NDDN Committee Report

INTRODUCTION

Canadians were once again reminded of the dangers Canadian Forces personnel face while carrying out their duties when fire broke out aboard HMCS Chicoutimi on October 5, 2004. The last of the four Upholder class submarines acquired by Canada from the United Kingdom had just begun its voyage across the Atlantic Ocean to its new home when the fire started. The crew members of the Chicoutimi had to react quickly in order to save their lives and their vessel, but some of them suffered injuries, including Lieutenant Chris Saunders who died after being evacuated to a hospital. The tragic loss of life and the dramatic situation faced by the remaining crew members until the crippled submarine could be towed back to its port of departure caught the attention of all Canadians.

Shortly after the incident aboard the Chicoutimi, this committee undertook a study of the acquisition of the four British-built Upholder class submarines, called the Victoria class in Canadian service. While the Board of Inquiry established by the military investigated the fire aboard the Chicoutimi, this committee examined the broader issues related to the acquisition of the submarines such as the assessment of the equipment needs of the Canadian Forces, the particular process through which the submarines were purchased, the way decisions concerning priorities are taken, and the training provided to Canadian submariners to ensure safe and efficient operation of the vessels. The Committee heard the testimony of a number of witnesses including not only senior officials from the Department of National Defence, but also retired military and government officials, including former submariners, and former ministers of National Defence. The goal was to examine the decisions taken over the last 15 years to acquire the four Upholder class submarines to replace the old Oberon class vessels and the problems encountered while trying to bring them up to full operational status within Canada’s maritime forces.

The incident aboard the Chicoutimi was the latest and most tragic in a long series of mishaps, delays, and problems that have plagued the acquisition and operation of Canada’s new class of submarines over the last decade. Some witnesses questioned the Committee’s decision to review the submarine acquisition at this time given that similar parliamentary studies had not been undertaken in the past whenever Canadian military personnel had been killed or injured in accidents.¹ Others may have wondered why the Committee waited years after its announcement to look into the submarine acquisition in some detail, forgetting that Committee members have raised questions about the project during past studies of military readiness and other issues. Indeed, parliamentarians and other Canadians knowledgeable about the military equipment procurement process became increasingly frustrated by the long delays experienced by this acquisition project. It took too long to decide whether or not to proceed with the acquisition and then it took too much time to reactivate the submarines and to bring them up to full operational status once they had been transferred to Canada. The fire aboard the Chicoutimi inevitably prompted strong reactions, especially since there were now also growing concerns about the safety of our submariners.

Thus, the Committee decided to hear testimony from a number of government officials, military personnel, and other witnesses in order to piece together the arguably torturous history of this lengthy and troubled acquisition project. The Committee also had the opportunity to hear the views of Canadian submariners during its visit of one of the submarines and naval facilities in Halifax. Unfortunately, a long drawn out acquisition process has become the norm for almost every new piece of equipment provided to the Canadian Forces. There are many examples, including the maritime helicopters and the introduction of new combat uniforms, where new equipment is delivered to the military a decade or two after the acquisition process has started. However, the acquisition of the submarines has been especially complicated, both in terms of process and technological issues. Some of the questions raised during Committee meetings may sometimes appear to be fundamental, but this is the type of information Canadians, most of whom are not experts in military affairs and submarine technology, are seeking in order to judge the value of this project.

Some academic studies and media reports had already described the major decisions taken during the course of the acquisition process. However, by questioning military and government representatives, as well as academics and retired military and other officials, the Committee was able to confirm some of the known facts while discovering some details which shed new light on the way decisions were taken and implemented. To assist the research process, the Committee requested a series of documents from the Department of National Defence, including the contracts for the acquisition and support of the submarines. However, while we recognized that meeting our demand involved time and effort, our examination of the issues was seriously hampered by delays experienced in obtaining from the Department the originals of the documents and the translated version necessary to proceed with the distribution of the documents to all members of the Committee in a timely fashion. The Committee decided to proceed with the drafting of its report despite these delays and those caused by the reconvening of the military Board of Inquiry examining the incident aboard the Chicoutimi because Canadians are waiting for answers about the acquisition project. The findings of the Board of Inquiry may or may not raise new questions about the submarine acquisition, but the fact remains that the Committee’s mandate was to examine the broad issues including the rationale for this acquisition, the decision-making process, and the management of the project. Thus, while it would have been useful to know the findings of the Board of Inquiry during drafting, the Committee believes that it has sufficient information to draw valid conclusions about this acquisition and leaves the door open to the tabling of additional reports on this project if in its judgement the findings of the Board of Inquiry report or new revelations make this necessary.