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FAIT Committee Report

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CHAPTER 16:
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT

However, there are political, strategic, and some business reasons for pursuing some issues in a regional context. If one accepts that, I think one then has to look in some more detail at how those regional rules are going to interact with multilateral rules. [Robert Howse, 33:1540]

The Need for a Dispute Settlement Process

In addition to agreeing to the terms of a treaty for the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), the parties will also have to come to an agreement on a process for settling disputes that may arise in the treaty's implementation or enforcement. Virtually all governments taking part in the FTAA negotiations are already members of at least one regional trade agreement or of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and have some experience with dispute settlement in accordance with the procedures under those agreements.

Trade liberalization agreements will be nothing but empty shells if the parties to them do not comply with their undertakings. They can discuss the difficulties they encounter in implementing the agreement at great length, but if none of the parties has the will to implement the spirit and letter of that agreement, they could well remain nothing but a pious hope. Hence, the addition of a mechanism compelling the implementation of the terms of the agreement and providing for sanctions for non-compliance would be more convincing than any diplomatic conference or committee meeting, not to say what it could do for the government's effectiveness.

The opportunity for a contracting party to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the WTO's predecessor, to block the formation of a panel or the adoption of a panel report, has been the subject of constant criticism over the past few decades. Consequently, the signing of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) under the aegis of the WTO introduced a mechanism that virtually cannot be paralyzed. Indeed, it is now impossible to block the formation of a panel or the adoption of a panel report or Appellate Body report.

However, the DSM, which will be five years old in the year 2000, is now beginning to come under criticism as well. Though no dispute settlement mechanism is perfect by any means, participants in the FTAA negotiations will be able to draw on experience with the dispute settlement mechanisms of the various bilateral, regional and multilateral fora in establishing their own mechanism to address the specific concerns of those members of the free trade area. Indeed, it is likely that their experience will have a decisive impact on the dispute settlement procedures they favour for the FTAA.

Choosing a Dispute Settlement Process

Clearly, the economic power of member countries is a much less important factor where an equitable dispute settlement mechanism is available. In the case of the FTAA, the small economies may thus receive the same treatment and enjoy the same rights as the major economic powers of this proposed free trade area, in particular the United States and Brazil. The WTO's dispute settlement process provides a fairly accurate picture of what an impartial system would look like. Less developed countries may win their cases against the United States and the European Union, thus forcing the latter to alter measures that are inconsistent with their undertakings under the WTO agreements.1 Equality amongst all members of the free trade area will be an essential factor in the agreement's likely success. Small countries will not want to be party to a trade liberalization agreement if they sense that the ground rules can be altered depending on the members' economic power.

None of the participants in the FTAA negotiations appear to have challenged the necessity of a dispute settlement mechanism. Dispute settlement was addressed in the Joint Declaration of March 19, 1998 of the Fourth Trade Ministerial Meeting held in San Jose, Costa Rica, in the following terms:

To establish a fair, transparent and effective mechanism for dispute settlement among FTAA countries, taking into account inter alia the WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes. To design ways to facilitate and promote the use of arbitration and other alternative dispute settlement mechanisms to solve private trade controversies in the framework of the FTAA.

According to this declaration, impartiality, transparency and efficiency should be the main features of the FTAA's dispute settlement mechanism. Consequently, all members of the FTAA will be accorded identical treatment regardless of their level of economic development or political power.

However, this appears not to be enough, given that a dispute settlement action is not a costless undertaking. Before taking an action under a dispute settlement process, a state would normally conduct a cost-benefit analysis of the exercise. In the case where the costs, including litigation costs, would exceed the perceived benefits, the state may well decide not to seek remedy. But since the smallest and poorest countries cannot spread these litigation costs over a wide economic base as the largest and richest countries of the hemisphere can, they would likely find litigation prohibitive in a greater percentage of disputes. The Committee was told of some proposals to correct this imbalance.

What I have in mind is the dispute resolution of the WTO. A number of proposals have been floated to provide poor small countries with the legal, financial and technical expertise they need to bring disputes to the dispute resolution process. It seems to me that when we're designing an FTAA, we should think about that and build that in at the very start, which is to say that not everyone is going to have equal access to dispute resolution. This is something we ourselves, as a small and open economy, value very much, to live in a system with rules that are enforced. So this is a very practical agenda item that in this case Canada can support. [Rohinton Medhora, 28:1625]

It would, therefore, be advisable to establish a financial assistance program in the case of dispute settlement. Such a program would cover only a portion of the litigation costs associated with a legitimate exercise to prevent a proliferation of cases which could reasonably be settled through inter-party negotiation. In addition, a cap should be imposed on the amount that a country could receive in a given period.

Under the WTO, the members of a panel may not be nationals of the parties to the dispute. For example, if Canada and the United States are involved in a dispute, no citizen of either of those countries may be a member of the panel. The purpose of this requirement is to guarantee the impartiality of members in a dispute they are called upon to adjudicate. The Committee was told that it would be better to go further in guaranteeing the impartiality of panels. One witness advocated the establishment of tribunals independent of the international organization's secretariat. In this way, it would be possible to prevent the parties, and even the organization's secretariat, from intervening in the process. [Howard Mann, 33:1540]

The transparency of the dispute settlement system is also a growing concern among parties to trade liberalization agreements. A number of criticisms of the WTO's dispute settlement mechanisms focus more precisely on the system's transparency. In a dispute before the WTO, the parties' arguments and the deliberations of the panel and Appellate Body are kept secret. Only the parties to the dispute and other members that have expressed a desire to make submissions concerning the dispute are allowed to express their point of view; no organization that is not a WTO member may participate.2 Witnesses underscored the importance of transparency in dispute settlement procedures and expressed the opinion that the parties' arguments and the hearings should be made public. Furthermore, third parties should be able to intervene and express their views on the dispute. [Robert Howse, 33:1530 and Howard Mann, 33:1545]

The effectiveness of the dispute settlement mechanism is another factor to consider. The system must be able to produce a decision in a relatively short time, and no party should be able to paralyze the system. Finally, it must be ensured that decisions are implemented by the parties to the dispute. The Committee recommends:

29. That the Government of Canada adopt the position that the dispute settlement mechanism of the Free Trade Area of the Americas be based on World Trade Organization principles, including emphasis on the implementation of a panel finding, compensation and retaliation.

Although the WTO's DSM has a number of positive features, it can nevertheless be improved upon. Between now and the negotiating deadline of 2005, the countries taking part in the negotiations will be able to draw on some 10 years of experience with this mechanism that will enable them to establish a dispute settlement system more suited to the FTAA.

Specific Problems to Resolve

One of the WTO's basic principles is that every member of the organization must treat all other members in the same way; this is the most-favoured nation (MFN) principle. However, one's membership in a regional trade liberalization agreement is a direct violation of this principle because a member state may grant more concessions to other member states than to WTO members.

The WTO does, nevertheless, recognize regional agreements. Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 and Article V of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) exempt members that are parties to a regional trade liberalization agreement from the application of the MFN principle in respect of undertakings made under that agreement. This does not, however, mean that regional agreements do not pose any problems for realizing greater multilateral trade liberalization.

This plethora of new issues dealt with under the WTO and the signing of agreements in these various areas mean that there is now the risk that the agreements and commitments may contradict each other. [Ivan Bernier,104:940]

The increasing number of regional trade liberalization agreements raises some implementation and interpretation problems. Consider the following example. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the WTO agreements contain similar provisions in a number of areas. In a dispute between Canada and the United States, the complaining party may file its complaint with the NAFTA Free Trade Commission or with the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. The forum selected will be based on the complainant's assessment of the provisions of each agreement in the hope of finding the forum most favourable to it.

This "forum shopping" behaviour could undermine the stability and predictability of the international trading system. If all the provisions concerning a particular field were identical (i.e. they were worded in the same way) from one agreement to the next, and if identical provisions were interpreted in the same way, there would likely be no problem created. However, this is not currently the case.

A proliferation of different basic rules will inherently lead to forum shopping, and there's not going to be anything that's going to be capable of stopping that. You'll simply spin the law and say, I don't have access under this rule, I don't have access under that. The critical issue is going to be the underlying compatibility or similarity of the rules. [Howard Mann, 33:1555]

The situation was also explained to us in the following terms:

A proliferation of similar but not identical legal provisions interpreted by different fora is likely to reduce predictability in trade law rules and norms and undermine one of the main purposes of regulating international commercial relations by rules. [Robert Howse, 33:1535]

Participants in the FTAA negotiations must become aware of the disadvantages of the increasing number of trade liberalization agreements containing similar but not identical provisions. There are three potential solutions to the problem. The first would be to avoid signing regional free trade agreements and to refer disputes to the WTO. However, this proposal disregards the underlying purpose of regional agreements which is to respond more satisfactorily than the WTO to the needs of a particular group of countries.

The second solution would be to use the same terms in all agreements in addressing the same subjects. However, this solution does not take into account the specific needs of the parties to a regional agreement. It is natural for there to be differences between agreements, since inter-party dynamics differ from one agreement to the other.

The third solution would be to establish a hierarchy amongst the various regional agreements and between the regional agreements and the WTO agreements. This would limit a party's recourse to shop between forums, since this hierarchy would determine which agreement would be applicable in a particular case.


1 Agreements resulting from the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations.

2 For a description of the main criticisms made of the WTO's dispute settlement mechanisms, please see Chapter 3 of the June 1999 report by the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade entitled, Canada and the Future of the World Trade Organization: Advancing a Millennium Agenda in the Public Interest.