CHAPTER 1: THE DECISION TO MAINTAIN
CANADA’S SUBMARINE CAPABILITY
Plans to Replace the Old Oberon Submarines (1980-1994)
Canada decided to replace its old Oberon submarines basically because military and government officials believed that maintaining a submarine capability was an important element of this country’s defence and its ability to protect its interests. In order to understand why this became an issue in the 1990s and why it is still an issue in 2005, it is necessary to review the origins of this capability and the long process which led to the signing of contracts with the United Kingdom for the acquisition of four submarines.
Canada’s Navy has a long history of submarine operations, but these have never been its main focus. The Navy operated a few submarines during the First World War and while it did not have submarines of its own during the Second World War, except for some captured enemy vessels in the final weeks of the war, some Canadians served aboard the submarines of the United Kingdom’s Royal Navy. The cold war prompted Canada’s Navy to acquire a few submarines in the 1960s, initially through leasing arrangements with the United States Navy for two Second World War vessels and then through the purchase from the United Kingdom of three new Oberon class submarines.2 Adding submarines to the fleet of surface vessels and maritime patrol aircraft was in keeping with the use by other NATO navies of a multi-layered approach to anti-submarine warfare to counter the threat posed by Soviet submarines. The naval battles of the Second World War had demonstrated the value of using air and naval forces combined to detect submerged submarines. However, as Martin Shadwick of the York Centre for International and Security Studies pointed out to the Committee, the Oberons were used for much of their operational life mainly to provide anti-submarine warfare training for air and surface ships. There was more emphasis on their surveillance and anti-submarine capabilities during the last years of operational use.3
By the 1980s, when submarines were a well-established capability within the fleet, the Canadian Navy started planning for the replacement of the three Oberons which were expected to be close to the limit of their safe operational lifespan by the end of the 1990s. The original plans called for new submarines with a propulsion system similar to the diesel-electric one used in the Oberons.4 However, there was a brief hiatus when, as indicated in the 1987 Defence White Paper, Canada announced its intention to buy nuclear-powered submarines and to expand its fleet to as many as 10 or 12 vessels. Various arguments were used to justify the proposed acquisition including the necessity to increase naval capabilities in order to assert sovereignty in Canadian waters, especially in the Arctic, and to make an effective contribution to allied maritime operations during the cold war. However, the proposed acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines was questioned because of the costs involved and concerns about the use of a propulsion system relying on nuclear energy, whatever its operational advantages under the polar ice cap and elsewhere.5 In 1989, when it became evident that the cold war was coming to an end, the Progressive Conservative Government announced the cancellation of these controversial plans as well as the first of what became a long series of cuts in Canadian defence spending made during the last decade of the last century, the effects of which are still being felt by the Canadian Forces today.
Thus, in the early 1990s, the Navy again found itself looking for a replacement for its old Oberons. Vice-Admiral (Retired) Peter Cairns, who was the commander of Maritime Forces Pacific and later commander of the Navy prior to his retirement in 1994, confirmed in his testimony to the Committee that between 1989 and 1993, the Navy examined many types of conventionally powered submarines as possible replacements for the Oberons. The candidates included the Walrus class submarine produced in the Netherlands, the German Type 209 and the British-made Upholder class then entering service with the Royal Navy. The Navy favoured submarines with enough range and other capabilities to operate in the oceans far from their home port rather than those designed more for coastal defence. This was due to the fact that in addition to the protection of Canadian waters, the Navy was also involved in naval operations in the North Atlantic and elsewhere as part of Canada’s commitments to NATO. Another reason for the search for a replacement submarine was the looming termination of a contract for spare parts for the Oberon. At that time, the United Kingdom was the main source of spare parts for the British-built Oberons operated by Australia and Canada as well as the Royal Navy. According to Brigadier-General (Retired) Darrell Dean, then-commander of the Canadian Defence Liaison Staff (London), British officials alerted Canada to this effect in 1992.6
The Navy’s plans to replace the Oberons were stated in the Department of National Defence policy statement entitled Canadian Defence Policy made public in April 1992. This document was issued at a time when Canada was still adjusting the size and capabilities of the Canadian Forces in light of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war. Among other things, it noted that submarines “greatly enhance the flexibility of maritime forces and increase our ability to carry out surveillance and enforcement in our maritime areas of responsibility.” The statement added that in “a project continuing beyond the end of the 15-year planning period, the Navy will replace its three Oberon Class submarines with up to six modern conventional submarines, in order to provide an underwater capability in both the Atlantic and Pacific.”7 This was a commitment to replace the old submarines, but the government of the day was not necessarily ready to proceed quickly with the actual acquisition of replacement submarines. There were other defence priorities at this time, including a contract, subsequently cancelled, for the purchase of EH-101 helicopters to replace the Sea King maritime helicopters, a project which was becoming more and more controversial because of, among other things, questions about the need for modernized anti-submarine capabilities in the post-cold war era. Besides, as the policy statement pointed out, the government intended to use the limited funds available for new military equipment projects “frugally on the highest priority items.”8 These and other factors may explain why the Progressive Conservative Cabinet of the day deferred a final decision on the acquisition of replacement submarines.9 However, the need to replace the old submarines became more acute as the Oberons decreased in efficiency.
British Upholder Submarines Become Available for Acquisition (1993-1994)
In the early 1990s, Canada was by no means the only NATO country adjusting the size and capabilities of its armed forces to the realities of a post-Cold war world. The United Kingdom was engaged in a similar process and took a number of decisions concerning military equipment, one of which had a significant impact on Canada’s plans to replace its old submarines. In 1993, the British Royal Navy had a submarine fleet composed of nuclear-powered (SSNs) and diesel-electric (SSKs) attack submarines, used mainly for anti-submarine warfare, and nuclear-powered submarines (SSBNs) carrying Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs).10 Given the collapse of the Soviet Union and the significant reduction in the threat to international peace, the U.K. government announced on July 5, 1993, in a defence white paper, a series of reductions in the force levels of British military forces. With regard to the Royal Navy, the U.K. Secretary of State for Defence, Mr. Rifkind, stated that “the rapid decline in the size and operational activity of the former Soviet submarine fleet means that there is no longer the same need to sustain the current level of anti-submarine operations in the North Atlantic;…” Therefore, he announced a reduction in the fleet of attack submarines to 12 SSNs and the withdrawal from service of the 4 Upholder class of diesel-electric submarines by 1995.11 The Upholders were at that time basically new submarines since construction of the first of the class began in late 1983 and the others were built during the last half of the 1980s. They completed the usual initial sea trials and began their operational service only when they were commissioned between 1990 and 1993, so they were not used extensively in operational terms before being withdrawn from service in 1994. The Upholders utilized some features similar to those found on nuclear-powered submarines such as an advanced hull design covered with anechoic tiles on the exterior surfaces so that they would be more difficult to detect. They were a new generation of submarines with a number of advantages over the Oberons and their 1960s technology.
However, the sea trials in the 1980s of the first vessel of the class, HMS Upholder, revealed problems including flooding in the original torpedo tubes and the loss of power when the main propulsion system was rapidly reversed during a performance test for an extreme situation sometimes encountered by submarines. The numerous months of delays caused by the teething problems experienced during the initial sea trials and the resulting controversy prompted the Defence Committee of the United Kingdom House of Commons to undertake a study of the Upholder project. In paragraph 34 of its 1991 report, the British committee noted the statement made by officials of the Ministry of Defence that it was not surprising that problems had occurred because the “first of class is always subjected to particularly rigorous sea trials.”12 While concerned about the problems causing the delays, the report basically shared that view and was optimistic that the Upholders “will prove to be excellent submarines” following correction of the faults identified during the initial trials.13 As demonstrated in paragraph 28, the report was more preoccupied by the manner in which the Ministry of Defence had managed the procurement project than by the design of the submarine. It questioned the decision of the ministry to take responsibility for the integration of the various elements of the submarine such as the equipment, propulsion, and weapons systems rather than letting the company which built the vessel do it. The propulsion equipment and the Weapons Handling and Discharge System apparently worked fine when tested at the factory, but experienced problems once they were installed in the submarine. The British report suggests that some of these interface problems between different systems could have been avoided if the integration had been carried out differently. Solutions to these problems were found and many of the required modifications were carried out during or shortly after the British parliamentary study. However, like other newly constructed naval vessels in their first years of operations, the Upholders were not necessarily completely free of problems when they were withdrawn from service in 1994.
The British committee report also briefly explored the potential for export sales of Upholder class submarines. In 1991, the focus was on the possible construction of additional Upholders rather than on the disposal of the four submarines constructed for the Royal Navy. In paragraph 16, the report stated that Canada had been identified as early as 1990 as a potential customer. When the United Kingdom decided to withdraw the Upholders from Royal Navy operations, Canada was again viewed as a potential customer, but this time it was the existing submarines which were offered for sale. British officials contacted the commander of the Canadian Defence Liaison Staff (London), Brigadier-General (Retired) Dean, in the fall of 1993 to see if Canada was interested in acquiring the submarines.14 Although the U.K. spent a few billion dollars to develop and build the four submarines, it was willing to sell them to a major ally at a fraction of the total costs instead of scrapping them. According to testimony and published sources, various countries including South Africa, Portugal, Greece, and others expressed interest, but, for a variety of reasons, including close cooperation between the Canadian and British navies over the years, the U.K. apparently gave Canada the right to first refusal. According to Mr. Ray Sturgeon, the Senior Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel) of the Department of National Defence in the period between 1992 and 1994, he went to the U.K. in March 1993 with Vice-Admiral (Retired) Cairns, then-Commander of Maritime Command. With the consent of the Minister of National Defence, they wanted to “launch preliminary discussions” with British officials to let them know that “we might be interested.”15 Mr. Sturgeon indicated that the meeting with British officials, “given the circumstances at the time,” did not involve the Canadian Defence Liaison Staff (London) which, as noted above, was contacted officially by a British official, the First Sea Lord, later in 1993.16
Debate in Canada and Cabinet Examination of Proposed Acquisition (1993-1996)
The possible acquisition by Canada of the four Upholder submarines became public knowledge in 1993-1994. This period was marked by, among other things, the transfer of power from a Progressive Conservative government to one formed by the Liberal Party following the October 1993 elections. The new government initiated a full scale review of Canadian defence policy which led to the tabling in the fall of 1994 of a report by the Special Joint Committee of the House of Commons and the Senate on Canada’s Defence Policy. The Special Joint Committee was composed of Members of Parliament from the Liberal, Reform, and Bloc Québécois parties and Liberal and Progressive Conservative Senators. There was no member from the New Democratic Party. In one of its recommendations, the Special Joint Committee stated that it could not support a full-scale acquisition project costing $4 to $6 billion for new submarines built in a foreign or Canadian shipyard on the premise that Canada’s treasury could simply not bear such an expense. However, the Committee added that the government should seriously consider the acquisition of three to six modern diesel-electric submarines on a basis that was “demonstrably cost-effective” or, in other words, that “could be managed within the existing capital budget” of the Department of National Defence.17 In a dissenting report, the Bloc Québécois members of the Special Joint Committee stated, among other things, that they were “completely opposed to the purchase of submarines for Canada’s Navy as envisaged in the majority report. Regardless of whether submarines are available on the market at low prices, we believe that purchasing such a system would inevitably result in related costs (purchases of torpedoes, maintenance and personnel training costs, operating expenses, increase in inventory systems upgrading, etc.) which would inflate the budget expenditures of the Department of Defence.”18
The Special Joint Committee majority report influenced the 1994 Defence White Paper which responded to the report’s recommendation regarding submarines by noting that the United Kingdom was selling its Upholder submarines and that the government intended to “explore this option.”19 It was clear that the government was going to pursue the matter, but the White Paper also identified equipment purchases which were given a high priority, such as new armoured personnel carriers for the army and a new search and rescue helicopter to replace the Labradors. Furthermore, it announced cuts in military personnel and in the defence budget in keeping with deficit reduction measures applied to federal government spending in general. Given these cuts, the context was not ideal for a speedy replacement of the Oberons, but the White Paper’s emphasis on maintaining a multi-purpose combat-capable force gave some urgency to the project because the Oberons were approaching the end of their service life and were less and less capable because of their age and safety considerations. This was yet another situation where Canadian Forces personnel had to continue operating old equipment amid some concerns about safety and readiness levels.
The replacement of the submarines was only one of a number of military equipment projects being considered at this time and it did not attract much public attention. There were no major announcements by government and military officials concerning the project in the months immediately following the publication of the 1994 Defence White Paper. Indeed, the Senior Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel) of the Department of National Defence from July 1994 to April 1996, Lieutenant-General (Retired) Robert Fischer stated that in terms of the acquisition process, “little, if any, substantive activity” on the Upholder file occurred during this period.20 However, there was in fact a flurry of activity, especially in December 1994 and in January 1995, before the acquisition process ground to a halt. In his testimony, Mr. Dean stated that the recently appointed Minister of National Defence, Mr. David Collenette, and the Deputy Minister at that time, Robert Fowler, were briefed on the availability of the Upholders during a stopover in London. After being advised that the approval process for the acquisition might take a long time, British officials nevertheless requested a letter from the Canadian minister to their minister to confirm Canada’s interest in the acquisition. In his letter dated December 10, 1994 to Malcolm Rifkind, U.K. Secretary of State for Defence, Mr. Collenette stated that in the wake of the White Paper’s support for the recommendations of the Special Joint Committee report, he had directed his staff to “explore more comprehensively” with British officials “the details of an acquisition plan” for the four Upholders. Mr. Dean stated that although he never saw a copy of the letter, it set in place the “lease-for-purchase barter” arrangement whereby the submarines could be leased and then purchased for a nominal fee in exchange of funds spent by the U.K. for the training of their forces at facilities in Canada.21 However, the text of Mr. Collenette’s letter actually only states that Canadian and British officials will work to confirm “the possibility of innovative financial arrangements.”22
Mr. Collenette’s letter paved the way for the January 1995 visit to the Upholder submarines in the United Kingdom by a team of Canadian military and departmental officials.23 Mr. Fischer and Mr. Dean mentioned in their testimony that some Canadian military personnel went to the U.K. in the mid-1990s either to visit the submarines, to receive training, or to participate in an exchange of military personnel between Canada and other allied countries, a practice which still exists today. At least one Canadian naval officer served aboard an Upholder class submarine as part of the crew during an exchange tour in the early 1990s. The information gathered earlier on the Upholders likely served to prepare the delegation for its January 1995 visit. British military and corporate officials gave technical briefings on the mechanical and electronic systems of the Upholders to the Canadians and apparently responded to most of their questions. It is clear that the Canadian delegation examined the submarines with the perspective that Canada was clearly interested in acquiring the submarines and was on the brink of taking a decision, perhaps as early as April 1995, to proceed with the acquisition.
While instructed not to engage in financial discussions, the delegation’s task was to compare the Upholders with the Oberons and identify equipment and training issues that had to be addressed in order to bring the newer submarines up to operational status within the Canadian fleet. Some of these issues had already been identified by the British parliamentary committee study and the Canadian military officers who visited the Upholders in the early 1990s. The 1995 report basically confirmed the consensus among Canadian naval personnel that if Canada obtained the Upholders, one of the major items would be the modification of the weapons system so that the torpedoes used by all Canadian warships, the U.S.-made MK 48 torpedo, could be used instead of the British torpedoes. This is the origin of one of the main elements of the “Canadianization” process undertaken when the Upholders were eventually transferred to Canada from the United Kingdom starting in 2000. It appears that the MK 48 torpedoes and especially the kind of fire control system used or being developed for the Canadian Oberons at that time were judged superior to the British equivalent. The changes concerning the torpedos, not to mention those for the communications systems, were likely proposed in order to ensure a high level of interoperability with allied naval forces. Some elements of the Upholders such as the propulsion and sensor systems were considered to be similar enough to those on the old Oberons to facilitate the training of the crews making the transition from the old vessels to the Upholder class. The advanced technology of the Upholders also promised to improve the operational effectiveness of Canada’s naval fleet. Some of the problems that have been mentioned in news stories since 2000 when the submarines started being transferred to Canada, such as those concerning the diesel exhaust hull and back up valves, were recognized in 1995 as issues requiring attention. Other issues which have more recently attracted attention, such as the insulation of electrical wiring, were not raised.
Overall, the 1995 delegation apparently had a positive attitude towards the Upholders and considered the condition of the submarines, which had already been moored for many months, to be better than expected. However, the condition varied from one vessel to another, as indicated in one of the report’s annexes. The general condition of HMS Upholder (later HMCS Chicoutimi), the first and oldest of the class, was described as being generally good, although it required a major period of work. The second vessel built, HMS Unseen (later HMCS Victoria) was considered to be in the best condition of all four. The condition of the third vessel built, HMS Ursula (later HMCS Corner Brook) was judged to be fair and there was some concern about how the machinery spaces were being cared for. The condition of HMS Unicorn (later HMCS Windsor), the newest vessel, was good although, as in the case of HMS Ursula, no specific defect list had been provided by British officials. It was clear that some work was required in order to bring the Upholders back to full operational status, but this did not appear to be an obstacle to the acquisition process. The fact that these used submarines were by this time basically the only option available to the Navy to replace the Oberons may have influenced the way senior naval officials interpreted the conclusions reached by the 1995 delegation.
Armed with the information gathered during the January 1995 visit of the Upholders, the Minister of National Defence of the day, David Collenette, was presumably convinced that the condition of the British vessels was good enough to meet Canada’s requirement and that the price asked by the British was within the limitations identified by the 1994 Defence White Paper. Thus, he argued the case for proceeding with the acquisition at a meeting of the Cabinet in April 1995. As Mr. Collenette told the Committee, the Cabinet more or less gave its approval to the project, but Prime Minister Jean Chrétien had second thoughts.24 Many sectors of Canadian society including social and health programs as well as defence were starting to feel the effects of the cuts in federal government spending which the Liberal Cabinet believed necessary in order to reduce the national deficit. The Prime Minister was apparently concerned about the way the Canadian public would perceive the purchase of submarines at a time when many social and health programs were being cancelled or reduced. Further action on the acquisition project was delayed pending a better political climate for the announcement of yet another military equipment project on top of the purchase of new armoured personnel carriers and the replacement of search and rescue helicopters announced in the White Paper. Mr. Collenette’s testimony confirmed the speculation among journalists and academics that Prime Minister Chrétien had been directly involved in the decision to delay the acquisition.25
The Navy had no option but to wait and hope for an improvement in the political climate for the acquisition to proceed. It was already facing the stark reality that it either obtained the Upholder submarines at a good price or it abandoned its submarine capability once it was no longer safe to operate the old Oberons. Now, there was no certainty if and when the acquisition project would actually go ahead. It is from this point on that the submarine project really entered into its period of “little, if any, substantive activity” as described by Mr. Fischer. Nevertheless, the Navy apparently remained resolved to replace the Oberons with the Upholders and the Committee did not see or hear much evidence that it or the Department reassessed the requirement for submarines during this period. However, the fact remains that by April 1995, most of the Upholders had been tied to a wharf for many months and, except for the electrical power fed from shore to demonstrate the electronic systems to prospective customers, the vessels were just soaking up the sun and the salt water. Both the Prime Minister and the Navy should have been concerned at this time about the effects of long periods of inactivity on the machinery aboard complex vessels like submarines.
Cabinet Approval for the Acquisition of the Upholders (1997-1998)
When Art Eggleton became Minister of National Defence in 1997, the Department was still awaiting Cabinet approval for the acquisition of the Upholder submarines. Shortly after becoming minister and receiving information on the proposed acquisition from military and departmental officials, Mr. Eggleton visited the submarines in the United Kingdom in June 1997. Mr. Eggleton told the Committee that there was no undue amount of pressure from British officials for a quick decision, although they were certainly anxious for a final decision since other countries continued to express interest in the submarines.26 He noted that the issue of Canada’s payment of penalties after the cancellation in 1993 of the EH-101 helicopters contract, which involved some British companies, had been settled by the time he became minister and was therefore not a factor in the submarine acquisition. Furthermore, by this time, other equipment priorities had been taken care of, such as the replacement of the Labrador search and rescue helicopters. However, Mr. Eggleton pointed out that it was still necessary to find extra funding within the defence budget for the submarines at a time when the Department of National Defence, like other governments departments, faced significant cuts in its expenditures. These funds were made available by withdrawing from service some of the old surface ships waiting to be replaced by the new frigates and two of the old Oberons. The already scheduled refit of one of the Oberons was also cancelled. As for the possibility of a barter arrangement where Canada “could offset the expenditure to the U.K. by the incoming revenue we get from the U.K.”, Mr. Eggleton confirmed that the issue had been raised before he became minister.
Mr. Eggleton stated that he made a major presentation on the submarine acquisition to the Cabinet which finally gave its approval on March 31, 1998. The Department of National Defence issued a news release and a backgrounder on April 6, 1998 announcing the acquisition of the Upholder submarines.27 These documents indicated that the total costs would not be more than $750 million (later adjusted to $812 million to take inflation into account). They also stated that the financing arrangements included an eight-year, interest-free, lease-to-buy arrangement, a bartering “of Canadian lease payments on the four submarines for the costs charged to the U.K. for continued training of British Forces in Canada at bases in Wainwright, Suffield and Goose Bay” (according to the backgrounder), and a nominal sum at the end of the lease of one pound Sterling to purchase each submarine. The Department issued another press release on July 2, 1998 which announced the signing of the two major contracts.28 One contract was with the Government of the United Kingdom for the lease-to-purchase of the four Upholders and the purchase of training equipment and a technical data package.
The other was signed with Vickers Shipbuilding and Engineering Ltd. (VSEL) for the initial equipment spares and the training of Canadian crews.29 The press release concerning the contracts again made reference to an arrangement involving “an innovative eight-year, interest-free, lease-to-buy agreement in which Canada’s submarine lease payments will be bartered for the British forces’ use of training facilities” in Canada.
| 2 | Canada purchased a fourth Oberon submarine in 1989, but HMCS Olympus was moored to a wharf and was used only for training. |
| 3 | Evidence, Meeting No. 19, February 10, 2005. |
| 4 | Most conventionally-powered or non-nuclear submarines have a propulsion system where diesel engines drive generators which power the electric motor used to turn the propeller and recharge the batteries. |
| 5 | While any submarine operations under the polar icecap involve some risks, nuclear-powered submarines can count on an almost endless flow of electrical power thanks to their nuclear reactor. Submerged diesel-electric submarines are dependent mostly on the finite power provided by batteries and cannot venture too far under the polar ice cap since they may have to break through the ice and surface to operate the diesel engines and recharge the batteries. Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) systems have been or are being developed which can replace or supplement the diesel engines with fuel cells or other sources of energy not dependent on air, but under ice operations by submarines with this type of equipment would still have to be carried out with caution. Limited under ice capability is only one of the advantages offered by AIP technology. See for example Karen Winzoski, “Taking the Plunge: Should Canada Use Fuel Cell Technology to Make the Victoria-class Submarines More Stealthy?” Canadian American Strategic Review, May 2003. |
| 6 | Evidence, Meeting No. 8, November 15, 2004. |
| 7 | Canada, Department of National Defence, Canadian Defence Policy. April 1992, p. 22. |
| 9 | Julie Ferguson, Deeply Canadian. New Submarines for a New Millenium. Port Moody, B.C., Beacon Publishing, 2000, p. 185. |
| 10 | The Royal Navy’s nuclear-powered submarines carrying ballistic missiles (SSBNs) was the U.K.’s nuclear deterrence force. In the early 1990s, the U.K. was in the process of replacing its SSBNs with Polaris missiles with new ones (the Vanguard class) with Trident missiles. In other words, the U.K. had other submarine projects underway at this time besides the Upholder project. |
| 11 | United Kingdom, House of Commons, Debates, July 5, 1993. |
| 12 | United Kingdom, House of Commons, Defence Committee, Procurement of Upholder Class Submarines, July 17, 1991. |
| 14 | Evidence, Meeting No. 8, November 15, 2004. |
| 15 | Evidence, Meeting No. 9, November 22, 2004. |
| 16 | Evidence, Meeting No. 8, November 15, 2004. |
| 17 | Report of the Special Joint Committee on Canada’s Defence Policy, Security in a Changing World, October 1994, p. 38. |
| 18 | Dissenting Report by the Bloc Québécois Members of the Special Joint Committee on Canada’s Defence Policy in Report of the Special Joint Committee on Canada’s Defence Policy, Security in a Changing World, October 1994, p. 81. |
| 19 | Department of National Defence, 1994 Defence White Paper, p. 47. |
| 20 | Evidence, Meeting No. 9, November 22, 2004. |
| 21 | Evidence, Meeting No. 8, November 15, 2004. |
| 22 | A copy of this letter was provided to the Committee with the other documents requested from the Department of National Defence. |
| 23 | A copy of the report was part of the documents provided by the Department of National Defence in answer to the Committee’s request for British and Canadian lists identifying the deficiencies of the Upholder class submarines. |
| 24 | Evidence, Meeting No. 15, December 13, 2004. |
| 25 | In her book, Julie Ferguson indicates that the decision concerning the submarine acquisition was delayed by Prime Minister Chrétien, but that this happened in the spring of 1996. See Julie Ferguson, Deeply Canadian. New Submarines for a New Millenium. Port Moody, B.C., Beacon Publishing, 2000, p.156. However, on page 185 as well as on p. 156, Julie Ferguson indicates that in 1995 British officials were irritated by the decision to delay the acquisition and ended Canada’s right to first refusal. |
| 26 | Evidence, Meeting No. 11, November 29, 2004. |
| 27 | Canada, Department of National Defence, “Submarines For Canada’s Navy,” News Release NR-98.018, April 6,1998; “Submarine For Canada’s Navy,” Backgrounder BG-98.017, April 6, 1998. |
| 28 | Canada, Department of National Defence, “Submarine Contracts Signed,” News Release NR-98.052, July 2, 1998. |
| 29 | In the following months, the name of the company changed a number of times. It was called Marconi-Marine (VSEL) Ltd. and then Marconi Naval Systems before changing to its current name, BAE Marine Systems, one of the many elements within the BAE Systems corporation. BAE Systems was established in 1999 when British Aerospace (BAe) merged with Marconi Electronic Systems. |