Chapter 13Rules of Order and Decorum

Rules Regarding the Contents of Speeches

References to Members

During debate, Members do not refer to one another by their names¹⁴⁰ but rather by title, position or constituency in order to guard against the tendency to personalize debate.¹⁴¹ A Minister is referred to by the portfolio he or she holds.¹⁴² The two main party leaders may be referred to as the Right Honourable Prime Minister and the Honourable Leader of the Opposition, and other party leaders are identified as the leaders of their respective parties,¹⁴³ or simply by the name of their constituencies. Former Prime Ministers sitting in the House are also referred to as “Right Honourable”, as are other Members with this designation. Parliamentary Secretaries, House Leaders and party Whips are typically designated by the posts they hold.

The Speaker will not allow a Member to refer to another Member by name even if the Member speaking is quoting from a document such as a newspaper article. As the Chair has noted, a Member “cannot do indirectly what cannot be done directly”.¹⁴⁴

Allusions to the presence or absence of a Member or Minister in the Chamber are unacceptable.¹⁴⁵ Speakers have upheld this prohibition on the ground that “there are many places that Members have to be in order to carry out all of the obligations that go with their office”.¹⁴⁶

Remarks which question a Member’s integrity, honesty or character are not in order.¹⁴⁷ A Member will be requested to withdraw offensive remarks, allegations, or accusations of impropriety directed towards another Member.¹⁴⁸ The Speaker has no authority to rule on statements made outside the House by one Member against another.¹⁴⁹

Reflections on the House or the Senate

Although the Chair has been known to show considerable leeway at times in recent years, it is generally understood that disrespectful reflections on Parliament as a whole, or on the House or the Senate individually, are not permitted.¹⁵⁰ Members of the House and the Senate are also protected by this rule. In debate, the Senate is generally referred to as “the other place” and Senators as “members of the other place”.¹⁵¹ References to Senate debates and proceedings are discouraged¹⁵² and it is out of order to question a Senator’s integrity, honesty or character.¹⁵³ This “prevents fruitless arguments between Members of two distinct bodies who are unable to reply to each other and guards against recrimination and offensive language in the absence of the other party”.¹⁵⁴

Reflections on the Chair

Reflections must not be cast in debate on the conduct of the Speaker or other Presiding Officers.¹⁵⁵ It is unacceptable to question the integrity and impartiality of a Presiding Officer and, if such comments are made, the Speaker may interrupt the Member and request that the remarks be withdrawn or immediately give the floor to another Member.¹⁵⁶ Only by means of a substantive motion, for which 48 hours’ written notice has been given, may the actions of the Chair be challenged, criticized and debated.¹⁵⁷ Reflections on the character or actions of the Speaker or other Presiding Officers have been ruled to be breaches of privilege.¹⁵⁸

References to the Sovereign, Royal Family, Governor General and Members of the Judiciary

Members are prohibited from speaking disrespectfully of the Sovereign, the Royal Family, the Governor General or the Administrator of the Government of Canada (in the absence of the Governor General).¹⁵⁹ In the same way, any reference to these persons which appears intended to influence the work of the House is also prohibited.¹⁶⁰

Attacks against and censures of judges and courts by Members in debate have always been considered unparliamentary and consequently treated as breaches of order.¹⁶¹ As Acting Speaker McClelland explained to the House, “This is a longstanding tradition in our Parliament that we be cautious when we attack individuals or groups, particularly in the judiciary, and those who are unable to come in here and have the same right of free expression as we enjoy with impunity here”.¹⁶² While it is permissible to speak in general terms about the judiciary or to criticize a law, it is inappropriate to criticize or impute motives directed to a specific judge or to criticize a decision made under the law by a judge.¹⁶³

Reference by Name to Members of the Public

Members are discouraged from referring by name to persons who are not Members of Parliament and who do not enjoy parliamentary immunity, except in extraordinary circumstances when the national interest calls for this.¹⁶⁴ The Speaker has ruled that Members have a responsibility to protect the innocent not only from outright slander, but from any slur directly or indirectly implied, and has suggested that Members avoid as much as possible mentioning by name people from outside the House who are unable to reply in their own defence.¹⁶⁵

Reference to Previous Debates and Proceedings

In the past, references to prior debates of the current session were generally discouraged in order to conserve the time of the House and to prevent Members from reviving debates that had concluded, unless the remarks were relevant to the matter under discussion.¹⁶⁶ Today, the Speaker’s attention is rarely, if ever, drawn to breaches of this rule. Generally, Members should not quote from their former speeches or from the speeches of their colleagues made during the current session;¹⁶⁷ the rule does not apply to speeches on different stages of a bill.¹⁶⁸ Direct reference is permitted, however, when a Member wishes to complain of something said or to clear up a misrepresentation or make a personal explanation.¹⁶⁹

Members may not speak against or reflect upon any decision of the House.¹⁷⁰ This stems from the well-established rule which holds that a question, once put and carried in the affirmative or negative, cannot be questioned again. Such reflections are not in order because the Member is bound by a vote agreed to by a majority.¹⁷¹ The Chair has been quick to call attention to reflections on votes.¹⁷² However, if a Member gives notice of his or her intention to move a motion that a vote be rescinded, the House may reconsider an earlier resolution or order.¹⁷³

Unparliamentary Language

The proceedings of the House are based on a long-standing tradition of respect for the integrity of all Members. Thus, the use of offensive, provocative or threatening language in the House is strictly forbidden. Personal attacks, insults and obscenities are not in order.¹⁷⁴ A direct charge or accusation against a Member may be made only by way of a substantive motion for which notice is required.¹⁷⁵

If language used in debate appears questionable to the Speaker, he or she will intervene. Nonetheless, any Member who feels aggrieved by a remark or allegation may also bring the matter to the immediate attention of the Speaker on a point of order. Points of order may not be raised during Members’ Statements or Question Period;¹⁷⁶ however, the Speaker may address a matter of unparliamentary language at once if he or she believes the matter to be sufficiently serious to merit immediate attention.¹⁷⁷ Normally, points of order arising from language used during Members’ Statements or Question Period are dealt with at the conclusion of Question Period.¹⁷⁸ Since the Speaker must rule on the basis of the context in which the language was used, points of order raised in regard to questionable language must be raised as soon as possible after the alleged irregularity has occurred.¹⁷⁹

If the Speaker did not hear the word or words in question, or if there is a dispute as to what words were actually used, the Chair may set the matter aside pending a review of the record, and if necessary, return to the House at a later time with a ruling.¹⁸⁰ The Speaker has also ruled that if the Chair did not hear the offensive word or phrase and if the offensive language was not recorded in the Debates, the Chair cannot be expected to rule in the absence of a reliable record.¹⁸¹

In dealing with unparliamentary language, the Speaker takes into account the tone, manner and intention of the Member speaking, the person to whom the words at issue were directed, the degree of provocation, and most important, whether or not the remarks created disorder in the Chamber.¹⁸² Thus, language deemed unparliamentary one day may not necessarily be deemed unparliamentary on another day. The codification of unparliamentary language has proven impractical as it is the context in which words or phrases are used that the Chair must consider when deciding whether or not they should be withdrawn.¹⁸³ Although an expression may be found to be acceptable, the Speaker has cautioned that any language which leads to disorder in the House should not be used. Expressions which are considered unparliamentary when applied to an individual Member have not always been considered so when applied “in a generic sense” or to a party.¹⁸⁴

Should the Speaker find the utterances of a particular Member offensive or disorderly, that Member will be requested to rise in his or her place and withdraw the unparliamentary word or phrase unequivocally. The Member’s apology is accepted in good faith and the matter is then considered closed.¹⁸⁵ However, if the Member refuses to obey the directive of the Speaker to retract his or her words, the Chair may refuse to recognize the Member until the words have been withdrawn,¹⁸⁶ or may “name” the Member for disregarding the authority of the Chair and order the Member to withdraw from the Chamber for the remainder of the sitting.¹⁸⁷

Repetition and Relevance in Debate

The rules of relevance and repetition¹⁸⁸ are intertwined and mutually reinforcing. The requirement that speeches remain relevant to the question before the House flows from the latter’s right to reach decisions without undue obstruction and to exclude from debate any discussion not conducive to that end. The rule against repetition helps to ensure the expeditious conduct of debate by prohibiting the repetition of arguments already made. To neglect either rule would seriously impair the ability of the House to manage its time efficiently.

Notwithstanding their importance, these rules remain difficult to define and enforce not least because such enforcement must respect the freedom of speech enjoyed by all Members. The rule against repetition can be invoked by the Speaker to prevent the repetition of arguments already made during the debate by any Member.¹⁸⁹ The rule of relevance enables the Chair to counter any tendency to stray from the question before the House or committee. It is not always possible to judge the relevance (or the repetitiveness) of a Member’s remarks until he or she has spoken at some length or even completed his or her remarks.¹⁹⁰ The Speaker must exercise his or her discretion: if the rules are applied too strictly, they have the potential for severely curtailing debate; if they are neglected, the resultant loss of debating time may prevent other Members from participating in debate. Particular circumstances, the mood of the House and the relative importance of the matter under debate will influence the rigidity with which the Speaker interprets these rules.

When enforcing the rules against irrelevance and repetition, the Speaker can call a Member to order, and if necessary, warn the Member that he or she risks being directed to discontinue his or her speech. Such warnings are usually sufficient. However, should the Member persist, the Speaker can proceed to recognize another Member, or if no other Member wishes to speak, put the question.¹⁹¹ In the event that the Member continues to disregard the Speaker’s instruction or direction, the Speaker has the authority to “name” that Member.

Historical Perspective

It is not certain when the British House of Commons originally adopted the practice of restraining repetitive or irrelevant debate; however, it seems to have been well established by the end of the 16th century. A manual of procedure dating from the era of the Elizabethan Parliaments listed among the powers of the Speaker the right to call a Member to order when “any speak to a Bil[sic] and be out of the matter”.¹⁹² During the same period, Speaker Popham, upon his election to the Chair in 1580, requested that Members “speak to the matter … and not to spend too much time in unnecessary motions or superfluous argument”.¹⁹³ The Journals for 1604 suggest that the rule of relevance was adopted in that year as an order of the House and one authority has cited it in this form: “That if any man speak impertinently, or beside the question in hand, it stands with the orders of the House for the Speaker to interrupt him, and to know the pleasure of the House, whether they will further hear him”.¹⁹⁴ In addition to this rule, the House soon thereafter adopted another prohibiting repetition.¹⁹⁵ Both rules proved difficult to enforce, particularly that on relevance which obliged the Speaker to obtain the support of the House in order to direct a Member to keep to the subject of debate. During the 18th century, interventions by Speakers were so rare that Members sometimes resented interruptions when they did take place.¹⁹⁶

When in 1867 the Canadian House of Commons adopted its rules, no reference was made to repetition in debate and the rule on relevance was mentioned only in the context of a general order which enjoined Members not to “speak beside the question in debate”.¹⁹⁷ Beyond advising the Member to speak to the subject, the Speaker depended almost entirely upon the support of the House and the goodwill of the Members to enforce the rule.

In a revision of the rules in 1910, the power of the Speaker was augmented. The Chair was empowered to direct a Member to discontinue his or her speech if the Chair deemed it either irrelevant or repetitious after having called the attention of the House to the matter.¹⁹⁸ In moving the adoption of this rule, Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier observed that it was “the English rule copied word for word”.¹⁹⁹ This was equally true of the rule which dealt with relevance in a Committee of the Whole and which was adopted at the same time: “Speeches in Committee of the Whole must be strictly relevant to the item or clause under consideration”.²⁰⁰

When the rules were again revised in 1927, the powers of the Speaker were further enhanced to permit effective action in the event of refusals to accept direction from the Chair. A special committee on procedure recommended that the Speaker be authorized to “name” a recalcitrant Member or, if the incident took place in committee, that the Chairman be authorized to report the Member to the House. The recommendation was accepted by the House without amendment or debate and the powers of the Chair in this regard remain unchanged.²⁰¹

Repetition

Repetition is prohibited in order to safeguard the right of the House to arrive at a decision and to make efficient use of its time. Although the principle is clear and sensible, it has not always been easy to apply²⁰² and the Speaker enjoys considerable discretion in this regard. The Chair can curtail prolonged debate by limiting Members’ speeches to points which have not already been made.²⁰³ The freedom of debate enjoyed by Members does not extend to the repetition of arguments that have already been heard.²⁰⁴ In the context of the legislative process, this restriction applies to Members’ remarks only within the same stage of debate on a bill. Arguments advanced at one stage may also legitimately be represented at another.

Finally, the rule against repetition has been used by Speakers in various other ways to assist the House in making efficient use of its time. Speakers have ruled against the tedious reading of letters even when they were used in support of an argument,²⁰⁵ the asking of a question during Question Period which was similar to another already asked that day,²⁰⁶ and the repeating of questions of privilege on the same subject matter.²⁰⁷

The Rule of Relevance

Although the House now has rules to limit the length of speeches, at one time there were few limits and debate often strayed beyond the subject in question. In 1882, J.G. Bourinot, then Clerk of the House, felt the need to add this comment to his overview of parliamentary practice:

A just regard to the privileges and dignity of Parliament demands that its time should not be wasted in idle and fruitless discussion; and consequently every member, who addresses the house, should endeavour to confine himself as closely as possible to the question under consideration.²⁰⁸

This advice still applies today as the business of government grows ever more complex and the time of the House is limited. It is often sufficient for the Speaker to remind a Member called to order of the proper subject matter of the debate and to indicate the manner in which the Member’s remarks were irrelevant.²⁰⁹ During the questions and comments period following most speeches, for example, a Member must address his or her remarks to the arguments expressed in the speech, or the Chair will invoke the rule of relevance.²¹⁰ In doing so, Speakers tend to be mindful of the need for some leniency.²¹¹ At times they have allowed references to other matters in debate if they were made in passing and were not the principal theme of the speech.²¹²

The rule of relevance applies not only to debate on a main motion but also to any proposed amendments to it.²¹³ Arguments ruled irrelevant during debate on a main motion are similarly irrelevant if introduced as the substance of an amendment. Should an amendment be proposed to a motion, the rule of relevance requires that debate be limited to that amendment until it is disposed of by the House.²¹⁴ Even if an amendment proposes to replace all the words in the main motion after the word “That” and to substitute an alternative proposition, debate is restricted to the main motion and the amendment; further propositions are irrelevant.²¹⁵ Once an amendment is disposed of by the House, it then becomes possible to debate the main motion in its full scope or to consider another amendment.

The previous question is exceptional with respect to the rule of relevance. The motion “That this question be now put” does nothing to hinder debate on the original motion. On the contrary, Members who have already participated in the debate may speak to the motion again after the previous question has been moved.²¹⁶ However, care must be taken to avoid repetition.

Bills

The relevance of debate to a motion before the House applies especially to the consideration of bills as they proceed through the several stages prior to their adoption. According to the practice which developed originally in the British House of Commons, “each stage is regarded as having its own peculiar function and to a certain extent its more or less limited range of debate”.²¹⁷ These functions, in turn, provide both the Speaker and the House with guidelines by which to apply the rule of relevance. Thus, for example, the second reading stage of a bill is limited to debate on its principle, whereas debate at report stage treats only motions offered in amendment to a bill. Despite the several opportunities allowed to the House to discuss a bill, the scope of debate is understood to be different at each stage, although, in recent years, the Chair has been known to show considerable leeway at times.²¹⁸

Second Reading

During debate on second reading, Members have frequently been tempted to delve into the clauses of a bill instead of confining themselves to consideration of the principle of the bill. Such interventions have been found in breach of the rule of relevance. Interruptions by the Speaker were made to discourage Members from discussing specific provisions of the bill rather than its principle.²¹⁹ In one ruling the Speaker stated quite clearly that “on a motion for second reading it is out of order to discuss the clauses of the bill”.²²⁰ When the House is considering an amending bill, the rule requires that debate at second reading be limited to the principle of the amending bill and not to the subject matter of the Act which it proposes to amend.²²¹

Committee Stage

The referral of a bill to a committee opens the way for close examination of its contents clause by clause. Today, most bills are sent to standing committees for study but, in the past, the detailed consideration of bills more often took place in a Committee of the Whole and it was in this larger forum that the practice governing the scrutiny of bills developed. Pursuant to the Standing Orders, speeches made in a Committee of the Whole must be strictly relevant to the item or clause under consideration.²²² Chairs have frequently cited this rule and called upon Members to observe it.²²³ The same practice applies in standing, special or legislative committees considering bills.

An important exception to the rule of relevance in committee is found in the wide-ranging debate permitted on Clause 1, or the clause following the short title. Although there is no explicit provision for this in the Standing Orders, this has been an accepted practice since at least the 1930s.²²⁴ Over the years, repetition of second reading debate and the anticipation of clause-by-clause debate were gradually excluded from the general debate on Clause 1,²²⁵ which is now limited to the contents of the bill.²²⁶ In the event that an amendment is proposed to Clause 1, discussion is confined to the amendment until it has been disposed of.²²⁷

Report Stage

According to Beauchesne, the report stage of a bill “is one of reconsideration of events which have taken place in committee. The consideration of a bill is now a more formal repetition of the committee stage with the applicable rules of debate which are proper when the Speaker is in the chair”.²²⁸ Report stage motions are amendments to clauses in a bill which seek to change, delete or restore those clauses. To avoid excessive repetition of debate, the Speaker invariably exercises the power to select and to combine motions in amendment.²²⁹ The Speaker can also constrain debate through the use of the relevance rule as applied to debate on clauses of a bill. Despite the similarities between debate at report stage and that at committee stage, there is no allowance for a wide-ranging discussion of a bill as occurs in committee during the study of Clause 1. Indeed, once the Order of the Day for the consideration of a bill at report stage is called, discussion is limited to “any amendment of which notice has been given”.²³⁰

Third Reading

Debate at third reading is intended to permit the House to review the legislative measure in its final form and is therefore strictly limited to the contents of the bill.²³¹ If an amendment is moved, debate must be relevant to that amendment until the House disposes of it.²³²

Debates on the Address in Reply to the Speech from the Throne and the Budget

The traditions and practices of the House allow for the rule of relevance to be relaxed during debate on the motion for an Address in Reply to the Speech from the Throne. During the days allotted to the debate on this motion, Private Members have the opportunity “to bring forward topics of their own choosing”.²³³ Consequently, debate tends to be very wide-ranging and the Speaker usually makes no effort to apply the rule of relevance. This is not the case, however, when the House is debating the Budget. The remarks of Members must be relevant to the motion before the House. All the same, the terms of the motion (i.e., that this House approve in general the budgetary policy of the government) are sufficiently broad to permit Members great latitude in their remarks without violating the principle of the rule.²³⁴

The Sub judice Convention

The sub judice convention is first and foremost a voluntary exercise of restraint on the part of the House in which restrictions are placed on the freedom of Members to make reference in debate to matters which are sub judice, that is, awaiting judicial decisions. It is also understood that matters before the courts are also prohibited as subjects of motions, petitions or questions in the House. This restriction exists in order to protect an accused person or other party to a court action or judicial inquiry from any prejudicial effect of public discussion of the issue.²³⁵ The convention recognizes the courts, as opposed to the House, as the proper forum in which to decide individual cases. As Speaker Fraser noted, the convention maintains a “separation and mutual respect between legislative and judicial branches of government”.²³⁶ Thus, the constitutional independence of the judiciary is recognized. The interpretation of this convention is left to the Speaker since no rule exists to prevent Parliament from discussing a matter which is sub judice.²³⁷ While precedents exist to guide the Chair, no attempt has ever been made to codify the practice.²³⁸ However, as Speaker Sauvé explained, the sub judice convention has never stood in the way of the House considering a prima facie matter of privilege vital to the public interest or to the effective operation of the House and its Members.²³⁹

There are some situations in which the application of the sub judice convention is fairly straightforward. The convention has been applied consistently to motions, references in debates, questions and supplementary questions and in all matters relating to criminal cases.²⁴⁰

The convention does not apply to legislation or to the legislative process as the right of Parliament to legislate may not be limited.²⁴¹ If the sub judice convention were to apply to bills, the whole legislative process could be stopped simply by the initiation of legal proceedings in any court in Canada.

Criminal and Civil Cases

No distinction has ever been made in Canada between criminal courts and civil courts for the purpose of applying the sub judice convention. It has also been applied with respect to certain tribunals other than courts of law. The convention exists to guarantee everyone a fair trial and to prevent any undue influence prejudicing a judicial decision or report of a tribunal of inquiry. In the view of the Special Committee on the Rights and Immunities of Members, “prejudice is most likely to occur in respect of criminal cases and civil cases of defamation where juries are involved”.²⁴²

Where criminal cases are concerned, precedents bar reference to such matters before judgment has been rendered and during any appeal. Members are expected to refrain from discussing matters that are before a criminal court not only in order to protect those persons who are undergoing trial and stand to be affected whatever its outcome, but also because the trial could be affected by debate in the House.²⁴³ It has been established that the convention ceases to apply, as far as criminal cases are concerned, when judgment has been rendered.²⁴⁴ The Speaker has confirmed that a matter becomes sub judice again if an appeal is entered following a judgment.²⁴⁵

The precedents are not as consistent where civil cases are concerned. The convention has been applied on some occasions²⁴⁶ and not on others.²⁴⁷ However, in 1976, the Speaker ruled that no restriction ought to exist on the right of any Member to put questions respecting any matter before the courts, particularly those relating to a civil matter, unless and until that matter is at least at trial.²⁴⁸ Although nothing resembling a settled practice has developed in relation to civil cases, the Chair has warned on various occasions of the need for caution in referring to matters pending judicial decisions whatever the nature of the court.²⁴⁹

Courts of Record and Commissions of Inquiry

From the precedents, it is clear that the application of the convention is limited to tribunals designated by statute as courts of record.²⁵⁰ A “court of record” is defined as follows: “1. A court that is required to keep a record of its proceedings. The court’s records are presumed accurate and cannot be collaterally impeached [and] … 2. A court that may fine and imprison people for contempt”.²⁵¹ The sub judice convention does not apply, however, to matters referred to royal commissions or other commissions of inquiry, although the Chair has cautioned against making reference to the proceedings, evidence, or findings of a royal commission before it has made its report.²⁵²

Role of the Speaker

Since the sub judice convention is not codified and is voluntary, the jurisdiction of the Speaker in such matters is somewhat difficult to outline. The Speaker’s discretionary authority over matters sub judice derives from his or her role as guardian of free speech in the House. The Chair has the duty to balance the rights of the House with the rights and interests of the ordinary citizen undergoing trial. Indeed, the Speaker intervenes in exceptional cases only when it appears likely that to do otherwise would be harmful to specific individuals. The problem facing a Speaker is that determining when a comment will have a tendency to influence is speculative—it cannot be done until after the remarks have been made.

In its 1977 inquiry, the Special Committee on the Rights and Immunities of Members recommended that, when there is doubt in the mind of the Chair, a presumption should exist in favour of allowing debate and against the application of the convention.²⁵³ The Committee concluded that, while there can be no substitute for the discretion of the Chair, all Members of the House should share in the responsibility of exercising restraint when it seems called for.²⁵⁴ A Member who feels that there could be a risk of causing prejudice in referring to a particular case or inquiry should refrain from raising the matter. Furthermore, a Member who calls for the suppression of discussion of a matter on grounds of sub judice should be obliged to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Chair that he or she has reasonable grounds for fearing that prejudice might result.²⁵⁵

It was the view of the Committee that the responsibility of the Chair, particularly during Question Period, should be minimal in regard to the sub judice convention, and that the responsibility should principally rest upon the Member who asks the question and the Minister to whom it is addressed. Should a question to a Minister touch upon a matter sub judice, it is likely that the Minister involved would have more information covering the matter than the Speaker, and the Minister might be better able to judge whether answering the question might cause prejudice. In such a situation, the Minister could refuse to answer the question on those grounds, bearing in mind that refusal to answer a question is his or her prerogative. From the precedents, this appears to be the approach the Chair has taken.²⁵⁶ The Speaker has interrupted Members only if he or she has felt the sub judice convention was being breached.²⁵⁷

Personal Explanations

The Chair may occasionally grant leave to a Member to explain a matter of a personal nature although there is no question before the House. This is commonly referred to by Members as “a point of personal privilege” and is an indulgence granted by the Chair. This is entirely distinct from a question of privilege and, as one Speaker noted, “There is no legal authority, procedural or otherwise, historic or precedential, that allows this”.²⁵⁸ Consequently, such occasions are not meant to be used for general debate and Members have been cautioned to confine their remarks to the point they wish to make.²⁵⁹ When granted, they have generally been used by Members to announce a resignation,²⁶⁰ or to explain changes in party affiliation, matters affecting them which have occurred outside the Chamber, or misinterpreted statements.²⁶¹

140.: There appears, however, to be no procedural impediment to Members referring to themselves by name. See, for example, Debates, October 23, 2006,pp. 4131–2.
141.: Beauchesne, Rules and Forms of the House of Commons of Canada, 4th ed., p. 126. See, for example, Debates, April 2, 1998,p. 5685; February 26, 2007,p. 7310; February 29, 2012,pp. 5628–9.
142.: Beauchesne, Rules and Forms of the House of Commons of Canada, 4th ed., p. 126. See, for example, Debates, October 6, 1997,p. 530; September 16, 2003,pp. 7446–7; June 5, 2015,p. 14659.
143.: Beauchesne, Rules and Forms of the House of Commons of Canada, 4th ed., p. 126.
144.: Debates, November 29, 1985, p. 8991. See, for example, Debates, October 26, 1990, pp. 14767–8; March 17, 1998,p. 4960; March 1, 1999,p. 12262; October 19, 2006,p. 3980; June 17, 2013,p. 18459.
145.: See, for example, Debates, December 5, 1995,pp. 17207–8; February 6, 1998,p. 3479; May 5, 1999,p. 14715; November 8, 2006,pp. 4904–5; February 27, 2012,p. 5529.
146.: Debates, April 3, 1987, p. 4875. Speakers have, however, declined to extend the prohibition to references to the absence of Members from committee meetings. See, for example, Debates, February 7, 2003,p. 3308; November 18, 2011,pp. 3275–6.
147.: Standing Order18. See, for example, Debates, September 29, 2003,p. 7942; October 31, 2005,p. 9255; May 4, 2006,p. 958; December 14, 2010,pp. 7251–2.
148.: Bourinot, Parliamentary Procedure and Practice, 4th ed., p. 361; Beauchesne, Rules and Forms of the House of Commons of Canada, 4th ed., p. 115. See, for example, Debates, October 6, 1998,p. 8832; April 6, 2005,p. 4750; April 25, 2006,p. 521; May 11, 2006,p. 1260; June 2, 2014,p. 6038. The use of unparliamentary language is discussed in detail later in the chapter.
149.: See, for example, Debates, February 11, 1993, pp. 15792–3; January 29, 2002,pp. 8444–5; February 9, 2012,p. 5096.
150.: Standing Order18. See also Bourinot, Parliamentary Procedure and Practice, 4th ed., pp. 360–1. See, for example, Debates, June 13, 1995,pp. 13734–5; September 24, 1998,p. 8354; February 5, 1999,pp. 11515–6; June 22, 2005,p. 7622; December 8, 2011,p. 4183.
151.: See, for example, Debates, January 21, 1994,p. 170; June 8, 1994,pp. 5015–7; May 16, 2000,p. 6886; June 13, 2013,pp. 18342–3.
152.: Bourinot, Parliamentary Procedure and Practice, 4th ed., p. 357. See, for example, Debates, December 5, 1985, pp. 9204–5. It is acceptable to refer to the official printed records of the Senate even though they may not have been formally asked for and communicated to the House.
153.: See, for example, Debates, March 12, 1993, p. 16913; June 23, 2005,p. 7696; May 16, 2007,p. 9563; June 5, 2013,p. 17736.
154.: Thomas Erskine May, Erskine May’s Treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of Parliament, 22nd ed., ed. Sir Donald Limon and W. R. McKay (London: Butterworths, 1997), p. 381.
155.: Beauchesne, Beauchesne’s Rules & Forms of the House of Commons of Canada, 6th ed., p. 49.
156.: See, for example, Debates, January 17, 1991, pp. 17294–5, 17304–5; May 25, 1993, p. 19709; May 17, 2006,p. 1544; June 5, 2013,p. 17736; September 23, 2014,p. 7719.
157.: See, for example, Debates, June 1, 1956, pp. 4537–9; Journals, June 4, 1956, pp. 692–3; June 8, 1956, pp. 725–6; Debates, March 13, 1964, p. 916; Journals, March 18, 1964, pp. 103–4; March 19, 1964, pp. 106–7; Debates, March 9, 1993, p. 16685; March 13, 2000,p. 4397; March 16, 2000,p. 4739. See also Order Paper and Notice Paper, June 4, 2003, p. III. The motion was subsequently withdrawn the next day. For further information on motions of censure against the Speaker, see Chapter 7, “The Speaker and Other Presiding Officers of the House”. See also Tim Mercer, “Challenging the Chair,” Canadian Parliamentary Review 29, no. 2 (Summer 2006): p. 21.
158.: In 1981, the Leader of the Opposition made remarks which constituted an attack on the authority and impartiality of the Speaker. The following day a Minister raised a question of privilege on the matter. The Leader of the Opposition subsequently withdrew his remarks and the matter was declared closed (Debates, January 21, 1981, p. 6410; January 22, 1981, pp. 6455–7). In 1993, a prima facie breach of privilege was found when a Member refused to withdraw disparaging remarks about a Chair Occupant (Journals, March 23, 1993, p. 2688, Debates, pp. 17403–5). Two days later, the Member apologized and the matter was declared closed (Debates, March 25, 1993, p. 17537). See also Debates, May 14, 1996,p. 2721.
159.: Standing Order18. For cases of disrespectful references to the Governor General, see, for example, Debates, May 23, 1958, p. 406; March 12, 1959, p. 1869; September 27, 1990, pp. 13509, 13513; February 24, 1994,pp. 1799–800. Discourteous references to Lieutenant-Governors have also been ruled out of order. See, for example, Debates, June 20, 1958, p. 1462; March 12, 1959, p. 1870.
160.: Bourinot, Parliamentary Procedure and Practice, 4th ed., pp. 338–9. See, for example, Debates, March 9, 1910, cols. 5100–1. May notes: “Her Majesty cannot be supposed to have a private opinion, apart from that of her responsible advisers; and any attempt to use her name in debate to influence the judgement of Parliament is immediately checked and censured. This rule also extends to other members of the royal family, but it is not strictly applied in cases where one of its members has made a public statement on a matter of current interest so long as comment is made in appropriate terms” (May, Erskine May’s Treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of Parliament, 24th ed., p. 440).
161.: Beauchesne, Rules and Forms of the House of Commons of Canada, 4th ed., pp. 128–9; 6th ed., pp. 150–1. See, for example, Debates, May 16, 1986, p. 13353; September 19, 1991, p. 2401; November 28, 1996,p. 6854; June 8, 1998,pp. 7680,7691; June 9, 1998,p. 7835. However, Members are not prohibited from giving notice of a substantive motion concerning the conduct of a judge (Debates, February 18, 1926, p. 1106).
162.: Debates, April 1, 1998,pp. 5653–4. See also Debates, April 2, 1998,p. 5743.
163.: See, for example, Debates, December 1, 1986, p. 1636; June 4, 1998,p. 7575; October 18, 1999,p. 256.
164.: See Speaker Milliken’s remarks to the effect that this convention applies only to statements which might potentially damage the reputation of a member of the public (Debates, April 2, 2003,p. 5040). In another ruling, Mr. Milliken declined to invoke this prohibition with regard to statements made in a public forum (Debates, May 11, 2005,pp. 5933–4).
165.: See, for example, Debates, May 26, 1987, pp. 6375–6; November 28, 1991, pp. 5509–10; April 18, 2005,pp. 5213–4; February 28, 2012,p. 5560.
166.: Bourinot, Parliamentary Procedure and Practice, 4th ed., p. 357. It is also irregular to refer to discussions held in a Committee of the Whole.
167.: See, for example, Debates, December 4, 1984, p. 896. In practice, this rule is often disregarded by the Chair.
168.: Bourinot, Parliamentary Procedure and Practice, 4th ed., p. 358.
169.: Beauchesne, Beauchesne’s Rules & Forms of the House of Commons of Canada, 6th ed., p. 141.
170.: Standing Order18.
171.: May, Erskine May’s Treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of Parliament, 22nd ed., p. 380.
172.: See, for example, Debates, May 19, 1960, p. 4025; October 20, 1970, p. 402; November 3, 1983, p. 28661; May 4, 1993, p. 18921; September 24, 1996,p. 4656; September 16, 2003,p. 7439.
173.: Standing Order18. For further information, see Chapter 12, “The Process of Debate”.
174.: Standing Order18. See, for example, Debates, February 25, 1998,pp. 4401–2; October 28, 1998,p. 9512; May 3, 2006,p. 848; September 29, 2014,p. 7958. This includes any allegation that a Member has lied or misled the House. See, for example, Debates, November 1, 2006,pp. 4533,4538; March 28, 2007,pp. 8035–6; December 1, 2009,p. 7420; June 8, 2015,p. 14736.
175.: See Speaker Michener’s ruling (Journals, June 19, 1959, pp. 581–6) and Speaker Fraser’s ruling (Debates, December 11, 1991, pp. 6141–2).
176.: Standing Order47.
177.: See, for example, Debates, March 24, 1993, p. 17482; October 22, 1997,p. 964; October 18, 2005,p. 8678; October 19, 2006,pp. 4008,4013; September 20, 2011,p. 1245; January 28, 2013,p. 13301.
178.: See, for example, Debates, April 6, 2005,pp. 4747,4750; December 10, 2012,p. 13077; June 10, 2013,p. 17979.
179.: See, for example, Debates, June 13, 1986, pp. 14370–2; March 5, 1987, p. 3882; December 9, 1997,p. 3018; March 27, 2007,pp. 7985–7.
180.: See, for example, Debates, March 22, 2007,pp. 7794–5; March 4, 2008,p. 3625; June 22, 2011,pp. 621–2; October 30, 2014,p. 9005.
181.: Speakers have, on occasion, found that there was sufficient corroborating evidence for alleged unparliamentary remarks neither heard by the Chair nor recorded in the Debates. See, for example, Debates, December 12, 1991, pp. 6218–9; November 28, 2001, p. 7614; October 30, 2006,pp. 4414–5. See also Debates, February 10, 1998,pp. 3714–5; June 13, 2012,p. 9567, when Members accused other Members of obscene gestures. The Speaker indicated that it would be difficult to check because the gesture would not be recorded or he did not see it.
182.: See, for example, Debates, November 5, 1998,pp. 9917–8; November 4, 2004,p. 1189; October 31, 2005,p. 9255; May 31, 2010,pp. 3157–8; September 25, 2014,p. 7819. On one occasion, the Speaker dismissed a point of order alleging unparliamentary language upon learning that what had given offence was the inaccurate English simultaneous interpretation of a French expression (Debates, June 14, 2006,pp. 2372–3).
183.: Lists of terms ruled unparliamentary have been included in the index to the Debates, in Bourinot, Parliamentary Procedure and Practice, 4th ed., pp. 361–4 and in Beauchesne, Beauchesne’s Rules & Forms of the House of Commons of Canada, 6th ed., pp. 142–50. In 1991, a government motion calling upon Members to refrain from the use of offensive and abusive language and for vigorous enforcement of Standing Order18 was debated on three occasions but never came to a vote (Journals, October 23, 1991, pp. 521–2; October 25, 1991, pp. 535–6; November 21, 1991, pp. 703–4). Neither did the work of an unofficial “Special Advisory Committee to the Speaker on Unparliamentary Language and the Speaker’s Authority to deal with Breaches of Decorum and Behaviour”, convened by Speaker John Fraser in 1992 and chaired by the Deputy Speaker and Chairman of Committees of the Whole, Andrée Champagne, lead to significant change in this regard. The Committee’s report, dated June 22, 1992, which took the form of draft amendments to the Standing Orders, was never presented to the House, nor were its recommendations ever implemented or formally debated. During the Thirty-Ninth Parliament, the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, in itsThirty-Seventh Report, presented to the House on March 1, 2007 (Journals,p. 1092), declined to recommend changes to the Standing Orders to strengthen the disciplinary powers of the Chair, and called upon all parties to support a vigorous exercise of its existing powers.
184.: See, for example, Debates, December 14, 1987, pp. 11761–2; October 26, 1998,p. 9379; February 18, 1999,p. 12094; May 6, 2004,p. 2847; March 13, 2009,p. 1744. See also Speaker Milliken’s ruling (Debates, March 12, 2009,pp. 1631–3).
185.: See, for example, Debates, September 25, 1998,p. 8401; October 30, 1998,p. 9641; February 16, 1999,pp. 11972–3; March 25, 1999,pp. 13483–4; October 28, 2004,p. 898; May 5, 2005,p. 5722; April 25, 2006,p. 521; December 1, 2009,p. 7420; June 8, 2015,p. 14736.
186.: On one occasion, when Jim Fulton (Skeena) refused to retract his remarks, Speaker Fraser chose not to recognize the Member until a withdrawal was made three weeks later (Debates, October 29, 1987, pp. 10542–3; October 30, 1987, pp. 10583–4; November 18, 1987, pp. 10927–8). See, for example, Debates, November 27, 2002,p. 1949; March 28, 2007,p. 8036; December 14, 2011,pp. 4435,4439.
187.: See, for example, Debates, February 12, 1997,pp. 8016–7; October 1, 1997,pp. 332,334–5; October 2, 1997,p. 367; December 1, 1998,pp. 10726–7,10730–1; December 6, 2002,p. 2380. For further information, see the section in this chapter entitled “Naming”.
188.: Standing Order11(2).
189.: Dawson (William Foster Dawson, Procedure in the Canadian House of Commons (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), p. 108) highlighted the difficulty in enforcing this rule by noting that, “the whole system of procedure is based on an assumption of repetition” and referred to three readings given to a bill.
190.: Sir John George Bourinot, Parliamentary Procedure and Practice in the Dominion of Canada (1884; repr., South Hackensack: Rothman Reprints, 1971) p. 349. See also the Chair’s remarks (Debates, June 17, 1992, p. 12297; June 23, 1992, p. 12641; February 1, 2002,p. 8584; December 1, 2011,p. 3898).
191.: Standing Order11(2). For cases of a Speaker directing a Member to discontinue his or her speech, see, for example, Debates, May 26, 1947, pp. 3450–1; August 25, 1958, p. 4073; October 31, 2014,pp. 9061–2. If a Member persists in breaching the repetition or relevance rule in a Committee of the Whole, he or she is reported to the House by the Chair if the Committee so directs. For further information, see Chapter 19, “Committees of the Whole House”.
192.: Vernon F. Snow, Parliament in Elizabethan England: John Hooker’s Order and Usage (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1977), p. 169.
193.: Hatsell, Precedents of Proceedings in the House of Commons, vol. 2, p. 232.
194.: Ibid., p. 230.
195.: The entry in the Journals reads: “… if any superfluous motion, or tedious speech be offered in the House, the party is to be directed and ordered by Mr. Speaker”. See Hatsell, Precedents of Proceedings in the House of Commons, vol. 2, p. 230.
196.: Even so formidable a character as Speaker Arthur Onslow could not manage to enforce the rule on his own authority (Peter D. G. Thomas, The House of Commons in the Eighteenth Century (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), pp. 217–8).
197.: Rules, Orders and Forms of Proceeding of the House of Commons of Canada, 1876, Rule No. 13.
198.: Rules of the House of Commons of Canada, 1910, Rule No. 19.
199.: Debates, April 29, 1910, col. 8377.
200.: Rules of the House of Commons of Canada, 1910, Rule No. 13(5).
201.: Debates, March 18, 1927, p. 1351.
202.: In more blatant cases, the Speaker has been able to specify the date and cite the page on which the same speech had previously been delivered. In one instance, the Speaker was able to predict that the Member was about to begin paragraph six of his speech and, in another, the Speaker cited five instances in which the same appeal had previously been made (Debates, June 9, 1955, p. 4610; April 19, 1956, p. 3073). On another occasion, once a Member had stated that he was going to repeat some of the material he had previously used in the same debate, the Speaker would not allow him to proceed (Debates, February 17, 1956, p. 1290). See also Speaker Beaudoin’s remarks (Debates, May 24, 1955, p. 4065).
203.: See, for example, Debates, June 9, 1955, p. 4609. On one occasion, a Member was chided because his remarks were “not much more than a repetition of what has been said by others who preceded him”. Accordingly, the Member was directed to shorten his remarks so that the House could “get down to the work properly before [it]” (Debates, August 31, 1917, p. 5237).
204.: See, for example, Debates, May 24, 1955, p. 4065.
205.: See, for example, Debates, April 19, 1922, p. 944.
206.: See, for example, Debates, November 21, 1977, p. 1063. In 1986, Speaker Bosley established that since time is scarce during Question Period, Members should avoid merely repeating questions that have already been asked, although Members may ask other questions on the same issue (Debates, February 24, 1986, p. 10879).
207.: See, for example, Debates, December 9, 1998,pp. 11120–1.
208.: Bourinot, Parliamentary Procedure and Practice, repr. 1st ed., 1971, p. 349.
209.: See, for example, Debates, November 5, 1990, pp. 15159–60; February 4, 1992, p. 6343; April 28, 1999,p. 14450; April 29, 1999,pp. 14492,14497; June 13, 2005,p. 6989; October 16, 2006,p. 3830; November 28, 2014,p. 9933.
210.: See, for example, Debates, February 6, 1987, pp. 3195–6, where the Chair ruled the remarks out of order and recognized another Member. See also Debates, June 7, 1994,p. 4930; June 7, 2006,p. 2085; November 4, 2014,pp. 9189–90.
211.: See, for example, Debates, February 8, 1993, pp. 15520, 15523; November 2, 1999,p. 971; October 16, 2006,p. 3830; October 17, 2011,p. 2096.
212.: See, for example, Debates, April 9, 1919, p. 1330; May 4, 1920, p. 1954; March 22, 1921, p. 1193; May 10, 2007,p. 9344; November 23, 2007,pp. 1303–4; December 5, 2013,p. 1846. One Speaker remarked that a matter raised outside the question in a debate would more properly “form by itself a subject of a special substantive motion” (Debates, March 27, 1923, p. 1553).
213.: May, Erskine May’s Treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of Parliament, 24th ed., p. 408: “Stated generally, no matter ought to be raised in debate on a question which would be irrelevant if moved as an amendment, and no amendment should be used for importing arguments which would be irrelevant to the main question”.
214.: See, for example, Debates, June 2, 1914, p. 4647.
215.: May, Erskine May’s Treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of Parliament, 24th ed., p. 408: “[such an amendment] … by concentrating debate on the main question and the amendment as alternative propositions, does tend to exclude consideration of other [otherwise] relevant alternatives”.
216.: For further information on the previous question, see Chapter 12, “The Process of Debate”, and Chapter 14, “The Curtailment of Debate”.
217.: Thomas Erskine May, Erskine May’s Treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of Parliament, 20th ed., ed. Sir Charles Gordon (London: Butterworths, 1983), p. 527.
218.: See, for example, Debates, November 28, 2014,pp. 9932–3.
219.: See, for example, Debates, April 2, 1913, col. 7014; March 25, 1920, pp. 734, 750–1; May 26, 1978, p. 5795.
220.: Debates, February 16, 1979, p. 3321. See also Debates, October 28, 1991, p. 4085.
221.: Beauchesne, Beauchesne’s Rules & Forms of the House of Commons of Canada, 6th ed., pp. 199–200. This is a position which has been maintained by the Speaker on several occasions. See, for example, Journals, November 14, 1949, pp. 237–8; Debates, May 6, 1959, p. 3402; Journals, October 15, 1962, pp. 76–7.
222.: Standing Order101(2). For further information, see Chapter 19, “Committees of the Whole House”.
223.: See, for example, Debates, November 30, 1977, pp. 1418–20; November 30, 1978, pp. 1657, 1665–6; December 11, 1979, pp. 2239, 2244; September 30, 1991, pp. 2937, 2979; June 23, 2011,pp. 1090–1.
224.: It is not exactly clear when this practice started; however, several Members have claimed that it was a custom which had grown during the years prior to the Second World War (Debates, June 6, 1947, p. 3878; June 30, 1947, p. 4845; July 14, 1947, p. 5570).
225.: See, for example, Debates, May 11, 1960, pp. 3783–4, 3788–9.
226.: See, for example, Debates, March 23, 1965, p. 12693.
227.: See, for example, Debates, August 2, 1960, p. 7418; November 30, 1978, pp. 1657, 1665.
228.: Beauchesne, Beauchesne’s Rules & Forms of the House of Commons of Canada, 6th ed., p. 211.
229.: Standing Orders76(5) and76.1(5). See Speaker Milliken’s ruling on the selection of report stage motions (Debates, March 21, 2001, pp. 1991–3).
230.: Standing Orders76(6) and76.1(6).
231.: Beauchesne, Beauchesne’s Rules & Forms of the House of Commons of Canada, 6th ed., p. 214; May, Erskine May’s Treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of Parliament, 23rd ed., ed. Sir William McKay (London: LexisNexis, 2004) p. 628. See, for example, Debates, May 29, 2009,p. 3956; May 28, 2013,pp. 17189–90.
232.: On one occasion, the Speaker corrected a Member who had assumed that he could speak to the amendment as if it were the third reading motion: “My ruling is that a Member should only address himself to the last question submitted to the House … the fact that a Member has not spoken to the third reading of the Bill is no justification for his travelling over the same ground on this question (the amendment) that he would have covered if he had spoken to the third reading of the Bill” (Debates, June 2, 1914, p. 4647).
233.: Beauchesne, Beauchesne’s Rules & Forms of the House of Commons of Canada, 6th ed., p. 82.
234.: See, for example, Debates, March 10, 1992, pp. 7949–50; April 3, 2012,pp. 6837–8.
235.: Philip Laundy, “The Sub Judice Convention in the Canadian House of Commons,” The Parliamentarian 57, no. 3 (July 1976): p. 211.
236.: Debates, March 8, 1990, p. 9007.
237.: Speakers, however, have discouraged all comments on matters sub judice rather than to allow Members to test the limits of the convention and the Speaker’s discretion (Debates, June 13, 2003,pp. 7280–1). Public petitions may not concern matters that are sub judice (Standing Order36(1.1)(g) and36(2.1)(e)).
238.: On December 13, 1976, the House appointed a special committee “to review the rights and immunities of Members of the House of Commons, to examine the procedures by which such matters are dealt with by the House, and to report on any changes it may be desirable to make” (Journals, p. 230). The Committee held three meetings during which it studied how the rights and immunities of Members are affected by the sub judice convention. The First Report of the Special Committee on the Rights and Immunities of Members, presented to the House on April 29, 1977 (Journals, pp. 720–9) but not concurred in, remains the definitive study of the sub judice convention in Canada and is still used today by the Speaker when dealing with such matters arising in the House.
239.: Debates, March 22, 1983, pp. 24027–8.
240.: See, for example, Debates, December 6, 1990, p. 16411; February 3, 1993, p. 15368; March 16, 1999,p. 12911; June 13, 2003,pp. 7280–1.
241.: See, for example, Debates, October 4, 1971, pp. 8395–6; March 31, 1981, pp. 8793–4; October 21, 1999,pp. 467–8.
242.: Journals, April 29, 1977, p. 728.
243.: See Speaker Fraser’s rulings (Debates, June 1, 1989, p. 2419; November 7, 1989, pp. 5654–6) and Deputy Speaker Milliken’s ruling (Debates, March 16, 1999,p. 12911).
244.: See Speaker Lemieux’s ruling, Debates, February 10, 1928, p. 366.
245.: See Speaker Lamoureux’s ruling (Debates, May 2, 1966, pp. 4583–4). In 1995, a Member rose on a point of order to contend that a Minister had contravened the convention during Question Period by commenting on a case under appeal in the Alberta courts. The Minister maintained that there was a difference between commenting on the facts of a case before the courts and stating the government’s opinion on a ruling rendered by the courts. In his response to the point of order, Speaker Parent ruled that he could not conclude that the Minister had contravened the convention by stating that the government disagreed with the ruling and planned to challenge the decision (Debates, April 6, 1995,pp. 11618–9).
246.: See, for example, Debates, June 7, 1938, p. 3625.
247.: See, for example, Debates, May 22, 1973, pp. 3990–1; July 9, 1973, pp. 5402–3.
248.: See Speaker Jerome’s ruling (Debates, February 11, 1976, p. 10844). This view was reiterated in a ruling given in 1987, although Speaker Fraser cautioned that a contrary ruling could be made if the Chair felt the question was about to prejudice the rights of either litigant (Debates, December 7, 1987, p. 11542). In a ruling delivered on April 20, 2005, Speaker Milliken declined to apply the sub judice convention to references to media reports that a Member not charged with any offence was “under investigation” by the police, and at the same time urged Members to refrain from such references out of respect for their colleagues (Debates,pp. 5334–5).
249.: See, for example, Debates, April 6, 1995,pp. 11618–9; March 16, 1999,p. 12911; May 13, 2004,pp. 3136–7,3162; March 8, 2011,pp. 8806–7.
250.: See Speakers’ rulings (Debates, March 5, 1947, pp. 1051–2; June 12, 1951, p. 3975; November 2, 1951, p. 662). However, in a 1933 incident, a Member attempted to debate charges brought against a county court judge whose conduct had been referred to a commission of inquiry. Speaker Black did not allow the discussion, even though the commission was not defined as a court of record (Debates, March 30, 1933, pp. 3558–9).
251.: Henry Campbell Black, Black’s Law Dictionary, 10th ed., ed. Bryan A. Garner (St. Paul: Thomson Reuters, 2014), p. 431.
252.: Debates, March 21, 1950, p. 949; October 17, 1957, p. 119; May 2, 1966, pp. 4589–90; Journals, November 9, 1978, pp. 128–9. The Speaker noted that “the body carrying out [the inquiry] is an investigatory body and not a judicial body coming to decision. … no decision of that body could in any way be prejudiced, surely, by a debate or discussion here” (Debates, October 31, 1977, pp. 433–4). Investigations conducted by the Ethics Commissioner (after 2006, the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner) of possible breaches of the Conflict of Interest Code for Members of the House of Commons were initially treated by Speakers as if subject to the sub judice convention. See, for example, Debates, June 7, 2005,p. 6738. However, the adoption of theFifty-Fourth Report of the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, presented to the House and concurred in on June 11, 2007 (Journals,p. 1503), deleted that provision in the Code. Such investigations are no longer treated as if they are sub judice matters (section 27 of The Conflict of Interest Code for Members of the House of Commons,Appendix 1 of the Standing Orders of the House of Commons).
253.: Journals, April 29, 1977, p. 728. See, for example, Debates, June 8, 1987, pp. 6817–20; March 8, 2011,pp. 8806–7.
254.: Journals, April 29, 1977, p. 728.
255.: See Speaker Bosley’s ruling (Debates, January 27, 1986, p. 10194).
256.: See, for example, Debates, February 14, 1986, pp. 10828–9; December 18, 1990, pp. 16901, 16905–6; October 11, 1991, p. 3643; December 4, 1996,p. 7087; December 8, 2014,p. 10296.
257.: See, for example, Debates, November 7, 1989, pp. 5654–6; June 12, 1996,p. 3711; October 20, 1997,pp. 829–30; February 13, 1998,p. 3854. On occasion, such interruptions have been more admonitory than declarative. See, for example, Debates, May 13, 2004,p. 3136.
258.: Debates, November 21, 1990, p. 15526.
259.: In 1996, Speaker Parent advised the House that Jean-Marc Jacob (Charlesbourg) would be rising to make a solemn declaration to the House. The Speaker cautioned Members that the statement was not to incite debate. The Speaker subsequently interrupted Mr. Jacob and ruled that “the words being used [in the statement] tend more toward a debate than a solemn declaration”. The Member was not allowed to continue (Debates, June 18, 1996,p. 4027).
260.: See, for example, Debates, March 15, 1984, pp. 2138–9; February 3, 1988, p. 12581; September 24, 1990, p. 13215; October 11, 2002,p. 632; November 5, 2014,pp. 9219–21.
261.: See, for example, Debates, April 9, 1991, pp. 19231–2; November 26, 1992, pp. 14113–5; January 24, 1994,p. 197; March 20, 2001,pp. 1869–70; May 10, 2012,p. 7888.

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