[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]
Tuesday, June 13, 1995
.1530 
[English]
The Chair: We like to be punctual in this committee, and so as it is exactly 3:30 p.m. we shall call the meeting to order, and we will welcome the minister.
I don't think anybody at that end of the table needs any introduction, and I'm sure people around this part of the table don't need any introduction.
So, Minister, welcome. You may want to indicate the people you have with you, most of whom I think we have seen and met before. We would welcome an opening statement from you, after which time we would like to ask you some questions.
Please.
Hon. David Collenette (Minister of National Defence and Minister of Veterans Affairs): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
With me is the Chief of the Defence Staff, John de Chastelain; our Acting Deputy Minister, John McLure; and our acting ADM of materiel, Pierre Lagueux.
General Fischer, who is the senior ADM materiel, is in Europe at the air show.
We also have have Vice-Admiral Mason, our Deputy Chief of Defence Staff, who is in charge of all operational decisions. Certainly any questions with respect to our deployment to Bosnia and Croatia may be directed to Admiral Mason.
We have other officials available for you if there are appropriate questions. Thank you,Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate the opportunity of coming for a second time to discuss the 1995 National Defence outlook. The outlook statement, which you have, is part of the government's new expenditure management system and has been provided to assist you in carrying out your new responsibility to review expenditure trends as part of your contribution to the federal budgetary process.
The initiative is in keeping with the government's ongoing effort to enhance the role of Parliament in addressing major policy issues.
[Translation]
Some members of this Committee, as part of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's defence policy, played a critical role last year in the development of the government's new defence policy.
The annual presentation of the departmental Outlook will ensure that you can now play an active role in overseeing its implementation.
Although only six months have passed since the 1994 Defence White Paper was released, we have clear evidence that the policy is the right one for Canada.
[English]
The international environment continues to present a mixed picture. On the positive side, we have seen some very real progress in arms control, the resolution of regional conflict and the spread of democracy. On the negative side, violent conflicts rooted in ethnic strife, boundary disagreements and resource disputes represent serious challenges to the goal of a more peaceful and secure world.
Closer to home, recent events such as the turbot dispute have clearly shown that the Canadian forces may have an important role in protecting Canadian interests.
[Translation]
Taken together, these developments clearly validate the white paper and, above all, show that it is right to emphasize Canada's need to maintain multipurpose, combat-capable forces. We have a policy that is proving its soundness, and we are now proceeding with its implementation.
The 1995 Outlook's purpose is to identify key initiatives that the Department will undertake in implementing the White Paper.
[English]
These initiatives do include:
- proceeding with the renewal of the NORAD agreement, in conjunction with the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade;
- completing the study led by Foreign Affairs of measures to improve the United Nations' rapid reaction capability;
- adding 3,000 regular force personnel to the army's field force;
- reviewing measures that could be taken to restructure the reserves;
- putting in place by mid-1997 a new command and control structure;
- and, assuming that we receive final cabinet approval, proceeding with a revised capital plan, including the four priority equipment programs identified in the white paper: the acquisition of new armoured personnel carriers, replacement of maritime and search-and-rescue helicopters, and the exploration of the possibility to acquire four recently built Upholder class submarines from the United Kingdom.
The white paper also does recognize the imperative of financial restraint, which compels the department and the forces to adopt fundamentally new ways of delivering the defence capabilities that Canada needs.
The task before our department and the forces in general in implementing the defence policy is one of managing this complex transition. I would like to illustrate the scale of the challenge.
.1535
Within the constraints of the department's funding line, the next three years of which are set out in the outlook document, I'm asking DND and the forces to do the following:
- first, ensure that sufficient funds are available for capital equipment, which represents a critical investment in the future of the Canadian Armed Forces as a capable fighting force;
- second, restructure the whole organization to become leaner and more efficient - an aim that underpins the reorganization of the command structure, the reduction of the resources we currently devote to support, and restructuring of the reserves;
- third, implement the infrastructure reductions detailed in the 1994 and 1995 budgets;
- fourth, carry out the planned reductions in military and civilian personnel fairly and humanely while retaining sufficient numbers of personnel in all essential occupations and increasing by 3,000 the number of soldiers in the army's combat arms units;
- and finally, foster a new management culture.
Further, I am asking the department and the forces to implement these far-reaching changes while maintaining a very extensive slate of operational commitments, both at home and abroad.
The scale of the challenge should not be underestimated. Not only are all the objectives I've just outlined essential, but they must all be attained simultaneously and none of them must be allowed to undercut the others.
[Translation]
My department and I are aware of the challenge we face and we are keenly aware that unforeseen developments - such as a crisis on the scale of the Gulf War or a major NATO operation - could complicate significantly the plans we have developed to manage this transition.
Nevertheless, I'm confident in the department's ability to meet the challenge.
[English]
The outlook statement concludes by stressing that as the department proceeds with the implementation of the new policy, it will be strive to be as open as possible with Canadians in general and Parliament in particular. Indeed, the outlook statement and its two annexes respond to the request made by members of the committee for more information on how the government and the department plan for the future of Canadian defence. I hope you found the departmental outlook to be informative and useful, and I would welcome your questions.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Minister. We welcome the outlook document and the ability to participate a little bit more meaningfully in the process. That was a recommendation that came out of our report, and we're pleased to have any opportunity to make a contribution to the policy process.
Could I begin by asking a question of my own, and that is with regard to Arctic sovereignty. The Arctic Resources Committee was in touch recently and indicated that they thought there was a weakness in our report in terms of the focus that we made or did not make on Arctic sovereignty.
I wanted to ask you in particular about the status of underwater detection equipment for the Arctic. Where does that stand now? Are we still in the research and development stage? Where do we stand with regard to the implementation of positioning certain underwater detection equipment in the Arctic that would let us know what's happening in those waters?
Mr. Collenette: I think Admiral King is going to answer that question.
I should just say that we are concerned about sovereignty in Canada's Arctic, and indeed, if we were to acquire new submarines, they could at some point be adapted to have a capability to go under the ice. As it is now, only nuclear submarines can go under the ice.
There is a proposal that has been examined for some time now about detection at the entrance to the channels near Ellesmere Island, and it's a pretty pricey venture. So we remain committed to the principle of asserting Canada's sovereignty over the Arctic, but we are mindful that we only have so many dollars to use.
Perhaps Admiral King could expand on this.
Rear Admiral J. King (Associate Assistant Deputy Minister, Policy and Communications, Department of National Defence): Thank you, Minister.
Mr. Chairman, we have for some time progressed what we call a family of surveillance projects, which seek to look at virtually every aspect of Arctic surveillance. That is surveillance under the ice, in the waters - the contiguous waters in the Arctic - in the air, and, indeed, on the surface.
Most of those projects have been in place for some time, although some of them are fairly recent, particularly the air projects where we're using advanced sonobuoy technology to see what we can do about submarine detection. But in all cases, the the environmental factors associated with this area make the development of this technology extremely difficult and extremely expensive.
.1540
We have found over the last number of years as we've progressed in each of the areas - indeed, we have about five separate projects - that in each case the technology simply has not progressed at a rate that will allow us to deploy something fully operationally in a cost-effective manner. So to this date we have not been able to put anything firmly in place, but work continues in all those areas.
The Chair: My second question, Mr. Minister, is a little closer to home. We've gone through an environmental review on low-level flying in Labrador, as you know, and I wanted you to let us know and get on the record where we stand now and how we intend to proceed for the future with regard to that operation in Goose Bay. You can expand on that to whatever degree you like.
Mr. Collenette: As you know, it was essential that we take a decision on the environmental assessment panel's report very quickly so that we could begin negotiations with our allies later this summer or early fall and have agreements in place for some time, I think, in early 1996, when the current agreement expires. Because the government has made that decision in the timeframe of about six weeks ago, we are now on target to conclude those negotiations with our allies. They'll be looking for some savings in terms of their own expenditures and improved management practices on our part, so that we can offer them a facility that is somewhat less expensive and operations that are less expensive than before.
We have had some indicators of other NATO nations' interest. At this stage I don't believe we have anything hard, but that could come over the course of the next year. We are about to appoint a facilitator, and I must say that I was away last week and I approved that, and I'm not sure whether the release got out, but it will get out if it hasn't gotten out. We have a facilitator, who would be available to bring the institute aspect of the environmental assessment panel into fruition. This is an individual who would have the confidence of the aboriginal communities, would have some academic and other credentials as well as being very cognizant of the terrain in Newfoundland.
So the answer to your question, Mr. Chair, is that we're proceeding. We believe the augmentation of the number of flights permitted will allow us to offer this service to our allies, and hopefully they will take it up. So that would be increased economic activity in Newfoundland-Labrador, and there is the possibility, of course, of other allies joining in.
The Chair: The chair now looks for hands for questions. Mr. Jacob.
[Translation]
Mr. Jacob (Charlesbourg): Welcome, Minister, General, Deputy Minister and Admiral. I will continue on the issue of low level flights. Minister, you've just mentioned that you have not made any firm commitment. Certain countries have shown some interest, but there is nothing concrete in what was advanced.
I would like to get some assurance here. A study or some budget forecast does exist. If we want to increase the low level flights to 18,000, we will have to change the Goose Bay base infrastructure and this will necessarily bring about additional costs of approximately 70 million dollars, if memory serves me.
Do you agree not to go ahead with expanding or repairing the infrastructures as long as you don't have a firm signed commitment from NATO countries?
.1545
Mr. Collenette: Mr. Jacob, I must tell you that our three clients, Germany, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, show a great deal of interest in seeing the low-level flights in Goose Bay continue. They are worried about the process and they are very happy to hear that the Canadian Government has decided to continue the low-level flights.
I suppose that it's realistic to assume that the allies will continue at the same level as in the past. But that's for the negotiations. Your question on infrastructures will be examined in the context of those negotiations.
For example, if the allies increase the number of flights, it may be necessary to have other facilities in Goose Bay, but there are no conclusions about this at this stage.
Mr. Jacob: The Chairman referred to sovereignty in the Arctic. I believe that in the past, there were not a lot of security implications regarding the facilities. I can't help but smile when you mention the acquisition of new submarines that would allow us to assert our sovereignty in the Arctic. I would like to tell you, Minister, that on a few occasions you mentioned that the special Joint Committee on defence policy review agreed with the purchase of the submarines. Let me point out that the Bloc Québécois did not agree.
I would like to come back to that position. At one point, I had asked - I don't know whether I asked the Admiral who is here today or someone else - how our Oberon submarines had been used in the past 25 or 30 years and what missions they had fulfilled. I remember that I was given the example of a drug related surveillance activity that had lasted about 10 days; I had gotten no further examples.
Before we go ahead with this project, I would like someone to demonstrate to me the usefulness of submarines and the missions they fulfilled last year or in the past two years. If it's simply a matter of equipment for fighting other countries, I think that given the current state of Canada's finances, it is somewhat unrealistic to want to acquire such equipment.
I would at least like to have some demonstration of its usefulness.
Mr. Collenette: Mr. Jacob, I must point out that submarines are used in the armed forces in 39 countries. The only country that has decided to leave the submarine club is Albania.
Canada has developed its submarine capacity since World War 2. It is the experience of that war that demonstrated that the lack of such a capacity did not contribute to an overall strengthening of Canadian forces during that period.
I must ask Admiral King to give you the view of navy experts and the reasons in favour of maintaining our submarine force.
.1550
We may decide to retire the old submarines, but I must emphasize that Canada has almost the longest coastline in the world. That's why we need naval capability. Admiral King will explain that submarines are a relatively cheap way of doing the job and that they can do extraordinary things that ordinary ships, frigates, couldn't do.
Admiral King.
RAdm King: Mr. Jacob, pardon me, but I must speak in English because I will be dealing with very technical matters.
[English]
Perhaps I could say that in the long time we have looked at the problem of replacing our submarines, an examination that has taken place over the last 20 years, we have convinced ourselves totally, despite a changing world environment, of the absolute necessity to have this capability in the country.
That capability really has four main imperatives. The first is that without submarines we have no way of exercising Canadian sovereignty in those waters that we claim as our own or over those waters where we have extensive interests. We simply have no other way of being present in the third dimension that one finds at sea, that is, under the water.
The second reason is aligned closely to the first, but it extends to those waters beyond our own but possibly also in our own - when we have to carry out combat operations in the maritime sense, that is, the navy, maritime aircraft and submarines. Without the capability of being able to operate under the water, we simply cannot guarantee the operational flexibility. We cannot give ourselves the basic protection against underwater attack that allows us to proceed and do the missions the government has tasked us to do. We find indeed today, as the minister pointed out, that virtually all nations in the world - and there are only about 35 of them that are land-locked - that have naval capabilities have submarines in their arsenals.
The third reason, which is very important, is that we need to be able to train in anti-submarine warfare and give ourselves the capability of understanding the complex operations that are associated with this form of warfare. We purchased the Oberon class submarines over 30 years ago for this simple reason. We do not have access to submarines of other nations with the regularity that we would need to operate with these types of vessels in order to maintain the capability we need to be effective when we're operating with other multinational forces; for example, the problem we have in the Adriatic today.
The last reason we convinced ourselves that we need to maintain this capability is because it allows us to be privy to the information surrounding submarine operations that our allies have and that they would not otherwise impart to us. This information allows us to know the details of the operations in which their submarines are engaged and which we believe is critical to maintaining our basic sovereignty.
Just to recap: first, to maintain Canadian sovereignty, not just in the Arctic but indeed throughout the waters of Canadian interests; second, to make us effective in combat operations outside of our waters, that is, as part of a UN or other allied contingency force; third, to give us the level of training we need to be effective in our normal combat operations; last, to have access to the information required to be able to know the sorts of things we need to know about other nations' underwater operations.
You asked about what we have done with our submarines over the last 30 years. As I said, things have changed significantly in the international environment in that time. But I think most significantly, we started out focused primarily on training our navy in submarine operations; in other words, the third of those elements that I mentioned to you.
As more submarines became proliferated throughout the world, as more nations had them, we saw the requirement to be able to use submarines against other submarines.
.1555
Ultimately, as submarine technology progressed to the point where they themselves became much more flexible, they became much cheaper. Their crew sizes decreased. The maintenance that had to be done on them decreased. We saw that they became a far more cost-effective vessel to use in our inventory to the extent that today the average submarine costs us about 30% of the cost of a surface ship. So while they cannot do all of the things that other vessels can do, they are extremely cost-effective in doing many of the things that other vessels do.
The final point I wish to make is that throughout all this time, the one point that has come through to us time and again is that whether or not we are doing an operation against a drug runner, as we did I think about three years ago - and we had a submarine on station for over 50 days, totally covert, undetected by people who were involved in the drug trade against Canada - or whether we're in a situation where we want to carry out wide area surveillance in our waters, or whether we want, for reasons of government policy, to send a submarine somewhere to gather information, or finally, whether we want to make sure our ships that are operating as they are today in the Adriatic have the capability to defend themselves and operate effectively against foreign submarines - and as I think you know, in the former Yugoslavia there are a number of foreign submarines operating.... For all those reasons, the covert stealth and the long endurance that only a submarine can give you mandate that they must remain a core feature of the combat capability of our navy today.
Thank you.
[Translation]
Mr. Jacob: I would just like to ask if, in DND's planning and also in the Navy's, there's a justification for the use of submarines. We are told that it's in case there were some kind of conflict and also to gather information.
As a layman, I'm trying to understand why, when the frigate program was started up, part of the funds were not set aside to modernize our submarines if they're cheaper to operate, as you say, and if they can do some things that surface ships can't do. I think we're investing a lot in frigates.
In a very difficult economic context, another ``gadget'' is brought up, one which has more or less been used in previous years and which is, in actual fact, just a form of insurance.
I find it difficult to understand the kind of planning the department must have carried out in choosing basically to go ahead with a frigate program and in deciding, once the program had been completed, to move on to submarines, when their usefulness, to my mind, extends only to information gathering and a form of insurance in case of conflict. I have a hard time grasping that.
[English]
The Chair: I'll allow a brief answer to that, but really we need to come back to it on the second round because we are going over time.
[Translation]
Mr. Collenette: I must give a political explanation, because the frigate purchase was a political choice.
As you know, Mr. Trudeau's government decided that purchase 15 years ago. I was an MP at that time and I remember very clearly the circumstances surrounding the frigate purchase. The decision was made because we needed to replace the ships that we have presently.
The former Mulroney government decided to increase the fleet by six frigates, but that wasn't the same thing as the submarines. If we have 12 frigates, it is truly for operational reasons and to replace the old ships. For instance, I think that in the Armed Forces we have ships that are 40 years old, from the 1950's.
.1600
Submarines meet other needs. That is why the Armed Forces think that we need new submarines. The government accepts this need, as well as the reasons stated in the special joint Senate and House committee on the defense policy review's report. The decision to purchase submarines, a political decision, depends on our negotiations with the government of the United Kingdom.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you. We can come back to this on a second round if you like, but we're going to have to move on.
Mr. McWhinney.
Mr. McWhinney (Vancouver Quadra): My question to the Minister of Defence. Picking up your response on the Arctic sovereignty issue, you know that we established our sovereignty over the Arctic with the Arctic Waters Act of 1970, and according to classical international law, sovereignty asserted remains inchoate unless it's maintained on a regular basis.
I'd like to ask you for your comments on what we're doing now to maintain the sovereignty under international law originally asserted and whether the armed forces have the capacity to maintain that in the traditional ways as classical international laws envisaged.
Mr. Collenette: I'll let the deputy chief of defence operations answer that in the context of the day-to-day activity. But, of course, sovereignty is maintained not just by a sea presence; it's maintained by air. We have the Aurora long-range patrol aircraft, which are used on the east and west coasts, that are quite valuable in protecting sovereignty and detecting underwater movements and other extraordinary movements.
I would invite you, Professor McWhinney, since you are from Vancouver, to go sometime to Comox and perhaps go out on a long-range patrol aircraft and see the work that they do. That's one way we exert sovereignty.
We exert sovereignty, obviously, through the presence of our naval vessels, as we've talked about, whether it's frigates or destroyers or submarines in our waters. We assert our sovereignty over the Arctic by the Canadian Rangers, which is a little-known force of volunteer aboriginal Canadians who receive some assistance from the Canadian Armed Forces. It's very successful. I know I've discussed with our colleague Ethel Blondin the enthusiasm with which people in northern Canada embrace the Rangers. This is a physical presence. We also have forward operating locations, such as the one at Yellowknife, with Twin Otters, where we can do some kind of patrol.
So we are in evidence in the northern regions quite well.
Perhaps, Admiral Mason, if I've forgotten some of the more intricate things, you could fill us in.
Vice-Admiral Lynn Mason (Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, Department of National Defence): Thank you, minister.
In addition to the three things the Minister of National Defence has mentioned, I should point out that there are a number of exercises that our ground forces, other than the Rangers, take part in every year in the Arctic, mostly to do with survival exercises and that sort of thing.
In addition, as Admiral King has pointed out, we fly a number of exercises with our Auroras in the Arctic every year, in addition to the northern sovereignty patrols which were mentioned, specifically to do with the sorts of experiments and exercises that we need to perform to see how we might track submarines under the ice. So those are the other sorts of things we do.
Mr. McWhinney: I thank the minister. Also, as a former air force flyer, I'd be happy to accept the invitation to use the defence patrol planes.
May I ask you, are we in a position to assert the classical international law form of testing sovereignty over waters, maintenance of passage through the Arctic by sea? Or has that become superannuated by the development of air and space technology?
.1605
Mr. Collenette: I believe we have a novel diplomatic arrangement with the United States under which they inform us of activities of their nuclear submarines under the ice, which enables us to at least say they are doing it with our acquiescence. Because you're an expert in international law, you'll know the refinements of that kind of operational approach.
The fact is that we do not have any means to go under the ice at the moment. The Upholder class submarines that the British would like to sell us could be adapted, I believe, at some point in the future for underwater surveillance.
Perhaps Admiral Mason or Admiral King could tell us, but I understand there has just been a completion - I read it the other night in my homework I get every night. The United States has just completed an exercise up in that area - I don't know if you're aware of that, but I got it in my briefing the other night - where the U.S. submarines have been in the area in pollution surveillance.
When I read the briefing note, it really struck me, coming back to Mr. Jacob's question, that here is this pretty expensive piece of equipment that people say is a Cold War relic, yet more and more, as we are faced with depletion of resources, the despoliation of the earth's atmosphere and environment, the protection of one's own interests - not only one's own interests but the principles of conservation, which were so well articulated by Mr. Tobin in the so-called turbot war - become very much paramount as a part of not only foreign policy and domestic policy but also defence policy.
You must have the means and equipment to discharge that kind of protection of your own and international common good.
Mr. McWhinney: Foreign submarine passage with our knowledge and with our consent is fully compatible with our international law sovereignty. So I thank you, Mr. Minister.
Mr. Collenette: I accept you as the judge on that. Thank you.
Mr. McWhinney: As long as we're notified and we agree.
Mr. Frazer (Saanich - Gulf Islands): I have some questions on equipment, but if I may, I'd first like to ask the minister a question on personnel matters. No matter how good the equipment is, unless the personnel are keen, dedicated and well motivated, the equipment won't do any good in developing a good force.
The requirement for that force is for the people who work within the environment to see it as fair and just. If I may, I'd like to deal with a specific case on which I'm getting feedback, which says that people are perceiving it may not be as fair and just as they would like to see it.
Specifically, I'd like to address the situation of Sergeant Mark Boland, now Private Boland. Just for the record, Sergeant Boland was on duty the evening that Shidane Arone was murdered in Somalia. While he was not directly involved, his perception was that he had some responsibility for it, and when he came to court martial, he made a plea of guilty against the advice of his lawyers. But he said, no, I have some responsibility and I did it.
The court martial sentenced him to 90 days in the service detention barracks and the Minister of National Defence appealed that sentence as not being adequate. Sergeant Boland, now Private Boland, served 66 days of that 90-day sentence, was released and returned to his unit. I understand that he performed extremely well in the unit after his return to it.
He was getting his career and his life back in shape again, when the appeal court finally rendered its decision. Its decision was to increase his sentence to one year.
Mr. Minister, had the original sentence that Sergeant Boland received been one year, or had the appeal court heard his case and extended the sentence to one year while he was in detention, I would not be interceding on his behalf. But I feel the fact that this individual served, was released, was getting his life back in shape, and then was reincarcerated after 11 months, is akin to double jeopardy. I realize it's not, but it certainly is very similar to double jeopardy.
I don't think this individual is a threat to society. I don't think justice is being served by keeping him in the service detention barracks.
I interceded with you on May 19 to ask that you exercise your authority as Minister of National Defence to suspend his sentence and allow him to continue with his posting to Gagetown. I understand he was looking forward to that and was going to try to re-establish his career in the service.
.1610
This individual has suffered tremendously, as has his family. As I understand it, he was recognized as, if not the best sergeant, one of the very best sergeants in the Airborne Regiment prior to that time. Again, my information is that he served extremely well when he returned from the service detention barracks.
I wonder if you could tell me what the logic is to insisting that this individual spend even more time in the service detention barracks.
Mr. Collenette: First of all, Mr. Frazer, I'm sure you are aware it would be inappropriate for me to comment in any way upon the events that occurred in Somalia, which are now subject to an independent inquiry under the Inquiries Act.
A number of charges were laid as a result of the incident to which you referred. Some of them were criminal; some of them were military. They were dealt with by the military justice system, which has been declared to be constitutional by the Supreme Court of Canada.
Any appeals, whether done by the Crown or by the accused, are then heard by civilian judges, headed by Federal Court Justice Barry Strayer, who is the chief of the Court Martial Appeal Court. They sit in panels of three; it's usually a Federal Court judge presiding, with two judges from one of the supreme courts of the various provinces.
In the particular case you mention, charges were heard in the first instance by the court martial process. An appeal was launched on the part of the Crown. The Court Martial Appeal Court accepted the Crown's argument. A sentence was rendered, and that sentence will be served.
Mr. Frazer: Mr. Minister, I don't quibble with the fact that the -
The Chair: Could I interject for a moment? The rules of engagement on the outlook document are rather grey, because we have never had an outlook document before us before, but I take them as somewhat similar to main estimates in the sense that almost anything goes.
However, I'm not sure I see the relevance of that particular question to the outlook document, that is, to what is going to happen in the future policy of the Canadian forces. Mr. Frazer, I know you have other questions. I would encourage you to get on to those as quickly as possible.
Mr. Frazer: Mr. Chairman, I think the most important thing in a military organization is its people. If we don't care about the people or concern ourselves with their welfare, then we may as well not have a military, because they are the vital aspect of it. The best equipment in the world won't give you the best army in the world. It's the people who give you that.
The Chair: I'm not questioning morale or general questions of that sort, but this is a particular case.
Mr. Frazer: But it goes to the whole subject, Mr. Chairman, because this is not an incident in isolation. It is known throughout the forces, and people are watching very carefully. They're concerned by their perception that justice is not being done here.
I wouldn't even be arguing this case if justice had moved swiftly, as it's supposed to. If the judgment had been rendered while the individual was still incarcerated, it would be game over. I wouldn't have brought it up.
I think the defence department or the justice system has to accept that this is a most unusual breach of what would be normal justice. This individual was released, was getting back on with his life, and now he's being sent back to jail. I find it -
The Chair: My view is it is borderline in terms of the outlook document, and I would encourage you to pursue other lines of questioning.
Mr. Frazer: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Minister, you mentioned in the House that the forces have provided upgraded anti-fragmentation protection. I'm not familiar with precisely what you were talking about. It's been advocated, for instance, that particularly with the situation getting worse in Bosnia and Croatia, perhaps we should be looking at bullet-proof vests, such as the police wear, under the flak jacket to provide our personnel with more protection from what appears to be a heightening war.
Could you give us some details as to just what we are looking at in the way of personal protection?
.1615
Mr. Collenette: Mr. Frazer, a number of changes have been made in the last year, and the chief will continue and give you some of those details.
We have added such things as night-vision goggles and extra-protective flak jackets with, I believe, porcelain inserts. We've solved the particular problem of helmets for the short run, pending the delivery of the Canadian-designed helmets that will be compatible with new communications equipment that is coming onstream and with new rifles.
We do have pretty up-to-date rifles and machine-guns. We have improved the communications equipment. I think the chief has been talking about allocating some more money to the upgrading of our front-line personnel; perhaps he could give us some more details.
General John de Chastelain (Chief of the Defence Staff, Department of National Defence): On the particular question of protection, in addition to flak jackets, each soldier has a load-carrying vest that has in it extra plates that provide protection against high-velocity bullets. As you know, flak jackets are protection against fragments as opposed to high-velocity bullets.
They each have these. They wear them when they feel it is appropriate. They don't wear them all the time because they're very heavy. They allow them also to carry their magazines loaded with ammunition and the like. So they do have the equipment they need, and they wear it when they need it.
Mr. Frazer: Is there any consideration being given to bullet-proof vests such as the police wear? They're more flexible and more comfortable to move around in. Has this been considered at all?
Gen de Chastelain: I don't know. I do know the troops have been given what they felt they needed, i.e., flak jackets and load-carrying vests on top of them. That provides the protection they feel is necessary. I believe it's as good as any protection there is.
Mr. Frazer: Are these available generally and in adequate numbers for all our personnel who are in Bosnia and Croatia right now? Do they have to exchange them when they go back and forth or is everyone issued one?
Gen de Chastelain: They're issued them when they're overseas. If you're asking me whether we have them in Canada too, I can't give you the answer. I imagine yes. But they are in place where they're needed. As I say, they're not worn all the time. Flak jackets are worn all the time in an area of concern, but when the situation gets difficult, they wear these vests as well.
Mr. Frazer: May I move to APCs for a moment? Could you give me a breakdown of the total number you intend to acquire for the forces and the composition of the fleet as regards wheeled and tracked vehicles?
Mr. Collenette: Mr. Frazer, in the white paper we accepted that most of the older APCs would require refurbishment and there would be the requirement to buy additional ones. The exact number will be determined by the cabinet and will fit within the financial parameters of the Minister of Finance.
I'm unable to give you an exact number at this time, because that's really a matter for cabinet to decide, but we will be proceeding with a large number of refurbishments. I believe we have about 1,750 APCs in the inventory. That includes the Bisons and all the rest of the tracked and wheeled vehicles. A goodly number of those will be refurbished.
Extra plating has been put on the M-113s in Bosnia and Croatia; that's given additional armoured protection for those people who are there now.
Mr. Frazer: Unhappily, Mr. Minister, it's also given a whole bunch of extra weight, and there is an underpowered engine in there already.
With the refurbishment, are we talking about the extended versions - the six-road-wheel model and the one with the additional anti-mine protection?
Mr. Collenette: Perhaps Monsieur Lagueux could give you some ideas that we are considering. Again, this has not been decided. This will be subject to discussion at cabinet, but he can give you some range of what we'd like to do.
Mr. Pierre Lagueux (Assistant Deputy Minister, Equipment Program Management, Department of National Defence): Thank you, Minister.
In effect, as the white paper did say, there will be a project to procure new APCs as well as to refurbish a certain quantity of existing APCs. You have correctly pointed out, Mr. Frazer, that when you add armour to the vehicle it adds weight, obviously, so there's a question of power.
Mr. Frazer: And fuel.
Mr. Lagueux: Yes, so by and large the types of upgrades that would be done, for example, to tracked vehicles would be to the drive train, the transmission, the engine and so on, as well as additional protection. Those are the types of upgrades we'll be looking at.
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For upgrades to wheeled vehicles, primarily there would be a scheduled heavy maintenance, repair and overhaul tied to the vehicles, perhaps adding some additional armour to those vehicles as well. That's for the wheeled vehicles that would remain in service.
Mr. Frazer: Is the upgrade to be strictly an upgrade of the present M-113, or are we going to the advance model that the Americans are upgrading to, which again is the six-road-wheel variety with a much larger engine and a far greater capacity to climb hills and do what has to be done?
Mr. Lagueux: The American company, United Defence Limited Partnership, has what they call the MTVL, which is a new vehicle that can be built either from scratch or by using the existing chassis of the M-113. They add extra length to the vehicle and add an extra road wheel; that is correct.
In fact, we were looking at upgrading our vehicles. It could be possible that we would extend some vehicles, but it is not yet determined what we will do in that area. It is mostly to upgrade the existing vehicles with drive trains and extra armour.
Mr. Frazer So it's not committed but it's not ruled out either.
Mr. Lagueux: Right.
Mr. Frazer: Thank you.
Mr. Hopkins (Renfrew - Nipissing - Pembroke): On page 6 of your outlook paper you talk about the implementation of the reductions in personnel, infrastructure and other overhead.
Mr. Minister, as to the infrastructure reductions in property - in actual land real estate - are we holding on to those as a reserve or are we allowing them to slip through our fingers and out to commercial property, private property or whatever?
During our review I asked several questions on whether we were going to build up a reserve of actual land, because if some day we need additional training areas, they're not going to be very easy to come by if we have allowed them to be sold or taken up by somebody else at this stage.
Mr. Collenette: Mr. Hopkins, I think that's a very good point. We have, I believe, around 30,000 buildings and property with a land mass close to the size of Prince Edward Island. National Defence is the country's biggest custodian of property.
A lot of the buildings are dilapidated. They date from the war or post-war era. Many of them will be ripped down. I've seen such buildings on bases across the country. I was at Valcartier a few weeks ago; some will be taken down there. Certainly at some of the bases where there is a good future there has to be replacement of the infrastructure.
With respect to training grounds, I think it's fair to say the military is very adamant - and we in the government agree - about keeping training lands. Canada has the best and the biggest training lands available. They tell me Cold Lake is about the same area as the country of Belgium, and that of course is used as a principal fighter base in Alberta in western Canada.
When we talk about low-level flying from Goose Bay, we know the kind of land that's involved, although I don't think all of it is in Defence's ownership. Gagetown, I believe, is the largest military base in the Commonwealth. We have Suffield and Wainwright in Alberta. These are massive places. We have Shilo in Manitoba, where the Germans train. The British train at Suffield. In your riding we have Petawawa, which is quite large.
Even though we're closing Chilliwack, we're going to keep the training area in the Chilcotin range. That's a massive area in British Columbia. In addition, we have a lot of other bases across the country.
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What happened in the Second World War is there was a smaller population and the war effort just built wherever it was required to build. Hopefully we won't have another war like the Second World War, but should we require military preparedness in the event of a war, I believe the infrastructure we have in terms of the actual land available is more than adequate to meet our needs.
I forgot Moose Jaw, which is probably one of our great assets. It is environmentally cleared and most friendly to pilot training because of the number of clear days it has and its relatively low population. That's why, rather than close CFB Moose Jaw, we declared in 1994 that we wanted to work towards bringing pilot training there with private operators, as had been done at Southport, the old Portage la Prairie base. We're working with Mr. Axworthy and Western Economic Diversification to try to attract NATO pilot training to Moose Jaw, and perhaps it will spill over into Portage and Winnipeg.
So we have these big facilities. We may rip down buildings and we may have to replace buildings. In fact, we're doing a lot of building as a result of the consolidation. I know a lot of people ask how we can be so strapped for cash and yet be building new buildings. The fact is that, as in business, very often you have to spend money to save money in terms of the payback. We're doing all of this.
Mr. Hopkins: When I asked that question, I was more concerned about the training area than I was about the buildings, because I realize in many cases they become a liability to you.
In completing your study, led by Foreign Affairs, on measures to improve the United Nations' rapid reaction capability, how is the input divided between Foreign Affairs and National Defence? Surely National Defence must have to outline their possibilities to the Department of Foreign Affairs before they can actually put anything valid on paper.
Mr. Collenette: You're specifically talking about the Rapid Reaction Force?
Mr. Hopkins: Yes. What kind of communication is there between the two departments?
Mr. Collenette: I can say - and this is rather gratuitous - that it's pretty good. Mr. Ouellet and I have known each other for 25 years, so we sort of know each other's moves. We work very well together.
The staff of both Foreign Affairs and Defence are extremely professional on the military side and also on the policy side. We have a policy component at National Defence.
Take, for example, this whole Rapid Reaction Force. We were given details in advance of the kind of proposal that would be coming forward. I discussed it with Mr. Perry, Mr. Rifkind and then Mr. Million. It seemed to us this was a reasonably good idea and one that Canada supported.
As to whether or not we would participate, that is really a decision the Prime Minister is going to have to take. He's had input on this from a number of us. I did make inquiries of the chief while we were in Paris to find out what kind of capability we had, should we decide to participate. There's a whole range of options that could be put forward. But before that is done, the government has to decide whether or not it wants to implicate itself more by putting more personnel and resources into this particular theatre of conflict.
Foreign Affairs deals with the larger policy aspects of this conflict, especially the diplomatic initiatives, and there's good cooperation between us.
Mr. Hopkins: I suppose this duplicates part of the answer you gave, but given our experience in the former Yugoslavia, do you see us getting into any other similar operation in the near future? Do you think this is going to put the brakes on somewhat, or do you see it as Canadians actually being needed even more in those situations for negotiations, requesting solutions and trying to bridge the gaps, if there is anything to bridge?
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Mr. Collenette: Canada's participation in the peacekeeping mandates of the UN is a priority. We have done this very well over the years. But we said in the white paper that we can't automatically sign onto every engagement. We have to be a bit more selective.
We only have so many resources. We tried to deal with the resource question by adding 3,000 people at the sharp end on the army, because that is the one component of the forces that is used the most. However, it's not used exclusively; the air force and navy are involved in peacekeeping operations. They were used in Haiti. They have been used off the coast of Yugoslavia. So we are trying to meet our obligations that way.
As you know from being a member of that committee and from knowing the white paper, we do have an ability to put up to 10,000 people in the field for short-term engagements. It is having that extra capacity that will permit us to be part of a NATO-led withdrawal from Bosnia and Croatia should the UN require that to be the case. So we do have the ability for those short-term operations.
The problem we have in Bosnia and Croatia is that it has gone on now for three years. The chief and I were talking the other week about the number of Canadian soldiers who have actually gone through the theatre. I think we talked in terms of between 12,000 and 14,000 people. They are not just the repeaters; they are different individuals who have been through that theatre. I think we have more war veterans today than at any time since the Korean war.
This is not a normal peacekeeping kind of operation. This is one of the concerns that keeps coming up. We're very careful about continual engagement and adding additional resources because this is something that has been going on for quite a while. Cyprus went on for quite a while. I forget the number of troops we had there at one time.
Gen de Chastelain: We had a maximum of 1,000 men. Mostly it was around 500.
Mr. Collenette: So this is really quite a commitment we've been making for the last three years.
Mr. Hopkins: Finally, Mr. Chairman, we mentioned the armoured personnel carriers. They had some discussion. Consider the replacement of the maritime helicopters and the search and rescue helicopters, and the possibility of the submarines. Given the dollar resources you know you have now, do you have any timeframe on these for when they will be available or coming off the line for use by the forces?
Mr. Collenette: If we were to take a decision on APCs this year, I would think the first to come out on line would be in 1997. If we take a decision on maritime helicopters, they will probably start coming on in 1998 or 1999. It will be close to 2000. The Sea Kings have a life going up to around 2000 or so.
Search and rescue might be a bit quicker because there's less hardware inside. Any of the people here can correct me if I'm wrong. We're looking at more of a commercial kind of application on the SAR. We're trying to perhaps look at ways of innovative financing. Search and rescue helicopters are essentially civilian helicopters, although they would be crewed by the air force.
There is one thing we are probably going to do. This is different from the previous government, which decided that one helicopter really designed for maritime combat operations could do the whole range of jobs, search and rescue. We are leaning toward having two helicopters. One would do search and rescue, which would be more or less an off-the-shelf, commercially applied, commercially certified helicopter. It would probably be operated - this is not in terms of crews - and maintained by private operators and financed perhaps through a leasing mechanism, such as a capital lease arrangement. That will then allow us to get the classic ship-borne helicopter, which would obviously be a combat helicopter.
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Mr. Hopkins: Will they be put out to bid?
Mr. Collenette: I can't give you any details on that because my colleagues haven't even been seized of that. There's all kinds of speculation going around, and officials have been working on various options. It's somewhat premature to discuss pieces of equipment, how much money is going to be spent and all those things, because it's really a decision for my colleagues and the government to decide. They haven't even been given any pieces of paper on which to make any decisions. There have been no scheduled discussions yet.
Mr. Hopkins: What I mean, Mr. Minister, is that they will not just be purchased in a straight purchase deal. There will be opportunities to have bids on those helicopters as opposed to just buying them outright.
Mr. Collenette: Were you talking about sole sourcing versus competitive bidding?
Mr. Hopkins: Yes.
Mr. Collenette: All these questions are being examined. One could go all competitive, one could go all sole source, or one could have a combination. The questions are what is in the best interest of operational capability, and what is in the best interest of the limited dollars the government has to spend. Whatever combination is right, that's the combination we will suggest to cabinet and then let them decide.
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Hopkins.
Ms Hickey.
Mrs. Hickey (St. John's East): You have answered some of my questions. One of my questions is whether we will be looking at re-evaluating the role of the tanks in the Canadian Armed Forces. Given the comments that were made on the capabilities of the vehicles used in operations in the former Yugoslavia, why is it necessary to wait until 1997 to look at getting new tanks?
Mr. Collenette: I am sorry for the little conference here, but I just wanted to clarify something. We don't have any tanks in Bosnia or Croatia. We have armoured personnel carriers.
We have Leopard tanks in Canada at, I think, three or four of the bases. There is a long-term program for their upgrade, but I don't think that kicks in until 2001. Again, that's just on the books as a planning option. No funds have been committed and no decision has been made to proceed with tanks. Those tanks are fully operational. They are probably late 1970s technology, but they still have good application and they are still very useful.
What we are talking about in the short run is the requirement for armoured personnel carriers specifically to assist in high-combat-style peacekeeping operations to afford additional protection for our forces. This is what the committee deemed to be most urgent and what we address in the white paper.
Mrs. Hickey: Thank you.
Mr. Mifflin (Bonavista - Trinity - Conception): I welcome the minister and the chief of staff to the historic hearing on the departmental outlook paper. I have three questions and they are fairly brief.
The first one is on the break-up of capital, personnel, and operations. The second one has to do with performance indicators. The third one has to do with management styles, to which reference is made frequently in the document.
On the first one, on page 5, I notice that operations and maintenance are mixed together. Is it possible at this point in time to indicate, of the $11 billion expenditure program for 1995-96, how much is operations, how much is capital, and how much is personnel? As we head towards the three years and beyond, are we looking for a target to reach a happy medium amongst these three?
Mr. Collenette: Mr. McLure is going to have a go at that.
Mr. John McLure (Acting Deputy Minister, Department of National Defence):Mr. Chairman, in 1995-96 the personnel costs are $4.47 billion. That is broken down into about $1.1 billion for civilian pay and $3.36 billion for military pay. All of the O and M, which includes the national procurement and research and development net of revenue, comes out at about $3 billion. The capital expenditures come out at $2.6 billion. These include some R and D expenditures, construction, major equipment, and a few minor items such as national search and rescue and so on.
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There was a $70 million difference between what was included in the main estimates and the amount actually included in the outlook document. That was a last-minute adjustment to our spending framework done in the context of the program review.
Mr. Mifflin: I thank you for the figures, but what I'm looking for is the percentage breakdown, and whether the percentage breakdown three years from now is trending towards another.... In other words, are you heading for a particular percentage for capital?
Mr. McLure: We would like to keep capital in the order of 23% to 24% of overall spending. Personnel costs are about 40% now, and those will stay roughly in the area of 40%. As the budget comes down, so will our personnel budget go down, and O and M will be in the order of 27%.
Mr. Mifflin: So you're saying there is no perceptible change. It's 43%, 27%, and the rest for capital, and that is the same for the three years.
Mr. McLure: You may be aware of some of the history on this. In the mid-1970s we got to the point where a disproportionate percentage of the overall budget was going to capital and led to what we were calling ``rust out''. A very small portion of the budget was going to capital.
As we moved into the late 1980s and got into some longer-term strategic planning, we ascertained that we couldn't let that happen again. That led to many of our strategic decisions in terms of budget reductions that occurred in 1989 and particularly in the budgets of 1994 and 1995 - that it would be very, very important that those capital expenditures be kept up, indeed as the qualitative measures of armed forces very much come apace with technology. That is why, particularly in the 1994 budget and the 1995 budget, we went to great lengths to preserve the percentage of the budget to capital that we think is appropriate.
Mr. Mifflin: The second question concerns the performance indicators. Is it worth the effort that we're spending to develop performance indicators?
Mr. Collenette: Sorry, was that to Mr. McLure?
Mr. Mifflin: Yes, Mr. Minister. Performance indicators - it's an old chestnut. It's been around for a long time. A lot of people beaver away, scratch their heads and stay awake at night worrying about these things. Where are we with this? Is there any use in pursuing this?
Mr. McLure: The Auditor General is keen that we develop performance indicators, I think probably across the government. The whole movement of the government's management framework is to more of a business planning concept. The outlook document we have before us today is very much a product of that new process.
Under the Defence 2000 initiative the department is turning very much more to a business planning approach. We are developing a new strategic outlook at the so-called level zero, which is the highest level. Feeding into that will be plans out of each command and group principle. What that will attempt to do is define more clearly the roles and tasks assigned to each of those higher levels.
It is very, very important to identify the results you want out of the resources that go in. In the past a lot of the activities taking place didn't necessarily contribute to the achievement of the bottom line - that is, the delivery of forces on the front line. We are coming to believe more and more that performance indicators are key in terms of measuring readiness and sustainment at the highest level. They can be used all the way down, even to things like running a pay system where you're assessing the efficiency and effectiveness of what it's costing you to pay your troops. As the old adage says, if you can't measure it, you can't manage it.
Mr. Mifflin: I guess my question should have been asked in a different way. We've been working with PMS for 20 years now.
Mr. McLure: We're a long way from the old PMS.
Mr. Mifflin: I understand that. I guess the real question is whether the department is seized with the real benefit of some kind of an indicator of effectiveness.
Mr. McLure: We are moving into this slowly. I think the biggest problem you could get into would be to develop an on-line process and have staff running with that process, in parallel and off-line from your primary combat purpose.
What I think is very important for the future is for the people who are charged with the combat responsibilities to understand what their key performance indicators are, and indeed to measure themselves literally on a daily basis, if they're achieving those objectives.
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That's a long way from where the old PMS was in developing - I won't call them irrelevant, because I think the people were probably earnestly trying to do a good job at that time - but we've migrated a long time since then. I think the application of technology in supporting management today is going to make it much easier for us to keep track of some of those, what I would call almost practical indicators of performance.
Mr. Mifflin: On the same topic, I'd like to ask the deputy chief if it would be possible to apply these performance indicators operationally in any effective, meaningful manner?
Gen de Chastelain: I've been involved in the game for 20 years, and I think it's an extremely difficult challenge to actually come up with objective, as opposed to subjective, performance measures, unless you go to the higher level and look at it from the point of view of a business case. But to actually look at performance measures at the tactical level I think is extremely difficult.
I think what we're looking for is a closed loop system, as the deputy has been mentioning, where there is a readiness reporting system that reveals what deficiencies we have. Then deficiencies are corrected either in a capital plan, a training plan or in our personnel plan - i.e., our business planning process. That results in improved forces for the next round of readiness reporting.
Performance measurement, of course, comes after the business plan has actually been put into effect. Exactly how we are going to capture those objective, as opposed to subjective, measures is very difficult, as I said.
Mr. Mifflin: For my last question before I leave this particular aspect, on a day-to-day basis, how does the chief of the defence staff measure the combat effectiveness in his daily briefings of each force, other than on a subjective basis?
Gen de Chastelain: Mr. Chairman, after discussion with the commanders concerned, after visiting them and their troops in the field or at sea or on the various air bases, they let me know what their shortages are and what their concerns are with regard to training levels.
For example, at the moment, the commander of land forces command has some serious concerns about the ability to operate at the formation level - in other words, at brigade group and up - given the requirement for repetitive sending of individual combat units to the former Yugoslavia. That is why he had planned a major exercise this year for combined level training.
It is on that subjective basis that the command or the commands view their training, determine the shortfalls or weaknesses, and report them to us. If their weakness is with regard to materiel, that's something we may be able to address. If their weakness is with regard to tasking, that is something we have to evaluate when we make recommendations to the minister about taking on new tasks. It is subjective, but it is fairly accurate.
Mr. Mifflin: Reference is made in the outlook document to new management styles. Can I ask the minister, what are these new management styles to which references are being made?
The Chair: New uniforms?
Mr. Collenette: I hope not; there was enough fuss with that a few years ago.
Mr. Mifflin, defence is the largest operational department of the federal government. It had a budget of $11 billion when I became minister, but it's climbing. It is a large operation. I think frankly that governments in the past haven't given proper political direction to the management of the institution of defence, and as a government we're trying to change that.
Some of the changes in terms of management style in using various private sector techniques and off-the-shelf procurement in terms of management practices applied in the private sector, costing and accounting and all the rest of that, did start two or three years ago when the budget cuts started taking effect. But we have accelerated that. We've been asked to give so much from the defence budget that if we don't extract efficiencies from our operations and management, we'll then have to get into the sharp end of capability. We're trying, as best as possible, not to do that.
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Right now we have a study in terms of the command and control of the forces, in answer to the white paper and the budget, of reducing the number of headquarters. As you know, we've eliminated one level of command. This exercise has been particularly energizing within the department. Not everybody welcomed it, because not everybody wants change. There will, however, be change; there has to be change. Those who don't want change will have to go somewhere else, because the only way we can make significant economies is to bring in different management practices, commercial applications of procurement and the like.
I'm really encouraged by the attitude we have from most people involved in this process. Whether it's the materiel end that Mr. Lagueux can talk about, or whether its at the personnel end, there are a lot of changes happening. They're not going to occur overnight.
Just on the command and control, it's going to take until 1997 to get that in place. You're dealing with the allocation of individuals, the movement of people, the movement of families, the decommissioning of buildings, and the movement of physical structures and equipment. It's not an easy thing to do, but we're going to try to do it as quickly as possible while we have the deadline of 1997.
I think it's a pretty exciting time to come into an organization that has given first-class operational service to the customer, if you want to use it, but requires more sophisticated and more up-to-date management practices. I'll give you an example.
We have like a ``Rolls-Royce'' of an armed forces, with an outstanding commitment of men and women, terrific dedication, a professional service second to none in the world. Like Rolls-Royce a number of years ago, the costs associated with preparedness for that very high quality of operational capability were really getting out of control. We're trying to recast the management and operations so that we can maintain the high level - the Rolls-Royce, if you will - service that Canadians expect of their military, but do it much more cheaply and efficiently.
The Chair: The bells will begin to ring at 5.15 p.m. for a vote at 5.30 p.m., but I think if we govern ourselves accordingly, we can fit in all our questions.
Bearing that in mind, I'll go to Mr. Richardson, then Mr. Frazer, and Mr. Jacob.
Mr. Richardson (Perth - Wellington - Waterloo): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would first like to congratulate the department and the minister for giving us this opportunity to review the outlook document. I've read it and it clearly sets forth more detail, and in some ways is more readable, than some of the other documents I've seen.
I happened to pick up on the answer of the minister to Mrs. Hickey that everything seems to be running smoothly. To me there's one hole, and that is the armoured capability. It may not be needed, but I think when it is needed it's going to be reflected.
I know they've gone for an upgraded Leopard tank. In this world today, if we can pick up submarines at that price, I don't know why in the hell we can't pick up tanks if we let it be known that we're in the market for something. By the time that comes around, that's approximately a 30-year-old tank. The chassis will probably have gone and it will need some new illuminating and sighting, etc. It's like asking for the old APCs to be upgraded.
You have to stick to your budget, but quite frankly at some stage I do believe sincerely that there is probably a buy-out. I think there should be the flexibility to make a buy if it is approximately the price of upgrade, and we should dump the Leopard.
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Gen de Chastelain: We haven't made any final decisions. At the moment a proposed Leopard 1 upgrade is on the books. We are looking at the kinds of opportunities you're talking about. We're discussing them with some of our European colleagues. If there is a good buy to be had in a more modern tank, certainly we'll consider it.
Mr. Richardson: I thank the chief for that. I know he's a bright man and I'm glad he had that in his hip pocket. I just want to assure you that we certainly support that approach.
I want to follow up on one other thing that flows directly from the meeting with the Atlantic group yesterday and the upcoming composition of the group we may be called upon to produce. If it did require armour, I didn't think we had armour that was capable, at the moment, to fill that role. That's what forced the posing of that question.
I'm not sure if you want to share that, because it's not part of the outlook document, so I won't ask that of the minister at this time. I'll take a pass on the next question.
Mr. Frazer: I have a brief question, but I want to mention to the minister that he's commended the special joint committee for our report a number of times and we thank him for that. But I would like to point out to him that he overshot the mark on the cuts to the personnel. Whereas we had said 66,700 was a minimum, he cut to 60,000. And he undershot the mark in our recommendation on the reduction of headquarters personnel.
I happen to know from personal experience the chief of the defence staff's penchant for meticulous planning, and I'm wondering whether you, the minister, will receive a plan for the reduction of headquarters personnel so that the progress of that plan can be measured against the actual performance going on.
Mr. Collenette: Mr. Frazer, there will be a measure of the performance in that reduction. When we come back in the fall or whenever the next time is we are called, we'll give you continual updates. The fact is that the Minister of Finance extracted a certain reduction in money and we agreed on how to achieve that reduction, so we can't miss our targets.
Mr. Frazer: I understand that, Mr. Minister. But I would prefer to see a plan presented that says in 1996 we're going to be at this many senior staff, in 1997 we're going to achieve this, in 1998 this is where we'll be and this is how we will have done it. So a normal individual can look at it and see that we're a little behind here, we're moving ahead there, or we're accomplishing the aim.
Mr. Collenette: I have no problem in trying to make that information available to you and helping you through the reductions. It's a good question. I've mentioned before that the number of general officers is reducing, the number of colonels and lieutenant-colonels. We're not just going to end up with senior personnel as we're going to 60,000.
I know you're disappointed about a couple of the recommendations of the committee not being accepted, but it was rather unique that the government accepted almost everything that a committee put forward as part of a policy.
I would have preferred to keep the number higher than 60,000, frankly, and meet your target. But the fact is, the financial situation of the government is such that we couldn't do that. To try to keep the equipment up to date and other requirements to maintain this Rolls-Royce or Cadillac in terms of service, we had to go down to the target of 60,000 people. If there can be more savings in personnel and dollars by delayering, in terms of the number at headquarters, we'll look at that.
I think people have to understand that this is a massive institution. I think it's the largest institution in the country. It's larger than Hydro-Québec, Ontario Hydro; it's a massive operation. The number of radical changes and financial reductions that have been required to be digested by National Defence since 1989 is phenomenal. I think it's a testimony to the professionalism of the people, both in the civil service and in uniform, that they have done this and maintained their operational effectiveness. There's only so much change you can put into place.
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Quite frankly, the problem we have in a democracy is that the priorities of governments have changed. That's the reason why in some parts of the country we're opening buildings that have just been constructed that we have no use for - long-range planning hasn't been done. We're trying to get a handle on this so that whoever is the government in years to come will try to follow this long-range plan so we don't have redundancies of personnel and redundant infrastructure wasting taxpayers' money...and equipment too.
Mr. Frazer: I guess my concern is that with the commitments that seem to have been given to the armed forces, I'm uncomfortable with the number of 60,000. I'm not sure it's adequate. I'm concerned that we are already putting substantial stress on our personnel by virtue of recurring commitments or deployments at short intervals. I would hate to see us take even more advantage of our personnel than we are at the moment.
With regard to the planned reduction, I would very much appreciate being able to see a plan of how the reduction is going to be achieved -
Mr. Collenette: Sure.
Mr. Frazer: - along with timeframes and so on, so that we can take some measurement as to whether more attention is to be paid here, there, or wherever.
Mr. Collenette: We can arrange to have that available probably in the fall, or the next year's document. There's no problem in sharing that information with the members of the committee and getting their advice.
On the question of the short time between engagements, the whole reason we have agreed to put additional personnel at the sharp end of the army - and that was one of the recommendations of the committee; I think you advocated 3,500 rather than 3,000 -
Mr. Frazer: Yes, we did.
Mr. Collenette: - was that we wanted to address this concern about too many deployments in too short a period of time.
Restructuring the parachute capability by taking the three companies and putting them back with their infantry units and making them part of new light battalions will help, because those companies will be a nucleus of these new light battalions that can give respite to those who have been over-tasked in the last few years for peacekeeping operations.
Mr. Frazer: My concern is that I don't really subscribe to your current allocation of an eighteen-month turnaround. I think it should be two years. Accepting that it takes six months to prepare a six-month tour, six months to perhaps spend time in career courses, and then six months to prepare to go back again, I think it would be a far better rotation than the eighteen months currently there. I understand this may be driven by sheer requirements of numbers, but I think the aim should be to establish a longer term between deployments to operational activity.
Mr. Collenette: In 1997, I believe, we'll have the 3,000 in the sharp end. This combined with the parachute companies will mean we'll probably be close to the two-year mark by 1997. So that will satisfy the concerns of people like yourself - and we have them, too, in the government - that we are over-tasking individuals.
This is something that is positive. A consensus has emerged from this committee. The government accepted that as part of the white paper. We're implementing it. The problem that has been identified is being resolved.
Mr. Frazer: In my last point, I go back to submarines. Perhaps you can or can't discuss this. Of course, the rumours are around that you are.... I understand the deal is not a fait accompli yet, but is there some truth or substantiation to the rumours that there are negotiations on offsets for war reparations or whatever you want to call it, along with use of facilities in Canada and this type of thing, to make the deal more beneficial?
Mr. Collenette: I don't think I should talk publicly about discussions that really aren't formal negotiations. The government has not decided, in principle, to acquire these four submarines.
Mr. Frazer: I understand that.
Mr. Collenette: They basically said to me, Collenette, we understand the requirement for these submarines. We think you can make a case for it, but can you make a financial case for it, given the other priorities in the defence budget and government finances? That's what I have to assure my colleagues of.
I think we will be able to have my colleagues consider an arrangement that will be financially innovative and deal with cashflow problems on the part of the government. But that doesn't mean we're going to accept the deal or agree to a deal.
Mr. Frazer. I understand that. Thank you for a very political answer, Mr. Minister.
The Chair: Mr. Jacob.
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[Translation]
Mr. Jacob: There have been questions raised about management and the Minister was saying that because it is a huge machine, it takes time to achieve concrete results.
I looked at the 1988 Auditor General's Report where he refers to certain management problems, particularly with capital programs, and I note that he made similar comments in 1992 about capital programs and various personnel and infrastructure management programs. Those criticisms were repeated in 1994. The Auditor General in fact mentioned that it would be possible to save close to $100 million if the Department of National Defence were to improve its management of infrastructure, military housing and other similar items.
In your outlook document, you state that you intend to use more modern management systems, borrowed from the private sector. Just out of curiosity, I had a look at the 1992 and 1993 budget papers to see whether the Department of National Defence was making similar comments back then, and I saw that it had indeed stated it would be using new methods with a view to improving its management practices. Those comments were there in the 1994 Budget, and here again in 1995.
I realize that because we're talking about a huge machine, it can be difficult to make changes, but I would appreciate your giving us some specific examples of changes that have actually been made to management procedures. For instance, as far as housing, moves by military personnel or the big decrease in capital program monitoring, I would like the Department to be in a position to prove that it has saved $30 million here, another $20 million there, and so forth.
In your outlook document, there seems to be a lot of wishful thinking, but very few hard facts. I'm sort of using the same approach here as Jack Fraser, who was asking that a program be put in place to reduce the size of headquarters. According to what I've read, the Department has been planning since 1991 to reduce the size of defence headquarters, and particularly national headquarters here in Ottawa, and also to bring down the number of senior and ordinary officers. These same comments are made in 1994 and 1995.
The Special Joint Committee to review Canada's defence policy recommended reducing the number of officers by 25% or 30%, but we have yet to see any concrete results there. So, in the fall, I would like someone to be able to tell me that the number of generals in 1992 was x, the number in the fall of 1995 is y, and the number of lieutenant-colonels, z.
In terms of new management procedures, I would also like to be told that they are also being applied in relation to computer systems, capital programs, personnel management, staff movement, and that all of this has made it possible to save x millions of dollars.
This is what I would call a good example of redundancy. I've looked through parts of the budget's tabled over the past four years. Whether they involved the period before or after your appointment, Minister, I note that they all express the same wishful thinking without providing many concrete results. When cuts are made, they tend to be made at the grassroots level, or in areas where they may not be fully justified.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[English]
Mr. Collenette: Mr. Jacob, I should tell you that a lot of what you said is music to my ears. We're on the same wavelength. I think what we should do is take you aside for a day and tell you all the changes we've been making, all the improvements we've been making.
You may have gone back to 1992-93. I wasn't the Minister of National Defence then. The Liberal Party was not in government. I will not answer for any of the management practices that predated our government. We are making changes, and I'll give you lots of examples. In fact, in the last few years the number of generals has been reduced by 25%. I think the number of colonels has been reduced by 20%. So we are reducing.... Is it 20%?
Gen de Chastelain: For colonels, 15%.
Mr. Collenette: So we have a way to go with colonels.
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In terms of computers, I am quite concerned that the department has a number of information technology centres and not all of them communicate with each other in a good management way. Take, for example, the new supply system upgrade for the new supply depot extensions in Montreal and in Edmonton. As the officials know, I went back meeting after meeting and said I've been through these kinds of contracts in private business - who is regulating it, who is making sure the money is well spent?
What we've done for the first time, on the contract that was awarded to Systemhouse of Ottawa for the supply systems upgrade, is to retain a third party to monitor the actual application of the systems development. We're talking about $275 million. That's a hell of a lot of money and I want to make sure that we, the client, are not absorbing, in the front end, development costs that should really be part of the obligation of the contractor. I'm not so sure this has been done in the past in government, not just in defence. We're moving toward this.
We have a system on the reserve pay system - I forget the name of it - where instead of allotting $71 million, which again is a hell of a lot for a computer contract, we are doing it in phases and we're making the contractor meet certain performance requirements. It's called -
Mr. McLure: RIIP.
Mr. Collenette: RIIP is not a good analogy to use, because we're not sure who's ripping off whom. But can you give me the correct name rather than RIIP?
Mr. McLure: It's the Reserve Integrated Information Project.
Mr. Collenette: Right. What we're doing with this is.... I think the company Arthur Andersen is involved in this, aren't they? We're saying, all right, you have a $7 million contract here. You come back to the next tranche of $14 million, but you have to show us what you've done and how you've met the performance on that particular contract.
We can take you through these things, Mr. Jacob, in briefings. The department can do it. I have no problem with that, because these are management techniques that are being applied. As long as it's not confidential information that we would be untoward in giving to you, I think we should try to convince you that we are bringing new management practices and new accounting practices into play to get better value for the taxpayer's dollar.
The Chair: I might take you up on that, Minister. It might be interesting for those members of the committee who want to, to engage in those briefings if we could set them up between your office and the clerk. Whichever members wanted to participate, could. I think there would be widespread interest in this apart from Mr. Jacob.
Mr. Collenette: There's always this impression, Mr. Chairman, that the Department of National Defence has something to hide in its management. We have nothing to hide. In fact, we have a lot to be proud of and we would like to share it with members of the committee. But we don't always have the time to do it and this really isn't the place to do it. Whereas if you come over for policy briefings, or the opposition comes over for policy briefings on Bosnia or whatever, we can give you technical briefings on management, as long as it doesn't betray any confidences or commercial arrangements or other prerequisites of the government's policy-making ability.
The Chair: If you're agreeable, we would attempt to set up such briefings between your office and our clerk.
Mr. McLure: Mr. Chairman, we have some examples where we could, even in this area, have members visit actual facilities where over the last eighteen months we've made enormous gains. The kinds of things the member was referring to, we can actually take them to the ground, explain to them what was there before, how much it would cost to operate, and review what is there now and see the productivity gains and the technology leap that was made.
Mr. Collenette: You can go to a base like CFB Borden, north of Toronto, where it was a pilot program. The base commander, who has just retired, was ecstatic in our freeing up the normal bureaucratic control and giving him a global budget, allowing him to manage it and apply savings, on his initiative, to other expenditures he wanted to make within the base. When I visited that base, not only the people in uniform were enthused about that kind of delegation and use of new management techniques, but the unions were. The civilian unions sat around and said it was the best thing to have happened to this particular base.
So we're making these improvements right across the country and we'd like to share this with you.
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The Chair: We will ask the clerk if she will work with a designated hitter from your office, Minister, and we'll attempt to set up such a series of briefings.
The clerk tells me that the vote has been delayed until 6:45 p.m. The bells will now ring at 6:30 p.m. We now have a little more time than we thought. I don't know what your time constraints are, Minister.
Mr. Collenette: You know I am very busy.
The Chair: John.
Mr. Richardson: I think that was a generous offer for some who don't see behind the scenes in the Department of National Defence. From the other side, Canadian forces headquarters, it would be nice if we could be put into the picture - I know how busy the minister is; I see him at work every day - to brief us on an operation before it hits. All these questions come to us in the House from other members. If we can be brought abreast of events, maybe just an ops briefing - here is what's going to happen at a certain...and here's what's involved - just a traditional ops briefing that could be presented, I think it would be welcomed. It would certainly make the members of the committee more articulate and better purveyors of what is happening, rather than just taking it from a note paper.
Mr. Collenette: I thank Mr. Richardson for those comments. I think we have a good story to tell at National Defence. We can't always keep members up to date on breaking issues. Something could happen in Bosnia or Rwanda or Haiti, and it just happens. I had a call at 11:45 p.m. on Christmas Eve about a suicide in Rwanda. These things happen around the clock. People have to understand that the armed forces is a 7-days-a-week, 24-hours-a-day operation. We have, with civilians, about 100,000 people. We have their families. We have communities, because there are military communities. It's almost a society within a society. It has its own unique culture and it is a culture that has served the country extremely well.
We can't always predict what is going to happen, whether it deals with ongoing operations, accidents, search and rescue, natural disasters, personal problems of people involved. It is a microcosm of Canadian society, so you will have death by one's own hand, suicide. You have traffic mishaps. You have social problems. You have all manner of personal disputes that go on. It is a big organization.
We can't always keep members.... We don't know what's going to happen, but I think the key.... I know you're not complaining about it, but I just wanted to use this opportunity to say that what we're trying to do is be as open as possible with people, both myself in the political end and certainly at the Canadian forces end, in briefing people, making them available to give the public the facts and let them judge what has gone on.
Mr. Richardson: I didn't want you to think we're trying to micro-manage. It's just something that may involve a major projection offshore, outside the country. When we're sitting in the lobbies or we are interacting with opposition members, they would be great people out there to project and clarify, because there's nothing like an example of a chart. A briefing could be very short. You're so busy; you're explaining it in the House. I certainly don't want to start getting the messages about suicides and other kinds of problems that are human and domestic in nature.
Mr. Collenette: Except that, as has been alleged, they are linked to some kind of military preparedness. We are very sensitive to that and we want to get the information out to assure people of the truth underlying a certain set of circumstances, such as the case of suicide.
The Chair: Before the committee dwindles away completely, I'd better draw the meeting to a close, Minister.
Mr. Collenette: I don't know, Mr. Chairman, whether it's an indication that we have mollified the opposition that they have left before the conclusion of the meeting.
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The Chair: You have just worn them down.
Mr. Collenette: This is perhaps the best sign of National Defence.
The Chair: And these are the best troops we have. We threw the best we had at you and look at what you did. You are the sole occupier of the field.
Let me thank you and your people for being with us and just say two things to you in conclusion.
We are looking forward to getting the report on the reserves and dealing with that in the fall, because that's an area of our report that we really didn't feel we went into sufficiently. We are looking forward to examining the reserves in more depth when we get the order of reference.
The other thing is that although we don't have answers around the table, we at least think we know what questions to ask now. So when you are ready with your decisions on capital acquisitions, the committee would be more than happy and prepared to get involved in a role of scrutiny and monitoring and examination. That was part of our report too. We wanted to have an ongoing parliamentary involvement, and I think we have the people who can make useful contributions to that, as they have to overall policy.
Having said that, thank you for being with us. The meeting is adjourned.