SECU Committee Report

DISSENTING OPINION

Dissenting opinion from Joe Comartin and Serge Ménard

From the outset, it must be understood that this is a preliminary report that addresses only two sets of provisions in the Anti-terrorism Act; namely, those pertaining to investigations and preventive arrests as provided for in sections 83.28, 83.29 and 83.3 of the Criminal Code, as amended by section 4 of the Anti-Terrorist Act.

We concur with the description of the specific historical context that led to the adoption of the Anti-terrorism Act.

We also agree with most of the recommendations made in the majority report of the Committee, which aim to provide better guidelines for the investigation process. This exceptional measure should be used only in specific cases in which it is necessary to prohibit activities where there is imminent peril of serious damage, and not in the case of misdeeds already committed.

We, like other members of the Committee are also of the opinion that another review of the provisions ten years after their coming into force is needed and would make it possible to better assess whether the provisions should be extended or allowed to expire.

We would have preferred a three-year period; however, we are willing to support the opinion of the majority for a ten-year period that should be the maximum amount of time allowed to pass before a final review of these exceptional measures is completed.

However, we do not agree with the Committee members’ opinion regarding the preventive arrests provided for in section 83.3 of the Criminal Code, as introduced in the Anti-terrorism Act. Our reasons are as follows.

Terrorism cannot be fought with legislation; it must be fought through the efforts of intelligence services combined with appropriate police action.

There is no act of terrorism that is not already a criminal offence punishable by the most stringent penalties under the Criminal Code. This is obviously the case for pre-meditated, cold-blooded murders; however, it is also true of the destruction of major infrastructures.

Moreover, when judges exercise their discretion during sentencing, they will consider the terrorists’ motive as an aggravating factor. They will find that the potential for rehabilitation is very low, that the risk of recidivism is very high and that deterrence and denunciation are grounds for stiffer sentencing. This is what they have always done in the past and there is no reason to think they will do differently in the future.

We must also consider that, when it comes to terrorism, deterrence has limitations. First, it will have very little impact on someone considering a suicide bombing. Second, those who decide to join a terrorist group generally believe that they are taking part in an historic movement that will have a triumphant outcome in the near future and that will see them emerge as heroes.

Therefore, one cannot expect that new legislation will provide the tools needed to effectively fight terrorism.

Legislation can, however, be amended if police do not seem to have the legal means needed to deal with the new threat of terrorism.

Consequently we must ensure that the proposed measure does not unduly disturb the balance that must exist between respect for the values of fairness, justice and respect for human rights, which are characteristic of our societies, while also ensuring better protection for Canadians and for the entire world community. 

Section 83.3, which provides for preventive arrests and the imposition of conditions, was advanced as such a measure when it was adopted.

Now, this provision has gone unused.

That is not surprising, given that police officers can use existing Criminal Code provisions to arrest someone who is about to commit an indictable offence.

Section 495 of the Criminal Code states that:

“(1) A peace officer may arrest without warrant

(a) a person […] who, on reasonable grounds, he believes […] is about to commit an indictable offence”

The arrested person must then be brought before a judge, who may impose the same conditions as those imposable under the Anti-terrorism Act. The judge may even refuse bail if he believes that the person’s release might jeopardize public safety.

If police officers believe that a person is about to commit an act of terrorism, then they have knowledge of a plot. They probably know, based on wiretap or surveillance information, that an indictable offence is about to be committed. Therefore, they have proof of a plot or attempt and need only lay a charge in order to arrest the person in question.

There will eventually be a trial, at which time the arrested person will have the opportunity to a full answer and defence. The person will be acquitted if the suspicions are not justified or if there is insufficient proof to support a conviction.

It seems obvious to us that the terrorist act thus apprehended would have been disrupted just as easily as it would have been had section 83.3 been used.

However, it is this provision that is most likely to give rise to abuses.

It may be used to brand someone a terrorist on grounds of proof that are not sufficient to condemn him but against which he will never be able to fully defend himself. This will prevent him from travelling by plane, crossing the border into the United States and probably from entering many other countries. It is very likely that he will lose his job and be unable to find another.

One could compare this situation to that of Maher Arar upon his return from Syria before he was exonerated by Justice O’Connor. In fact, it will probably be worse, because it was the suspicions passed on by the RCMP that harmed Mr. Arar. If this new and temporary provision of the Criminal Code were used, it would be a judicial decision to impose conditions because of apprehended terrorist activity. The general public would see that person as almost certainly, if not definitely, a terrorist.

Terrorist movements often spring from and are nourished by profound feelings of injustice among a segment of the population. The fight against these injustices is often conducted in parallel by those who want to correct the injustices through democratic means and those who believe it is necessary to use terrorism.

The former made a positive contribution to the transformation of the societies in which we live today. They are often the source of many of the rights that we enjoy.

It is inevitable that political activity will bring the first and second groups together. Very often, the former will not even be aware that the latter are involved in terrorism. The planning of terrorist activity is by its nature secret.

The ease with which a person who has neither the inclination nor the intention to commit terrorist acts can be labelled a terrorist is thus disconcerting.

In order to determine whether a person is part of a terrorist network, security officers make use of electronic surveillance, but, as we saw in the Arar case, they also monitor the contacts of someone who they know or believe is connected to a terrorist network.

Now, to be able to order incarceration and, subsequently, the imposition of conditions of release, it is sufficient that the judge be convinced “that the detention is necessary in order to maintain confidence in the administration of justice, having regard to all the circumstances, including the apparent strength of the peace officer’s grounds under subsection (2), and the gravity of any terrorist activity that may be carried out.”

In other words, the apprehension of serious terrorist activity and grounds that appear founded will suffice. Proof that these grounds are well founded is not necessary.

It should also be noted that the person arrested need not be the one that is thought likely to commit a terrorist act, but only and simply a person whose arrest “is necessary to prevent the carrying out of the terrorist activity.”

There is an important nuance there that is both astonishing and disturbing. It can include innocent people who are unaware of the reasons for which terrorists are soliciting their aid in a planned activity while concealing the real reasons they are asking for aid. Secrecy is the very essence of a terrorist activity.

Some see in the reference to section 810 of the Criminal Code an indication that our criminal law already uses a procedure similar to that set out in section 83.3. While there is a similarity in the procedure followed, there is a very big difference in the consequences of applying these two sections.

Section 810 states:

“An information may be laid before a justice by or on behalf of any person who fears on reasonable grounds that another person will cause personal injury to him or her or to his or her spouse or common-law partner or child or will damage his or her property.”

That other person is then summoned (and not arrested) before a judge, who can then order that person to enter into a recognizance to keep the peace and be of good behaviour for any period that does not exceed twelve months, and comply with such other reasonable conditions prescribed in the recognizance.

The judge cannot commit that person to a prison term unless the person refuses to sign the recognizance, after listening to all the parties and being satisfied by the evidence adduced that there are reasonable grounds for the fears.

If the person signs the recognizance and respects the conditions, he or she remains at liberty, will not be sentenced and will thus have no criminal record.

This section is often used in the case of apprehended domestic violence or when there is enmity between two people that one of them fears may turn violent.

This provision and section 83.3 that we are currently studying are very different in nature and have radically different consequences.

There is also no comparison between the impact that the use of section 83.3 and section 810 would have on someone’s reputation.

When the decision is made to depart from the fundamental principles underlying our system of criminal law, there is always a risk that these measures will later be applied in a manner totally different from those foreseen. That was the case with the imposition of the war measures act in 1970, which saw the incarceration, among others, of a great poet, a pop singer, numerous relatives of people charged with terrorist activities and almost all the candidates of a municipal political party.

In light of this analysis, we feel that Parliament should not renew section 83.3, which was introduced into the Criminal Code by the Anti-terrorism Act, for two fundamental reasons: one, it is of little, if any, use in the fight against terrorism, and two, there is a very real danger of its being used against honest citizens.

A terrorist activity deemed dangerous can be disrupted just as effectively, and in fact more effectively, by the regular application of the Criminal Code.

As a result, we recommend the abolition of section 83.3 of the Criminal Code.

Joe Comartin and Serge Ménard