NDDN Committee Report
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CHAPTER 1 — THE CONTEXT
Perhaps the most important lesson the Committee learned
is that our Canadian Forces mission in Afghanistan is a highly complex and
noble operation. It is extremely difficult and will not be ended by any quick
fixes. It is also apparent that apart from those with a direct interest,
ordinary Canadians have not heard enough about this mission. Consequently, we
feel there is an incomplete understanding of what is really going on in Afghanistan and therefore some misperception of what our Canadian Forces are doing. Along with this lack of information, the Committee has
been surprised by the pessimism of many commentators who tend to think the Afghanistan problem is perhaps just too difficult. These adverse perceptions are, in part,
aggravated by the absence of a coherent government communication plan that
provides Parliamentarians with up-to-date information on the details of the
many accomplishments of JTF-Afg. More transparency and clarity would go a long
way to helping Canadians gain a better and more complete understanding of the
Canadian military mission in Afghanistan. Canadian troops fought alongside United States (US)
forces and other coalition forces in Afghanistan in early 2002, against the
remnants of Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters, as part of Canada’s contribution to the global war on terrorism. Four Canadian soldiers died in that
campaign. Canadian Forces units returned to Afghanistan as part of the NATO-led
ISAF in 2003, taking up security duties in Kabul and its surrounding area.
Before they left in 2005, three more soldiers had been killed in action. The
Canadian Forces took over leadership of a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)
in Kandahar in August 2005 and in early 2006 provided the command element and
an infantry battle group for the Multinational Brigade in Regional Command
South, as part of the US Operation Enduring Freedom. Spring and summer fighting
was intense and before Canadian troops reverted to ISAF command at the end of
July 2006, another 13 Canadian soldiers and one Canadian diplomat had been
killed. For the rest of 2006, ISAF operations offered no respite for our
troops. By the end of the year, a further 25 Canadian soldiers were killed in
action, bringing the overall total of Canadian dead in Afghanistan since 2002, to 45. Another 13 soldiers have died in Afghanistan in 2007. Most Canadians
know this much. However, the Committee also heard that, since 2003,
both the government and the media have offered neither the breadth nor depth of
information about the Canadian Forces mission in Afghanistan, to the extent
required by Canadians to fully understand
why our troops are there and what they are doing.[1] In this regard, the Committee notes the government’s release of a report
explaining the progress being made by the Canadian mission in Afghanistan.[2] Officially known as the Agreement on
Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of
Permanent Government Institutions, the Bonn Agreement was the initial series of
agreements intended to re-create the State of Afghanistan, after the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. There had been no popularly-agreed government in Afghanistan since 1979, so it was felt necessary to have a transition period before a
permanent government was established. In December 2001, a number of prominent
Afghans[3] met
under UN auspices in Bonn, Germany, to decide on a plan for governing the
country; as a result, the Afghan Interim Authority was inaugurated on December
22, 2001 with a six-month mandate to be followed by a two-year Transitional
Authority, after which elections are to be held. Bonn Agreement conditions were met with
the conclusion of the Presidential election in 2004 and national and
parliamentary elections in 2005. Following on from the Bonn Agreement, the Afghanistan
Compact was developed during a conference held in London from January 31 to
February 1, 2006. It provides the framework for international community
engagement in Afghanistan for the period 2006‑2011. Representatives from
the international community, including Canada, attended the conference, which
was co-chaired by Afghanistan, the UN and the United Kingdom (UK). Canada pledged its full support. The Compact sets out detailed outcomes and benchmarks,
with timelines for their delivery. It also contains mutual obligations that aim
to ensure greater coherence of efforts between the Afghan government and the
international community. The Compact is not a simple aid package. It seeks to
build lasting Afghan capacity and effective state and civil society
institutions, with particular emphasis on developing human capital. It
identifies three critical and interdependent areas of activity: a. Security; b. Governance, the rule of law and human rights; and c. Economic and social development. Afghanistan and the international community have clear
interests in seeing the Afghanistan Compact succeed, but it will not be easy.
We have come to the current situation because Afghanistan was a failing and
failed state for over 30 years. A review of this tragic degeneration will help
us understand the magnitude of the challenge that faces Afghanistan, and Canada, now. Afghanistan is a rugged, sparsely populated mountainous
country of approximately 652,000 square kilometres (about the size of Manitoba). It shares borders with China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and a sector of the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir that is
controlled by Pakistan. About half of the country is more than 2,000 meters
above sea level. A 2006 estimate puts the population of Afghanistan at about 31.1 million people.[5] The
major languages are Pashto and Dari/Farsi. The southern province of Kandahar, in which the
Canadian Forces mission is based, is one of 34 provinces in Afghanistan. It has a population of about 1 million and an area over 54,000 square
kilometres (about the size of Nova Scotia). According to a 2006 estimate, over
450,000 people live in Kandahar City, the provincial capital. Afghanistan joined the UN in 1946. The country has
rarely been controlled by an effective central government because the
historical influence of tribal leaders and local warlords has thwarted
centralized rule from Kabul. In 1973, King Zahir Shah was overthrown in a coup by
his cousin and former Prime Minister, Muhammad Daud. In April 1978, leftist
military officers overthrew and killed Daud, and Noor Muhammad Taraki became
President. In September 1979 after a long and bitter insurgency, Taraki was
deposed and later killed. He was replaced by his deputy, Hafizullah Amin, who
also failed to suppress the rebellion. Faced with instability on its southern
border, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) sent military forces
into Afghanistan on December 25, 1979 and took control of Kabul. Babrak Karmal,
leader of a less hard-line faction, was installed as President, but the
rebellion persisted. Insurgent mujahedeen fighters who, given the Cold War
context of the time, were covertly funded and equipped by the US, battled
Soviet troops throughout the country for the next decade. In November 1987, Karmal was replaced by Mohammad
Najibullah. Earlier that year, under the auspices of the UN, Afghanistan, Pakistan, the USSR and the US signed Agreements on the Settlement of the Situation
Relating to Afghanistan. These agreements provided for an end to foreign
intervention in Afghanistan, and the USSR began withdrawing its forces. The UN
set up a mission to monitor the withdrawal of foreign forces — the
United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP) — and
made plans to support the anticipated repatriation of refugees. The Soviet
withdrawal was completed in February 1989. The rebels who had not signed the
agreements, however, continued fighting against Najibullah's government. As civil war between various factions continued
following the Soviet withdrawal, the number of civilians fleeing the country
increased steadily, and Afghanistan suffered the world's leading refugee
crisis. By 1990, there were 6.3 million civilians in exile — 3.3
million in Pakistan and 3 million in Iran. Fighting intensified in 1992. Rebel forces closed in on
Kabul and the Najibullah government collapsed. On April 24, 1992, the
Peshawar Accord brought the agreement of leaders of the mujahedeen (guerrilla)
forces — except one, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar — to form a
government under Sigbatullah Mojaddedi. According to the agreement, Mojaddedi
would head a Transitional Council for two months. He would then be replaced by
a Leadership Council to last four months that would be headed by Burhannudin
Rabbani. Rabbani was declared President of the Islamic State in Afghanistan in July 1992. Under the Accord, he was to have relinquished power in October,
but he didn't. By that time, Ahmad Shah Massoud, Rabbani’s Minister of Defense,
was engaged in armed confrontation with Hekmatyar in Kabul. In 1993, two peace accords — in Islamabad on March 7 and Jalalabad on 18 May — were negotiated between
President Rabbani and eight other Afghan leaders. The parties agreed to form a
government for 18 months, to set in motion an electoral process. In December
1993, the UN established the United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan
(UNSMA) to canvass a broad spectrum of Afghan leaders for their views on how
the UN could best help with national reconciliation and reconstruction. Despite these positive developments, Kabul was soon
besieged again, first by various mujahedeen factions, and then by the Taliban,
a movement with its foundations in Kandahar. The movement initially gained
momentum as an opposition to the mujahedeen, whom the Taliban came to regard as
having corrupted Afghan society. In late 1994 and early 1995, the Taliban continued to
grow in strength, and they took control of much of southern and western Afghanistan, including Kandahar and Herat. In September 1996, the Taliban took Kabul. The government
retreated to Taloqan and Mazar-i-Sharif and formed a new coalition called the Northern Alliance. Fighting between the Taliban and Northern Alliance
groups continued between 1997 and 2000 with little change in military
positions. In July and August 1998, the Taliban overran many northern provinces,
as well as the cities of Mazar-i-Sharif and Taloqan, where the government had
relocated. A major massacre of thousands of civilians took place in Mazar after
the Taliban took the city. Following the August 7, 1998 terrorist bomb attacks on
US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Tanzania, the UN Security Council adopted a
resolution, expressing concern at the continuing presence of terrorists in the territory of Afghanistan. It condemned attacks on UN personnel in Taliban-held areas,
including the killing of two Afghan staff members of the World Food Program
(WFP) and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Jalalabad, and of
the Military Adviser to UNSMA in Kabul. It also condemned the capture of the
Consulate-General of Iran in Mazar-i-Sharif. On December 8, 1998, another UN Security Council
resolution demanded that the Taliban stop providing sanctuary and training for
international terrorists and that all Afghan factions cooperate in bringing
indicted terrorists to justice. A week later, after the Taliban failed to
respond to this demand, the UN Security Council applied broad sanctions under
the UN Charter. In early 1999, yet another UN Security Council
resolution noted that Osama bin Laden had been indicted by the US for the August 1998 embassy bombings and demanded that the Taliban turn him over to the
appropriate authorities to be brought to justice. This too was ignored and
further sanctions were applied. There had been other issues. In a statement on October
22, 1999, the UN Security Council also expressed profound distress over reports
of involvement in the fighting, on the Taliban side, of thousands of non-Afghan
nationals, some of whom were below the age of 14. It noted the seriously
deteriorating humanitarian situation and the worsening human rights situation — including
forced displacements of civilian populations, summary executions, abuse and
arbitrary detention of civilians, violence against women and girls, and
indiscriminate bombing. The capture of Iran's Consulate-General in
Mazar-i-Sharif, along with the murder of Iranian diplomats and a journalist,
were described as flagrant violations of international law. Deeply disturbed by
a significant increase in the cultivation, production and trafficking of drugs,
especially in Taliban-controlled areas, the UN Security Council demanded that
such illegal activities be halted. The conflict within Afghanistan continued through 2000
and 2001. Political and security problems, in the absence of an effective
government, caused frequent interruptions in the flow of humanitarian
assistance, and various crises required temporary departures of UN and
non-governmental aid workers. Already suffering from the devastating effects of civil
war, in the late 1990s the people of Afghanistan also faced a series of natural
disasters — starting with earthquakes in February and May 1998 that
killed more than 7,000 and affected the livelihoods and shelter of a further
165,000. In June, some 6,000 people were killed in severe flooding. Also at
that time, a severe and protracted drought began. In the face of such a daunting situation, the UN
delivered more than 94,000 tons of food aid to 1.13 million people in 2000
alone, while vaccinating some 5.3 million children against polio and
providing support for non-discriminatory education to more than 300,000
children — including home schooling projects for girls. Nevertheless,
one quarter of all children born in Afghanistan were dying of preventable
diseases before the age of five. Afghan women were nearly five times more
likely to die in childbirth than in other developing countries. Typhoid and
cholera epidemics were rampant, and pneumonia and malaria had re-emerged as
public health threats. The condition of women had deteriorated markedly, and
only one in 20 girls received any kind of education. To compound the problem, refugees were returning to
what the UN Mine Clearance Program has called the most heavily mined country in
the world, with a staggering 9.7 million land mines. As part of its efforts,
the program cleared some 68 square kilometres of previously affected areas, but
obviously much remained to be done. On September 4, 2001, the UN issued a report entitled The
Deepening Crisis, which highlighted the desperate and worsening
humanitarian situation faced by Afghans. The crisis, however, would only get
worse. After the September 11, 2001 attacks on the US, the
Taliban government of Afghanistan refused US demands to hand over Osama bin
Laden and therefore became a target of US military might. The US military response commenced on October 7, 2001. US objectives were to make clear to Taliban leaders that the harbouring of terrorists is
unacceptable, to acquire intelligence on al Qaeda and Taliban resources, to
develop relations with groups opposed to the Taliban, to prevent the use of Afghanistan as a safe haven for terrorists, and to destroy the Taliban military allowing
opposition forces to succeed in their struggle.[7] Finally, military force would help facilitate the delivering of humanitarian
supplies to the Afghan people. In December 2001, major leaders from the Afghan
opposition groups and diaspora met in Bonn, Germany, and agreed on a plan (the
Bonn Agreement) for the formulation of a new democratic government. Hamid
Karzai, a Pashtun from the southern city of Kandahar, was appointed Chairman of
the Afghan Interim Authority. In January 2002, the first milestone of the Bonn
Agreement was achieved with the announcement of the Special Independent
Commission for the Convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga (Pashtun for “grand
council” — a traditional forum in which tribal elders come together
and settle affairs). An emergency Loya Jirga of some 1,500 delegates met in
June 2002 to form the Transitional Administration of Interim President Hamid
Karzai. In 2004, the country convened a Constitutional Loya
Jirga (Council of Elders) and ratified a new constitution the following year.
Hamid Karzai also became the President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
in 2004. Legislative elections were held in
September 2005. The National Assembly — the first freely elected
legislature in Afghanistan since 1973 — sat in December 2005. However, Afghanistan’s tenuous security situation
continued to threaten the gains of the recent transition, with incidents caused
by terrorist and criminal activities, as well as factional clashes. The
increase in poppy cultivation and narcotics trafficking continued to be of
particular concern, as they further eroded the security environment.
Consequently, assistance and development programmes suffered, as deployment of
the UN personnel, NGOs and other humanitarian agencies was restricted due to
concerns for their safety. The government of Afghanistan is attempting to rebuild
the country after over 30 years of conflict within its borders. It is also
trying to establish a democratic government. The current, democratically-elected Afghan government
is weakened by endemic corruption, undermined by independent tribal warlords
and opposed by the Taliban who are conducting an insurgency based in the
southern and eastern provinces nearest the border with Pakistan. The insurgency has created a degree of insecurity that impedes reconstruction and
development. While some successes have been enjoyed by international
development efforts in the west and north, more remains to be done in the south
and east. The UN is coordinating humanitarian and development
efforts within Afghanistan, including substantial development assistance from Canada. As well, Canada, along with other major NATO allies has contributed military forces
to the UN-mandated, NATO-led ISAF that conducts military operations to
neutralize Taliban forces, support the projection of Afghan government
influence and protect development and reconstruction activity. While much
remains to be done, considerable progress has been made. During the summer and autumn of 2006, there were calls
for an increase in NATO troop strength in the south. Canada, among others,
expressed concern that not all NATO allies were sharing the combat burden
equally. On the other hand, there has been criticism that what is needed is not
more troops, but more development assistance. The way to ‘win the hearts and
minds’ of Afghans, many say, is not with bullets or bombs, but with food and
medicine. The Canadian mission is, in their view, unbalanced and needs more
determined and robust diplomacy and development components. On this issue, the Committee was constantly reminded
that, for now at least, security trumps other concerns. In the end, among all
the witnesses the Committee met, it found near unanimous agreement that
additional development cannot happen without a commensurate increase in
security and that security in the south was not yet adequate to permit
widespread development assistance. However, the outlook is not entirely bleak.
More Canadian reconstruction funds are now flowing into Kandahar. Much like that which occurred in 2006, some sources
expected another ‘spring offensive’ by the Taliban insurgents this year, but
ISAF forces, Canadian troops among them, conducted pre-emptive operations to
disrupt Taliban forces. In fact, in early 2007, NATO significantly increased its
forces in the southern region and launched Operation Achilles against Taliban
insurgents, mainly in neighbouring Helmand Province. James Appathurai, the NATO
Spokesman explained that “since the Riga Summit (November 2006) […] [NATO] has
added about 7,000 troops to its force levels.,“ In the south, the number of
troops has gone up during the past 18 months, from 1,000 to about 12,500, of
which 2500 are Canadian.[8] Canadian troops have been clearing Taliban out of the
Panjwayi and Zhari districts, claiming success in finding and killing key
Taliban leaders. Improved security has encouraged civilians to start returning
and this, coupled with the Canadian government’s
February 2007 announcement of the allocation of an additional $200 million
dollars[9] in
reconstruction funds, over the next two years, makes for brighter days ahead in
Kandahar Province. Allied efforts must be recognized as well. The US is deploying another brigade into the eastern provinces of Afghanistan and has committed an
additional $11.8 billion in military and civilian aid over two years, mostly to
pay for the expansion and training of the Afghan army and police. Britain too has augmented its forces in the south by an additional 2,000 troops and additional
special operating forces are being deployed. The additional British forces
have provided Regional Command South with a reserve battalion that can be
deployed to address emergencies anywhere in Afghanistan.[10] The Australian Provincial Reconstruction Team in Uruzgan Province have been working closely with Dutch forces. Despite the good
reconstruction work being done, the Australian Minister of Defence noted
recently in an Australian Ministry of Defence Newsletter[11] that his Government is
sending a 300-strong Special Operations Task Group, to work within ISAF in the
southern province of Uruzgan, to enhance provincial security, disrupt Taliban
extremists’ command and control and supply routes, support the development of
the Afghan national security forces and help reinforce the legitimacy of the
Afghan Government. About 400 of a planned 1000 Polish troops have been
operating in Afghanistan since early 2007. Poland has placed no caveats on
their forces.[12] Germany is deploying an additional six reconnaissance aircraft and the Italians are sending
surveillance drones and a transport plane. “In the short term we will not remove the threat of the
Taliban, but we will contain it,” said British General David Richards, who
completed his tour as ISAF's commander in February 2007. The betting is that
the Taliban will not attempt another conventional battle but will intensify
ambushes and suicide-bombings[13] and, in fact, no Taliban ‘spring offensive’ has materialized this year. Beyond the military sphere, signs of progress are
apparent in many parts of the country, not the least of which is the growth in
education and health care and the return of more than four million refugees. According
to Christopher Alexander, the UN Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary
General in Kabul, the health care system now allows 85% of Afghans to have
access to primary health care (from virtually 0% under the previous Taliban
regime); 7.3 million children have been vaccinated; 5.4 million children (34%
of them girls) area attending schools; the national GDP was $4 billion in 2002,
but has grew to $8.9 billion in 2006. Currency reform has taken hold and the
national budget is balanced. [14] So Canada and NATO entered the spring of 2007 with
guarded optimism, better prepared than last year, but still facing the same
melange of threats. Taliban and al Qaeda insurgencies, fuelled by drug
traffickers, corrupt officials and common criminals, are equally active in Afghanistan and Pakistan.[15] The
Taliban, along with elements led by Afghan Islamist Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s[16] and foreign jihadi fighters[17] are the primary, direct military threat to the security of Afghanistan and the
authority of the duly elected Afghan government in southern Afghanistan.[18] They are also the main military threat facing Canadian troops in Kandahar province. Afghans are determined, brave fighters who have
historically repelled invaders and occupiers by asymmetric insurgency warfare.
They are not known for fighting pitched conventional battles in large numbers,
but they will infest an area and wear down an enemy with vicious hit and run
attacks. The Committee often heard people wondering how we could hope for any
military success in Afghanistan, given Afghan success at defeating occupying
armies of Alexander the Great, the British and the Soviet Union. Such questions
greatly over-simplify the circumstances and are perhaps unrelated to
current ISAF operations. Unlike its historical predecessors, ISAF is not an
invading or occupation force. It is in Afghanistan at the request of the duly
elected Afghan government and its mission is sanctioned by the UN. The word Taliban is the Pashto plural form of
the Arabic طالب Tālib,
"student". The Taliban are a strict Sunni puritanical Islamist and
Pashtun-nationalist movement that ruled most of Afghanistan from 1996 until
2001. They emerged from the ethnically Pashtun areas of Afghanistan. Many of the Taliban grew up in refugee camps in Pakistan and much of the
current membership is drawn from the students of religious seminaries, or
madrassas, in Pakistan. The Taliban originated around 1993-1994. Pakistani
military and intelligence authorities based in the city of Quetta, located near
the border with Afghanistan, formed a militia movement consisting of religious
students in Pakistani religious schools, to gain control of the Afghan
mujahedeen government. The leader of the movement was Mullah Mohammed Omar. In early 1994, Omar gathered recruits from Islamic
schools, and his movement gained momentum. In October 1994, about 200 Taliban
seized the Afghan trading border town of Spin Boldak, thus opening a supply
route for Pakistani aid to Afghan Taliban sympathizers, who were based in Kandahar. The Afghan government refused to accept the presence of
Pakistan-sponsored Taliban. Conflict escalated and a protracted battle ensued
between Taliban and the government south of Kabul, eventually spreading to
northern cities such as Herat and Kunduz. Pakistan began to aid, mobilize and
expand the Taliban. A steady flow of graduates from Pakistani madrassas, gave
the Taliban a reliable supply of new recruits. The Taliban captured the Afghan capital of Kabul in 1996 and, by 1998, controlled over 90% of the country. Afghans then found
themselves under the rule of an austere and puritanical regime that banned
television, most forms of recreation, non-religious music and statues, such as
the giant Buddhas in Bamiyan, which the Taliban destroyed in March 2001. In 1996, Osama bin Laden moved to Afghanistan from Sudan. During Osama bin Laden's stay in Afghanistan, he had helped finance the
Taliban. After al-Qaeda attacked US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the US began actively supporting the opposition Northern Alliance and demanding
that the Taliban turn over Osama bin-Laden to the US government.[19] The Taliban protected bin Laden from extradition and continued to harbour him
after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the US. On October 7, 2001, the US, aided by the UK, Canada, and a coalition of other countries, initiated military actions in Afghanistan. The ground campaign was mainly fought by the Northern Alliance, the remaining
elements of the anti-Taliban forces, which the Taliban had never been able to
destroy. In early December, the Taliban gave up their last city stronghold of Kandahar and retired to the mountainous wilderness along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. They
were not, however, idle. The Taliban re-emerged to threaten the October 2004
presidential election, but despite sporadic attacks in the weeks leading up to the
vote, the election went off relatively smoothly. In late 2005, the Taliban
introduced new tactics against American, Canadian and allied forces in southern
Afghanistan, including the suicide bomb and other measures adapted from the
war in Iraq. Some intelligence sources indicated the presence of foreign
fighters too. The insurgency
continues. Less than 100 kilometres from Kandahar, just over the
Pakistan-Afghan border, are the tribal lands of Baluchistan Province. The major city in this area is the Pakistani city of Quetta, the provincial capital
of Baluchistan. Some say the Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters can operate in this
area with impunity.[20] Others believe that the presence of the Taliban is not only being tolerated by
the Pakistani government, but that it is being actively supported especially by
the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) organization.[21] To make matters worse, some experts think Afghanistan is just one step away from becoming a narco-state.[22] The mixture of corrupt warlords, illegal drug traders and a massive poppy crop
that provided most of the world’s opium supply in 2006, operating in league
with the Taliban, produces a formidable challenge. The insurgency and the illicit drug trade cannot be
controlled so long as the border with Pakistan remains uncontrolled. The
Taliban still enjoy sanctuary in Pakistan, whether with the Pakistani
government's approval (as President Karzai claims) or despite efforts to stop
them (as President Musharraf insists). In the south-east, the Americans have
reinforced their presence on the border with Pakistan. But in the Canadian and
British
sectors, the frontier is virtually unguarded. Despite NATO's planned
reinforcements, there is unlikely to be more than a thin presence of special
operations forces to watch over this part of the border.[23] ISAF combat operations in southern Afghanistan during the past year highlighted the apparent ability of Pakistani-based Taliban
fighters to cross undetected into Afghanistan and attack Afghan and ISAF
(including Canadian) military forces. Often, these same Taliban forces, once
defeated, were able to escape back across the border into Pakistan where they seem to have enjoyed a degree of save haven. Afghan and NATO political
leaders have been diplomatically active in putting pressure on Pakistani
President Musharraf to rein in Taliban insurgents living in Pakistan. Musharraf, for his part, claims he is doing what he can. Minister of Foreign Affairs The
Honourable Peter Mackay told the Committee: While
many efforts are being made, there is one reality that can't be denied, and
that is that 40 million Pashtuns are estimated to live along the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border. It is from this tribal group that the Taliban
insurgents who are attacking our troops derive most of their support […]
Moreover, it is estimated that some 30,000 Pashtuns move, effectively
unhindered, back and forth across the Afghanistan border every day.[24] Afghanistan-Pakistan border issues are covered more fully in
Chapter 4. The
Taliban are not just attacking the ISAF forces. They have attacked mosques
where moderate imams preach against them. They have attacked hospitals and
other social services funded by the international community. They have murdered
teachers who provide instruction to girls. One unidentified Taliban leader told
al-Jazeera television, "By the will of God, we expect to gain the
confidence and support of the Afghan people, especially their support for
martyrdom operations, which will continue in the future. We already have a
large group of Afghan freedom fighters who are waiting to volunteer in these
martyrdom operations."[25] On February 23, 2007, Radio Free Europe reported that
groups of Taliban fighters had launched a series of attacks across western,
southern, and eastern Afghanistan, beginning an expected spring offensive. NATO
reported that Taliban forces were present in at least five southern and western
provinces of Afghanistan — Helmand, Kandahar, Farah, Uruzgan, and
Ghor. Earlier in the month, on February 2, 2007, Taliban elements seized the
town of Musa Qala in Helmand Province and controlled the town about 25
kilometres from a key reconstruction project at the Kajaki hydroelectric dam.
Meanwhile, correspondents at Kajaki reported that several hundred British Royal
Marines had been fighting on a daily basis to keep the Taliban far enough from
the dam so that reconstruction work could continue. In the western Farah Province, several hundred Taliban
fighters seized the remote district of Bakwa on February 19. However, within 24
hours, the Taliban vacated Bakwa and a day later 200 Afghan troops deployed to
the town unopposed. Also on February 19, in the eastern Kunar Province, US troops engaged Taliban fighters near the border with Pakistan. That same day, militants in the
southern part of Uruzgan Province ambushed Afghan and NATO forces as they tried
to dismantle a roadside bomb. Then, on February 20, a Taliban suicide bomber
disguised as a doctor injured seven US soldiers when he blew himself up at a hospital
in southeastern Khost Province. In 2007, as expected by ISAF, the Taliban has reverted
to more ‘hit and run’ tactics and suicide bombings directed at Afghan
civilians, in an effort to turn them against ISAF forces and foreigners
generally. They have attacked and ‘retaken’ isolated towns, melting away before
having to face superior ISAF firepower. Previously, in 2006, whenever Taliban
forces massed to take on ISAF forces directly, they were decisively defeated,
as they were by Canadian troops in Op Mountain Thrust, Op Medusa and Op Falcon
Summit. The former Commander of ISAF, British General David Richards told the
Committee during a meeting in Afghanistan, in January 2007, that he felt the
Taliban were over-rated as a conventional fighting force, but that did not mean
they were not dangerous. For its part, ISAF has learned from its 2006
experiences and has been conducting its own aggressive operations in southern Afghanistan, to disrupt anticipated Taliban operations. Operation Achilles was NATO’s largest operation to date
and it was launched in Helmand Province in March 2007, to establish a wide area
of security around the Kajaki power dam, to enable needed repairs to take place
and to ensure the dam would be able to function into the future, providing
electric power to the region. A Canadian combat team under Major Alex Ruff was
deployed to the Kandahar-Helmand provincial border area and conducted
operations to block insurgents trying to escape from other allied NATO forces. Other NATO operations were conducted throughout southern
Afghanistan during the past three months and their collective effect has been
to neutralize any significant insurgent spring offensive. By mid-April, US General Dan McNeill, the Commander of ISAF, said that an anticipated spring offensive by
insurgents […] [had] not materialized on a large scale, although he warned that
violence in the country could still reach last year’s levels.[26] While the Taliban may be the most direct military
threat to the national security of Afghanistan, the poisonous mixture of
widespread, ingrained corruption; independent warlords and a burgeoning illegal
drug trade constitutes the most dangerous domestic threat. Professor Janice
Stein of the University of Toronto’s Munk Centre for International Studies has
said President Karzai’s government has an endemic problem of corruption and
that to eradicate it will be a long process, so we must be reasonable in our
expectations about how long it will take.[27] Another example of a challenge to political reform in Afghanistan has been the role of warlords who have risen to power with both the Afghan
government and the international community’s apparent blessings. While various allegations
of their involvement in crimes against humanity and war crimes persist, some
remain notoriously corrupt. A great many warlords simultaneously work for
government and rule almost independently of national strategies and priorities.
This is one serious factor in the disillusionment of the population.[28] The issue may linger a while. A revised version of a
controversial bill granting amnesty to groups that allegedly committed war
crimes was signed into law on March 10, 2007, by Afghan President Hamid Karzai after
being approved by the Afghan parliament, which includes many former militia
leaders. The resolution bars the state from independently prosecuting
individuals for war crimes absent accusation from an alleged victim. It also
extends immunity to all groups involved in pre-2002 conflicts, as opposed to
only leaders of various factions alleged to have committed war crimes during
the 1980s resistance against Soviet forces and war crimes committed during the
country's civil war. The Taliban and other human rights violators active before
the establishment of the December 2001 Interim Administration in Afghanistan are protected under the bill.[29] Critics
say the law may violate Afghanistan's constitution as well as certain international
human rights treaties. There is also a strong perception amongst Afghans that
external forces are using warlords, security force commanders and government
officials for their own strategic purposes. Such manipulation seriously
undermines both the rights and livelihoods of Afghans.[30] Last, but certainly not least, the drug economy is
booming, despite extensive attempts to wipe out opium production. International
efforts to eradicate the poppy crop failed so far. According to the UN Office
on Drugs and Crime (UNDOC), opium poppy production in the country reached a
record 6,100 metric tons in 2006, beating the 2005 total by 49 percent. Poppy
crop eradication programmes have tended to affect the poorest farmers who, in
the absence of a viable alternative crop, are left with essentially two
choices — continuing poverty or working for the Taliban. Illicit drugs breed corruption. Counter-narcotics
efforts provide leverage for corrupt officials to extract enormous bribes from
traffickers. Such corruption has attracted former militia commanders who joined
the Ministry of the Interior after being demobilized. Police chief posts in
poppy-growing districts are reputedly sold to the highest bidder: as much as
$100,000 is paid for a six-month appointment to a position with a monthly
salary of $60. And while the Taliban have protected some small farmers against
eradication efforts, not single high-ranking government official has been
prosecuted for drug-related corruption.[31] A detailed discussion of all these issues is beyond the
mandate of our study and Canadian military forces do not have a direct role in
any of these areas. They do not participate in poppy crop eradication, nor do
they engage in any counter-narcotics operations. They may however, have some
positive influence on Afghans as they work with and mentor them in various
activities, from employing local Afghans to mentoring Afghan National Army
(ANA) leaders. Beyond that, a full investigation of these troubling issues must
be left to a future study. The Committee was not sure how to address this issue
and it too may be outside our mandate, but it did strike us that much of the
debate of Canada’s overall Afghanistan mission, and specifically of the
military mission, seemed to be characterized by a certain impatience to ‘get it
over with.’ This may be a manifestation of our tendency to look at the problem
through Western eyes and, frankly, view it as somewhat of a distraction from
what we should be doing with our lives here in Canada. Afghans do not have the
luxury of looking at their predicament in such a detached way. Viewed through a historian’s lens it might be noticed
that since the Second World War, Western tolerance for protracted conflict has
become quite limited. Public opinion at home, detached as it is from the
reality of the battlefield, can turn on a dime and force governments to bring
the troops home, just because citizens feel they have had enough.[32] In some ways, this sounds a little selfish, especially when such considerations
do not include any attempt to understand what might happen to those we are
trying to help if we pack up and go home. Virtually all witnesses told the Committee that it will
take decades to get Afghanistan back on its feet as a thriving member of the
international community. “Balkan-like time”[33] is
how Ambassador Christopher Alexander described the expected time-line.[34] In the end, the Committee came to think that uninformed
impatience at home might have some adverse impact on our national will and
therefore have a negative influence on our determination to do what is required
to achieve strategic objectives set by Government. We did not dwell on this
point, but it did add to our consideration of the roles played by government
and the media in exercising their responsibilities to keep Canadians informed
of the mission.GENERAL
CANADA AND AFGHANISTAN
ONCE A FAILING STATE …[4]
... THEN A FAILED STATE[6]
THE CURRENT SITUATION
THREATS
The Taliban
Corruption, Warlords and Opium
Our Own Impatience
[1] Among those who brought this point up was James Appathurai, the NATO Spokesman. He told the Committee’ “[…] because the press corps certainly does not want to cover, will not cover, except in the most extreme circumstances, the positive developments[…] I […] ask them to cover the building of a school or a road. They were very clear. They will not do it. They will do it if the school burns down.
[2] Government of Canada. Canada’s Mission in Afghanistan.
[3] Some influential Afghans chose not to attend. Among them was Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a former Afghan Prime Minister, who objected to US influence and presence in Afghanistan. He remains ‘at large’ and an important leader among insurgent groups.
[4] Based on United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan website at http://www.unama-afg.org/about/info.htm.
[5] CountryReports.org at http://www.countryreports.org/country.aspx?countryid=1
[6] Some of this information is based on information taken from GlobalSecurity.org at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm. Accessed November 2006.
[7] US Department of Defence news briefing held at the Pentagon on October 7, 2001. At http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2001/10/mil-011007-usia04.htm. Accessed November 2006.
[8] Appathurai, James. Evidence. Standing Committee on National Defence, February 27, 2007. p. 16.
[9] The Prime Minister announced the funding on February 26, 2007. The Prime Minister’s website says: “Prime Minister Stephen Harper today announced up to $200 million in additional funding for reconstruction and development activities in Afghanistan […] The funding, to be disbursed this year and next on top of Canada’s annual allocation of $100 million to development activities in Afghanistan, will flow to five priority areas: governance and development ($120 million); counter-narcotics ($30 million); policing ($20 million); de-mining ($20 million); and road construction ($10 million).” At http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?category=1&id=1552.
[10] ISAF New Release. British troops ready to respond to immediate
threats. May 17, 2007. At
http://www.nato.int/isaf/Update/Press_Releases/newsrelease/2007/pr070517-377.htm.
[11] Defence Direct, April 2007. At http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/defencedirect/apr2007/april.htm
[12] Bogdan, Zaryn. Polish Radio External Service. May 10, 2007. At
http://www.polskieradio.pl/zagranica/gb/dokument.aspx?iid=52203.
[13] “A Double Spring Offensive.” The Economist. Print edition. February 22, 2007.
[14] Alexander, Christopher. Evidence. Standing Committee of National Defence, February 27, 2007. p. 16.
[15] Rubin, Barnett R. and Abubakar Siddique. “Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Stalemate.” Special Report. United States Intitute of Peace, October 2006.
[16] Gulbuddin Hekmatyar served twice as Afghanistan’s Prime Minister in the 1990s, but was forced to flee to Iran before the end of the decade. He opposed the US invasion of Afghanistan and ended up leading an insurgency against the Afghan government. He was invited to participate in the Bonn Agreement in 2001, but refused, complaining about American interference. He remains at large, still sponsoring insurgent attacks against the Afghanistan government and foreign troops in the country.
[17] Ibid. p. 3.
[18] Jones, Seth. “Pakistan’s Dangerous Game.” Survival Vol. 49, No. 1, Spring 2007. pp. 15-32.
[19] Ahmad Shah Massoud, the charismatic leader of the Northern Alliance was the target of a suicide attack on September 9, 2001, two days before the September 11, 2001 attacks on the US, a timing considered significant by some commentators who believe Osama bin Laden ordered the assassination to ensure he would have the Taliban's protection and cooperation in Afghanistan.
[20] Jones, Seth. “Flagging Ally: Pakistan's Lapses Are Hurting the War on Terror.” San Diego Union-Tribune. January 14, 2007. Seth Jones is a RAND Corporation expert in Terrorism and Nation-building.
[21] Lamb, Christina. “Britain says Pakistan is hiding Taliban chief.” Times Online. October 8, 2006. At
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article665054.ece.
“Lieutenant-General David Richards will fly to Islamabad tomorrow to try to
persuade Pervez Musharraf to rein in his military intelligence service, which
Richards believes is training Taliban fighters to attack British troops.”
[22] Dodd, Mark. “Afghanistan warns of narco-state danger.” The Australian. February 20, 2007. On February 19, 2007, Afghanistan’s Ambassador to Australia, Mohammed Anwar Anwarzai, said, ”Unfortunately, we are now on the verge of becoming a narco-state. I can confess to that.”
[23] The Afghan Border Police are stationed at established crossing points, but they are not capable of conducting extensive border control operations.
[24] Mackay, The Honourable Peter. Evidence. Standing Committee on National Defence, No. 24. November 22, 2006.
[25] Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. In Depth Afghanistan: The Taliban, Afghanistan’s Fundamentalist Leaders, updated March 21, 2006.
[26] Chivers, C.J. “Major Taliban offensive hasn’t materialized, NATO General says.” International Herald Tribune, Wednesday, April 18, 2007.
[27] Stein, Professor Janice. Appearing on The Agenda. TV Ontario, February 20, 2007.
[28] ACBAR. Brief to the United Nations Security Council on the Situation in Afghanistan.
[29] Price, Caitlin. “Afghanistan president signs war crimes amnesty bill into law.” Jurist Legal News and Research. University of Pittsburgh, Sunday, March 11, 2007. At http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2007/03/afghanistan-president-signs-war-crimes.php.
[30] ACBAR.
[31] Rubin, Barnett. “Saving Afghanistan.” Foreign
Affairs. January/February 2007. At
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070101faessay86105/barnett-r-rubin/saving-afghanistan.html.
[32] US forces were consistently militarily successful throughout the Vietnam War, but that record was no match for the anti-war movement. In the eyes of Americans, the war had simply gone on for too long, at too high a price for little apparent gain.
[33] The United Nations Protection Force first entered Croatia in 1992. The NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) entered Bosnia in 1995. It became the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) in 1996. Military forces, now under European Union command, remain in the Bosnia-Herzegovina today.
[34] Alexander, Christopher. UN Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (Political Affairs) in Afghanistan, appearing before the Committee on February 27, 2007.