NDDN Committee Report

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Following the fire aboard HMCS Chicoutimi on October 5, 2004, the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs decided to examine Canada’s acquisition of four Upholder class submarines from the United Kingdom. The Committee examined issues related to this acquisition including the assessment of the equipment needs of the Canadian Forces, how the submarines were purchased, the decision-making process, and the training given to Canadian submariners.

The Committee heard the testimony of a number of academics, military officers, and government officials, as well as former ministers of National Defence and other individuals in order to piece together the history of this acquisition project. This testimony shows that in the early 1990s, the government and the military, faced with the need to replace the old Oberon submarines, decided that Canada should acquire replacement submarines. However, given the end of the cold war and cuts in federal government spending, notably on defence, the proposed project faced a number of hurdles. These included opposition from some Canadians to such an acquisition as well as the higher priority given to other military equipment projects by the 1994 Defence White Paper. Nevertheless, the White Paper stated that the option of acquiring existing submarines at a good price, given qualified support by the 1994 report of the Special Joint Committee of the House of Commons and the Senate on Canada’s Defence Policy, would be explored. 

The option explored was the acquisition from the United Kingdom of four Upholder class diesel-electric submarines withdrawn from service with the Royal Navy in 1994. According to testimony and the documents obtained from the Department of National Defence, the Navy evaluated the British submarines in 1995 in preparation for their imminent acquisition, but the Cabinet decision to go ahead was delayed. Concerned about competing demands on the federal treasury during a period of fiscal restraint and the possible public reaction to the announcement of such a military equipment purchase, Prime Minister Chrétien delayed approving the project at that time. Months of delay turned into years and the project was finally approved by the Cabinet only in 1998.

The Committee heard concerns about the effects of such a long delay on the condition of the submarines. These effects complicate the evaluation of the extent to which Canada received good value for the money paid for this acquisition. There are also differing perceptions on the importance of these submarines to Canada’s defence capabilities. Some witnesses highlighted the extent to which these submarines can contribute to surveillance operations in Canadian waters, including those in the North to a limited extent. Others questioned the necessity of equipping the Navy with submarines given the changing nature of the threat faced by Canada and its allies. A consensus on the importance of these submarines to Canada’s military capabilities may only be possible when this country’s defence priorities, set in 1994, are updated.  

The evaluation of the purchase of the submarines was not helped by the confusion which existed over the costs of the acquisition project and how the contractual arrangements were carried out. Government announcements in 1998 concerning the submarine acquisition emphasized the low costs of the $750 million project compared to those for the construction of new submarines. They also highlighted the possibility of a barter arrangement where some of the costs of leasing the submarines would be in exchange for the funds paid for the use by British forces of training facilities in Canada. The impression that at least some of the costs were covered by the barter arrangement lingered on until a few weeks after the fire aboard HMCS Chicoutimi when it was revealed during testimony that the barter arrangement did not materialize. The Committee is concerned that the government did not take action to correct this perception.

The Committee is also concerned by all the problems experienced during the reactivation of the submarines in the United Kingdom and the preparations here in Canada to bring the submarines, renamed the Victoria class, to full operational status. The problems involved in preparing Canadian submariners for the transition to the new type of submarines and in Canadianizing the vessels to ensure interoperability with other Canadian warships and those of allied countries appear to have been underestimated. Delays in the reactivation process caused delays in training and the Canadianization process did not escape the effects of perhaps overly optimistic expectations about how smoothly the acquisition process would proceed. Some of the problems have been overcome and progress is being made on others. However, more rigorous risk analysis might have helped avoid some of the problems. The lessons learned could help the Navy face the significant challenge of operating the only examples of this class of submarine in the world.