

RE: Shellcast Permits

From: "Anand, Shalini -TIE" </o=dfait-maeci/ou=exchange administrative group (fydibohf23spdlt)/cn=recipients/cn=anands2a9e">
To: "Finch, Anthony -SHNGI -TD-MINA" <anthony.finch@international.gc.ca>
Cc: "Funtek, Katharine -TID" <katharine.funtek@international.gc.ca>, *MINA-Dept Unit <d-mina-dept-unit@international.gc.ca>, *USS-DMA Advisors <d-uss-dmaadvisors@international.gc.ca>, *DMT-Policy <d-dmt-policy@international.gc.ca>, *TFM-Policy <d-tfm-policy@international.gc.ca>
Date: Mon, 06 Apr 2020 16:52:56 -0400
Attachments: Unnamed Attachment (68 bytes)

Hi Tony,

Could you offer more detailed information on this, e.g. were permit numbers by any chance given?

I've asked my team to look into this, but I did a quick search of a system and nothing came up.

Warmly,
S.

From: Finch, Anthony -SHNGI -TD-MINA
Sent: April 6, 2020 4:49 PM
To: Anand, Shalini -TIE
Cc: Funtek, Katharine -TID ; *MINA-Dept Unit ; *USS-DMA Advisors ; *DMT-Policy ; *TFM-Policy
Subject: Shellcast Permits

Hello,

The CEO of [REDACTED] has reached out to o/MINA after the company's export permit applications for Turkey and [REDACTED] were apparently denied.

Would you be able to share the reasoning for the denials for o/MINA's info?

Thank you,

Anthony Finch
Departmental Advisor | Conseiller ministériel
Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs | Bureau du Ministre des Affaires étrangères
Anthony.finch@international.gc.ca
Global Affairs Canada | Affaires mondiales Canada
Government of Canada | Gouvernement du Canada



RE: Status update on Permit [REDACTED]

From: "Anand, Shalini -TIE" </o=dfait-maeci/ou=exchange administrative group (fydibohf23spdlt)/cn=recipients/cn=anands2a9e">
To: "Mawani, Aliya -MINA" <aliya.mawani@international.gc.ca>, "Ayoub, Farid -MINA" <farid.ayoub@international.gc.ca>, "Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE" <marieeve.roymarcoux@international.gc.ca>, "Gosselin, Catherine -TIR" <catherine.gosselin@international.gc.ca>
Cc: "MINA-Dept Unit <d-mina-dept-unit@international.gc.ca>, *USS-DMA Advisors <d-uss-dmaadvisors@international.gc.ca>, "Boileau, Guy - DMT" <guy.boileau@international.gc.ca>, *TFM-Policy <d-tfm-policy@international.gc.ca>, "Schonfeld, Benjamin -TIR" <benjamin.schonfeld@international.gc.ca>, "Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE" <joonhyuk.yoon@international.gc.ca>, "Funtek, Katharine -TID" <katharine.funtek@international.gc.ca>
Date: Wed, 30 Sep 2020 11:55:22 -0400

Hi Aliya:

We haven't forgotten this - apologies for the slightly delayed reply - there has been a lot going on.

- We are planning to write back to the message at the Bureau level, but we are crafting the response carefully as the above noted [REDACTED] permit number has raised an objection from one of our consultation partners. Does oMINA prefer to respond directly to [REDACTED] or that we move ahead with this approach?
- The one [REDACTED] permit in our system is to Turkey for Group 2 items. It was received in June of 2020 and is still under consultation.
- As for the item in yellow, this refers to the industry working group with GAC at the DG level (that we've mentioned in a few of the oMINA briefings). The working group is presently discussing the export controls process, with an emphasis on service standards and transparency.

Hope this helps. Let me know on item 1 please.

Warmly,
S.

From: Mawani, Aliya -MINA
Sent: September 30, 2020 11:40 AM
To: Ayoub, Farid -MINA ; Anand, Shalini -TIE ; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE ; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR
Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit ; *USS-DMA Advisors ; Boileau, Guy -DMT ; *TFM-Policy ; Schonfeld, Benjamin -TIR
Subject: RE: Status update on Permit [REDACTED]


Hi all,

Following up on this request. I've pasted the exchange with [REDACTED] below. Ally has also asked if there is more information on the highlighted portion in his email?

Thanks,

Aliya

Aliya Mawani
 Senior Departmental Advisor | Conseillère ministérielle principale
 Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs | Bureau du Ministre des Affaires étrangères
Aliya.mawani@international.gc.ca
 Telephone | Téléphone: 343-203-5953

 Global Affairs / Affaires mondiales
 Canada / Canada

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: September 29, 2020 5:36 PM
To: Chick, Allison -MINA <Allison.Chick@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Costello, Dan -IFM <Dan.Costello@international.gc.ca>
Subject: FW: [REDACTED]
Importance: High

Allison:

[REDACTED]

Best regards,

[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]
Date: Thursday, September 24, 2020 at 10:54 PM
To: "Katharine.Funtek@international.gc.ca" <Katharine.Funtek@international.gc.ca>
Cc: "Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca" <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>
Subject: [REDACTED]

Dear Katharine:

[REDACTED]

Best regards,

From: Ayoub, Farid -MINA <Farid.Ayoub@international.gc.ca>
Sent: September 29, 2020 8:19 PM
To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Schonfeld, Benjamin -TIR <Benjamin.Schonfeld@international.gc.ca>
Subject: Status update on Permit [REDACTED]

Hi there Team T,

This can wait till tomorrow.

oMINA is requesting a status update on Permit [REDACTED] as well as the [REDACTED] permits. oMINA was approached by [REDACTED]

Merci,

Farid

Farid Ayoub
Departmental Advisor | Conseiller ministériel
Departmental Liaison Unit | Unité de liaison ministérielle (DLU)
Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs | Bureau du Ministre des affaires étrangères
Telephone | Téléphone (343)571-3588
farid.ayoub@international.gc.ca
125, Sussex Drive | 125 promenade Sussex

Ottawa, Ontario, K1A 0G2
Global Affairs Canada | Affaires mondiales Canada
Government of Canada | Gouvernement du Canada



RE: TURKEY Permits.

From: "Anand, Shalini -TIE" </o=dfait-maeci/ou=exchange administrative group (fydibohf23spdl)/cn=recipients/cn=anands2a9e">
To: "Prevost, Paul" <paul.prevost@pco-bcp.gc.ca>
Bcc: "Funtek, Katharine -TID" <katharine.funtek@international.gc.ca>
Date: Wed, 07 Oct 2020 09:32:24 -0400

Hi Paul:

I updated Patrick Wittmann yesterday and Monday, but I am happy to speak with you as well, if helpful. Just flagging in case you're seeking the same information.

Let me know, I'm available until 10:30 this morning.

Warmest regards,

Shalini

From: Prevost, Paul
Sent: October 7, 2020 8:57 AM
To: Anand, Shalini -TIE
Cc: Funtek, Katharine -TID
Subject: FW: TURKEY Permits

Shalini, I wrote to Katharine this morning thinking she was still at TID. She referred me to you. Please see below.

Brigadier-Général Paul Prévost, RCAF

Director of Operations | Directeur des opérations
Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat | Secrétariat pour la politique étrangère et la défense
Privy Council Office | Bureau du Conseil Privé
Government of Canada | Gouvernement du Canada
Paul.Prevost@pco-bcp.gc.ca / Tel: [613-957-5481](tel:613-957-5481) / Cell : 

From: Prevost, Paul
Sent: Wednesday, October 7, 2020 8:52 AM
To: 'Katharine.Funtek@international.gc.ca' <Katharine.Funtek@international.gc.ca>
Subject: TURKEY Permits

Katharine,

We are getting many questions from PMO as you can imagine on the permits issue and my analyst is talking to your staff.

Can we chat this morning to discuss the broader issues on permits. I need to understand a bit more on the process, the consultations and get my hands on ready-use analysis on this particular issue if there are some docs that you could share. This would hopefully prevent the back and forth to answer questions as they come in.

I have a meeting with PMO at 1300 where this will be raised. I am avail now, at 1000, 1045 or 1130.

Grateful.

Pepe

Brigadier-Général Paul Prévost, RCAF

Director of Operations | Directeur des opérations
Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat | Secrétariat pour la politique étrangère et la défense
Privy Council Office | Bureau du Conseil Privé
Government of Canada | Gouvernement du Canada
Paul.Prevost@pco-bcp.gc.ca / Tel: [613-957-5481](tel:613-957-5481) / Cell : 

RE: [REDACTED] Export Permits for Deliveries to Turkey

From: "Anand, Shalini -TID" <"/o=dfait-maeci/ou=exchange administrative group (fydibohf23spdlt)/cn=recipients/cn=anands2a9e">
To: "Mawani, Aliya -MINA" <aliya.mawani@international.gc.ca>, "Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE" <marieeve.roymarcoux@international.gc.ca>, "Mallett, Erika -TIE" <erika.mallett@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <d-mina-dept-unit@international.gc.ca>, *USS-DMA Advisors <d-uss-dmaadvisors@international.gc.ca>, *DMT-Policy <d-dmt-policy@international.gc.ca>, *TFM-Policy <d-tfm-policy@international.gc.ca>
Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2020 11:06:23 -0400

Hi:
Please see below. I owe him another follow up message – but we have received concerns about some of these permits, so they are moving onto DGRC stage.
Warmly,
S.

From: Mawani, Aliya -MINA
Sent: October 23, 2020 10:47 AM
To: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE ; Anand, Shalini -TID
Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit ; *USS-DMA Advisors ; *DMT-Policy ; *TFM-Policy
Subject: FW: [REDACTED] Export Permits for Deliveries to Turkey

Good morning!

Please see below correspondence from [REDACTED] Grateful if you could please confirm the following:

- 1) Is the company in touch with officials as well? Yes
- 2) Are these all Group 2 permits? Yes
- 3) Have officials spoken to the company to educate them about our current suspension on Group 2 permits? Yes

Many thanks!

Aliya

Aliya Mawani
Senior Departmental Advisor | Conseillère ministérielle principale
Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs | Bureau du Ministre des Affaires étrangères
Aliya.mawani@international.gc.ca
Telephone | Téléphone: 343-203-5953



Global Affairs | Affaires mondiales
Canada | Canada

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: October 21, 2020 10:20 AM
To: Chick, Allison -MINA <Allison.Chick@international.gc.ca>
Subject: [REDACTED] Export Permits for Deliveries to Turkey


Dear Allison

I have read that Prime Minister Trudeau had a call with President Erdoğan of Turkey with respect to Export permits of Canadian defence articles to Turkey. Did that have any positive impact on the potential approval of our outstanding export permits for delivery of repaired and new equipment to Turkish Aerospace?

I understand that our export permits for repaired goods and follow on equipment remain under review by external consultants without any questions so far. This has been the status of these export permit applications for some considerable time now. The survival of our company depends on these export permits. We now have signed contracts for [REDACTED] deliveries that depend on these permits being granted. It would help us greatly if these permits were granted or at least the decision on whether they will be granted was available soon.

EP Ref#	Perm/Temp	Description	Application Date	EXCOL Status	Customer	Country of Final Destination
892447-1	Permanent	Follow on order for multiple [REDACTED] systems.	8-May-20	Under Review with External consultants	[REDACTED]	Turkey
895337-7	Permanent	Replace or Repairs [REDACTED] equipment damaged by customer during Hard Landing.	6-Aug-20	Under Review with External consultants	[REDACTED]	Turkey
890241-3	Permanent	Return of loaned [REDACTED]	30-Mar-2020	Decision Phase	[REDACTED]	Turkey

Warm Regards



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RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

From: "McLaughlin, Emily -MINA" <emily.mclaughlin@international.gc.ca>
To: "Boileau, Guy -DMT" <guy.boileau@international.gc.ca>, "Grant, Alison -ECE" <alison.grant@international.gc.ca>, "Hamilton, Kevin -IGR" <kevin.hamilton@international.gc.ca>
Cc: "Mawani, Aliya -MINA" <aliya.mawani@international.gc.ca>, "Turner, Andrew -ECE" <andrew.turner@international.gc.ca>, "Anand, Shalini -TIE" <shalini.anand@international.gc.ca>, "Yendall, Jonathan -INP" <jonathan.yendall@international.gc.ca>, "Mishra, Rachna -ELB" <rachna.mishra@international.gc.ca>, "Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE" <marieeve.roymarcoux@international.gc.ca>, "Gosselin, Catherine -TIR" <catherine.gosselin@international.gc.ca>, "Senkiw, Jillian -TIR" <jillian.senkiw@international.gc.ca>, "Bastien, Jean-François -TIR" <jean-francois.bastien@international.gc.ca>, "TFM-Policy" <d-tfm-policy@international.gc.ca>, "Sproule, David -ECD" <david.sproule@international.gc.ca>, "Carrière, Sébastien -IGN" <sebastien.carriere@international.gc.ca>, "USS-DMA Advisors" <d-uss-dmaadvisors@international.gc.ca>, "MINA-Dept Unit" <d-mina-dept-unit@international.gc.ca>, "DMT-Policy" <d-dmt-policy@international.gc.ca>, "McCardell, Sandra -EGM" <sandra.mccardell@international.gc.ca>, "Christie, Bruce -TFMA" <bruce.christie@international.gc.ca>
Date: Wed, 21 Oct 2020 19:42:07 -0400

I was assuming that and we will hold until told otherwise.

Cheers,
 Emily

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 21, 2020 7:41 PM
To: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Mishra, Rachna -ELB <Rachna.Mishra@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; McCardell, Sandra -EGM <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Simply to note that, before sharing with oMINA, I will run this by DMT first. Stay tune.

From: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 21, 2020 7:00 PM
To: Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>; Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Mishra, Rachna -ELB <Rachna.Mishra@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; McCardell, Sandra -EGM <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>
Subject: Re: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

My recommendation is that we wait to see how HOM and our entreaties here to Turkish Embassy have an impact. I raised this today with Turkish DHOM and emphasized that [REDACTED] engagement is required and will help move this file forward. HOM is likewise connecting with MFA counterparts in Ankara with same message and also welcoming President Erdogan's offer to provide information, expressed in his call with our PM on Friday. That information could be conveyed through these [REDACTED] channels. Let's reassess within several days if we don't see progress.

Alison

Director, Eastern Europe and Eurasia
Cell: 613-462-2747

On Oct 21, 2020, at 6:53 PM, Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca> wrote:

Aliya:

Just to be clear and make sure oMINA understands: We are not having any problems *connecting with the Turkish military, as such. Our contacts with them are deep and varied.

But, on that point, perhaps others will have ideas on how oMINA might be of help in persuading Turkish officials to be a bit more forthcoming...

KH

From: Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>

Sent: Wednesday, October 21, 2020 4:46 PM

To: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Mishra, Rachna -ELB <Rachna.Mishra@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; McCardell, Sandra -EGM <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Dear All,

Thanks very much for putting together this useful update.

O/MINA noted the repeated outreach attempts to the Turkish military and is asking if the department assesses that MINA/their office could assist in making the defence connection – or if there are other ways in which they could be helpful?

Grateful for your views. Thanks,

Aliya

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>

Sent: October 20, 2020 4:24 PM

To: Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Mishra, Rachna -ELB <Rachna.Mishra@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Colleagues: DMT has approved the report and it is now being shared with oMINA (pasted below). Thank you, once again. As

updates become available, thank you in advance for keeping us posted so that DMT/USS and oMINA have the very latest.
GuyB.

- ANKRA Defence Attaché has made several attempts to outreach to the Turkish military. A detailed response is not expected any time soon. ANKRA HOM will engage with the Turkish MFA to emphasize the importance of the [REDACTED] talks to moving this issue forward.
- While it is impossible to independently verify the situation on the ground (OSCE monitoring suspended for months due to COVID), INA will continue to report on all latest intelligence. The latest footage of downed drones (if genuine) certainly appears to show a TB-2 UAV with [REDACTED] on board.
- The Department is following up with other countries that may be supplying drone parts/technology to Turkey and Azerbaijan to gather additional information, including [REDACTED]. ANKRA Defence Attache indicates that his contacts report that [REDACTED] has suspended any UAV-related exports (they are still providing though spare parts and components to support [REDACTED]). While [REDACTED] has yet to respond, it seems that [REDACTED] are used in Turkish drones, however they are not a controlled item/defence item/dual-use item.
- If no further intelligence becomes available, the Department may contact the company for its input and assessment of the video.
- JLTA along with PER and the relevant Geographic Divisions are assessing the situation as it pertains to Turkish drones in Libya.
- All consultation partners have advised that for the time being they have no further intel/info to suggest that we should consider suspending any additional permits that are still valid to Turkey.
- GAC and OGDs are working on a review of the situation on the suspended permits in question, with a view to providing MINA consolidated advice on options/next steps.
- WRT to the [REDACTED] the companies had already shipped items against those permits, so there is no urgent action required.

From: Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>

Sent: October 20, 2020 2:02 PM

To: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Hello Guy,

Please find below a report on the current situation as well as the updated version of the Critical Path. Please let us know if you have any questions.

Andrew

- ANKRA Defence Attache has initiated outreach to Turkish military, but has yet to receive a response. ANKRA HOM will engage with the Turkish MFA to emphasize the importance of the [REDACTED] talks to moving this issue forward.
- While it is impossible to independently verify the situation on the ground (OSCE monitoring suspended for months due to COVID), INA will continue to report on all latest intelligence. The latest footage of downed drones (if genuine) certainly appears to show a TB-2 UAV with [REDACTED] on board.
- The Department is following up with other countries that may be supplying drone parts/technology to Turkey and Azerbaijan to gather additional information, including [REDACTED]. ANKRA Defence Attache indicates that his contacts report that [REDACTED] has suspended any UAV-related exports (they are still providing though spare parts and components to support [REDACTED]). While [REDACTED] has yet to respond, it seems that [REDACTED] are used in Turkish drones, however they are not a controlled item/defence item/dual-use item.
- If no further intelligence becomes available, the Department may contact the company for its input and assessment of the video.
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- GAC and OGDs are working on a review of the situation and the suspended permits in question, with a view to providing MINA

consolidated advice on options/next steps.

- WRT to the [REDACTED], the companies had already shipped items against those permits, so there is no urgent action required.

Follow-up to MINA briefing on Turkish drones – Next steps

Immediate Actions:

- 1) [REDACTED] for controlled goods and inform companies (after letters are vetted by legal and green-lit by oMINA) – done
- 2) Send question to Minister on likewise [REDACTED] for controlled goods, to suspend Canadian exports of controlled goods to conflict zone – done

Actions on Monday:

- 1) Engagement with Turkey.
 - **Recommendation to MINA:** That outreach to Turkey be done by MINA to his counterpart on Monday, given their good personal relationship, their recent discussion on exports, and to seek Turkey's views on regional events (Nagorno-Karabakh, Eastern Mediterranean). Guidance from MINA requested this weekend – TPs would be prepared this weekend if MINA agrees. - done
 - If not MINA, a diplomatic demarche will be done by EGM/Sandra McCardell to the Turkish Ambassador in Ottawa as early as possible on Monday. – done
 - Given the serious impact that suspending these permits, and making a statement about it, will have on our relations with Turkey, it is important that engagement with Turkey happen prior to any press announcement. There are [REDACTED] valid L3 Wescam permits valued at over ~[REDACTED] that the Minister is seeking to suspend. - done
- 2) Officials (IFM) requests that DND hold consultations with Turkish military on end use of UAVs with Canadian L3 Wescam technology (possibly via their Defence Attaché in Ankara) – requested and following up
- 3) Officials (TIE) informs L3 Wescam about the suspension, and suspension to be undertaken in system. - done
- 4) Communications released on suspensions.
 - There are likely issues of commercial confidentiality in releasing a statement referring to a specific product or company. There are also concerns about the negative impact a statement referring to Turkey will have on our bilateral relationship. The communications product will be drafted with these concerns in mind. - done

Other actions:

- 1) Officials (ECE) request to ANKRA to reach out to both [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] counterparts to confirm with confidence existence of their components on Turkish UAVs – done and waiting for [REDACTED] reply
- 2) Officials (TIE) to re-send L3 Turkey permits that are under review to consultation partners to allow for further input, given change in circumstances. - done
- 3) [REDACTED]
- 4) Officials (TIE) to provide more information to respond to MINA question about intelligence on export permits after they are shipped (supported by IND) – following up
- 5) [REDACTED]

From: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>

Sent: Tuesday, October 20, 2020 1:45 PM

To: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit

<D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Guy – this is coming very shortly, apologies for delay in pulling together the points, we have all been in different meetings.

Alison

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 20, 2020 12:50 PM
To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Thanks Shalini, what is requested is one report to oMINA on Azerbaijan so your input yesterday should be captured in the one consolidated report being requested. I should have mentioned as well DMT's specific point about "there were to have been contacts through the military and also either other possible suppliers: eg [REDACTED]"

Kevin, Jonathan, Alison, assume this is being compiled and we'll be able to receive soon today?

With thanks

From: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 20, 2020 12:44 PM
To: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Guy, I will let I-branch colleagues respond to your two points below, as they are leading on intel reporting.

TIE's input from yesterday remains the same, which I think addresses the first question to a degree. For item 2, I am coordinating with the i-branch, and if needed, TIE will reach out to the company to support efforts to validate whether the picture/video in the tweet shows L3 wescam items.

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 20, 2020 12:37 PM
To: Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Colleagues – a quick follow-up on this request for one consolidated report re Azerbaijan covering: 1) whether we have any intel the issue of military goods destined to Turkey that may be in Azerbaijan; and 2) the tweet that MINA sent to DMT last night (immediately below).

Can we expect the report within the next hour in DMOs?
With thanks
GuyB.

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT
Sent: October 19, 2020 9:38 PM
To: Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INA <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Colleagues, with apologies for another message this evening, in addition to the requested information below, DMT has requested that the report also provide what we know (and not know yet and what we are doing to find out) about the air defense units of the Artsakh Defense Army shooting down Azerbaijan UAVs. See tweet below MINA just sent to DMT about this.

Thank you once again for the consolidate report by Noon tomorrow for DMT approval.

<< File: IMG_5681.png >>

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT
Sent: October 19, 2020 8:03 PM
To: Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INA <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Glad to see that everyone that should be copied now are (including oUSS who I am now copying).

I will kindly ask I-E-T Branches to pls coordinate one response/report for tomorrow by Noon on our efforts thus far, and next steps, after which we will seek DMT approval, and then submit to oMINA.

With thanks to everyone
GuyB.

From: Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 19, 2020 7:53 PM
To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INA <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Looping in INA on the question of intel gathering and assessment (see highlighted line below). I will let INA reply, but my understanding is that an assessment has been made, high side, specific to likelihood of UAVs from Turkey being used by Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Regarding ██████████ contacts, the CDA in ANKRA submitted a Note Verbale to the Turkish MoD on 9 October, requesting a meeting on a urgent basis. The NV specified that we are seeking specific information on the possible re-export of UAV components by Turkey to Azerbaijan, pursuant to reports in the Turkish media and MINA's decision to suspend specific export permits. We equipped the CDA with detailed background to aid him in his demarche. The CDA has made three follow up enquiries (Thursday, Friday and today).). Last week he was told that the Turkish Armed Forces were gathering the responses to his questions, and that he would be called for a meeting when they were in a position to reply. Today, however, he was informed that this is "a very sensitive topic" and that a response or invitation for a meeting will "not be for a while."

It bears noting that the Turks are unlikely to be easily motivated to cooperate with us at this time, when it comes to information sharing on this file. We can continue to push, but a timely and detailed response through the Turkish Armed Forces / MoD is probably more than we can hope for at this point.

KH

From: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>
Sent: Monday, October 19, 2020 7:21 PM
To: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Absolutely, looping in Kevin, David and Alison in I-branch and E-branch, respectively, both of DMT's questions/issues fall to their teams (I inadvertently didn't include them in my last message – I've been having outlook issues).

What I recall from an Ibranch update is that the DA in Turkey tried to set up a demarche, but has not had any success. That said, I understand that the DA has been reaching out to likeminded countries to determine how they are treating exports to Turkey linked to UAVs. Kevin Hamilton will have to confirm and will be better placed to respond to your two messages below.

I will add that all of this will feed into the memo and analysis noted under bullet four below, which the T-branch is leading on, with considerable input from DND, I branch and E-branch.

Hope this helps a little.

Warmly,
 S.

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 19, 2020 6:37 PM
To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Sorry for the second message, DMT just wrote to me saying: "There were to have been contacts through the military and also either other possible suppliers: eg ██████████."

Pls let me know about bringing back-in E Branch and I Branch (and I forgot, oUSS as well).

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT
Sent: October 19, 2020 6:35 PM
To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Hi Shalini, thank you for this. It has been shared with DMT. In the meantime, it is my understanding that there's been some correspondence bw MINA and Turkey as to whether we have any intel the issue of military goods destined to Turkey that may be in Azerbaijan. DMT has asked for a report to be submitted to oMINA tomorrow on this, noting specifically who is working on intel gathering, what we know and don't know. I note that in your reply that E-Branch was removed. Grateful if you can let me know whether you prefer looping-in E Branch (and I Branch) or whether you prefer that I reply all to this message and include both Branches. What you provided below is form a significant part of the report but would need to know if there's been any work on this by E and I Branches and our Post and what we have heard thus far (and next steps).

With thanks

GuyB.

From: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>

Sent: October 19, 2020 10:40 AM

To: *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Subject: FW: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Dear Guy:

Further to the exchange below, here is a brief update for DMT/oDMT awareness.

- We have twice circulated the list of all valid/not expired export permits to Turkey to our consultation partners and asked them to review with a critical lens, and advise whether they have intel/info to suggest that we should consider suspending any additional permits.
- To date, they have all come back and indicated that they do not have further intel/info that suggest that we need to suspend additional permits to Turkey at this time.
- They now have this list and will advise us if they get intel/info that changes this recommendation. (oMINA is aware)
- WRT to the suspended permits for L3 Wescam, T-branch is working across GAC/government on a review of the situation and the permits in question, with a view to providing MINA consolidated advice on options/next steps.
- WRT to the [REDACTED] the companies had already shipped items against those permits, so there is no urgent action required. oMINA is aware.

Let me know if any further info is required on our approach.

Warmly,
S.

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT

Sent: October 8, 2020 12:21 PM

To: Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>

Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>; Coleman, Robert -ECE <Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions

Salut Marie-Eve and team, just a quick follow-up to the message below. Do you think a response by end of day would be feasible?

With thanks

GuyB.

From: Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>

Sent: October 6, 2020 5:23 PM

To: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>

Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>; Coleman, Robert -ECE <Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions

And TIR/Bastien

From: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 6, 2020 5:19 PM
To: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>; Coleman, Robert -ECE <Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions

Looping in ECE/Coleman.

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 6, 2020 5:18 PM
To: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions

Salut Marie-Eve: As you saw, DMT has approved the analysis and it is now being shared with oMINA.

DMT has asked whether now we can verify if we have any reason to believe that any of the military goods to Turkey might be in Azerbaijan? DMT specifically referenced, for example, the UAV engines for instance in Group 2-10.

With thanks

From: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 6, 2020 4:18 PM
To: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>
Subject: FW: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions

Bonjour Guy,

Tel que discuté, voici les réponses avec les changements demandés.

Laisse-moi savoir si tu as des question ou commentaires.

Marie Eve

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>

Sent: October 5, 2020 7:55 PM

To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>

Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>

Subject: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions

Hi Shalini and Marie-Eve, with apologies for the eventing message, DMT just received a call from MINA re Turkey. We have been asked for the following analysis by Noon tomorrow please:

1. Summary of the kind of goods in the Group 2 list of valid permits to Turkey that was submitted to oMINA today. If we could draw-out the kind of goods included in the attached table you produced that would be grateful (e.g. DMT asked as an example whether it included riffles).

Turkey is a significant purchaser of Canadian controlled goods and technology. Various Canadian companies are involved at various stages in the supply and provision of systems, subsystems, parts and components of a diverse range of military programs. These can be categorized into the following:

- Parts, components, and accessories for [REDACTED]
- Parts, components, avionics and other accessories for various aircraft platforms made in other countries, including the [REDACTED] as well as the [REDACTED]
- Flight simulators, and their corresponding parts, components and technical data
- Parts, components, subsystems and their corresponding technical data and assistance related to the development of Turkish satellites (including military satellites)
- Parts, components and subsystems (including GPS anti-jam devices) to be integrated into various bombs, missiles, rockets and other ordnances
- Parts, components and technical data to be integrated into various armoured vehicles ([REDACTED])
- Technical data and assistance for the development of [REDACTED]
- Production tools and machines for the manufacturing of ammunition and cartridges of various calibres
- Riflescopes, sights and their corresponding parts and components
- Rocket motors and other components for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)
- Electro-Optical and Infrared systems to be incorporated into various aerial platforms (including UAVs)
- Naval equipment (including cables and arresting harness for helicopter retrieval system, sonobuoys, various modules, etc.) to be integrated into warships and other naval platforms.
- Technical data and assistance related to the development and construction of a wind tunnel (to test aircraft and missiles)
- IED disruptors, as well as protective equipment for military personnel

Here is the list of valid (and suspended) Group 2 permits to Turkey, with the changes requested:

<< File: Group 2 items to Turkey (including MDPs) v.1 (003).docx >>

2. Since 2016 (pre and post 2019 period), number of Wescam cameras that have been shipped and number of Wescam cameras that have not/not yet been shipped. Understand this may be challenging given return and repair. If exact number is not feasible, a solid estimate would be grateful with accompanying caveats.

Total number of Wescam cameras exported to Turkey since 2016, and cameras not yet exported

Exported		Not yet exported	
New	Repaired	New	Repaired
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Notes:

- The numbers above are only for Wescam complete surveillance systems and does not include parts and components of the surveillance systems.
- Exported cameras cover exports since 2016 (pre and post 2019 exports).
- The “not exported” figures pertain only to the [REDACTED] Wescam valid permits (now suspended) as they could still be exported should the suspension be lifted.
- * This is the number of cameras the exporter would be allowed to export under their permits. This number could represent cameras ready to be exported and cameras under production or not yet produced. The permit suspension prevents the exporter from exporting these cameras.
- ** This represents the number of repaired cameras that would be allowed to be exported. Our system does not allow us to determine whether these cameras are in Canada or still with the end user. The permit suspension prevents these cameras

from being exported. It is unlikely that the end-user would send the cameras in its possession for repairs in Canada during the suspension given that they would be unable to have their cameras back.

3. Grateful if we could receive a profile of the type of Canadian exports of military goods to Turkey over the last 5 years, (e.g. whether we have shipped any LAVs to Turkey).
<< File: Military Exports to Turkey 2019-2014.docx >>

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to let me know.

Guy R. Boileau

Deputy Director | Directeur adjoint

Office of the Deputy Minister of International Trade | Cabinet du Sous-ministre du Commerce international

guy.boileau@international.gc.ca

Tel. 343-203-5965

Global Affairs Canada | Affaires mondiales Canada

Government of Canada | Gouvernement du Canada

<< OLE Object: Picture (Device Independent Bitmap) >>

RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

From: "McLaughlin, Emily -MINA" <emily.mclaughlin@international.gc.ca>
To: "Boileau, Guy -DMT" <guy.boileau@international.gc.ca>, "Grant, Alison -ECE" <alison.grant@international.gc.ca>, "Hamilton, Kevin -IGR" <kevin.hamilton@international.gc.ca>
Cc: "Mawani, Aliya -MINA" <aliya.mawani@international.gc.ca>, "Turner, Andrew -ECE" <andrew.turner@international.gc.ca>, "Anand, Shalini -TIE" <shalini.anand@international.gc.ca>, "Yendall, Jonathan -INP" <jonathan.yendall@international.gc.ca>, "Mishra, Rachna -ELB" <rachna.mishra@international.gc.ca>, "Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE" <marieeve.roymarcoux@international.gc.ca>, "Gosselin, Catherine -TIR" <catherine.gosselin@international.gc.ca>, "Senkiw, Jillian -TIR" <jillian.senkiw@international.gc.ca>, "Bastien, Jean-François -TIR" <jean-francois.bastien@international.gc.ca>, "TFM-Policy" <d-tfm-policy@international.gc.ca>, "Sproule, David -ECD" <david.sproule@international.gc.ca>, "Carrière, Sébastien -IGN" <sebastien.carriere@international.gc.ca>, "USS-DMA Advisors" <d-uss-dmaadvisors@international.gc.ca>, "MINA-Dept Unit" <d-mina-dept-unit@international.gc.ca>, "DMT-Policy" <d-dmt-policy@international.gc.ca>, "McCardell, Sandra -EGM" <sandra.mccardell@international.gc.ca>, "Christie, Bruce -TFMA" <bruce.christie@international.gc.ca>
Date: Wed, 21 Oct 2020 20:29:58 -0400

Merci Guy (and others).

Shared with oMINA.

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 21, 2020 8:16 PM
To: McLaughlin, Emily -MINA <Emily.McLaughlin@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Mishra, Rachna -ELB <Rachna.Mishra@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; McCardell, Sandra -EGM <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Hi Emily – DMT agrees with the recommendation outlined in Alison’s message.
 Gtg to oMINA.
 GuyB.

From: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 21, 2020 7:00 PM
To: Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>; Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Mishra, Rachna -ELB <Rachna.Mishra@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; McCardell, Sandra -EGM <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>
Subject: Re: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

My recommendation is that we wait to see how HOM and our entreaties here to Turkish Embassy have an impact. I raised this today with Turkish DHOM and emphasized that [REDACTED] engagement is required and will help move this file forward. HOM is likewise connecting with MFA counterparts in Ankara with same message and also welcoming President Erdogan’s offer to provide information, expressed in his call with our PM on Friday. That information could be conveyed through these [REDACTED] channels. Let’s reassess within several days if we don’t see progress.

Alison

Director, Eastern Europe and Eurasia
Cell: 613-462-2747

On Oct 21, 2020, at 6:53 PM, Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca> wrote:

Aliya:

Just to be clear and make sure oMINA understands: We are not having any problems *connecting with the Turkish military, as such. Our contacts with them are deep and varied.

But, on that point, perhaps others will have ideas on how oMINA might be of help in persuading Turkish officials to be a bit more forthcoming...

KH

From: Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>

Sent: Wednesday, October 21, 2020 4:46 PM

To: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Mishra, Rachna -ELB <Rachna.Mishra@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; McCardell, Sandra -EGM <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Dear All,

Thanks very much for putting together this useful update.

O/MINA noted the repeated outreach attempts to the Turkish military and is asking if the department assesses that MINA/their office could assist in making the defence connection – or if there are other ways in which they could be helpful?

Grateful for your views. Thanks,

Aliya

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>

Sent: October 20, 2020 4:24 PM

To: Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Mishra, Rachna -ELB <Rachna.Mishra@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Colleagues: DMT has approved the report and it is now being shared with oMINA (pasted below). Thank you, once again. As updates become available, thank you in advance for keeping us posted so that DMT/USS and oMINA have the very latest. GuyB.

- ANKRA Defence Attaché has made several attempts to outreach to the Turkish military. A detailed response is not expected any time soon. ANKRA HOM will engage with the Turkish MFA to emphasize the importance of the [REDACTED] talks to moving this issue forward.
- While it is impossible to independently verify the situation on the ground (OSCE monitoring suspended for months due to COVID), INA will continue to report on all latest intelligence. The latest footage of downed drones (if genuine) certainly appears to show a TB-2 UAV with [REDACTED] on board.
- The Department is following up with other countries that may be supplying drone parts/technology to Turkey and Azerbaijan to gather additional information, including [REDACTED]. ANKRA Defence Attache indicates that his contacts report that [REDACTED] has suspended any UAV-related exports (they are still providing though spare parts and components to support [REDACTED]). While [REDACTED] has yet to respond, it seems that [REDACTED] are used in Turkish drones, however they are not a controlled item/defence item/dual-use item.
- If no further intelligence becomes available, the Department may contact the company for its input and assessment of the video.
- JLTA along with PER and the relevant Geographic Divisions are assessing the situation as it pertains to Turkish drones in Libya.
- All consultation partners have advised that for the time being they have no further intel/info to suggest that we should consider suspending any additional permits that are still valid to Turkey.
- GAC and OGDs are working on a review of the situation on the suspended permits in question, with a view to providing MINA consolidated advice on options/next steps.
- WRT to the [REDACTED] the companies had already shipped items against those permits, so there is no urgent action required.

From: Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>

Sent: October 20, 2020 2:02 PM

To: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Hello Guy,

Please find below a report on the current situation as well as the updated version of the Critical Path. Please let us know if you have any questions.

Andrew

- ANKRA Defence Attache has initiated outreach to Turkish military, but has yet to receive a response. ANKRA HOM will engage with the Turkish MFA to emphasize the importance of the [REDACTED] talks to moving this issue forward.
- While it is impossible to independently verify the situation on the ground (OSCE monitoring suspended for months due to COVID), INA will continue to report on all latest intelligence. The latest footage of downed drones (if genuine) certainly appears to show a TB-2 UAV with [REDACTED] on board.
- The Department is following up with other countries that may be supplying drone parts/technology to Turkey and Azerbaijan to gather additional information, including [REDACTED]. ANKRA Defence Attache indicates that his contacts report that [REDACTED] has suspended any UAV-related exports (they are still providing though spare parts and components to support [REDACTED]). While [REDACTED] has yet to respond, it seems that [REDACTED] are used in Turkish drones, however they are not a controlled item/defence item/dual-use item.
- If no further intelligence becomes available, the Department may contact the company for its input and assessment of the video.
- JLTA along with PER and the relevant Geographic Divisions are assessing the situation as it pertains to Turkish drones in Libya.
- All consultation partners have advised that for the time being they have no further intel/info to suggest that we should

consider suspending any additional permits that are still valid to Turkey.

- GAC and OGDs are working on a review of the situation and the suspended permits in question, with a view to providing MINA consolidated advice on options/next steps.
- WRT to the [REDACTED] the companies had already shipped items against those permits, so there is no urgent action required.

Follow-up to MINA briefing on Turkish drones – Next steps

Immediate Actions:

- 1) [REDACTED] for controlled goods and inform companies (after letters are vetted by legal and green-lit by oMINA) – done
- 2) Send question to Minister on likewise [REDACTED] for controlled goods, to suspend Canadian exports of controlled goods to conflict zone – done

Actions on Monday:

- 1) Engagement with Turkey.
 - **Recommendation to MINA:** That outreach to Turkey be done by MINA to his counterpart on Monday, given their good personal relationship, their recent discussion on exports, and to seek Turkey's views on regional events (Nagorno-Karabakh, Eastern Mediterranean). Guidance from MINA requested this weekend – TPs would be prepared this weekend if MINA agrees. - done
 - If not MINA, a diplomatic demarche will be done by EGM/Sandra McCardell to the Turkish Ambassador in Ottawa as early as possible on Monday. – done
 - Given the serious impact that suspending these permits, and making a statement about it, will have on our relations with Turkey, it is important that engagement with Turkey happen prior to any press announcement. There are [REDACTED] valid L3 Wescam permits valued at over [REDACTED] that the Minister is seeking to suspend. - done
- 2) Officials (IFM) requests that DND hold consultations with Turkish military on end use of UAVs with Canadian L3 Wescam technology (possibly via their Defence Attaché in Ankara) – requested and following up
- 3) Officials (TIE) informs L3 Wescam about the suspension, and suspension to be undertaken in system. - done
- 4) Communications released on suspensions.
 - There are likely issues of commercial confidentiality in releasing a statement referring to a specific product or company. There are also concerns about the negative impact a statement referring to Turkey will have on our bilateral relationship. The communications product will be drafted with these concerns in mind. - done

Other actions:

- 1) Officials (ECE) request to ANKRA to reach out to both [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] counterparts to confirm with confidence existence of their components on Turkish UAVs – done and waiting for [REDACTED] reply
- 2) Officials (TIE) to re-send L3 Turkey permits that are under review to consultation partners to allow for further input, given change in circumstances. - done
- 3) [REDACTED]
- 4) Officials (TIE) to provide more information to respond to MINA question about intelligence on export permits after they are shipped (supported by IND) – following up
- 5) [REDACTED]

From: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>

Sent: Tuesday, October 20, 2020 1:45 PM

To: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD

<David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Guy – this is coming very shortly, apologies for delay in pulling together the points, we have all been in different meetings.

Alison

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>

Sent: October 20, 2020 12:50 PM

To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>;

Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR

<Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -

TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD

<David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN

<Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit

<D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Thanks Shalini, what is requested is one report to oMINA on Azerbaijan so your input yesterday should be captured in the one consolidated report being requested. I should have mentioned as well DMT's specific point about "there were to have been contacts through the military and also either other possible suppliers: eg [REDACTED]"

Kevin, Jonathan, Alison, assume this is being compiled and we'll be able to receive soon today?

With thanks

From: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>

Sent: October 20, 2020 12:44 PM

To: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Grant,

Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR

<Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -

TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD

<David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN

<Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit

<D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Guy, I will let I-branch colleagues respond to your two points below, as they are leading on intel reporting.

TIE's input from yesterday remains the same, which I think addresses the first question to a degree. For item 2, I am coordinating with the i-branch, and if needed, TIE will reach out to the company to support efforts to validate whether the picture/video in the tweet shows L3 wescam items.

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>

Sent: October 20, 2020 12:37 PM

To: Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>;

Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR

<Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -

TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD

<David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN

<Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit

<D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Colleagues – a quick follow-up on this request for one consolidated report re Azerbaijan covering: 1) whether we have any intel the issue of military goods destined to Turkey that may be in Azerbaijan; and 2) the tweet that MINA sent to DMT last night (immediately below).

Can we expect the report within the next hour in DMOs?

With thanks

GuyB.

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT

Sent: October 19, 2020 9:38 PM

To: Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INA <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Colleagues, with apologies for another message this evening, in addition to the requested information below, DMT has requested that the report also provide what we know (and not know yet and what we are doing to find out) about the air defense units of the Artsakh Defense Army shooting down Azerbaijan UAVs. See tweet below MINA just sent to DMT about this.

Thank you once again for the consolidate report by Noon tomorrow for DMT approval.

<< File: IMG_5681.png >>

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT

Sent: October 19, 2020 8:03 PM

To: Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INA <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Glad to see that everyone that should be copied now are (including oUSS who I am now copying).

I will kindly ask I-E-T Branches to pls coordinate one response/report for tomorrow by Noon on our efforts thus far, and next steps, after which we will seek DMT approval, and then submit to oMINA.

With thanks to everyone

GuyB.

From: Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>

Sent: October 19, 2020 7:53 PM

To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INA <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Looping in INA on the question of intel gathering and assessment (see highlighted line below). I will let INA reply, but my understanding is that an assessment has been made, high side, specific to likelihood of UAVs from Turkey being used by

Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Regarding [REDACTED] contacts, the CDA in ANKRA submitted a Note Verbale to the Turkish MoD on 9 October, requesting a meeting on a urgent basis. The NV specified that we are seeking specific information on the possible re-export of UAV components by Turkey to Azerbaijan, pursuant to reports in the Turkish media and MINA's decision to suspend specific export permits. We equipped the CDA with detailed background to aid him in his demarche. The CDA has made three follow up enquiries (Thursday, Friday and today).). Last week he was told that the Turkish Armed Forces were gathering the responses to his questions, and that he would be called for a meeting when they were in a position to reply. Today, however, he was informed that this is "a very sensitive topic" and that a response or invitation for a meeting will "not be for a while."

It bears noting that the Turks are unlikely to be easily motivated to cooperate with us at this time, when it comes to information sharing on this file. We can continue to push, but a timely and detailed response through the Turkish Armed Forces / MoD is probably more than we can hope for at this point.

KH

From: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>

Sent: Monday, October 19, 2020 7:21 PM

To: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Absolutely, looping in Kevin, David and Alison in I-branch and E-branch, respectively, both of DMT's questions/issues fall to their teams (I inadvertently didn't include them in my last message – I've been having outlook issues).

What I recall from an Ibranch update is that the DA in Turkey tried to set up a demarche, but has not had any success. That said, I understand that the DA has been reaching out to likeminded countries to determine how they are treating exports to Turkey linked to UAVs. Kevin Hamilton will have to confirm and will be better placed to respond to your two messages below.

I will add that all of this will feed into the memo and analysis noted under bullet four below, which the T-branch is leading on, with considerable input from DND, I branch and E-branch.

Hope this helps a little.

Warmly,
S.

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>

Sent: October 19, 2020 6:37 PM

To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Sorry for the second message, DMT just wrote to me saying: "There were to have been contacts through the military and also either other possible suppliers: eg [REDACTED]"

Pls let me know about bringing back-in E Branch and I Branch (and I forgot, oUSS as well).

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT

Sent: October 19, 2020 6:35 PM

To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR

<Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Hi Shalini, thank you for this. It has been shared with DMT. In the meantime, it is my understanding that there's been some correspondence bw MINA and Turkey as to whether we have any intel the issue of military goods destined to Turkey that may be in Azerbaijan. DMT has asked for a report to be submitted to oMINA tomorrow on this, noting specifically who is working on intel gathering, what we know and don't know. I note that in your reply that E-Branch was removed. Grateful if you can let me know whether you prefer looping-in E Branch (and I Branch) or whether you prefer that I reply all to this message and include both Branches. What you provided below is form a significant part of the report but would need to know if there's been any work on this by E and I Branches and our Post and what we have heard thus far (and next steps).

With thanks

GuyB.

From: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>

Sent: October 19, 2020 10:40 AM

To: *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Subject: FW: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Dear Guy:

Further to the exchange below, here is a brief update for DMT/oDMT awareness.

- We have twice circulated the list of all valid/not expired export permits to Turkey to our consultation partners and asked them to review with a critical lens, and advise whether they have intel/info to suggest that we should consider suspending any additional permits.
- To date, they have all come back and indicated that they do not have further intel/info that suggest that we need to suspend additional permits to Turkey at this time.
- They now have this list and will advise us if they get intel/info that changes this recommendation. (oMINA is aware)
- WRT to the suspended permits for L3 Wescam, T-branch is working across GAC/government on a review of the situation and the permits in question, with a view to providing MINA consolidated advice on options/next steps.
- WRT to the [REDACTED] the companies had already shipped items against those permits, so there is no urgent action required. oMINA is aware.

Let me know if any further info is required on our approach.

Warmly,
S.

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT

Sent: October 8, 2020 12:21 PM

To: Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>

Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>; Coleman, Robert -ECE <Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions

Salut Marie-Eve and team, just a quick follow-up to the message below. Do you think a response by end of day would be feasible?

With thanks

GuyB.

From: Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>

Sent: October 6, 2020 5:23 PM

To: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>; Coleman, Robert -ECE <Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions

And TIR/Bastien

From: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 6, 2020 5:19 PM
To: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>; Coleman, Robert -ECE <Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions

Looping in ECE/Coleman.

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 6, 2020 5:18 PM
To: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions

Salut Marie-Eve: As you saw, DMT has approved the analysis and it is now being shared with oMINA.

DMT has asked whether now we can verify if we have any reason to believe that any of the military goods to Turkey might be in Azerbaijan? DMT specifically referenced, for example, the UAV engines for instance in Group 2-10.

With thanks

From: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 6, 2020 4:18 PM
To: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>
Subject: FW: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions

Bonjour Guy,

Tel que discuté, voici les réponses avec les changements demandés.

Laisse-moi savoir si tu as des question ou commentaires.

Marie Eve

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 5, 2020 7:55 PM
To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>
Subject: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions

Hi Shalini and Marie-Eve, with apologies for the eventing message, DMT just received a call from MINA re Turkey. We have been asked for the following analysis by Noon tomorrow please:

- Summary of the kind of goods in the Group 2 list of valid permits to Turkey that was submitted to oMINA today. If we could draw-out the kind of goods included in the attached table you produced that would be grateful (e.g. DMT asked as an example whether it included rifles).

Turkey is a significant purchaser of Canadian controlled goods and technology. Various Canadian companies are involved at various stages in the supply and provision of systems, subsystems, parts and components of a diverse range of military programs. These can be categorized into the following:

- Parts, components, and accessories for [REDACTED]
- Parts, components, avionics and other accessories for various aircraft platforms made in other countries, including the F-35, F-16, [REDACTED] as well as the [REDACTED]
- Flight simulators, and their corresponding parts, components and technical data
- Parts, components, subsystems and their corresponding technical data and assistance related to the development of Turkish satellites (including military satellites)
- Parts, components and subsystems (including GPS anti-jam devices) to be integrated into various bombs, missiles, rockets and other ordnances
- Parts, components and technical data to be integrated into various armoured vehicles [REDACTED]
- Technical data and assistance for the development of [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- Production tools and machines for the manufacturing of ammunition and cartridges of various calibres
- Riflescopes, sights and their corresponding parts and components
- Rocket motors and other components for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)
- Electro-Optical and Infrared systems to be incorporated into various aerial platforms (including UAVs)
- Naval equipment (including cables and arresting harness for helicopter retrieval system, sonobuoys, various modules, etc.) to be integrated into warships and other naval platforms.
- Technical data and assistance related to the development and construction of a wind tunnel (to test aircraft and missiles)
- IED disruptors, as well as protective equipment for military personnel

Here is the list of valid (and suspended) Group 2 permits to Turkey, with the changes requested:

<< File: Group 2 items to Turkey (including MDPs) v.1 (003).docx >>

- Since 2016 (pre and post 2019 period), number of Wescam cameras that have been shipped and number of Wescam cameras that have not/not yet been shipped. Understand this may be challenging given return and repair. If exact number is not feasible, a solid estimate would be grateful with accompanying caveats.

Total number of Wescam cameras exported to Turkey since 2016, and cameras not yet exported

Exported		Not yet exported	
New	Repaired	New	Repaired
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Notes:

- The numbers above are only for Wescam complete surveillance systems and does not include parts and components of the surveillance systems.
- Exported cameras cover exports since 2016 (pre and post 2019 exports).
- The "not exported" figures pertain only to the [REDACTED] Wescam valid permits (now suspended) as they could still be exported should the suspension be lifted.
- * This is the number of cameras the exporter would be allowed to export under their permits. This number could represent cameras ready to be exported and cameras under production or not yet produced. The permit suspension prevents the exporter from exporting these cameras.

- ** This represents the number of repaired cameras that would be allowed to be exported. Our system does not allow us to determine whether these cameras are in Canada or still with the end user. The permit suspension prevents these cameras from being exported. It is unlikely that the end-user would send the cameras in its possession for repairs in Canada during the suspension given that they would be unable to have their cameras back.
3. Grateful if we could receive a profile of the type of Canadian exports of military goods to Turkey over the last 5 years, (e.g. whether we have shipped any LAVs to Turkey).
<< File: Military Exports to Turkey 2019-2014.docx >>

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to let me know.

Guy R. Boileau

Deputy Director | Directeur adjoint

Office of the Deputy Minister of International Trade | Cabinet du Sous-ministre du Commerce international

guy.boileau@international.gc.ca

Tel. 343-203-5965

Global Affairs Canada | Affaires mondiales Canada

Government of Canada | Gouvernement du Canada

<< OLE Object: Picture (Device Independent Bitmap) >>

RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

From: "Mawani, Aliya -MINA" <aliya.mawani@international.gc.ca>

To: "Khokhar, Jamal -ANKRA -HOM/CDM" <jamal.khokhar@international.gc.ca>, "Sproule, David -ECD" <david.sproule@international.gc.ca>, "Grant, Alison -ECE" <alison.grant@international.gc.ca>, "Boileau, Guy -DMT" <guy.boileau@international.gc.ca>, "Hamilton, Kevin -IGR" <kevin.hamilton@international.gc.ca>

Cc: "McCardell, Sandra -EGM" <sandra.mccardell@international.gc.ca>, "Christie, Bruce -TFMA" <bruce.christie@international.gc.ca>, "Turner, Andrew -ECE" <andrew.turner@international.gc.ca>, "Helal, Marie-Thérèse -ECE" <marie-therese.helal@international.gc.ca>, "Schoenauer, Andrea -ANKRA -GR" <andrea.schoenauer@international.gc.ca>, "Braithwaite, Todd -ANKRA -DR" <todd.braithwaite@international.gc.ca>, "Graham, Molly -EGM" <molly.graham@international.gc.ca>, "Anand, Shalini -TID" <shalini.anand@international.gc.ca>, "Mishra, Rachna -ELB" <rachna.mishra@international.gc.ca>, "Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE" <marieeve.roymarcoux@international.gc.ca>, "Gosselin, Catherine -TIR" <catherine.gosselin@international.gc.ca>, "Senkiw, Jillian -TIR" <jillian.senkiw@international.gc.ca>, "Bastien, Jean-François -TIR" <jean-francois.bastien@international.gc.ca>, "Yendall, Jonathan -INP" <jonathan.yendall@international.gc.ca>, "Carrière, Sébastien -IGN" <sebastien.carriere@international.gc.ca>, *USS-DMA Advisors <d-uss-dmaadvisors@international.gc.ca>, *MINA-Dept Unit <d-mina-dept-unit@international.gc.ca>, *DMT-Policy <d-dmt-policy@international.gc.ca>, *TFM-Policy <d-tfm-policy@international.gc.ca>

Date: Fri, 30 Oct 2020 11:29:22 -0400

Dear Colleagues,

I know you're all working flat out, so once again, many thanks for your efforts.

MINA has asked for an update and next steps on the investigation by end of day today. Grateful for any further details you can provide since the last update.

Many thanks,

Aliya

From: Khokhar, Jamal -ANKRA -HOM/CDM <Jamal.Khokhar@international.gc.ca>

Sent: October 26, 2020 6:56 AM

To: Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>

Cc: McCardell, Sandra -EGM <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Helal, Marie-Thérèse -IRC <Marie-Therese.Helal@international.gc.ca>; Schoenauer, Andrea -ANKRA -GR <Andrea.Schoenauer@international.gc.ca>; Braithwaite, Todd -ANKRA -DR <Todd.Braithwaite@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TID <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Mishra, Rachna -ELB <Rachna.Mishra@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Subject: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Importance: High

MFA DG Americas (ADM equivalent) and I were finally able to speak after a short delay [REDACTED]

This message refers to MFA's views on the proposed [REDACTED] talks related to the use of Turkish made drones featuring Canadian-made components in N-K. A separate message will follow on general bilateral engagement.

Summary:

The type of [REDACTED] conversation we were hoping to have in short order will likely not precede having the fuller briefing on our export permits regime and approvals framework which Canada had proposed. Such a briefing was last discussed as recently as August.

MFA would hope that such a briefing to address our position on the question of end-user limitations as well as our views on the ATT.

Report:

DG Americas correctly noted MFA's understanding that 'we were supposed to have a briefing on your export permit regime, the technical and political drivers and priorities, and how the approvals process functioned'. The last discussions within GAC on such a briefing was in August.

He hoped that any additional conversation on export controls to be broader than [REDACTED] and could also include 'representatives of our respective defence industries, in addition to government officials.

While understanding their expectation for a briefing on Canada's export control regime, I underscored that Canada adheres to its ATT obligations and is concerned with the use of Canadian technologies in the N-K theatre. And, that it was important to have a clear understanding as to where Turkish-built UAVs with Canadian technology have been and are currently being employed in operations as well as end-users of Turkish-built UAVs with Canadian technology.

He referenced the assumption that this question was for N-K, and not necessarily for Libya or northern Syria, for example.

The DG did say that there might be a difference of understanding on end-use provisions versus violations of ATT and if we could clarify specifically our end-user limitations.

He reconfirmed our understanding that it was unlikely for Turkey to be able to share, in the short term, the information requested by our DND due to operational sensitivities.

Rather, he suggested a good place to start would be following through with our proposed briefing.

Meanwhile, he asked that we forward to the MFA the request for [REDACTED] consultations in writing, with our specific questions, and concerns – i.e., technical and political violations.

I re-confirmed that our DA had already forwarded 4 lines of inquiry to his MOD contacts, but that I would forward those to him for follow-up.

ECE/TIR Next Steps:

Questions will likely continue on our export controls regime and approvals framework – and clarifying our end user requirements/guidelines as well as reviewing obligations under ATT. The recently announced proposed sale of Turkish drones to Ukraine could raise additional points.

With that, and in the absence of [REDACTED] talks, over the short-term, there would be much to be gained through following through with the planned briefing.

As follow-on, a consultation involving the participation of defence industry participants may indeed be useful.

PS: If a [REDACTED] conversation were still deemed to still be a priority, then given [REDACTED] with [REDACTED] a call between the two would signal the importance to Canada and our very real concerns -- even if it were unlikely to get us much further on that front.

Jamal

From: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>

Sent: October 26, 2020 2:54 AM

To: Khokhar, Jamal -ANKRA -HOM/CDM <Jamal.Khokhar@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE <Kamiliya.Akkouche@international.gc.ca>; Helal, Marie-Thérèse -IRC <Marie-Therese.Helal@international.gc.ca>

Subject: Fwd: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Jamal, MT - see chain below.

ECD is speaking to Amb Uras tomorrow. Please let us know if you get a response from MFA to your letter.

Thanks

Alison

Director, Eastern Europe and Eurasia

Cell: 613-462-2747

Begin forwarded message:

From: "El Kabiri, Reda -MINA" <Reda.ElKabiri@international.gc.ca>
Date: October 25, 2020 at 7:22:09 PM EDT
To: "Grant, Alison -ECE" <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>, "Boileau, Guy -DMT" <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>, "Hamilton, Kevin -IGR" <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>
Cc: "McLaughlin, Emily -MINA" <Emily.McLaughlin@international.gc.ca>, "Mawani, Aliya -MINA" <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>, "Turner, Andrew -ECE" <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>, "Anand, Shalini -TID" <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>, "Yendall, Jonathan -INP" <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>, "Mishra, Rachna -ELB" <Rachna.Mishra@international.gc.ca>, "Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE" <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>, "Gosselin, Catherine -TIR" <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>, "Senkiw, Jillian -TIR" <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>, "Bastien, Jean-François -TIR" <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>, *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>, "Sproule, David -ECD" <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>, "Carrière, Sébastien -IGN" <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>, *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>, *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>, *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>, "McCardell, Sandra -EGM" <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>, "Christie, Bruce -TFMA" <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Hi again! This is probably already in your plans but I just wanted to flag that o/MINA expressed a strong interest in obtaining timely readouts of the scheduled phone call between ECD and Turkish HOM, as well as ANKRA HOM outreach with senior levels at the MFA.

Merci beaucoup,
 Reda (on call for MINA-DLU)
 Mobile: 613-404-7244

From: El Kabiri, Reda -MINA
Sent: October 25, 2020 1:48 PM
To: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>
Cc: McLaughlin, Emily -MINA <Emily.McLaughlin@international.gc.ca>; Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TID <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Mishra, Rachna -ELB <Rachna.Mishra@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; McCardell, Sandra -EGM <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Absolutely thank you Alison. This is why we expect this may need to happen in a secure room given the nature of discussions. Aliya will be picking this one tomorrow for the DLU.

Reda (on call for MINA-DLU)
 Mobile: 613-404-7244

From: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 25, 2020 1:43 PM
To: El Kabiri, Reda -MINA <Reda.ElKabiri@international.gc.ca>; Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>
Cc: McLaughlin, Emily -MINA <Emily.McLaughlin@international.gc.ca>; Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TID <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Mishra, Rachna -ELB <Rachna.Mishra@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; McCardell, Sandra -EGM <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Reda – we will respond tomorrow. To be clear this seems to be a follow up on the question of Turkey's response to the consultations.

Alison

From: El Kabiri, Reda -MINA <Reda.ElKabiri@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 25, 2020 10:21 AM
To: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>
Cc: McLaughlin, Emily -MINA <Emily.McLaughlin@international.gc.ca>; Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TID <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Mishra, Rachna -ELB <Rachna.Mishra@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; McCardell, Sandra -EGM <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Bonjour,

Apologies for this Sunday email (this can wait Monday morning). o/MINA would be keen to get a **status update on this investigation**.

Should you believe that the update will have to be in a secure room, o/MINA exempt is willing to come in person so please let us know and the MINA-DLU will send invitations for a meeting in secure room. If an email (or encrypted email) would be enough considering the information you will be sharing tomorrow, we would be grateful to obtain the update tomorrow as soon as deemed possible.

Many thanks!!

Reda (on call for MINA-DLU)
 Mobile: 613-404-7244

From: McLaughlin, Emily -MINA <Emily.McLaughlin@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 21, 2020 8:30 PM
To: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Mishra, Rachna -ELB <Rachna.Mishra@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; McCardell, Sandra -EGM <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Merci Guy (and others).

Shared with oMINA.

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 21, 2020 8:16 PM
To: McLaughlin, Emily -MINA <Emily.McLaughlin@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Mishra, Rachna -ELB <Rachna.Mishra@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE

<MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; McCardell, Sandra -EGM <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Hi Emily – DMT agrees with the recommendation outlined in Alison’s message.
 Gtg to oMINA.
 GuyB.

From: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 21, 2020 7:00 PM
To: Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>; Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Mishra, Rachna -ELB <Rachna.Mishra@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; McCardell, Sandra -EGM <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>
Subject: Re: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

My recommendation is that we wait to see how HOM and our entreaties here to Turkish Embassy have an impact. I raised this today with Turkish DHOM and emphasized that [REDACTED] engagement is required and will help move this file forward. HOM is likewise connecting with MFA counterparts in Ankara with same message and also welcoming President Erdogan’s offer to provide information, expressed in his call with our PM on Friday. That information could be conveyed through these [REDACTED] channels. Let’s reassess within several days if we don’t see progress.

Alison

Director, Eastern Europe and Eurasia
 Cell: 613-462-2747

On Oct 21, 2020, at 6:53 PM, Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca> wrote:

Aliya:

Just to be clear and make sure oMINA understands: We are not having any problems *connecting with the Turkish military, as such. Our contacts with them are deep and varied. [REDACTED]

But, on that point, perhaps others will have ideas on how oMINA might be of help in persuading Turkish officials to be a bit more forthcoming...

KH

From: Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>
Sent: Wednesday, October 21, 2020 4:46 PM
To: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE

<Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Mishra, Rachna -ELB <Rachna.Mishra@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; McCardell, Sandra -EGM <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Dear All,

Thanks very much for putting together this useful update.

O/MINA noted the repeated outreach attempts to the Turkish military and is asking if the department assesses that MINA/their office could assist in making the defence connection – or if there are other ways in which they could be helpful?

Grateful for your views. Thanks,

Aliya

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 20, 2020 4:24 PM
To: Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Mishra, Rachna -ELB <Rachna.Mishra@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Colleagues: DMT has approved the report and it is now being shared with oMINA (pasted below). Thank you, once again. As updates become available, thank you in advance for keeping us posted so that DMT/USS and oMINA have the very latest.
 GuyB.

- ANKRA Defence Attaché has made several attempts to outreach to the Turkish military. A detailed response is not expected any time soon. ANKRA HOM will engage with the Turkish MFA to emphasize the importance of the [REDACTED] talks to moving this issue forward.
- While it is impossible to independently verify the situation on the ground (OSCE monitoring suspended for months due to COVID), INA will continue to report on all latest intelligence. The latest footage of downed drones (if genuine) certainly appears to show a TB-2 UAV with [REDACTED] on board.
- The Department is following up with other countries that may be supplying drone parts/technology to Turkey and Azerbaijan to gather additional information, including [REDACTED]. ANKRA Defence Attache indicates that his contacts report that [REDACTED] has suspended any UAV-related exports (they are still providing though spare parts and components to support [REDACTED]). While [REDACTED] has yet to respond, it seems that [REDACTED] are used in Turkish drones, however they are not a controlled item/defence item/dual-use item.
- If no further intelligence becomes available, the Department may contact the company for its input and assessment of the video.
- JLTA along with PER and the relevant Geographic Divisions are assessing the situation as it pertains to Turkish drones in Libya.
- All consultation partners have advised that for the time being they have no further intel/info to suggest that we should consider suspending any additional permits that are still valid to Turkey.

- GAC and OGDs are working on a review of the situation on the suspended permits in question, with a view to providing MINA consolidated advice on options/next steps.
- WRT to the [REDACTED] the companies had already shipped items against those permits, so there is no urgent action required.

From: Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>

Sent: October 20, 2020 2:02 PM

To: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>;

Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR

<Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR

<Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien,

Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-

Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN

<Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>;

*MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Hello Guy,

Please find below a report on the current situation as well as the updated version of the Critical Path. Please let us know if you have any questions.

Andrew

- ANKRA Defence Attache has initiated outreach to Turkish military, but has yet to receive a response. ANKRA HOM will engage with the Turkish MFA to emphasize the importance of the [REDACTED] talks to moving this issue forward.
- While it is impossible to independently verify the situation on the ground (OSCE monitoring suspended for months due to COVID), INA will continue to report on all latest intelligence. The latest footage of downed drones (if genuine) certainly appears to show a TB-2 UAV with [REDACTED] on board.
- The Department is following up with other countries that may be supplying drone parts/technology to Turkey and Azerbaijan to gather additional information, including [REDACTED]. ANKRA Defence Attache indicates that his contacts report that [REDACTED] has suspended any UAV-related exports (they are still providing though spare parts and components to support [REDACTED]). While [REDACTED] has yet to respond, it seems that [REDACTED] are used in Turkish drones, however they are not a controlled item/defence item/dual-use item.
- If no further intelligence becomes available, the Department may contact the company for its input and assessment of the video.
- JLTA along with PER and the relevant Geographic Divisions are assessing the situation as it pertains to Turkish drones in Libya.
- All consultation partners have advised that for the time being they have no further intel/info to suggest that we should consider suspending any additional permits that are still valid to Turkey.
- GAC and OGDs are working on a review of the situation and the suspended permits in question, with a view to providing MINA consolidated advice on options/next steps.
- WRT to the [REDACTED] the companies had already shipped items against those permits, so there is no urgent action required.

Follow-up to MINA briefing on Turkish drones – Next steps

Immediate Actions:

- 1) [REDACTED] for controlled goods and inform companies (after letters are vetted by legal and green-lit by oMINA) – done
- 2) Send question to Minister on likewise [REDACTED] for controlled goods, to suspend Canadian exports of controlled goods to conflict zone – done

Actions on Monday:

- 1) Engagement with Turkey.
- **Recommendation to MINA:** That outreach to Turkey be done by MINA to his counterpart on Monday, given

their good personal relationship, their recent discussion on exports, and to seek Turkey's views on regional events (Nagorno-Karabakh, Eastern Mediterranean). Guidance from MINA requested this weekend – TPs would be prepared this weekend if MINA agrees. - done

s.20(1)(c)

s.23

- If not MINA, a diplomatic demarche will be done by EGM/Sandra McCardell to the Turkish Ambassador in Ottawa as early as possible on Monday. – done
 - Given the serious impact that suspending these permits, and making a statement about it, will have on our relations with Turkey, it is important that engagement with Turkey happen prior to any press announcement. There are valid L3 Wescam permits valued at over [REDACTED] that the Minister is seeking to suspend. - done
- 2) Officials (IFM) requests that DND hold consultations with Turkish military on end use of UAVs with Canadian L3 Wescam technology (possibly via their Defence Attaché in Ankara) – requested and following up
 - 3) Officials (TIE) informs L3 Wescam about the suspension, and suspension to be undertaken in system. - done
 - 4) Communications released on suspensions.
- There are likely issues of commercial confidentiality in releasing a statement referring to a specific product or company. There are also concerns about the negative impact a statement referring to Turkey will have on our bilateral relationship. The communications product will be drafted with these concerns in mind. - done

Other actions:

- 1) Officials (ECE) request to ANKRA to reach out to both [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] counterparts to confirm with confidence existence of their components on Turkish UAVs – done and waiting for [REDACTED] reply
- 2) Officials (TIE) to re-send L3 Turkey permits that are under review to consultation partners to allow for further input, given change in circumstances. - done
- 3) [REDACTED]
- 4) Officials (TIE) to provide more information to respond to MINA question about intelligence on export permits after they are shipped (supported by IND) – following up
- 5) [REDACTED]

From: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>

Sent: Tuesday, October 20, 2020 1:45 PM

To: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Guy – this is coming very shortly, apologies for delay in pulling together the points, we have all been in different meetings.

Alison

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>

Sent: October 20, 2020 12:50 PM

To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Thanks Shalini, what is requested is one report to oMINA on Azerbaijan so your input yesterday should be captured in the one consolidated report being requested. I should have mentioned as well DMT's specific point about "there were to have been contacts through the military and also either other possible suppliers: eg

██████████

Kevin, Jonathan, Alison, assume this is being compiled and we'll be able to receive soon today?

With thanks

From: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 20, 2020 12:44 PM
To: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Guy, I will let I-branch colleagues respond to your two points below, as they are leading on intel reporting.

TIE's input from yesterday remains the same, which I think addresses the first question to a degree. For item 2, I am coordinating with the i-branch, and if needed, TIE will reach out to the company to support efforts to validate whether the picture/video in the tweet shows L3 wescam items.

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 20, 2020 12:37 PM
To: Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Colleagues – a quick follow-up on this request for one consolidated report re Azerbaijan covering: 1) whether we have any intel the issue of military goods destined to Turkey that may be in Azerbaijan; and 2) the tweet that MINA sent to DMT last night (immediately below).

Can we expect the report within the next hour in DMOs?
 With thanks

GuyB.

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT
Sent: October 19, 2020 9:38 PM
To: Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INA <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Colleagues, with apologies for another message this evening, in addition to the requested information below, DMT has requested that the report also provide what we know (and not know yet and what we are doing to find out) about the air defense units of the Artsakh Defense Army shooting down Azerbaijan UAVs. See tweet below MINA just sent to DMT about this.

Thank you once again for the consolidate report by Noon tomorrow for DMT approval.

<< File: IMG_5681.png >>

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT
Sent: October 19, 2020 8:03 PM
To: Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INA <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Glad to see that everyone that should be copied now are (including oUSS who I am now copying).

I will kindly ask I-E-T Branches to pls coordinate one response/report for tomorrow by Noon on our efforts thus far, and next steps, after which we will seek DMT approval, and then submit to oMINA.

With thanks to everyone

GuyB.

From: Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 19, 2020 7:53 PM
To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INA <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Looping in INA on the question of intel gathering and assessment (see highlighted line below). I will let INA reply, but my understanding is that an assessment has been made, high side, specific to likelihood of UAVs from Turkey being used by Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Regarding ██████████ contacts, the CDA in ANKRA submitted a Note Verbale to the Turkish MoD on 9 October, requesting a meeting on a urgent basis. The NV specified that we are seeking specific information on the

possible re-export of UAV components by Turkey to Azerbaijan, pursuant to reports in the Turkish media and MINA's decision to suspend specific export permits. We equipped the CDA with detailed background to aid him in his demarche. The CDA has made three follow up enquiries (Thursday, Friday and today). Last week he was told that the Turkish Armed Forces were gathering the responses to his questions, and that he would be called for a meeting when they were in a position to reply. Today, however, he was informed that this is "a very sensitive topic" and that a response or invitation for a meeting will "not be for a while."

It bears noting that the Turks are unlikely to be easily motivated to cooperate with us at this time, when it comes to information sharing on this file. We can continue to push, but a timely and detailed response through the Turkish Armed Forces / MoD is probably more than we can hope for at this point.

KH

From: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>
Sent: Monday, October 19, 2020 7:21 PM
To: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Absolutely, looping in Kevin, David and Alison in I-branch and E-branch, respectively, both of DMT's questions/issues fall to their teams (I inadvertently didn't include them in my last message – I've been having outlook issues).

What I recall from an Ibranch update is that the DA in Turkey tried to set up a demarche, but has not had any success. That said, I understand that the DA has been reaching out to likeminded countries to determine how they are treating exports to Turkey linked to UAVs. Kevin Hamilton will have to confirm and will be better placed to respond to your two messages below.

I will add that all of this will feed into the memo and analysis noted under bullet four below, which the T-branch is leading on, with considerable input from DND, I branch and E-branch.

Hope this helps a little.

Warmly,
 S.

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 19, 2020 6:37 PM
To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Sorry for the second message, DMT just wrote to me saying: "There were to have been contacts through the military and also either other possible suppliers: eg ██████████"

Pls let me know about bringing back-in E Branch and I Branch (and I forgot, oUSS as well).

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT
Sent: October 19, 2020 6:35 PM
To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Hi Shalini, thank you for this. It has been shared with DMT. In the meantime, it is my understanding that there's been some correspondence bw MINA and Turkey as to whether we have any intel the issue of military goods destined to Turkey that may be in Azerbaijan. DMT has asked for a report to be submitted to oMINA tomorrow on this, noting specifically who is working on intel gathering, what we know and don't know. I note that in your reply that E-Branch was removed. Grateful if you can let me know whether you prefer looping-in E Branch (and I Branch) or whether you prefer that I reply all to this message and include both Branches. What you provided below is form a significant part of the report but would need to know if there's been any work on this by E and I Branches and our Post and what we have heard thus far (and next steps).

With thanks

GuyB.

From: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>

Sent: October 19, 2020 10:40 AM

To: *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Subject: FW: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Dear Guy:

Further to the exchange below, here is a brief update for DMT/oDMT awareness.

- We have twice circulated the list of all valid/not expired export permits to Turkey to our consultation partners and asked them to review with a critical lens, and advise whether they have intel/info to suggest that we should consider suspending any additional permits.
- To date, they have all come back and indicated that they do not have further intel/info that suggest that we need to suspend additional permits to Turkey at this time.
- They now have this list and will advise us if they get intel/info that changes this recommendation. (oMINA is aware)
- WRT to the suspended permits for L3 Wescam, T-branch is working across GAC/government on a review of the situation and the permits in question, with a view to providing MINA consolidated advice on options/next steps.
- WRT to the [REDACTED] the companies had already shipped items against those permits, so there is no urgent action required. oMINA is aware.

Let me know if any further info is required on our approach.

Warmly,
S.

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT

Sent: October 8, 2020 12:21 PM

To: Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>

Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>; Coleman, Robert -ECE <Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions

Salut Marie-Eve and team, just a quick follow-up to the message below. Do you think a response by end of day would be feasible?

With thanks

GuyB.

From: Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>

Sent: October 6, 2020 5:23 PM

To: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>

Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>; Coleman, Robert -ECE <Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions

And TIR/Bastien

From: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>

Sent: October 6, 2020 5:19 PM

To: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>

Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>; Coleman, Robert -ECE <Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions

Looping in ECE/Coleman.

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>

Sent: October 6, 2020 5:18 PM

To: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>

Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions

Salut Marie-Eve: As you saw, DMT has approved the analysis and it is now being shared with oMINA.

DMT has asked whether now we can verify if we have any reason to believe that any of the military goods to Turkey might be in Azerbaijan? DMT specifically referenced, for example, the UAV engines for instance in Group 2-10.

With thanks

From: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>

Sent: October 6, 2020 4:18 PM

To: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>

Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>

Subject: FW: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions

Bonjour Guy,

Tel que discuté, voici les réponses avec les changements demandés.

Laisse-moi savoir si tu as des question ou commentaires.

Marie Eve

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 5, 2020 7:55 PM
To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>
Subject: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions

Hi Shalini and Marie-Eve, with apologies for the eventing message, DMT just received a call from MINA re Turkey. We have been asked for the following analysis by Noon tomorrow please:

1. Summary of the kind of goods in the Group 2 list of valid permits to Turkey that was submitted to oMINA today. If we could draw-out the kind of goods included in the attached table you produced that would be grateful (e.g. DMT asked as an example whether it included rifles).

Turkey is a significant purchaser of Canadian controlled goods and technology. Various Canadian companies are involved at various stages in the supply and provision of systems, subsystems, parts and components of a diverse range of military programs. These can be categorized into the following:

- Parts, components, and accessories for [REDACTED]
- Parts, components, avionics and other accessories for various aircraft platforms made in other countries, including [REDACTED] as well as the [REDACTED]
- Flight simulators, and their corresponding parts, components and technical data
- Parts, components, subsystems and their corresponding technical data and assistance related to the development of Turkish satellites (including military satellites)
- Parts, components and subsystems (including GPS anti-jam devices) to be integrated into various bombs, missiles, rockets and other ordnances
- Parts, components and technical data to be integrated into various armoured vehicles [REDACTED]
- Technical data and assistance for the development of [REDACTED]
- Production tools and machines for the manufacturing of ammunition and cartridges of various calibres
- Riflescopes, sights and their corresponding parts and components
- Rocket motors and other components for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)
- Electro-Optical and Infrared systems to be incorporated into various aerial platforms (including UAVs)
- Naval equipment (including cables and arresting harness for helicopter retrieval system, sonobuoys, various modules, etc.) to be integrated into warships and other naval platforms.
- Technical data and assistance related to the development and construction of a wind tunnel (to test aircraft and missiles)
- IED disruptors, as well as protective equipment for military personnel

Here is the list of valid (and suspended) Group 2 permits to Turkey, with the changes requested:

<< File: Group 2 items to Turkey (including MDPs) v.1 (003).docx >>

2. Since 2016 (pre and post 2019 period), number of Wescam cameras that have been shipped and number of Wescam cameras that have not/not yet been shipped. Understand this may be challenging given return and repair. If exact number is not feasible, a solid estimate would be grateful with accompanying caveats. Total number of Wescam cameras exported to Turkey since 2016, and cameras not yet exported

Exported

Not yet exported

New


Repaired

New

Repaired



Notes:

- The numbers above are only for Wescam complete surveillance systems and does not include parts and components of the surveillance systems.
 - Exported cameras cover exports since 2016 (pre and post 2019 exports).
 - The “not exported” figures pertain only to the  Wescam valid permits (now suspended) as they could still be exported should the suspension be lifted.
 - * This is the number of cameras the exporter would be allowed to export under their permits. This number could represent cameras ready to be exported and cameras under production or not yet produced. The permit suspension prevents the exporter from exporting these cameras.
 - ** This represents the number of repaired cameras that would be allowed to be exported. Our system does not allow us to determine whether these cameras are in Canada or still with the end user. The permit suspension prevents these cameras from being exported. It is unlikely that the end-user would send the cameras in its possession for repairs in Canada during the suspension given that they would be unable to have their cameras back.
3. Grateful if we could receive a profile of the type of Canadian exports of military goods to Turkey over the last 5 years, (e.g. whether we have shipped any LAVs to Turkey).
<< File: Military Exports to Turkey 2019-2014.docx >>

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to let me know.

Guy R. Boileau

Deputy Director | Directeur adjoint

Office of the Deputy Minister of International Trade | Cabinet du Sous-ministre du Commerce international

guy.boileau@international.gc.ca

Tel. 343-203-5965

Global Affairs Canada | Affaires mondiales Canada

Government of Canada | Gouvernement du Canada

<< OLE Object: Picture (Device Independent Bitmap) >>

RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

From: "Anand, Shalini -TID" <shalini.anand@international.gc.ca>
To: "Grant, Alison -ECE" <alison.grant@international.gc.ca>, "Mawani, Aliya -MINA" <aliya.mawani@international.gc.ca>, "Khokhar, Jamal -ANKRA -HOM/CDM" <jamal.khokhar@international.gc.ca>, "Sproule, David -ECD" <david.sproule@international.gc.ca>, "Boileau, Guy -DMT" <guy.boileau@international.gc.ca>, "Hamilton, Kevin -IGR" <kevin.hamilton@international.gc.ca>
Cc: "McCardell, Sandra -EGM" <sandra.mccardell@international.gc.ca>, "Christie, Bruce -TFMA" <bruce.christie@international.gc.ca>, "Turner, Andrew -ECE" <andrew.turner@international.gc.ca>, "Helal, Marie-Thérèse -ECE" <marie-therese.helal@international.gc.ca>, "Schoenauer, Andrea -ANKRA -GR" <andrea.schoenauer@international.gc.ca>, "Braithwaite, Todd -ANKRA -DR" <todd.braithwaite@international.gc.ca>, "Graham, Molly -EGM" <molly.graham@international.gc.ca>, "Mishra, Rachna -ELB" <rachna.mishra@international.gc.ca>, "Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE" <marieeve.roymarcoux@international.gc.ca>, "Gosselin, Catherine -TIR" <catherine.gosselin@international.gc.ca>, "Senkiw, Jillian -TIR" <jillian.senkiw@international.gc.ca>, "Bastien, Jean-François -TIR" <jean-francois.bastien@international.gc.ca>, "Yendall, Jonathan -INP" <jonathan.yendall@international.gc.ca>, "Carrière, Sébastien -IGN" <sebastien.carriere@international.gc.ca>, *USS-DMA Advisors <d-uss-dmaadvisors@international.gc.ca>, *MINA-Dept Unit <d-mina-dept-unit@international.gc.ca>, *DMT-Policy <d-dmt-policy@international.gc.ca>, *TFM-Policy <d-tfm-policy@international.gc.ca>, "Sproule, David -ECD" <david.sproule@international.gc.ca>, "Coleman, Robert -ECE" <robert.coleman@international.gc.ca>
Date: Fri, 30 Oct 2020 11:36:32 -0400

Hi Aliya:

To clarify, when you say "investigation" do you mean an update on the thread below (i.e. the ██████████ engagement)? If so, Alison's reply should be sufficient. If not, could you clarify if you mean on the Turkey group 2 valid permits (which Guy just sent); or on the Wescam suspended permits (on which we are undertaking a review – as noted to oMINA in our last call). Just want to ensure that we're all on the same page. Sorry if I'm missing something.

Warmly,
S.

From: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 30, 2020 11:33 AM
To: Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>; Khokhar, Jamal -ANKRA -HOM/CDM <Jamal.Khokhar@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>
Cc: McCardell, Sandra -EGM <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Helal, Marie-Thérèse -ECE <Marie-Therese.Helal@international.gc.ca>; Schoenauer, Andrea -ANKRA -GR <Andrea.Schoenauer@international.gc.ca>; Braithwaite, Todd -ANKRA -DR <Todd.Braithwaite@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TID <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Mishra, Rachna -ELB <Rachna.Mishra@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Coleman, Robert -ECE <Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Hi Aliya

This should be routed I think through oDMT to T-branch. ECE is not in position to respond overall to the investigation.

On the Canada Turkey bilat side there is one update, which is that we have offered a technical briefing to the Turkish MFA on Canada's export controls regime, and offered a date of next week. Turkey has said that this is required before any ██████████ consultations take place. Turkey cannot make the date offered and we are waiting for a counter-proposal. This briefing will be led at the DG level by TID but hosted by ECD.

Alison

From: Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 30, 2020 11:29 AM
To: Khokhar, Jamal -ANKRA -HOM/CDM <Jamal.Khokhar@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>;

Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>

Cc: McCardell, Sandra -EGM <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Helal, Marie-Thérèse -ECE <Marie-Therese.Helal@international.gc.ca>; Schoenauer, Andrea -ANKRA -GR <Andrea.Schoenauer@international.gc.ca>; Braithwaite, Todd -ANKRA -DR <Todd.Braithwaite@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TID <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Mishra, Rachna -ELB <Rachna.Mishra@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Importance: High

Dear Colleagues,

I know you're all working flat out, so once again, many thanks for your efforts.

MINA has asked for an update and next steps on the investigation by end of day today. Grateful for any further details you can provide since the last update.

Many thanks,

Aliya

From: Khokhar, Jamal -ANKRA -HOM/CDM <Jamal.Khokhar@international.gc.ca>

Sent: October 26, 2020 6:56 AM

To: Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>

Cc: McCardell, Sandra -EGM <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Helal, Marie-Thérèse -IRC <Marie-Therese.Helal@international.gc.ca>; Schoenauer, Andrea -ANKRA -GR <Andrea.Schoenauer@international.gc.ca>; Braithwaite, Todd -ANKRA -DR <Todd.Braithwaite@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TID <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Mishra, Rachna -ELB <Rachna.Mishra@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Subject: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Importance: High

MFA DG Americas (ADM equivalent) and I were finally able to speak after a short delay [REDACTED]

This message refers to MFA's views on the proposed [REDACTED] talks related to the use of Turkish made drones featuring Canadian-made components in N-K. A separate message will follow on general bilateral engagement.

Summary:

The type of [REDACTED] conversation we were hoping to have in short order will likely not precede having the fuller briefing on our export permits regime and approvals framework which Canada had proposed. Such a briefing was last discussed as recently as August.

MFA would hope that such a briefing to address our position on the question of end-user limitations as well as our views on the ATT.

Report:

DG Americas correctly noted MFA's understanding that 'we were supposed to have a briefing on your export permit regime, the technical and political drivers and priorities, and how the approvals process functioned'. The last discussions within GAC on such a briefing was in August.

He hoped that any additional conversation on export controls to be broader than [REDACTED] and could also include 'representatives of our respective defence industries, in addition to government officials.

While understanding their expectation for a briefing on Canada's export control regime, I underscored that Canada adheres to its ATT obligations and is concerned with the use of Canadian technologies in the N-K theatre. And, that it was important to have a clear understanding as to where Turkish-built UAVs with Canadian technology have been and are currently being employed in operations as well as end-users of Turkish-built UAVs with Canadian technology.

He referenced the assumption that this question was for N-K, and not necessarily for Libya or northern Syria, for example.

The DG did say that there might be a difference of understanding on end-use provisions versus violations of ATT and if we could clarify specifically our end-user limitations.

He reconfirmed our understanding that it was unlikely for Turkey to be able to share, in the short term, the information requested by our DND due to operational sensitivities.

Rather, he suggested a good place to start would be following through with our proposed briefing.

Meanwhile, he asked that we forward to the MFA the request for [REDACTED] consultations in writing, with our specific questions, and concerns – i.e., technical and political violations.

I re-confirmed that our DA had already forwarded 4 lines of inquiry to his MOD contacts, but that I would forward those to him for follow-up.

ECE/TIR Next Steps:

Questions will likely continue on our export controls regime and approvals framework – and clarifying our end user requirements/guidelines as well as reviewing obligations under ATT. The recently announced proposed sale of Turkish drones to Ukraine could raise additional points.

With that, and in the absence of [REDACTED] talks, over the short-term, there would be much to be gained through following through with the planned briefing.

As follow-on, a consultation involving the participation of defence industry participants may indeed be useful.

PS: If a [REDACTED] conversation were still deemed to still be a priority, then given [REDACTED] with [REDACTED] a call between the two would signal the importance to Canada and our very real concerns -- even if it were unlikely to get us much further on that front.

Jamal

From: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 26, 2020 2:54 AM
To: Khokhar, Jamal -ANKRA -HOM/CDM <Jamal.Khokhar@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE <Kamiliya.Akkouche@international.gc.ca>; Helal, Marie-Thérèse -IRC <Marie-Therese.Helal@international.gc.ca>
Subject: Fwd: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Jamal, MT - see chain below.

ECD is speaking to Amb Uras tomorrow. Please let us know if you get a response from MFA to your letter.

Thanks

Alison

Director, Eastern Europe and Eurasia
 Cell: 613-462-2747

Begin forwarded message:

From: "El Kabiri, Reda -MINA" <Reda.ElKabiri@international.gc.ca>
Date: October 25, 2020 at 7:22:09 PM EDT
To: "Grant, Alison -ECE" <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>, "Boileau, Guy -DMT" <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>, "Hamilton, Kevin -IGR" <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>
Cc: "McLaughlin, Emily -MINA" <Emily.McLaughlin@international.gc.ca>, "Mawani, Aliya -MINA" <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>, "Turner, Andrew -ECE" <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>, "Anand, Shalini -TID"

<Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>, "Yendall, Jonathan -INP" <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>, "Mishra, Rachna - ELB" <Rachna.Mishra@international.gc.ca>, "Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE" <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>, "Gosselin, Catherine -TIR" <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>, "Senkiw, Jillian -TIR" <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>, "Bastien, Jean-François -TIR" <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>, *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>, "Sproule, David -ECD" <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>, "Carrière, Sébastien -IGN" <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>, *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>, *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>, *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>, "McCardell, Sandra -EGM" <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>, "Christie, Bruce -TFMA" <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Hi again! This is probably already in your plans but I just wanted to flag that o/MINA expressed a strong interest in obtaining timely readouts of the scheduled phone call between ECD and Turkish HOM, as well as ANKRA HOM outreach with senior levels at the MFA.

Merci beaucoup,
Reda (on call for MINA-DLU)
Mobile: 613-404-7244

From: El Kabiri, Reda -MINA

Sent: October 25, 2020 1:48 PM

To: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>

Cc: McLaughlin, Emily -MINA <Emily.McLaughlin@international.gc.ca>; Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TID <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Mishra, Rachna -ELB <Rachna.Mishra@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; McCardell, Sandra -EGM <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Absolutely thank you Alison. This is why we expect this may need to happen in a secure room given the nature of discussions. Aliya will be picking this one tomorrow for the DLU.

Reda (on call for MINA-DLU)
Mobile: 613-404-7244

From: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>

Sent: October 25, 2020 1:43 PM

To: El Kabiri, Reda -MINA <Reda.ElKabiri@international.gc.ca>; Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>

Cc: McLaughlin, Emily -MINA <Emily.McLaughlin@international.gc.ca>; Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TID <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Mishra, Rachna -ELB <Rachna.Mishra@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; McCardell, Sandra -EGM <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Reda – we will respond tomorrow. To be clear this seems to be a follow up on the question of Turkey's response to the consultations.

Alison

From: El Kabiri, Reda -MINA <Reda.ElKabiri@international.gc.ca>

Sent: October 25, 2020 10:21 AM

To: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>

Cc: McLaughlin, Emily -MINA <Emily.McLaughlin@international.gc.ca>; Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TID <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Mishra, Rachna -ELB <Rachna.Mishra@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; McCardell, Sandra -EGM <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Bonjour,

Apologies for this Sunday email (this can wait Monday morning). o/MINA would be keen to get a **status update on this investigation**.

Should you believe that the update will have to be in a secure room, o/MINA exempt is willing to come in person so please let us know and the MINA-DLU will send invitations for a meeting in secure room. If an email (or encrypted email) would be enough considering the information you will be sharing tomorrow, we would be grateful to obtain the update tomorrow as soon as deemed possible.

Many thanks!!

Reda (on call for MINA-DLU)

Mobile: 613-404-7244

From: McLaughlin, Emily -MINA <Emily.McLaughlin@international.gc.ca>

Sent: October 21, 2020 8:30 PM

To: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Mishra, Rachna -ELB <Rachna.Mishra@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; McCardell, Sandra -EGM <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Merci Guy (and others).

Shared with oMINA.

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>

Sent: October 21, 2020 8:16 PM

To: McLaughlin, Emily -MINA <Emily.McLaughlin@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Mishra, Rachna -ELB <Rachna.Mishra@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; McCardell, Sandra -EGM <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Hi Emily – DMT agrees with the recommendation outlined in Alison’s message.
Gtg to oMINA.
GuyB.

From: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 21, 2020 7:00 PM
To: Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>; Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Mishra, Rachna -ELB <Rachna.Mishra@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-Francois -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; McCardell, Sandra -EGM <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>
Subject: Re: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

My recommendation is that we wait to see how HOM and our entreaties here to Turkish Embassy have an impact. I raised this today with Turkish DHOM and emphasized that [REDACTED] engagement is required and will help move this file forward. HOM is likewise connecting with MFA counterparts in Ankara with same message and also welcoming President Erdogan’s offer to provide information, expressed in his call with our PM on Friday. That information could be conveyed through these [REDACTED] channels. Let’s reassess within several days if we don’t see progress.

Alison

Director, Eastern Europe and Eurasia
 Cell: 613-462-2747

On Oct 21, 2020, at 6:53 PM, Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca> wrote:

Aliya:

Just to be clear and make sure oMINA understands: We are not having any problems *connecting with the Turkish military, as such. Our contacts with them are deep and varied. [REDACTED]

But, on that point, perhaps others will have ideas on how oMINA might be of help in persuading Turkish officials to be a bit more forthcoming...

KH

From: Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>
Sent: Wednesday, October 21, 2020 4:46 PM
To: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Mishra, Rachna -ELB <Rachna.Mishra@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-

Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; McCardell, Sandra -EGM <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Dear All,

Thanks very much for putting together this useful update.

O/MINA noted the repeated outreach attempts to the Turkish military and is asking if the department assesses that MINA/their office could assist in making the defence connection – or if there are other ways in which they could be helpful?

Grateful for your views. Thanks,

Aliya

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>

Sent: October 20, 2020 4:24 PM

To: Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Mishra, Rachna -ELB <Rachna.Mishra@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Colleagues: DMT has approved the report and it is now being shared with oMINA (pasted below). Thank you, once again. As updates become available, thank you in advance for keeping us posted so that DMT/USS and oMINA have the very latest.
GuyB.

- ANKRA Defence Attaché has made several attempts to outreach to the Turkish military. A detailed response is not expected any time soon. ANKRA HOM will engage with the Turkish MFA to emphasize the importance of the talks to moving this issue forward.
- While it is impossible to independently verify the situation on the ground (OSCE monitoring suspended for months due to COVID), INA will continue to report on all latest intelligence. The latest footage of downed drones (if genuine) certainly appears to show a TB-2 UAV with on board.
- The Department is following up with other countries that may be supplying drone parts/technology to Turkey and Azerbaijan to gather additional information, including ANKRA Defence Attache indicates that his contacts report that has suspended any UAV-related exports (they are still providing though spare parts and components to support). While has yet to respond, it seems that are used in Turkish drones, however they are not a controlled item/defence item/dual-use item.
- If no further intelligence becomes available, the Department may contact the company for its input and assessment of the video.
- JLTA along with PER and the relevant Geographic Divisions are assessing the situation as it pertains to Turkish drones in Libya.
- All consultation partners have advised that for the time being they have no further intel/info to suggest that we should consider suspending any additional permits that are still valid to Turkey.
- GAC and OGDs are working on a review of the situation on the suspended permits in question, with a view to providing MINA consolidated advice on options/next steps.
- WRT to the the companies had already shipped items against those permits, so there is no urgent action required.

From: Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 20, 2020 2:02 PM
To: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Hello Guy,

Please find below a report on the current situation as well as the updated version of the Critical Path. Please let us know if you have any questions.

Andrew

- ANKRA Defence Attache has initiated outreach to Turkish military, but has yet to receive a response. ANKRA HOM will engage with the Turkish MFA to emphasize the importance of the [REDACTED] talks to moving this issue forward.
- While it is impossible to independently verify the situation on the ground (OSCE monitoring suspended for months due to COVID), INA will continue to report on all latest intelligence. The latest footage of downed drones (if genuine) certainly appears to show a TB-2 UAV with [REDACTED] on board.
- The Department is following up with other countries that may be supplying drone parts/technology to Turkey and Azerbaijan to gather additional information, including [REDACTED]. ANKRA Defence Attache indicates that his contacts report that [REDACTED] has suspended any UAV-related exports (they are still providing though spare parts and components to support [REDACTED]). While [REDACTED] has yet to respond, it seems that [REDACTED] are used in Turkish drones, however they are not a controlled item/defence item/dual-use item.
- If no further intelligence becomes available, the Department may contact the company for its input and assessment of the video.
- JLTA along with PER and the relevant Geographic Divisions are assessing the situation as it pertains to Turkish drones in Libya.
- All consultation partners have advised that for the time being they have no further intel/info to suggest that we should consider suspending any additional permits that are still valid to Turkey.
- GAC and OGDs are working on a review of the situation and the suspended permits in question, with a view to providing MINA consolidated advice on options/next steps.
- WRT to the [REDACTED] the companies had already shipped items against those permits, so there is no urgent action required.

Follow-up to MINA briefing on Turkish drones – Next steps

Immediate Actions:

- 1) [REDACTED] for controlled goods and inform companies (after letters are vetted by legal and green-lit by oMINA) – done
- 2) Send question to Minister on likewise [REDACTED] for controlled goods, to suspend Canadian exports of controlled goods to conflict zone – done

Actions on Monday:

- 1) Engagement with Turkey.
- **Recommendation to MINA:** That outreach to Turkey be done by MINA to his counterpart on Monday, given their good personal relationship, their recent discussion on exports, and to seek Turkey's views on regional events (Nagorno-Karabakh, Eastern Mediterranean). Guidance from MINA requested this weekend – TPs would be prepared this weekend if MINA agrees. - done
- If not MINA, a diplomatic demarche will be done by EGM/Sandra McCardell to the Turkish Ambassador in Ottawa as early as possible on Monday. – done
- Given the serious impact that suspending these permits, and making a statement about it, will have on our relations

with Turkey, it is important that engagement with Turkey happen prior to any press announcement. There are valid L3 Wescam permits valued at over [REDACTED] that the Minister is seeking to suspend. - done

s.20(1)(c)

s.23

- 2) Officials (IFM) requests that DND hold consultations with Turkish military on end use of UAVs with Canadian L3 Wescam technology (possibly via their Defence Attaché in Ankara) – requested and following up
- 3) Officials (TIE) informs L3 Wescam about the suspension, and suspension to be undertaken in system. - done
- 4) Communications released on suspensions.
- There are likely issues of commercial confidentiality in releasing a statement referring to a specific product or company. There are also concerns about the negative impact a statement referring to Turkey will have on our bilateral relationship. The communications product will be drafted with these concerns in mind. - done

Other actions:

- 1) Officials (ECE) request to ANKRA to reach out to both [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] counterparts to confirm with confidence existence of their components on Turkish UAVs – done and waiting for [REDACTED] reply
- 2) Officials (TIE) to re-send L3 Turkey permits that are under review to consultation partners to allow for further input, given change in circumstances. - done
- 3) [REDACTED]
- 4) Officials (TIE) to provide more information to respond to MINA question about intelligence on export permits after they are shipped (supported by IND) – following up
- 5) [REDACTED]

From: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>

Sent: Tuesday, October 20, 2020 1:45 PM

To: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Guy – this is coming very shortly, apologies for delay in pulling together the points, we have all been in different meetings.

Alison

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>

Sent: October 20, 2020 12:50 PM

To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Thanks Shalini, what is requested is one report to oMINA on Azerbaijan so your input yesterday should be captured in the one consolidated report being requested. I should have mentioned as well DMT's specific point about "there were to have been contacts through the military and also either other possible suppliers: eg

Kevin, Jonathan, Alison, assume this is being compiled and we'll be able to receive soon today?

With thanks

From: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 20, 2020 12:44 PM
To: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Guy, I will let I-branch colleagues respond to your two points below, as they are leading on intel reporting.

TIE's input from yesterday remains the same, which I think addresses the first question to a degree. For item 2, I am coordinating with the i-branch, and if needed, TIE will reach out to the company to support efforts to validate whether the picture/video in the tweet shows L3 wescam items.

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 20, 2020 12:37 PM
To: Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Colleagues – a quick follow-up on this request for one consolidated report re Azerbaijan covering: 1) whether we have any intel the issue of military goods destined to Turkey that may be in Azerbaijan; and 2) the tweet that MINA sent to DMT last night (immediately below).

Can we expect the report within the next hour in DMOs?

With thanks

GuyB.

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT
Sent: October 19, 2020 9:38 PM
To: Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INA <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR

<Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Colleagues, with apologies for another message this evening, in addition to the requested information below, DMT has requested that the report also provide what we know (and not know yet and what we are doing to find out) about the air defense units of the Artsakh Defense Army shooting down Azerbaijan UAVs. See tweet below MINA just sent to DMT about this.

Thank you once again for the consolidate report by Noon tomorrow for DMT approval.

<< File: IMG_5681.png >>

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT
Sent: October 19, 2020 8:03 PM
To: Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INA <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Glad to see that everyone that should be copied now are (including oUSS who I am now copying).

I will kindly ask I-E-T Branches to pls coordinate one response/report for tomorrow by Noon on our efforts thus far, and next steps, after which we will seek DMT approval, and then submit to oMINA.

With thanks to everyone

GuyB.

From: Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 19, 2020 7:53 PM
To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INA <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Looping in INA on the question of intel gathering and assessment (see highlighted line below). I will let INA reply, but my understanding is that an assessment has been made, high side, specific to likelihood of UAVs from Turkey being used by Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Regarding ██████████ contacts, the CDA in ANKRA submitted a Note Verbale to the Turkish MoD on 9 October, requesting a meeting on a urgent basis. The NV specified that we are seeking specific information on the possible re-export of UAV components by Turkey to Azerbaijan, pursuant to reports in the Turkish media and MINA's decision to suspend specific export permits. We equipped the CDA with detailed background to aid him in his demarche. The CDA has made three follow up enquiries (Thursday, Friday and today).). Last week he was told that the Turkish Armed Forces were gathering the responses to his questions, and that he would be called for a meeting when they were in a position to reply. Today, however, he was informed that this is "a very sensitive topic" and that a response or invitation for a meeting will "not be for a while."

It bears noting that the Turks are unlikely to be easily motivated to cooperate with us at this time, when it comes

to information sharing on this file. We can continue to push, but a timely and detailed response through the Turkish Armed Forces / MoD is probably more than we can hope for at this point.

KH

From: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>
Sent: Monday, October 19, 2020 7:21 PM
To: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Absolutely, looping in Kevin, David and Alison in I-branch and E-branch, respectively, both of DMT's questions/issues fall to their teams (I inadvertently didn't include them in my last message – I've been having outlook issues).

What I recall from an Ibranch update is that the DA in Turkey tried to set up a demarche, but has not had any success. That said, I understand that the DA has been reaching out to likeminded countries to determine how they are treating exports to Turkey linked to UAVs. Kevin Hamilton will have to confirm and will be better placed to respond to your two messages below.

I will add that all of this will feed into the memo and analysis noted under bullet four below, which the T-branch is leading on, with considerable input from DND, I branch and E-branch.

Hope this helps a little.

Warmly,
S.

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 19, 2020 6:37 PM
To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Sorry for the second message, DMT just wrote to me saying: "There were to have been contacts through the military and also either other possible suppliers: eg [REDACTED]
 Pls let me know about bringing back-in E Branch and I Branch (and I forgot, oUSS as well).

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT
Sent: October 19, 2020 6:35 PM
To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Hi Shalini, thank you for this. It has been shared with DMT. In the meantime, it is my understanding that there's been some correspondence bw MINA and Turkey as to whether we have any intel the issue of military goods destined to Turkey that may be in Azerbaijan. DMT has asked for a report to be submitted to oMINA tomorrow on this, noting specifically who is working on intel gathering, what we know and don't know. I note that in your reply that E-Branch was removed. Grateful if you can let me know whether you prefer looping-in E Branch (and I Branch) or whether you prefer that I reply all to this message and include both Branches. What you provided

below is form a significant part of the report but would need to know if there's been any work on this by E and I Branches and our Post and what we have heard thus far (and next steps).

With thanks

GuyB.

From: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 19, 2020 10:40 AM
To: *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Subject: FW: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Dear Guy:

Further to the exchange below, here is a brief update for DMT/oDMT awareness.

- We have twice circulated the list of all valid/not expired export permits to Turkey to our consultation partners and asked them to review with a critical lens, and advise whether they have intel/info to suggest that we should consider suspending any additional permits.
- To date, they have all come back and indicated that they do not have further intel/info that suggest that we need to suspend additional permits to Turkey at this time.
- They now have this list and will advise us if they get intel/info that changes this recommendation. (oMINA is aware)
- WRT to the suspended permits for L3 Wescam, T-branch is working across GAC/government on a review of the situation and the permits in question, with a view to providing MINA consolidated advice on options/next steps.
- WRT to the [REDACTED] the companies had already shipped items against those permits, so there is no urgent action required. oMINA is aware.

Let me know if any further info is required on our approach.

Warmly,
S.

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT
Sent: October 8, 2020 12:21 PM
To: Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>; Coleman, Robert -ECE <Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions

Salut Marie-Eve and team, just a quick follow-up to the message below. Do you think a response by end of day would be feasible?

With thanks

GuyB.

From: Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 6, 2020 5:23 PM
To: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>; Coleman, Robert -ECE

<Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions

And TIR/Bastien

From: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 6, 2020 5:19 PM
To: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>; Coleman, Robert -ECE <Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions

Looping in ECE/Coleman.

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 6, 2020 5:18 PM
To: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions

Salut Marie-Eve: As you saw, DMT has approved the analysis and it is now being shared with oMINA.

DMT has asked whether now we can verify if we have any reason to believe that any of the military goods to Turkey might be in Azerbaijan? DMT specifically referenced, for example, the UAV engines for instance in Group 2-10.

With thanks

From: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 6, 2020 4:18 PM
To: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>
Subject: FW: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions

Bonjour Guy,

Tel que discuté, voici les réponses avec les changements demandés.

Laisse-moi savoir si tu as des question ou commentaires.

Marie Eve

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>

Sent: October 5, 2020 7:55 PM

To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>

Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>

Subject: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions

Hi Shalini and Marie-Eve, with apologies for the eventing message, DMT just received a call from MINA re Turkey. We have been asked for the following analysis by Noon tomorrow please:

- Summary of the kind of goods in the Group 2 list of valid permits to Turkey that was submitted to oMINA today. If we could draw-out the kind of goods included in the attached table you produced that would be grateful (e.g. DMT asked as an example whether it included raffles).

Turkey is a significant purchaser of Canadian controlled goods and technology. Various Canadian companies are involved at various stages in the supply and provision of systems, subsystems, parts and components of a diverse range of military programs. These can be categorized into the following:

- Parts, components, and accessories for [REDACTED]
- Parts, components, avionics and other accessories for various aircraft platforms made in other countries, including [REDACTED] as well as the [REDACTED]
- Flight simulators, and their corresponding parts, components and technical data
- Parts, components, subsystems and their corresponding technical data and assistance related to the development of Turkish satellites (including military satellites)
- Parts, components and subsystems (including GPS anti-jam devices) to be integrated into various bombs, missiles, rockets and other ordnances
- Parts, components and technical data to be integrated into various armoured vehicles [REDACTED]
- Technical data and assistance for the development of [REDACTED]
- Production tools and machines for the manufacturing of ammunition and cartridges of various calibres
- Riflescopes, sights and their corresponding parts and components
- Rocket motors and other components for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)
- Electro-Optical and Infrared systems to be incorporated into various aerial platforms (including UAVs)
- Naval equipment (including cables and arresting harness for helicopter retrieval system, sonobuoys, various modules, etc.) to be integrated into warships and other naval platforms.
- Technical data and assistance related to the development and construction of a wind tunnel (to test aircraft and missiles)
- IED disruptors, as well as protective equipment for military personnel

Here is the list of valid (and suspended) Group 2 permits to Turkey, with the changes requested:
<< File: Group 2 items to Turkey (including MDPs) v.1 (003).docx >>

- Since 2016 (pre and post 2019 period), number of Wescam cameras that have been shipped and number of Wescam cameras that have not/not yet been shipped. Understand this may be challenging given return and repair. If exact number is not feasible, a solid estimate would be grateful with accompanying caveats. Total number of Wescam cameras exported to Turkey since 2016, and cameras not yet exported

Exported		Not yet exported	
New	Repaired	New	Repaired
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Notes:

- The numbers above are only for Wescam complete surveillance systems and does not include parts and components of the surveillance systems.
- Exported cameras cover exports since 2016 (pre and post 2019 exports).
- The "not exported" figures pertain only to the [REDACTED] Wescam valid permits (now suspended) as they could still be exported should the suspension be lifted.
- * This is the number of cameras the exporter would be allowed to export under their permits. This number could represent cameras ready to be exported and cameras under production or not yet produced. The permit suspension prevents the exporter from exporting these cameras.

- ****** This represents the number of repaired cameras that would be allowed to be exported. Our system does not allow us to determine whether these cameras are in Canada or still with the end user. The permit suspension prevents these cameras from being exported. It is unlikely that the end-user would send the cameras in its possession for repairs in Canada during the suspension given that they would be unable to have their cameras back.
3. Grateful if we could receive a profile of the type of Canadian exports of military goods to Turkey over the last 5 years, (e.g. whether we have shipped any LAVs to Turkey).
<< File: Military Exports to Turkey 2019-2014.docx >>

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to let me know.

Guy R. Boileau

Deputy Director | Directeur adjoint

Office of the Deputy Minister of International Trade | Cabinet du Sous-ministre du Commerce international

guy.boileau@international.gc.ca

Tel. 343-203-5965

Global Affairs Canada | Affaires mondiales Canada

Government of Canada | Gouvernement du Canada

<< OLE Object: Picture (Device Independent Bitmap) >>

RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)**From:** "Mawani, Aliya -MINA" <aliya.mawani@international.gc.ca>**To:** "Boileau, Guy -DMT" <guy.boileau@international.gc.ca>, "Turner, Andrew -ECE" <andrew.turner@international.gc.ca>, "Grant, Alison -ECE" <alison.grant@international.gc.ca>, "Anand, Shalini -TIE" <shalini.anand@international.gc.ca>, "Hamilton, Kevin -IGR" <kevin.hamilton@international.gc.ca>, "Yendall, Jonathan -INP" <jonathan.yendall@international.gc.ca>, "Mishra, Rachna -ELB" <rachna.mishra@international.gc.ca>**Cc:** "Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE" <marieeve.roymarcoux@international.gc.ca>, "Gosselin, Catherine -TIR" <catherine.gosselin@international.gc.ca>, "Senkiw, Jillian -TIR" <jillian.senkiw@international.gc.ca>, "Bastien, Jean-François -TIR" <jean-francois.bastien@international.gc.ca>, "TFM-Policy" <d-tfm-policy@international.gc.ca>, "Sproule, David -ECD" <david.sproule@international.gc.ca>, "Carrière, Sébastien -IGN" <sebastien.carriere@international.gc.ca>, "USS-DMA Advisors" <d-uss-dmaadvisors@international.gc.ca>, "MINA-Dept Unit" <d-mina-dept-unit@international.gc.ca>, "DMT-Policy" <d-dmt-policy@international.gc.ca>, "McCardell, Sandra -EGM" <sandra.mccardell@international.gc.ca>, "Christie, Bruce -TFMA" <bruce.christie@international.gc.ca>**Date:** Wed, 21 Oct 2020 16:45:37 -0400

Dear All,

Thanks very much for putting together this useful update.

O/MINA noted the repeated outreach attempts to the Turkish military and is asking if the department assesses that MINA/their office could assist in making the defence connection – or if there are other ways in which they could be helpful?

Grateful for your views. Thanks,

Aliya

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>**Sent:** October 20, 2020 4:24 PM**To:** Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Mishra, Rachna -ELB <Rachna.Mishra@international.gc.ca>**Cc:** Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>**Subject:** RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Colleagues: DMT has approved the report and it is now being shared with oMINA (pasted below). Thank you, once again. As updates become available, thank you in advance for keeping us posted so that DMT/USS and oMINA have the very latest. GuyB.

- ANKRA Defence Attaché has made several attempts to outreach to the Turkish military. A detailed response is not expected any time soon. ANKRA HOM will engage with the Turkish MFA to emphasize the importance of the [REDACTED] talks to moving this issue forward.
- While it is impossible to independently verify the situation on the ground (OSCE monitoring suspended for months due to COVID), INA will continue to report on all latest intelligence. The latest footage of downed drones (if genuine) certainly appears to show a TB-2 UAV with [REDACTED] on board.
- The Department is following up with other countries that may be supplying drone parts/technology to Turkey and Azerbaijan to gather additional information, including [REDACTED] ANKRA Defence Attache indicates that his contacts report that [REDACTED] has suspended any UAV-related exports (they are still providing though spare parts and components to support [REDACTED] While [REDACTED] has yet to respond, it seems that [REDACTED] are used in Turkish drones, however they are not a controlled item/defence item/dual-use item.
- If no further intelligence becomes available, the Department may contact the company for its input and assessment of the video.
- JLTA along with PER and the relevant Geographic Divisions are assessing the situation as it pertains to Turkish drones in Libya.
- All consultation partners have advised that for the time being they have no further intel/info to suggest that we should

consider suspending any additional permits that are still valid to Turkey.

- GAC and OGDs are working on a review of the situation on the suspended permits in question, with a view to providing MINA consolidated advice on options/next steps.
- WRT to the [REDACTED] the companies had already shipped items against those permits, so there is no urgent action required.

From: Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>

Sent: October 20, 2020 2:02 PM

To: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Hello Guy,

Please find below a report on the current situation as well as the updated version of the Critical Path. Please let us know if you have any questions.

Andrew

- ANKRA Defence Attache has initiated outreach to Turkish military, but has yet to receive a response. ANKRA HOM will engage with the Turkish MFA to emphasize the importance of the [REDACTED] talks to moving this issue forward.
- While it is impossible to independently verify the situation on the ground (OSCE monitoring suspended for months due to COVID), INA will continue to report on all latest intelligence. The latest footage of downed drones (if genuine) certainly appears to show a TB-2 UAV with [REDACTED] on board.
- The Department is following up with other countries that may be supplying drone parts/technology to Turkey and Azerbaijan to gather additional information, including [REDACTED] ANKRA Defence Attache indicates that his contacts report that [REDACTED] has suspended any UAV-related exports (they are still providing though spare parts and components to support [REDACTED] While [REDACTED] has yet to respond, it seems that [REDACTED] are used in Turkish drones, however they are not a controlled item/defence item/dual-use item.
- If no further intelligence becomes available, the Department may contact the company for its input and assessment of the video.
- JLTA along with PER and the relevant Geographic Divisions are assessing the situation as it pertains to Turkish drones in Libya.
- All consultation partners have advised that for the time being they have no further intel/info to suggest that we should consider suspending any additional permits that are still valid to Turkey.
- GAC and OGDs are working on a review of the situation and the suspended permits in question, with a view to providing MINA consolidated advice on options/next steps.
- WRT to the [REDACTED] the companies had already shipped items against those permits, so there is no urgent action required.

Follow-up to MINA briefing on Turkish drones – Next steps

Immediate Actions:

- 1) [REDACTED] for controlled goods and inform companies (after letters are vetted by legal and green-lit by oMINA) – done
- 2) Send question to Minister on likewise [REDACTED] for controlled goods, to suspend Canadian exports of controlled goods to conflict zone – done

Actions on Monday:

- 1) Engagement with Turkey.
 - **Recommendation to MINA:** That outreach to Turkey be done by MINA to his counterpart on Monday, given their good personal relationship, their recent discussion on exports, and to seek Turkey's views on regional events (Nagorno-Karabakh, Eastern Mediterranean). Guidance from MINA requested this weekend – TPs would be prepared this weekend if MINA agrees. - done
 - If not MINA, a diplomatic demarche will be done by EGM/Sandra McCardell to the Turkish Ambassador in Ottawa as early as possible on Monday. – done
 - Given the serious impact that suspending these permits, and making a statement about it, will have on our relations with Turkey, it is important that engagement with Turkey happen prior to any press announcement. There are [redacted] valid L3 Wescam permits valued at over [redacted] that the Minister is seeking to suspend. - done
- 2) Officials (IFM) requests that DND hold consultations with Turkish military on end use of UAVs with Canadian L3 Wescam technology (possibly via their Defence Attaché in Ankara) – requested and following up
- 3) Officials (TIE) informs L3 Wescam about the suspension, and suspension to be undertaken in system. - done
- 4) Communications released on suspensions.
 - There are likely issues of commercial confidentiality in releasing a statement referring to a specific product or company. There are also concerns about the negative impact a statement referring to Turkey will have on our bilateral relationship. The communications product will be drafted with these concerns in mind. - done

Other actions:

- 1) Officials (ECE) request to ANKRA to reach out to both [redacted] and [redacted] counterparts to confirm with confidence existence of their components on Turkish UAVs – done and waiting for [redacted] reply
- 2) Officials (TIE) to re-send L3 Turkey permits that are under review to consultation partners to allow for further input, given change in circumstances. - done
- 3) [redacted]
- 4) Officials (TIE) to provide more information to respond to MINA question about intelligence on export permits after they are shipped (supported by IND) – following up
- 5) [redacted]

From: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>

Sent: Tuesday, October 20, 2020 1:45 PM

To: Boleau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boleau@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Yendal, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendal@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Tumer, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Tumer@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Guy – this is coming very shortly, apologies for delay in pulling together the points, we have all been in different meetings.

Alison

From: Boleau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boleau@international.gc.ca>

Sent: October 20, 2020 12:50 PM

To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Thanks Shalini, what is requested is one report to oMINA on Azerbaijan so your input yesterday should be captured in the one consolidated report being requested. I should have mentioned as well DMT's specific point about "there were to have been contacts through the military and also either other possible suppliers: eg [REDACTED]"

Kevin, Jonathan, Alison, assume this is being compiled and we'll be able to receive soon today?

With thanks

From: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>

Sent: October 20, 2020 12:44 PM

To: Boleau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boleau@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Guy, I will let I-branch colleagues respond to your two points below, as they are leading on intel reporting.

TIE's input from yesterday remains the same, which I think addresses the first question to a degree. For item 2, I am coordinating with the i-branch, and if needed, TIE will reach out to the company to support efforts to validate whether the picture/video in the tweet shows L3 wescam items.

From: Boleau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boleau@international.gc.ca>

Sent: October 20, 2020 12:37 PM

To: Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Colleagues – a quick follow-up on this request for one consolidated report re Azerbaijan covering: 1) whether we have any intel the issue of military goods destined to Turkey that may be in Azerbaijan; and 2) the tweet that MINA sent to DMT last night (immediately below).

Can we expect the report within the next hour in DMOs?

With thanks

GuyB.

From: Boleau, Guy -DMT

Sent: October 19, 2020 9:38 PM

To: Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INA <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Tumer, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Tumer@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Colleagues, with apologies for another message this evening, in addition to the requested information below, DMT has requested that the report also provide what we know (and not know yet and what we are doing to find out) about the air defense units of the Artsakh Defense Army shooting down Azerbaijan UAVs. See tweet below MINA just sent to DMT about this. Thank you once again for the consolidate report by Noon tomorrow for DMT approval.

<< File: IMG_5681.png >>

From: Boleau, Guy -DMT
Sent: October 19, 2020 8:03 PM
To: Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Tumer, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Tumer@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INA <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Glad to see that everyone that should be copied now are (including oUSS who I am now copying).

I will kindly ask I-E-T Branches to pls coordinate one response/report for tomorrow by Noon on our efforts thus far, and next steps, after which we will seek DMT approval, and then submit to oMINA.
 With thanks to everyone
 GuyB.

From: Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 19, 2020 7:53 PM
To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Boleau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boleau@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INA <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Looping in INA on the question of intel gathering and assessment (see highlighted line below). I will let INA reply, but my understanding is that an assessment has been made, high side, specific to likelihood of UAVs from Turkey being used by Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Regarding ██████████ contacts, the CDA in ANKRA submitted a Note Verbale to the Turkish MoD on 9 October, requesting a meeting on a urgent basis. The NV specified that we are seeking specific information on the possible re-export of UAV components by Turkey to Azerbaijan, pursuant to reports in the Turkish media and MINA's decision to suspend specific export permits. We equipped the CDA with detailed background to aid him in his demarche. The CDA has made three follow up enquiries (Thursday, Friday and today).). Last week he was told that the Turkish Armed Forces were gathering the responses to his questions, and that he would be called for a meeting when they were in a position to reply. Today, however, he was informed that this is "a very sensitive topic" and that a response or invitation for a meeting will "not be for a while."

It bears noting that the Turks are unlikely to be easily motivated to cooperate with us at this time, when it comes to information sharing on this file. We can continue to push, but a timely and detailed response through the Turkish Armed Forces / MoD is probably more than we can hope for at this point.

KH

From: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>
Sent: Monday, October 19, 2020 7:21 PM
To: Boleau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boleau@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Absolutely, looping in Kevin, David and Alison in I-branch and E-branch, respectively, both of DMT's questions/issues fall to their teams (I inadvertently didn't include them in my last message – I've been having outlook issues).

What I recall from an Ibranch update is that the DA in Turkey tried to set up a demarche, but has not had any success. That said, I understand that the DA has been reaching out to likeminded countries to determine how they are treating exports to Turkey linked to UAVs. Kevin Hamilton will have to confirm and will be better placed to respond to your two messages below.

I will add that all of this will feed into the memo and analysis noted under bullet four below, which the T-branch is leading on, with considerable input from DND, I branch and E-branch.

Hope this helps a little.

Warmly,
S.

From: Boleau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boleau@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 19, 2020 6:37 PM
To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Sorry for the second message, DMT just wrote to me saying: "There were to have been contacts through the military and also either other possible suppliers: eg [REDACTED]"
 Pls let me know about bringing back-in E Branch and I Branch (and I forgot, oUSS as well).

From: Boleau, Guy -DMT
Sent: October 19, 2020 6:35 PM
To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Hi Shalini, thank you for this. It has been shared with DMT. In the meantime, it is my understanding that there's been some correspondence bw MINA and Turkey as to whether we have any intel the issue of military goods destined to Turkey that may be in Azerbaijan. DMT has asked for a report to be submitted to oMINA tomorrow on this, noting specifically who is working on intel gathering, what we know and don't know. I note that in your reply that E-Branch was removed. Grateful if you can let me know whether you prefer looping-in E Branch (and I Branch) or whether you prefer that I reply all to this message and include both Branches. What you provided below is form a significant part of the report but would need to know if there's been any work on this by E and I Branches and our Post and what we have heard thus far (and next steps).

With thanks
GuyB.

From: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 19, 2020 10:40 AM
To: *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Subject: FW: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Dear Guy:

Further to the exchange below, here is a brief update for DMT/oDMT awareness.

- We have twice circulated the list of all valid/not expired export permits to Turkey to our consultation partners and asked them to review with a critical lens, and advise whether they have intel/info to suggest that we should consider suspending any additional permits.
- To date, they have all come back and indicated that they do not have further intel/info that suggest that we need to suspend additional permits to Turkey at this time.
- They now have this list and will advise us if they get intel/info that changes this recommendation. (oMINA is aware)
- WRT to the suspended permits for L3 Wescam, T-branch is working across GAC/government on a review of the situation and the permits in question, with a view to providing MINA consolidated advice on options/next steps.
- WRT to the [REDACTED] the companies had already shipped items against those permits, so there is no urgent action required. oMINA is aware.

Let me know if any further info is required on our approach.

Warmly,
S.

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT
Sent: October 8, 2020 12:21 PM
To: Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>; Coleman, Robert -ECE <Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions

Salut Marie-Eve and team, just a quick follow-up to the message below. Do you think a response by end of day would be feasible?

With thanks
GuyB.

From: Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 6, 2020 5:23 PM
To: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>; Coleman, Robert -ECE <Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions

And TIR/Bastien

From: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 6, 2020 5:19 PM
To: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>; Coleman, Robert -ECE <Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions

Looping in ECE/Coleman.

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 6, 2020 5:18 PM
To: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions

Salut Marie-Eve: As you saw, DMT has approved the analysis and it is now being shared with oMINA.

DMT has asked whether now we can verify if we have any reason to believe that any of the military goods to Turkey might be in Azerbaijan? DMT specifically referenced, for example, the UAV engines for instance in Group 2-10.

With thanks

From: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 6, 2020 4:18 PM
To: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>
Subject: FW: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions

Bonjour Guy,

Tel que discuté, voici les réponses avec les changements demandés.

Laisse-moi savoir si tu as des question ou commentaires.

Marie Eve

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 5, 2020 7:55 PM
To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>
Subject: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions

Hi Shalini and Marie-Eve, with apologies for the eventing message, DMT just received a call from MINA re Turkey. We have been asked for the following analysis by Noon tomorrow please:

1. Summary of the kind of goods in the Group 2 list of valid permits to Turkey that was submitted to oMINA today. If we could draw-out the kind of goods included in the attached table you produced that would be grateful (e.g. DMT asked as an example whether it included rifles).

Turkey is a significant purchaser of Canadian controlled goods and technology. Various Canadian companies are involved at various stages in the supply and provision of systems, subsystems, parts and components of a diverse range of military programs. These can be categorized into the following:

- Parts, components, and accessories for [REDACTED]
- Parts, components, avionics and other accessories for various aircraft platforms made in other countries, including [REDACTED] as well as the [REDACTED]
- Flight simulators, and their corresponding parts, components and technical data
- Parts, components, subsystems and their corresponding technical data and assistance related to the development of Turkish satellites (including military satellites)
- Parts, components and subsystems (including GPS anti-jam devices) to be integrated into various bombs, missiles, rockets and other ordnances
- Parts, components and technical data to be integrated into various armoured vehicles ([REDACTED])
- Technical data and assistance for the development of [REDACTED]
- Production tools and machines for the manufacturing of ammunition and cartridges of various calibres
- Riflescopes, sights and their corresponding parts and components
- Rocket motors and other components for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)
- Electro-Optical and Infrared systems to be incorporated into various aerial platforms (including UAVs)
- Naval equipment (including cables and arresting harness for helicopter retrieval system, sonobuoys, various modules, etc.) to be integrated into warships and other naval platforms.
- Technical data and assistance related to the development and construction of a wind tunnel (to test aircraft and missiles)
- IED disruptors, as well as protective equipment for military personnel

Here is the list of valid (and suspended) Group 2 permits to Turkey, with the changes requested:

<< File: Group 2 items to Turkey (including MDPs) v.1 (003).docx >>

2. Since 2016 (pre and post 2019 period), number of Wescam cameras that have been shipped and number of Wescam cameras that have not/not yet been shipped. Understand this may be challenging given return and repair. If exact number is not feasible, a solid estimate would be grateful with accompanying caveats.

Total number of Wescam cameras exported to Turkey since 2016, and cameras not yet exported

Exported		Not yet exported	
New	Repaired	New	Repaired
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Notes:

- The numbers above are only for Wescam complete surveillance systems and does not include parts and components of the surveillance systems.
- Exported cameras cover exports since 2016 (pre and post 2019 exports).
- The "not exported" figures pertain only to the [REDACTED] Wescam valid permits (now suspended) as they could still be exported should the suspension be lifted.
- * This is the number of cameras the exporter would be allowed to export under their permits. This number could represent cameras ready to be exported and cameras under production or not yet produced. The permit suspension prevents the exporter from exporting these cameras.
- ** This represents the number of repaired cameras that would be allowed to be exported. Our system does not allow us to determine whether these cameras are in Canada or still with the end user. The permit suspension prevents these cameras from being exported. It is unlikely that the end-user would send the cameras in its possession for repairs in Canada during the suspension given that they would be unable to have their cameras back.

3. Grateful if we could receive a profile of the type of Canadian exports of military goods to Turkey over the last 5 years, (e.g. whether we have shipped any LAVs to Turkey).

<< File: Military Exports to Turkey 2019-2014.docx >>

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to let me know.

Guy R. Boileau

Deputy Director | Directeur adjoint
Office of the Deputy Minister of International Trade | Cabinet du Sous-ministre du Commerce international
guy.boileau@international.gc.ca
Tel. 343-203-5965
Global Affairs Canada | Affaires mondiales Canada
Government of Canada | Gouvernement du Canada
<< OLE Object: Picture (Device Independent Bitmap) >>

RE: Turkey Call Note

From: "Anand, Shalini -TIE" <shalini.anand@international.gc.ca>
To: "Prevost, Paul" <paul.prevost@pco-bcp.gc.ca>, "Turner, Andrew -ECE" <andrew.turner@international.gc.ca>
Cc: "Gosselin, Catherine -TIR" <catherine.gosselin@international.gc.ca>, "Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE" <marieeve.roymarcoux@international.gc.ca>, "Bastien, Jean-François -TIR" <jean-francois.bastien@international.gc.ca>, "Senkiw, Jillian -TIR" <jillian.senkiw@international.gc.ca>, "TFM-Policy" <d-tfm-policy@international.gc.ca>
Date: Thu, 15 Oct 2020 14:54:49 -0400
Attachments: PCO Turkey call note 16Oct20_rt_TID.docx (145.29 kB)

Hi Paul:

Thank you for providing us the opportunity to comment. We've made a number of edits to the TPs and background sections related to export controls. Thanks to those on the cc line for the work and the speedy turn around.

Hope this helps.

Warmly,
S.

From: Prevost, Paul <Paul.Prevost@pco-bcp.gc.ca>
Sent: October 15, 2020 12:25 PM
To: Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>
Subject: FW: Turkey Call Note

Andrew/Shalini

Please review our talking points on permits at page 1 and 2. It clearly states the end-user agreements and unsure if it is appropriate. If you have comments; in tack changes would be appropriate.

Call will most likely take place tomorrow morning.

Brigadier-Général Paul Prévost, RCAF

Director of Operations | Directeur des opérations
Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat | Secrétariat pour la politique étrangère et la défense
Privy Council Office | Bureau du Conseil Privé
Government of Canada | Gouvernement du Canada
Paul.Prevost@pco-bcp.gc.ca / Tel: 613-957-5481 / Cell : 

From: Tesselaar, Robert <Robert.Tesselaar@pco-bcp.gc.ca>
Sent: Thursday, October 15, 2020 9:08 AM
To: Prevost, Paul <Paul.Prevost@pco-bcp.gc.ca>
Cc: Lussier, Vincent <Vincent.Lussier@pco-bcp.gc.ca>; McPhail, Bernard <Bernard.McPhail@pco-bcp.gc.ca>
Subject: Turkey Call Note

Sir,

Attached is the latest version of subject note. While there is a fair bit in the note, I believe the conversation will focus on three areas, export permits, the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh and the tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea.

The Eastern Mediterranean issues have become more prominent with MINA's recent visit to Greece which happened to coincide with Turkey re-commence gas exploration in the contested waters. This led to statements of condemnation by the Greek FM at the end of the MINA-FM meeting (see attached).

Pro Patria,

Rob

Lieutenant-Colonel RD Tesselaar

Analyst, Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat
Privy Council Office / Government of Canada

Unclas: robert.tesselaar@pco-bcp.gc.ca
[REDACTED]

office: 613-948-6596 / cell: [REDACTED]

Analyste, Secrétariat pour la politique étrangère et la défense
Bureau du Conseil Privé / Gouvernement du Canada
Sans classification: robert.tesselaar@pco-bcp.gc.ca

bur: 613-948-6596 / cell: [REDACTED]

**Pages 1990 to / à 1999
are withheld pursuant to sections
sont retenues en vertu des articles
15(1), 15(1) - International, 19(1), 20(1)(c)
of the Access to Information Act
de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information**

RE: Turkey Exports

From: "Funtek, Katharine -TID" <katharine.funtek@international.gc.ca>
To: "Mawani, Aliya -MINA" <aliya.mawani@international.gc.ca>
Cc: "LaTorre, Jason -DMT" <jason.latorre@international.gc.ca>, "Boileau, Guy -DMT" <guy.boileau@international.gc.ca>, "Farid, Sohrab -DMA -USS" <sohrab.farid@international.gc.ca>, "Cohen, Sara -USS" <sara.cohen@international.gc.ca>, "MINA-Dept Unit <d-mina-dept-unit@international.gc.ca>", "Anand, Shalini -TIE" <shalini.anand@international.gc.ca>, "TFM-Policy <d-tfm-policy@international.gc.ca>", "Kinneer, Jocelyn -TIR" <jocelyn.kinneer@international.gc.ca>, "Senkiw, Jillian -TIR" <jillian.senkiw@international.gc.ca>
Date: Wed, 15 Apr 2020 10:56:11 -0400

Good morning, Aliya:

Notification of Ministerial policy is done by way of a Notice to Exporters posted on the GAC website and a message to brokers. The Notice has been drafted and is being sent to translation.

Permit applications for exports to Turkey would continue to be part of the pipeline process. In the last pipeline that went up before Easter, there was an annex dedicated solely to permit applications to Turkey. That was provided at the request of O/MINA solely for information purposes at that time. It would be helpful to know, in advance of tomorrow's pipeline briefing, whether O/MINA wishes to revisit that annex with a view to decision-making.

Katharine

From: Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>
Sent: April-15-20 10:39 AM
To: Funtek, Katharine -TID <Katharine.Funtek@international.gc.ca>
Cc: LaTorre, Jason -DMT <Jason.LaTorre@international.gc.ca>; Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Farid, Sohrab -DMA -USS <Sohrab.Farid@international.gc.ca>; Cohen, Sara -USS <Sara.Cohen@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Kinneer, Jocelyn -TIR <Jocelyn.Kinneer@international.gc.ca>
Subject: FW: Turkey Exports

Good morning Katharine,

Further to yesterday's message from o/MINA Allison Chick below, can you confirm if exporters have been informed? If so, would this be via EXCOL?

Thanks very much,

Aliya

Aliya Mawani

Senior Departmental Advisor | Conseillère ministérielle principale
 Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs | Bureau du Ministre des Affaires étrangères
Aliya.mawani@international.gc.ca
 Telephone | Téléphone: 343-203-5953



Global Affairs | Affaires mondiales
 Canada | Canada

From: Chick, Allison -MINA <Allison.Chick@international.gc.ca>
Sent: April 14, 2020 10:23 AM
To: Hannaford, John -DMT <John.Hannaford@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Lagueux, Annie -MINA <Annie.Lagueux@international.gc.ca>; Duhaime, Olivier -MINA <Olivier.Duhaime@international.gc.ca>; Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>; LaTorre, Jason -DMT <Jason.LaTorre@international.gc.ca>; 'Champagne, François-Philippe - Personnel' <Francois-Philippe.Champagne.█@parl.gc.ca>
Subject: Turkey Exports

Hi John,

With respect to a decision on exports to Turkey - the Minister is fine with the recommendation of the department to **apply this temporary suspension to military (Group 2 – military items) exports only** which would be consistent with our like-minded partners. Additionally, the Minister is fine with **the department's recommendation to apply an exemption to any NATO-related cooperation programs**, provided as is the law in Canada, that all permits MUST be considered through the ATT criteria and ensure that none are being used in the conflict in Syria.

Please let me know if you have any questions.

Sincerely,

Ally

RE: Turkey Group 2 PARs

From: "Anand, Shalini -TIE" </o=dfait-maeci/ou=exchange administrative group (fydibohf23spdl)/cn=recipients/cn=anands2a9e">
To: "McLaughlin, Emily -MINA" <emily.mclaughlin@international.gc.ca>
Cc: "Funtek, Katharine -TID" <katharine.funtek@international.gc.ca>, *TFM-Policy <d-tfm-policy@international.gc.ca>, *DMT-Policy <d-dmt-policy@international.gc.ca>, *USS-DMA Advisors <d-uss-dmaadvisors@international.gc.ca>, *MINA-Dept Unit <d-mina-dept-unit@international.gc.ca>
Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2020 16:48:20 -0400

Hi:

We've just begun work reviewing the Turkey permits for the memo and will also need to consult J-branch to ensure that we identify exceptions appropriately, so it is not likely to come up for a few weeks.

Understood on point number two. Will leave this with oMINA for consideration.

Warmly,
S.

From: McLaughlin, Emily -MINA
Sent: July 15, 2020 3:00 PM
To: Anand, Shalini -TIE
Cc: Funtek, Katharine -TID ; *TFM-Policy ; *DMT-Policy ; *USS-DMA Advisors ; *MINA-Dept Unit
Subject: RE: Turkey Group 2 PARs

Hi Shalini,

oMINA notes the reference to the Turkey memo, and would like to know what this is exactly. Do you have a sense of when this will come up?

oMINA also notes that while this is mostly administrative, they will have to discuss with MINA his comfort of extending the validity of permits in a time where we have a policy of presumptive denial on group 2 permits.

Thank you,
Emily

From: Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>
Sent: July 9, 2020 12:04 PM
To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Funtek, Katharine -TID <Katharine.Funtek@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey Group 2 PARs

Thanks very much Shalini. This has been shared with o/MINA. We'll come back to you on next steps re: memo and/or discussion at next week's briefing.

Best,

Aliya

From: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>
Sent: July 9, 2020 11:33 AM
To: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Funtek, Katharine -TID <Katharine.Funtek@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>
Subject: Turkey Group 2 PARs

Dear Aliya:

I'm attaching the 3 export permit amendment requests (PARs) for Group 2 items to Turkey. We sent these originally via the June 26 pipeline (and flagged it in the cover note) for consideration for approval two reasons: 1) because these are PARs (i.e. amendments to existing permits), not full permits, and 2) this is primarily an administrative request by the company to change the company name on the permit on account of a merger/acquisition. Please note that the company has also requested an extension of the validity of the permits to compensate for the process delay on the Department's part, so that it can complete its shipments of items against the original permit (with its new name on the permits). Given that there is no change to end-user or items, we included these in the pipeline as they are relatively straightforward.

By way of further background on the permits, the permits are for [REDACTED] to be used for the detection and measurement and analysis of signals from radar based systems, plus related software and technologies. They will be used by the [REDACTED] gathering.

If helpful, we can discuss this at the next oMINA briefing, or if there is a strong preference for these to be included in the Turkey memo that is forthcoming, we can do that too.

Grateful for feedback on the above.

Warmly,
S.

RE: Turkey Group 2 permits and follow up on 3:30 pm oMINA briefing ++

From: "Boileau, Guy -DMT" <guy.boileau@international.gc.ca>
To: "Anand, Shalini -TID" <shalini.anand@international.gc.ca>, "MINA-Dept Unit <d-mina-dept-unit@international.gc.ca>
Cc: "Sproule, David -ECD" <david.sproule@international.gc.ca>, "Turner, Andrew -ECE" <andrew.turner@international.gc.ca>, "Grant, Alison -ECE" <alison.grant@international.gc.ca>, "Hamilton, Kevin -IGR" <kevin.hamilton@international.gc.ca>, "Yendall, Jonathan -INP" <jonathan.yendall@international.gc.ca>, "Mishra, Rachna -ELB" <rachna.mishra@international.gc.ca>, "Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE" <marieeve.roymarcoux@international.gc.ca>, "Gosselin, Catherine -TIR" <catherine.gosselin@international.gc.ca>, "Senkiw, Jillian -TIR" <jillian.senkiw@international.gc.ca>, "Bastien, Jean-François -TIR" <jean-francois.bastien@international.gc.ca>, "TFM-Policy <d-tfm-policy@international.gc.ca>, "Sproule, David -ECD" <david.sproule@international.gc.ca>, "Carrière, Sébastien -IGN" <sebastien.carriere@international.gc.ca>, "USS-DMA Advisors <d-uss-dmaadvisors@international.gc.ca>, "Christie, Bruce -TFMA" <bruce.christie@international.gc.ca>, "Thompson, Kevin -JLTA" <kevin.thompson@international.gc.ca>, "Mallett, Erika -TIE" <erika.mallett@international.gc.ca>, "DMT-Policy <d-dmt-policy@international.gc.ca>
Date: Sun, 25 Oct 2020 15:32:46 -0400

MINA-DU, DMT has approved the following message for onward transmission to oMINA.

With thanks

GuyB.

Dear oMINA

Further to the 3:30 briefing with oMINA on Friday, during which officials discussed the valid group 2 permits to Turkey, below is: a) a brief summary of the context that I provided at the outset; b) a response to the question that Ally asked during the line by line permit review; and c) further details on the P&WC engines that were raised via a Radio Canada media question, about which I gave a heads up (likely coming to you via the Lbranch).

Context/Update on our reviews of valid permits with consultation partners:

- a. To date, at MINA's direction, [REDACTED]
- b. As mentioned, we've asked our consultation partners twice about the list of valid Group 2 (military goods) permits for items going directly to Turkey. We have asked if there are any concerns about these valid permits and to date, there have been no concerns raised. Given that the information and intelligence is still coming in and that the situation is evolving, we are planning to go back to consultee partners next week for a third time to validate this;
- c. Finally, we are trying to broaden our data mining of valid permits to look at non-Group 2 permits as well, but given the limitations of our system, this will take time to pull together and review. We are aiming to have an update towards the end of next week, depending on other requests/pressures.

RE: 854184-8 (MAGNUM INTEGRATED TECHNOLOGY LTD) - Ally was asking who the end users are for the ammunition that would be manufactured by ZSR Patlayici Sanayi A.S.

Per the End Use Statement in the file, the end user of the export is ZSR Patlayici Sanayi A.S., as they will be using the machinery to manufacture the ammunition themselves. However, the consignee website and they appear to sell to both commercial and military. Most of the ammo listed is typically called "NATO rounds" because NATO allies use them in their missions, and the facility is NATO certified. However, NATO rounds are also very popular with sport shooters who have rifles that shoot .308 because they are cheaper to buy and fit the .308 chamber. There is also an M43 round listed, used in SKS

Pratt & Whitney Canada to Turkey: question about exports to Turkey of engines for the [REDACTED] aircraft

Ref ID	Submit Date	Description	Consignee	Country	End Use	Status
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Request to export [REDACTED] civil certified PT6A- [REDACTED] turboprop engines [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Turkey	for installation on the [REDACTED]	Expired [REDACTED] (Approved [REDACTED])
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Request to export [REDACTED] civil certified PT6A- [REDACTED] turboprop engines [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Turkey	for installation on the [REDACTED] aircraft.	Expired [REDACTED] (Approved [REDACTED])
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Request to export [REDACTED] civil certified PT6A- [REDACTED] turboprop engines [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Turkey	for installation on the [REDACTED] aircraft	Expired [REDACTED] (Approved [REDACTED])

RE: Turkey Permits

From: "Anand, Shalini -TIE" <"o=dfait-maeci/ou=exchange administrative group (fydibohf23spdlt)/cn=recipients/cn=anands2a9e">
To: "Bongard, Karen -MINA" <karen.bongard@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <d-mina-dept-unit@international.gc.ca>, *USS-DMA Advisors <d-uss-dmaadvisors@international.gc.ca>, *DMT-Policy <d-dmt-policy@international.gc.ca>, *TFM-Policy <d-tfm-policy@international.gc.ca>, "Verheul, Steve -TFM" <steve.verheul@international.gc.ca>, "Funtek, Katharine -TID" <katharine.funtek@international.gc.ca>
Date: Sat, 04 Apr 2020 15:30:23 -0400
Attachments: Unnamed Attachment (68 bytes); Unnamed Attachment (68 bytes); Unnamed Attachment (68 bytes); Unnamed Attachment (68 bytes); Unnamed Attachment (68 bytes); Unnamed Attachment (68 bytes)

We're working on getting these through our approvals chain.

From: Bongard, Karen -MINA
Sent: April 4, 2020 3:30 PM
To: Anand, Shalini -TIE
Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit ; *USS-DMA Advisors ; *DMT-Policy ; *TFM-Policy ; Verheul, Steve -TFM ; Anand, Shalini -TIE ; Funtek, Katharine -TID
Subject: Turkey Permits

Hi Shalini – Hope all is well at your end.

OMINA has asked for a status update on where we are at with the updated Turkey permit list.

Thanks and regards,

Karen
 MINA DLU (on call)

From: Finch, Anthony -SHNGI -TD-MINA <Anthony.Finch@international.gc.ca>
Sent: April 2, 2020 11:02 AM
To: Funtek, Katharine -TID <Katharine.Funtek@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Verheul, Steve -TFM <Steve.Verheul@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey Permits

Katharine,

Per an email exchange and phone call with o/MINA in the last few minutes, I can offer that the o/MINA team is including export permits in a broader discussion they are having with MINA with respect to Turkey writ large. What they are seeking at this time is a master list of all export permit applications for Turkey currently in the system, regardless of whether the department is ready to recommend approval/issuance or not. If there are specific permits the department would like to flag as ready for MINA's consideration for issuance, this will also be welcomed as part of the product you send up.

Please let me know if you have any questions or comments.

Regards,

Anthony Finch
 Departmental Advisor | Conseiller ministériel
 Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs | Bureau du Ministre des Affaires étrangères
Anthony.finch@international.gc.ca
 Global Affairs Canada | Affaires mondiales Canada
 Government of Canada | Gouvernement du Canada



From: Finch, Anthony -SHNGI -TD-MINA
Sent: April 2, 2020 10:37 AM
To: Funtek, Katharine -TID <Katharine.Funtek@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-

Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Verheul, Steve -TFM <Steve.Verheul@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey Permits

Hello Katharine,

I have asked o/MINA to offer further context as to what motivates the request at this time so as to allow the department to deliver a suitable product. I will share their feedback with you asap.

Not a problem to Cc *TFM on export permit exchanges.

Regards,

Anthony Finch

Departmental Advisor | Conseiller ministériel

Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs | Bureau du Ministre des Affaires étrangères

Anthony.finch@international.gc.ca

Global Affairs Canada | Affaires mondiales Canada

Government of Canada | Gouvernement du Canada



From: Funtek, Katharine -TID <Katharine.Funtek@international.gc.ca>

Sent: April 2, 2020 9:33 AM

To: Finch, Anthony -SHNGI -TD-MINA <Anthony.Finch@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>

Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Verheul, Steve -TFM <Steve.Verheul@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey Permits

Good morning, Anthony. The Turkey permits that have been deemed ready for Minister's consideration for issuance will be going up on the open system. I would appreciate clarification on the purpose for which O/MINA is requesting these permits, as that will determine how we send them up. Is this request essentially an annex to the action memorandum on Turkey that is currently with the Minister?

Also, I would ask, please, that *TFM policy be copied on all export permit related messaging that is copied to DMOs and DLUs.

Thanks, Anthony!

Katharine

From: Finch, Anthony -SHNGI -TD-MINA <Anthony.Finch@international.gc.ca>

Sent: April-02-20 9:24 AM

To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Funtek, Katharine -TID <Katharine.Funtek@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey Permits

Good morning,

If on C6, we have until about noon today at which point we expect that o/MINA staff will all have exited the building.

Regards,

Anthony Finch

Departmental Advisor | Conseiller ministériel

Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs | Bureau du Ministre des Affaires étrangères

Anthony.finch@international.gc.ca

Global Affairs Canada | Affaires mondiales Canada

Government of Canada | Gouvernement du Canada



From: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>

Sent: April 2, 2020 9:01 AM

To: McLaughlin, Emily -MINA <Emily.McLaughlin@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Funtek, Katharine -TID <Katharine.Funtek@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Subject: Re: Turkey Permits

It's in our approvals chain.

Sent from my iPhone

On Apr 1, 2020, at 7:11 PM, McLaughlin, Emily -MINA <Emily.McLaughlin@international.gc.ca> wrote:

Hi Shalini,

Sorry to bother you, but oMINA is chasing the input for item 1. Do you think we will get that this evening? I just want to manage expectations.

Cheers,
Emily

From: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>

Sent: March 31, 2020 9:53 AM

To: Finch, Anthony -SHNGI -TD-MINA <Anthony.Finch@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Funtek, Katharine -TID <Katharine.Funtek@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey Permits

Hi Tony:

For item 1, we are data mining (it takes a bit longer, as there is no search function for indirect exports to Turkey and our technology is dated). We should have something to you this afternoon.

For item 2, is it possible that there is an arbitrary deadline that DCB provided to oMINA? We have a memo in the works, which I believe is with legal (we are following up), however this timeframe is not on our radar. Please note that the officer who was previously leading on the file has left the division, and we are looking into the status of this memo.

Thanks.
Warmly,
S.

From: Finch, Anthony -SHNGI -TD-MINA <Anthony.Finch@international.gc.ca>

Sent: March 31, 2020 9:08 AM

To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Funtek, Katharine -TID <Katharine.Funtek@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey Permits

Good morning Shalini,

Grateful for an update on items 1 and 2 and MINA is requesting these.

Thank you,

Anthony Finch

Departmental Advisor | Conseiller ministériel

Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs | Bureau du Ministre des Affaires étrangères

Anthony.finch@international.gc.ca

Global Affairs Canada | Affaires mondiales Canada

Government of Canada | Gouvernement du Canada



From: Finch, Anthony -SHNGI -TD-MINA
Sent: March 30, 2020 3:40 PM
To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Funtek, Katharine -TID <Katharine.Funtek@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Kinnear, Jocelyn -TIR <Jocelyn.Kinnear@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey Permits

Hello,

TIR/Kinnear's variation on item three in the list of o/MINA requests this morning is with exempt staff and they were very pleased with the content.

Grateful for an update on items 1 and 2.

Thank you,

Anthony Finch

Departmental Advisor | Conseiller ministériel
Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs | Bureau du Ministre des Affaires étrangères
Anthony.finch@international.gc.ca
Global Affairs Canada | Affaires mondiales Canada
Government of Canada | Gouvernement du Canada



From: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>
Sent: March 30, 2020 11:25 AM
To: Finch, Anthony -SHNGI -TD-MINA <Anthony.Finch@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Funtek, Katharine -TID <Katharine.Funtek@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Kinnear, Jocelyn -TIR <Jocelyn.Kinnear@international.gc.ca>
Subject: Re: Turkey Permits

Thanks Tony:

Looking into item 1 and 2, and copying JK to address item 3.

Warmly,
S.

Sent from my iPhone

On Mar 30, 2020, at 11:14 AM, Finch, Anthony -SHNGI -TD-MINA <Anthony.Finch@international.gc.ca> wrote:

Shalini,

O/MINA has urgently requested that the following be shared by today at 15h00:

- List of outstanding permits for Turkey.
- Deadline for the L3 memo which o/MINA understands to be tomorrow.
- Copy of the Turkey memo.

Your timely feedback is appreciated.

Thank you,

Anthony Finch

Departmental Advisor | Conseiller ministériel
Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs | Bureau du Ministre des Affaires étrangères
Anthony.finch@international.gc.ca
Global Affairs Canada | Affaires mondiales Canada
Government of Canada | Gouvernement du Canada

TIR.0168

RE: Turkish FM Request for Call with MINA on Export Permits Today URGENT

From: "Anand, Shalini -TIE" </o=dfait-maeci/ou=exchange administrative group (fydibohf23spdl)/cn=recipients/cn=anands2a9e">
To: "Tarasofsky, Richard -ECE" <richard.tarasofsky@international.gc.ca>, "Ayoub, Farid -CFXL" <farid.ayoub@international.gc.ca>, "Penttila, Pirkko -TCE" <pirkko.penttila@international.gc.ca>
Cc: "Funtek, Katharine -TID" <katharine.funtek@international.gc.ca>, *MINA-Dept Unit <d-mina-dept-unit@international.gc.ca>, *USS-DMA Advisors <d-uss-dmaadvisors@international.gc.ca>, *DMT-Policy <d-dmt-policy@international.gc.ca>, *TFM-Policy <d-tfm-policy@international.gc.ca>, "Kinnear, Jocelyn -TIR" <jocelyn.kinnear@international.gc.ca>, "Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE" <marieeve.roymarcoux@international.gc.ca>, "Grant, Alison -ECE" <alison.grant@international.gc.ca>, "Tumer, Andrew -ECE" <andrew.tumer@international.gc.ca>, "Pilloud, Marc -ECE" <marc.pilloud@international.gc.ca>, "Aubrey, Scott Bryce -ECE" <scottbryce.aubrey@international.gc.ca>
Date: Fri, 24 Jul 2020 14:01:56 -0400

Dear oMINA:

Below is the easier to read chart, to complement the Annex on export permits below.
 To clarify, the [redacted] they are presently in our system per below.
 Hope this helps.
 Warmly,
 S.

Ref ID	Submit Date	Description	Consignee/ End User	Country	End Use	Status
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	Republic of Turkey	Turkey	[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	Turkey	[redacted]	This is with MINA/oMINA since April 3, 2020 pipeline
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	Republic of Turkey	Turkey	[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	Turkey	[redacted]	In consultation, given that it

		including all materials, associated spare parts and Kits.	Republic of Turkey		was only received in late April. Working to expedite responses from consultation partners.
--	--	-----------------------------------------------------------	--------------------	--	--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

* While the company wanted a permit amendment request (PAR), it did not qualify because it had already received an earlier PAR (and our EIPA handbook does not allow for two PARs to be issued against the same permit).

From: Tarasofsky, Richard -ECE

Sent: July 24, 2020 11:20 AM

To: Ayoub, Farid -CFXL; Penttila, Pirkko -TCE; Anand, Shalini -TIE

Cc: Funtek, Katharine -TID; *MINA-Dept Unit; *USS-DMA Advisors; *DMT-Policy; *TFM-Policy; Kinnear, Jocelyn -TIR; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE; Grant, Alison -ECE; Turner, Andrew -ECE; Pilloud, Marc -ECE; Aubrey, Scott Bryce -ECE

Subject: RE: Turkish FM Request for Call with MINA on Export Permits Today URGENT

Adding in others from ECE.

From: Ayoub, Farid -CFXL <Farid.Ayoub@international.gc.ca>

Sent: July-24-20 11:18 AM

To: Penttila, Pirkko -TCE <Pirkko.Penttila@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Funtek, Katharine -TID <Katharine.Funtek@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Kinnear, Jocelyn -TIR <Jocelyn.Kinnear@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Tarasofsky, Richard -ECE <Richard.Tarasofsky@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkish FM Request for Call with MINA on Export Permits Today URGENT

Looping in the Geo desk.

Thanks,

Farid

From: Penttila, Pirkko -TCE <Pirkko.Penttila@international.gc.ca>

Sent: July 24, 2020 11:06 AM

To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Funtek, Katharine -TID <Katharine.Funtek@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Kinnear, Jocelyn -TIR <Jocelyn.Kinnear@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>

Subject: FW: Turkish FM Request for Call with MINA on Export Permits Today URGENT

Hi there,

oMINA is asking, on a priority basis, if you could put together the following:

Can you please clarify on the [REDACTED] permit that is with OMINA - is the division now re-consulting on it as the permit is expired?

Can you please provide all permit numbers, details in a simple chart for us?

Thanks,

Pirkko

From: Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>

Sent: July-24-20 9:21 AM

To: EXTOTT (DCB) <dcb@international.gc.ca>; *DCB-Management/Gestion <D-DCB-Management_Gestion@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Beloin, Valérie -ECE <Valerie.Beloin@international.gc.ca>; Aubrey, Scott Bryce -ECE <ScottBryce.Aubrey@international.gc.ca>; Tarasofsky, Richard -ECE <Richard.Tarasofsky@international.gc.ca>; Pilloud, Marc -ECE <Marc.Pilloud@international.gc.ca>; Caron, Natalie -EGM <Natalie.Caron@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-

Unit@international.gc.ca>

Subject: Turkish FM Request for Call with MINA on Export Permits Today

Please find attached the EGM approved recommendation for a call between MINA and the Turkish FM, which Turkey requested yesterday and has asked to take place urgently.

All the best,

Andrew

From: Turner, Andrew -ECE

Sent: Thursday, July 23, 2020 9:25 AM

To: *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Caron, Natalie -EGM <Natalie.Caron@international.gc.ca>; Tarasofsky, Richard -ECE <Richard.Tarasofsky@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Kinnear, Jocelyn -TIR <Jocelyn.Kinnear@international.gc.ca>

Subject: Turkish FM Request for Call with MINA on Export Permits Today

The Turkish Embassy has just contacted ECE to request a phone call between the Turkish FM and MINA at 13:00 today.

The reason for the urgent request is to discuss the issue of outstanding export permits that have not been issued due to Canada's restrictions on Group 2 items. This issue has been repeatedly raised by Turkish official in Ankara and Ottawa, as well as in previous ministerial discussions over the past few months. However, two cases in particular (one with [REDACTED] and one with [REDACTED]) are viewed with extreme urgency by the Turkish authorities,

[REDACTED] ANKRA HOM was called into the MFA last week to discuss the matter, and presented with the attached aide-memoire. This new request for the ministerial phone call appears to be following up on these efforts.

ECE has informed the Turkish Embassy that we will convey the request, but flagged that it may not be possible to arrange something so quickly. Given the importance that Turkey attaches to this issue and our ongoing cooperation on various issues, we would recommend that MINA agree to the call at a mutually convenient time. We will submit the formal recommendation, but are using this message to provide a heads-up.

Please let us know if you have any questions.

Andrew

RE: Turkish MFA demarches on Export Permits, showing restrained

From: "Anand, Shalini -TIE" </o=dfait-maeci/ou=exchange administrative group (fydibohf23spdlt)/cn=recipients/cn=anands2a9e">
To: "Mawani, Aliya -MINA" <aliya.mawani@international.gc.ca>, "MINA-Dept Unit <d-mina-dept-unit@international.gc.ca>, "Turner, Andrew -ECE" <andrew.turner@international.gc.ca>, "Funtek, Katharine -TID" <katharine.funtek@international.gc.ca>
Cc: "DMT-Policy <d-dmt-policy@international.gc.ca>, "USS-DMA Advisors <d-uss-dmaadvisors@international.gc.ca>, "Kinnear, Jocelyn -TIR" <jocelyn.kinnear@international.gc.ca>, "Korecky, Judy -TIR" <judy.korecky@international.gc.ca>, "Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE" <marieeve.roymarcoux@international.gc.ca>, "Thoppil, Naina -TIE" <naina.thoppil@international.gc.ca>, "Mallett, Erika -TIE" <erika.mallett@international.gc.ca>
Date: Mon, 17 Aug 2020 17:53:44 -0400
Attachments: Annex D -Export permits deemed ready for issuance destined to Turkey - REVISED AUG 17 2020 for all non-group 2 permits.docx (50.74 kB)

Hi Aliya:
 Below is the requested information. Hope this helps.
 Warmly,
 S.

From: Mawani, Aliya -MINA
Sent: August 17, 2020 2:18 PM
To: Anand, Shalini -TIE ; *MINA-Dept Unit ; Turner, Andrew -ECE ; Funtek, Katharine -TID
Cc: *DMT-Policy ; *USS-DMA Advisors ; Kinnear, Jocelyn -TIR ; Korecky, Judy -TIR ; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE
Subject: RE: Turkish MFA demarches on Export Permits, showing restrained
Importance: High

Good afternoon Katharine, Shalini and Andrew,

Following up on the report below that was shared with o/MINA late last week, o/MINA is seeking to clarify exactly which export permits Turkey démarched us on last week (permit numbers and details please).

- Please see below for an update to the last chart that I provided to o/MINA on this subject. Bottom line: all permit consultations have now concluded, and these Group 2 permits are being reviewed in the context of the Turkey Group 2 memo (details below).

Ref ID	Submit Date	Description	Consignee/ End User	Country	End Use	Status
			Republic of Turkey	Turkey		
				Turkey		Was sent to MINA/oMINA in April 3, 2020 pipeline; likely to be included in memo on Turkey group 2 permits that may be considered for

						exemption, this may qualify
				Turkey		
			Republic of Turkey			
				Turkey		Consultation just concluded. Developing a memo on Turkey group 2 permits that may be considered for exemption, this may qualify
		including all materials, associated spare parts and Kits.				

O/MINA has also asked for information on all permits in our exports backlog associated with Turkey, namely:

- According to our system, there are presently [REDACTED] export permit applications destined directly to Turkey under review in our system; below is more information on those permits:
 - [REDACTED] of the [REDACTED] are for Group 2 items
 - [REDACTED] of these Group 2 export permit applications have completed consultations and may be included in the below noted Turkey group 2 memo
 - To note: among the [REDACTED], there are [REDACTED] that were submitted pre-2020 (some have completed consultations and may be included in the Turkey group 2 memo, some of them are still in consult)
 - [REDACTED] of the [REDACTED] are with oMINA/MINA (see below for details);
 - The remainder of the permits are either under review or in consultation
 - To note: the [REDACTED] refers only to permit applications for items destined directly to Turkey, as our system does not allow us to data mine those applications that are for items going indirectly to Turkey

-information on outstanding permits with o/MINA (we believe there are some from an April 3rd pipeline);

- Correct, as discussed in the oMINA Tuesday briefings, there are some outstanding Turkey non-Group 2 permits that were sent in the April 3 2020 pipeline. I've attached an updated version of document (removing all group 2 items) for easy reference. Hopefully this helps.

-information on any permits that are group 2 and may be coming up in a memo;

- There are presently between [REDACTED] permits under consideration for exceptional circumstances. For legal consistency we have to be cautious about ensuring that we not only have reviewed for ATT, but that we can clearly point to exceptional circumstances for permits that we recommend for approval, given the Minister's early April policy on restricting issuance of Group 2 permits. Accordingly, we are working closely with the legal team and geographic on this memorandum/approach.

-information on any permits still being processed through our system

- Please see answer to question 2 above.

The information can be shared in whatever format is easiest for you – list, excel sheet, etc.

O/MINA has asked for the information today if at all possible – but I realize this may take a bit to pull together. If today is not in the realm

of the possible, grateful if you can provide a realistic ETA tomorrow that we can stick to.

Thank you – and let me know if you have any questions,

Aliya

From: Clark, Nancy -USS -DMA <Nancy.Clark@international.gc.ca>
Sent: August 13, 2020 1:25 PM
To: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>
Subject: FW: Turkish MFA demarches on Export Permits, showing restrained [REDACTED]

Colleagues, please pass the report from below from ANKRA to oMINA for awareness.

Nancy

REPORT: Turkish MFA demarches on Export Permits, showing restrained [REDACTED]

I was demarched by [REDACTED] on the two same export control cases as raised with HOM a near one month ago. I have built a very collegial and constructive relationship with my Turkish interlocutor over the course of my two years at post to the point where we are able to speak frankly and often find common ground (most recent examples of such were the PPE and Colvert cases). However, our conversation of this morning, while respectful, was one of our most difficult. To some extent, this can be contributed to the clearly restrained [REDACTED] over what the Turks characterize as our “silence” and “non-response” on its flagged export license cases. But a larger source of difficulty is [REDACTED] – it is becoming harder to explain the long timelines linked to our internal processes, and most notably, [REDACTED]. It is also difficult to seek Turkey’s support on other matters ([REDACTED] when we have little to say on their raised issues of importance. This is disappointing, as only a few weeks ago we were at a place where overtures were made by Turkey to host [REDACTED] at their esteemed global heads of mission event. Now, while MFA recognizes MINA’s competing priorities, they expressed [REDACTED]

An iterated account of my exchange with the MFA is below. I was largely in listening mode, although promised to impress again on (you) colleagues in Ottawa the importance to which Turkey attaches to these cases, conveying the points raised, along with their rising level of [REDACTED] in particular on our communication with them on these issues. I agreed to touch base with the MFA tomorrow to share any information gleaned from my reach back today. To that end, **grateful if you can share and expand on most recent talking points** to give a better, more transparent sense to Turkey on where we are on these licenses. We also **support that consideration be given for MINA to initiate a call with the FM**, to not only help mitigate fall out from this ongoing irritant (perhaps by inquiring into the informal invite to visit), but to also discuss other regional developments.

Finally, Turkish MFA expressed **their openness to be briefed on Canada’s export control processes**, including as it pertains to the ATT, to better understand the frameworks and legislation guiding our approach. ANKRA would welcome views on arranging such a discussion, but for our part, we are supportive. It has been our and the experience of allies that the more transparency you can bring to export control regimes, the more appreciative Turkey is.

Points raised by Turkish MFA (summarized) :

- Calling in follow-up from HOM and DG call last month on two projects where requests were made to facilitate completion, where both linked to export licenses. Deeply frustrated by the non-response from Ottawa.
- One project - [REDACTED] - is a “civilian project,” which they had understood would be exempted from the “sanctions” (their used term). Turkey noted the plane had arrived via Dublin. However, to finalize this project that “should have been completed years ago” but whose timelines were extended at the request of the Canadian company. Canada’s “Non response” and failure to so far extend the export license has only further complicated the issue, and has led to big challenges for the Turkish company, including bringing the plane back to Turkey. As such, Turkey continues to request the following:
 - Facilitation of travel (and quarantine) exemptions for two Turkish company representatives/experts to travel to Canada to undertake final processes, data transfers, sort out remaining issues etc.
 - Renewal of the requisite export licences.
- Lack of completion of the project will result [REDACTED]
- One project, military in nature, is that of [REDACTED]. Likely to be declared as a NATO asset. Turkey feels it has exhausted every avenue to sort this out – including engagements by the MFA and their Embassy to various GAC interlocutors, as well as company stakeholders.

- Recognize the challenges related with COVID19 and so trying to be very constructive. Turkey gave a lot of exceptions when resolving recent Canadian commercial raised cases. Lack of resolution and silence on these two cases does not give a good message to the business community.
- Turkey continues to seek more information on what is exactly the issue with Canada's implementation of ATT with respect to Turkey and willingness to try to look to resolve issues

Annex D - Export permits deemed ready for issuance destined to Turkey (direct and indirect) – August 17, 2020 update – non –group 2 permits only

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
Directly to Turkey							
	13-Feb-20			6-9.A.6		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item Description: Permanent export of various repaired plane parts. End-Use: [REDACTED] End-User Country/End-User: Turkey / [REDACTED] EUS states no further re-export. Condition(s): None. Consultations: 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss
	11-Feb-20			6-9.A.6		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item Description: Permanent export of various repaired plane parts. End-Use: [REDACTED] End-User Country/End-User: Turkey / [REDACTED] EUS states no further re-export. Condition(s): None. Consultations: 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

No concerns: all consultees responded

No comment: waived consultation based on recent issuance of permits with comparable circumstances and/or destination country is a party state in applicable regime

**Annex D - Export permits deemed ready for issuance destined to Turkey (direct and indirect) – August 17, 2020
update – non –group 2 permits only**

	22-Jan-20	EMS TECHNOLOGI ES CANADA, LTD.		1-5.A.2.a.2		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item Description: Permanent export of repaired HS-720 High Speed Data Unit. End-Use: To be used to support communication from the cockpit and the cabin. End-User Country/End-User: Turkey / Turkish Airlines. EUS states no further re-export. Condition(s): None. Consultations: 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss
	10-Jan-20			6-9.A.6		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item Description: [REDACTED] End-Use: If [REDACTED] End-User Country/End-User: Turkey / [REDACTED] Condition(s): None. Consultations: 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss
	26-Nov-19			6-9.A.6		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item Description: [REDACTED] End-Use: [REDACTED] End-User Country/End-User: Turkey / [REDACTED] Condition(s): None. Consultations: 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

No concerns: all consultees responded

No comment: waived consultation based on recent issuance of permits with comparable circumstances and/or destination country is a party state in applicable regime

Annex D - Export permits deemed ready for issuance destined to Turkey (direct and indirect) – August 17, 2020 update – non –group 2 permits only

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
Indirectly to Turkey via OPC Germany							
	3-Mar-20			6-11.A.3.b.1, 6-11.D.2, 6-11.E.2		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item Description: Permanent export of Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) Receivers, related technology, software and firmware updates. End-Use: Items will be used for small satellites for earth observation. End-User Country/End User: Germany, Turkey, India, Egypt / EUS states items may be re-exported to countries above. Condition(s): None. Consultations: 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

No concerns: all consultees responded

No comment: waived consultation based on recent issuance of permits with comparable circumstances and/or destination country is a party state in applicable regime

RE: Turkish Trade Team

From: "Bastien, Jean-François -TIR" <"/o=dfait-maeci/ou=exchange administrative group (fydibohf23spdlt)/cn=recipients/cn=bastiej326c">
To: "Tesselaar, Robert" <robert.tesselaar@pco-bcp.gc.ca>
Cc: "Pilloud, Marc -ECE" <marc.pilloud@international.gc.ca>, "Coleman, Robert -ECE" <robert.coleman@international.gc.ca>
Date: Thu, 17 Sep 2020 11:26:48 -0400

Duly noted, and thank you for the prompt reply.

Regards,
 J-F

De : Tesselaar, Robert <Robert.Tesselaar@pco-bcp.gc.ca>
Envoyé : 17 septembre 2020 11:21
À : Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>
Cc : Pilloud, Marc -ECE <Marc.Pilloud@international.gc.ca>; Coleman, Robert -ECE <Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca>
Objet : RE: Turkish Trade Team

J-F,

We are good for the moment. The leader's call has been held off pending the MINA's call with the Turkish FM today. I expect we will need to quickly put together talking points for the PM early next week. Thanks for following up.

Pro Patria,

Rob

Lieutenant-Colonel RD Tesselaar

Analyst, Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat
 Privy Council Office / Government of Canada
 Unclass: robert.tesselaar@pco-bcp.gc.ca

office: 613-948-6596 / cell: [REDACTED]

Analyste, Secrétariat pour la politique étrangère et la défense
 Bureau du Conseil Privé / Gouvernement du Canada
 Sans classification: robert.tesselaar@pco-bcp.gc.ca

bur: 613-948-6596 / cell: [REDACTED]

From: Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>

Sent: Thursday, September 17, 2020 11:07 AM

To: Tesselaar, Robert <Robert.Tesselaar@pco-bcp.gc.ca>

Cc: Marc.Pilloud@international.gc.ca; Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca

Subject: RE: Turkish Trade Team

Hi Robert,

I understand conversations may have taken place at higher levels in the last two days between my management and PCO, and to which I was not necessarily privy to, so I wanted to follow-up on your request to see if further information was still requested.

And should we not be in a position to share the memo, what type of info would be most useful (i.e Talking points vs background information).

Many thanks,
 J-F

Jean-François Bastien
 Senior Policy Analyst | Analyste principal en politiques
 Export Controls Policy Division | Direction de la politique des contrôles à l'exportation
 Global Affairs Canada | Affaires mondiales Canada

613-790-8492
jean-francois.bastien@international.gc.ca

De : Bastien, Jean-François -TIR
Envoyé : 15 septembre 2020 9:24
À : 'Tesselaar, Robert' <Robert.Tesselaar@pco-bcp.gc.ca>; Pilloud, Marc -ECE <Marc.Pilloud@international.gc.ca>; Coleman, Robert -ECE <Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca>
Objet : RE: Turkish Trade Team

Good morning gentlemen,

The memo is being steered by our sister division responsible for the operations side of export permits (TIE). Let me confirm the lead and I will get back to you asap.

J-F

De : Tesselaar, Robert <Robert.Tesselaar@pco-bcp.gc.ca>
Envoyé : 15 septembre 2020 9:15
À : Pilloud, Marc -ECE <Marc.Pilloud@international.gc.ca>; Coleman, Robert -ECE <Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>
Objet : RE: Turkish Trade Team

Marc,

Thank you.

JF,

I have sent an email on the high side as my C6 account is still in the queue so it will need to go to my PCO/CabNet account.

Pro Patria,

Rob

Lieutenant-Colonel RD Tesselaar

Analyst, Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat
 Privy Council Office / Government of Canada
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 Bureau du Conseil Privé / Gouvernement du Canada
 Sans classification: robert.tesselaar@pco-bcp.gc.ca

bur: 613-948-6596 / cell: [REDACTED]

From: Marc.Pilloud@international.gc.ca <Marc.Pilloud@international.gc.ca>
Sent: Tuesday, September 15, 2020 9:04 AM
To: Tesselaar, Robert <Robert.Tesselaar@pco-bcp.gc.ca>; Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca; Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca
Subject: RE: Turkish Trade Team

Good morning Robert,

Adding my colleague Jean-François from our exports control policy division who leads on the Turkey memo.

JF, are you able to please send Robert Tesselaar (PCO) a C6 copy of the exports control memo copying me and Robert C.? If you also have a copy that you could share with me through signet D that would be great since I do not have access to C6 today.

Best,

Marc

De : Tesselaar, Robert <Robert.Tesselaar@pco-bcp.gc.ca>
Envoyé : 15 septembre 2020 8:29
À : Coleman, Robert -ECE <Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca>
Cc : Pilloud, Marc -ECE <Marc.Pilloud@international.gc.ca>
Objet : RE: Turkish Trade Team

Robert,

Thank you for this, it is helpful even though there doesn't seem to have been much movement.

I understand that there are memos with oMINA on another batch of export permits. I thought they were primarily linked to aircraft issues, but heard this morning that there might be more [REDACTED] included? Would it be possible to get a bootleg of those memos to understand the background of the issues?

Thanks,

Pro Patria,

Rob

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Sans classification: robert.tesselaar@pco-bcp.gc.ca

[REDACTED]
bur: 613-948-6596 / cell: [REDACTED]

From: Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca <Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca>
Sent: Monday, September 14, 2020 5:14 PM
To: Tesselaar, Robert <Robert.Tesselaar@pco-bcp.gc.ca>
Cc: Marc.Pilloud@international.gc.ca
Subject: FW: Turkish Trade Team

Hi Rob:

Here is the latest we have on [REDACTED] but we are checking overnight with ISTBL on any updates and will revert. Sadly, not much has changed. Do you need any updates on any other trade files in preparation for the call?

Best,
Robert

From: Pilloud, Marc -ECE <Marc.Pilloud@international.gc.ca>
Sent: September 14, 2020 2:18 PM
To: Coleman, Robert -ECE <Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca>
Subject: TR: Turkish Trade Team

[REDACTED]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

De : Tesselaar, Robert <Robert.Tesselaar@pco-bcp.gc.ca>
Envoyé : 14 septembre 2020 1:43
À : Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Coleman, Robert -ECE <Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca>; Pilloud, Marc -ECE <Marc.Pilloud@international.gc.ca>
Objet : RE: Turkish Trade Team

Andrew,

Thank you for the introduction.

Marc,
Robert,

As Andrew mentions, I am preparing for a potential call between PMJT and President Erdogan. One of the possible topics is on [Redacted]
[Redacted] Would it be possible to get an update on that file? This is the last I have:

[Redacted]

Thanks for your help,

Pro Patria,

Rob

Lieutenant-Colonel RD Tesselaar

Analyst, Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat
Privy Council Office / Government of Canada
Unclas: robert.tesselaar@pco-bcp.gc.ca

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Bureau du Conseil Privé / Gouvernement du Canada
Sans classification: robert.tesselaar@pco-bcp.gc.ca

[Redacted]
bur: 613-948-6596 / cell: [Redacted]

From: Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>


Sent: Monday, September 14, 2020 1:36 PM

To: Tesselaar, Robert <Robert.Tesselaar@pco-bcp.gc.ca>

Cc: Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca; Marc.Pilloud@international.gc.ca

Subject: Turkish Trade Team

Hello Robert,

As discussed, my colleagues Robert and Marc look at Turkey from the Trade side and are best placed to discuss anything related to 

Marc, Robert, PCO is working to prepare materials for the possible PM-President call that Turkey has requested.

All the best,

Andrew

RE: Turkish Trade Team**From:** "Tesselaar, Robert" <robert.tesselaar@pco-bcp.gc.ca>**To:** "Pilloud, Marc -ECE" <marc.pilloud@international.gc.ca>, "Coleman, Robert -ECE" <robert.coleman@international.gc.ca>, "Bastien, Jean-François -TIR" <jean-francois.bastien@international.gc.ca>**Date:** Tue, 15 Sep 2020 09:15:08 -0400

Marc,

Thank you.

JF,

I have sent an email on the high side as my C6 account is still in the queue so it will need to go to my PCO/CabNet account.

Pro Patria,

Rob

Lieutenant-Colonel RD Tesselaar

Analyst, Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat

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office: 613-948-6596 / cell: [REDACTED]

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Bureau du Conseil Privé / Gouvernement du Canada

Sans classification: robert.tesselaar@pco-bcp.gc.ca

bur: 613-948-6596 / cell: [REDACTED]

From: Marc.Pilloud@international.gc.ca <Marc.Pilloud@international.gc.ca>**Sent:** Tuesday, September 15, 2020 9:04 AM**To:** Tesselaar, Robert <Robert.Tesselaar@pco-bcp.gc.ca>; Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca; Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca**Subject:** RE: Turkish Trade Team

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Thanks,

Pro Patria,

Rob

Lieutenant-Colonel RD Tesselaar

Analyst, Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat
Privy Council Office / Government of Canada
Unclas: robert.tesselaar@pco-bcp.gc.ca

[Redacted]
office: 613-948-6596 / cell: [Redacted]

Analyste, Secretariat pour la politique étrangère et la défense
Bureau du Conseil Privé / Gouvernement du Canada
Sans classification: robert.tesselaar@pco-bcp.gc.ca

[Redacted]
bur: 613-948-6596 / cell: [Redacted]

From: Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca <Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca>
Sent: Monday, September 14, 2020 5:14 PM
To: Tesselaar, Robert <Robert.Tesselaar@pco-bcp.gc.ca>
Cc: Marc.Pilloud@international.gc.ca
Subject: FW: Turkish Trade Team

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Robert

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Sent: September 14, 2020 2:18 PM
To: Coleman, Robert -ECE <Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca>
Subject: TR: Turkish Trade Team

[Redacted]

- [Redacted]

De : Tesselaar, Robert <Robert.Tesselaar@pco-bcp.gc.ca>

Envoyé : 14 septembre 2020 1:43

À : Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Coleman, Robert -ECE <Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca>; Pilloud, Marc -ECE <Marc.Pilloud@international.gc.ca>

Objet : RE: Turkish Trade Team

Andrew,

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Marc,
Robert,

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[REDACTED]

Thanks for your help,

Pro Patria,

Rob

Lieutenant-Colonel RD Tesselaar

Analyst, Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat
Privy Council Office / Government of Canada
Unclas: robert.tesselaar@pco-bcp.gc.ca

[REDACTED]
office: 613-948-6596 / cell: [REDACTED]

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Bureau du Conseil Privé / Gouvernement du Canada
Sans classification: robert.tesselaar@pco-bcp.gc.ca

[REDACTED]
bur: 613-948-6596 / cell: 343-[REDACTED]

From: Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>

Sent: Monday, September 14, 2020 1:36 PM

To: Tesselaar, Robert <Robert.Tesselaar@pco-bcp.gc.ca>

Cc: Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca; Marc.Pilloud@international.gc.ca

Subject: Turkish Trade Team

Hello Robert,

As discussed, my colleagues Robert and Marc look at Turkey from the Trade side and are best placed to discuss anything related to [REDACTED]

Marc, Robert, PCO is working to prepare materials for the possible PM-President call that Turkey has requested.

All the best,

Andrew

RE: Urgent- 2pm today

From: "Bastien, Jean-François -TIR" <"/o=dfait-maeci/ou=exchange administrative group (fydibohf23spdlt)/cn=recipients/cn=bastiej326c">
To: "Lussier, Vincent" <vincent.lussier@pco-bcp.gc.ca>
Cc: "McPhail, Bernard" <bernard.mcphail@pco-bcp.gc.ca>
Date: Tue, 06 Oct 2020 12:34:39 -0400

Bonjour Vincent,

Bien reçu. Je vous reviens le plus rapidement possible.

J-F

De : Lussier, Vincent <Vincent.Lussier@pco-bcp.gc.ca>
Envoyé : 6 octobre 2020 11:56
À : Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>
Cc : McPhail, Bernard <Bernard.McPhail@pco-bcp.gc.ca>
Objet : Urgent- 2pm today

Salut J-F,

Je dois préparer une note de breffage à l'attention du PMO et du FDPA (qui lui rencontre l'ambassadrice Arménienne cet après-midi) qui nous posent quelques questions. Ne te gêne surtout pas de m'envoyer l'information au compte-goutte. Can you fact-check what is below and provide some answers to :

1. 1. Reference the 2018 guide to Canada's export control list <https://www.international.gc.ca/controls-contrôles/assets/pdfs/documents/guide->. Confirming that any goods belonging within those 9 Groups (understanding Group 8 no longer exists) require an export permit. The law governing export permits is derived from the Export and Import Permits Act.
 - a. a. Any information concerning the governance of this process would be most welcome.
2. 2. In October 2019 following Turkey's incursion into Syria, Canada suspended the issuance of ALL new permits to Turkey, and thus it was not possible to export any goods belonging to the 9 groups.
3. 3. In April 2020, realizing that our October measures went above and beyond what like-minded allies had done, we lifted the suspension on export permits for all groups, except Group 2 items (Munitions and military hardware), thus allowing for the review of permits on a case-by-case basis (please confirm that our understanding is correct). Also, I'm wondering why, for instance, why Group [REDACTED] items (Arms treaty – ie light weapons, tanks etc) were still allowed (maybe I misunderstood something)?
 - a. a. In May 2020, MINA approved the issuance of [REDACTED] permits and a total of [REDACTED] Wescam systems were sent to Turkey.
 - i. Do we know what was used in terms of rationale for this exemption? Why did MINA grant these permits? What other assessment was done before deciding to lift the restrictions? What criteria did we use?
4. 4. Yesterday MINA suspended currently issued and valid permits for Group 2 items only as well as the issuance of new permits for Group 2 items. This affected [REDACTED] valid permits that have been temporarily revoked. Were there any pending L3/Wescam permits (permits waiting to be approved) that will also be affected by this decision? More
5. 5. Generally what other Turkey permits are affected by this decision?

Major Vincent Lussier

Analyst, Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat
Privy Council Office / Government of Canada
Work Cell: 613-297-6877 / Personal Cell: [REDACTED]

Analyste, Secrétariat pour la politique étrangère et la défense
Bureau du Conseil Privé / Gouvernement du Canada
Portable travail: 613-297-6877 / Portable perso: [REDACTED]

RE: WESCAM Export Permits

From: "Bastien, Jean-François -TIR" <"o=dfait-maeci/ou=exchange administrative group (fydibohf23spdlt)/cn=recipients/cn=bastiej326c">
To: "Tesselaar, Robert" <robert.tesselaar@pco-bcp.gc.ca>
Date: Thu, 01 Oct 2020 15:40:05 -0400

Hi Robert,

I haven't forgot about your request. That said, there is an important ministerial briefing this afternoon on the matter so this may explain the delay for some of my colleagues to get back to me.

Stay tuned.

J-F

De : Tesselaar, Robert <Robert.Tesselaar@pco-bcp.gc.ca>
Envoyé : 1 octobre 2020 12:48
À : Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; Coleman, Robert -ECE <Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca>
Cc : Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Lussier, Vincent <Vincent.Lussier@pco-bcp.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>
Objet : RE: WESCAM Export Permits

JF,

The leader's call is still up in the air. This is in the context of Armenia-Azerbaijan and the media reports of Canadian produced equipment being used in the conflict, specifically the allegations of Turkish drones with WESCAM sensors.

Pro Patria,

Rob

Lieutenant-Colonel RD Tesselaar

Analyst, Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat
Privy Council Office / Government of Canada
Unclas: robert.tesselaar@pco-bcp.gc.ca

office: 613-948-6596 / cell: [REDACTED]

Analyste, Secrétariat pour la politique étrangère et la défense
Bureau du Conseil Privé / Gouvernement du Canada
Sans classification: robert.tesselaar@pco-bcp.gc.ca

bur: 613-948-6596 / cell: [REDACTED]

From: Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>
Sent: Thursday, October 1, 2020 12:44 PM
To: Tesselaar, Robert <Robert.Tesselaar@pco-bcp.gc.ca>; Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca
Cc: Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca; [Lussier, Vincent <Vincent.Lussier@pco-bcp.gc.ca>](mailto:Lussier,Vincent@pco-bcp.gc.ca); Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca
Subject: RE: WESCAM Export Permits

Hi Robert,

Message well-received.

Let me follow-up on my end and I will get back to you asap.

Is this in the context of an upcoming leader-level call? I know one was in the work recently.

JF

Envoyé de mon appareil Samsung de Bell via le réseau le plus vaste au pays.

----- Message d'origine -----

De : "Tesselaar, Robert" <Robert.Tesselaar@pco-bcp.gc.ca>

Date : 20-10-01 12:28 p.m (GMT-05:00)

À : "Bastien, Jean-François -TIR" <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>, "Coleman, Robert -ECE" <Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca>

Cc : "Grant, Alison -ECE" <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>, "Lussier, Vincent" <Vincent.Lussier@pco-bcp.gc.ca>

Objet : WESCAM Export Permits

JF,

We need to provide an summary of the WESCAM permit history as background to address recent media reports. One question in particular that has come up is whether we imposed any caveat or restrictions on Turkey's use of the systems once that permits were approved. Do you have an info on that aspect and details on the last permits that were approved that we could get this afternoon? My colleague, Vincent Lussier (cc'd), has the lead on this and may have further specific information requirements.

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bur: 613-948-6596 / cell: [REDACTED]

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From: "Bastien, Jean-François -TIR" </o=dfait-maeci/ou=exchange administrative group (fydibohf23spdlt)/cn=recipients/cn=bastiej326c">
To: "Tesselaar, Robert" <robert.tesselaar@pco-bcp.gc.ca>
Cc: "Grant, Alison -ECE" <alison.grant@international.gc.ca>, "Lussier, Vincent" <vincent.lussier@pco-bcp.gc.ca>, "Senkiw, Jillian -TIR" <jillian.senkiw@international.gc.ca>, "Gosselin, Catherine -TIR" <catherine.gosselin@international.gc.ca>, "Coleman, Robert -ECE" <robert.coleman@international.gc.ca>
Date: Fri, 02 Oct 2020 07:34:48 -0400
Attachments: Sitrep - possible permit linkages to alleged use of Turkish drones with Canadian sensors in conflict zones.September 30 2020.final.3.docx (37.6 kB)

Good morning Robert,

Apologies for the delay.

Please find attached a sitrep that was prepared on the issue.

With respect to media reports, and should media lines be needed, we have those on hand and available through our Communications people.

Best regards,
J-F

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Sent: October 1, 2020 12:48 PM
To: Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; Coleman, Robert -ECE <Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca>
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Objet : WESCAM Export Permits

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bur: 613-948-6596 / cell: [REDACTED]

POSSIBLE EXPORT PERMIT LINKAGES TO ALLEGED USE OF TURKISH DRONES IN CONFLICT ZONES

ISSUE

- There are media reports and allegations that Turkey has transferred or sold drones to the Azerbaijani armed forces, possibly with Canadian technology, that are being used in the recent flare-up of large-scale military attacks between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh. The Armenian National Committee of Canada alleges that Azerbaijan is using Turkish made Bayraktar TB2 drones.
- A recent report by Project Ploughshares claims that Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones allegedly used by the Turkish military in Syria and Libya may have been used in conjunction with sensors obtained from a Canadian company L3 Harris Wescam (Wescam).
- Officials are seeking to determine the veracity of these claims and to determine whether there are any potential export control issues.
- Canada's policy approach towards exports of Group 2 items to Turkey has not changed since April 2020.

Canadian Export Controls and Turkey

Canada has one of the strongest export controls systems in the world, and respect for human rights is enshrined in our export controls legislation.

In September 2019, Canada acceded to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and placed the ATT assessment criteria directly into Canadian law. Under the law, controlled goods and technology cannot be exported from Canada where there is a substantial risk that they could be used to commit or to facilitate serious violations of international humanitarian law, international human rights law, or serious acts of gender-based violence. Other criteria which would lead to a permit application denial include a substantial risk that the arms or munitions could be used to undermine peace and security or to further international organized crime or terrorism. Canada has one of the most robust legal applications of this Treaty in the world.

Until recently Turkey [REDACTED] in terms of Canada's export controls, given their membership and adherence to the four multilateral export control regimes (i.e. the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Australia Group), as well as being a member of NATO and having effective export control mechanisms. [REDACTED]

On October 11, 2019, in response to Turkey's military incursion into north-eastern Syria, the Government of Canada announced a temporary suspension on the issuance of all new permits

for the export of controlled goods and technology to Turkey. Exporters who were issued permits for the export of such items to Turkey prior to October 11, 2019 may continue to export against those permits during their period of validity.

In April 2020, Canada significantly narrowed the scope of its policy to include only military goods and technology. While restrictions continue to apply to military exports to Turkey, during the permit review process Canada is considering whether there are exceptional circumstances, including but not limited to NATO cooperation programs, that might justify issuing an export permit for military items on a case-by-case basis.

The Government of Canada has stated that it continues to monitor developments in Turkey and the surrounding region, and will take appropriate action should credible evidence be found regarding the misuse of any controlled Canadian good or technology, including to commit or to facilitate serious violations of international human rights or humanitarian law.

Project Ploughshares Report

Project Ploughshares recently released a report entitled *Killer Optics: Exports of Wescam Sensors to Turkey – A Litmus Test of Canada’s Compliance with the Arms Trade Treaty*. The report claims that a Canadian company L3Harris Wescam exported a large number of Electro Optical/Infra-Red (EO/IR) imaging and targeting sensor systems that can be used for tracking targets and guiding munitions to the Turkish military in 2019, based on Statistics Canada data.

Project Ploughshares further alleges that the Turkish military has committed serious breaches of international humanitarian law (IHL) and other violations, particularly when conducting airstrikes, and that Wescam sensors, mounted on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), have been used extensively by Turkey in its recent military activities. Project Ploughshares asserts that Canada is therefore violating the ATT obligations by permitting exports of Wescam sensors.

The department notes that Turkish drones have been used in Turkey’s military and security operations - both domestically and internationally -- and they have both defensive and offensive capabilities, depending on how they are tasked. Notably, the TB2 UAV are always used for the purposes of observation, surveillance, identification and targeting of targets, but some versions of the TAI ANKA drones also carry weapons.

Turkey’s justification of its cross-border military operations in Iraq and Syria relied heavily on an argument of national security related to the activities of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). While Canada does not always support Turkey’s military actions -- as was the case with Operation Peace Spring -- like most of our like-minded counterparts we support the position that Turkey, a NATO ally, has legitimate security concerns, specifically related to the activities of the PKK which is a listed terrorist organization in Canada.

The Turkish military is, by-and-large, a professional army that acts in accordance with its international obligations. While Operations Olive Branch and Peace Spring both resulted in the displacement of civilians, there is no clear evidence that suggest a deliberate targeting of civilians or civilian infrastructure.

The Ploughshares report relies heavily on two UN reports (9 August 2018 and 28 January 2020), as well as an Amnesty International Report (Oct 2019), which itself relies primarily on accounts reported by the Kurdish Red Crescent (affiliated with the self-administration in the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria). The Kurdish Red Crescent is not formally affiliated with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). While we do not doubt KRC's credibility, their assessment should not be equated with an ICRC assessment.

The UN reports that list incidents in which civilians were killed as a result of Turkish military operations are limited to the two military operations (Olive Branch and Peace Spring) in which the Turkish side specifically targeted the Peoples Protection Unit (YPG) armed group – which they perceive to be the Syrian branch of the PKK. In these military operations, Turkey relied extensively on the Syrian armed opposition groups (SNA) to conduct the ground offensive. The department's initial assessment (in line with likemindeds) is that the Turkish military did not/not engage in the deliberate and purposeful targeting of civilians or civilian infrastructure.

In its May 2020 memorandum to the Minister, the department noted that there had been no substantiated evidence of the Turkish Armed Forces committing human rights violations in Syria, either in Idlib or northeast Syria during OPS. [REDACTED]

In Libya, since 2019 Turkey has provided weapons, drones, and reportedly over 16,500 Syrian mercenaries to Libya in support of Government of National Accord (GNA)-aligned forces, with which Turkey has a security agreement as of December 2019. A November 2019 UN Panel of Experts report on Libya found Turkey to be "routinely" in violation of UN sanctions on Libya related to arms, which were in force before the Turkey-GNA security agreement. A UN Panel of Experts report from December 2019 found that Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones, and possibly one Karayel drone, were exported to Libya for use by the GNA. While there have been unconfirmed reports that Turkish drones have killed civilians in Libya and thereby contributed to violations of IHL, there has been no conclusive evidence to-date that Turkey has committed violations of IHL in Libya. The United Nations and NGOs have very limited access to most of Libya due to ongoing conflict and instability, severely complicating the collection of evidence on alleged violations of international humanitarian law in Libya (e.g. testimonies, forensic evidence).

[REDACTED] A separate classified assessment has been shared with ministerial and deputies offices through normal channels.

Permit Analysis

[REDACTED] A number of foreign competitors in the US, France, Italy, Israel and even in Turkey manufacture similar cameras / technologies that can be used in such UAVs. [REDACTED]


While it is known that some Bayraktar TB-2 UAVs possess [REDACTED] sensors due to its high quality, the proportion that do is not known. At this juncture, it would be impossible to credibly guess a percentage. We do not presently have the necessary information to make such an estimate, however officials are making best efforts to obtain information that would assist in this regard, [REDACTED]

Wescam has received permits from GAC for camera surveillance systems destined directly to Turkey (the main consignees in these instances are [REDACTED] both of which supply the Turkish government). None of the permits issued to Wescam for items destined to Turkey from January 1, 2016 to September 27, 2020 indicate an end use in Libya, Azerbaijan or Armenia. Information related to current valid previously issued permits to Turkey is provided in the attached tables.

There appear to be no applications, nor any valid permits in EXCOL for L3 Wescam items destined directly to Libya, Azerbaijan or Armenia.

There are presently [REDACTED] applications in EXCOL that are “under review” for Wescam camera systems going via Turkey ([REDACTED] is the consignee) onwards to the Azerbaijan Airforce. These applications are currently under consultation.

Recent Interactions with [REDACTED]



Positions of Like-Minded Countries

The attached Annex sets out an up to date comparative chart on the position of key partner countries’ controls over strategic exports to Turkey, as well their relative commercial exposure.

Although most of our like-mindeds imposed exports restrictions on Turkey following the October 2019 incursion into Syria, Canada’s decision to immediately suspend all new export permits to Turkey went beyond our like-mindeds and immediately became a bilateral irritant with Turkey. Since Canada updated its exports control policy in April to only restrict Group 2 permits, its approach appears to be most closely aligned with the more restrictive of EU members, who are

either not issuing permits for any military items or only for military items who are either not issuing permits for any military items to Turkey or not issuing permits for military items to Turkey for end use in Syria, for military use or other uses. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] have placed no restrictions on military exports to Turkey, which they are assessing on a case-by-case basis.

Next Steps

The Department is pursuing a wide range of steps in order to ascertain more information and proactively monitor the situation closely.

The Department could consider a number of different steps from an export controls perspective, depending on the additional information that becomes available.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Given the new outbreak in violence over Nagorno-Karabakh, Canada's Ambassador to Turkey raised our concerns about alleged use of Turkish drones equipped with Canadian technology with the Turkish MFA Head of Americas (ADM-eq) on September 29. This conversation will continue with Turkey to reaffirm our export controls regime and seek assurances about end use.

[REDACTED]

In the interim, officials continue to engage with DND and allies, as well as with GAC's legal bureau to gather information related to allegations in Syria, Canada's ATT obligations, and Canada's arms embargo to Libya.

The Embassy in Ankara, including our DND Defence Attaché, continues to engage local government, likeminded countries, and other key stakeholders, including civil society, as well as frequently monitor social media and NGO reporting.

The Department's Intelligence Bureau (IND) has prepared a detailed assessment, which will be shared separately due to its classification. IND will continue to monitor intelligence reporting and will continue to provide detailed and tailored intelligence assessments working with key Canadian and FVEY intelligence partners.

The Export Controls Bureau remains in close contact with [REDACTED] and is awaiting further information from the company.

Author's name/division or mission/tel.: Korecky/TIR/613-291-0347

Approval bureau/mission: TID

Consulted divisions/missions/departments: TIE/ECE/JLT/JLH/INA

PERMITS ISSUED TO L3 WESCAM FOR TURKEY (from January 1, 2016 to October 11, 2019)

No.	Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Actual Exports as of the second quarter ending June 30, 2020 (Final date of submission for 3 rd quarter report by exporters is November 1 st)	Status
1		2016/05/25	Temporary export of quantity 1 Model Stabilized Optical Sensor Systems and replacement parts		For integration and ground tests			Temporarily exported items came back to Canada.	Permit issued on 2016/05/27, expired on 2018/09/31
2		2016/08/10	Permanent export of quantity EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems (including ancillary equipment)		For installation and integration into UAVs	Turkish Army		of total value as follows: repaired (non-warranty repairs) - Components of the Repaired component (warranty repair) -	Permit issued on 2016/09/01, expired on 2017/07/11
3		2016/09/29	Humidity Indicator Installation Tools (Test Equipment for Wescam EO/IR Surveillance Systems)		To test Wescam EO/IR Surveillance Systems	Ministry of Defence of Turkey		total value, as follows: Humidity Indicator Installation Tools	Permit issued on 2016/10/13 expired on 2018/10/31
4		2016/11/22	EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems (including ancillary equipment)		For installation and integration into UAVs	Ministry of Defence of Turkey		of total value as follows: 	Permit issued on 2017/07-11, expired on 2018/12/31

No.	Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Actual Exports as of the second quarter ending June 30, 2020 (Final date of submission for 3 rd quarter report by exporters is November 1 st)	Status
								repaired (warranty repair;) Repaired , replacement components of the	
5		2017/01/05	Purge kit, ground boresight module, mission grip handcontroller		Auxiliary equipment for EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems	Ministry of Defence of Turkey, Ministry of the Interior of Turkey Turkish Gendarmerie		of total value, as follows: purge kit (component of a system)	Permit issued on 2017/01/11, expired on 2019/01/31
6		2017/01/16	Test Equipment for the Wescam EO/IR Surveillance Systems.		For diagnosis and testing activities of and/or Systems	Ministry of Defence of Turkey Ministry of the Interior of Turkey		of total value, as follows: Various test equipment for system - Technical data -	Permit issued on 2017/05/10, expired on 2019/01/31
7		2017/01/17	Circuit Card Assemblies, Camera Assemblies, Cable Assemblies, Wiring Harness Assemblies, Lens Assemblies, Motor Gearbox, etc.		For integration into Wescam EO/IR Surveillance Systems	Ministry of Defence of Turkey Ministry of the Interior of Turkey		of total value, as follows: repaired systems (non-warranty) - Various components and subassemblies of systems -	Permit issued 2018/01/08, expired on 2019/01/31
8		2017/01/24	each of Handcontrollers and		For demonstration			Temporarily exported items returned to	Permit

No.	Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Actual Exports as of the second quarter ending June 30, 2020 (Final date of submission for 3 rd quarter report by exporters is November 1 st)	Status
			Mission Grips (for Wescam EO/IR Surveillance Systems), Simulator Kits, Emulator Kits, lot of cables, and Wescam Kinetics					Canada	issued on 2017/02/01, expired on 2019/02/28
9		2017/02/03	Test Equipment (for Wescam EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems), repaired EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems, repaired/replacement parts (for Wescam EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems) and Controlled Technical Data relating to Wescam's EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems		For diagnosis and testing activities and repair/replacement of Systems			of total value as follows: repaired (non-warranty repair) - Various repaired components and sub-assemblies of the system - Technical data -	Permit issued 2018/02/02, expired on 2019/02/28
10		2017/02/21	EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems (including ancillary equipment; Ground Boresight Modules (BSM); Mission Grips Assemblies and Purge Kits - Maintenance Kits (for Wescam Systems)		For installation and integration into UAVs	Ministry of Defence of Turkey		of total value, as follows: Various components/sub-assemblies of the	Permit issued on 2019/01/11, expired on 2020/02/28
11		2017/03/21	Temporary export of Handcontroller Assemblies, Mission Grip Assemblies, Cable Assemblies, Simulators and Emulators, Kinetic and eLearning	WESCAM Inc., Care of: IDEF-International Defence	For exhibition in a defence fair	L3 WESCAM		Temporarily exported items returned to Canada.	Permit issued 2017/03/21 1 expired on

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				Industry Fair 2017					2019/03/31
12		2017/03/28	Temporary export of Handcontroller Assemblies, Mission Grip Assemblies and Cable Assemblies		For demonstration			Temporarily exported items returned to Canada.	Permit issued 2017/03/28, expired on 2019/03/31
13		2017/05/10	Test Equipment for the Wescam EO/IR Surveillance Systems.		For diagnosis and testing activities of and/or Systems			of the total value, as follows: Various test equipment for the systems Technical data -	Permit issued on 2017/05/10, expired on 2019/01/31
14		2017/05/26	Provision of technical assistance documents, training course(s) and training documents, and maintenance software for project development/marketing information		For military and government end use			NIL exports	Permit issued 2017/05/26, expired on 2019/05/31
15		2017/07/11	Permanent export of EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems including ancillary equipment		For installation and integration into UAVs	Turkish Army		of total value, as follows; Various components of Repaired component of	Permit issued on 2017/07/11 and expired 2018/09/13

No.	Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Actual Exports as of the second quarter ending June 30, 2020 (Final date of submission for 3 rd quarter report by exporters is November 1 st)	Status
16		2017/07/11	Permanent export of EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems including ancillary equipment		For installation and integration into UAVs	Ministry of Defence of Turkey Ministry of the Interior of Turkey		of total value repaired system – warranty repair Repaired/replacement parts for surveillance systems -	Permit issued on 2017/07/11 expired on 2018/12/31
17		2017/08/14	Permanent export of EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems including ancillary equipment; Ground Boresight Modules (BSM); Mission Grips Assemblies and Purge Kits - Maintenance Kits (for Wescam Systems)		For installation and integration into UAVs	Ministry of Defence of Turkey		of total value. As follows: Components and sub-assemblies of	Permit issued on 2019/07/10 expired on 2020/08/31
18		2017/08/31	Software source code to be used in troubleshooting	Wescam Inc. c/o	This is so that WESCAM employees can effectively and efficiently track down the observed problems and link them to lines in the source code.			No reporting required; export	Permit issued on 2017/09/01, expired on 2018/03/31
19		2017/09/18	Permanent export of quantity EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems including ancillary equipment; quantity Ground Boresight Modules (BSM)	Turkish Ministry of Int'l Affairs- National Police	For anti-terrorism operations	Turkish National Police		of total value, as follows: system Ground Boresight Modules -	Permit issued on 2019/08/29, expired, 2020/09/30

No.	Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Actual Exports as of the second quarter ending June 30, 2020 (Final date of submission for 3 rd quarter report by exporters is November 1 st)	Status
20		2017/11/01	Permanent export of quantity [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems ([REDACTED] including ancillary equipment	[REDACTED]	For installation and integration into UAVs	Turkish Naval Forces	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED] of total value, as follows: [REDACTED] Various sub-assemblies/components of the [REDACTED] system - [REDACTED]	Permit issued on 2019/09/27, valid until 2020/11/30
21		2017/11/01	Permanent export of quantity [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems ([REDACTED] including ancillary equipment	[REDACTED]	For installation and integration into UAVs	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED] of total value, as follows: [REDACTED] Components and sub-assemblies of the [REDACTED] system - [REDACTED]	Permit issued on 2019/09/27, valid until 2021/12/31
22		2017/11/20	Desiccant Assembly (for Wescam [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance Systems)	[REDACTED]	To repair Wescam [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance Systems	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED] of total value, as follows: [REDACTED] Desiccant Assemblies - [REDACTED] all quantities exported)	Permit issued on 2017/11/28, expired on 2019/11/30
23		2017/12/08	Permanent export of [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems including ancillary equipment; [REDACTED] Ground Boresight Modules (BSM); two Mission Grips Assemblies and [REDACTED] Purge Kits - Maintenance Kits (for Wescam [REDACTED] Systems)	[REDACTED]	For installation and integration into UAVs	Ministry of Defence of Turkey	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED] of total value, as follows: [REDACTED] Components/sub-assemblies of the [REDACTED] system - [REDACTED]	Permit issued on 2019/09/27, valid until 2021/01/31

No.	Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Actual Exports as of the second quarter ending June 30, 2020 (Final date of submission for 3 rd quarter report by exporters is November 1 st)	Status
24		2018/01/08	Repaired Wescam EO/IR Surveillance Systems, repaired/replacement Sub Assemblies (for Wescam EO/IR Surveillance Systems and Technical Assistance (documents, course(s)/material and software).		For repair and replacement of parts	Ministry of Defence of Turkey Ministry of the Interior of Turkey		of total value, as follows: Repaired/replacement components/sub-assemblies of systems -	Permit issued on 2018/01/08, expired 2019/01/31
25		2018/01/17	Temporary export of a PC with Wescam Simulator Software		For demonstration and evaluation			Report of return of temporarily exported item still for submission.	Permit issued on 2018/01/30, expired on 2020/01/31
26		2018/01/22	Permanent export of EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems including ancillary equipment		For installation and integration into UAVs	Turkish Land Forces		Permit was not utilized and was requested to be cancelled by exporter.	Permit was issued on 2018/02/16, cancelled on 2018/11/15
27		2018/01/22	Purge Kit (for Wescam EO/IR Surveillance Systems)		For repair of cameras			NIL exports	Permit issued on 2018/02/02, expired on 2020/02/29
28		2018/01/25	Temporary export of EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems		For demonstration			PAR was requested on this temporary permit (see details in Status)	Permit issued on 2018/02/05; expired on 2020/02/29

No.	Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Actual Exports as of the second quarter ending June 30, 2020 (Final date of submission for 3 rd quarter report by exporters is November 1 st)	Status
									A permit amendment request (PAR) to extend the validity period was approved by the Minister on May 7, 2020 per BPTS: 01794-2020
29		2018/02/02	Test Equipment (for Wescam Wescam EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems), repaired EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems , repaired/replacement parts (for Wescam EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems) and Controlled Technical Data relating to Wescam's EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems		For diagnosis and testing activities and repair/replacement	Ministry of Defence of Turkey Ministry of the Interior of Turkey		\$ of total value, as follows: repaired systems (non-warranty repairs) - Repaired components/sub-assemblies, test equipment - Technical data -	Permit issued on 2018/02/02, expired on 2019/02/28
30		2018/02/15	EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems, Hand Controller Assemblies, Mission Grip Assemblies, Lot Cable Assemblies and Lot Circuit Card Assemblies (CCA)		For replacement in case of failure during demonstrations			PAR was requested on this temporary permit (see details in Status)	Permit issued on 2018/02/20, expired on 2020/02/29 A permit

No.	Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Actual Exports as of the second quarter ending June 30, 2020 (Final date of submission for 3 rd quarter report by exporters is November 1 st)	Status
									amendment request (PAR) to extend the validity period was approved by the Minister on May 7, 2020 per BPTS: 01794-2020
31		2018/02/20	Spare parts/components for Wescam [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance/Camera Systems	[REDACTED]	To repair existing systems	[REDACTED] Ministry of Defence of Turkey Ministry of the Interior of Turkey Undersecretariat of Defence Industries	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED] of total value. As follows: Spares and components of the [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] systems - [REDACTED]	Permit issued on 2018/03/05, expired on 2020/03/31 A permit amendment request to extend the permit validity by a year is currently in the decisions chain (Memo)

No.	Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Actual Exports as of the second quarter ending June 30, 2020 (Final date of submission for 3 rd quarter report by exporters is November 1 st)	Status
32		2018/02/20	Spare parts/components for Wescam [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance/Camera Systems	[REDACTED]	To repair existing systems	Ministry of Defence of Turkey Ministry of the Interior of Turkey Undersecretariat of Defence Industries	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED] of the total value, as follows: Spare parts for the [REDACTED] system - [REDACTED]	Permit issued on 2018/03/05, expired on 2020/03/31 A permit amendment request to extend the permit validity by a year is currently in the decisions chain (Memo)
33		2018/02/22	[REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems ([REDACTED] including ancillary equipment; [REDACTED] Ground Boresight Modules (BSM) and [REDACTED] Mission Grips Assemblies and technical data	[REDACTED]	For installation and integration into UAVs	Ministry of Defence of Turkey Undersecretariat of Defence Industries	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED] of total value, as follows: [REDACTED] Components and sub-assemblies of [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Technical data – [REDACTED]	Permit issued on 2018/03/13, expired on 2020/03/31 A permit amendment request to extend the permit validity by a year is

No.	Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Actual Exports as of the second quarter ending June 30, 2020 (Final date of submission for 3 rd quarter report by exporters is November 1 st)	Status
									currently in the decisions chain (Memo)
34		2018/03/06	Repaired Wescam [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance Systems, repaired/replacement Sub Assemblies (for Wescam [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance Systems and Technical Assistance (documents, course(s)/material and software).	[REDACTED]	To repair existing systems	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED] of total value as follows: Spares, repaired/replacement sub-assemblies and components of [REDACTED] systems - [REDACTED] Technical data - [REDACTED]	Permit issued on 2018/03/26, expired on 2020/03/31 A permit amendment request (PAR) to extend the validity period was approved by the Minister on May 7, 2020 per BPTS: 01794-2020
35		2018/03/08	Test Equipment and Technical Data (for the Wescam [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance Systems).	Wescam Inc. Field Service Representative (FSR) c/o [REDACTED]	To perform repairs	Wescam Inc. Field Service Representative (FSR) c/o [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED] as follows: Test equipment and cables for the [REDACTED] systems - [REDACTED]	Permit issued on 2018/03/16, expired on 2020/03/31

No.	Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Actual Exports as of the second quarter ending June 30, 2020 (Final date of submission for 3 rd quarter report by exporters is November 1 st)	Status
									A permit amendment request to extend the permit validity by a year is currently in the decisions chain (Memo)
36		2018/03/13	Repaired/Upgraded EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems, MOD Kit Incl: Software/Firmware; I MOD Kit Incl: Software/Firmware; MOD Kit Incl: Wiring Harness Cable MOD Kit Incl: Wiring Harness; Cable, MOD Kit MOD Kit Incl: ; Wiring Harness; Cable MOD Kit Including: Wiring Harness; Cable		For upgrades into systems	Ministry of Defence of Turkey Ministry of the Interior of Turkey Undersecretariat of Defence Industries		of total value as follows: Various MOD Kits for the systems	Permit issued on 2018/03/20, expired on 2020/03/31 A permit amendment request to extend the permit validity by a year is currently in the decisions chain (Memo)

No.	Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Actual Exports as of the second quarter ending June 30, 2020 (Final date of submission for 3 rd quarter report by exporters is November 1 st)	Status
37		2018/04/04	Permanent export of [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems ([REDACTED] including ancillary equipment	[REDACTED]	For installation and integration into UAVs	Turkish Gendarmerie	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED] of total value, as follows: [REDACTED]	Permit issued on 2018/04/16, expired on 2020/04/30
38		2018/05/23	Permanent export of quantity [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems ([REDACTED]) including ancillary equipment	[REDACTED]	For installation and integration into UAVs	Turkish Police	[REDACTED]	NIL exports	Permit issued on 2018/06/04, expired on 2020/06/30 A permit amendment request to extend the permit validity by a year is currently in the decisions chain (Memo)
39		2018/05/23	Permanent export of quantity [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting System [REDACTED] including ancillary equipment	[REDACTED]	For installation and integration into UAVs	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED] permit fully utilized as follows: [REDACTED] [REDACTED] repaired [REDACTED] (warranty repair; [REDACTED]	Permit issued on 2018/06/07, expired on 2020/06/30

No.	Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Actual Exports as of the second quarter ending June 30, 2020 (Final date of submission for 3 rd quarter report by exporters is November 1 st)	Status
40		2018/06/26	Provision of technical assistance documents, training course(s) and training documents, and maintenance software for project development/marketing information		For quotation and/or marketing			No reporting required on permit utilization, export for technical data/software	Permit issued on 2018/06/29, valid until 2022/06/30 A permit amendment request to extend the permit validity by a year is currently in the decisions chain (Memo)
41		2018/07/05	Permanent export of spare parts/components for Wescam EO/IR Surveillance/Camera Systems		To perform repairs			of total value, as follows: Spare and components of the system -	Permit issued on 2018/07/10, expired on 2020/07/31
42		2018/08/13	Repaired/Upgraded EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems, MOD Kit Incl: Software/Firmware;		For upgrades into systems	Ministry of Defence of Turkey Ministry of the		of total value, as follows: Various MOD Kits for the systems -	Permit issued on 2018/08/13, expired on 2020/03/31

No.	Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Actual Exports as of the second quarter ending June 30, 2020 (Final date of submission for 3 rd quarter report by exporters is November 1 st)	Status
			<p>MOD Kit Incl: Software/Firmware; [REDACTED]</p> <p>MOD Kit Wiring Harness Cable MOD Kit Incl: Wiring Harness; Cable, MOD Kit MOD Kit : Wiring Harness; Cable MOD Kit Including: Wiring Harness; Cable</p>			<p>Interior of Turkey Undersecretaria t of Defence Industries</p>			
43	[REDACTED]	2018/08/17	<p>Repaired Wescam [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance Systems, repaired/replacement Sub-Assemblies (for Wescam [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance Systems under warranty) and Technical Assistance (documents, course(s)/material and software)</p>	[REDACTED]	To perform repairs	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	<p>[REDACTED] exports, as follows: Repaired/replacement sub-assemblies of the [REDACTED] system – [REDACTED] Technical documents and software – [REDACTED] [REDACTED]</p>	<p>Permit issued on 2018/08/20 and valid until 2022/09/30</p>
44	[REDACTED]	2018/10/15	<p>Permanent export of completed, semi- finished and assembly kits for Wescam [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance/Camera Systems, repaired systems and semi- finished systems and technical assistance</p>	[REDACTED]	For installation and integration into UAVs	<p>Turkish Land Forces Turkish Gendarmerie Turkish National Police Turkish Naval Forces [REDACTED]</p>	[REDACTED]	<p>[REDACTED] of total value, as follows: [REDACTED] [REDACTED] semi-finished [REDACTED] systems - [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Assembly Kits for the [REDACTED] systems - [REDACTED]</p>	<p>Permit issued on 2018/11/06 and valid until 2022/11/30</p>

No.	Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Actual Exports as of the second quarter ending June 30, 2020 (Final date of submission for 3 rd quarter report by exporters is November 1 st)	Status
45		2018/10/25	each, and EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems, Hand Controller Assemblies, Mission Grip Assemblies, Lot Cable Assemblies, Simulators, Kinetics, Boresight Modules, Laptops with moving map software and Lot Circuit Card Assemblies (CCA)		For replacement in case of failure during demonstrations			Report of return of temporarily exported item still for submission.	Permit issued on 2018/11/06 and valid until 2020/11/30 A permit amendment request to extend the permit validity by a year is currently in the decisions chain (Memo)
46		2018/11/22	Circuit Card Assemblies (CCA's)		For replacement of CCA's previously exported			of total value, as follows: Circuit Card Assemblies -	Permit issued on 2018/12/03 and valid until 2020/12/31
47		2018/11/27	EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems and related items		For installation and integration into UAVs			of total value, as follows: systems -	Permit issued on 2019/01/30 and valid until

No.	Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Actual Exports as of the second quarter ending June 30, 2020 (Final date of submission for 3 rd quarter report by exporters is November 1 st)	Status
								Sub-assemblies and components of the [REDACTED] systems - [REDACTED] Technical data - [REDACTED]	2022/01/31
48	[REDACTED]	2018/11/28	[REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems and related items	[REDACTED]	For installation and integration into UAVs	Ministry of Defence of Turkey Ministry of the Interior of Turkey	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED] of total value, as follows: [REDACTED] Sub-assemblies and components of the [REDACTED] Technical data - [REDACTED]	Permit issued on 2019/01/14 and valid until 2022/01/31
49	[REDACTED]	2019/01/11	[REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems [REDACTED] including ancillary equipment; [REDACTED] Ground Boresight Modules (BSM); [REDACTED] Mission Grips Assemblies and [REDACTED] Purge Kits - Maintenance Kits (for Wescam [REDACTED] Systems)	[REDACTED]	For installation and integration into UAVs	Ministry of Defence of Turkey	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED] o the total value as follows: [REDACTED] Components and sub-assemblies of the [REDACTED]	Permit issued on 2019/01/14, expired on 2020/02/28
50	[REDACTED]	2019/02/06	Test Equipment for the Wescam [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems and [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance Systems.	[REDACTED]	For diagnosis and testing activities of [REDACTED] Systems owned/used by end users	Ministry of Defence of Turkey Ministry of the Interior of Turkey	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED] of total value, as follows: [REDACTED] Test equipment, repaired sub-assemblies and components of the [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] systems - [REDACTED]	Permit issued on 2019/02/20 and valid until 2021/02/28

No.	Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Actual Exports as of the second quarter ending June 30, 2020 (Final date of submission for 3 rd quarter report by exporters is November 1 st)	Status
51		2019/03/07	Permanent export of EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems (including ancillary equipment; Ground Boresight Modules (BSM) and Mission Grips Assembly		For installation and integration into UAVs	Ministry of Defence of Turkey		of total value, as follows:	Permit issued on 2019/03/12 and valid until 2021/03/31
52		2019/07/10	Permanent export of EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems (including ancillary equipment; Ground Boresight Modules (BSM); Mission Grips Assemblies and Purge Kits - Maintenance Kits (for Wescam Systems)		For installation and integration into UAVs	Ministry of Defence of Turkey		of total value, as follows: Components and sub-assemblies of the	Permit issued on 2019/07/10, expired on 2020/08/31
53		2019/08/01	Repaired EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems, Ground Boresight Modules (GBSM) and Controlled Technical data		To perform repairs	Ministry of Defence of Turkey Turkey National Police		Repairs were so there was no reporting condition on the permit.	Permit issued on 2019/08/13 and valid until 2023/08/31
54		2019/08/07	Boresight Modules for Wescam EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems with provisions for repairs		For repair and replacement of parts	Ministry of Defence of Turkey Ministry of the Interior of Turkey		of total value, as follows: Ground Boresight Modules; component of the	Permit issued on 2019/08/14 and valid until 2023/08/31

No.	Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Actual Exports as of the second quarter ending June 30, 2020 (Final date of submission for 3 rd quarter report by exporters is November 1 st)	Status
55		2019/08/13	Wescam EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems, and their parts and components		For installation and integration into UAVs	Presidency of the Republic of Turkey		of total value as follows:	Permit issued on 2019/08/14 and valid until 2023/08/31
56		2019/08/20	Repaired EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems, Ground Boresight Modules (GBSM) and Controlled Technical data - Documents, Training and Software		To perform repairs	Turkish Air Force		exports as follows: repaired systems (warranty repairs) – repaired component of the system (warranty repair) –	Permit issued on 2019/08/29 and valid until 2023/08/31
57		2019/08/29	Permanent export of quantity EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems (including ancillary equipment); quantity Ground Boresight Modules (BSM)	Turkish Ministry of Int'l Affairs-National Police	For anti-terrorism operations	Turkish National Police		of total value, as follows: Ground Boresight Modules, component of the systems -	Permit issued on 2019/08/29, expired on 2020/09/30
58		2019/08/28	Temporary export of quantity each of Handcontroller Assemblies and Mission Grip Assemblies, and quantity lot Cable Assemblies		For demonstration			Report of return of temporarily exported item still for submission.	Permit issued on 2019/09/24 and valid until 2023/09/30
59		2019/09/13	Various spare parts for Wescam		For repair and replacement	Turkish Land		of total vale as follows:	Permit

No.	Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Actual Exports as of the second quarter ending June 30, 2020 (Final date of submission for 3 rd quarter report by exporters is November 1 st)	Status
			EO/IR Surveillance Systems		of parts	Forces Turkish Gendarmerie Turkish National Police Turkish Naval Forces [REDACTED]		Various spare parts for the [REDACTED] systems - [REDACTED]	issued on 2019/10/09 and valid until 2023/09/30
60	[REDACTED]	2019/09/21	Temporary export of quantity [REDACTED] each of Handcontroller Assemblies and Mission Grip Assemblies, and quantity [REDACTED] lot Cable Assemblies	Turkish Ministry of Internal Affairs / Turkish National Police	For demonstration	Turkish Ministry of Internal Affairs / Turkish National Police	[REDACTED]	Report of return of temporarily exported item still for submission.	Permit issued on 2019/10/07 and valid until 2023/10/31
61	[REDACTED]	2019/09/23	Repaired [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems, Repaired Ground Boresight Modules for [REDACTED] Systems and Controlled Technical Data - document, training and software	Turkish Republic Governorship VAN/General Directorate of Security of VAN	For anti-terrorism operations	Ministry of the Interior of Turkey Turkish National Police	[REDACTED]	Repairs were [REDACTED] so there was no reporting condition on the permit.	Permit issued on 2019/10/04 and valid until 2023/09/30
62	[REDACTED]	2019/09/27	Permanent export of quantity [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems [REDACTED] including ancillary equipment	[REDACTED]	For installation and integration into UAVs	Turkish Naval Forces	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED] of total value, as follows: [REDACTED] Components and sub-assemblies of the [REDACTED] system - [REDACTED]	Permit issued on 2019/09/27 and valid until 2020/11/30

No.	Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Actual Exports as of the second quarter ending June 30, 2020 (Final date of submission for 3 rd quarter report by exporters is November 1 st)	Status
63		2019/09/27	Permanent export of quantity [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems ([REDACTED] including ancillary equipment	[REDACTED]	For installation and integration into UAVs	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED] of total value, as follows: [REDACTED] Components and sub-assemblies for the [REDACTED]	Permit issued on 2019/09/27 and valid until 2021/12/31
64		2019/09/27	Permanent export of [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems including ancillary equipment; Ground Boresight Modules (BSM); Mission Grips Assemblies and [REDACTED] Purge Kits - Maintenance Kits (for Wescam [REDACTED] Systems)	[REDACTED]	For installation and integration into UAVs	Ministry of Defence of Turkey	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED] of the total value, as follows: [REDACTED] Components and sub-assemblies for the [REDACTED]	Permit issued on 2019/09/27 and valid until 2021/01/31

Observations

- The timeframe (between January 1, 2016 to October 11, 2019) has been chosen in order to compare the above finding with the Ploughshare’s report.
- Note that during this timeframe (between January 1, 2016 to October 11, 2019), [REDACTED] in terms of Canada’s export controls, given their membership and adherence to the 4 multilateral export control regimes (i.e. the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Australia Group), as well as being a member of NATO and having effective export control mechanisms. [REDACTED]
- On October 11, 2019, in response to Turkey’s military incursion into Syria, the Government of Canada announced the temporary suspension on the issuance of all new permits for the export of controlled goods and technology to Turkey. [REDACTED]

- Permits issued after October 11, 2019 have been addressed in the other table.
- Between January 1, 2016 to October 11, 2019, a total of 64 permits have been issued to L3 Wescam to Turkey. Out of these 64 permits issued:
 - [REDACTED] have now expired
 - [REDACTED] has been cancelled (at the request of applicant)
 - [REDACTED] are currently valid (3 of these permits will be expiring by the end of November 2020).
- In terms of the consignees, there are various entities that have received L3 Wescam products in Turkey, including [REDACTED]. These are all well-known and reputable defence companies in Turkey.
- Most of the L3 Wescam products were intended to be installed and integrated into various UAV platforms built by these Turkish defence companies (but not in all cases).
- In terms of the end users, they are mostly the military, as well as government and law enforcement agencies within Turkey. However, there have also been [REDACTED] instances where the end users have been specifically identified as the [REDACTED] and the [REDACTED].
- No end user(s) in either **Libya, Syria, Azerbaijan or Armenia** have been identified in the end use documentation provided by the consignees.

COMPARISON OF ISSUED PERMITS FOR TURKEY TO WESCAM

Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Country of Destination	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Status	Actual Exports (as of Sept 30, 2020)
	2019/11/06	Permanent export of EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems, sub-assemblies, including provisions for repairs, technical data and software		Turkey	For integration and installation into the to be used for surveillance operations	Presidency of Defence Industries (SSB)		Issued permit on May 6, 2020 per BPTS: 01794-2020	of total value), as follows: repaired (warranty repair, zero value)
	2019/11/06	Permanent export of EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems, sub-assemblies, including provisions for repairs, technical data and software		Turkey	For integration and installation into the prototype	Note:		Issued permit on May 6, 2020 per BPTS: 01794-2020	of total value), as follows:
	2019/08/26	Permanent export of EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems, sub-assemblies, including provisions for repairs, technical data and software		Turkey	For installation and integration into the to be used for surveillance and targeting.	Military and law enforcement agencies under the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of the Interior		Issued permit on May 6, 2020 per BPTS: 01794-2020	of total value), as follows: Subassemblies of the Various spares, repaired and replacement parts for

Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Country of Destination	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Status	Actual Exports (as of Sept 30, 2020)
	2019/10/28	Permit amendment request (PAR) to extend permit validity by a year on a temporary export for [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems	[REDACTED]	Turkey	To be used as loaner systems for training purposes.	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Amendment permit was re-issued on May 7, 2020 per BPTS: 01794-2020. Extended validity date until May 7, 2021.	Temporary export permit. No permit utilization required
	2019/10/30	Permit amendment request (PAR) to extend permit validity by a year on a temporary export for [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems and accessories.	[REDACTED]	Turkey	To be used to demonstrate the system's capabilities in the scope of police, maritime surveillance and army reconnaissance; the system will be used for flight demonstration on a [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Amendment permit was re-issued on May 7, 2020 per BPTS: 01794-2020. Extended validity date until May 7, 2021.	Temporary export permit. No permit utilization required
	2019/12/05	Permit amendment request (PAR) to extend permit validity by a year on a permanent export of repaired [REDACTED] surveillance systems [REDACTED] repaired/replacement components and sub-assemblies and related technical data and software	[REDACTED]	Turkey	Consignee is an authorized Wescam Service Provider and will use the items for in-country repairs of the [REDACTED] surveillance systems; repaired systems to be returned to its foreign owners.	Turkish Ministry of Defence. Turkish Ministry of the Interior [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Amendment permit was re-issued on May 7, 2020 per BPTS: 01794-2020. Extended validity date until May 7, 2021.	For [REDACTED] now expired, actual exports is [REDACTED], as follows: [REDACTED] repaired [REDACTED] (zero valued; warranty repairs) Various components and subassemblies for the [REDACTED] For the Permit Amendment Request (PAR) in [REDACTED] actual exports is [REDACTED] as follows: Various components and subassemblies for the [REDACTED]

Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Country of Destination	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Status	Actual Exports (as of Sept 30, 2020)
									Under [redacted] permits, actual exports is [redacted] of total value of the permit.
Total									

Summary/Additional Notes:

Under BPTS: 01794-2020 Wescam received:

- [redacted] export permits and [redacted] permit amendment requests (PARs) for Turkey
- The [redacted] new permits were for a total of [redacted] EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems to be used in the UAVs of [redacted] and [redacted] with the Turkish MOD and Ministry of the Interior as the primary end-users.
- All [redacted] PARs are for extension of the permit validity by a year.
- [redacted] of PARs are related to the temporary exports of [redacted] EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems to be used in UAVs.
- [redacted] of PARs is for the [redacted] model of Wescam’s surveillance system. This export is for the return of repaired systems in Canada and various components and sub-assemblies of the [redacted] system to be used for in-country repair (in Turkey) by consignee [redacted] as an authorized Wescam Service Provider. If [redacted] is unable to undertake repair in Turkey, it sends the system back to Wescam in Canada to be repaired.
- The second Ref ID in the last [redacted] entries (highlighted in red) is the new file under which the amended permits were issued. The Department had to issue a new file, given that the permits expired while the PARs were under review. This practice has been validated by the legal bureau.

Additional notes:

- No end user(s) in Libya, Syria, Azerbaijan and Armenia have been identified in the end use documentation provided by the consignees.
- The stated end-use in the End-Use Statements are also highlighted in yellow font.

RE: erikRE: L3 Permits.

From: "Anand, Shalini -TIE" </o=dfait-maeci/ou=exchange administrative group (fydibohf23spdlt)/cn=recipients/cn=anands2a9e">
To: "Mawani, Aliya -MINA" <aliya.mawani@international.gc.ca>, "Grant, Alison -ECE" <alison.grant@international.gc.ca>, "Gosselin, Catherine -TIR" <catherine.gosselin@international.gc.ca>
Cc: "Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE" <marieeve.roymarcoux@international.gc.ca>, "Gosselin, Catherine -TIR" <catherine.gosselin@international.gc.ca>, "Funtek, Katharine -TID" <katharine.funtek@international.gc.ca>, "Schonfeld, Benjamin -TIR" <benjamin.schonfeld@international.gc.ca>, *MINA-Dept Unit <d-mina-dept-unit@international.gc.ca>, *USS-DMA Advisors <d-uss-dmaadvisors@international.gc.ca>, *DMT-Policy <d-dmt-policy@international.gc.ca>, *TFM-Policy <d-tfm-policy@international.gc.ca>, "Alday, Corazon -TIE" <corazon.alday@international.gc.ca>, "Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE" <joonhyuk.yoon@international.gc.ca>, "Mallett, Erika -TIE" <erika.mallett@international.gc.ca>, "Turner, Andrew -ECE" <andrew.turner@international.gc.ca>, "Farid, Sohrab -DMA -USS" <sohrab.farid@international.gc.ca>, "Coleman, Robert -ECE" <robert.coleman@international.gc.ca>, "Pilloud, Marc -ECE" <marc.pilloud@international.gc.ca>, "Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE" <kamiliya.akkouche@international.gc.ca>, "Sproule, David -ECD" <david.sproule@international.gc.ca>, "McCardell, Sandra -EGM" <sandra.mccardell@international.gc.ca>, "Anand, Shalini -TIE" <shalini.anand@international.gc.ca>
Date: Fri, 25 Sep 2020 17:08:17 -0400

Hi Aliya:

Below is the analysis provided by the geo, but I've spoken with Catherine and TIE/TIR will work on responses to the questions in yellow highlight.

Warmly,
S.

From: Mawani, Aliya -MINA
Sent: September 25, 2020 12:55 PM
To: Grant, Alison -ECE ; Anand, Shalini -TIE
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE ; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR ; Funtek, Katharine -TID ; Schonfeld, Benjamin -TIR ; *MINA-Dept Unit ; *USS-DMA Advisors ; *DMT-Policy ; *TFM-Policy ; Alday, Corazon -TIE ; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE ; Mallett, Erika -TIE ; Turner, Andrew -ECE ; Farid, Sohrab -DMA -USS ; Coleman, Robert -ECE ; Pilloud, Marc -ECE ; Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE ; Sproule, David -ECD ; McCardell, Sandra -EGM
Subject: RE: erikRE: L3 Permits

Alison, Shalini,

Thanks again! o/MINA will share this with the Minister. Please find follow-up questions in red below. I realize some of these responses may come from the consultations still underway.

Also, I know this is obvious – but grateful if leads could be prepared to speak to this analysis during Monday's MINA briefing.

Best,

Aliya

On 20 September 2020, Project Ploughshares published a report entitled "Killer Optics: Exports of Wescam Sensors to Turkey – A Litmus Test of Canada's Compliance with the Arms Trade Treaty". In it, Project Ploughshares alleges that the Turkish military has committed serious breaches of international humanitarian law (IHL) and other violations, particularly when conducting airstrikes. Project Ploughshares also alleges that Wescam sensors, mounted on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), have been used extensively by Turkey in its recent military activities. Given these violations Project Ploughshares asserts that Canada is violating the ATT obligations by permitting exports of Wescam sensors. A Globe and Mail article was published a few days later, citing the Ploughshare allegations.

General comments:

- ANKRA reviewed the full Ploughshare report, including the sources used in the report. The mission found that on the technical aspects it is well researched and provides a fact-based portrayal of the UAV systems used by Turkish security forces. However, many of the allegations in the report and media would be difficult to corroborate.
- Turkish drones have been used in Turkey's military and security operations - both domestically and internationally -- and they have both defensive and offensive capabilities, depending on how they are tasked.
- Turkey's justification of its cross-border military operations in Iraq and Syria relied heavily on an argument of national security related to the activities of the PKK. In Iraq it was Operation Claw, and in Syria these were Operations Peace Spring (N/E Syria), and Olive Branch (N/W Syria, Afrin).
- Canada, like most of our like-minded counterparts, supports the position that Turkey, a NATO ally, has legitimate security concerns,

specifically related to the activities of the PKK – also a listed terrorist organization in Canada.

- **Likeminded counterparts:** agree that the Turkish military is, by-and-large, a professional army that acts in accordance with its international obligations. While Operations Olive Branch and Peace Spring both resulted in the displacement of civilians, there is no clear evidence that suggest a deliberate targeting of civilians or civilian infrastructure.
- [REDACTED] in Turkey most recently confirmed (on 09.23) that [REDACTED] has not found any credible evidence that the Turkish military directly violated IHL in its operations. Likewise, [REDACTED] is not aware of any transfers by the Turkish army of its military equipment to illicit or non-state actors.
- Can you please advise what like minded have export suspensions still in place for Turkey? How does our suspension on Group 2 line up with others? - TIR
- Can we see these UK conclusions? - TIR
- Can we please see a historical list of when permits were issued to Turkey for these L3 systems, and how does that timeline line up with the allegations by Ploughshares? - TIE
- Do we know if the May 2020 permits were shipped? - TIE

Regarding the alleged IHL violations by the Turkish military:

- The Ploughshares report relies heavily on two UN reports (9 August 2018 and 28 January 2020), as well as an Amnesty International Report (Oct 2019), which itself relies primarily on accounts reported by the Kurdish Red Crescent (affiliated with the self-administration in the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria). The Kurdish Red Crescent is not formally affiliated with the ICRC. While we do not doubt KRC's credibility, their assessment should not be equated with an ICRC assessment.
- Findings in these reports informed the generalized arguments on IHL violations picked up by both the G&M and CBC articles.
- It is important to note that while these reports provide some evidence related to possible violations of IHL as a result of Turkish air strikes – the evidence relates only to the Olive Branch (N/W Syria, Afrin) and Peace Spring (N/E Syria) Operations, for a total number of 7-8 incidents directly associated with the Turkish military.
 - What is the department's analysis of these reports and of these incidents?
- There are additional allegations in the UN report of IHL abuses by Turkish-backed *factions* in all three Turkish military operation zones in Syria (Olive Branch, Euphrates Shield, Peace Spring). While Turkey certainly bears some responsibility for the actions of these non-state armed actors, it is important to distinguish between the actions of those players and those of the Turkish military.
 - How does this distinction factor into the department's analysis of the allegations of IHL violations?
- In the department's May 2020 memorandum to the Minister, it is noted that there had been no substantiated evidence of the Turkish Armed Forces committing human rights violations in Syria, neither in Idlib nor northeast Syria during OPS.
- [REDACTED]
- TRPLI has also noted that there is no substantiated evidence that Turkey has violated IHL in either Idlib or Libya.
 - Thank you for consulting TRPLI. Does mission have any analysis to provide on this conclusion?
- However in Libya, the UN Panel of Experts report from December 2019 found that Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones, and possibly one Karayel drone, were exported to Libya, for use by the GNA. This is in direct contravention of the arms embargo for Libya. Since it predates the December 2019 security agreement between Turkey and the GNA, Turkey cannot rely on this argument, as it currently does.
 - Does this diversion concern officials? How did this factor into their analysis in the May 2020 memo? Did we know this then?

Regional stability and security:

- Part of the obligation under ATT is to ensure that exports do not threaten regional peace and security
- In **Idlib** there is a strong argument that Turkey's March 2020 military operation succeeded in halting an aggressive Syrian regime offensive which resulted in massive civilian displacement and threatened a new wave of migration into Turkey and further afield to the EU.
- In **Libya**, Turkey reached a security agreement with the U.N.-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) and its support prevented the fall of the GNA in Tripoli and again took a stance against Russian expansion in the region.
- As a NATO ally, Turkey is expected to comply with and act in accordance with its international obligations. While Canada does not always support Turkey's military actions, as was the case for Operation Peace Spring, Canada recognizes that Turkey has legitimate security concerns.
- The UAVs in question are used as an offensive system and while the Bayraktar TB2s systems are used for surveillance and targeting, their targeting can and does imply offensive action. However, this would be the case globally, not just in Turkey. That is, WESCAM exports its products to over 80 countries, including UK, Australia, Japan, Spain, Germany, Jordan, USA, UAE, etc. – many of whom would use drones in a similar manner. And, WESCAM has competitor companies that produce similar products which could also be used on UAVs from Turkey or any of the above noted countries.

Syria context:

- A key military difference between the Turkish incursion into the northeast (OPS) and the Idlib Operation Spring Shield (OSS) is that the 2019 OPS was mainly a ground operation (supported by artillery) by Turkish military and Turkish-backed troops, while drone/UAV technology was mainly used for intel/surveillance rather than for airstrikes. How do we know that they were used mainly for intel/surveillance?
- This is when the alleged IHL violations were reportedly mainly committed by Turkish-backed forces, and not the Turkish military themselves. In Idlib 2020, there was more of an emphasis on the use of armed drone technology against regime forces, although as noted, Canada did not condemn Turkey's OSS as we did OPS – and this was partly due to the difference in context in the two

situations.

From: Mawani, Aliya -MINA
Sent: September 25, 2020 12:00 PM
To: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Funtek, Katharine -TID <Katharine.Funtek@international.gc.ca>; Schonfeld, Benjamin -TIR <Benjamin.Schonfeld@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Alday, Corazon -TIE <Corazon.Alday@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>; Mallett, Erika -TIE <Erika.Mallett@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Farid, Sohrab -DMA -USS <Sohrab.Farid@international.gc.ca>; Coleman, Robert -ECE <Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca>; Pilloud, Marc -ECE <Marc.Pilloud@international.gc.ca>; Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE <Kamiliya.Akkouche@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; McCardell, Sandra -EGM <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: erikRE: L3 Permits

Thanks so much for this Alison and team! There will undoubtedly be questions so you'll be hearing from us ☺

Aliya

From: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>
Sent: September 25, 2020 11:36 AM
To: Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Funtek, Katharine -TID <Katharine.Funtek@international.gc.ca>; Schonfeld, Benjamin -TIR <Benjamin.Schonfeld@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Alday, Corazon -TIE <Corazon.Alday@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>; Mallett, Erika -TIE <Erika.Mallett@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Farid, Sohrab -DMA -USS <Sohrab.Farid@international.gc.ca>; Coleman, Robert -ECE <Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca>; Pilloud, Marc -ECE <Marc.Pilloud@international.gc.ca>; Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE <Kamiliya.Akkouche@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; McCardell, Sandra -EGM <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: erikRE: L3 Permits

Aliya,

We sent the report to post (ANKRA) and asked for views, as well as canvassed other geographic divisions here. What follows is a first take on the Globe and Mail article and Project Ploughshares Report from a geographic perspective. This does not include military, technical or legal opinions.

Alison

On 20 September 2020, Project Ploughshares published a report entitled "Killer Optics: Exports of Wescam Sensors to Turkey – A Litmus Test of Canada's Compliance with the Arms Trade Treaty". In it, Project Ploughshares alleges that the Turkish military has committed serious breaches of international humanitarian law (IHL) and other violations, particularly when conducting airstrikes. Project Ploughshares also alleges that Wescam sensors, mounted on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), have been used extensively by Turkey in its recent military activities. Given these violations Project Ploughshares asserts that Canada is violating the ATT obligations by permitting exports of Wescam sensors. A Globe and Mail article was published a few days later, citing the Ploughshare allegations.

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- ██████████
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when the alleged IHL violations were reportedly mainly committed by Turkish-backed forces, and not the Turkish military themselves. In Idlib 2020, there was more of an emphasis on the use of armed drone technology against regime forces, although as noted, Canada did not condemn Turkey's OSS as we did OPS – and this was partly due to the difference in context in the two situations.

Drafted: ANKRA/HOM, ANKRA-Defense Attache, Schoenauer, ESA
Consulted: ANKRA/HOM
Consolidated: ECE/Akkouche
Approved: ECD

From: Grant, Alison -ECE
Sent: September 23, 2020 9:35 AM
To: Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Funtek, Katharine -TID <Katharine.Funtek@international.gc.ca>; Schonfeld, Benjamin -TIR <Benjamin.Schonfeld@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Alday, Corazon -TIE <Corazon.Alday@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>; Mallett, Erika -TIE <Erika.Mallett@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Farid, Sohrab -DMA -USS <Sohrab.Farid@international.gc.ca>; Coleman, Robert -ECE <Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca>; Pilloud, Marc -ECE <Marc.Pilloud@international.gc.ca>; Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE <Kamiliya.Akkouche@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; McCardell, Sandra -EGM <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: erikRE: L3 Permits

Will do. Adding ECD and EGM for their awareness.

From: Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>
Sent: September 23, 2020 9:30 AM
To: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Funtek, Katharine -TID <Katharine.Funtek@international.gc.ca>; Schonfeld, Benjamin -TIR <Benjamin.Schonfeld@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Alday, Corazon -TIE <Corazon.Alday@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>; Mallett, Erika -TIE <Erika.Mallett@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Farid, Sohrab -DMA -USS <Sohrab.Farid@international.gc.ca>; Coleman, Robert -ECE <Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca>; Pilloud, Marc -ECE <Marc.Pilloud@international.gc.ca>; Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE <Kamiliya.Akkouche@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: erikRE: L3 Permits

Hi Alison. We spoke. As discussed, Monday's going to be too late I'm afraid. Grateful for whatever you can provide us by late in the day tomorrow – and then any updates after thereafter. I understand MINA also raised this with DMT last night, seeking more information about our department's analysis vs. Project Ploughshares report.

Many thanks for your efforts. I know there's a lot going on,

Aliya

From: Mawani, Aliya -MINA
Sent: September 22, 2020 7:36 PM
To: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Funtek, Katharine -TID <Katharine.Funtek@international.gc.ca>; Schonfeld, Benjamin -TIR <Benjamin.Schonfeld@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Alday, Corazon -TIE <Corazon.Alday@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>; Mallett, Erika -TIE <Erika.Mallett@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Farid, Sohrab -DMA -USS <Sohrab.Farid@international.gc.ca>; Coleman, Robert -ECE <Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca>; Pilloud, Marc -ECE <Marc.Pilloud@international.gc.ca>; Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE <Kamiliya.Akkouche@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: erikRE: L3 Permits

Thanks for this Shalini. I've shared with o/MINA.

Alison and ECE – I'll come back to you on the proposed timeline.

Thanks so much,

Aliya

From: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>

Sent: September 22, 2020 7:23 PM

To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Funtek, Katharine -TID <Katharine.Funtek@international.gc.ca>; Schonfeld, Benjamin -TIR <Benjamin.Schonfeld@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Alday, Corazon -TIE <Corazon.Alday@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>; Mallett, Erika -TIE <Erika.Mallett@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Farid, Sohrab -DMA -USS <Sohrab.Farid@international.gc.ca>; Coleman, Robert -ECE <Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca>; Pilloud, Marc -ECE <Marc.Pilloud@international.gc.ca>; Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE <Kamiliya.Akkouche@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: erikRE: L3 Permits

Looping in ECE team.

From: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>

Sent: September 22, 2020 7:19 PM

To: Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Funtek, Katharine -TID <Katharine.Funtek@international.gc.ca>; Schonfeld, Benjamin -TIR <Benjamin.Schonfeld@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Alday, Corazon -TIE <Corazon.Alday@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>; Mallett, Erika -TIE <Erika.Mallett@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Beland, Marc -ECE <marc.beland@international.gc.ca>; Farid, Sohrab -DMA -USS <Sohrab.Farid@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: erikRE: L3 Permits

Hi:

Attached please find the a factual chart about the permits in the below noted MINA approved memo. Per Ally's request, we've included the value and quantity of the items in the chart. We've also done a brief written summary underneath, in case this format is preferred.

Hope this helps.

Warmly,
S.

From: Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>

Sent: September 22, 2020 6:46 PM

To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Farid, Sohrab -DMA -USS <Sohrab.Farid@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Funtek, Katharine -TID <Katharine.Funtek@international.gc.ca>; Schonfeld, Benjamin -TIR <Benjamin.Schonfeld@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Alday, Corazon -TIE <Corazon.Alday@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>; Mallett, Erika -TIE <Erika.Mallett@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Beland, Marc -ECE <marc.beland@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: erikRE: L3 Permits

Thanks Shalini.

Allison and team – do you have a sense of when we might be able to get this input?

Best,

Aliya

From: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>
Sent: September 22, 2020 1:04 PM
To: Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>; Farid, Sohrab -DMA -USS <Sohrab.Farid@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Funtek, Katharine -TID <Katharine.Funtek@international.gc.ca>; Schonfeld, Benjamin -TIR <Benjamin.Schonfeld@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Alday, Corazon -TIE <Corazon.Alday@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>; Mallett, Erika -TIE <Erika.Mallett@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Beland, Marc -ECE <marc.beland@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: erikRE: L3 Permits

I think the checking of these allegations would more likely fall to the geographic, but we can support their effort. We can provide more of a technical assessment on the permits, which we're working on. Copying E-branch.

From: Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>
Sent: September 22, 2020 12:58 PM
To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Farid, Sohrab -DMA -USS <Sohrab.Farid@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Funtek, Katharine -TID <Katharine.Funtek@international.gc.ca>; Schonfeld, Benjamin -TIR <Benjamin.Schonfeld@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Alday, Corazon -TIE <Corazon.Alday@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>; Mallett, Erika -TIE <Erika.Mallett@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: erikRE: L3 Permits

Thanks Shalini.

FYI – I'm told MINA has also asked USS to look into the allegations outlined in the most recent article but not sure if this request has made it to you yet. It would be super helpful to get sense of the timeline on this part.

Aliya

From: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>
Sent: September 22, 2020 12:27 PM
To: Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Funtek, Katharine -TID <Katharine.Funtek@international.gc.ca>; Schonfeld, Benjamin -TIR <Benjamin.Schonfeld@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Alday, Corazon -TIE <Corazon.Alday@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>; Mallett, Erika -TIE <Erika.Mallett@international.gc.ca>
Subject: erikRE: L3 Permits

Got it – we're working on a summary chart, and a few bullets to summarize the memo. Will get back to you today.
Warmly,
S.

From: Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>
Sent: September 22, 2020 12:23 PM
To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Funtek, Katharine -TID <Katharine.Funtek@international.gc.ca>; Schonfeld, Benjamin -TIR <Benjamin.Schonfeld@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Subject: L3 Permits

Hi Shalini –

As discussed on the phone with Ally just now – can we please get a detailed item description of these permits:

Items and Stated End Use: The items in the [REDACTED] export permit applications are all Group 2 (Munitions List) items. The total value of these items is approximately [REDACTED]. There are [REDACTED] export permit applications [REDACTED] from L3 Wescam for its [REDACTED] camera electro-optical infrared surveillance system, and supporting parts and technology (the [REDACTED] model). There are also [REDACTED] permit amendment requests (PARs) from the company [REDACTED] for temporary exports that are part of the same series of [REDACTED] camera surveillance systems. The [REDACTED] PAR [REDACTED] is a permanent export pertaining to the [REDACTED] surveillance system, support components, spares and repairs. The distinction between the [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] series of surveillance systems is that the [REDACTED] components (e.g. [REDACTED] and other specially designed components) are sourced from non-U.S. supply chains, meaning that the [REDACTED] is not subject to U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) controls. Conversely, the [REDACTED] contains ITAR controlled items. All of the items in these [REDACTED] export permits/PARs are intended to be integrated into [REDACTED] UAVs. The UAVs with these surveillance systems can be used [REDACTED].

Thank you!

Aliya

Aliya Mawani

Senior Departmental Advisor | Conseillère ministérielle principale
Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs | Bureau du Ministre des Affaires étrangères
Aliya.mawani@international.gc.ca
Telephone | Téléphone: 343-203-5953



RE: re: Friday's call re: [REDACTED]

From: "Mawani, Aliya -MINA" <aliya.mawani@international.gc.ca>
To: "Anand, Shalini -TIE" <shalini.anand@international.gc.ca>, "MINA-Dept Unit <d-mina-dept-unit@international.gc.ca>, "DMT-Policy <d-dmt-policy@international.gc.ca>
Cc: "TFM-Policy <d-tfm-policy@international.gc.ca>, "USS-DMA Advisors <d-uss-dmaadvisors@international.gc.ca>, "Christie, Bruce -TFMA" <bruce.christie@international.gc.ca>, "Funtek, Katharine -TID" <katharine.funtek@international.gc.ca>, "Gosselin, Catherine -TIR" <catherine.gosselin@international.gc.ca>, "Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE" <marieeve.roymarcoux@international.gc.ca>, "Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE" <joonhyuk.yoon@international.gc.ca>, "Grant, Alison -ECE" <alison.grant@international.gc.ca>, "Coleman, Robert -ECE" <robert.coleman@international.gc.ca>
Date: Mon, 28 Sep 2020 11:24:31 -0400

Thanks Shalini. Will do.

From: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>
Sent: September 28, 2020 11:23 AM
To: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>; Funtek, Katharine -TID <Katharine.Funtek@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Coleman, Robert -ECE <Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca>
Subject: FW: re: Friday's call re: [REDACTED]

Dear Aliya:

Please share this exchange with oMINA (further to our 11 a.m. discussion with Ally).

More forthcoming on the permits analysis/export controls front, as it becomes available.

Warmly,
S.

From: [REDACTED]@L3Harris.com <[REDACTED]@L3Harris.com>
Sent: September 28, 2020 11:12 AM
To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; [REDACTED]@L3Harris.com
Cc: Funtek, Katharine -TID <Katharine.Funtek@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>; [REDACTED]@L3Harris.com
Subject: RE: re: Friday's call re: [REDACTED]

Hello Shalini,

To our knowledge no export permits issued to L3 Wescam for items destined to [REDACTED] were/are intended for [REDACTED] with a stated end use [REDACTED]. Yes, there are current applications where [REDACTED] is designated as the end-user. I hope this helps.

Yes, we are preparing the charts outlining the information discussed on Friday.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

L3HARRIS TECHNOLOGIES CANADA
L3Harris.com / [REDACTED]@L3Harris.com
255 Albert Street, Suite 804 / Ottawa, ON /Canada



From: Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>
Sent: Sunday, September 27, 2020 7:18 PM

To: [REDACTED]@L3Harris.com>; [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]@L3Harris.com>
Cc: Katharine.Funtek@international.gc.ca; MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca; JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca
Subject: [EXTERNAL] re: Friday's call re: [REDACTED]

Dear [REDACTED]

It was great to speak with you again on Friday.

Thank you for confirming that to the best of your knowledge none of the L3 Wescam export permits for items destined to [REDACTED] were intended for end use in or re-sale to [REDACTED]

Recognizing that there have been additional reports about [REDACTED] can you confirm if any export permits issued to L3 wescam for items destined to [REDACTED] were/are intended for [REDACTED] with a stated end use [REDACTED] Our system doesn't appear to show any issued permits of this nature, at first glance, though it does show [REDACTED] applications in the system from Wescam for permits destined to [REDACTED] for onwards use by [REDACTED]

Thank you also for confirming that [REDACTED] is working on a chart that indicates the items shipped against the [REDACTED] permits/PARs issued to Wescam in May 2020 [REDACTED] and a separate chart on your PAR applications for items destined to [REDACTED] to provide us insight into how much has been shipped to date against each of the original permits.

Warmest regards,

Shalini Anand (Ms.)
Director/Directrice
Export Controls Operations Division/Direction des opérations des controles à l'exportation



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RE: re: Turkey oMINA briefing Monday.

From: "Anand, Shalini -TIE" </o=dfait-maeci/ou=exchange administrative group (fydibohf23spdl)/cn=recipients/cn=anands2a9e">
To: *MINA-Dept Unit <d-mina-dept-unit@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *TFM-Policy <d-tfm-policy@international.gc.ca>, *USS-DMA Advisors <d-uss-dmaadvisors@international.gc.ca>, *DMT-Policy <d-dmt-policy@international.gc.ca>, "Funtek, Katharine -TID" <katharine.funtek@international.gc.ca>, "Gosselin, Catherine -TIR" <catherine.gosselin@international.gc.ca>, "Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE" <marieeve.roymarcoux@international.gc.ca>, "Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE" <joonhyuk.yoon@international.gc.ca>, "Mallett, Erika -TIE" <erika.mallett@international.gc.ca>, "Schonfeld, Benjamin -TIR" <benjamin.schonfeld@international.gc.ca>, "Grant, Alison -ECE" <alison.grant@international.gc.ca>, *DCB-Management/Gestion <d-dcb-management_gestion@international.gc.ca>, *DCB <d-dcb@international.gc.ca>
Date: Mon, 28 Sep 2020 21:29:35 -0400
Attachments: Turkey Annex B_v19 with Legend.docx (45.6 kB); Turkey Annex C_v13 with Legend.docx (31.23 kB); Turkey Annex A _v17 with legend.docx (81.15 kB)

Hi Emily:

At this morning's Turkey/export permits briefing, Ally requested an updated breakdown of what is in the Annexes for the Turkey memo (referenced in the trail below). Accordingly, please see below. I've also attached slightly updated annexes, as colleagues included a few more notes under some of the permits.

DCB colleagues: grateful if you could once again update CCM.

Warmly,
S.

The permit applications have been divided into three Annexes from lower to higher risk permit applications. Each Annex provides details on each permit application, including a description of the exceptional circumstances that apply:

- **Annex A** contains ██████████ for Group 2 items. It includes indirect exports to Turkey via a likeminded country, which means that the item would be subject to a likeminded country's export controls regime; exports of items being returned to the original owners of items after repair in Canada; extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, for non-offensive purposes; and applications that comply with the precedent set in memorandum BPTS 01794-2020 (same applicant, end-user and end-use), which you [MINA] approved [noting that some of these permits have been the subject of media attention recently].
- **Annex B** contains ██████ fully consulted applications for Group 2 items for which no concerns or objections were raised.
- **Annex C** contains ██████ applications of Group 2 items for which consultations partners noted some concerns relating to regional conflicts and diversion, but did not raise a formal objection.

From: Anand, Shalini -TIE
Sent: September 27, 2020 6:49 PM
To: *MINA-Dept Unit
Cc: *TFM-Policy ; *USS-DMA Advisors ; *DMT-Policy ; Funtek, Katharine -TID ; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR ; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE ; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE ; Mallett, Erika -TIE ; Schonfeld, Benjamin -TIR ; Grant, Alison -ECE ; *DCB-Management/Gestion ; *DCB
Subject: re: Turkey oMINA briefing Monday

Dear Aliya:

For tomorrow's briefing with Ally, please see attached updated Turkey annexes, which accompany memo BPTS 3389-2020. New permits have been added (in yellow) and we have re-circulated these to consultation partners for a second check and to provide any additional notes/context, given the changing dynamics in the region. Accordingly, there are now a total of ██████ permit applications at a value of ██████████ for the Minister's consideration. We have also updated the attached decks.

DCB colleagues, please save this email and these Annexes into CCM mercury (no need to save the decks).

Warmly,
S.

Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status
United Arab Emirates						
	29/09/2019			2-11.a, 2-21.a, 2-22.a, 6-11.A.3.b.3, 6-11.E.2, 6-11.D.2		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item Description: [redacted] receivers, [redacted] antenna, technology and software. End-Use: For installation [redacted] technology demonstrations to potential customers. End-User Country/Organization: Turkey/ [redacted] Condition (s): Quarterly Reporting Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Exception: D – Permits by [redacted] were raised by President Erdogan during his January 2020 call with PM Trudeau. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's sensitive domestic defense industry programs are monitored at the highest level and <div style="display: flex; align-items: center;"> <input type="checkbox"/> • I concur </div> <div style="display: flex; align-items: center;"> <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur </div> <div style="display: flex; align-items: center;"> <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss </div>

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

							decisions on these permits have a direct impact on bilateral relations. Although the final user is in the UAE, a refusal could be viewed as a lack of support from Canada to a NATO ally and impact our bilateral relations.	
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Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
Turkey							
	25/11/2019	CAE Inc. (St-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Quebec)		2-14, 2-21.a, 2-22.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This is a permit amendment request to extend the validity date of the permit by 1 year (permit expired January 31, 2020; however given that a review was underway, JLT/Legal division has advised that the permit could be reinstated, if approved; it would reflect the original request for extension or amendment, from the date of approval). Export of hardware, software and technology related to the Image Generators program. • End-Use: For the Full Mission Simulator Image Generator (for pilot training). • End-User Country/End User: Turkey/Turkish Air Force • Condition (s): Quarterly reporting • Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Exceptions: D – Permits for items used by Turkish Armed Forces are often raised at the highest level. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey’s military are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on bilateral relations with a NATO ally.• Exceptions: E – Export permit applications for an extension to an existing project from before Oct. 19.	
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Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada’s values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada’s foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	25/11/2019	CAE Inc. (St-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Quebec)		2-21.a, 2-22.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item Description: This is a permit amendment request to extend the validity date by a year (permit expired on January 31, 2020; however given that a review was underway, JLT/Legal division has advised that the permit could be reinstated, if approved; it would reflect the original request for extension or amendment, from the date of approval). For the export of software and technology related to the Image Generator program. End-Use: Items will be accessed by consignee from their own systems, to provide on-site support to the Turkish Air Force (for pilot training). End-User Country/End User: Turkey / Condition (s): Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Exceptions: D – Permits for items used 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada’s values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada’s foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						<p>by Turkish Armed Forces are often raised at the highest level. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's military are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on bilateral relations with a NATO ally.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Exception E – Export permit applications for an extension to an existing permit from before Oct. 19.	
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Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
				2-22.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item Description: This is a permit amendment request to extend the validity date of the permit by 1 year (permit expired on June 30, 2020; however given that a review was underway, JLT/Legal division has advised that the permit could be reinstated, if approved; it would reflect the original request for extension or amendment, from the date of approval). To export technology related to HMX transmissions. End-Use: [REDACTED] End-User Country/End User: Turkey/ Turkish military. Condition (s): Consultations: Expedited consultation with DND and GEO, no objections raised. Exceptions: E – Export permit applications for an extension to an existing permit from 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada’s values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada’s foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						before Oct. 19.	

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status
						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Item description: [REDACTED] • End-Use: [REDACTED] • End-User Country/End-User: Turkey / [REDACTED] • Condition (s): Quarterly reporting. • Consultations: Expedited consultation with DND and GEO, no objections raised. <p>Exception C – Items can only be used for training. Once installed, firearms cannot discharge live rounds, only simulated rounds.</p>

<input type="checkbox"/>	• I concur
<input type="checkbox"/>	• I do not concur
<input type="checkbox"/>	• I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada’s values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada’s foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	10/10/2019			2-11.a, 2-21.a.1, 2-22.a, 6-11.A.3.b.3, 6-11.D.2, 6-11.E.2		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item description: Antennas, technology and software upgrade downloads. End Use: For a drillship managed by [redacted] The vessel's work is in the Eastern Mediterranean. End User Country / Organization: Turkey / [redacted] Condition (s): Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Exceptions: C – GPS receiver, for navigation, going to civilian end user. Exception D – Permits by [redacted] were raised by President Erdogan during his January 2020 call with PM Trudeau. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's sensitive domestic defense industry programs are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on bilateral 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						relations with a NATO ally.	
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Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	09/12/2019			2-11.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item description: Replacement parts and components for [redacted] Aircraft Ship Integrated Securing and Traversing (ASIST) System. End Use: To be used by the Turkish Navy on their MILGEM class ships. End User Country / Organization: Turkey / Turkish Navy Condition (s): Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Exceptions: C – items secure helicopters to ship, serve no other purpose. Exceptions: D – [redacted] permits raised repeatedly in July by MFA and TK Embassy. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on bilateral relations with a NATO ally. 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada’s values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada’s foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Exception F – Permit request to re-export parts that were exported under a previous permit but returned for warranty repairs.	
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Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	22/01/2020			2-10.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item description: Various spares and subcomponents used in conjunction with the ASIST helicopter landing system. End Use: To be used on the SH-70 helicopter. End User Country / Organization: Turkey / Turkish Naval Forces Command Condition (s): Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Exceptions: C – items secure helicopters to ship, serve no other purpose. Exceptions: D – [redacted] permits raised repeatedly in July by MFA and TK Embassy. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on bilateral relations with a NATO ally. 	<input type="checkbox"/> *I concur <input type="checkbox"/> *I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> *I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada’s values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada’s foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	27/01/2020			2-10.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item description: cable cutter assemblies. Replacement of parts originally exported in June 2019. End Use: To be used in conjunction with the ASIST helicopter landing system on the SH-70 helicopter. End User Country / Organization: Turkey / Turkish Naval Forces Command Condition (s): Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Exceptions: C – items secure helicopters to ship, serve no other purpose. Exceptions: D – permits raised repeatedly in July by MFA and TK Embassy. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada’s values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada’s foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						<p>impact on bilateral relations with a NATO ally.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Exception F – Permit request to re-export parts that were exported under a previous permit but returned due to non-compliance.	
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Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

s.20(1)(c)

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	05/03/2020			2-10.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item description: cable cutter assembly. Warranty replacement of defective part. End Use: To be used in conjunction with the ASIST helicopter landing system on the SH-70 helicopter. End User Country / Organization: Turkey / Turkish Naval Forces Command Condition (s): Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Exceptions: C – items secure helicopters to ship, serve no other purpose. Exceptions: D – permits raised repeatedly in July by MFA and TK Embassy. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on bilateral relations with a NATO ally. 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada’s values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada’s foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

							<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Exceptions: F – Permit request to re-export parts that were exported under a previous permit but returned for warranty repairs.
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Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada’s values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada’s foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
891054-7	09/04/2020	ARMAMENT TECHNOLOGY INCORPORATED (Halifax, Nova Scotia)	OSMANLI SAVUNMA SAN TIC LTD STI	2-1.d	428,000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item Description: Export of (80) firearm sights, and (40) riflescopes. End Use: For commercial re-sale to law enforcement, security, military and civilian marksmen by the consignee. End-User Country/End-User: Turkey/ OSMANLI SAVUNMA SAN TIC LTD STI. EUS states no further re-export. Condition (s): Quarterly reporting Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Exception C – While this item is not used for self-defence purposes, it can help with targeting and avoidance of civilian casualties. In addition, these items are available widely on a commercial basis. 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex C: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status
Turkey						
						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item description: [REDACTED] End Use: [REDACTED] End Use Country / Organization: Turkey / [REDACTED] Condition (s): Quarterly reporting. Consultations: Fully consulted, no objections, some risks pertaining to regional peace and security were raised. Note: while the value of this item is negligible, as it is a data transfer, the Department has been advised that [REDACTED]

• I concur
 • I do not concur
 • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend : exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a)Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b)Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada’s values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c)A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d)There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada’s foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e)Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f)Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex C: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

s.20(1)(c)

						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Exceptions: D – bilateral relations.  • Exceptions: E – Export permit applications for an extension to an existing permit from 
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Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend : exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a)Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b)Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada’s values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c)A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d)There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada’s foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e)Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f)Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex C: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Item Description: [REDACTED] • End-Use: [REDACTED] • End-User Country/Organization: Turkey/[REDACTED] • Condition (s): • Consultation: Fully consulted, no objections, some risks pertaining to Turkey's active involvement in regional armed conflicts were raised. • Note: [REDACTED] • Exceptions: C – [REDACTED] 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend : exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a)Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b)Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada’s values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c)A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d)There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada’s foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e)Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f)Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex C: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	02/12/2019	Honeywell Limited (Mississauga, Ontario)		2-10.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item description: Generator Control Units used on the T-70 helicopter. End-Use: Generator control units will be installed in the Turkish Utility Helicopter T-70. These devices control the electrical power generators on the helicopter. End User Country / Organizations: Turkey / Turkish Military (various) Condition (s): Quarterly reporting Consultations: Fully consulted, no objections, but some risks pertaining to the final end use of this equipment were raised. Exception D – Permits linked to Turkey’s sensitive domestic defense industry are raised repeatedly, including at the leaders level. A refusal of this permit could be seen as bilateral irritant and a lack of support to a NATO ally. 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend : exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a)Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b)Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada’s values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c)A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d)There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada’s foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e)Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f)Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
United Arab Emirates							
	2019/09/25	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)	L3 / WESCAM TERRITORY DIRECTOR – MIDDLE EAST AND TURKEY	2-21.a.1; 2-22.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Item Description: Technical assistance documents, training courses/materials and software related to the [redacted] and [redacted] surveillance camera systems • End-Use: To be used for the operation, maintenance and/or installation of the surveillance systems and transfer to third parties in consignee's assigned geographical coverage which is Middle East and Turkey; possible re-transfer to Turkey. • End-User Country/End User: UAE/various end-users in the Middle East and Turkey • Condition(s): None • Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns (ECE was also consulted for the Turkey angle) • Exception: D – Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at the leaders and ministerial levels. Wescam permits were raised in an April call between PM-Trudeau/Erdogan. Wescam permits were last raised during MINA's Sept.17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

							demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's domestic UAV program are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on the bilateral relation with a NATO ally.
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Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status
					1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item Description: Technical data regarding [REDACTED] End-Use: [REDACTED] End-User Country/Organization: Turkey/ Turkey Ministry of National Defense Turkish Air Force. Condition (s): Consultations: Subject to the export controls of the [REDACTED] Fully consulted, no concerns. Exceptions: D – [REDACTED] permit raised repeatedly. [REDACTED] This serves to demonstrate that decisions around


<input type="checkbox"/>	• I concur
<input type="checkbox"/>	• I do not concur
<input type="checkbox"/>	• I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada’s values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada’s foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						<p>permits are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on the bilateral relations with a NATO ally.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• 	
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Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
					1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item Description: Technical data related to [redacted] End-Use: [redacted] End-User Country/Organization: Turkey/ Republic of Turkey Ministry of National Defense Turkish Air Force. Condition (s): Consultations: Subject to the export controls of the [redacted] Fully consulted, no concerns. Exceptions: D – [redacted] raised repeatedly. [redacted] This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on the bilateral relations with 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada’s values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada’s foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						a NATO ally.	
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Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
Turkey							
	2020/03/30			2-11.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item description: Instantaneous Frequency Measurement (IFM) receiver (Digitizing receiver), for return after testing. End-Use: Used for detection and monitoring of radar signals. End User Country / Organizations: Turkey Condition (s): Quarterly reporting Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Exception : D – This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's domestic UAV program are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on bilateral relations with a NATO ally. Exception F – Request to re-export parts that were exported under a previous 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
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- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						permit but returned for repairs (Proof of import provided)	
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Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

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- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada’s foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	2020/04/24	FIELD AVIATION COMPANY INC. (Mississauga, Ontario)		2-10.a, 2-22.a, 9-4.a.ii		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item description: Modified Bombardier Challenger aircraft including all materials, associated spare parts and kits. End-Use: For surveillance and Information Communication. End User Country / Organizations: Turkey / Presidency of the Republic of Turkey. Condition (s): Quarterly reporting Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Exceptions: D – This permit was raised repeatedly. In July, Turkey asked for an urgent call with MINA to discuss the Field Aviation permit. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on bilateral relations with a NATO ally. Exception: E: Export permit applications 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
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- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada’s foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
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- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						<p>for an extension to an existing project from before Oct. 19.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Note: Department was advised that aircraft was already shipped against the company's previous permit, and that this permit is for materials/spare parts, no changes were requested to this permit. • Note: Export is limited to the [REDACTED] aircraft noted, serial number 5946, and does not allow a [REDACTED] aircraft to be exported if this permit is approved. 	
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Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

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- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
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- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
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Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	06/12/2019	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-5.d		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item Description: Ground Boresight Module/adaptor systems for the Wescam Surveillance Systems (a part for calibration of the camera system) End-Use: To be installed on a End-User Country/Organization: Turkey/ Condition (s): Quarterly reporting Consultations: Fully consulted, no objections. Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.) Exception: D – Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at the leaders and ministerial levels. Wescam permits were raised in an April call between PM-Trudeau/Erdogan. Wescam permits were last raised during MINA's Sept. 17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to demonstrate that decisions 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
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- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
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Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						<p>around permits linked to Turkey's domestic UAV program are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on the bilateral relation with a NATO ally.</p>	
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Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	05/12/2019	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-5.b, 2-15.d, 2-21.a.1, 2-22.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item Description: This is a permit amendment request to extend validity date by a year (permit expired on March 31, 2020; however given that a review was underway, JLT/Legal division has advised that the permit could be reinstated, if approved; it would reflect the original request for extension or amendment, from the date of approval). The permit is for export of various spare parts and components of the surveillance camera systems and related technology and software. End-Use: Used by consignee to repair and systems in Turkey. End-User Country/End User: Turkey / L3 Wescam. The EUS states the items will not be re-exported or transferred to another party. Condition (s): Quarterly reporting. Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.) Exception D – Wescam permits raised 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada’s values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada’s foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						<p>repeatedly including at the leaders and ministerial levels. Wescam permits were raised in an April call between PM-Trudeau/Erdogan. Wescam permits were last raised during MINA's Sept.17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's domestic UAV program are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on the bilateral relation with a NATO ally.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Exception: E – Export permit applications for an extension to an existing project from before Oct. 19. 	
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Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

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	05/12/2019	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-5.b, 2-15.d, 6-9.A.6, 2-11.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item Description: This is a permit amendment request to extend the validity date by a year (permit expired March 31, 2020; however given that a review was underway, JLT/Legal division has advised that the permit could be reinstated, if approved; it would reflect the original request for extension or amendment, from the date of approval). The permit is for export of spare parts and components of the [redacted] surveillance camera systems. End-Use: To perform surveillance, targeting, research, test and training by Turkish law enforcement authorities. End-User Country/End User: Turkey / [redacted] of Turkey. EUS states no further re-export to a third party. Condition (s): Quarterly reporting. Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.) Exception : D – Wescam permits raised 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

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Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

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Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	02/12/2019	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-15.d, 6-9.A.6, 2-5.b, 2-21.a, 2-22.b		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item Description: This is a permit amendment request to extend the validity date by 1 year (permit expired on March 31, 2020; however given that a review was underway, JLT/Legal division has advised that the permit could be reinstated, if approved; it would reflect the original request for extension or amendment, from the date of approval). Permit allows a total export of surveillance & targeting camera systems, Ground boresight modules, mission grip assemblies and technical data. End-Use: To perform surveillance, targeting, research, test and training by Turkish law enforcement authorities. End-User Country/End User: Turkey / Turkish Ministry of Defense. Condition (s): Quarterly reporting. Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.) 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

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Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

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Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	02/12/2019	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-22.a, 2-21.a, 2-18		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item Description: This is a permit amendment request to extend the validity date by a year (permit expired March 31, 2020; however given that a review was underway, JLT/Legal division has advised that the permit could be reinstated, if approved; it would reflect the original request for extension or amendment, from the date of approval). Permit allows for a total of [redacted] master control units, [redacted] handcontroler assemblies, and controlled technical data. End-Use: To perform repairs of [redacted] surveillance camera systems. End-User Country/End User: Turkey / L3. EUS states no further re-export. Condition (s): Quarterly reporting. Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Exception D – Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at the leaders and ministerial levels. Wescam permits were raised in an April call between PM-Trudeau/Erdogan. Wescam 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

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Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

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Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	02/01/2020	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-15.d, 2-5.b		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item Description: This is a permit amendment request to extend permit by 1 year (permit expired April 30, 2020; however given that a review was underway, JLT/Legal division has advised that the permit could be reinstated, if approved; it would reflect the original request for extension or amendment, from the date of approval). Permit allows for a total of () surveillance & targeting camera systems. End-Use: To be installed on the System, used for the purpose of surveillance and targeting. End-User: Turkey / Turkish Gendarmerie. EUS states no further re-export. Condition (s): Quarterly reporting. Consultation: Fully consulted, no concerns. Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.) Exception D – Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at the leaders and ministerial levels. Wescam permits were 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

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Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

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Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	26/05/2020	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-5.b, 2-15.d		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item Description: This is permit amendment request to extend permit for 1 year (permit expired June 30, 2020; however given that a review was underway, JLT/Legal division has advised that the permit could be reinstated, if approved; it would reflect the original request for extension or amendment, from the date of approval). Permit allows for a total export of () surveillance and targeting camera systems, including ancillary equipment. End Use: The systems will be used for surveillance and targeting. End User Country/Organization: Turkey / Turkish National Police Conditions: Quarterly Reporting Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.) Exception D – Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at the leaders and 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

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Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

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Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	28/05/2020	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-5.b, 2-15.d		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item Description: This is a permit amendment request to extend the validity date by a year (permit expired June 30, 2020; however given that a review was underway, JLT/Legal division has advised that the permit could be reinstated, if approved; it would reflect the original request for extension or amendment, from the date of approval). Permit allows for the export of [redacted] surveillance and targeting camera system, including ancillary equipment. End-Use: To perform surveillance, targeting, research, test and training by Turkish law enforcement authorities. End-User Country/End User: Turkey / [redacted] EUS states no further re-export to a non-listed party. Condition (s): Quarterly reporting. Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.) 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

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- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	28/05/2020	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-21.a.1; 2-22.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item Description: This is a permit amendment request to extend the current permit by 1 year to June 30, 2023 (original permit expires June 30, 2022) For the export of technical assistance documents, training courses/materials and software and firmware related to the [redacted] and [redacted] surveillance camera systems End Use: For a quotation/proposal on the surveillance systems, which requires the technical items. End User Country/Organization: Turkey / [redacted] Conditions: Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.) Exception D – Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at the leaders and ministerial levels. Wescam permits were raised in an April call between PM-Trudeau/Erdogan. Wescam permits were last raised during MINA's Sept.17 call with 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

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- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
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Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						<p>Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's domestic UAV program are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on the bilateral relation with a NATO ally.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Exception: E – Export permit applications for an extension to an existing project from before Oct. 19. 	
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Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	06/07/2020	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-5.b, 2-11.a, 2-15.d, 2-14, 2-21.a.1		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item Description: This is a permit amendment request to extend the validity date by a year (permit expires on November 30, 2020) to provide continuous demonstration. Permit allows for a total of [redacted] EO/IR surveillance & targeting camera systems, [redacted] EO/IR surveillance & targeting camera systems ([redacted] hand controller units, [redacted] mission grip assemblies, [redacted] desktop simulator kits, [redacted] laptops, [redacted] kinetic computers and [redacted] ground boresight modules. End-Use: Items will be used to demonstrate electro-optic and infrared system capabilities to the military, government and law enforcement. End-User Country/End User: Turkey/[redacted] [redacted] Condition (s): Temporary condition. Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Precedent memo - BPTS 01794- 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

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Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						<p>2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Exception D – Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at the leaders and ministerial levels. Wescam permits were raised in an April call between PM-Trudeau/Erdogan. Wescam permits were last raised during MINA's Sept.17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's domestic UAV program are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on the bilateral relation with a NATO ally. • Exception: E – Export permit applications for an extension to an existing project from before Oct. 19.
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Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	2020/07/21	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-5.b; 2-15.d; 2-21.a.1; 2-22.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item description: This is a permit amendment request to extend the validity date of the permit by a year to January 30, 2023 (permit expires on January 31, 2022). Export allows for a total of () EO/IR surveillance & targeting camera, () ground boresight modules, () mission grips and hand-controllers, and technical documents, training courses/ materials and operational software/firmware. End-Use: To be incorporated into the () platform for the purpose of surveillance and targeting. End User: Turkey / () Condition (s): Quarterly reporting Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.) Exception D – Wescam permits raised 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

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Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						<p>repeatedly including at the leaders and ministerial levels. Wescam permits were raised in an April call between PM-Trudeau/Erdogan. Wescam permits were last raised during MINA's Sept. 17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's domestic UAV program are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on the bilateral relation with a NATO ally.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Exception: E – Export permit applications for an extension to an existing project from before Oct. 19.
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Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	2020/06/08	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-11.a, 2-15.d, 2-18.a, 2-21.a, 2-22.a, 6-9.A.6		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item description: Repair and return of EO/IR surveillance camera systems, () and () EO/IR surveillance and targeting camera systems, repair/replacement parts, test equipment and related technical data, training materials and software. End-Use: Repaired full systems are to be returned to their foreign owners; the replacement parts, test equipment and technology will be used for in-country repairs/maintenance. End User Country / Organizations: Turkey / () Condition (s): Quarterly reporting Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.) Exception D – Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at the leaders and 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

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Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						<p>ministerial levels. Wescam permits were raised in an April call between PM-Trudeau/Erdogan. Wescam permits were last raised during MINA's Sept. 17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's domestic UAV program are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on the bilateral relation with a NATO ally.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Exception: F – request to re-export parts that were exported under a previous permit but returned for repairs (Proof of import provided)
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Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	2020/04/06	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-15.d, 2-18.a, 2-21.a, 2-22.a, 6-9.A.6		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item description: EO/IR surveillance and targeting camera systems for their own end use and EO/IR surveillance and targeting camera systems, as well as software. End-Use: For end use by who will use the CMX-15D for sustainability and maintainability purposes and for after sales support. End User Country / Organizations: Turkey / SSB (Presidency of Defense industry) Condition (s): Quarterly reporting Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.) Exceptions: D – Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at the leaders and ministerial levels. Wescam permits were raised in an April call 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

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Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

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Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	2020/04/06	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-5.b, 2-15.d, 2-18.a,2-21.a, 2-22.a, 6-9.A.6		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item description: EO/IR surveillance and targeting camera systems, () EO/IR surveillance and targeting camera systems, () hand-controller assemblies, ground boresight modules, repair/replacement parts, and test equipment to Turkey. End-Use: Used for the purpose of Surveillance and Targeting. End User Country / Organizations: Turkey / Condition (s): Quarterly reporting Consultations Fully consulted no concerns. Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.) Exception D – Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at the leaders and ministerial levels. Wescam permits were raised in an April call between PM-Trudeau/Erdogan. Wescam 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

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Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

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Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	2020/05/13	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-15.d, 2-18.a, 2-21.a, 2-22.a, 6-9.A.6		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item description: EO/IR surveillance and targeting camera systems, ground boresight modules, handcontroller assemblies and technical documents. End-Use: Used for the purpose of Surveillance and Targeting. End User Country / Organizations: Turkey / Condition (s): Quarterly reporting Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.) Exception D – Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at the leaders and ministerial levels. Wescam permits were raised in an April call between PM-Trudeau/Erdogan. Wescam permits were last raised during MINA's Sept.17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to demonstrate that 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

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Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						decisions around permits linked to Turkey's domestic UAV program are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on the bilateral relation with a NATO ally.	
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Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	2020/06/08	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-15.d		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item description: Various spare parts for the Wescam EO/IR surveillance and targeting camera systems. End-Use: Used in the repairs and maintenance of defective surveillance systems owned by military and law enforcement agencies that fall under Ministry of Defense of Interior. End User Country / Organizations: Turkey / Condition (s): Quarterly reporting Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.) Exception D – Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at the leaders and ministerial levels. Wescam permits were raised in an April call between PM-Trudeau/Erdogan. Wescam permits were last raised during MINA's 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada’s values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada’s foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						<p>Sept.17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's domestic UAV program are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on the bilateral relation with a NATO ally.</p>	
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Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

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- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	2020/06/03	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-15.d		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item description: Return temporarily imported [redacted] produced parts for the Wescam [redacted] EO/IR surveillance and targeting camera systems. End-Use: Items underwent an independent assessment in Canada. Used for the purpose of Surveillance and Targeting. End User Country / Organizations: Turkey / [redacted] Condition (s): Quarterly reporting Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.) Exception D – Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at the leaders and ministerial levels. Wescam permits were raised in an April call between PM-Trudeau/Erdogan. Wescam permits were last raised during MINA's Sept.17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

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Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						<p>This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's domestic UAV program are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on the bilateral relation with a NATO ally.</p>	
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Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

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- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	2020/07/29	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-5.d; 2-11.a; 2-15.d; 2-18.a; 2-21.a.1; 2-22.a; 6-9.A.6		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item description: (repaired EO/IR surveillance & targeting camera systems, and EO/IR surveillance & targeting camera systems, replacement parts, related test equipment, technical data, training materials and software. End-Use: Foreign-owned items to be returned after repair. End User Country / Organizations: Turkey / Presidency of the Republic of Turkey and Presidency of Defence Industries Condition (s): Quarterly reporting Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.) Exception: D – Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at the leaders and ministerial levels. Wescam permits 	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

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- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada’s foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						<p>were raised in an April call between PM-Trudeau/Erdogan. Wescam permits were last raised during MINA's Sept.17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's domestic UAV program are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on the bilateral relation with a NATO ally.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Exception: F – Request to re-export parts that were exported under a previous permit but returned for repairs (Proof of import provided) 	
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Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

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Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	2020/07/15	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-15.d		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item description: Return temporarily imported [redacted] produced parts for the Wescam ([redacted] EO/IR surveillance and targeting camera systems. End-Use: Canada conducted an independent assessment of parts; the assessment had been completed and items are to be returned to consignee [redacted] End User Country / Organizations: Turkey / [redacted] Condition (s): Quarterly reporting Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.) Exception D – Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at the leaders and ministerial levels. Wescam permits were raised in an April call between PM-Trudeau/Erdogan. Wescam permits were last raised during MINA's 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

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Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						<p>Sept.17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's domestic UAV program are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on the bilateral relation with a NATO ally.</p>	
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RE: re: Turkey oMINA briefing Monday

From: "Anand, Shalini -TIE" <shalini.anand@international.gc.ca>
To: "Mawani, Aliya -MINA" <aliya.mawani@international.gc.ca>, "MINA-Dept Unit" <d-mina-dept-unit@international.gc.ca>
Cc: "TFM-Policy" <d-tfm-policy@international.gc.ca>, "USS-DMA Advisors" <d-uss-dmaadvisors@international.gc.ca>, "DMT-Policy" <d-dmt-policy@international.gc.ca>, "Funtek, Katharine -TID" <katharine.funtek@international.gc.ca>, "Gosselin, Catherine -TIR" <catherine.gosselin@international.gc.ca>, "Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE" <marieeve.roymarcoux@international.gc.ca>, "Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE" <joonhyuk.yoon@international.gc.ca>, "Mallett, Erika -TIE" <erika.mallett@international.gc.ca>, "Schonfeld, Benjamin -TIR" <benjamin.schonfeld@international.gc.ca>, "Grant, Alison -ECE" <alison.grant@international.gc.ca>, "DCB-Management/Gestion" <d-dcb-management_gestion@international.gc.ca>, "DCB" <d-dcb@international.gc.ca>
Date: Mon, 28 Sep 2020 10:40:45 -0400
Attachments: RE: Permits Update from oMINA (122.88 kB)

Hi Aliya:
Please see below. Perhaps we can clarify anything outstanding in the 11 a.m. briefing?
Warmly,
S.

From: Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>
Sent: September 28, 2020 10:23 AM
To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Funtek, Katharine -TID <Katharine.Funtek@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>; Mallett, Erika -TIE <Erika.Mallett@international.gc.ca>; Schonfeld, Benjamin -TIR <Benjamin.Schonfeld@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; *DCB-Management/Gestion <D-DCB-Management_Gestion@international.gc.ca>; *DCB <D-DCB@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: re: Turkey oMINA briefing Monday

Shalini,

Thanks very much for sending all this through. Ally has reviewed and has a couple of follow-up questions:

- 1) Are you expecting any updates to the memo or does the analysis provided remains current? (recognize this is also a geo question) Original plan was not to update the memo, but I do appreciate that geo context has changed. Let us discuss internally and circle back.
- 2) Annex A [REDACTED] – can you please confirm if this had already been issued and that Turkey was removed from the list of end users?
This is still in our system, and Turkey is still on the list of end users, so it should remain in the annex for MINA consideration.
- 3) Can you please confirm if the permit from the May 8 Pipeline (Annex C [REDACTED]) will be added to the annexes?
No, we mentioned this in our earlier correspondence (see attached), but I think Ally might have confused the permit in item 2 with this one. This permit was issued following the Aug 28 pipeline, as Turkey was removed as an end user (as stated in the permit conditions and in a note from the company).
- 4) Can we please get a breakdown of what is in each Annex (as was previously laid out in the memo but is now outdated).
Happy to provide more information, but given that the call is in 20 mins, I'll get a bit more insight from Ally on what is needed to ensure that we get her what is most helpful.

Thanks very much,

Aliya

From: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>
Sent: September 27, 2020 6:49 PM
To: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Funtek, Katharine -TID <Katharine.Funtek@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR

<Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>; Mallett, Erika -TIE <Erika.Mallett@international.gc.ca>; Schonfeld, Benjamin -TIR <Benjamin.Schonfeld@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; *DCB-Management/Gestion <D-DCB-Management_Gestion@international.gc.ca>; *DCB <D-DCB@international.gc.ca>

Subject: re: Turkey oMINA briefing Monday

Dear Aliya:

For tomorrow's briefing with Ally, please see attached updated Turkey annexes, which accompany memo BPTS 3389-2020. New permits have been added (in yellow) and we have re-circulated these to consultation partners for a second check and to provide any additional notes/context, given the changing dynamics in the region. Accordingly, there are now a total of [REDACTED] permit applications at a value of [REDACTED] for the Minister's consideration. We have also updated the attached decks.

DCB colleagues, please save this email and these Annexes into CCM mercury (no need to save the decks).

Warmly,
S.

RE: Permits Update from o/MINA

From: "Anand, Shalini -TIE" </o=dfait-maeci/ou=exchange administrative group (fydibohf23spdl)/cn=recipients/cn=anands2a9e">
To: "Mawani, Aliya -MINA" <aliya.mawani@international.gc.ca>
Cc: "Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE" <marieeve.roymarcoux@international.gc.ca>, "Funtek, Katharine -TID" <katharine.funtek@international.gc.ca>, *USS-DMA Advisors <d-uss-dmaadvisors@international.gc.ca>, *DMT-Policy <d-dmt-policy@international.gc.ca>, *TFM-Policy <d-tfm-policy@international.gc.ca>, *MINA-Dept Unit <d-mina-dept-unit@international.gc.ca>, "Schonfeld, Benjamin -TIR" <benjamin.schonfeld@international.gc.ca>, "Gosselin, Catherine -TIR" <catherine.gosselin@international.gc.ca>, "Korecky, Judy -TIR" <judy.korecky@international.gc.ca>, "Haq-Alam, Hasina -TIE" <hasina.haq-alam@international.gc.ca>
Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2020 14:02:32 -0400

Hi Aliya:

We're working through the permit issuance and other requests in this message.

We noticed that [REDACTED] of the [REDACTED] permits listed in section 3 of the message below was modified by the company and submitted via a pipeline on August 28. It has since been issued (to all destinations save Turkey).

- By way of background: the company learned that the permit may be taking longer in the system on account of the Turkey Group 2 issue, and given that the permit is destined first to the [REDACTED] and then onwards to [REDACTED] the company requested that we remove Turkey from the list of final destination countries.
- Accordingly, we re-submitted the updated permit application in the August 28 pipeline, and oMINA confirmed that there were no further questions on it, so we issued it per our usual process (with a condition that items cannot go to Turkey).
- This was sent up on August 28, so we didn't yet have the chance to remove it from our ongoing tracking list of permits that remain with oMINA.
- Bottom line: we can collectively remove it from our tracking lists.

Warmly,
S.

From: Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>
Sent: September 14, 2020 11:51 PM
To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Funtek, Katharine -TID <Katharine.Funtek@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; Schonfeld, Benjamin -TIR <Benjamin.Schonfeld@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TFM <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Korecky, Judy -TIR <Judy.Korecky@international.gc.ca>
Subject: Permits Update from o/MINA

Dear Shalini,

As discussed, here's the round-up from o/MINA with an update on:

- 1) Permits for which there are no further questions
- 2) Permits for which there are further questions
- 3) Permits to be added to the deck and discussion for the MINA briefing on permits destined for Turkey

Please let me know if you have any questions – and of course any specifics can be discussed during tomorrow morning's briefing.

Thanks so much,

Aliya

Aliya Mawani
 Senior Departmental Advisor | Conseillère ministérielle principale
 Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs | Bureau du Ministre des Affaires étrangères

1) Permits that o/MINA has no further questions on:

- For those where the [REDACTED] is an end-user: As officials have confirmed that all permits to the [REDACTED] have been assessed against the ATT, and no concern and/or substantial risk has been identified that they would be used in a manner contrary to these criteria, including to commit serious violations of IHL and/or human rights, including in [REDACTED] we have no further questions on these permits.
 - **August 7 Pipeline:**
 - Annex A: [REDACTED]
 - Please amend permit to remove [REDACTED] and please confirm this has been done. (DLU note: we understand that the option to remove [REDACTED] was previously suggested by the department?)
 - **July 24 Pipeline:**
 - Annex C: [REDACTED]
 - **July 17 Pipeline:**
 - Annex B: [REDACTED]
 - Annex D: [REDACTED]
 - **July 3 Pipeline:**
 - Annex C: [REDACTED]
 - **June 5 Pipeline:**
 - [REDACTED]
 - **May 29 Pipeline**
 - [REDACTED]
 - Please amend permit to remove [REDACTED] provide an assessment of the role of the [REDACTED] in local and regional conflict and please confirm this has been done.
 - **May 22 Pipeline:**
 - Annex C: [REDACTED]
 - **May 8 Pipeline:**
 - Annex A: [REDACTED]
 - **May 1 Pipeline:**
 - Annex C: [REDACTED]
 - **April 24 Pipeline**
 - Annex A: [REDACTED]
 - Annex C: [REDACTED]
 - **April 17 Pipeline**
 - Annex C: [REDACTED]
 - **April 3 Pipeline:**
 - Annex B: [REDACTED]
 - Annex E: [REDACTED]

2) Permits that o/MINA does have further questions on:

- **June 26 Pipeline**
 - Annex A: [REDACTED] - please confirm who the end users are in the countries listed. Are they civilian research entities, government, military?
- **June 12 Pipeline**
 - Annex C: [REDACTED] - don't know why this wasn't sent up in a memo since it should be captured under our policy of presumptive denial for exports to law enforcement. Please provide rationale from officials.
- **May 15 Pipeline:**
 - Annex C: [REDACTED]
 - Please provide an analysis on the [REDACTED] and their use of force
- **April 3 Pipeline:**
 - Please confirm the following permits are for civilian/commercial aircraft and not military:
 - Annex D: [REDACTED]
- Permits where the end user is the [REDACTED] (see below) – o/MINA would like to see these permits come up with official

analysis and recommendations from officials considering we have a policy of presumptive denial to [REDACTED]

- **July 24 Pipeline:**
 - Annex C [REDACTED]
- **May 8 Pipeline**
 - Annex C [REDACTED]
- **April 3 Pipeline**
 - Annex A [REDACTED]
 - Annex E: [REDACTED]

3) Permits that need to be added to the deck and discussion for briefing MINA on Turkey permits:

- **July 17 Pipeline:**
 - Annex C [REDACTED]
- **May 8 Pipeline:**
 - Annex C [REDACTED]

RE: re: suspension of permits

From: "Lafontaine, Annie -MINA" <annie.lafontaine@international.gc.ca>
To: "Anand, Shalini -TIE" <shalini.anand@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <d-mina-dept-unit@international.gc.ca>, *USS-DMA Advisors <d-uss-dmaadvisors@international.gc.ca>, *TFM-Policy <d-tfm-policy@international.gc.ca>, *MINA-Dept Unit <d-mina-dept-unit@international.gc.ca>, *DMT-Policy <d-dmt-policy@international.gc.ca>, "Christie, Bruce -TFMA" <bruce.christie@international.gc.ca>, "Grant, Alison -ECE" <alison.grant@international.gc.ca>, "Thompson, Kevin -JLTA" <kevin.thompson@international.gc.ca>, "Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE" <marieeve.roymarcoux@international.gc.ca>, "Gosselin, Catherine -TIR" <catherine.gosselin@international.gc.ca>, "Hamilton, Kevin -IGR" <kevin.hamilton@international.gc.ca>
Date: Fri, 02 Oct 2020 23:32:26 -0400

Many thanks Shalini
 I have informed oMINA.
 Have a good (rest of) evening.
 Annie

De : Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>
Envoyé : 2 octobre 2020 23:21
À : Lafontaine, Annie -MINA <Annie.Lafontaine@international.gc.ca>
Cc : *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Thompson, Kevin -JLTA <Kevin.Thompson@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>
Objet : RE: re: suspension of permits

Hi:

1. Great, we will proceed to suspend [REDACTED] permits tonight, per MINA direction at the 3 p.m. briefing, and using the text below.
2. We would plan to use the language in the second notice on Monday when notifying L3 wescam, if there is a decision/we get authority to do so.
3. To note, the correct number of valid L3 Wescam permits that would be affected by the suspension [REDACTED] The number of L3 permits that have been issued to Turkey since Jan 1, 2016 is [REDACTED]

Warmly,
 S.

From: Lafontaine, Annie -MINA <Annie.Lafontaine@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 2, 2020 11:13 PM
To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Thompson, Kevin -JLTA <Kevin.Thompson@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: re: suspension of permits

Hi Shalini
 If legal is comfortable with the text, so is oMINA.
 Thank you
 Annie

De : Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>
Envoyé : 2 octobre 2020 22:55
À : Lafontaine, Annie -MINA <Annie.Lafontaine@international.gc.ca>
Cc : *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE

<Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Thompson, Kevin -JLTA <Kevin.Thompson@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>

Objet : RE: re: suspension of permits

Hi:

The updated oMINA language has been vetted with legal. Our concern is that it may complicate things, as it could raise questions about the investigation that is mentioned, e.g. start dates and end dates. We've revised the text below, which hopefully addresses the issue. Please advise.

As you may be aware, there have been allegations that goods and technology exported from Canada may have been used in the ongoing hostilities between Azerbaijan and Armenia. For this reason Global Affairs Canada has decided to suspend your export permits XXXXXXX (Ref. Id. XXXXXXX) pursuant to subsection 10(1) of the *Export and Import Permits Act* while we review these allegations. This suspension takes effect immediately.

We will inform you of the final decision regarding these export permits once we have completed our assessment of these allegations.

The export of this/these item(s) without a valid permit would constitute a violation of the *Export and Import Permits Act*, for which an exporter could face penalties or imprisonment following prosecution.

Please note that we have informed the Canada Border Services Agency of this suspension.

From: Lafontaine, Annie -MINA <Annie.Lafontaine@international.gc.ca>

Sent: October 2, 2020 10:36 PM

To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>

Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE

<Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Thompson, Kevin -JLTA <Kevin.Thompson@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: re: suspension of permits

This is what they would suggest, if you agree.

Annie

"This is to inform you that due to the ongoing investigation into the use of Canadian exports in the ongoing hostilities between Azerbaijan and Armenia, Global Affairs Canada has decided to suspend your export permit XXXXXXX (Ref. Id. XXXXXXX) pursuant to subsection 10(1) of the *Export and Import Permits Act* while we further assess the developments on the ground. This suspension takes effect immediately."

De : Lafontaine, Annie -MINA <Annie.Lafontaine@international.gc.ca>

Envoyé : 2 octobre 2020 22:35

À : Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>

Cc : *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE

<Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Thompson, Kevin -JLTA <Kevin.Thompson@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>

Objet : RE: re: suspension of permits

Hi Shalini

The sentence referred to is: "This is to inform you that due to ongoing hostilities between Azerbaijan and Armenia, Global Affairs Canada has decided to suspend your export permit"

They just have never seen a suspension notice written with this type of direct rationale. They are wondering if we would not just point to the investigation (and not to word smith). They just like to know if this is typical wording.

Thank you

Annie

De : Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>

Envoyé : 2 octobre 2020 22:25

À : Lafontaine, Annie -MINA <Annie.Lafontaine@international.gc.ca>

Cc : *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Thompson, Kevin -JLTA <Kevin.Thompson@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>

Objet : RE: re: suspension of permits

Yes, there is a typo – just sent a message about this under separate cover. Reconfirming numbers.

Can you confirm which line oMINA is referring to below please? Apologies, if I'm missing something.

From: Lafontaine, Annie -MINA <Annie.Lafontaine@international.gc.ca>

Sent: October 2, 2020 10:22 PM

To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>

Cc : *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Thompson, Kevin -JLTA <Kevin.Thompson@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: re: suspension of permits

Hello Shalini

OMINA mentioned that they have never seen the language in line 1 used before. Do we know why it would be used now?

They would suggest a line about the ongoing investigation into the current conflict. Could we see if we could adjust according to this?

On the L3 piece, would there be a typo? It seems it would not be valid permits but Grateful if you could please confirm.

Thank you,
Annie

De : Lafontaine, Annie -MINA <Annie.Lafontaine@international.gc.ca>

Envoyé : 2 octobre 2020 21:49

À : Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>

Cc : *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Thompson, Kevin -JLTA <Kevin.Thompson@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>

Objet : RE: re: suspension of permits

Hello Shalini

I am on call tonight for the MINA DLU and have sent the request to oMINA.

I will follow-up with them asap.

Thank you
Annie

De : Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>

Envoyé : 2 octobre 2020 21:42

À : *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>

Cc : *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Thompson, Kevin -JLTA <Kevin.Thompson@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>

Objet : re: suspension of permits

Dear Aliya:

Further to the post-briefing discussion, below please find the draft language for the company suspension notices, which we just received back after legal thoroughly vetted.

Can oMINA please confirm that they are comfortable with this language, and that as MINA directed we can move forward to suspend [REDACTED] noting that the shipments may have already taken place in all [REDACTED] instances (i.e. the most recent reporting that we have is several months old for [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] permits are for repair so there are no reporting requirements)? If so, given the late hour, we will send the email notice and suspend permits tonight, and call the companies to ensure that they received the emails tomorrow.

Can oMINA confirm whether the [REDACTED] Please advise. If so, the same language in the first text below would be applicable.

We have also included the draft text for the suspension of the [REDACTED] L3 Wescam permits to Turkey, on which we will await further direction on Monday.

Thanks to TIE/JLT for their work on this.

Warmly,
S.

1) in relation to the escalation along the Nagorno-Karabakh front

This is to inform you that due to ongoing hostilities between Azerbaijan and Armenia, Global Affairs Canada has decided to suspend your export permit XXXXXXX (Ref. Id. XXXXXXX) pursuant to subsection 10(1) of the *Export and Import Permits Act* while we further assess the developments on the ground. This suspension takes effect immediately.

We will inform you of the final decision regarding this export permit once we have completed our assessment of the situation.

The export of this/these item(s) without a valid permit would constitute a violation of the *Export and Import Permits Act*, for which an exporter could face penalties or imprisonment following prosecution.

Please note that we have informed the Canada Border Services Agency of this suspension.

Best regards,

2) in relation to use of drones with Canadian technology in certain regions

As you are aware, there have been allegations that drones equipped with your technology may have been transferred, used in a manner inconsistent with the end use assurance provided by the end user or used contrary to United Nations arms embargoes. For these reasons Global Affairs Canada has decided to suspend your export permits XXXXXXX (Ref. Id. XXXXXXX) pursuant to subsection 10(1) of the *Export and Import Permits Act* while we review these allegations. This suspension takes effect immediately.

We will inform you of the final decision regarding these export permits once we have completed our assessment of these allegations.

The export of this/these item(s) without a valid permit would constitute a violation of the *Export and Import Permits Act*, for which an exporter could face penalties or imprisonment following prosecution.

Please note that we have informed the Canada Border Services Agency of this suspension.

Best regards,

RE: re: updated information on what has shipped to date against L3 Wescam permits - as of Oct 2, 2020

From: "Anand, Shalini -TIE" <shalini.anand@international.gc.ca>
To: "Mawani, Aliya -MINA" <aliya.mawani@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *TFM-Policy <d-tfm-policy@international.gc.ca>, *USS-DMA Advisors <d-uss-dmaadvisors@international.gc.ca>, *DMT-Policy <d-dmt-policy@international.gc.ca>, *MINA-Dept Unit <d-mina-dept-unit@international.gc.ca>, "Funtek, Katharine -TID" <katharine.funtek@international.gc.ca>, "Gosselin, Catherine -TIR" <Catherine.gosselin@international.gc.ca>, "Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE" <joonhyuk.yoon@international.gc.ca>, "Alday, Corazon -TIE" <corazon.alday@international.gc.ca>, "Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE" <marieeve.roymarcoux@international.gc.ca>, "Schonfeld, Benjamin -TIR" <benjamin.schonfeld@international.gc.ca>, "Korecky, Judy -TIR" <judy.korecky@international.gc.ca>, "Senkiw, Jillian -TIR" <jillian.senkiw@international.gc.ca>, "Grant, Alison -ECE" <alison.grant@international.gc.ca>
Date: Fri, 02 Oct 2020 11:12:08 -0400
Attachments: L3WESCAM PERMITS TO TURKEY from Jan 1 2016 to Oct 11 2019 V6 (clean).docx (50.08 kB)

Dear Aliya:

Per the message below, and the oMINA briefing last night, attached please find the latest chart on the Jan 1 2016-Oct 11 2019 L3 Wescam permits to Turkey. This time period aligns with the allegations in the PP report and reflects the latest reporting on shipments that the company has input into our system.

Again, thanks to the team – especially Jo and Cora – for combing through these by hand.

Warmly,
S.

From: Anand, Shalini -TIE
Sent: October 1, 2020 1:01 PM
To: Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; Funtek, Katharine -TID <Katharine.Funtek@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>; Alday, Corazon -TIE <Corazon.Alday@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Schonfeld, Benjamin -TIR <Benjamin.Schonfeld@international.gc.ca>; Korecky, Judy -TIR <Judy.Korecky@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>
Subject: re: updated information on what has shipped to date against L3 Wescam permits

Hi Aliya:

Further to the charts that we previously provided oMINA on shipments of Wescam products against each of their valid Turkey permits, last night we have received the updated shipping details from the company against their existing valid permits in the system. It's cumbersome to go through each file, but we are doing so. As a starting point, we have updated the chart of the █ permits/PARs that were approved by MINA in May 2020. This chart now shows what has been shipped against each permit up to Sept 30, 2020, according to the latest company reporting from last night.

Warmly,
S.

Shalini Anand (Ms.)
 Director/Directrice
 Export Controls Operations Division/Direction des opérations des contrôles à l'exportation



REVISED VERSION: UPDATE ON POSSIBLE LINKAGES TO ALLEGED USE OF TURKISH DRONES IN CONFLICT ZONES

s.20(1)(c)

From: "Korecky, Judy -TIR" <judy.korecky@international.gc.ca>
To: *MINA-Dept Unit <d-mina-dept-unit@international.gc.ca>, "Mawani, Aliya -MINA" <aliya.mawani@international.gc.ca>
Cc: "Funtek, Katharine -TID" <katharine.funtek@international.gc.ca>, "Gosselin, Catherine -TIR" <catherine.gosselin@international.gc.ca>, "Anand, Shalini -TIE" <shalini.anand@international.gc.ca>, "Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE" <marieeve.roymarcoux@international.gc.ca>, "Senkiw, Jillian -TIR" <jillian.senkiw@international.gc.ca>, "Bastien, Jean-François -TIR" <jean-francois.bastien@international.gc.ca>, *DMT-Policy <d-dmt-policy@international.gc.ca>, *TFM-Policy <d-tfm-policy@international.gc.ca>, *USS-DMA Advisors <d-uss-dmaadvisors@international.gc.ca>, "Picard, Beatrix -TIR" <beatrix.picard@international.gc.ca>, "Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE" <joonhyuk.yoon@international.gc.ca>, "Pilloud, Marc -ECE" <marc.pilloud@international.gc.ca>, "Grant, Alison -ECE" <alison.grant@international.gc.ca>, "Coleman, Robert -ECE" <robert.coleman@international.gc.ca>, "Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE" <kamiliya.akkouche@international.gc.ca>, "Alday, Corazon -TIE" <corazon.alday@international.gc.ca>
Date: Thu, 01 Oct 2020 19:14:58 -0400

Hello o/MINA,

It has come to our attention that there is a error in the last paragraph of the Permit Analysis Section of the report sent yesterday, specifically with respect to the number of applications under review for end-use by the Azerbaijan Airforce. See correction immediately below:

There are presently [REDACTED] applications in EXCOL that are "under review" for Wescam camera systems going via Turkey [REDACTED] is the consignee) onwards to the Azerbaijan Airforce.

A revised copy of the report is below.

Judy

UNCLASSIFIED

POSSIBLE EXPORT PERMIT LINKAGES TO ALLEGED USE OF TURKISH DRONES IN CONFLICT ZONES

ISSUE

- There are media reports and allegations that Turkey has transferred or sold drones to the Azerbaijani armed forces, possibly with Canadian technology, that are being used in the recent flare-up of large-scale military attacks between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh. The Armenian National Committee of Canada alleges that Azerbaijan is using Turkish made Bayraktar TB2 drones.
- A recent report by Project Ploughshares claims that Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones allegedly used by the Turkish military in Syria and Libya may have been used in conjunction with sensors obtained from a Canadian company L3 Harris Wescam (Wescam).
- Officials are seeking to determine the veracity of these claims and to determine whether there are any potential export control issues.
- Canada's policy approach towards exports of Group 2 items to Turkey has not changed since April 2020.

Canadian Export Controls and Turkey

Canada has one of the strongest export controls systems in the world, and respect for human rights is enshrined in our export controls legislation.

In September 2019, Canada acceded to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and placed the ATT assessment criteria directly into Canadian law. Under the law, controlled goods and technology cannot be exported from Canada where there is a substantial risk that they could be used to commit or to facilitate serious violations of international humanitarian law, international human rights law, or serious acts of gender-based violence. Other criteria which would lead to a permit application denial include a substantial risk that the arms or munitions could be used to undermine peace and security or to further international organized crime or terrorism. Canada has one of the most robust legal applications of this Treaty in the world.

Until recently Turkey [REDACTED] in terms of Canada's export controls, given their membership

and adherence to the four multilateral export control regimes (i.e. the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Australia Group), as well as being a member of NATO and having effective export control mechanisms.

On October 11, 2019, in response to Turkey's military incursion into north-eastern Syria, the Government of Canada announced a temporary suspension on the issuance of all new permits for the export of controlled goods and technology to Turkey. Exporters who were issued permits for the export of such items to Turkey prior to October 11, 2019 may continue to export against those permits during their period of validity.

In April 2020, Canada significantly narrowed the scope of its policy to include only military goods and technology. While restrictions continue to apply to military exports to Turkey, during the permit review process Canada is considering whether there are exceptional circumstances, including but not limited to NATO cooperation programs, that might justify issuing an export permit for military items on a case-by-case basis.

The Government of Canada has stated that it continues to monitor developments in Turkey and the surrounding region, and will take appropriate action should credible evidence be found regarding the misuse of any controlled Canadian good or technology, including to commit or to facilitate serious violations of international human rights or humanitarian law.

Project Ploughshares Report

Project Ploughshares recently released a report entitled *Killer Optics: Exports of Wescam Sensors to Turkey – A Litmus Test of Canada's Compliance with the Arms Trade Treaty*. The report claims that a Canadian company L3 Harris Wescam (Wescam) exported a large number of Electro Optical/Infra-Red (EO/IR) imaging and targeting sensor systems that can be used for tracking targets and guiding munitions to the Turkish military in 2019, based on Statistics Canada data.

Project Ploughshares further alleges that the Turkish military has committed serious breaches of international humanitarian law (IHL) and other violations, particularly when conducting airstrikes, and that Wescam sensors, mounted on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), have been used extensively by Turkey in its recent military activities. Project Ploughshares asserts that Canada is therefore violating the ATT obligations by permitting exports of Wescam sensors.

The department notes that Turkish drones have been used in Turkey's military and security operations - both domestically and internationally - and they have both defensive and offensive capabilities, depending on how they are tasked. Notably, the TB2 UAV are always used for the purposes of observation, surveillance, identification and targeting of targets, but some versions of the TAI ANKA drones also carry weapons.

Turkey's justification of its cross-border military operations in Iraq and Syria relied heavily on an argument of national security related to the activities of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). While Canada does not always support Turkey's military actions - as was the case with Operation Peace Spring - like most of our like-minded counterparts we support the position that Turkey, a NATO ally, has legitimate security concerns, specifically related to the activities of the PKK which is a listed terrorist organization in Canada.

The Turkish military is, by-and-large, a professional army that acts in accordance with its international obligations. While Operations Olive Branch and Peace Spring both resulted in the displacement of civilians, there is no clear evidence that suggest a deliberate targeting of civilians or civilian infrastructure.

The Ploughshares report relies heavily on two UN reports ([9 August 2018](#) and [28 January 2020](#)), as well as an [Amnesty International Report](#) (Oct 2019), which itself relies primarily on accounts reported by the Kurdish Red Crescent (affiliated with the self-administration in the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria). The Kurdish Red Crescent is not formally affiliated with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). While we do not doubt KRC's credibility, their assessment should not be equated with an ICRC assessment.

The UN reports that list incidents in which civilians were killed as a result of Turkish military operations are limited to the two military operations (Olive Branch and Peace Spring) in which the Turkish side specifically targeted the Peoples Protection Unit (YPG) armed group - which they perceive to be the Syrian branch of the PKK. In these military operations, Turkey relied extensively on the Syrian armed opposition groups (SNA) to conduct the ground offensive. The department's initial assessment (in line with likeminded) is that the Turkish military did not/engage in the deliberate and purposeful targeting of civilians or civilian infrastructure.

In its May 2020 memorandum to the Minister, the department noted that there had been no substantiated evidence of the Turkish Armed Forces committing human rights violations in Syria, either in Idlib or northeast Syria during OPS. [REDACTED]

In Libya, since 2019 Turkey has provided weapons, drones, and reportedly over 16,500 Syrian mercenaries to Libya in support of Government of National Accord (GNA)-aligned forces, with which Turkey has a security agreement as of December 2019. A November 2019 UN Panel of Experts report on Libya found Turkey to be “routinely” in violation of UN sanctions on Libya related to arms, which were in force before the Turkey-GNA security agreement. A UN Panel of Experts report from December 2019 found that Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones, and possibly one Karayel drone, were exported to Libya for use by the GNA. While there have been unconfirmed reports that Turkish drones have killed civilians in Libya and thereby contributed to violations of IHL, there has been no conclusive evidence to-date that Turkey has committed violations of IHL in Libya. The United Nations and NGOs have very limited access to most of Libya due to ongoing conflict and instability, severely complicating the collection of evidence on alleged violations of international humanitarian law in Libya (e.g. testimonies, forensic evidence).

[REDACTED] A separate classified assessment has been shared with ministerial and deputies offices through normal channels.

Permit Analysis

[REDACTED] . A number of foreign competitors in the US, France, Italy, Israel and even in Turkey manufacture similar cameras / technologies that can be used in such UAVs. [REDACTED]

While it is known that some Bayraktar TB-2 UAVs possess [REDACTED] sensors due to its high quality, the proportion that do is not known. At this juncture, it would be impossible to credibly guess a percentage. We do not presently have the necessary information to make such an estimate, however officials are making best efforts to obtain information that would assist in this regard, [REDACTED]

Wescam has received permits from GAC for camera surveillance systems destined directly to Turkey (the main consignees in these instances are [REDACTED] both of which supply the Turkish government). None of the permits issued to Wescam for items destined to Turkey from January 1, 2016 to September 27, 2020 indicate an end use in Libya, Azerbaijan or Armenia. Information related to current valid previously issued permits to Turkey is provided in the attached tables.

There appear to be no applications, nor any valid permits in EXCOL for L3 Wescam items destined directly to Libya, Azerbaijan or Armenia.

There are presently [REDACTED] applications in EXCOL that are “under review” for Wescam camera systems going via Turkey ([REDACTED] is the consignee) onwards to the Azerbaijan Airforce. These applications are currently under consultation.

Recent Interactions with [REDACTED]

Positions of Like-Minded Countries

The attached Annex sets out an up to date comparative chart on the position of key partner countries’ controls over strategic exports to Turkey, as well their relative commercial exposure.

Although most of our like-minded imposed exports restrictions on Turkey following the October 2019 incursion into Syria, Canada's decision to immediately suspend all new export permits to Turkey went beyond our like-minded and immediately became a bilateral irritant with Turkey. Since Canada updated its exports control policy in April to only restrict Group 2 permits, its approach appears to be most closely aligned with the more restrictive of EU members, who are either not issuing permits for any military items or only for military items who are either not issuing permits for any military items to Turkey or not issuing permits for military items to Turkey for end use in Syria, for military use or other uses. [REDACTED] have placed no restrictions on military exports to Turkey, which they are assessing on a case-by-case basis.

Next Steps

The Department is pursuing a wide range of steps in order to ascertain more information and proactively monitor the situation closely.

The Department could consider a number of different steps from an export controls perspective, depending on the additional information that becomes available.

[REDACTED]

Given the new outbreak in violence over Nagorno-Karabakh, Canada's Ambassador to Turkey raised our concerns about alleged use of Turkish drones equipped with Canadian technology with the Turkish MFA Head of Americas (ADM-eq) on September 29. This conversation will continue with Turkey to reaffirm our export controls regime and seek assurances about end use.

[REDACTED]

In the interim, officials continue to engage with DND and allies, as well as with GAC's legal bureau to gather information related to allegations in Syria, Canada's ATT obligations, and Canada's arms embargo to Libya.

The Embassy in Ankara, including our DND Defence Attaché, continues to engage local government, likeminded countries, and other key stakeholders, including civil society, as well as frequently monitor social media and NGO reporting.

The Department's Intelligence Bureau (IND) has prepared a detailed assessment, which will be shared separately due to its classification. IND will continue to monitor intelligence reporting and will continue to provide detailed and tailored intelligence assessments working with key Canadian and FVEY intelligence partners.

The Export Controls Bureau remains in close contact with [REDACTED], and is awaiting further information from the company.

Author's name/division or mission/tel.: Korecky/TIR/613-291-0347

Approval bureau/mission: TFMA

Consulted divisions: TIE/ECE/JLT/JLH/INA

From: Korecky, Judy -TIR

Sent: September-30-20 5:31 PM

To: Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Catherine Gosselin (Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca) <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; Picard, Beatrix -TIR <Beatrix.Picard@international.gc.ca>

Subject: FW: UPDATE ON POSSIBLE LINKAGES TO ALLEGED USE OF TURKISH DRONES IN CONFLICT ZONES

Hi Aliya,

Further to a quick discussion with Guy Boileau, I am sending to you a slightly revised version of the Sitrep document that provides additional context on one point. For awareness, the insertion is in italics below.

While it is known that some Bayraktar TB-2 UAVs possess [REDACTED] sensors due to its high quality, the proportion that do is not known. At this juncture it would be impossible to credibly guess a percentage. We do not presently have the necessary information to make such an estimate, however officials are making best efforts to obtain information that would assist in this regard, i [REDACTED]

I will share the revised version of this document with consultees and other interested parties in a separate email.

Judy

From: Korecky, Judy -TIR
Sent: September-30-20 5:01 PM
To: Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: UPDATE ON POSSIBLE LINKAGES TO ALLEGED USE OF TURKISH DRONES IN CONFLICT ZONES

Hi Aliya and Catherine,

Attached find a clean version without the "draft" watermark. Is it sufficient to send it to you in this manner?

Judy

From: Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>
Sent: September-30-20 4:37 PM
To: Korecky, Judy -TIR <Judy.Korecky@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: UPDATE ON POSSIBLE LINKAGES TO ALLEGED USE OF TURKISH DRONES IN CONFLICT ZONES

Hi Judy,

Aliya just called to ask whether you would be able to remove the "draft" watermark from the document as she isn't able to do that at her end. I also tried and wasn't able to remove it. Strange, no?

Thank you!

Catherine
613.410.6521

From: Korecky, Judy -TIR <Judy.Korecky@international.gc.ca>
Sent: September-30-20 3:53 PM
To: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; McCardell, Sandra -EGM <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Anderson, Ian -EGM <Ian.Anderson@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Brisson, Julien -ECE <Julien.Brisson@international.gc.ca>; Nelson, David -IGR <David.Nelson@international.gc.ca>; Termorshuizen, Cindy -IGD <Cindy.Termorshuizen@international.gc.ca>; Friele, Shawn -IFM <Shawn.Friele@international.gc.ca>; Funtek, Katharine -TID <Katharine.Funtek@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE <Kamiliya.Akkouche@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Picard, Beatrix -TIR <Beatrix.Picard@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; Hughes, Steven -INA <Steven.Hughes@international.gc.ca>; Jones, Paul -INA <Paul.Jones@international.gc.ca>; Pilloud, Marc -ECE <Marc.Pilloud@international.gc.ca>; Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE <Kamiliya.Akkouche@international.gc.ca>; Brisson, Julien -ECE <Julien.Brisson@international.gc.ca>; Netley, Rebecca -JLH <Rebecca.Netley@international.gc.ca>; Thompson, Kevin -JLTA <Kevin.Thompson@international.gc.ca>; Fetz, Thomas -JLH <Thomas.Fetz@international.gc.ca>; Utting, Elizabeth -JLH <Elizabeth.Utting@international.gc.ca>; St-Pierre, Nicolas -JFM <Nicolas.St-Pierre@international.gc.ca>; Amegan, Karim -JLH <Karim.Amegan@international.gc.ca>; LaTorre, Jason -DMT <Jason.LaTorre@international.gc.ca>; Farid, Sohrab -DMA -USS <Sohrab.Farid@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INA <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Gagnon, Felix -JLTA <Felix.Gagnon@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>
Subject: UPDATE ON POSSIBLE LINKAGES TO ALLEGED USE OF TURKISH DRONES IN CONFLICT ZONES

Good afternoon o/MINA,

Attached please find a Situational Update Report with annexes to provide an update on possible linkages to alleged use of Turkish drones with Canadian sensors in conflict zones. This document has been widely consulted within the department.

Judy

Judy Korecky

Deputy Director, Export Controls Policy Division | Directrice adjointe, Direction de la politique en matière des contrôles à l'exportation

judy.korecky@international.gc.ca

Telephone | Téléphone: 343-203-4332

125 rue Sussex Drive, Ottawa K1A 0G2

Global Affairs Canada | Affaires mondiales Canada

Government of Canada | Gouvernement du Canada



Re: Export Controls Pipeline Report 03 April 2020

From: "Mawani, Aliya -MINA" <aliya.mawani@international.gc.ca>
To: "Anand, Shalini -TIE" <shalini.anand@international.gc.ca>
Cc: "MINA-Dept Unit <d-mina-dept-unit@international.gc.ca>, "TFM-Policy <d-tfm-policy@international.gc.ca>, "DMT-Policy <d-dmt-policy@international.gc.ca>, "USS-DMA Advisors <d-uss-dmaadvisors@international.gc.ca>, "Funtek, Katharine -TID" <katharine.funtek@international.gc.ca>
Date: Sat, 04 Apr 2020 22:27:42 -0400

Thank you Shalini. This has been shared with o/MINA.

Aliya

Sent from my iPhone

On Apr 4, 2020, at 9:38 PM, Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca> wrote:

EXPORT CONTROLS PIPELINE REPORT

As per the attached agreement between OMINA/COS/Deschamps-Laporte and TFM/Verheul, all permits in the attached annexes will be issued 48 hours from the end of the Tuesday briefing with oMINA on export controls, with the exception of specific permits about which OMINA has signalled that it may have questions.

There are 120 export permit applications deemed ready for issuance for a total value of [REDACTED]

- Annex A: Contains 42 low-risk applications [REDACTED] or: temporary export (e.g. exhibition/demonstration); repairs and returns; and exports [REDACTED]. In the latter situation, we rely on the rigour of the export controls regimes of the likeminded countries. Annex A also contains multi-destinations permit applications for items containing cryptographic components.
- Annex B: Contains 33 low-risk applications [REDACTED] for items destined for regions that typically do not raise concerns.
- Annex C: Contains 8 low-risk applications [REDACTED] for items going to regions, which have in the past raised questions, including items destined for [REDACTED]
- Annex D: As requested by oMINA, this annex Contains 19 low-risk applications [REDACTED] for items going to Turkey deemed ready for issuance, pending a policy decision on Turkey memo BPTS: 3767-2019.
- Annex E: Contains 18 low risk applications [REDACTED] that were previously shared in pipelines, on which MINA/oMINA had questions. Given the exceptional circumstances in which we are working, we are sending these again for ease of reference. In the event that there are no further questions on these, we will issue them per the timelines noted above. If there are further questions, please advise and the Department will send them to the Minister under cover of a memo.

Katharine Funtek
Director General
Trade and Export Controls Bureau

TR: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

From: "Lafontaine, Annie -MINA" <annie.lafontaine@international.gc.ca>
To: "Anand, Shalini -TID" <shalini.anand@international.gc.ca>
Cc: "DMT-Policy <d-dmt-policy@international.gc.ca>", "USS-DMA Advisors <d-uss-dmaadvisors@international.gc.ca>", "MINA-Dept Unit <d-mina-dept-unit@international.gc.ca>
Date: Mon, 26 Oct 2020 20:30:13 -0400

Hi Shalini

I am on call tonight for the MINA DLU and wanted to let you know that Allison Chick would like to discuss some of these pieces with you at the top of your meeting tomorrow. Highlighted pieces below specifically.

Thank you
 Annie

De : Khokhar, Jamal -ANKRA -HOM/CDM

Envoyé : 26 octobre 2020 06:56

À : Sproule, David -ECD ; Grant, Alison -ECE ; Boileau, Guy -DMT ; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR

Cc : McCardell, Sandra -EGM ; Christie, Bruce -TFMA ; Turner, Andrew -ECE ; Helal, Marie-Thérèse -IRC ; Schoenauer, Andrea -ANKRA -GR ; Braithwaite, Todd -ANKRA -DR ; Graham, Molly -EGM ; Mawani, Aliya -MINA ; Anand, Shalini -TID ; Mishra, Rachna -ELB ; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE ; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR ; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR ; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR ; Yendall, Jonathan -INP ; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN ; *USS-DMA Advisors ; *MINA-Dept Unit ; *DMT-Policy ; *TFM-Policy

Objet : Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Importance : Haute

MFA DG Americas (ADM equivalent) and I were finally able to speak after a short delay due to a Covid incidence in his family.

This message refers to MFA's views on the proposed [REDACTED] talks related to the use of Turkish made drones featuring Canadian-made components in N-K. A separate message will follow on general bilateral engagement.

Summary:

The type of [REDACTED] conversation we were hoping to have in short order will likely not precede having the fuller briefing on our export permits regime and approvals framework which Canada had proposed. Such a briefing was last discussed as recently as August.

MFA would hope that such a briefing to address our position on the question of end-user limitations as well as our views on the ATT.

Report:

DG Americas correctly noted MFA's understanding that 'we were supposed to have a briefing on your export permit regime, the technical and political drivers and priorities, and how the approvals process functioned'. The last discussions within GAC on such a briefing was in August.

He hoped that any additional conversation on export controls to be broader than [REDACTED] and could also include 'representatives of our respective defence industries, in addition to government officials.

While understanding their expectation for a briefing on Canada's export control regime, I underscored that Canada adheres to its ATT obligations and is concerned with the use of Canadian technologies in the N-K theatre. And, that it was important to have a clear understanding as to where Turkish-built UAVs with Canadian technology have been and are currently being employed in operations as well as end-users of Turkish-built UAVs with Canadian technology.

He referenced the assumption that this question was for N-K, and not necessarily for Libya or northern Syria, for example.

The DG did say that there might be a difference of understanding on end-use provisions versus violations of ATT and if we could clarify specifically our end-user limitations.

He reconfirmed our understanding that it was unlikely for Turkey to be able to share, in the short term, the information requested by our DND due to operational sensitivities.

Rather, he suggested a good place to start would be following through with our proposed briefing.

Meanwhile, he asked that we forward to the MFA the request for [REDACTED] consultations in writing, with our specific questions, and concerns – i.e., technical and political violations.

I re-confirmed that our DA had already forwarded 4 lines of inquiry to his MOD contacts, but that I would forward those to him for follow-

up.

ECE/TIR Next Steps:

Questions will likely continue on our export controls regime and approvals framework – and clarifying our end user requirements/guidelines as well as reviewing obligations under ATT. The recently announced proposed sale of Turkish drones to Ukraine could raise additional points.

With that, and in the absence of [REDACTED] talks, over the short-term, there would be much to be gained through following through with the planned briefing.

As follow-on, a consultation involving the participation of defence industry participants may indeed be useful.

PS: If a [REDACTED] conversation were still deemed to still be a priority, then given [REDACTED] with [REDACTED] a call between the two would signal the importance to Canada and our very real concerns -- even if it were unlikely to get us much further on that front.

Jamal

From: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 26, 2020 2:54 AM
To: Khokhar, Jamal -ANKRA -HOM/CDM <Jamal.Khokhar@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE <Kamiliya.Akkouche@international.gc.ca>; Helal, Marie-Thérèse -IRC <Marie-Therese.Helal@international.gc.ca>
Subject: Fwd: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Jamal, MT - see chain below.

ECD is speaking to Amb Uras tomorrow. Please let us know if you get a response from MFA to your letter.

Thanks

Alison

Director, Eastern Europe and Eurasia
 Cell: 613-462-2747

Begin forwarded message:

From: "El Kabiri, Reda -MINA" <Reda.ElKabiri@international.gc.ca>
Date: October 25, 2020 at 7:22:09 PM EDT
To: "Grant, Alison -ECE" <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>, "Boileau, Guy -DMT" <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>, "Hamilton, Kevin -IGR" <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>
Cc: "McLaughlin, Emily -MINA" <Emily.McLaughlin@international.gc.ca>, "Mawani, Aliya -MINA" <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>, "Turner, Andrew -ECE" <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>, "Anand, Shalini -TID" <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>, "Yendall, Jonathan -INP" <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>, "Mishra, Rachna -ELB" <Rachna.Mishra@international.gc.ca>, "Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE" <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>, "Gosselin, Catherine -TIR" <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>, "Senkiw, Jillian -TIR" <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>, "Bastien, Jean-François -TIR" <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>, *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>, "Sproule, David -ECD" <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>, "Carrière, Sébastien -IGN" <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>, *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>, *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>, *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>, "McCardell, Sandra -EGM" <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>, "Christie, Bruce -TFMA" <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Hi again! This is probably already in your plans but I just wanted to flag that o/MINA expressed a strong interest in obtaining timely readouts of the scheduled phone call between ECD and Turkish HOM, as well as ANKRA HOM outreach with senior levels at the MFA.

Merci beaucoup,
 Reda (on call for MINA-DLU)
 Mobile: 613-404-7244

From: El Kabiri, Reda -MINA
Sent: October 25, 2020 1:48 PM
To: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>
Cc: McLaughlin, Emily -MINA <Emily.McLaughlin@international.gc.ca>; Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TID <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Mishra, Rachna -ELB <Rachna.Mishra@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; McCardell, Sandra -EGM <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Absolutely thank you Alison. This is why we expect this may need to happen in a secure room given the nature of discussions. Aliya will be picking this one tomorrow for the DLU.

Reda (on call for MINA-DLU)
 Mobile: 613-404-7244

From: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 25, 2020 1:43 PM
To: El Kabiri, Reda -MINA <Reda.ElKabiri@international.gc.ca>; Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>
Cc: McLaughlin, Emily -MINA <Emily.McLaughlin@international.gc.ca>; Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TID <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Mishra, Rachna -ELB <Rachna.Mishra@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; McCardell, Sandra -EGM <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Reda – we will respond tomorrow. To be clear this seems to be a follow up on the question of Turkey's response to the consultations.

Alison

From: El Kabiri, Reda -MINA <Reda.ElKabiri@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 25, 2020 10:21 AM
To: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>
Cc: McLaughlin, Emily -MINA <Emily.McLaughlin@international.gc.ca>; Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TID <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Mishra, Rachna -ELB <Rachna.Mishra@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; McCardell, Sandra -EGM <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Bonjour,

Apologies for this Sunday email (this can wait Monday morning). o/MINA would be keen to get a status update on this

investigation.

Should you believe that the update will have to be in a secure room, o/MINA exempt is willing to come in person so please let us know and the MINA-DLU will send invitations for a meeting in secure room. If an email (or encrypted email) would be enough considering the information you will be sharing tomorrow, we would be grateful to obtain the update tomorrow as soon as deemed possible.

Many thanks!!

Reda (on call for MINA-DLU)

Mobile: 613-404-7244

From: McLaughlin, Emily -MINA <Emily.McLaughlin@international.gc.ca>

Sent: October 21, 2020 8:30 PM

To: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Mishra, Rachna -ELB <Rachna.Mishra@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE

<MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>;

*TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>;

*MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; McCardell, Sandra -EGM <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Merci Guy (and others).

Shared with oMINA.

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>

Sent: October 21, 2020 8:16 PM

To: McLaughlin, Emily -MINA <Emily.McLaughlin@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Mishra, Rachna -ELB <Rachna.Mishra@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE

<MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>;

*TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>;

*MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; McCardell, Sandra -EGM <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Hi Emily – DMT agrees with the recommendation outlined in Alison’s message.

Gtg to oMINA.

GuyB.

From: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>

Sent: October 21, 2020 7:00 PM

To: Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>; Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Mishra, Rachna -ELB <Rachna.Mishra@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR

<Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD

<David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>;

McCardell, Sandra -EGM <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>

Subject: Re: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

My recommendation is that we wait to see how HOM and our entreaties here to Turkish Embassy have an impact. I raised this today with Turkish DHOM and emphasized that [REDACTED] engagement is required and will help move this file forward. HOM is likewise connecting with MFA counterparts in Ankara with same message and also welcoming President Erdogan's offer to provide information, expressed in his call with our PM on Friday. That information could be conveyed through these [REDACTED] channels. Let's reassess within several days if we don't see progress.

Alison

Director, Eastern Europe and Eurasia
Cell: 613-462-2747

On Oct 21, 2020, at 6:53 PM, Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca> wrote:

Aliya:

Just to be clear and make sure oMINA understands: We are not having any problems *connecting with the Turkish military, as such. Our contacts with them are deep and varied. [REDACTED]

But, on that point, perhaps others will have ideas on how oMINA might be of help in persuading Turkish officials to be a bit more forthcoming...

KH

From: Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>
Sent: Wednesday, October 21, 2020 4:46 PM
To: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Mishra, Rachna -ELB <Rachna.Mishra@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; McCardell, Sandra -EGM <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Dear All,

Thanks very much for putting together this useful update.

O/MINA noted the repeated outreach attempts to the Turkish military and is asking if the department assesses that MINA/their office could assist in making the defence connection – or if there are other ways in which they could be helpful?

Grateful for your views. Thanks,

Aliya

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 20, 2020 4:24 PM
To: Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Mishra, Rachna -ELB <Rachna.Mishra@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Colleagues: DMT has approved the report and it is now being shared with oMINA (pasted below). Thank you, once again. As updates become available, thank you in advance for keeping us posted so that DMT/USS and oMINA have the very latest.
GuyB.

- ANKRA Defence Attaché has made several attempts to outreach to the Turkish military. A detailed response is not expected any time soon. ANKRA HOM will engage with the Turkish MFA to emphasize the importance of the [REDACTED] talks to moving this issue forward.
- While it is impossible to independently verify the situation on the ground (OSCE monitoring suspended for months due to COVID), INA will continue to report on all latest intelligence. The latest footage of downed drones (if genuine) certainly appears to show a TB-2 UAV with [REDACTED] on board.
- The Department is following up with other countries that may be supplying drone parts/technology to Turkey and Azerbaijan to gather additional information, including [REDACTED]. ANKRA Defence Attache indicates that his contacts report that [REDACTED] has suspended any UAV-related exports (they are still providing though spare parts and components to support [REDACTED]). While [REDACTED] has yet to respond, it seems that [REDACTED] are used in Turkish drones, however they are not a controlled item/defence item/dual-use item.
- If no further intelligence becomes available, the Department may contact the company for its input and assessment of the video.
- JLTA along with PER and the relevant Geographic Divisions are assessing the situation as it pertains to Turkish drones in Libya.
- All consultation partners have advised that for the time being they have no further intel/info to suggest that we should consider suspending any additional permits that are still valid to Turkey.
- GAC and OGDs are working on a review of the situation on the suspended permits in question, with a view to providing MINA consolidated advice on options/next steps.
- WRT to the [REDACTED] the companies had already shipped items against those permits, so there is no urgent action required.

From: Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 20, 2020 2:02 PM
To: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Hello Guy,

Please find below a report on the current situation as well as the updated version of the Critical Path. Please let us know if you have any questions.

Andrew

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s.23

- ANKRA Defence Attache has initiated outreach to Turkish military, but has yet to receive a response. ANKRA HOM will engage with the Turkish MFA to emphasize the importance of the [REDACTED] talks to moving this issue forward.
- While it is impossible to independently verify the situation on the ground (OSCE monitoring suspended for months due to COVID), INA will continue to report on all latest intelligence. The latest footage of downed drones (if genuine) certainly appears to show a TB-2 UAV with [REDACTED] on board.
- The Department is following up with other countries that may be supplying drone parts/technology to Turkey and Azerbaijan to gather additional information, including [REDACTED]. ANKRA Defence Attache indicates that his contacts report that [REDACTED] has suspended any UAV-related exports (they are still providing though spare parts and components to support [REDACTED]). While [REDACTED] has yet to respond, it seems that [REDACTED] are used in Turkish drones, however they are not a controlled item/defence item/dual-use item.
- If no further intelligence becomes available, the Department may contact the company for its input and assessment of the video.
- JLTA along with PER and the relevant Geographic Divisions are assessing the situation as it pertains to Turkish drones in Libya.
- All consultation partners have advised that for the time being they have no further intel/info to suggest that we should consider suspending any additional permits that are still valid to Turkey.
- GAC and OGDs are working on a review of the situation and the suspended permits in question, with a view to providing MINA consolidated advice on options/next steps.
- WRT to the [REDACTED] the companies had already shipped items against those permits, so there is no urgent action required.

Follow-up to MINA briefing on Turkish drones – Next steps

Immediate Actions:


- 1) [REDACTED] for controlled goods and inform companies (after letters are vetted by legal and green-lit by oMINA) – done
- 2) Send question to Minister on likewise [REDACTED] for controlled goods, to suspend Canadian exports of controlled goods to conflict zone – done

Actions on Monday:

- 1) Engagement with Turkey.
- **Recommendation to MINA:** That outreach to Turkey be done by MINA to his counterpart on Monday, given their good personal relationship, their recent discussion on exports, and to seek Turkey's views on regional events (Nagorno-Karabakh, Eastern Mediterranean). Guidance from MINA requested this weekend – TPs would be prepared this weekend if MINA agrees. - done
- If not MINA, a diplomatic demarche will be done by EGM/Sandra McCardell to the Turkish Ambassador in Ottawa as early as possible on Monday. – done
- Given the serious impact that suspending these permits, and making a statement about it, will have on our relations with Turkey, it is important that engagement with Turkey happen prior to any press announcement. There are [REDACTED] valid L3 Wescam permits valued at over [REDACTED] that the Minister is seeking to suspend. - done
- 2) Officials (IFM) requests that DND hold consultations with Turkish military on end use of UAVs with Canadian L3 Wescam technology (possibly via their Defence Attaché in Ankara) – requested and following up
- 3) Officials (TIE) informs L3 Wescam about the suspension, and suspension to be undertaken in system. - done
- 4) Communications released on suspensions.
- There are likely issues of commercial confidentiality in releasing a statement referring to a specific product or company. There are also concerns about the negative impact a statement referring to Turkey will have on our bilateral relationship. The communications product will be drafted with these concerns in mind. - done

Other actions:

- 1) Officials (ECE) request to ANKRA to reach out to both [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] counterparts to confirm with confidence existence of their components on Turkish UAVs – done and waiting for [REDACTED] reply
- 2) Officials (TIE) to re-send L3 Turkey permits that are under review to consultation partners to allow for further input, given change in circumstances. - done
- 3) [REDACTED]

- 4) Officials (TIE) to provide more information to respond to MINA question about intelligence on export permits after they are shipped (supported by IND) – following up
- 5) 

From: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>
Sent: Tuesday, October 20, 2020 1:45 PM
To: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Guy – this is coming very shortly, apologies for delay in pulling together the points, we have all been in different meetings.

Alison

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 20, 2020 12:50 PM
To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Thanks Shalini, what is requested is one report to oMINA on Azerbaijan so your input yesterday should be captured in the one consolidated report being requested. I should have mentioned as well DMT's specific point about "there were to have been contacts through the military and also either other possible suppliers: eg



Kevin, Jonathan, Alison, assume this is being compiled and we'll be able to receive soon today?

With thanks

From: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 20, 2020 12:44 PM
To: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Policy@international.gc.ca; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Guy, I will let I-branch colleagues respond to your two points below, as they are leading on intel reporting.

TIE's input from yesterday remains the same, which I think addresses the first question to a degree. For item 2, I am coordinating with the i-branch, and if needed, TIE will reach out to the company to support efforts to validate whether the picture/video in the tweet shows L3 wescam items.

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 20, 2020 12:37 PM
To: Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Colleagues – a quick follow-up on this request for one consolidated report re Azerbaijan covering: 1) whether we have any intel the issue of military goods destined to Turkey that may be in Azerbaijan; and 2) the tweet that MINA sent to DMT last night (immediately below).

Can we expect the report within the next hour in DMOs?
With thanks
GuyB.

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT
Sent: October 19, 2020 9:38 PM
To: Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INA <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Colleagues, with apologies for another message this evening, in addition to the requested information below, DMT has requested that the report also provide what we know (and not know yet and what we are doing to find out) about the air defense units of the Artsakh Defense Army shooting down Azerbaijan UAVs. See tweet below MINA just sent to DMT about this.

Thank you once again for the consolidate report by Noon tomorrow for DMT approval.

<< File: IMG_5681.png >>

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT
Sent: October 19, 2020 8:03 PM
To: Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE

<Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INA <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Glad to see that everyone that should be copied now are (including oUSS who I am now copying).

I will kindly ask I-E-T Branches to pls coordinate one response/report for tomorrow by Noon on our efforts thus far, and next steps, after which we will seek DMT approval, and then submit to oMINA.
 With thanks to everyone
 GuyB.

From: Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 19, 2020 7:53 PM
To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INA <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Looping in INA on the question of intel gathering and assessment (see highlighted line below). I will let INA reply, but my understanding is that an assessment has been made, high side, specific to likelihood of UAVs from Turkey being used by Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Regarding ██████████ contacts, the CDA in ANKRA submitted a Note Verbale to the Turkish MoD on 9 October, requesting a meeting on a urgent basis. The NV specified that we are seeking specific information on the possible re-export of UAV components by Turkey to Azerbaijan, pursuant to reports in the Turkish media and MINA's decision to suspend specific export permits. We equipped the CDA with detailed background to aid him in his demarche. The CDA has made three follow up enquiries (Thursday, Friday and today).). Last week he was told that the Turkish Armed Forces were gathering the responses to his questions, and that he would be called for a meeting when they were in a position to reply. Today, however, he was informed that this is "a very sensitive topic" and that a response or invitation for a meeting will "not be for a while."

It bears noting that the Turks are unlikely to be easily motivated to cooperate with us at this time, when it comes to information sharing on this file. We can continue to push, but a timely and detailed response through the Turkish Armed Forces / MoD is probably more than we can hope for at this point.

KH

From: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>
Sent: Monday, October 19, 2020 7:21 PM
To: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Absolutely, looping in Kevin, David and Alison in I-branch and E-branch, respectively, both of DMT's questions/issues fall to their teams (I inadvertently didn't include them in my last message – I've been having outlook issues).

What I recall from an Ibranch update is that the DA in Turkey tried to set up a demarche, but has not had any success. That said, I understand that the DA has been reaching out to likeminded countries to determine how they are treating exports to Turkey linked to UAVs. Kevin Hamilton will have to confirm and will be better placed to respond to your two messages below.

I will add that all of this will feed into the memo and analysis noted under bullet four below, which the T-branch is leading on, with considerable input from DND, I branch and E-branch.

Hope this helps a little.

Warmly,
S.

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 19, 2020 6:37 PM
To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Sorry for the second message, DMT just wrote to me saying: "There were to have been contacts through the military and also either other possible suppliers: eg [REDACTED]
 Pls let me know about bringing back-in E Branch and I Branch (and I forgot, oUSS as well).

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT
Sent: October 19, 2020 6:35 PM
To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Hi Shalini, thank you for this. It has been shared with DMT. In the meantime, it is my understanding that there's been some correspondence bw MINA and Turkey as to whether we have any intel the issue of military goods destined to Turkey that may be in Azerbaijan. DMT has asked for a report to be submitted to oMINA tomorrow on this, noting specifically who is working on intel gathering, what we know and don't know. I note that in your reply that E-Branch was removed. Grateful if you can let me know whether you prefer looping-in E Branch (and I Branch) or whether you prefer that I reply all to this message and include both Branches. What you provided below is form a significant part of the report but would need to know if there's been any work on this by E and I Branches and our Post and what we have heard thus far (and next steps).

With thanks
GuyB.

From: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 19, 2020 10:40 AM
To: *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Subject: FW: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Dear Guy:

Further to the exchange below, here is a brief update for DMT/oDMT awareness.

- We have twice circulated the list of all valid/not expired export permits to Turkey to our consultation partners and asked them to review with a critical lens, and advise whether they have intel/info to

- suggest that we should consider suspending any additional permits.
- To date, they have all come back and indicated that they do not have further intel/info that suggest that we need to suspend additional permits to Turkey at this time.
 - They now have this list and will advise us if they get intel/info that changes this recommendation. (oMINA is aware)
 - WRT to the suspended permits for L3 Wescam, T-branch is working across GAC/government on a review of the situation and the permits in question, with a view to providing MINA consolidated advice on options/next steps.
 - WRT to the [REDACTED] the companies had already shipped items against those permits, so there is no urgent action required. oMINA is aware.

Let me know if any further info is required on our approach.

Warmly,
S.

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT
Sent: October 8, 2020 12:21 PM
To: Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>; Coleman, Robert -ECE <Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions

Salut Marie-Eve and team, just a quick follow-up to the message below. Do you think a response by end of day would be feasible?

With thanks
GuyB.

From: Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 6, 2020 5:23 PM
To: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>; Coleman, Robert -ECE <Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions

And TIR/Bastien

From: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 6, 2020 5:19 PM
To: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>; Coleman, Robert -ECE <Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions

Looping in ECE/Coleman.

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 6, 2020 5:18 PM
To: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions

Salut Marie-Eve: As you saw, DMT has approved the analysis and it is now being shared with oMINA.

DMT has asked whether now we can verify if we have any reason to believe that any of the military goods to Turkey might be in Azerbaijan? DMT specifically referenced, for example, the UAV engines for instance in Group 2-10.

With thanks

From: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 6, 2020 4:18 PM
To: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>
Subject: FW: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions

Bonjour Guy,

Tel que discuté, voici les réponses avec les changements demandés.

Laisse-moi savoir si tu as des question ou commentaires.

Marie Eve

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 5, 2020 7:55 PM
To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>
Subject: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions

Hi Shalini and Marie-Eve, with apologies for the eventing message, DMT just received a call from MINA re Turkey. We have been asked for the following analysis by Noon tomorrow please:


1. Summary of the kind of goods in the Group 2 list of valid permits to Turkey that was submitted to oMINA today. If we could draw-out the kind of goods included in the attached table you produced that would be grateful (e.g. DMT asked as an example whether it included riffles).

Turkey is a significant purchaser of Canadian controlled goods and technology. Various Canadian companies are involved at various stages in the supply and provision of systems, subsystems, parts and components of a diverse range of military programs. These can be categorized into the following:

- Parts, components, and accessories for [REDACTED]
- Parts, components, avionics and other accessories for various aircraft platforms made in other countries, including [REDACTED] as well as the [REDACTED]
- Flight simulators, and their corresponding parts, components and technical data
- Parts, components, subsystems and their corresponding technical data and assistance related to the development of Turkish satellites (including military satellites)
- Parts, components and subsystems (including GPS anti-jam devices) to be integrated into various bombs, missiles, rockets and other ordnances
- Parts, components and technical data to be integrated into various armoured vehicles [REDACTED]
- Technical data and assistance for the development of [REDACTED]
- Production tools and machines for the manufacturing of ammunition and cartridges of various calibres
- Riflescopes, sights and their corresponding parts and components
- Rocket motors and other components for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)
- Electro-Optical and Infrared systems to be incorporated into various aerial platforms (including UAVs)
- Naval equipment (including cables and arresting harness for helicopter retrieval system, sonobuoys, various modules, etc.) to be integrated into warships and other naval platforms.
- Technical data and assistance related to the development and construction of a wind tunnel (to test aircraft and missiles)
- IED disruptors, as well as protective equipment for military personnel

Here is the list of valid (and suspended) Group 2 permits to Turkey, with the changes requested:
 << File: Group 2 items to Turkey (including MDPs) v.1 (003).docx >>

- Since 2016 (pre and post 2019 period), number of Wescam cameras that have been shipped and number of Wescam cameras that have not/not yet been shipped. Understand this may be challenging given return and repair. If exact number is not feasible, a solid estimate would be grateful with accompanying caveats. Total number of Wescam cameras exported to Turkey since 2016, and cameras not yet exported



Notes:

- The numbers above are only for Wescam complete surveillance systems and does not include parts and components of the surveillance systems.
- Exported cameras cover exports since 2016 (pre and post 2019 exports).
- The “not exported” figures pertain only to the [REDACTED] Wescam valid permits (now suspended) as they could still be exported should the suspension be lifted.
- * This is the number of cameras the exporter would be allowed to export under their permits. This number could represent cameras ready to be exported and cameras under production or not yet produced. The permit suspension prevents the exporter from exporting these cameras.
- ** This represents the number of repaired cameras that would be allowed to be exported. Our system does not allow us to determine whether these cameras are in Canada or still with the end user. The permit suspension prevents these cameras from being exported. It is unlikely that the end-user would send the cameras in its possession for repairs in Canada during the suspension given that they would be unable to have their cameras back.

- Grateful if we could receive a profile of the type of Canadian exports of military goods to Turkey over the last 5 years, (e.g. whether we have shipped any LAVs to Turkey).
 << File: Military Exports to Turkey 2019-2014.docx >>

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to let me know.

Guy R. Boileau
 Deputy Director | Directeur adjoint
 Office of the Deputy Minister of International Trade | Cabinet du Sous-ministre du Commerce international
guy.boileau@international.gc.ca
 Tel. 343-203-5965
 Global Affairs Canada | Affaires mondiales Canada
 Government of Canada | Gouvernement du Canada
 << OLE Object: Picture (Device Independent Bitmap) >>

Turkey Group 2 PARs

From: "Anand, Shalini -TIE" </o=dfait-maeci/ou=exchange administrative group (fydibohf23spdlt)/cn=recipients/cn=anands2a9e">
To: *MINA-Dept Unit <d-mina-dept-unit@international.gc.ca>
Cc: "Funtek, Katharine -TID" <katharine.funtek@international.gc.ca>, *TFM-Policy <d-tfm-policy@international.gc.ca>, *DMT-Policy <d-dmt-policy@international.gc.ca>, *USS-DMA Advisors <d-uss-dmaadvisors@international.gc.ca>
Date: Thu, 09 Jul 2020 11:32:52 -0400
Attachments: Annex D to the pipeline report for June 26, 2020.docx (37.96 kB)

Dear Aliya:

I'm attaching the 3 export permit amendment requests (PARs) for Group 2 items to Turkey. We sent these originally via the June 26 pipeline (and flagged it in the cover note) for consideration for approval two reasons: 1) because these are PARs (i.e. amendments to existing permits), not full permits, and 2) this is primarily an administrative request by the company to change the company name on the permit on account of a merger/acquisition. Please note that the company has also requested an extension of the validity of the permits to compensate for the process delay on the Department's part, so that it can complete its shipments of items against the original permit (with its new name on the permits). Given that there is no change to end-user or items, we included these in the pipeline as they are relatively straightforward.

By way of further background on the permits, the permits are for [REDACTED] to be used for the detection and measurement and analysis of signals from radar based systems, plus related software and technologies. They will be used by [REDACTED]

If helpful, we can discuss this at the next oMINA briefing, or if there is a strong preference for these to be included in the Turkey memo that is forthcoming, we can do that too.

Grateful for feedback on the above.

Warmly,
S.

Tweets: Additional information from Wescam re Turkey

From: "Boileau, Guy -DMT" <guy.boileau@international.gc.ca>
To: "Anand, Shalini -TID" <shalini.anand@international.gc.ca>, "MINA-Dept Unit <d-mina-dept-unit@international.gc.ca>
Cc: "USS-DMA Advisors <d-uss-dmaadvisors@international.gc.ca>, "TFM-Policy <d-tfm-policy@international.gc.ca>, "Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE" <marieeve.roymarcoux@international.gc.ca>, "Gosselin, Catherine -TIR" <catherine.gosselin@international.gc.ca>, "Senkiw, Jillian -TIR" <jillian.senkiw@international.gc.ca>, "Bastien, Jean-François -TIR" <jean-francois.bastien@international.gc.ca>, "Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE" <joonhyuk.yoon@international.gc.ca>, "Mallett, Erika -TIE" <erika.mallett@international.gc.ca>, "Schonfeld, Benjamin -TIR" <benjamin.schonfeld@international.gc.ca>, "Hamilton, Kevin -IGR" <kevin.hamilton@international.gc.ca>, "Yendall, Jonathan -INP" <jonathan.yendall@international.gc.ca>, "Grant, Alison -ECE" <alison.grant@international.gc.ca>, "Sproule, David -ECD" <david.sproule@international.gc.ca>, "Carrière, Sébastien -IGN" <sebastien.carriere@international.gc.ca>, "Turner, Andrew -ECE" <andrew.turner@international.gc.ca>, "Christie, Bruce -TFMA" <bruce.christie@international.gc.ca>, "DMT-Policy <d-dmt-policy@international.gc.ca>
Date: Sun, 25 Oct 2020 15:26:57 -0400
Attachments: 1711201006 and -1 - EUS.pdf (147.89 kB)

MINA-DU, MINA had requested information on tweets in the media with potentially downed Wescam images. The following message has been reviewed and approved by DMT and can be shared with oMINA.

With thanks

Dear oMINA:

Further to the tweets in the media with potentially downed Wescam video footage and images, we reached out to the company to support the analysis coming from geos and I branch. Bottom line: they have indicated that some of the images may be their product, but it is difficult to confirm. We've also included some analysis of the end use statements that Wescam pointed to in their comments.

Wescam feedback:

1. Important to note that responses are based on viewing of the digital images/videos found in the links, however we are not able to comment on their authenticity
2. The external product representations contained in the video as well as the other images are consistent with a WESCAM produced [REDACTED]. We are unable to determine if that specific camera was removed from the aircraft wreckage shown in the links.
3. The camera shown in the image seems to have had the circular electronic interface board removed for display purposes. It also shows some visible damage but we cannot correlate the level of damage of the turret with the aircraft wreckage. We have seen a number of crashed units which tend to be damaged beyond economic repair. The crash scene we have seen in various tweets shows expected destruction of the aircraft. The turret is installed on the belly of the aircraft and we would expect significant damage. The turret itself is also cleaner than expected post-crash, but not conclusive.
4. Part number, product name and serial number on the [REDACTED] tag shown in the image is consistent with our naming conventions.
5. S/N [REDACTED] is shown on the product tag in the image. A system with this serial number was delivered in September 2020 under permit number 1 [REDACTED] approved in September 2019 for end user Turkish Naval Forces. (End-Use Statement – EUS - attached)
6. As in point 2, the video tweeted does show what looks like the external housing of the WESCAM [REDACTED]. Note that the RCPS, as well as the other components/parts shown loose or on the ground (and which were edited into the video) are not components or subassemblies of the [REDACTED]. We cannot tell if it was the same system as the one which was shown disassembled in the other images.

EUS Analysis:

-The permit was for the proposed export of [REDACTED] EO/IR systems to [REDACTED] in Turkey. According to the EUS, the [REDACTED] would be installed into the [REDACTED]. The EUS also states that "the [REDACTED] systems will be delivered to and used by the final end user Turkish Naval Forces, who will use the [REDACTED] system for the purpose of surveillance and targeting". It further states that "the imported goods will not be diverted, re-exported or transferred to a non-listed party for any

reason”.

-As far as export controls is concerned, L3's obligation was to deliver their products to [REDACTED] as per the terms of their issued permit. This seems to have been done. Furthermore, [REDACTED] undertaking was to incorporate the [REDACTED] into their [REDACTED] platforms. This also seems to have been done.

-Therefore, the incorporation of the [REDACTED] sensors into the [REDACTED] platforms was in itself the end use.

Footage and images sent to company for analysis:

<http://asbarez.com/197714/artsakh-forces-down-turkish-bayraktar-drone/>

Note: serial/part number at 0:25.

<https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1318281456955916289>

<https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/armenia-turkey-azerbaijan-nagorno-karabakh-drone-champagne-1.5770144>

<https://twitter.com/armgov>

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**is withheld pursuant to section
est retenue en vertu de l'article**

20(1)(c)

**of the Access to Information Act
de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information**

UPDATE ON POSSIBLE LINKAGES TO ALLEGED USE OF TURKISH DRONES IN CONFLICT ZONES

From: "Korecky, Judy -TIR" <judy.korecky@international.gc.ca>

To: *MINA-Dept Unit <d-mina-dept-unit@international.gc.ca>

Cc: *DMT-Policy <d-dmt-policy@international.gc.ca>, "Boileau, Guy -DMT" <guy.boileau@international.gc.ca>, *TFM-Policy <d-tfm-policy@international.gc.ca>, *USS-DMA Advisors <d-uss-dmaadvisors@international.gc.ca>, "McCardell, Sandra -EGM" <sandra.mccardell@international.gc.ca>, "Graham, Molly -EGM" <molly.graham@international.gc.ca>, "Anderson, Ian -EGM" <ian.anderson@international.gc.ca>, "Sproule, David -ECD" <david.sproule@international.gc.ca>, "Hamilton, Kevin -IGR" <kevin.hamilton@international.gc.ca>, "Brisson, Julien -ECE" <julien.brisson@international.gc.ca>, "Nelson, David -IGR" <david.nelson@international.gc.ca>, "Temorshuizen, Cindy -IGD" <cindy.temorshuizen@international.gc.ca>, "Friele, Shawn -IFM" <shawn.friele@international.gc.ca>, "Funtek, Katharine -TID" <katharine.funtek@international.gc.ca>, "Gosselin, Catherine -TIR" <catherine.gosselin@international.gc.ca>, "Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE" <joonhyuk.yoon@international.gc.ca>, "Christie, Bruce -TFMA" <bruce.christie@international.gc.ca>, "Grant, Alison -ECE" <alison.grant@international.gc.ca>, "Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE" <kamiliya.akkouche@international.gc.ca>, "Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE" <marieeve.roymarcoux@international.gc.ca>, "Anand, Shalini -TIE" <shalini.anand@international.gc.ca>, "Picard, Beatrix -TIR" <beatrix.picard@international.gc.ca>, "Bastien, Jean-François -TIR" <jean-francois.bastien@international.gc.ca>, "Hughes, Steven -INA" <steven.hughes@international.gc.ca>, "Jones, Paul -INA" <paul.jones@international.gc.ca>, "Pilloud, Marc -ECE" <marc.pilloud@international.gc.ca>, "Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE" <kamiliya.akkouche@international.gc.ca>, "Brisson, Julien -ECE" <julien.brisson@international.gc.ca>, "Netley, Rebecca -JLH" <rebecca.netley@international.gc.ca>, "Thompson, Kevin -JLTA" <kevin.thompson@international.gc.ca>, "Fetz, Thomas -JLH" <thomas.fetz@international.gc.ca>, "Utting, Elizabeth -JLH" <elizabeth.utting@international.gc.ca>, "St-Pierre, Nicolas -JFM" <nicolas.st-pierre@international.gc.ca>, "Amegan, Karim -JLH" <karim.amegan@international.gc.ca>, "LaTorre, Jason -DMT" <jason.latorre@international.gc.ca>, "Farid, Sohrab -DMA -USS" <sohrab.farid@international.gc.ca>, "Yendall, Jonathan -INA" <jonathan.yendall@international.gc.ca>, "Gagnon, Felix -JLTA" <felix.gagnon@international.gc.ca>, "Senkiw, Jillian -TIR" <jillian.senkiw@international.gc.ca>

Date: Wed, 30 Sep 2020 15:53:08 -0400

Attachments: L3WESCAM PERMITS TO TURKEY after Oct 11 2019 announcement (w. PUR as of Sept 25 2020) - V2.docx (18.23 kB); L3WESCAM PERMITS TO TURKEY from Jan 1 2016 to Oct 11 2019 V2.docx (30.44 kB); Annex A - Country Positions Export Controls Turkey -Sept 28 2020 - CLEAN.docx (37.96 kB); Sitrep - possible permit linkages to alleged use of Turkish drones with Canadian sensors in conflict zones.September 30 2020.final.2.docx (38.9 kB)

Good afternoon o/MINA,

Attached please find a Situational Update Report with annexes to provide an update on possible linkages to alleged use of Turkish drones with Canadian sensors in conflict zones. This document has been widely consulted within the department.

Judy

Judy Korecky

Deputy Director, Export Controls Policy Division | Directrice adjointe, Direction de la politique en matière des contrôles à l'exportation

judy.korecky@international.gc.ca

Telephone | Téléphone: 343-203-4332

125 rue Sussex Drive, Ottawa K1A 0G2

Global Affairs Canada | Affaires mondiales Canada

Government of Canada | Gouvernement du Canada



COMPARISON OF ISSUED PERMITS FOR TURKEY TO WESCAM

Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Country of Destination	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Status	Permit Utilization (as of Sept 25, 2020)
	2019/11/06	Permanent export of EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems, sub-assemblies, including provisions for repairs, technical data and software		Turkey	For integration and installation unto the to be used for surveillance operations	Presidency of Defence Industries (SSB)		Issued permit on May 6, 2020 per BPTS: 01794-2020	This permit has not been utilized
	2019/11/06	Permanent export of EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems, sub-assemblies, including provisions for repairs, technical data and software		Turkey	For integration and installation unto the prototype	N ote:		Issued permit on May 6, 2020 per BPTS: 01794-2020	This permit has not been utilized.
	2019/08/26	Permanent export of EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems, sub-assemblies, including provisions for repairs, technical data and software		Turkey	For installation and integration unto the to be used for surveillance and targeting.	Military and law enforcement agencies under the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of the Interior		Issued permit on May 6, 2020 per BPTS: 01794-2020	This permit has been utilized for up to
	2019/10/28	Permit amendment		Turkey	To be used as			Amendment	

Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Country of Destination	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Status	Permit Utilization (as of Sept 25, 2020)
		request (PAR) to extend permit validity by a year on a temporary export for [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems	[REDACTED]		loaner systems for training purposes.	[REDACTED]		permit was re-issued on May 7, 2020 per BPTS: 01794-2020. Extended validity date until May 7, 2021.	Temporary export permit. No permit utilization required
	2019/10/30	Permit amendment request (PAR) to extend permit validity by a year on a temporary export for [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems and accessories.	[REDACTED]	Turkey	To be used to demonstrate the system's capabilities in the scope of police, maritime surveillance and army reconnaissance; the system will be used for flight demonstration on a [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		Amendment permit was re-issued on May 7, 2020 per BPTS: 01794-2020. Extended validity date until May 7, 2021.	Temporary export permit. No permit utilization required
	2019/12/05	Permit amendment request (PAR) to extend permit validity by a year on a permanent export of repaired [REDACTED] surveillance systems [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Turkey	Consignee is an authorized Wescam Service Provider and will use the items for in-country repairs of the [REDACTED]	Turkish Ministry of Defence. Turkish Ministry of the Interior		Amendment permit was re-issued on May 7, 2020 per BPTS: 01794-2020. Extended validity date	This permit has been utilized for up to [REDACTED]

Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Country of Destination	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Status	Permit Utilization (as of Sept 25, 2020)
		repaired/replacement components and sub-assemblies and related technical data and software			surveillance systems; repaired systems to be returned to its foreign owners.			until May 7, 2021.	
Total									

Summary/Additional Notes:

Under BPTS: 01794-2020 Wescam received:

- [redacted] export permits and [redacted] amended permit for Turkey
- The [redacted] new permits were for a total of [redacted] EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems to be used in the UAVs of [redacted] and [redacted], with the Turkish MOD and Ministry of the Interior as the primary end-users.
- All [redacted] permit amendment requests (PARs) are for extension of the permit validity by a year.
- [redacted] of PARs are related to the temporary exports of [redacted] /IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems to be used in UAVs.
- [redacted] of PARs is for the [redacted] model of Wescam's surveillance system. This export is for the return of repaired systems in Canada and various components and sub-assemblies of the [redacted] system to be used for in-country repair (in Turkey) by consignee [redacted] as an authorized Wescam Service Provider. If [redacted] is unable to undertake repair in Turkey, it sends the system back to Wescam in Canada to be repaired.
- The second Ref ID in the last [redacted] entries (highlighted in red) is the new file under which the amended permits were issued, given that the permits expired while the PARs were under review.

Additional notes:

- No end user(s) in Libya, Syria, Azerbaijan and Armenia have been identified in the end use documentation provided by the consignees.
- The stated end-use in the End-Use Statements are also highlighted in yellow font.

PERMITS ISSUED TO L3 WESCAM FOR TURKEY (from January 1, 2016 to October 11, 2019)

No.	Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Status
1		2016/05/25	Temporary export of quantity [REDACTED] Model [REDACTED] Stabilized Optical Sensor Systems and replacement parts	[REDACTED]	For integration and ground tests	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Permit expired on 2018/05/31
2		2016/08/10	Permanent export of quantity [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems ([REDACTED]) including ancillary equipment	[REDACTED]	For installation and integration into UAVs	Turkish Army	[REDACTED]	Permit expired on 2017/07/11
3		2016/09/29	[REDACTED] Humidity Indicator Installation Tools (Test Equipment for Wescam [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance Systems)	[REDACTED]	To test Wescam [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance Systems	Ministry of Defence of Turkey	[REDACTED]	Permit expired on 2016/10/19
4		2016/11/22	[REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems [REDACTED] including ancillary equipment	[REDACTED]	For installation and integration into UAVs	Ministry of Defence of Turkey	[REDACTED]	Permit expired on 2017/07/12
5		2017/01/05	Purge kit, ground boresight module, mission grip handcontroller	[REDACTED]	Auxiliary equipment for [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems	Ministry of Defence of Turkey, Ministry of the Interior of Turkey Turkish Gendarmerie	[REDACTED]	Permit expired on 2017/01/11
6		2017/01/16	Test Equipment for the Wescam [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance Systems.	[REDACTED]	For diagnosis and testing activities of [REDACTED] and/or [REDACTED] Systems	[REDACTED] Ministry of Defence of Turkey Ministry of the Interior of Turkey	[REDACTED]	Permit expired on 2017/05/10
7		2017/01/17	Circuit Card Assemblies, Camera Assemblies, Cable Assemblies, Wiring Harness Assemblies, Lens Assemblies, Motor Gearbox, etc.	[REDACTED]	For integration into Wescam [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance Systems	[REDACTED] Ministry of Defence of Turkey Ministry of the Interior of Turkey	[REDACTED]	Permit expired on 2018/01/08
8		2017/01/24	[REDACTED] each of Handcontrollers and	Turkish	For demonstration	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Permit expired on

No.	Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Status
			Mission Grips (for Wescam EO/IR Surveillance Systems), MX-Simulator Kits, Emulator Kits, lot of cables, and Wescam Kinetics					2019/05/30
9		2017/02/03	Test Equipment (for Wescam EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems), repaired EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems , repaired/replacement parts (for Wescam EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems) and Controlled Technical Data relating to Wescam's EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems		For diagnosis and testing activities and repair/replacement of Systems			Permit expired on 2018/02/02
10		2017/02/21	EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems including ancillary equipment; Ground Boresight Modules (BSM); Mission Grips Assemblies and Purge Kits - Maintenance Kits (for Wescam Systems)		For installation and integration into UAVs	Ministry of Defence of Turkey		Permit expired on 2019/01/11
11		2017/03/21	Temporary export of Handcontroller Assemblies, Mission Grip Assemblies, Cable Assemblies, Simulators and Emulators, Kinetic and eLearning	WESCAM Inc., Care of: IDEF-International Defence Industry Fair 2017	For exhibition in a defence fair	L3 WESCAM		Permit expired on 2019/07/11
12		2017/03/28	Temporary export of Handcontroller Assemblies, Mission Grip Assemblies and Cable Assemblies		For demonstration			Permit expired on 2019/05/30
13		2017/05/10	Test Equipment for the Wescam EO/IR Surveillance Systems.		For diagnosis and testing activities of and/or Systems			Permit expired on 2017/05/10

No.	Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Status
14		2017/05/26	Provision of technical assistance documents, training course(s) and training documents, and maintenance software for project development/marketing information		For military and government end use			Permit expired on 2017/05/29
15		2017/07/11	Permanent export of EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems including ancillary equipment		For installation and integration into UAVs	Turkish Army		Permit expired 2017/07/12
16		2017/07/11	Permanent export of EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems including ancillary equipment		For installation and integration into UAVs	Ministry of Defence of Turkey Ministry of the Interior of Turkey		Permit expired on 2017/07/12
17		2017/08/14	Permanent export of EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems including ancillary equipment; Ground Boresight Modules (BSM); Mission Grips Assemblies and Purge Kits - Maintenance Kits (for Wescam Systems)		For installation and integration into UAVs	Ministry of Defence of Turkey		Permit expired on 2019/07/16
18		2017/08/31	Software source code to be used in troubleshooting	Wescam Inc. c/o	This is so that WESCAM employees can effectively and efficiently track down the observed problems and link them to lines in the source code.			Permit expired on 2017/09/01
19		2017/09/18	Permanent export of quantity EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems including ancillary equipment; quantity Ground Boresight Modules (BSM)	Turkish Ministry of Int'l Affairs-National Police	For anti-terrorism operations	Turkish National Police		Permit expired on 2019/08/29

No.	Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Status
20		2017/11/01	Permanent export of quantity [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems [REDACTED] including ancillary equipment	[REDACTED]	For installation and integration into UAVs	Turkish Naval Forces	[REDACTED]	Permit expired on 2019/09/27
21		2017/11/01	Permanent export of quantity [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems [REDACTED] including ancillary equipment	[REDACTED]	For installation and integration into UAVs	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Permit expired on 2019/09/27
22		2017/11/20	Desiccant Assembly (for Wescam [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance Systems)	[REDACTED]	To repair Wescam [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance Systems	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Permit expired on 2017/11/28
23		2017/12/08	Permanent export of [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems [REDACTED] including ancillary equipment; [REDACTED] Ground Boresight Modules (BSM); [REDACTED] Mission Grips Assemblies and [REDACTED] Purge Kits - Maintenance Kits (for Wescam [REDACTED] Systems)	[REDACTED]	For installation and integration into UAVs	Ministry of Defence of Turkey	[REDACTED]	Permit expired on 2019/09/27
24		2018/01/08	Repaired Wescam [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance Systems, repaired/replacement Sub Assemblies (for Wescam [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance Systems and Technical Assistance (documents, course(s)/material and software).	[REDACTED]	For repair and replacement of parts	[REDACTED] Ministry of Defence of Turkey Ministry of the Interior of Turkey	[REDACTED]	Permit expired on 2018/01/08
25		2018/01/17	Temporary export of a PC with Wescam [REDACTED] Simulator Software	[REDACTED]	For demonstration and evaluation	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Permit expired on 2018/01/30
26		2018/01/22	Permanent export of [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems [REDACTED] including ancillary equipment	[REDACTED]	For installation and integration into UAVs	Turkish Land Forces	[REDACTED]	Permit was cancelled on 2018/11/15
27		2018/01/22	Purge Kit (for Wescam [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance Systems)	[REDACTED]	For repair of cameras	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Permit expired on 2018/02/02

No.	Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Status
28		2018/01/25	Temporary export of EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems (For demonstration			Permit expired on 2018/02/05
29		2018/02/02	Test Equipment (for Wescam Wescam EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems), repaired EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems , repaired/replacement parts (for Wescam EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems) and Controlled Technical Data relating to Wescam's EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems		For diagnosis and testing activities and repair/replacement	Ministry of Defence of Turkey Ministry of the Interior of Turkey		Permit expired on 2018/02/02
30		2018/02/15	EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems, Hand Controller Assemblies, Mission Grip Assemblies, Lot Cable Assemblies and Lot Circuit Card Assemblies (CCA)		For replacement in case of failure during demonstrations			Permit expired on 2018/02/20
31		2018/02/20	Spare parts/components for Wescam and EO/IR Surveillance/Camera Systems		To repair existing systems	Ministry of Defence of Turkey Ministry of the Interior of Turkey Undersecretariat of Defence Industries		Permit expired on 2018/03/05
32		2018/02/20	Spare parts/components for Wescam and EO/IR Surveillance/Camera Systems		To repair existing systems	Ministry of Defence of Turkey Ministry of the Interior of Turkey Undersecretariat of Defence Industries		Permit expired on 2018/03/05
33		2018/02/22	EO/IR Surveillance		For installation and	Ministry of Defence		Permit expired on

No.	Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Status
			and Targeting Systems ([REDACTED] including ancillary equipment; [REDACTED] Ground Boresight Modules (BSM) and [REDACTED] Mission Grips Assemblies	[REDACTED]	integration into UAVs	of Turkey Undersecretariat of Defence Industries		2018/03/13
34	[REDACTED]	2018/03/06	Repaired Wescam I [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance Systems, repaired/replacement Sub Assemblies (for Wescam [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance Systems and Technical Assistance (documents, course(s)/material and software).	[REDACTED]	To repair existing systems	[REDACTED] Ministry of Defence of Turkey Ministry of the Interior of Turkey Undersecretariat of Defence Industries	[REDACTED]	Permit expired on 2018/03/26
35	[REDACTED]	2018/03/08	Test Equipment and Technical Data (for the Wescam [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance Systems).	Wescam Inc. Field Service Representative (FSR) c/o [REDACTED]	To perform repairs	Wescam Inc. Field Service Representative (FSR) c/o [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Permit expired on 2018/03/16
36	[REDACTED]	2018/03/13	[REDACTED] Repaired/Upgraded [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems, [REDACTED] MOD Kit [REDACTED] Incl: Software/Firmware; [REDACTED] [REDACTED] MOD Kit : [REDACTED] Incl: Software/Firmware; [REDACTED] [REDACTED] MOD Kit [REDACTED] Incl: [REDACTED] Wiring Harness Cable [REDACTED] MOD Kit : [REDACTED] Incl: Wiring Harness; Cable, [REDACTED] MOD Kit [REDACTED] MOD Kit [REDACTED] Wiring Harness; [REDACTED] MOD Kit [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Wiring Harness; Cable	[REDACTED]	For upgrades into [REDACTED] systems	[REDACTED] Ministry of Defence of Turkey Ministry of the Interior of Turkey Undersecretariat of Defence Industries	[REDACTED]	Permit expired on 2018/08/13
37	[REDACTED]	2018/04/04	Permanent export of [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	For installation and	Turkish Gendarmerie	[REDACTED]	Permit expired on

No.	Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Status
			EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems () including ancillary equipment		integration into UAVs			2018/11/15
38		2018/05/23	Permanent export of quantity EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems () including ancillary equipment		For installation and integration into UAVs	Turkish Police		Permit expired on 2020/05/26
39		2018/05/23	Permanent export of quantity EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting System () including ancillary equipment		For installation and integration into UAVs			Permit expired on 2018/06/07
40		2018/06/26	Provision of technical assistance documents, training course(s) and training documents, and maintenance software for project development/marketing information		For quotation and/or marketing			Permit expired on 2020/05/28
41		2018/07/05	Permanent export of spare parts/components for Wescam EO/IR Surveillance/Camera Systems		To perform repairs			Permit expired on 2018/07/10
42		2018/08/13	Repaired/Upgraded EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems, MOD Kit Incl: Software/Firmware; MOD Kit Incl: Software/Firmware; MOD Kit Incl: Miring Harness Cable		For upgrades into systems	Ministry of Defence of Turkey Ministry of the Interior of Turkey Undersecretariat of Defence Industries		Permit expired on 2018/08/13

No.	Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Status
			MOD Kit Incl: Wiring Harness; Cable, MOD Kit MOD Kit Wiring Harness; Cable MOD Kit Wiring Harness; Cable					
43		2018/08/17	Repaired Wescam EO/IR Surveillance Systems, repaired/replacement Sub-Assemblies (for Wescam EO/IR Surveillance Systems under warranty) and Technical Assistance (documents, course(s)/material and software)		To perform repairs			Permit issued on 2018/08/20 and valid until 2022/09/30
44		2018/10/15	Permanent export of completed, semi-finished and assembly kits for Wescam EO/IR Surveillance/Camera Systems, repaired systems and semi-finished systems and technical assistance		For installation and integration into UAVs	Turkish Land Forces Turkish Gendarmerie Turkish National Police Turkish Naval Forces		Permit issued on 2018/11/06 and valid until 2022/11/30
45		2018/10/25	each, and EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems, Hand Controller Assemblies, Mission Grip Assemblies, Lot Cable Assemblies, MX Simulators, Kinetics, Boresight Modules, Laptops with moving map software and Lot Circuit Card Assemblies (CCA)		For replacement in case of failure during demonstrations			Permit issued on 2020/07/06 and valid until 2020/11/30
46		2018/11/22	Circuit Card Assemblies (CCA's)		For replacement of CCA's previously exported			Permit issued on 2018/12/03 and valid until 2020/12/31
47		2018/11/27	EO/IR Surveillance and		For installation and			Permit issued on

No.	Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Status
			Targeting Systems and related items		integration into UAVs	Forces		2019/01/30 and valid until 2022/01/31
48		2018/11/28	EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems and related items		For installation and integration into UAVs	Ministry of Defence of Turkey Ministry of the Interior of Turkey		Permit issued on 2019/01/14 and valid until 2022/01/31
49		2019/01/11	EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems including ancillary equipment; Ground Boresight Modules (BSM); Mission Grips Assemblies and Purge Kits - Maintenance Kits (for Wescam Systems)		For installation and integration into UAVs	Ministry of Defence of Turkey		Permit expired on 2019/01/14
50		2019/02/06	Test Equipment for the Wescam EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems and EO/IR Surveillance Systems.		For diagnosis and testing activities of and/or Systems owned/used by end users	Ministry of Defence of Turkey Ministry of the Interior of Turkey		Permit issued on 2019/02/20 and valid until 2021/02/28
51		2019/03/07	Permanent export of EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems including ancillary equipment; Ground Boresight Modules (BSM) and Mission Grips Assembly		For installation and integration into UAVs	Ministry of Defence of Turkey		Permit issued on 2019/03/12 and valid until 2021/03/31
52		2019/07/10	Permanent export of EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems including ancillary equipment; Ground Boresight Modules (BSM); Mission Grips Assemblies and Purge Kits - Maintenance Kits (for Wescam Systems)		For installation and integration into UAVs	Ministry of Defence of Turkey		Permit expired on 2019/07/16

No.	Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Status
53		2019/08/01	Repaired EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems, Ground Boresight Modules (GBSM) and Controlled Technical data		To perform repairs	Ministry of Defence of Turkey Turkey National Police		Permit issued on 2019/08/13 and valid until 2023/08/31
54		2019/08/07	Boresight Modules for Wescam EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems		For repair and replacement of parts	Ministry of Defence of Turkey Ministry of the Interior of Turkey		Permit issued on 2019/08/14 and valid until 2023/08/31
55		2019/08/13	Wescam EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems, and their parts and components		For installation and integration into UAVs	Presidency of the Republic of Turkey		Permit issued on 2019/08/14 and valid until 2023/08/31
56		2019/08/20	Repaired EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems, Ground Boresight Modules (GBSM) and Controlled Technical data - Documents, Training and Software		To perform repairs	Turkish Air Force		Permit issued on 2019/08/29 and valid until 2023/08/31
57		2019/08/29	Permanent export of quantity EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems including ancillary equipment; quantity Ground Boresight Modules (BSM)	Turkish Ministry of Int'l Affairs-National Police	For anti-terrorism operations	Turkish National Police		Permit issued on 2019/09/03 and valid until 2020/09/30
58		2019/08/28	Temporary export of quantity each of Handcontroller Assemblies and Mission Grip Assemblies, and quantity lot Cable Assemblies		For demonstration			Permit issued on 2019/09/24 and valid until 2023/09/30
59		2019/09/13	Various spare parts for Wescam		For repair and	Turkish Land Forces		Permit issued on

No.	Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Status
			EO/IR Surveillance Systems		replacement of parts	Turkish Gendarmerie Turkish National Police Turkish Naval Forces		2019/10/09 and valid until 2023/09/30
60		2019/09/21	Temporary export of quantity each of Handcontroller Assemblies and Mission Grip Assemblies, and quantity lot Cable Assemblies	Turkish Ministry of Internal Affairs / Turkish National Police	For demonstration	Turkish Ministry of Internal Affairs / Turkish National Police		Permit issued on 2019/10/07 and valid until 2023/10/31
61		2019/09/23	Repaired EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems, Repaired Ground Boresight Modules for Systems and Controlled Technical Data - document, training and software	Turkish Republic Governorship VAN/General Directorate of Security of VAN	For anti-terrorism operations	Ministry of the Interior of Turkey Turkish National Police		Permit issued on 2019/10/04 and valid until 2023/09/30
62		2019/09/27	Permanent export of quantity EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems including ancillary equipment		For installation and integration into UAVs	Turkish Naval Forces		Permit issued on 2019/10/14 and valid until 2020/11/30
63		2019/09/27	Permanent export of quantity EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems including ancillary equipment		For installation and integration into UAVs			Permit issued on 2019/10/11 and valid until 2021/12/31
64		2019/09/27	Permanent export of EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems (including ancillary equipment; Ground Boresight Modules (BSM); Mission Grips Assemblies and Purge Kits - Maintenance Kits (for Wescam Systems)		For installation and integration into UAVs	Ministry of Defence of Turkey		Permit issued on 2019/10/01 and valid until 2021/01/31

Observations

- The timeframe (between January 1, 2016 to October 11, 2019) has been chosen in order to compare the above finding with the Ploughshare's report.
- Note that during this timeframe (between January 1, 2016 to October 11, 2019), [REDACTED] in terms of Canada's export controls, given their membership and adherence to the 4 multilateral export control regimes (i.e. the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Australia Group), as well as being a member of NATO and having effective export control mechanisms. [REDACTED]
- On October 11, 2019, in response to Turkey's military incursion into Syria, the Government of Canada announced the temporary suspension on the issuance of all new permits for the export of controlled goods and technology to Turkey. [REDACTED]
- Permits issued after October 11, 2019 have been addressed in the other table.
- Between January 1, 2016 to October 11, 2019, a total of 64 permits have been issued to L3 Wescam to Turkey. Out of these 64 permits issued:
 - [REDACTED] have now expired
 - [REDACTED] has been cancelled (at the request of applicant)
 - [REDACTED] are currently valid [REDACTED] these permits will be expiring by the end of November 2020).
- In terms of the consignees, there are various entities that have received L3 Wescam products in Turkey, including [REDACTED] etc. These are all well-known and reputable defence companies in Turkey.
- Most of the L3 Wescam products were intended to be installed and integrated into various UAV platforms built by these Turkish defence companies (but not in all cases).
- In terms of the end users, they are mostly the military, as well as government and law enforcement agencies within Turkey. However, there have also been [REDACTED] instances where the end users have been specifically identified as the [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]
- No end user(s) in either **Libya, Syria, Azerbaijan or Armenia** have been identified in the end use documentation provided by the consignees.

**ANNEX A - CONTROLLED EXPORTS TO TURKEY
COMPARATIVE COUNTRY POSITIONS AND COMMERCIAL EXPOSURE**

Presumptive Denial for Group 2 (military items): Canada

No New Permits (military items): Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Italy, Australia, Poland, Switzerland, Spain, Belgium, Austria


No New Permits (military end-use/use in combat/Syria): UK, France, Germany, Czech Republic, Slovakia

Suspended Valid Permits (military items): France, Sweden

Reviewing Valid Permits: U.K., Norway, Italy

No Restrictions: U.S., New Zealand, South Korea, Japan, Portugal

Countries fully or partially restricting exports to Turkey

Country	Country Position	Commercial Exposure
CANADA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Canada temporarily suspended the issuance of new permits to Turkey on October 10, 2019. • Shipments proceeded under existing valid permits. • In April 2020, Canada narrowed the scope of the restriction to apply a policy of presumptive denial only to Group 2 (military) items. • Exports to Turkey of military items could be allowed if one or more of the following exceptions apply AND there are no other concerns: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project; ○ items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada’s values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance); ○ a high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Exports of military goods and technology to all (non-US) destinations (2019) CAD \$3.757 billion. • Canadian exports of military goods and technology (“military items”¹) to Turkey (2019) CAD \$151.4 million. • Turkey is the third largest destination for Canadian military exports, accounting for 4% of all non-U.S. exports. • 

¹ Throughout the table “military items” refers to items that are included in the Wassenaar Arrangement’s Munitions Lists, which is the equivalent of Group 2 of Canada’s Export Control List. Some “military items”, such as rifles for sport shooting, may not be destined for military end-use.

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Country	Country Position	Commercial Exposure
	<p>be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ there are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests; ○ an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and ○ to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Certain lower-risk controlled items to Turkey are eligible for a General Export Permit (GEP) and can continue to be shipped unless a regulatory amendment is sought. 	
France	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The French government has suspended all existing licenses for defence materials and dual-use goods with <i>a clear military end-use</i> and is not issuing new permits for the same items. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● French military exports to Turkey in 2019 were CAD \$55.95 million, which is down from CAD \$65.9 million in 2018. ● In 2019, 62 licenses to export military items to Turkey were issued which is down from 108 in 2018.
United Kingdom	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● In October 2019, the UK suspended the issuance of new export permits for all military items to Turkey. [REDACTED] 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● In 2018, the UK issued 329 export licenses for military items to Turkey worth CAD \$107.3 million (the UK does not report on the value of actual exports, only on the

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Country	Country Position	Commercial Exposure
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • [REDACTED] • Ministers have ordered a full review of sales of items to Turkey that might be used in military operations in Syria. • [REDACTED] 	<p>value of permits authorized).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Most of the licenses issued in 2018 were for aircraft parts and components (110). • Full 2019 data on UK arms exports has yet to be made public. However, the UK's 2019 report to the <i>UN Register of Conventional Arms</i> shows that no conventional arms were exported to Turkey in 2019.
Germany	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Germany will not issue <u>new permits</u> to Turkey for any military exports that could be used in Syria. • [REDACTED] • Turkey has generally benefitted from the German equivalent of Canada's General Export Permits (GEPs). [REDACTED] • Two German opposition parties, Die Linke (Left) and Die Grüne (Greens), have said that preventing new deals is not sufficient, and have called for an immediate stop to all arms deliveries to Turkey. • [REDACTED] 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • For the first half of 2020, Germany issued export permits for some CAD \$23 million of defence items to Turkey; none of these were "war weapons". • In 2019, 187 export licences were authorised with a total value of CAD \$49 million. • Turkey is not among Germany's top 20 export destinations for military items. • In 2018, Germany issued 58 licenses for military items to Turkey worth CAD \$18.8 million. This was down from 147 licenses issued in 2017.
Netherlands	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Netherlands (NL) has suspended the issuance of new export permits to Turkey for any military items and dual-use goods with a military end-use, [REDACTED] • [REDACTED] • [REDACTED] 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Military exports to Turkey (2019) CAD \$24.31 million.

September 28, 2020

Country	Country Position	Commercial Exposure
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • [REDACTED] • NL advocated for an EU-wide arms embargo at the Foreign Affairs Council, but did not garner sufficient support. [REDACTED] • NL has removed Turkey from the list of countries eligible for global licences, which are issued when goods have multiple possible final destinations. 	
Sweden	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • On October 15, 2019, all valid licenses to export military equipment to Turkey were suspended. [REDACTED] • [REDACTED]. In 2019, no new export permits for military items were granted and no new export permits to Turkey have been approved since April 2017. • [REDACTED] • On July 10, 2020, Swedish FM Linde confirmed that Sweden continues to support a weapons embargo against Turkey, which she previously proposed at an EU Foreign Ministers meeting. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Military exports to Turkey in 2018 were CAD \$40.7 million. However, no equipment that could be used to support combat operations was exported. • Military exports of approximately CAD \$6 million were shipped to Turkey in 2019, but deliveries took place before all valid export licenses were revoked in October 2019. The deliveries were classed as 'other military equipment'. • Sweden denied 3 export licence applications to Turkey in 2019.

September 28, 2020

Country	Country Position	Commercial Exposure
Norway	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> As of October 11, 2019, Norway suspended the issuance of new permits for military and dual-use items to Turkey. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Norwegian military export to Turkey (2019) were worth CAD \$1.65 million, the majority of which were for “energetic materials” (e.g. explosives, pyrotechnics, propellants and/or fuels). Norwegian military exports to Turkey (2018) were CAD \$5.99 million, the majority of which was for “fire control systems” (i.e. missile targeting systems).
Finland	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> On October 9, 2019, Finland suspended the issuance of new permits for arms to Turkey [REDACTED] 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Military exports to Turkey (2018) were worth CAD \$24.5 million and mainly consisted of military armored plates for protection. Finland's annual exports of defense equipment represent about 1% of the EU total.
Denmark	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In October 2019, Denmark suspended the issuance of new export licenses for all military equipment to Turkey. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Two permits were issued for exports to Turkey of military items in 2019 worth CAD \$131,243.
Italy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> On October 13, 2019, Italy announced an executive decree suspending the issuance of new export licenses for arms to Turkey. The decree also announced a review of existing permits to Turkey. As of September 2020, the decree has not yet been adopted [REDACTED] Turkey is not eligible for any Italian equivalent to a GEP. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Available data indicates that Italy has exported over CAD \$57 million of arms and ammunition to Turkey in Q1 2020. Italy exported CAD \$98.2 million worth of arms and ammunition to Turkey in 2019. Permits were issued for CAD \$531 million worth of military exports to Turkey in 2018.

September 28, 2020

Country	Country Position	Commercial Exposure
Australia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • On October 15, 2019, the Minister for Defence said in an interview that she had asked for a pause in export permits to Turkey. • [REDACTED] • [REDACTED] 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Australia's reporting to the <i>UN Register of Conventional Arms</i> does not indicate any sales of any conventional arms to Turkey between 2017-2019.
Czech Republic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • On October 15, 2019, the Czech Republic (CZ) announced a ban on all military sales to Turkey, stopped issuing new licences [REDACTED] • [REDACTED] • [REDACTED] • [REDACTED] • CZ has a special relationship with the Kurds having engaged in training of Kurdish Special Forces and provision of weapons and munitions. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In 2018, total Czech arms exports amounted to CAD \$84.4 million. • In 2017, CZ exported CAD \$3.9 million to Turkey. This comprised of firearms and related components, along with "armoured or protective equipment".

Country	Country Position	Commercial Exposure
Poland	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Poland has suspended issuing new permits for arms exports to Turkey, [REDACTED] For dual-use items, applications to Turkey are still being considered on a case-by-case basis. Poland includes Turkey on its GEPs for the export of Turkish strategic items that were imported into Poland for the purposes of tests and exhibitions. [REDACTED] 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Polish military exports to all destinations (2018) CAD \$713 million. Polish arms sales to Turkey (2018) CAD \$2.2 million. In 2018, 5 export permits were issued for items destined for Turkey valued at a total of CAD \$35 million.
Slovakia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Slovakia will not issue new licenses for arms exports to Turkey, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In 2018, CAD \$26.6 million in export licenses to Turkey were approved.
Switzerland	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No export ban has been announced. [REDACTED] 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In 2019, Switzerland exported CAD \$3,464 worth of handguns [REDACTED] Arms exports to Turkey amounted to CAD \$127,282 in 2018. The majority was “fire control systems” e.g., missile targeting systems for tanks, and CAD \$6370 was for individual handguns.

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Country	Country Position	Commercial Exposure
Belgium	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Belgian regions are responsible for issuing export licenses for strategic items. • Flanders Region: stopped issuing licences for strategic exports to Turkey. • Wallonia Region: stopped issuing licences for strategic exports to Turkey. • Brussels region: 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Flanders Region: recent data shows that all licences for strategic exports have been refused in 2020 but modest dual-use exports were authorized in 2019 (less than CAD \$156,124). • Wallonia Region: decrease in total value of strategic exports from more than CAD \$12.5 million in 2017 to less than CAD \$156,00 in 2018.
European Union	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • On 14 October 2019, the EU Council condemned Turkey's military action that "seriously undermines the stability and security of the whole region." • The Council committed to strong national positions regarding Member States' arms export policy to Turkey, with a specific reference to the application of Article 4 of Common Position 2008/944, which stipulates that Member States must consider the need "not to affect adversely regional stability in any significant way" when exporting military goods and technology. While not a full arms ban, it does reiterate EU guidelines and commitments for Member States on arms exports. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2019 data has yet to be released. • In 2018, EU Member States issued 859 licenses for the export of military items to Turkey worth a combined total of CAD \$3.9 billion. There were 8 permits denied for military exports to Turkey. • In 2017, EU Member States reported a combined total of CAD \$883.7 million of actual arms exports to Turkey. • There were over CAD \$4 billion in authorized exports to Turkey in 2017. The same year there were 16 licence refusals for Turkey across the EU.

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Country	Country Position	Commercial Exposure
Spain	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> [REDACTED] 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Spanish military exports to Turkey during the first half of 2019 were CAD \$228.6 million, of which CAD \$209.5 million was for the export of one military transport aircraft. Spanish exports to all destinations (2018) CAD \$5.54 billion. In 2018, Spanish exports of military goods to Turkey totalled CAD \$475 million. Spain issued 29 licenses for military exports to Turkey (1.8% of all licenses issued) in 2018.
Austria	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> [REDACTED] In 2016, the Austrian Parliament passed a motion banning all arms exports to Turkey. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> N/A
Estonia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Estonia's policy is aligned with the EU position; [REDACTED] 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> N/A
Lithuania	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lithuania's policy is aligned with the EU position; [REDACTED] 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> N/A

Countries that have not introduced restrictions on exports to Turkey

United States	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The U.S. has not instituted any changes to its policy on military exports to Turkey nor have they altered their licensing policy with regards to dual-use goods. Specific to U.S. export controls, all export permit applications (direct commercial sales and foreign military sales) are assessed on a case-by-case basis. Relations between Turkey and the US have been strained further to Turkey's decision to purchase Russian S-400 air defence systems. The US is of the view that this will have detrimental impacts on interoperability between Turkey and NATO, but U.S. officials have reiterated that the U.S.-Turkey military-to-military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> U.S. arms exports to all destinations (2018) CAD \$13.9 billion. U.S. arms exports to Turkey (2018) CAD \$316.1 million, up from CAD \$193 million in 2017. In 2017, the U.S. exported CAD \$180.7 million through direct commercial sales.
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	<p>relationship is strong and their extensive cooperation will continue.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Relations between Turkey and the US became further strained in February 2020 when Turkey announced its decision to adopt Huawei's mobile infrastructure. • In September 2020, the U.S. announced that as of October 1, 2020, it would lift its three-decade-old arms embargo on Cyprus to allow for the export of "non-lethal" military goods to the island for a period of one year. This has infuriated Turkey which is calling on the US to reconsider its decision. 	
New Zealand	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • New Zealand has very few military or dual-use exports to Turkey. [REDACTED] • New Zealand does not have a GEP equivalent for exports to Turkey. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • [REDACTED]
Republic of Korea	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • [REDACTED] • According to the Korea Trade Association's 2019 report, ROK continues exporting defense goods to Turkey. • [REDACTED] • [REDACTED] 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ROK does not release official data for sales of controlled items. • DAPA reported that ROK exported CAD \$1.7 million in military goods to the Middle East in 2017.
Japan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Japan does not have any restrictions in place for exports to Turkey. • There are no references to Turkey on Japanese government websites related to export or trade controls. • Japan is pursuing Economic Partnership Agreement negotiations with Turkey. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Turkey was Japan's 30th export destination by value in 2019 (at CAD \$3.3 billion). • No arms or ammunition have been exported to Turkey by Japan in recent years. • The most recent such export was in 2013, and consisted of CAD \$19,057 worth of shotguns.

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Portugal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No export ban or policy related to export licences to Turkey has been announced. • Export permit applications are evaluated on a case-by-case basis based on the criteria set out in EU Council's Common Position of December 8th, 2008 – which sets common rules applying to the assessment of controlled exports, as well as the criteria and obligations stemming from the ATT. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Portugal has not supplied the Turkish Armed Forces, either directly or indirectly, with any lethal military equipment or any parts for such equipment. • There is no record of any exports of military items from Portugal to Turkey since at least 2013. • [REDACTED]
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Note: the commercial data above is drawn from a variety of open sources and may not be directly comparable.

POSSIBLE EXPORT PERMIT LINKAGES TO ALLEGED USE OF TURKISH DRONES IN CONFLICT ZONES

ISSUE

- There are media reports and allegations that Turkey has transferred or sold drones to the Azerbaijani armed forces, possibly with Canadian technology, that are being used in the recent flare-up of large-scale military attacks between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh. The Armenian National Committee of Canada alleges that Azerbaijan is using Turkish made Bayraktar TB2 drones.
- A recent report by Project Ploughshares claims that Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones allegedly used by the Turkish military in Syria and Libya may have been used in conjunction with sensors obtained from a Canadian company L3 Harris Wescam (Wescam).
- Officials are seeking to determine the veracity of these claims and to determine whether there are any potential export control issues.
- Canada's policy approach towards exports of Group 2 items to Turkey has not changed since April 2020.

Canadian Export Controls and Turkey

Canada has one of the strongest export controls systems in the world, and respect for human rights is enshrined in our export controls legislation.

In September 2019, Canada acceded to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and placed the ATT assessment criteria directly into Canadian law. Under the law, controlled goods and technology cannot be exported from Canada where there is a substantial risk that they could be used to commit or to facilitate serious violations of international humanitarian law, international human rights law, or serious acts of gender-based violence. Other criteria which would lead to a permit application denial include a substantial risk that the arms or munitions could be used to undermine peace and security or to further international organized crime or terrorism. Canada has one of the most robust legal applications of this Treaty in the world.

Until recently Turkey [REDACTED] in terms of Canada's export controls, given their membership and adherence to the four multilateral export control regimes (i.e. the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Australia Group), as well as being a member of NATO and having effective export control mechanisms. [REDACTED]

On October 11, 2019, in response to Turkey's military incursion into north-eastern Syria, the Government of Canada announced a temporary suspension on the issuance of all new permits

for the export of controlled goods and technology to Turkey. Exporters who were issued permits for the export of such items to Turkey prior to October 11, 2019 may continue to export against those permits during their period of validity.

In April 2020, Canada significantly narrowed the scope of its policy to include only military goods and technology. While restrictions continue to apply to military exports to Turkey, during the permit review process Canada is considering whether there are exceptional circumstances, including but not limited to NATO cooperation programs, that might justify issuing an export permit for military items on a case-by-case basis.

The Government of Canada has stated that it continues to monitor developments in Turkey and the surrounding region, and will take appropriate action should credible evidence be found regarding the misuse of any controlled Canadian good or technology, including to commit or to facilitate serious violations of international human rights or humanitarian law.

Project Ploughshares Report

Project Ploughshares recently released a report entitled *Killer Optics: Exports of Wescam Sensors to Turkey – A Litmus Test of Canada’s Compliance with the Arms Trade Treaty*. The report claims that a Canadian company L3Harris Wescam exported a large number of Electro Optical/Infra-Red (EO/IR) imaging and targeting sensor systems that can be used for tracking targets and guiding munitions to the Turkish military in 2019, based on Statistics Canada data.

Project Ploughshares further alleges that the Turkish military has committed serious breaches of international humanitarian law (IHL) and other violations, particularly when conducting airstrikes, and that Wescam sensors, mounted on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), have been used extensively by Turkey in its recent military activities. Project Ploughshares asserts that Canada is therefore violating the ATT obligations by permitting exports of Wescam sensors.

The department notes that Turkish drones have been used in Turkey’s military and security operations - both domestically and internationally -- and they have both defensive and offensive capabilities, depending on how they are tasked. Notably, the TB2 UAV are always used for the purposes of observation, surveillance, identification and targeting of targets, but some versions of the TAI ANKA drones also carry weapons.

Turkey’s justification of its cross-border military operations in Iraq and Syria relied heavily on an argument of national security related to the activities of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). While Canada does not always support Turkey’s military actions -- as was the case with Operation Peace Spring -- like most of our like-minded counterparts we support the position that Turkey, a NATO ally, has legitimate security concerns, specifically related to the activities of the PKK which is a listed terrorist organization in Canada.

The Turkish military is, by-and-large, a professional army that acts in accordance with its international obligations. While Operations Olive Branch and Peace Spring both resulted in the displacement of civilians, there is no clear evidence that suggest a deliberate targeting of civilians or civilian infrastructure.

The Ploughshares report relies heavily on two UN reports (9 August 2018 and 28 January 2020), as well as an Amnesty International Report (Oct 2019), which itself relies primarily on accounts reported by the Kurdish Red Crescent (affiliated with the self-administration in the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria). The Kurdish Red Crescent is not formally affiliated with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). While we do not doubt KRC's credibility, their assessment should not be equated with an ICRC assessment.

The UN reports that list incidents in which civilians were killed as a result of Turkish military operations are limited to the two military operations (Olive Branch and Peace Spring) in which the Turkish side specifically targeted the Peoples Protection Unit (YPG) armed group – which they perceive to be the Syrian branch of the PKK. In these military operations, Turkey relied extensively on the Syrian armed opposition groups (SNA) to conduct the ground offensive. The department's initial assessment (in line with likemindeds) is that the Turkish military did not/not engage in the deliberate and purposeful targeting of civilians or civilian infrastructure.

In its May 2020 memorandum to the Minister, the department noted that there had been no substantiated evidence of the Turkish Armed Forces committing human rights violations in Syria, either in Idlib or northeast Syria during OPS.

In Libya, since 2019 Turkey has provided weapons, drones, and reportedly over 16,500 Syrian mercenaries to Libya in support of Government of National Accord (GNA)-aligned forces, with which Turkey has a security agreement as of December 2019. A November 2019 UN Panel of Experts report on Libya found Turkey to be "routinely" in violation of UN sanctions on Libya related to arms, which were in force before the Turkey-GNA security agreement. A UN Panel of Experts report from December 2019 found that Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones, and possibly one Karayel drone, were exported to Libya for use by the GNA. While there have been unconfirmed reports that Turkish drones have killed civilians in Libya and thereby contributed to violations of IHL, there has been no conclusive evidence to-date that Turkey has committed violations of IHL in Libya. The United Nations and NGOs have very limited access to most of Libya due to ongoing conflict and instability, severely complicating the collection of evidence on alleged violations of international humanitarian law in Libya (e.g. testimonies, forensic evidence).

A separate classified assessment has been shared with ministerial and deputies offices through normal channels.

Permit Analysis

A number of foreign competitors in the US, France, Italy, Israel and even in Turkey manufacture similar cameras / technologies that can be used in such UAVs.

While it is known that some Bayraktar TB-2 UAVs possess [REDACTED] sensors due to its high quality, the proportion that do is not known. Wescam has received permits from GAC for camera surveillance systems destined directly to Turkey (the main consignees in these instances are [REDACTED] both of which supply the Turkish government). None of the permits issued to Wescam for items destined to Turkey from January 1, 2016 to September 27, 2020 indicate an end use in Libya, Azerbaijan or Armenia. Information related to current valid previously issued permits to Turkey is provided in the attached tables.

There appear to be no applications, nor any valid permits in EXCOL for L3 Wescam items destined directly to Libya, Azerbaijan or Armenia.

There are presently [REDACTED] applications in EXCOL that are “under review” for Wescam camera systems going via Turkey ([REDACTED] is the consignee) onwards to the Azerbaijan Airforce. These applications are currently under consultation.

Recent Interactions with [REDACTED]

Positions of Like-Minded Countries

The attached Annex sets out an up to date comparative chart on the position of key partner countries’ controls over strategic exports to Turkey, as well their relative commercial exposure.

Although most of our like-minded imposed exports restrictions on Turkey following the October 2019 incursion into Syria, Canada’s decision to immediately suspend all new export permits to Turkey went beyond our like-mindeds and immediately became a bilateral irritant with Turkey. Since Canada updated its exports control policy in April to only restrict Group 2 permits, its approach appears to be most closely aligned with the more restrictive of EU members, who are either not issuing permits for any military items or only for military items who are either not issuing permits for any military items to Turkey or not issuing permits for military items to Turkey for end use in Syria, for military use or other uses. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] have placed no restrictions on military exports to Turkey, which they are assessing on a case-by-case basis.

Next Steps

The Department is pursuing a wide range of steps in order to ascertain more information and proactively monitor the situation closely.

The Department could consider a number of different steps from an export controls perspective, depending on the additional information that becomes available.

[REDACTED]

Given the new outbreak in violence over Nagorno-Karabakh, Canada's Ambassador to Turkey raised our concerns about alleged use of Turkish drones equipped with Canadian technology with the Turkish MFA Head of Americas (ADM-eq) on September 29. This conversation will continue with Turkey to reaffirm our export controls regime and seek assurances about end use.

[REDACTED]

In the interim, officials continue to engage with DND and allies, as well as with GAC's legal bureau to gather information related to allegations in Syria, Canada's ATT obligations, and Canada's arms embargo to Libya.

The Embassy in Ankara, including our DND Defence Attaché, continues to engage local government, likeminded countries, and other key stakeholders, including civil society, as well as frequently monitor social media and NGO reporting.

The Department's Intelligence Bureau (IND) has prepared a detailed assessment, which will be shared separately due to its classification. IND will continue to monitor intelligence reporting and will continue to provide detailed and tailored intelligence assessments working with key Canadian and FVEY intelligence partners.

The Export Controls Bureau remains in close contact with [REDACTED] and is awaiting further information from the company.

Author's name/division or mission/tel.: Korecky/TIR/613-291-0347

Approval bureau/mission: TID

Consulted divisions/missions/departments: TIE/ECE/JLT/JLH/INA

TIR.0203

re: Turkey oMINA briefing Monday

From: "Anand, Shalini -TIE" </o=dfait-maeci/ou=exchange administrative group (fydibohf23spdlt)/cn=recipients/cn=anands2a9e">
To: *MINA-Dept Unit <d-mina-dept-unit@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *TFM-Policy <d-tfm-policy@international.gc.ca>, *USS-DMA Advisors <d-uss-dmaadvisors@international.gc.ca>, *DMT-Policy <d-dmt-policy@international.gc.ca>, "Funtek, Katharine -TID" <katharine.funtek@international.gc.ca>, "Gosselin, Catherine -TIR" <catherine.gosselin@international.gc.ca>, "Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE" <marieeve.roymarcoux@international.gc.ca>, "Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE" <joonhyuk.yoon@international.gc.ca>, "Mallett, Erika -TIE" <erika.mallett@international.gc.ca>, "Schonfeld, Benjamin -TIR" <benjamin.schonfeld@international.gc.ca>, "Grant, Alison -ECE" <alison.grant@international.gc.ca>, *DCB-Management/Gestion <d-dcb-management_gestion@international.gc.ca>, *DCB <d-dcb@international.gc.ca>
Date: Sun, 27 Sep 2020 18:49:11 -0400
Attachments: Slides for Turkey Annex B.pdf (880.08 kB); Turkey Annex B_v19 with Legend.docx (45.5 kB); Turkey Annex C_v13 with Legend.docx (30.74 kB); Slides for Turkey Annex A.pdf (582.59 kB); Turkey Annex A_v16 with legend.docx (74 kB); Slides for Turkey Annex C.pdf (518.22 kB)

Dear Aliya:


For tomorrow's briefing with Ally, please see attached updated Turkey annexes, which accompany memo BPTS 3389-2020. New permits have been added (in yellow) and we have re-circulated these to consultation partners for a second check and to provide any additional notes/context, given the changing dynamics in the region. Accordingly, there are now a total of █ permit applications at a value of \$█ for the Minister's consideration. We have also updated the attached decks.

DCB colleagues, please save this email and these Annexes into CCM mercury (no need to save the decks).

Warmly,
S.

Permits for Turkey Annex B


[redacted] - [redacted] receivers and
antennas





– Parts and software for cockpit image generator





 – Transmission for tracked military vehicle



– Parts for simunition conversion kit
(allows a firearm to use simulated ammunition for training)




 —  receivers and
antennas





– Rifle sights and scopes



Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status
United Arab Emirates						
	29/09/2019			2-11.a, 2-21.a, 2-22.a, 6-11.A.3.b.3, 6-11.E.2, 6-11.D.2		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item Description: [redacted] receivers, [redacted] antenna, technology and software. End-Use: [redacted] technology demonstrations to potential customers. End-User Country/Organization: Turkey/ [redacted] Condition (s): Quarterly Reporting Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Exception: D - Permits by [redacted] were raised by President Erdogan during his January 2020 call with PM Trudeau. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's sensitive domestic defense industry programs are <div style="display: flex; align-items: center;"> <input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss </div>

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

								<p>monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on bilateral relations. Although the final user is in the UAE, a refusal could be viewed as a lack of support from Canada to a NATO ally and impact our bilateral relations.</p>	
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Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

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- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada’s values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada’s foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
Turkey							
	25/11/2019	CAE Inc. (St-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Quebec)		2-14, 2-21.a, 2-22.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> This is a permit amendment request to extend the validity date of the permit by 1 year (permit expired January 31, 2020; however given that a review was underway, JLT/Legal division has advised that the permit could be reinstated, if approved; it would reflect the original request for extension or amendment, from the date of approval). Export of hardware, software and technology related to the Image Generators program. End-Use: For the Full Mission Simulator Image Generator (for pilot training). End-User Country/End User: Turkey/Turkish Air Force Condition (s): Quarterly reporting Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Exceptions: D - Permits for items used by Turkish Armed Forces are often raised at the highest level. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey’s military are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on bilateral relations with a NATO ally. • Exceptions: E - Export permit applications for an extension to an existing project from before Oct. 19. 	
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Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b)Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada’s values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c)A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d)There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada’s foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e)Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f)Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	25/11/2019	CAE Inc. (St-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Quebec)		2-21.a, 2-22.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item Description: This is a permit amendment request to extend the validity date by a year (permit expired on January 31, 2020; however given that a review was underway, JLT/Legal division has advised that the permit could be reinstated, if approved; it would reflect the original request for extension or amendment, from the date of approval). For the export of software and technology related to the Image Generator program. End-Use: Items will be accessed by consignee from their own systems, to provide on-site support to the Turkish Air Force (for pilot training). End-User Country/End User: Turkey / Condition (s): Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Exceptions: D - Permits for items used by 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

							<p>Turkish Armed Forces are often raised at the highest level. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's military are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on bilateral relations with a NATO ally.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Exception E - Export permit applications for an extension to an existing permit from before Oct. 19.
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Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;

b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);

c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;

d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;

e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and

f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
				2-22.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item Description: This is a permit amendment request to extend the validity date of the permit by 1 year (permit expired on June 30, 2020; however given that a review was underway, JLT/Legal division has advised that the permit could be reinstated, if approved; it would reflect the original request for extension or amendment, from the date of approval). To export technology related to HMX transmissions. End-Use: [REDACTED] End-User Country/End User: Turkey/ Turkish military. Condition (s): Consultations: Expedited consultation with DND and GEO, no objections raised. Exceptions: E - Export permit applications for an extension to an existing permit from 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada’s values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada’s foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						before Oct. 19.	
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Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada’s values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada’s foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item description: [REDACTED] End-Use: [REDACTED] End-User Country/End-User: Turkey / [REDACTED] Condition (s): Quarterly reporting. Consultations: Expedited consultation with DND and GEO, no objections raised. <p>Exception C - Items can only be used for training. Once installed, firearms cannot discharge live rounds, only simulated rounds.</p>	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada’s values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada’s foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	10/10/2019			2-11.a, 2-21.a.1, 2-22.a, 6-11.A.3.b.3, 6-11.D.2, 6-11.E.2		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item description: Antennas, technology and software upgrade downloads. End Use: For a drillship managed by [redacted] The vessel's work is in the Eastern Mediterranean. End User Country / Organization: Turkey / [redacted] Condition (s): Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Exceptions: C – GPS receiver, for navigation, going to civilian end user. Exception D –Permits by [redacted] were raised by President Erdogan during his January 2020 call with PM Trudeau. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's sensitive domestic defense industry programs are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on bilateral 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						relations with a NATO ally.	
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Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	09/12/2019			2-11.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item description: Replacement parts and components for [redacted] Aircraft Ship Integrated Securing and Traversing (ASIST) System. End Use: To be used by the Turkish Navy on their MILGEM class ships. End User Country / Organization: Turkey / Turkish Navy Condition (s): Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Exceptions: C – items secure helicopters to ship, serve no other purpose. Exceptions: D - [redacted] permits raised repeatedly in July by MFA and TK Embassy. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on bilateral relations with a NATO ally. 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada’s values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada’s foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						<ul style="list-style-type: none">Exception F - Permit request to re-export parts that were exported under a previous permit but returned for warranty repairs.	
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Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	22/01/2020			2-10.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item description: Various spares and subcomponents used in conjunction with the ASIST helicopter landing system. End Use: To be used on the SH-70 helicopter. End User Country / Organization: Turkey / Turkish Naval Forces Command Condition (s): Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Exceptions: C – items secure helicopters to ship, serve no other purpose. Exceptions: D - [redacted] permits raised repeatedly in July by MFA and TK Embassy. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on bilateral relations with a NATO ally. 	<input type="checkbox"/> *I concur <input type="checkbox"/> *I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> *I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada’s values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada’s foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	27/01/2020			2-10.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item description: cable cutter assemblies. Replacement of parts originally exported in June 2019. End Use: To be used in conjunction with the ASIST helicopter landing system on the SH-70 helicopter. End User Country / Organization: Turkey / Turkish Naval Forces Command Condition (s): Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Exceptions: C – items secure helicopters to ship, serve no other purpose. Exceptions: D – permits raised repeatedly in July by MFA and TK Embassy. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada’s values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada’s foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						<p>impact on bilateral relations with a NATO ally.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Exception F - Permit request to re-export parts that were exported under a previous permit but returned due to non-compliance.	
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Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	05/03/2020			2-10.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item description: cable cutter assembly. Warranty replacement of defective part. End Use: To be used in conjunction with the ASIST helicopter landing system on the SH-70 helicopter. End User Country / Organization: Turkey / Turkish Naval Forces Command Condition (s): Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Exceptions: C – items secure helicopters to ship, serve no other purpose. Exceptions: D - permits raised repeatedly in July by MFA and TK Embassy. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on bilateral relations with a NATO ally. 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada’s values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada’s foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Exceptions: F - Permit request to re-export parts that were exported under a previous permit but returned for warranty repairs.	
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Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
891054-7	09/04/2020	ARMAMENT TECHNOLOGY INCORPORATED (Halifax, Nova Scotia)	OSMANLI SAVUNMA SAN TIC LTD STI	2-1.d	428,000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item Description: Export of (80) firearm sights, and (40) riflescopes. End Use: For commercial re-sale to law enforcement, security, military and civilian marksmen by the consignee. End-User Country/End-User: Turkey/ OSMANLI SAVUNMA SAN TIC LTD STI. EUS states no further re-export. Condition (s): Quarterly reporting Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Exception C – While this item is not used for self-defence purposes, it can help with targeting and avoidance of civilian casualties. In addition, these items are available widely on a commercial basis. 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex C: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status
Turkey						
						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item description: [REDACTED] End Use: [REDACTED] End Use Country / Organization: Turkey / [REDACTED] Condition (s): Quarterly reporting. Consultations: Fully consulted, no objections, some risks pertaining to regional peace and security were raised. Note: while the value of this item is negligible, as it is a data transfer, the Department has been advised that [REDACTED]

<input type="checkbox"/>	I concur
<input type="checkbox"/>	I do not concur
<input type="checkbox"/>	I wish to discuss



Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend : exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a)Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b)Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada’s values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c)A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d)There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada’s foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e)Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f)Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex C: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

s.20(1)(c)

						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Exceptions: D – bilateral relations.  • Exceptions: E - export permit applications for an extension to an existing permit from 
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Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend : exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a)Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b)Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada’s values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c)A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
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- e)Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f)Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex C: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Item Description: [REDACTED] • End-Use: [REDACTED] • End-User Country/Organization: Turkey/[REDACTED] • Condition (s): • Consultation: Fully consulted, no objections, some risks pertaining to Turkey's active involvement in regional armed conflicts were raised. • Note: [REDACTED] • Exceptions: C - [REDACTED] 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend : exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a)Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b)Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada’s values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c)A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d)There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada’s foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e)Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f)Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex C: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	02/12/2019	Honeywell Limited (Mississauga, Ontario)		2-10.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item description: Generator Control Units used on the T-70 helicopter. End-Use: Generator control units will be installed in the Turkish Utility Helicopter T-70. These devices control the electrical power generators on the helicopter. End User Country / Organizations: Turkey / Turkish Military (various) Condition (s): Quarterly reporting Consultations: Fully consulted, no objections, but some risks pertaining to the final end use of this equipment were raised. Exception D – Permits linked to Turkey's sensitive domestic defense industry are raised repeatedly, including at the leaders level. A refusal of this permit could be seen as bilateral irritant and a lack of support to a NATO ally. 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend : exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex C: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey


Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend : exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
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- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Permits for Turkey Annex A

[REDACTED] – Technical assistance, training and software to support the [REDACTED] surveillance camera systems




– Technical data and scale model of



– Technical data to modify




 - Digitizing receiver for radio monitoring







surveillance and targeting camera systems, parts and components, software and technology



Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
United Arab Emirates							
	2019/09/25	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)	L3 / WESCAM TERRITORY DIRECTOR – MIDDLE EAST AND TURKEY	2-21.a.1; 2-22.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item Description: Technical assistance documents, training courses/materials and software related to the [redacted] and [redacted] surveillance camera systems End-Use: To be used for the operation, maintenance and/or installation of the surveillance systems and transfer to third parties in consignee's assigned geographical coverage which is Middle East and Turkey; possible re-transfer to Turkey. End-User Country/End User: UAE/various end-users in the Middle East and Turkey Condition(s): None Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns (ECE was also consulted for the Turkey angle) Exception: D - Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at Min level. Wescam permits were last discussed during MINA's Sept. 17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's domestic UAV program are monitored at 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
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- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status
					1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item Description: Technical data regarding [REDACTED] End-Use: [REDACTED] End-User Country/Organization: Turkey/ Turkey Ministry of National Defense Turkish Air Force. Condition (s): Consultations: Subject to the export controls of the [REDACTED] Fully consulted, no concerns. Exceptions: D – bilateral relations. [REDACTED] permit raised repeatedly. [REDACTED] This serves to demonstrate


<input type="checkbox"/>	• I concur
<input type="checkbox"/>	• I do not concur
<input type="checkbox"/>	• I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

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- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada’s foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
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Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						<p>that decisions around permits are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on the bilateral relations with a NATO ally.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">  	
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Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

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- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada’s values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
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- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
					1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item Description: Technical data related to [REDACTED] End-Use: [REDACTED] End-User Country/Organization: Turkey/ Republic of Turkey Ministry of National Defense Turkish Air Force. Condition (s): Consultations: Subject to the export controls of the [REDACTED] Fully consulted, no concerns. Exceptions: D – bilateral relations. [REDACTED] permit raised repeatedly. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada’s values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
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- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

							impact on the bilateral relations with a NATO ally.	
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Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
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- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
Turkey							
	2020/03/30			2-11.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item description: Instantaneous Frequency Measurement (IFM) receiver (Digitizing receiver), for return after testing. End-Use: Used for detection and monitoring of radar signals. End User Country / Organizations: Turkey Condition (s): Quarterly reporting Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Exception : D - <p>This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's domestic UAV program are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on bilateral relations with a NATO ally.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Exception F - request to re-export parts that were exported under a previous 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						permit but returned for repairs (Proof of import provided)	
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Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

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- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada’s values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
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- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	2020/04/24	FIELD AVIATION COMPANY INC. (Mississauga, Ontario)		2-10.a, 2-22.a, 9-4.a.ii		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item description: Modified Bombardier Challenger aircraft including all materials, associated spare parts and kits. End-Use: For surveillance and Information Communication. End User Country / Organizations: Turkey / Presidency of the Republic of Turkey. Condition (s): Quarterly reporting Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Exceptions: D - This permit raised repeatedly. In July, Turkey asked for an urgent call with MINA to discuss the Field Aviation permit. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on bilateral relations with a NATO ally. 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
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Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

							<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Exception: E: export permit applications for an extension to an existing project from before Oct. 19. • Note: Department was advised that aircraft was already shipped against the company's previous permit, and that this permit is for materials/spare parts, no changes were requested to this permit. • Note: Export is limited to the [REDACTED] aircraft noted, serial number 5946, and does not allow a [REDACTED] aircraft to be exported if this permit is approved.
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Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	06/12/2019	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-5.d		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item Description: Ground Boresight Module/adaptor systems for the Wescam Surveillance Systems (a part for calibration of the camera system) End-Use: To be installed on a End-User Country/Organization: Turkey/ Condition (s): Quarterly reporting Consultations: Fully consulted, no objections. Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.) Exception: D - Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at Min level. Wescam permits were last discussed during MINA's Sept. 17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's domestic UAV program are monitored at the 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

							<p>highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on the bilateral relation with a NATO ally. (TK UAVs with CA tech. have been sighted in Libya, Syria, N. Iraq and East Med.) ECE/Post is not aware of any human rights violation that would implicate any Wescam permits.</p>	
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Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada’s values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada’s foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	05/12/2019	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-5.b, 2-15.d, 2-21.a.1, 2-22.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item Description: This is a permit amendment request to extend validity date by a year (permit expired on March 31, 2020; however given that a review was underway, JLT/Legal division has advised that the permit could be reinstated, if approved; it would reflect the original request for extension or amendment, from the date of approval). The permit is for export of various spare parts and components of the surveillance camera systems and related technology and software. End-Use: Used by consignee to repair and systems in Turkey. End-User Country/End User: Turkey / L3 Wescam. The EUS states the items will not be re-exported or transferred to another party. Condition (s): Quarterly reporting. Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.) Exception D - Wescam permits raised 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada’s values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada’s foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						<p>repeatedly including at Min level. Wescam permits were last discussed during MINA's Sept. 17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's domestic UAV program are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on bilateral relations with a NATO ally.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Exception: E - export permit applications for an extension to an existing project from before Oct. 19.
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Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	05/12/2019	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-5.b, 2-15.d, 6-9.A.6, 2-11.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item Description: This is a permit amendment request to extend the validity date by a year (permit expired March 31, 2020; however given that a review was underway, JLT/Legal division has advised that the permit could be reinstated, if approved; it would reflect the original request for extension or amendment, from the date of approval). The permit is for export of spare parts and components of the [redacted] surveillance camera systems. End-Use: To perform surveillance, targeting, research, test and training by Turkish law enforcement authorities. End-User Country/End User: Turkey / [redacted] of Turkey. EUS states no further re-export to a third party. Condition (s): Quarterly reporting. Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.) Exception : D – Wescam permits raised 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada’s values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada’s foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	02/12/2019	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-15.d, 6-9.A.6, 2-5.b, 2-21.a, 2-22.b		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item Description: This is a permit amendment request to extend the validity date by 1 year (permit expired on March 31, 2020; however given that a review was underway, JLT/Legal division has advised that the permit could be reinstated, if approved; it would reflect the original request for extension or amendment, from the date of approval). Permit allows a total export of surveillance & targeting camera systems, Ground boresight modules, mission grip assemblies and technical data. End-Use: To perform surveillance, targeting, research, test and training by Turkish law enforcement authorities. End-User Country/End User: Turkey / Turkish Ministry of Defense. Condition (s): Quarterly reporting. Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.) 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada’s values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada’s foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

							<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Exceptions: D - Permits for items used by Turkish Armed Forces are often raised at the highest level. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey’s military are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on bilateral relations with a NATO ally. • Exceptions: E - Export permit applications for an extension to an existing permit from before Oct. 19. 	
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Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b)Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada’s values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c)A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d)There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada’s foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e)Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f)Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	02/12/2019	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-22.a, 2-21.a, 2-18		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item Description: This is a permit amendment request to extend the validity date by a year (permit expired March 31, 2020; however given that a review was underway, JLT/Legal division has advised that the permit could be reinstated, if approved; it would reflect the original request for extension or amendment, from the date of approval). Permit allows for a total of [redacted] master control units, [redacted] handcontroler assemblies, and controlled technical data. End-Use: To perform repairs of [redacted] surveillance camera systems. End-User Country/End User: Turkey / L3. EUS states no further re-export. Condition (s): Quarterly reporting. Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Exception D –Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at Min level. Wescam permits were last discussed during MINA’s Sept. 17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada’s values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada’s foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						<p>demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's domestic UAV program are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on bilateral relations with a NATO ally.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Exception: E - export permit applications for an extension to an existing project from before Oct. 19.	
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- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
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- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	02/01/2020	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-15.d, 2-5.b		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item Description: This is a permit amendment request to extend permit by 1 year (permit expired April 30, 2020; however given that a review was underway, JLT/Legal division has advised that the permit could be reinstated, if approved; it would reflect the original request for extension or amendment, from the date of approval). Permit allows for a total of () surveillance & targeting camera systems. End-Use: To be installed on the () System, used for the purpose of surveillance and targeting. End-User: Turkey / Turkish Gendarmerie. EUS states no further re-export. Condition (s): Quarterly reporting. Consultation: Fully consulted, no concerns. Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.) Exception D - Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at Min level. Wescam permits were last discussed during MINA's 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						<p>Sept. 17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's domestic UAV program are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on bilateral relations with a NATO ally.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Exception: E - export permit applications for an extension to an existing project from before Oct. 19. 	
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- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
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- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	26/05/2020	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-5.b, 2-15.d		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Item Description: This is permit amendment request to extend permit for 1 year (permit expired June 30, 2020; however given that a review was underway, JLT/Legal division has advised that the permit could be reinstated, if approved; it would reflect the original request for extension or amendment, from the date of approval). Permit allows for a total export of █ surveillance and targeting camera systems, including ancillary equipment. • End Use: The systems will be used for surveillance and targeting. • End User Country/Organization: Turkey / Turkish National Police • Conditions: Quarterly Reporting • Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. • Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.) • Exception D - Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at Min level. Wescam 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
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- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						<p>permits were last discussed during MINA's Sept. 17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's domestic UAV program are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on bilateral relations with a NATO ally.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Exception: E - export permit applications for an extension to an existing project from before Oct. 19. 	
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- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	28/05/2020	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-5.b, 2-15.d		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item Description: This is a permit amendment request to extend the validity date by a year (permit expired June 30, 2020; however given that a review was underway, JLT/Legal division has advised that the permit could be reinstated, if approved; it would reflect the original request for extension or amendment, from the date of approval). Permit allows for the export of [redacted] surveillance and targeting camera system, including ancillary equipment. End-Use: To perform surveillance, targeting, research, test and training by Turkish law enforcement authorities. End-User Country/End User: Turkey / [redacted] EUS states no further re-export to a non-listed party. Condition (s): Quarterly reporting. Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.) 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

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- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada’s foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Exception D - Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at Min level. Wescam permits were last discussed during MINA's Sept. 17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's domestic UAV program are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on bilateral relations with a NATO ally. • Exception: E - export permit applications for an extension to an existing project from before Oct. 19.
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Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
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Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	28/05/2020	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-21.a.1; 2-22.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item Description: This is a permit amendment request to extend the current permit by 1 year to June 30, 2023 (original permit expires June 30, 2022) For the export of technical assistance documents, training courses/materials and software and firmware related to the [redacted] and [redacted] surveillance camera systems End Use: For a quotation/proposal on the surveillance systems, which requires the technical items. End User Country/Organization: Turkey / [redacted] Conditions: Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.) Exception D - Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at Min level. Wescam permits were last discussed during MINA's Sept. 17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

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Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						<p>domestic UAV program are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on bilateral relations with a NATO ally.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Exception: E - export permit applications for an extension to an existing project from before Oct. 19.	
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Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	06/07/2020	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-5.b, 2-11.a, 2-15.d, 2-14, 2-21.a.1		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item Description: This is a permit amendment request to extend the validity date by a year (permit expires on November 30, 2020) to provide continuous demonstration. Permit allows for a total of [redacted] EO/IR surveillance & targeting camera systems, [redacted] EO/IR surveillance & targeting camera systems [redacted] handcontroller units, [redacted] mission grip assemblies, [redacted] desktop simulator kits, [redacted] laptops, [redacted] kinetic computers and [redacted] ground boresight modules. End-Use: Items will be used to demonstrate electro-optic and infrared system capabilities to the military, government and law enforcement. End-User Country/End User: Turkey [redacted] [redacted] Condition (s): Temporary condition. Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Precedent memo - BPTS 01794- 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

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- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada’s foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						<p>2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Exception D - Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at Min level. Wescam permits were last discussed during MINA's Sept. 17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's domestic UAV program are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on bilateral relations with a NATO ally. • Exception: E - export permit applications for an extension to an existing project from before Oct. 19. 	
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- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
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Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	2020/07/21	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-5.b; 2-15.d; 2-21.a.1; 2-22.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item description: This is a permit amendment request to extend the validity date of the permit by a year to January 30, 2023 (permit expires on January 31, 2022). Export allows for a total of [REDACTED] EO/IR surveillance & targeting camera, [REDACTED] ground boresight modules, [REDACTED] mission grips and hand-controllers, and technical documents, training courses/ materials and operational software/firmware. End-Use: To be incorporated into the [REDACTED] platform for the purpose of surveillance and targeting. End User: Turkey / [REDACTED] Condition (s): Quarterly reporting Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.) Exception D - Wescam permits raised 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

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- There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	2020/06/08	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-11.a, 2-15.d, 2-18.a, 2-21.a, 2-22.a, 6-9.A.6		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item description: Repair and return of EO/IR surveillance camera systems, () and () EO/IR surveillance and targeting camera systems, repair/replacement parts, test equipment and related technical data, training materials and software. End-Use: Repaired full systems are to be returned to their foreign owners; the replacement parts, test equipment and technology will be used for in-country repairs/maintenance. End User Country / Organizations: Turkey / () Condition (s): Quarterly reporting Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.) Exception D - Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at Min level. 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

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Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						<p>Wescam permits were last discussed during MINA's Sept. 17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's domestic UAV program are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on bilateral relations with a NATO ally.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Exception: F - request to re-export parts that were exported under a previous permit but returned for repairs (Proof of import provided)
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Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	2020/04/06	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-15.d, 2-18.a, 2-21.a, 2-22.a, 6-9.A.6		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item description: EO/IR surveillance and targeting camera systems for their own end use and EO/IR surveillance and targeting camera systems, as well as software. End-Use: For end use by [redacted] will use the [redacted] for sustainability and maintainability purposes and for after sales support. End User Country / Organizations: Turkey / SSB (Presidency of Defense industry) Condition (s): Quarterly reporting Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.) Exceptions: D - Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at Min level. Wescam permits were last discussed during MINA's Sept. 17 call 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

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Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	2020/04/06	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-5.b, 2-15.d, 2-18.a,2-21.a, 2-22.a, 6-9.A.6		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item description: (EO/IR surveillance and targeting camera systems, EO/IR surveillance and targeting camera systems, hand-controller assemblies, ground boresight modules, repair/replacement parts, and test equipment to Turkey. End-Use: Used for the purpose of Surveillance and Targeting. End User Country / Organizations: Turkey / Condition (s): Quarterly reporting Consultations Fully consulted no concerns. Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.) Exception D - Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at Min level. Wescam permits were last discussed during MINA's Sept. 17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

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Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

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Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	2020/05/13	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-15.d, 2-18.a, 2-21.a, 2-22.a, 6-9.A.6		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item description: () EO/IR surveillance and targeting camera systems, () ground boresight modules, () handcontroller assemblies and technical documents. End-Use: Used for the purpose of Surveillance and Targeting. End User Country / Organizations: Turkey / () Condition (s): Quarterly reporting Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.) Exception D - Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at Min level. Wescam permits were last discussed during MINA's Sept. 17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's domestic UAV program are monitored at the 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

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Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

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Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	2020/06/08	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-15.d		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item description: Various spare parts for the Wescam EO/IR surveillance and targeting camera systems. End-Use: Used in the repairs and maintenance of defective surveillance systems owned by military and law enforcement agencies that fall under Ministry of Defense of Interior. End User Country / Organizations: Turkey / Condition (s): Quarterly reporting Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.) Exception D - Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at Min level. Wescam permits were last discussed during MINA's Sept. 17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

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Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

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- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	2020/06/03	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-15.d		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item description: Return temporarily imported [redacted] produced parts for the Wescam [redacted] EO/IR surveillance and targeting camera systems. End-Use: Items underwent an independent assessment in Canada. Used for the purpose of Surveillance and Targeting. End User Country / Organizations: Turkey / [redacted] Condition (s): Quarterly reporting Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.) Exception D - Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at Min level. Wescam permits were last discussed during MINA's Sept. 17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's domestic 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

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Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						UAV program are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact o on bilateral relations with a NATO ally.	
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Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

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- f)Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	2020/07/29	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-5.d; 2-11.a; 2-15.d; 2-18.a; 2-21.a.1; 2-22.a; 6-9.A.6		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item description: repaired EO/IR surveillance & targeting camera systems, and EO/IR surveillance & targeting camera systems, replacement parts, related test equipment, technical data, training materials and software. End-Use: Foreign-owned items to be returned after repair. End User Country / Organizations: Turkey / Presidency of the Republic of Turkey and Presidency of Defence Industries Condition (s): Quarterly reporting Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.) Exception D. bilat relations. Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at Min level. Wescam permits were last 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

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Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						<p>discussed during MINA's Sept. 17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's domestic UAV program are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on bilateral relations with a NATO ally.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Exception: F - request to re-export parts that were exported under a previous permit but returned for repairs (Proof of import provided) 	
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Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	2020/07/15	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-15.d		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item description: Return temporarily imported [redacted] produced parts for the Wescam [redacted] EO/IR surveillance and targeting camera systems. End-Use: Canada conducted an independent assessment of parts; the assessment had been completed and items are to be returned to consignee [redacted] End User Country / Organizations: Turkey / [redacted] Condition (s): Quarterly reporting Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.) Exception D - Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at Min level. Wescam permits were last discussed during MINA's Sept. 17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

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
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Permits for Turkey Annex C

– Technical data to support



 – Optical sensor that detects incoming laser beam



(b) – Generator control units for




TIR.0210

re: updated information on what has shipped to date against L3 Wescam permits

From: "Anand, Shalini -TIE" <shalini.anand@international.gc.ca>
To: "Mawani, Aliya -MINA" <aliya.mawani@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *TFM-Policy <d-tfm-policy@international.gc.ca>, *USS-DMA Advisors <d-uss-dmaadvisors@international.gc.ca>, *DMT-Policy <d-dmt-policy@international.gc.ca>, *MINA-Dept Unit <d-mina-dept-unit@international.gc.ca>, "Funtek, Katharine -TID" <katharine.funtek@international.gc.ca>, "Gosselin, Catherine -TIR" <catherine.gosselin@international.gc.ca>, "Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE" <joonhyuk.yoon@international.gc.ca>, "Alday, Corazon -TIE" <corazon.alday@international.gc.ca>, "Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE" <marieeve.roymarcoux@international.gc.ca>, "Schonfeld, Benjamin -TIR" <benjamin.schonfeld@international.gc.ca>, "Korecky, Judy -TIR" <judy.korecky@international.gc.ca>, "Senkiw, Jillian -TIR" <jillian.senkiw@international.gc.ca>, "Grant, Alison -ECE" <alison.grant@international.gc.ca>
Date: Thu, 01 Oct 2020 13:01:16 -0400
Attachments: L3WESCAM PERMITS TO TURKEY after Oct 11 2019 announcement (w. PUR as of Sept 30 2020) V3.docx (19.07 kB)

Hi Aliya:

Further to the charts that we previously provided oMINA on shipments of Wescam products against each of their valid Turkey permits, last night we have received the updated shipping details from the company against their existing valid permits in the system. It's cumbersome to go through each file, but we are doing so. As a starting point, we have updated the chart of the  permits/PARs that were approved by MINA in May 2020. This chart now shows what has been shipped against each permit up to Sept 30, 2020, according to the latest company reporting from last night.

Warmly,
S.

Shalini Anand (Ms.)
Director/Directrice
Export Controls Operations Division/Direction des opérations des contrôles à l'exportation



re:updated information on what has shipped to date against L3 Wescam permits

From: "Anand, Shalini -TIE" <shalini.anand@international.gc.ca>
To: "Mawani, Aliya -MINA" <aliya.mawani@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *TFM-Policy <d-tfm-policy@international.gc.ca>, *USS-DMA Advisors <d-uss-dmaadvisors@international.gc.ca>, *DMT-Policy <d-dmt-policy@international.gc.ca>, *MINA-Dept Unit <d-mina-dept-unit@international.gc.ca>, "Funtek, Katharine -TID" <katharine.funtek@international.gc.ca>, "Gosselin, Catherine -TIR" <catherine.gosselin@international.gc.ca>, "Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE" <joonhyuk.yoon@international.gc.ca>, "Alday, Corazon -TIE" <corazon.alday@international.gc.ca>, "Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE" <marieeve.roymarcoux@international.gc.ca>, "Schonfeld, Benjamin -TIR" <benjamin.schonfeld@international.gc.ca>, "Korecky, Judy -TIR" <judy.korecky@international.gc.ca>, "Senkiw, Jillian -TIR" <jillian.senkiw@international.gc.ca>, "Grant, Alison -ECE" <alison.grant@international.gc.ca>
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Director/Directrice
Export Controls Operations Division/Direction des opérations des contrôles à l'exportation





29 SEPTEMBER 2020

TURKEY:

(U//FOUO) **Context:** A Project Ploughshares report alleges that Turkish UAVs mounted with sensors from a Canada-based company (WESCAM) have been used extensively by Turkey in its recent military activities. Project Ploughshares further alleges that Turkey has exported UAVs equipped with sensors from a Canada-based company to armed groups in Libya, in breach of a UN arms embargo. A *Globe and Mail* article, citing the Project Ploughshares report, references an October 2019 Amnesty International (AI) press release (itself end-noted in the Project Ploughshares report) which claimed that a 12 October 2019 Turkish airstrike, around 07:00am (local), near a school in Salhiye, Hasakah Province, Syria killed 4 civilians and injured 6, based on the testimony of a Kurdish Red Crescent worker. Neither the AI press nor the Project Ploughshares report indicate the means of the claimed Turkish airstrike (e.g. aircraft or UAV).