decisive and comprehensive.

Let me quickly add that unlike the previous arguments that sanctions would affect the poor, the poor are already down and out. No amount of sanctions imposed on Nigeria would affect my family, for example. My father is unemployed; my mother has no job. I have two brothers who are graduates who have been unemployed for five years. So there is no amount of sanctions imposed on Nigeria that would make a difference.

In fact, as I speak, my immediate younger brother, with a BA from the University of Ife, is in Liberia looking for work. A Nigerian abandons Nigeria and goes to Liberia to seek employment. Thousands of Nigerians are seeking political asylum in South Africa. We are not counting the numbers in Germany, where over 25,000 of them are making claims for political asylum, and 9,000 in the United Kingdom.

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The other way, of course, is to support civil society with those within Nigeria and those who represent interests in Nigeria abroad. Right now it appears that only those organizations abroad are able to articulate these issues and flag the interests of organizations within Nigeria.

The third point I quickly want to make is that Canada occupies a special place in terms of how Nigerians perceive nations of the world. I say this with all seriousness, not only because two of my own children are Canadian citizens or because I took my graduate degrees in this country, but also because I think Canada has always taken a very principled position on some of these critical issues. I do know that Nigerians and organizations in civil society, as well as other democratic nations in the western world, will take very seriously initiatives that come from the Canadian government.

The killing of Ken Saro-Wiwa was only the recent evidence. I don't know how many people have seen the videotape prepared by Channel 4. I think the quotes in that tape would demonstrate very clearly that the massacres in that region were orchestrated, planned and executed by the Government of Nigeria. The military officer in charge of that operation is on the tape describing precisely how he cordons off the community, throws grenades and drives everyone into the bush.

From evidence and information that I have, I'm saying that if action is not taken immediately, what we will be dealing with in another six months will be something far, far more serious, far, far more dangerous, not only for Nigeria but for the entire West Africa subregion. We should all remember that we're dealing not with a country of 2 million, but with a country of over 100 million people. The implications for the entire West African economy will be much worse than we can think of right now.

I would urge the committee and the Canadian government to take very seriously - even if it means blazing the trail - the question of sanctions and oil embargo.

In my paper I have outlined the ways in which I think civil society can be supported. As a member of the Campaign for Democracy and the Committee for the Defence of Human Rights in Nigeria, I know precisely the limitations of these organizations back home.

I think I'll leave it there in the interest of time. I can take questions later. Thank you.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Professor.

It might be of interest to you to know that members of the committee had the opportunity of meeting with members of the National Democratic Coalition when they were here recently in Ottawa. I must say that everything you told us confirmed the position they were taking as well on the need for present sanctions and action. Thank you very much.

Now, Minister, I wonder if you can give us until ten past.... I'll tell you why. Our normal rule is to go five minutes, five minutes, and five minutes. But if you tell me that you have to be out of here, then I'll just -

Mrs. Stewart: Absolutely, ten past will have to be it.

The Chairman: In that case we'll hold everybody to about three minutes.

[Translation]

Mrs. Debien.

Mrs. Debien (Laval East): I have a question to direct to the minister in the light of what Mr. Broadbent, Mrs. MacDonald and Mr. Ihonvbere have said about the crisis facing Nigeria at the present time and the impact this could have on the whole western Africa region.

You said that very shortly, you are going to participate with other colleagues in a working session in London. In the light of what Mr. Broadbent said - and I agree with him - regarding an oil embargo, does Canada intend to propose such an embargo at the London meeting?

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[English]

Mrs. Stewart: Canada said, starting with the Commonwealth and before, we are open to a consideration and support of any measures, including an oil embargo. However, it was and is the view of our government that a unilateral embargo on the part of Canada would not be very effective.

At the moment we're not the only ones considering that embargo. Just yesterday I was reading in the press that again the U.S. will consider an oil embargo. If that is the case, it would have a significant impact.

Irving Oil, the company that imports most of the oil in Canada from Nigeria, has said it would be willing to follow the lead. So that won't be a difficulty.

It certainly will be on the agenda in our discussions in London.

The Chairman: Mr. Morrison.

Mr. Morrison (Swift Current - Maple Creek - Assiniboia): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'd like to pursue that a little further, Mrs. Stewart. You did say unilateral action perhaps would not be helpful. I believe we are the second-largest importer of Nigerian crude. I may be off base on that. It's 600,000 barrels a day.

Mrs. Stewart: No, we're a small player.

Mr. Morrison: Well, 600,000 barrels isn't small.

Mrs. Stewart: But in comparison with -

Mr. Morrison: Anyway, I guess the way I'd like to phrase my question is that in spite of what you said about what you may or may not support at the conference, what is the position of your government on this? You must have had some discussions. Is the government considering actively pursuing or actively promoting sanctions or not?

Mrs. Stewart: A variety of sanctions can be imposed. An oil embargo is one of them. Certainly we have said we are open to that. It will be on the table next week at the meeting in London of the eight foreign ministers. We've been exploring other sanctions that have been suggested as well - extending visa sanctions to not just leaders of Nigeria but also their extended families; preventing students in those families from studying abroad and so on; a sports embargo, which is another form of sanction. All these things will be on the table.

Canada - I cannot tell you this enough - is very concerned about the situation in Nigeria. We are concerned because we have decreasing resources to provide to development assistance. The needs in the world...more and more of those diminishing funds and resources are being spent on emergencies. If Nigeria breaks down, it will be an emergency of the largest proportion. We don't want to see that.

The Chairman: Mr. Speller.

Mr. Speller (Haldimand - Norfolk): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the minister for coming.

If we look back to our experience in South Africa, we all praise ourselves for putting the pressure on South Africa and moving them, but as you know, that process took a long time. It was a hard time to get the sanctions on, to get all countries to agree to these sanctions, to get them to work.

What steps could we take outside of these meetings to speed up the process? If we look at what happened before in Somalia, Rwanda and Burundi, we knew these problems were going to be there. We all knew it. We tried sanctions and we tried certain things, but experience around the world shows it seems it takes the Americans to come into somewhere to really put the muscle on. I know the Commonwealth is important around the world. Being the chair of the parliamentary association, I understand the resolve of countries to deal with Nigeria.

What can we do to speed up the process, to make sure that what our friend here says just doesn't happen in six months? Six months is a short period of time.

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Mrs. Stewart: I think our government understands the urgency of the issue. That's why we agreed to meet at this time, as quickly as possible, to discuss the Nigerian issue. The Commonwealth can't effect the change that's necessary all by itself. On the other hand, the Commonwealth is a very credible international institution. It is watched and listened to. If we come forward with some advice about what the global community, not just the Commonwealth, ought to be doing....

I think Nigeria does present a picture distinct from South Africa. If the international community did agree to an oil embargo, it could be effective quite rapidly, because oil alone accounts for so much of Nigerian revenue. It would have a very immediate effect. As well, the revenues from oil go directly into government hands. It doesn't go to the people.

Mr. Broadbent: Into their pockets.

Mrs. Stewart: Yes.

Mr. Speller: One of the things the South Africans did, as you know, was to give a little bit and then give a little bit more to try to stave off these sanctions. Mr. Broadbent talked about their having to show something within three months.

What would we see as being a credible move - outside of resigning and free and fair democratic elections? What do we say is needed?

Mrs. Stewart: That will be part of the analytical discussion in London as well, but whatever is done has to give a clear signal to the people of Nigeria, not just the international community, that they are changing and that they're going to move toward democracy.

As I understand it, and as you've heard described, there is such total disregard for rights and for the voicing of any opposition in that country that all the leaders of an opposition are in jail. So as I understand it, as it's been described to me - and maybe the others would like to comment on this - if Abacha were to stand down right now there would be a political vacuum there. Civil society hasn't had a chance to organize itself.

So I don't believe it's something that can change from one day to the next. The attitude can change but it's going to be a process. In that process there have to be clear signals right from the beginning that this government understands it's up against a wall and it's prepared to start a process of democratic change.

We're not going to wait three years, which is what Abacha suggested on October 1. That is absolutely too long. The people aren't going to wait two years for there to be significant change.

The Chairman: We have about two minutes of the minister's time left.

Mr. Lastewka, is your question a quick one?

Mr. Lastewka (St. Catharines): Yes.

Since the U.S. has a major import of oil from Nigeria, what discussions or what leadership has Canada taken in moving the U.S. closer to sanctions?

Mrs. Stewart: I can leave it to my officials to talk about specific initiatives that have been taken. In international meetings there basically has been a lot of dialogue around the concern of Nigeria. There was some contradiction in the U.S. emanating from South Africa. One U.S. spokesperson said about 10 days ago that they wouldn't consider an oil embargo. Following that there have been at least two statements by the U.S., at the highest levels, that they would be open to and would consider an oil embargo. Yesterday they were suggesting they would even consider a unilateral oil embargo.

So this is coming out of discussions. The world cannot afford to have a country like Nigeria, with its prestige and its huge population, fall apart. We realize that it all costs us enormously.

Mr. Lastewka: Mr. Broadbent talked about Shell. A number of other people have talked about Shell. Some of us saw the article or advertisement Shell took out in our newspapers in Canada. Has the Canadian government met with Shell Canada or affiliates of Shell to discuss the situation in Nigeria?

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Mrs. Stewart: Not that I'm aware of. Irving Oil, as I was saying before, imports most of the Nigerian oil into Canada. You have seen on the part of the people of this country some small personal embargoing of Shell. The City of Toronto has denied consideration of Shell purchasing into their city structure, which is important. I would hope you would see a rising momentum from the public in Canada, too, on this issue.

Mr. Lastewka: I guess I look at it from the standpoint that it's better to keep people at the table talking than to separate away from the table. That's why my question to you was, is the Government of Canada talking to Shell Canada to begin that influence? It's much easier to do it when they're at the table than when they're not.

Mrs. Stewart: Yes. To date, I'm not aware that they have.

Mr. Lastewka: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Mr. Lastewka, we invited Shell Canada to come to this meeting, as you know. While they declined, they delivered to the clerk this morning a written statement. Once it's translated, we will circulate it to all members of the committee. So we might be able to pursue that further.

Madame Stewart, thank you very much for coming. We appreciate it.

I wonder if we might just take a short break to allow the minister to leave.

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The Chairman: Can we return to order, please.

Mr. Broadbent, I believe you signalled that you would like to make an observation in relation to one of the questions asked of the minister. Did you want to follow up on that?

Mr. Broadbent: Yes. It's just an observation for consideration, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.

We were all pleased, I'm sure, to hear what Christine Stewart said about the Commonwealth meeting that will hopefully come up with a concrete agenda. The only observation I was going to make was that instead of waiting for a consensus to emerge, I for one would like to see Canada take some risk in leading the consensus.

I'll be more specific about that. If we take what the minister has said, she's open to the question of sanctions, for example. I for one, obviously - and we've heard from our Nigerian friend and colleague here - would like to see our foreign ministers...I'd like to see Mr. Ouellet publicly say that he plans to meet his equivalent in the United States to try to talk him into accepting sanctions. Six European states have come out publicly - not that they're going to consider sanctions, they're calling for sanctions. It's that kind of step.

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I'll repeat what I said before. I think our government has played a useful, constructive and positive role. There's no question about that.

The question is where do we go from here? All I would say is that instead of waiting for a consensus to emerge, it would be great - because I'm talking to politicians here - to help shape the public agenda.

The UN finally got involved in Haiti. Why? Because of the black caucus in the United States. It became an internal political issue in the United States. Anyone who has done a serious analysis of that, I think, would agree with what I'm saying. It was not exclusively because of that, but that was the catalyst. In this context, if we stepped out in front on principle on the embargo and tried to persuade our American friends, the same kind of domestic politics might play a useful role.

The Chairman: Thank you.

It's regrettable that Professor Kim Nossal was unable to come this morning. Professor Nossal has written a book, and I gather he's one of the world's leading experts on sanctions. In the excerpt from his book that our committee staff provided us, he said that often sanctions do not work and should only be used in very rare circumstances. It would have been interesting to hear from him as to whether or not this is one of those circumstances.

I understand that the African communities are not entirely happy with the idea of sanctions, particularly some of the countries in the region. The assistant deputy minister for Africa and the Middle East, Mr. Laverdure, is here. Perhaps he will share any information he might have about the understanding from other countries in the region about the effectiveness or appropriateness of sanctions in these circumstances.

Mr. Claude Laverdure (Assistant Deputy Minister, Africa and the Middle East, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade): Mr. Chairman, for the last two and a half weeks, Minister Ouellet and I travelled through various countries in central Africa. We asked all of our interlocutors what they would do and what we should be doing about Nigeria. We visited Mali, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Cameroon and Benin, and at the francophone summit we met with foreign ministers and heads of state from Senegal and other countries.

It was as if they had met before speaking to us, because the message was always the same - as small neighbours of giant Nigeria, we are very worried about any economic sanctions on Nigeria. This is not the way to deal with General Abacha. The consequences will be worse for us than for Nigeria. Mr. Ouellet said that he would note their comments, but that Canada would have to come to a decision and take a stand. It was very interesting to hear these comments, especially from Ghana, and to listen to people around the table at the francophone summit.

As you may have heard or seen in the press, for a while at the francophone summit, people were suggesting there should be no reference to Nigeria in the final statement of the heads of state. Prime Minister Chrétien had to fight alone for a little while to say that we could not meet for three days in Cotonou and not make any reference to Nigeria.

I'm not suggesting that these people are not willing to take stands, but we have to remember that countries in Africa are not all like South Africa or Zimbabwe on this particular issue.

The Chairman: That's helpful.

[Translation]

Mr. Leblanc.

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Mr. Leblanc (Longueuil): I have a question which might go beyond the issue of Nigeria. I know that every time we want to interfere with dictatorial regimes, we always run into many problems to reach an agreement at the United Nations or within the Commonwealth. It takes a lot of paper, many meetings and we are slow to take action.

Often, the countries concerned have, by then, had time to self-destruct. We have seen such a disaster happen in Rwanda and, as Ms MacDonald mentioned, there are upheavals, structures are destroyed, corruption becomes rampant, and so on.

I think we have enough experience with that kind of thing at the international level. Maybe it's time for the United Nations to be empowered, one way or the other, to act at one point. When there is a coup in a country like Nigeria and dictators seize power, the United Nations should be empowered to do the same thing; that is, it should be able to organize a coup of its own and to get back in power.

Rich countries are becoming poorer and poorer. Our resources are more and more limited. We have to spend enormous amounts of money to put things back in order in these countries, because we always feel that we should protect the people and take care of the population's concerns and human rights. In any case, we have to spend a fortune to put some kind of order in all this. I am not quite sure that countries like the United States, Canada, which has an enormous debt, France and those other countries which are supposed to be rich, can afford to do so, because they are becoming poorer and poorer.

We have to stop and ask ourselves how the United Nations could be empowered to act before disaster strikes. I am referring specifically to the United Nations.

Often, embargoes are harder on the people than on their leaders who already have pockets full of money and can survive several years before something is done. It's always the people who pay for that, who loose more and more and are forced into poverty.

Should we count more on the United Nations? Is it a credible entity? As I said earlier, the process it follows takes time. When there is an emergency in Nigeria, the United Nations should get more involved, because we are not necessarily going to be able to get things back in order.

[English]

Mr. Michael Kergin (Assistant Deputy Minister, Political and International Affairs, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade): Briefly, we strongly agree that the UN should be trying to ensure that problems or conflicts are dealt with before they reach a point that the cost in human tragedy to the international community to clean up those problems becomes overwhelming.

One problem is that the UN Charter, which was written in 1945, is based on the concept of the nation state and the jealous sovereignty of nation states. This is all through the charter, so that an overriding principle for the Security Council is the respect for national boundaries, and the institutions, governments, administration, or whatever you want to call them, that are within those established boundaries. As a matter of intrusive policy, the UN is somewhat handicapped in being able to go into a country - which we're seeing more of, like failed states - take it over and to try to re-establish some order.

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A lot of countries are small and very jealous of their sovereign prerogative. They're worried about outside forces or countries intruding or imposing their views internally. So unless there is a change in the UN Charter, there is a limit to what the Security Council can do.

For example, when we talk about peacekeeping or peace operations, it's always under the rubric of something representing a threat to international peace and security. It is sometimes difficult to argue that gross violations of human rights in a small country are a direct threat to international peace and security. It can be a threat to international democracy or a threat to international values, but a threat to international peace and security is a slightly tougher case to make.

On the other side, I think there has been a fair amount of progress. UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali came up with an interesting document about two years ago, his An Agenda for Peace. This is based on the idea of preventive diplomacy, of moving quickly when there are signs of potential conflict between states, or applying it separately if there are signs of human rights abuses or abuses of civil governance and so on. It is based on the idea of trying to put institutions in place that shore up, remedy or try to assist a country to deal with violations, or with problems with its neighbours, so that you can get some structures in place before the problem gets out of hand.

To some extent the Commonwealth has picked that up with the Millbrook declaration, and its measures to try to assist countries that lapse from democracy, democratic procedures or civil rights behaviour. It has measures to put mechanisms in place to apply political and economic pressure if there are persistent violations, to try to bring the country into a more acceptable mode of behaviour.

These are things that individual countries or countries working in association, as through the Commonwealth or UN, can do if there is a will to do that. As I said, under the UN Charter there is no legal method whereby you can impose order in a country unless you have a recognizable threat to international peace and security.

Ms MacDonald: I want to make a couple of comments.

One is with regard to the United Nations. Any kind of action through the United Nations takes a long time, and I feel the situation in Nigeria is such that we don't have that kind of time. That's the message that we're trying to get across today. It simply doesn't exist.

It's no good for countries in la Francophonie to say don't say anything because we might get hurt. They'll get hurt far worse if the situation in Nigeria blows up. I think that is the message the Canadian government should take to the United States. Discussions can go on at the highest levels to make this a more active file than it is at the present time.

But it's in other areas as well - the Commonwealth, la Francophonie and the other organizations. Go to the Organization of African Unity. Take steps that raise the profile of this. It is dropping off the agenda, and unless there is concerted action by a country like Canada taking some leadership, we'll be facing a situation in Nigeria that will be so catastrophic that it will consume all of the countries around it.

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Therefore, I just want to say that the UN Security Council will never get around to doing anything about this. The UN Secretary-General could act on his own. He could appoint people to investigate the situation and be more publicly outspoken than what's now taking place.

Since the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and the eight co-defendants, there has been very little in the media, in the public debate whatsoever, about Nigeria. Steps that this country can take through individual organizations, and particularly through the government, to try to get it back onto the international agenda are the most critical thing.

The Chairman: Thank you.

I see Mr. Broadbent, but we're well over the time for this question. I'm sure you'll have a chance to get back in.

Madame Beaumier.

Ms Beaumier (Brampton): Thank you. I'm always a little confused when we're talking about human rights issues and governments responses, including our own.

I think what I have discovered so far from this hearing is that Irving Oil has said that an embargo wouldn't be a problem for them, and South Africa and Zimbabwe have also called for an embargo. Nationals from Nigeria have called for an embargo. We have European support, as Mr. Broadbent has stated. I believe our Prime Minister demonstrated a willingness and a desire to take the lead in the Commonwealth in speaking out against what's happening in Nigeria.

We get a big push on for something. Everyone's interested. Ken Saro-Wiwa was an artist. He was well respected. He was a world-renowned individual. Now that he's buried, it seems that the issue is slowly.... We seem to get a surge.

Do you know whether our minister is prepared...? If we could, as politicians, as Ed pointed out, express a desire, would our minister be prepared to go to the United States and take the lead in pushing for this embargo? I don't think there's any question that this embargo is going to hurt the government, not the people who are already suffering there. Has the minister talked about building up the push for this again?

We all seem to agree that something must be done now. Could you explain to me why we aren't doing so?

Mr. Laverdure: I can assure you that the Prime Minister and Minister Ouellet do not wish to see the issue put on the back burner, that's for sure.

Ms Beaumier: I understand that.

Mr. Laverdure: For the time being, Mr. Ouellet has been saying - this is why we did that tour of central Africa - that he's putting the emphasis now on the meeting we're having in London next week, hoping this will serve as a starting point, in a way. If we can get a consensus in the Commonwealth, then it will be easier maybe for us, with the U.K., to go to Washington to show them that we have at least 50 countries in the world favouring an oil embargo.

You're suggesting maybe that we do both at the same time. I can certainly speak to Mr. Ouellet to see if we can go to Washington next week.

Ms Beaumier: I would think that as Canadian citizens, in spite of the fact that we like to banter and fight and argue with the United States, we probably have more in common with them and could have more influence on them than could perhaps even the Commonwealth.

I'm not sure you always have to make moral decisions based on our international economics. I think that's something we've tended to forget over the last few years.

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Mr. Laverdure: I will discuss it immediately with the minister. I know he has his own schedule, but I'm going to Washington for another reason this week. I've already indicated to the embassy that if I can meet with my counterpart one afternoon to talk about Nigeria, I'm very willing to do so to give them our views. This would be the same day that Mrs. Stewart is in London. I'll try to manage these two meetings together.

Yes, we have no objection at all to speaking with the Americans. We thought that because we did manage to get the Commonwealth meeting going before Christmas this would be, for the time being at least, our priority.

Ms Beaumier: Do you anticipate having a problem with the British government?

Mr. Laverdure: You saw their action at the European Union. With the Dutch, they disagreed with any oil embargo. I would not suggest that they will definitely object to an oil embargo at the next Commonwealth meeting, but chances are....

Mr. Kergin: Maybe I could just address quickly the Commonwealth meeting. I guess it's the role sometimes of civil servants to lower expectations. People think they're naysayers. We try to say that we interpret reality. If we can, then we hope to improve reality at London.

But the reality is that the Commonwealth does work by consensus. You have a number of folks in the Commonwealth who have a fairly strong allergy to collective action being imposed from outside. So we have to manage within the foreign ministers group that we're operating, which is really only eight of the 53 member countries of the Commonwealth.

At that meeting, we will be pushing very hard for a Canadian agenda, which I think is close to where you would like us to see the push. I won't say necessarily they're on the other side of the table, but you do have the U.K., which has a fairly powerful economic interest in Nigeria, and you have some other countries that I say are rather reluctant, on principal, to see the use of sanctions.

As Mr. Broadbent said, these are exceptional circumstances and exceptional circumstances often require exceptional measures. But our interpretation of what is an exceptional circumstance and other interpretations of exceptional circumstances can sometimes vary.

You will have within the Commonwealth - I know this from having been at Auckland with the Prime Minister - a number of countries who feel that sanctions are not necessarily the way to go with Nigeria. Even a number of Commonwealth countries took a long time to come to that view on something that was very specific in South Africa, which was apartheid, which was something so against the grain and fundamentally, if you will, inhuman. Even that took time to translate that indignity, or the sense of outrage that one had, into actual use of collective sanctions.

I just want to say, with respect to the meeting coming up next Tuesday and Wednesday, that we will be pushing hard. But we have to recognize that the Commonwealth's strongest suit probably is one of credibility, because it represents a very good cross-section of countries: north, south, developed, less developed, small states, and large states.

It also provides an excellent bully pulpit. So if the Commonwealth, as an institution, expresses outrage and can use a foreign ministers group like this one to convey that outrage to provide a forum for those who are victims of Nigeria to come to address and to use that forum as a microphone, that in itself carries influence with other countries.

I would be surprised if we were to see, coming out of London, a specific action relating to sanctions or economic measures. Indeed, the committee of foreign ministers can only recommend, and it would recommend back to heads of government, back to their various capitals.

But there are many other things the committee can do. In fact, the Canadian initiative to set the measures up, which you've seen in the Millbrook declaration, is modelled very much on what the OAS is doing. It is in terms of providing certain incentives to countries to go back to democratic procedures, and, at the same time, to offer a certain degree, if you will, of measures that might be of a punitive nature. But it is an escalation rather than going right to the end. I think, again, many Commonwealth members are a little shy of going straight to economic sanctions without going through a series of steps where you increase the pressure slowly.

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The Chairman: Mr. Broadbent, do you have a quick observation?

Mr. Broadbent: It's related to the previous issue.

The Chairman: Because it's somebody else's turn to ask questions.

Mr. Broadbent: Okay, just a quick observation.

We've just had it confirmed - my apprehensions, frankly - of what to expect from the Commonwealth. In terms of the substance of action that has been called for by most of the people here this morning, if I understand it, it isn't going to happen.

I would like to remind this committee that Canada took the lead in 1986 with Margaret Thatcher and the British government then fighting against sanctions on South Africa. It was because we were prepared not to wait for a consensus but did it publicly and then went in and fought for it that finally something happened. I strongly believe even if we don't get the consensus - and I understand what the officials are saying is that we're not likely to get a consensus - Canada surely should be out front in this.

The other comment I would make...I'm not surprised in the consultative process, talking to the members of the Francophonie states, most of whom are not democracies, that they didn't want any action. I've been on this job for six years. I can't remember a single example when the Francophonie members collectively have said something should be done as an organization to move against a state that was violating fundamental rights. So to hear that they don't want anything particularly strong to be done doesn't surprise me a bit. I would have been surprised to hear the opposite.

Prof. Ihonvbere: I just want to say if Canada were to take the initiative, support would come from all Nigerian organizations. I'm aware of at least 50 major pan-Nigerian organizations, based inside and outside Nigeria, that would be willing to put in writing within the next 48 hours that they support that kind of initiative and they're willing to.... This is not just saying it verbally.

So it's something that's going to be quite popular in terms of the Nigerian community. They'd be willing to put that in terms of support.

The Chairman: As I indicated to you earlier, that confirms what we were told by the previous members of the opposition who attended before the committee.

I must say, just before I pass to Mr. Morrison, I think probably all members of the committee in the course of our mandate are learning about the effects of international affairs, and becoming increasingly frustrated with the way in which international organizations operate. You mentioned the United Nations can't function, the Francophonie isn't going to function, the Commonwealth isn't going to function. This certainly increases my belief that one of the things the committee could be doing is trying to make sure these institutions are more reflective of the way in which we should function. But that's another subject for another day.

Mr. Morrison.

Mr. Morrison: I'd like to thank the members of the department for straightening out my misinformation on the size of our imports from Nigeria. Apparently they are about one-fifth of what I thought.

My question is for Dr. Ihonvbere. You were saying, Doctor, that if nothing is done from outside of Nigeria, you are anticipating effectively civil war in the country. I wish you would walk me through this. I didn't quite follow what you were anticipating. Who, other than the junta, has arms? Who is going to perpetrate a civil war in a country that is as thoroughly under the heel of the military as Nigeria? It takes two to fight.

Prof. Ihonvbere: There are three dimensions to that issue. The first would be within the military itself. The decision on the former president, General Obasanjo, and others, which followed massive international pressure, sort of divided the government itself. There were those who wanted him executed irrespective of international opinion. There were those who felt the government had no business trying them in the first instance. There was really no evidence. There were those who felt it should be commuted. That division has not been resolved.

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In fact, one of the reasons why Saro-Wiwa and others were killed was that the government failed to garner mileage for the commutation of the sentences. People simply said 25 years,15 years - you had no business putting them in jail.

So within the military itself the possibility of a very bloody coup organized by junior middle-ranking officers exists.

The second condemnation comes from exiles abroad. This is now made up also of military officers, mostly those who participated in the 1990 coup. Remember that the leader of that coup and many of his supporters were not apprehended. They are abroad. The government has declared two of them wanted again, Colonel Nyiam and Chief Ogboru, who had bankrolled the 1990 operation.

From what we know, a sizeable and significant number of Nigerians believe the only way to get Abacha out is to militarily challenge him. They're going to seek support from anywhere possible. I've overhead some of them saying maybe they will get the money from drug dealers. Nigeria has quite a sizeable number of those. They will get the money and carry out the operations necessary. One cannot predict for now what the agenda will be or whether they are sufficiently angered by what is going on in the country.

The third, of course, will be from within, a massive internal uprising. Abacha right now is confusing the silence with acquiescence. Aside from the Yorubas in the west, who feel rightly aggrieved that Abiola was not only denied the presidency but is also in jail, and have actually passed the charter of self-determination, which includes statements that, for instance, they do not feel they should belong to part of Nigeria, given the way they've been treated, the oil-producing communities have been aggrieved. In fact, one reason why Abacha took out Saro-Wiwa was to silence and intimidate these communities - not just the Ogonis. I told you about their seceding from Nigeria and taking their oil with them, because they remain part of the most marginalized.

So we have three major dimensions to this. I'm saying that within these various constituencies you have persons who have sufficient resources to mobilize the kind of extra-legal agenda to engage in a major contention for power. The preference for this extra-legal agenda would only become important when there are no other rational and more open and legal approaches to secure peace.

Mr. Morrison: In your opinion, sir, is it physically possible that the junta could be overthrown by violent revolution? Just how well-entrenched are they? You talk of a massive civil uprising. You're going to have a massive uprising by people who I gather are essentially unarmed. Can this junta be overthrown?

Prof. Ihonvbere: It's quite possible. The most credible of all these will be those who are outside. If you follow discussions on Nijanet and other Nigerian cyberspace communication lines, you will find that more and more Nigerians are now beginning to say the time for talk is over; the time for action is now.

Remember also that the crisis in Liberia flooded Nigeria with a lot of small arms. As well, it is the government that has not been paying the salaries of police officers regularly. It is common knowledge in Nigeria that police officers are selling their weapons to the public - when they're not renting them out to armed robbers.

So there are several possibilities in there. Of course, in Nigeria if you take over Lagos, Abuja and Kaduna, the deal is done. So it's not as if you need the entire country to do it.

Mr. Morrison: Thank you, sir.

The Chairman: It's an unusual form of privatization, if I may say so, that the police would rent their arms to the criminals. It seems to me that's carrying the process of privatization beyond anything we've seen even in this country.

Mr. Broadbent: Yet.

The Chairman: I will ignore the comment from Mr. Broadbent.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

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Ms MacDonald: Can I add one comment to that? You had mentioned Nigeria being a country where a great many people are without the force of arms. I think that's a misconception. There is a tremendous inflow of illegal arms into Nigeria. The amount of weaponry is really astounding. It's not that it is organized in any way, but if there were to be any kind of uprising, it could very quickly degenerate into one of the bloodiest battles you've ever seen.

The Chairman: May I follow up by asking a question? Professor, we were aware of course that the Biafran war was one of the most tragic wars since the Second World War in terms of loss of life. When you describe this scenario, do you envisage that this would be along tribal lines, north, south? Would it be geographic or would it just be total chaos?

Prof. Ihonvbere: There would be a strong geographic dimension to it, because with the annulment of the elections, the east is sort of playing what they call in Nigeria ``the beautiful bride girl''. They are staying away, hoping the north and the west will fight it out and they will pick up the crumbs.

Ojukwu, the leader of Biafra, was here recently in the United States, sponsored by Abacha, to campaign for support. All he ended up doing was utterly polarizing the Nigerian community, pitching the Ibos against the other communities.

I just want to add that if anyone has done a study of the religious riots in the north, you will find that the amount of arms in circulation is not too far from what happened in Somalia. On one occasion when the southerners responded, the government had to draft in the military plus a decree requiring citizens to submit their weapons to the nearest police station. They were shocked at the amount of automatic weaponry that was in private hands.

The Chairman: Mr. Volpe.

Mr. Volpe (Eglinton - Lawrence): Mr. Chairman, I'm pleased that we have this calibre of people before us today to discuss what is obviously a very serious issue. I'm talking about both those who used to be in public life and those who are part of our civil service.

Mr. Broadbent, I appreciate the impassioned approach you took in trying to exhort the committee members to take a position. I think you used the word ``risk'' in talking about politicians trying to shape a political agenda. I want to follow up on that theme and see if we can find out what kind of risk Canada runs in taking a position that might be consistent with that which I hear raised by the panellists on this side of the table.

On reading some of the documentation we have with us today, and from what you've said, this sounds like a bomb ready to explode. Our officials tell us, however, that not everybody has the same perspective, so I'd like to address this question to our officials: what are the risks for Canada if it were to take the kind of action that both Madame MacDonald and Mr. Broadbent suggest we advocate? You might divide your answer into two parts if you will, maybe just follow up on Mr. Morrison's suggestion and give me a calculation of the economic risks and then another of the political risks.

Mr. Kergin: Mr. Vice-Chair, I don't think I could comment on the political risk, because that's really something for the government to comment on in terms of their image and reputation.

The risk I would point to is the possible risk of ineffectiveness. Unless one prepares very carefully and ensures that if one is looking at economic measures like sanctions, they are comprehensively and completely applied, then they become ineffective. If they are seen to be ineffective because a number of countries aren't involving themselves in it.... I'm not an expert on oil, but oil is remarkably fungible. Oil can be easily transferred through third countries and so on. It's very hard to police the origin of oil. Nigeria's oil has a very low sulphur content, so it's a rare type of oil but it's not unique.

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I think the key in dealing with a country like Nigeria, although it is correct to say that they are more vulnerable than South Africa in the sense that have only one major project to sell, is that the product they do have is one that's very hard to nail down, unless you have complete and comprehensive observance of sanctions and the will to implement those sanctions.

Mr. Volpe: So then you would agree with Professor Nossal. I think the basic argument in his brief to this committee is to stay away from sanctions and embargos and any kind of action that you cannot guarantee as blanketing the geography and politics of the area under embargo.

Mr. Kergin: I haven't read his brief, but I would say that's one of the issues. Everybody has to buy into sanctions and obey sanctions, and if that doesn't happen the sanctions are not effective.

Mr. Volpe: In your estimation, is that our basic argument for supporting continuing dialogue without taking a leadership position?

Mr. Kergin: I don't think there is anything wrong with our working to advance sanctions, if it is the decision of the government to move in that direction. Perhaps it would not be effective to apply sanctions unilaterally, to have Canada alone apply sanctions, because the question then would arise as to how effective that might be in changing behaviour in Nigeria.

Mr. Volpe: In spite of those scenarios, have you taken into consideration what Canada's response might be if Nigeria were to follow the same path as Rwanda? What might be the cost to Canada under that set of circumstances?

Mr. Kergin: If Nigeria were to implode and go into a civil war and these sorts of things?

We're now looking at the cost of trying to put together Bosnia-Hercegovina. It's extremely high, I presume. I'm not an expert in Africa - perhaps Claude Laverdure could answer more precisely - but the cost of attempting to remedy the suffering and tragedy that would come out of a Nigerian civil war would be extremely high.

Mr. Volpe: Would it be high enough for us to balance the economic costs of aggressive action on our part with calling for sanctions and embargos and so on?

Mr. Kergin: Again, I think one has to look at the effectiveness of action. If in applying sanctions unilaterally Canada were not effective....

Mr. Volpe: I have a problem with ``effective'', so maybe you can help me out.

In this room not that many years ago we had a South African government representative who tried to tell members of our caucus - I'm the only one here, so nobody can contest what I'm saying - that perhaps we should not have sanctions against South Africa, and this was an individual who was very much against apartheid.

The effectiveness of those sanctions can be measured in the final result. The final result is what you and I can both see today - you perhaps more vividly than I do.

I have a problem today with how to measure the effectiveness of those sanctions. Because I chose to focus on Mr. Broadbent's use of the word ``risk'' and Mr. Morrison's questions, I have to put an economic value to it. You're quite right; we will either be the beneficiaries or the sufferers of any political risk.

Are you looking at giving us a definition of effectiveness that's short term and therefore material, immediate, or are you looking at giving effectiveness a definition that's a little more long-term, à la the South African model?

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Mr. Kergin: You want to measure effectiveness, whether short- or long-term, in terms of the goal you're setting yourself up for, and I think the goal would be -

Mr. Volpe: The South African model.

Mr. Kergin: That took 30-plus years.

Mr. Volpe: As far as Canada is concerned, it took from 1986 to whenever.

Mr. Kergin: In terms of the application of sanctions, it's about 10 years.

As I say, if you're talking about sanctions you have to talk about comprehensive sanctions. If comprehensive sanctions were imposed against Nigeria.... One of the points Mr. Nossal raised, and I don't know if you were alluding to this, is the cost to individuals within Nigeria, who would be suffering as a result of the additional economic hardship brought on by sanctions.

That factor has to be included. I can't comment on that. Claude Laverdure could comment better. I would measure the effectiveness of sanctions in terms of a transition to democracy in Nigeria, and if a comprehensive system of sanctions could assist in that, I think it would be worth while working towards that end. I think many international commentators would suggest that could happen.

The Chairman: Mrs. Debien.

[Translation]

Mrs. Debien: I would just like to make a brief comment on the issue raised by Mr. Volpe, who wants to know what kind of risk Canada would take if it were to intervene. I could tell you that Canada would certainly take the risk of being, once more, the leader it always was in the area of human rights.

Mr. Volpe: I just asked the question.

Mrs. Debien: But you're the one who represents the government.

Mr. Volpe: All right.

Mrs. Debien: I had another comment for Mr. Kergin, but I think that Mr. Broadbent said it perfectly. How many protests, how much indignation and how many years will it take before we reach a consensus? I believe Mr. Broadbent has given the perfect answer to this comment.

Mr. Laverdure, you told us that, together with minister Ouellet, you have met, at the Francophone Summit, all the smaller countries which border on Nigeria and that they have told you how much they fear economic sanctions through an oil embargo.

Do these other countries realize that if we don't deal with the present crisis in Nigeria in one way or the other - leaving aside for the moment the means to do so - it could very well have just as dramatic an impact on them, because they are financially dependent on Nigeria, they share a border with that country, they could be overrun by refugees and have to face all these problems which were just mentioned, such as extra-legal action, hijacking and all these bombs that could explode in this part of Africa?

If we leave aside their commercial relations with Nigeria, do these countries realize that the consequences might be much more serious, if we don't deal with the problem now?

Mr. Laverdure: Ma'am, this is one of the arguments Mr. Ouellet tried to use, not necessarily to contradict, but to challenge their views. We have to take into account the work we do at the moment in countries neighbouring Nigeria which are extremely poor, among the poorest in the world.

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It might be difficult for the people to take the middle or the long, rather than the short term into account. In Cotonou, we met with Pierre Sané, who is Amnisty International Secretary-General, and who was telling these people that it was better for them to suffer the consequences of an economic embargo now, rather than wait for things to explode, because then, the situation in their respective countries would be much worse.

Most of the people we talked to preferred to stick to their line of thinking and reminded us that they get practically all their energy, in terms of oil or electricity, from their neighbour, Nigeria, for a good price, so they say.

Furthermore, many of those smaller countries, with about 5 to 50 million people, export 80 to 85% of their agricultural products or other to the 100 million Nigerians who are happy to buy them. They are concerned that, if we corner General Abacha, they will be the ones to feel the direct and immediate impact of any kind of action we take.

As you mentioned, we argued to the contrary, that if we don't do anything, things are going to implode and we'll have another Biafra on our hands. I don't think they were convinced, but at least, we gave them our message, we shared our views and I believe we have been heard. However, I am not sure that if we went around again next week, these people would have changed their minds. So, we should perhaps, as Mr. Volpe suggested, take some risks and encourage other countries to take some as well.

However, this could be costly for Canada. The question is, what is going to be more costly: to let the situation in Nigeria explode or impose an oil embargo and face eight or nine neighbouring countries which will come to us and say: "We need more financial support from Canada to bail us out, because of our problems with our neighbour". So, one way or the other, what is happening in Nigeria at the present time might very well turn out to be costly for us.

The Chairman: Ms MacDonald, do you have any comments?

[English]

Ms MacDonald: I would like to come back on the question of the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of sanctions.

Sanctions will never be totally comprehensive and effective. There is always leakage. There was in the case of South Africa, and there is in the case of Iraq. But there are other steps that can be followed up.

In 1989 the Secretary-General asked me to sit on an eminent persons group looking into the avoidance of sanctions by transnational corporations in South Africa. Our report actually shamed a number of transnational corporations into changing their methods of operation in South Africa. So there are steps that can be taken.

Interestingly, the member of the eminent persons group who wrote the foreword to that report was Wole Soyinka.

The Chairman: Mr. English.

Mr. English (Kitchener): I want to follow up on sanctions and the effectiveness of sanctions.

In Professor Nossal's brief - I haven't read it but I have read his book, and I think we should circulate some reviews of that book - his argument is that sanctions are essentially rain dancing. What is interesting in this case, however, is that they would seem to be more than simply a moral statement. The two African countries, perhaps the two countries in the world that experienced sanctions - South Africa and Zimbabwe - are the ones calling for sanctions. One would think that Mandela, and Mugabe, for that matter, both thought that sanctions assisted them enormously in coming to what was actually a peaceful resolution of the South African and Rhodesian cases. That's just a point.

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Secondly, in this case, Mr. Kergin talked about the difficulty of oil sanctions, but we are in fact forcing, and have for some time, an oil sanction against Iraq, which apparently is quite effective.

The third point, looking at sanctions in recent times, is that I do accept that it takes a long time to work. In the case of South Africa, it did take a very long time to work within the Commonwealth, mainly because of some resistance by British governments from really the 1960s on.

But in that case, Canada did take a leadership role right from the 1960s on, from the Commonwealth conference in the early 1960s. In Mr. Trudeau's recent book he talks about his work at the Commonwealth being his great achievement. This is in the area of human rights in South Africa. This is an organization he showed little regard for in his first years in office.

If you look at that and you consider Canada's role, I think it gave us a lot of advantages with the Africans. And I'd welcome the comments of our Nigerian colleague here.

When we were doing the foreign policy review several South Africans came here and said it was because Canada took a leadership role on sanctions - it argued with not simply Mrs. Thatcher but also other British Prime Ministers, going right back to 1961 - that Canada had a special place. Indeed, we even had people come and tell us that Canada's business interests in South Africa have benefited greatly because of the recognition by the new South African government that we were in the lead.

I think those points are fairly strong arguments in support of a Canadian leadership role at this moment.

The United States is reluctant on South Africa too, as we know, but Britain is reluctant again, it seems, in this case. It perhaps does fall to states at the middle level, the six that are leading the way from Europe, to go forward and pull along those other countries that have always been reluctant on sanctions. I suppose great superpowers, or traditional colonial powers, always are. I wondered how you would respond to that particular argument.

Maybe this is the opportunity for Canada to gain the kind of international goodwill.... I mean, the purpose of foreign policy, as our minister says so often, as ministers have over the years, is in Canada's case to build up a credibility, an international respectability, that in the longer run benefits us. It's not simply in our own national terms but also in terms of, frankly, our economic interests.

Mr. Kergin: In a word, I would agree with everything you've said. My point was that you have to have the international community agree on sanctions, implement sanctions, for them to be effective.

Mr. English: But we didn't have it in those cases. It was a very long -

Mr. Kergin: It was a very long process.

Mr. English: - and a difficult process in those cases.

Mr. Kergin: But I think what you're saying, and I would agree, is that we should start the process of getting countries to think about and look at sanctions on Nigeria. I would agree with you on that. My concern was not to have undue expectations that within three months, as may have been suggested.... In my view, I think it would be unlikely that comprehensive oil sanctions be put on Nigeria within three months. It is a lengthy process. You just need a couple of holdouts when you're dealing with oil to make it more difficult to have effectiveness on sanctions.

But in terms of developing the political momentum toward that, I agree entirely. It's just that I wouldn't want to have undue expectations that within a very short period of time we suddenly would bring the Nigerian economy to a grinding halt. It will take time, and it is a complicated process. That was really my point.

Mr. English: Just to follow up on that, in the case of Nigeria, in our own case I looked at the trade figures. We import roughly $600 million and export roughly $17 million. That's a huge trade deficit. The product we buy from them seems to be one that, as you said, you can buy anywhere.

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Wouldn't Canada's leadership opportunity here be quite large? We can make a difference, and at very little cost to ourselves. Wouldn't the moral leadership given by Canada do two things: one, embarrass other nations into following; and second, perhaps more importantly, lead to a more widespread public opinion directed toward Nigeria? It would keep the issue, to use the words, I think, of Ms MacDonald, ``on the table, not on the back burner''. We'd have continuing attention on this question. Perhaps that would be the most effective instrument for the longer term.

[Translation]

Mr. Laverdure: Let me say that I do not think that Canada's leadership on the Nigerian issue is being questioned. Mr. Chrétien and Mrs. Stewart played a very important role in Auckland.Mr. Chrétien and Mr. Ouellet played just as an important role in Cotonou. I would underline that, when I analyze the reasons behind the very clear and very firm messages which were given to us in the countries we visited, I come to the conclusion that Canada is still, to this day, considered as the leader, the country which is always on the front line, ready to take risks and to influence its friends. I don't think we abdicated.

None of us this morning has said that we were not considering any longer the possibility of an oil embargo, of trying to get the support of those who can throw their weight behind us, but we should also - because I think that is the honest way to go about it - try to assess the consequences on some neighbouring countries and on the people of Nigeria.

I believe it's normal that we should try and assess that. I think it might be worthwhile to remind you that Canada has been asked to be a member of the committee of eight and that Canada is still considered as a country which can show leadership on these issues. I believe this is not going to change. At the moment, we try to see how we can achieve that and, as my colleague Michael Kergin said, how we can ensure that the action we are going to take will allow us to reach the goals we have set.

It might be something we have a tendency to forget at the outset. What are we trying to do in Nigeria and how are we going to do it? We talk about it, but it's always implied. We have some objectives. How are we going to achieve them? I believe that we have not mattered down our position and that Canada is certainly not afraid to face its responsibilities.

[English]

Mr. English: Thank you. I certainly appreciate your comments.

It's quite true that the Prime Minister, both in New Zealand and at the Francophonie summit, did take the leadership there. I think Canadians strongly approved. The comments in our press and certainly among my colleagues with regard to the leadership, particularly at Auckland, reflect the fact that Canadians approve that kind of leadership. We just hope to see it in the future, too.

The Chairman: Thank you.

Before I move on to Mr. Martin, I understand, Mr. English, you have an important engagement that will take you away. We have a quorum. I have been informed by Mr. Lastewka that he has a motion he would like to move. With the indulgence of the committee, I would just break here. We could deal with that, and then we'll go back to questions after Mr. Martin.

Mr. Lastewka.

Mr. Lastewka: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, I want to get an understanding that you did mention that Shell did submit something. I am trying to find the piece of paper Shell submitted.

The Chairman: Madame Hilchie received a letter from Shell Canada this morning, apologizing to Madame Hilchie for the fact that they were not able to appear before the committee on the grounds that Shell Canada itself buys no oil from Nigeria and has nothing to do with Nigeria. It is therefore its principal shareholder, which...it relates to Nigeria. It was not able, according to this letter, to get somebody from London or Holland to come and speak knowledgeably about it. So they weren't prepared to come before the committee.

I think that's properly putting their position.

Mr. Lastewka: Did they say in the letter they would be prepared to come at a future date?

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The Chairman: No, they sent a brief provided by Shell International Petroleum Company Limited, from London. They said they didn't know anything about this, or can't...but they were sending a brief by the international company. So that's what they did.

Mr. Alcock indicated to me he felt that was inappropriate behaviour.

Mr. Volpe: I agree with him. If they want to make a statement, let them come, and we'll hear them.

Mr. Lastewka: I'm going to ask your indulgence, then, because I'd like to make two motions. I'm disappointed that the multinational has taken that attitude. It would have been valuable for them to be here today while we talked about this very extreme and urgent matter.

Therefore, I would like to move the following: that we, the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, in view of the extreme urgency of the situation in Nigeria, as confirmed by the evidence received before this committee, the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, encourage the Government of Canada to take a strong leadership role in coordinating an enforceable oil embargo against Nigeria with the U.S.A., the European Union and other partners to stop the military terror in Nigeria and to assist Nigeria to move towards peaceful democratic change.

Ms Beaumier: I'll second that.

Mr. Broadbent: Do you want to petition some votes on that?

The Chairman: Mr. Broadbent, you're trying to get back into Parliament by the back door - and Madame MacDonald too.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

The Chairman: Are there any comments from the other members? I take it this motion would have unanimous consent.

Motion agreed to

The Chairman: Mr. Lastewka, do you have a second motion?

Mr. Lastewka: Yes, I do. Further to my disappointment that Shell was unable to be here, I would move that, pursuant to its powers under Standing Order 108(1)(a), the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade order that a representative from Shell Canada appear before this committee in order to present evidence relating to the committee's study of the situation in Nigeria.

We'll give them enough time to have their international organization and all their multinational networks prepare whatever they have to prepare and then appear before this committee.

Ms Beaumier: I second that motion.

The Chairman: That motion, I'm advised by the clerk, is in order.

Is there any discussion of that motion?

[Translation]

Mr. Leblanc, do you agree with this proposal?

Mr. Leblanc: Yes, but I wonder why we would request such a thing from Shell and not from other oil companies.

The Chairman: As I understand, only Shell International is active in Nigeria. The only other oil company which was mentioned to the committee is Irving Oil, in New Brunswick which, after all, does nothing else than buy oil in the context of a simple commercial deal. So, it's Shell which has been in Nigeria since the beginning. According to the evidence presented today, this company is in the best position to give us some information on the oil economy in Nigeria.

[English]

Mr. Lastewka: Mr. Chairman, it's my intention that by doing the first motion, that would take care of the involvement of Irving Oil.

The Chairman: Very well. That's right.

The professor might want to just add something to help Mr. Leblanc.

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Prof. Ihonvbere: As has already been pointed out, Shell has been in Nigeria since 1908. It is the dominant oil corporation. It has 95 oil wells in Ogoniland, and it was its attempt to build additional pipelines without compensating the community that led to the conflict that eventually saw the nine officials killed.

The immediate demands of MOSOP, the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People, was made to Shell for compensation for environmental degradation, the destruction of land and marine life and so on.

The Chairman: Thank you.

Mr. Broadbent: Mr. Chairman, my comments pertained directly to the performance of Shell. If the committee, in its laudable action in terms of the first motion that was adopted, wants to discuss with Shell its past performance in Nigeria and the efficacy of an oil embargo, it might be a good idea to invite the other multinationals. I think Shell accounts for about 50% of production, but there is another major part. It might be useful not to have the other companies here as victims or targets. I think Shell's performance in particular is something to be accountable for, but it might be useful for the committee to hear representatives from the other multinational companies talk about the efficacy of an embargo.

Mr. Volpe: I think that's a useful suggestion, but it doesn't necessarily take away from the motion. If I understand the mover of this motion correctly, the motion is being presented because Shell has already turned us down, but we haven't offered that same opportunity to any of the other companies. Perhaps to take into account Mr. Leblanc's considerations, an invitation can be extended to the other companies. If we don't get a response, then perhaps we can follow the precedent the committee might set today.

The Chairman: I think that's appropriate. Members of the committee, I want to be careful not to convey Shell's response as a rejection. In view of that, perhaps I should table this letter so that all committee members can see what Shell said. It was my interpretation of what Shell said, and it's not fair if I've misinterpreted them. That's the first point.

The letter will have to speak to itself. What they say is that they are not in a position to comment knowledgeably on these issues because they're a Canadian company with nothing to do with Nigeria. They will provide a statement from their head office.

If we adopt Mr. Lastewka's motion, I would like to explore with them how we could get somebody from head office. Mr. Lastewka made it clear in his introduction that we recognize that there are corporate veils, but these corporations are also interlinked, so maybe we can expect better cooperation.

I will follow up on Mr. Broadbent's suggestion for Mobil and other corporations as well.

This committee only has jurisdiction over Canadian citizens and Canadian corporations, so we cannot require attendance from anyone outside of Canada. We can certainly use our moral suasion to try to make sure we get the best possible evidence from Canadian corporations, and I will follow that up if this motion is adopted.

I would recommend that if that is done, it be done in the context of exploring the issue of sanctions. We could then bring in Professor Nossal, who wasn't able to come this morning, and we could hear everybody at the same time.

That's what I would recommend. We could do something on sanctions and how they work, so we could better understand how they would work.

Mr. English: Mr. Chairman, I think the meeting with Shell Canada would be useful in many respects, because it is Shell that is at the centre. Shell has put the ads in the newspapers, and it's Shell that Mr. Broadbent says has a long historical record in Nigeria.

Although I respect Mr. Leblanc's comment, I think we might complicate it if we go too much further in bringing other corporations, quite apart from considerations about the nationality of corporations. If Professor Nossal is to be invited, and I don't disagree with that, I suggest that we bring in Professor Leslie Pal to respond to him.

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The Chairman: Very well. I'm perfectly open to that. I just mentioned Professor Nossal because he was supposed to turn up this morning and didn't because of the snowstorm. It would give us an opportunity to bring him again. He seems to be somebody we don't know, frankly. It's clear from his opinion - it was circulated to us - that he generally believes sanctions are difficult to impose. He therefore doesn't advocate them, but does admit that in certain circumstances they are appropriate. This might be one of those circumstances. It would be very interesting.

Mr. English: I'm just saying we should get two points of view.

The Chairman: Absolutely. I agree with that entirely.

Mr. Martin (Esquimalt - Juan de Fuca): I'd just like to ask Professor Ihonvbere one question relating to this.

Are you aware of Shell putting $3.5 billion into the Niger Delta for environmental degradation it was responsible for? Is that true?

Prof. Ihonvbere: No, it's not true.

I might just mention that my doctoral work at the University of Toronto was on the oil industry in Nigeria. I have studied the liberal and environmental policies of the companies over the last15 years.

What Shell has done in most cases - and this is also applicable to a lesser degree to some other companies - is to divide those communities and pay token compensation to cliques within the communities rather than to clean up. In fact, the video I mentioned earlier on shows very clearly and visibly the impact of the activities in these areas, including gas flaring, which goes against the proper clean-up procedure that requires them either to reinject or to preserve the gas. But they prefer to burn it. In most of these communities there is what they call ``permanent daylight'', where gas flares go on 24 hours a day.

There is a memo, a copy of which I have here, which was sent by the internal security task force in charge of cleaning up Ogoniland. It directly states that they were attacking these communities because ``Shell operations still impossible unless ruthless military operations are undertaken for smooth economic activities to commence''. It goes on to talk about ``pressure on oil companies for prompt regular financial inputs as discussed''.

So there is enough evidence on the ground of Shell's involvement financially to support the ``wasting operations'' - which is the language in this memo to the governor - as well as the fact that they pressured the government to militarily occupy and clean out the area so that they could continue to produce.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Mr. Leblanc, do you have a question?

Mr. Leblanc: If we invited other oil companies, even if they are not very active in Nigeria, this might broaden our discussions. We want Shell to appear. I agree in principle, but we should broaden the debate a bit.

The Chairman: I think so too. Let's do a survey and

[English]

since you are here today, Professor Ihonvbere, and are so knowledgeable in this area, I would like to suggest to members of the committee that if we're going to do this, given the urgency all the members of the panel have suggested, we should do it before Parliament meets again in February. I hope members are willing to return - and we will try to do that - as early as possible in the new year. We won't let it go until February. We'll do it before Parliament resumes. We'll have a special meeting of the committee.

Would it be possible to explore with you, sir, your returning here to help us with your expert advice as well - or is Austin too far from Toronto in the winter?

Prof. Ihonvbere: Certainly. I would be glad to return.

Mr. Broadbent: We can meet in Austin, Mr. Chairman.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

Mr. Lastewka: I do agree with Mr. Leblanc's suggestions. The only reason I had named Shell is because we had invited them. We just received a letter. I was reading the ad that was in the newspapers on ``clear thinking in troubled times'', which was a message to the Canadian people. I as a parliamentarian felt very strongly that if Shell had done that advertising, they owed some responsibility to come here and discuss it with us.

The Chairman: That's a very good point. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Lastewka's motion is on the table, seconded by Ms Beaumier. Is there any further comment? Do I take it that it has the unanimous consent of the committee?

Motion agreed to

The Chairman: Thank you very much, sir. I take it, then, your instructions to me are to try to put together something that would go beyond that to see who else we could get in to help us with this issue.

Mr. Lastewka: That is correct, Mr. Chairman. I understand they need some time because they're a multinational, but I also understand how multinationals work.

The Chairman: That's helpful.

We have 15 minutes left. It's Mr. Martin's turn. We have time for approximately three more questioners.

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Mr. Martin: I would argue that above all else, the risks of non-intervention far exceed the risks of intervening, not only for us as a country, independent of humanitarian aspects and financial aspects, but also for the companies such as Shell. Are we going to spring forth into the international sphere with our neighbours, with the Nordic countries, with the OAU, with the United Nations, to explain to them that non-intervention is going to cost us all so much more in the future than if we intervene now? I would hope we take that tack.

I wonder, as a question to Professor Ihonvbere and Ms MacDonald, whether you feel a freeze on the assets of the regime of General Abacha would have an effective lever on the regime. As I see it, the regime is becoming progressively more paranoid, isolated, as time passes, and the ability for the international community...through diplomatic measures are actually going to be less effective as time goes on.

So I wonder if we can hit them where it counts - in the pocketbook. Do both of you feel, in your experience, if Canada takes a leadership role in calling for the freeze on the personal assets - as difficult as that is - of General Abacha and his regime, this would be an effective contribution Canada can make?

Prof. Ihonvbere: That is one of the demands the popular groups in Nigeria have made, which also TransAfrica has advanced. Of course, I realize it will be very difficult to have access to the dedicated accounts in Switzerland and other areas, but if that would certainly put additional pressure on the government, I think it would be quite welcome.

One quick point I also want to make is that one argument the Canadian government is likely to confront would be the fact that a transition agenda is in place. There is no transition agenda in place in Nigeria as of now. In fact, you do not begin a transition agenda by proscribing trade unions, jailing poor democracy leaders, closing the universities and hanging social and political activists. In fact, what you're doing is alienating them and finding a genuine excuse to consolidate military rule and to suffocate democracy.

So that argument, of why you are talking about sanctions when the government is working at the transition, is going to be made. I have it on authority from a bunch of insiders that the entire transition announced on October 1...the three-year was just the minimum.

Mr. Martin: The group of 53 he's organized to advise him on foreign policy is a sham, I understand.

Prof. Ihonvbere: Most of those fellows are the very persons who helped subvert the last election.

Ms MacDonald: In our recommendations to the Commonwealth we did strongly recommend that an expert immediately begin to look at the effective ways in which the assets abroad of the Nigerian regime be frozen. That has not been done. It's one of the things that I hope perhaps the minister can press for in London, because the Commonwealth itself could undertake to set that in motion. It doesn't need to get the backing of other groups outside. I think this would be extremely helpful - plus the fact that the cancellation or the non-issuing of visas to all of the people associated with the military regime in any way should be put into effect by Commonwealth countries right across the board.

Mr. Martin: I'd like to put forth a motion, Mr. Graham.

The Chairman: Did you clear it with the clerk? Unfortunately, we have now lost our quorum. However, you can table a notice of motion, which we can then deal with at our next meeting. I invite you to do that.

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Mr. Martin: I will table two motions, then.

The other thing I would like to know is if you're aware that Vickers in the United Kingdom, if it's true, are selling $230 million worth of tanks to Nigeria. Is that true? That deal is actually going through in Nigeria as we speak now. Are you familiar with that?

Mr. Kergin: John Major announced that there was going to be a freeze on military exports from the U.K. to Nigeria. The question is - and we'll have to look into it - whether that is from the moment he made that announcement or whether contracts already signed would continue deliveries. I don't have the answer. That's something we'll look into.

But he did publicly say there was going to be a ban on military sales. Sometimes if there are contractual obligations those will go through before that takes effect. We'll look into that. I'm not aware of it.

Mr. Martin: I'll let somebody else have a chance. I have so many questions. It would take too long.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence.

The Chairman: The motions have now...?

Mr. Martin: I will bring them to you to discuss the next time.

The Chairman: Thank you very much.

Mr. Lastewka, and then Mr. Leblanc.

Mr. Lastewka: Mr. Chairman, I wanted to ask our professor, who made the long trip here from Texas, a question about what we discussed, how an oil embargo would not have any effect on people in Nigeria because they're at their low ebb as it is, and they're not getting benefits. We talked about the unemployment and so forth.

I wasn't clear on the adjoining states around Nigeria. I was hoping to get that question in earlier, but because of our quorum I was pressed for time. I didn't get a clear understanding from you or from any of the other panellists about any effect it would have on the neighbouring states.

Prof. Ihonvbere: Some of the countries in west Africa, including Tanzania, also depend on Nigeria for oil imports. But this is a supply they can easily get from neighbouring Gabon, or even Libya, with which they still trade, or Angola, which now has normalized relations with the United States and is aggressively trying to penetrate the African markets. So I do not think it's going to spell immediate disaster for the countries in the region if an oil embargo is imposed on Nigeria.

In terms of the internal dimensions of it, there is enough evidence that even what is collected at the moment, which is about $40 million a day, is not evenly distributed or invested in the provision of basic needs. So the oil embargo would only serve to preserve for a democratic Nigeria resources that currently are being squandered and looted out of the country by the military clique.

Mr. Lastewka: I have one more question for the panellists, because my line of thinking was the same as Mr. Martin's.

I always have a problem when we're trying to work things out, no matter what the problem or difficulty, that when you move people away from a table or put them on the outside it's hard to get people back to the table. That would have been my question to the minister when she was here. By our saying if you don't do things, you're out.... Sometimes it's good to have people at the table hearing what people are continually telling them about what they're doing wrong. What are your comments?

Mr. Broadbent: I would very much like to comment on that, Mr. Chairman.

On the general proposition, I agree with what's being suggested. It's good to have people there to do the talking. It's for that reason, for example, that I support sending back our ambassador to have someone on the ground who can do the right things there.

In this context, it seems to me I would make a parallel with Haiti. When you have the kind of person who has been described by someone here - who is much more knowledgeable from direct experience in his own country than certainly I am - of that kind of character, I would say it is analogous to General Cédras in Haiti in the sense that all reasonable discourse was having no effect.

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It was only by the kind of resolution - and I hope our government takes it up - of the leadership the committee is showing here to continue to guide Canadian government leadership on that which you demonstrate the clear intent to use, in this case, economic force and power, that perhaps you will get this person to talk, that you will get this person to respond in some way.

It's an instrument, it seems to be, that has to be used very rarely, for the reasons you have indicated. It's better as a general proposition in political and international life to have people there who are talking to each other. But when you reach a conclusion that the talk is going nowhere, and that person, in fact, through international diplomacy would like you to keep talking, then I think this kind of direct action that the committee is recommending, and of the kind that was ultimately taken with General Cédras in Haiti, can finally compel a kind of discourse to accept a settlement.

Those are the only comments I would make.

Ms MacDonald: Normally I would agree with the proposal you've put forward, that one should keep people at the table if there is any hope whatsoever of being able to have a realistic discourse with them. I don't think that's possible with the present regime in Nigeria.

General Abacha doesn't talk to anyone, including his own cabinet. He hasn't met with his cabinet for a year. He issues decrees, and that's about it. He has not met with any of the high commissioners, the ambassadors. This is just a man who has totally isolated himself from the overall population and from even the military on which he depends.

His leading ministers with whom we met.... For instance, the foreign minister, Mr. Akinyemi, spent two hours trying to lecture us on the very good state of the rule of law in Nigeria. I mean, that was the gist of his meeting with us. The minister of the interior with whom we met, and who is responsible for prisons, had the effrontery to tell us that Nigeria has among the most humane prisons in the world.

This is the calibre of people you would have to deal with if you kept them at the table. I don't think it's possible to carry on any kind of sensible and realistic conversation with that regime.

Mr. Lastewka: Mr. Chairman, I have one last comment. I really want to thank all our witnesses today for being so detailed, so precise and so straightforward. I as a committee member have really appreciated their in-depth work.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Mr. Leblanc, please, let me ask a short question.

[English]

I have just a follow-up question on Mr. Lastewka's first question.

We've been informed that of the oil revenues of Nigeria, a significant portion is siphoned off. It doesn't go into the government coffers but into the personal coffers of the leader. Are there any statistics? Is anyone able to inform the committee as to how much money that is? I gather the purpose of sanctions would be to hit directly the pocketbooks of the leaders. Do we have any knowledgeable base as to how much money this is?

Prof. Ihonvbere: It is difficult to be precise - Randal Robin has been doing a lot of work on this - because this money is going into dedicated accounts in Switzerland. But we do know Abacha himself made an offer to pay several million dollars cash to buy the American Embassy in Lagos, including a house worth $200 million naira. I mean, these are facts on paper.

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So there is sufficient information here and there on what they have in Nigeria and in some open accounts, but what they have in Switzerland is difficult. That should help members of the committee know the kind of regime we're dealing with.

This is a regime that has completely lost hope and confidence in the system and has created a parallel state. Their children do not go to local universities. They are abroad. So they can close the universities for a year. They do not use the local hospitals. When they are sick they go abroad or import doctors into the country. So if you go to any of the hospitals they are called mortuaries, not hospitals. They do not use the local postal service. They do not watch local television stations. They all have satellite dishes.

So we're dealing with people who really think in terms of living abroad. They can take care of themselves and their children and they can intimidate the rest of the country in order to facilitate that.

The Chairman: Thank you.

[Translation]

Mr. Leblanc.

Mr. Leblanc: I know that Canada can play a leading role and that it's important that it does so, but let me go back to the United Nations' role. I am directing my question to Mr. Laverdure. Have the United Nations already taken a position through their preventive arm? Was there any declaration regarding this situation?

Mr. Laverdure: This week, I saw a draft resolution proposed by, I think, some forty countries and which was to be discussed yesterday or today in New York. To me, this is not the resolution of the year. The text is quite lukewarm and the language is very loose. I don't know if we could manage to give it some teeth. How it would be received also remains to be seen. I think that if the United Nations countries find it sometimes necessary to change the text of a resolution, it's so that members will agree to vote for it.

If the wording is too harsh, too many votes are lost and, at the end of the day, the resolutions that are approved are inconsequential. I don't know if it has been discussed yesterday or if it is going to be discussed today, but a draft resolution has been submitted to the United Nations this week. The organization will recognize that the situation in Nigeria is serious, but as far as proposing to take firm action... Personally, I doubt it.

Mr. Leblanc: You have briefly mentioned some of the reasons why the United Nations would hesitate to take stricter action. Could you tell us why the United Nations cannot, or will not, go a little bit further in such a serious situation?

Mr. Kergin: As you know, the United Nations is made up of member countries. All member countries do not think along the same lines as we do, or as some other member countries do. The membership is always divided in terms of the strategies or policies which should be applied, to deal with a country which rejects democratic principles and does not protect human rights. Once again, the United Nations work through consensus, but before a resolution is developed, the main concern is to ensure that the vast majority of the member countries will support it at the General Assembly.

I believe Mr. Laverdure was referring to a resolution which will be discussed by the Security Council. There will, therefore, be only 15 countries which will be eligible to vote. Among those, some have a non-interference policy. They don't approve of resolutions dealing with internal affairs, with situations which do not clearly put international peace or order at risk.

In that case, the wording of the resolution is subtle, loose, as Mr. Laverdure was saying, so that it cannot really be taken as a condemnation.

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It is so because not every country shares our opinion. It's also the reason why there are resolutions which, from the Canadian perspective, are not as direct and frank as we would like.

One the flaws of the United Nations is that it is an organization within which each country has a vote and all other countries have to be convinced to use a language which suits the majority.

[English]

Ms Beaumier: I have a statement more than anything else.

When I hear what appears to be waffling on policies like this, like most Canadians, I become very frustrated. I get very frustrated when I hear expressions like ``Canada will follow the lead''. Canada must take the lead in issues that are of this much importance in the world.

We have forgotten something, and it's something that probably has moved me the most in my involvement in politics. A very influential Prime Minister of this country once said that the strength of some nations is determined by the size of their armies, others by the size of their heart, but in the world Canada is a giant. In all negotiations of this nature, we must never forget this. If we don't try, then for sure it's not going to work.

The Chairman: Thank you.

I'd like to reiterate on Mr. Lastewka's comment. On behalf of all members of the committee, I think we've been very fortunate this morning. We've had excellent panellists. We appreciate the time and energy you've taken, and the distances you've come. We appreciate the information from the members of the department.

I would recommend to the committee that we reconvene on this matter in the second week of January. I will have the clerk's office confer with you as to what would be the best day.

[Translation]

The second week in January?

Mr. Leblanc: Not before February.

The Chairman: Not before February. I am going to check with all members of the committee. I hope it will be possible before February because, judging by everything we have heard, otherwise, it will be to late.

[English]

Mr. Broadbent: Mr. Chairman, before you adjourn, could you just clarify, for some of us at this end of the table, the force of resolution? I take it the resolution was adopted, notwithstanding the -

The Chairman: We adopted two resolutions. Which one are you referring to?

Mr. Broadbent: The first one, the fact that after Christmas you will be continuing to hold further hearings on this.... I take it that the first one would be a request to our minister going to the Commonwealth meeting to pursue and show leadership on the sanctions issue. Is that it?

The Chairman: That's the way I read it. It says that we ``encourage the Government of Canada to take a strong leadership role in coordinating an enforceable oil embargo'', and that would be as of now. The minister was here earlier today, and my understanding was that's what they're presently exploring. We feel that should be in the strongest language. Members of the committee are saying that definitely should be pursued and not be allowed to drop, and we will convey that to the members of the government.

Ms MacDonald: Before you have your meeting in January, may I suggest that you get a copy of the Channel 4 documentary on what took place in Ogoniland? If there's one thing that will have an impact, it's that documentary.

The Chairman: Thank you. That's a helpful suggestion.

This is our last session this year, and I would like to thank all of the members for their cooperation and help over the course of the year.

[Translation]

I wish you a wonderful holiday and a happy New Year.

The meeting is adjourned.