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February 16, 2021

Ms. Erica Pereira
Clerk of the Committee
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development
House of Commons
131 Queen Street, 6th Floor
Ottawa, ON K1A 0A6

Dear Ms. Pereira:

Pursuant to the Committee's motion adopted on October 29, 2020, ordering the provision of documents pertaining to the study of export controls, please find uploaded the latest installment of documents from Global Affairs Canada.

These documents are provided further to the following recent installments:

- December 21, 2020 – Relevant Global Affairs Canada briefing notes and memorandums and Privy Council Office email correspondence.
- February 5, 2021 – List of remaining documents to be processed and provided to the Committee.

For ease of reference, we have also uploaded a copy of the February 5, 2021 list so that Committee members may cross-reference with the documents provided today.

Global Affairs Canada has continued to apply the principle of transparency to the greatest extent possible. Redactions include only information for which disclosure would be injurious to the conduct of international affairs, ongoing investigations, and third-party competitive positions. Global Affairs Canada has waived most solicitor-client privilege. As well, the department conducted extensive third-party consultations and encouraged companies to permit the department to release to the Committee as much information as possible. As a result, only information that would prejudice the finances, competitive position and negotiations has been redacted.

We anticipate delivering the remaining documents in two final installments, with the first to be uploaded to the Committee the week of March 21, 2021, and the second, to be uploaded in early April, 2021.

Should you have any questions about these materials, please do not hesitate to reach out to me.

Sincerely,

Colleen Calvert
Executive Director, Cabinet and Parliamentary Affairs

FW: REVISED VERSION: UPDATE ON POSSIBLE LINKAGES TO ALLEGED USE OF TURKISH DRONES IN CONFLICT ZONES

From: "Boileau, Guy -DMT" <guy.boileau@international.gc.ca>
To: "Boileau, Guy -DMT" <guy.boileau@international.gc.ca>
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2020 18:22:57 -0500
Attachments: Unnamed Attachment (68 bytes)

From: Korecky, Judy -TIR
Sent: October 1, 2020 7:15 PM
To: *MINA-Dept Unit ; Mawani, Aliya -MINA
Cc: Funtek, Katharine -TID ; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR ; Anand, Shalini -TIE ; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE ; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR ; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR ; *DMT-Policy ; *TFM-Policy ; *USS-DMA Advisors ; Picard, Beatrix -TIR ; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE ; Pilloud, Marc -ECE ; Grant, Alison -ECE ; Coleman, Robert -ECE ; Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE ; Alday, Corazon -TIE
Subject: REVISED VERSION: UPDATE ON POSSIBLE LINKAGES TO ALLEGED USE OF TURKISH DRONES IN CONFLICT ZONES

Hello o/MINA,

It has come to our attention that there is a error in the last paragraph of the Permit Analysis Section of the report sent yesterday, specifically with respect to the number of applications under review for end-use by the Azerbaijan Airforce. See correction immediately below:

There are presently () applications in EXCOL that are "under review" for Wescam camera systems going via Turkey () is the consignee) onwards to the Azerbaijan Airforce.

A revised copy of the report is below.

Judy

UNCLASSIFIED

POSSIBLE EXPORT PERMIT LINKAGES TO ALLEGED USE OF TURKISH DRONES IN CONFLICT ZONES**ISSUE**

There are media reports and allegations that Turkey has transferred or sold drones to the Azerbaijani armed forces, possibly with Canadian technology, that are being used in the recent flare-up of large-scale military attacks between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh. The Armenian National Committee of Canada alleges that Azerbaijan is using Turkish made Bayraktar TB2 drones.

A recent report by Project Ploughshares claims that Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones allegedly used by the Turkish military in Syria and Libya may have been used in conjunction with sensors obtained from a Canadian company L3 Harris Wescam (Wescam).

Officials are seeking to determine the veracity of these claims and to determine whether there are any potential export control issues.

Canada's policy approach towards exports of Group 2 items to Turkey has not changed since April 2020.

Canadian Export Controls and Turkey

Canada has one of the strongest export controls systems in the world, and respect for human rights is enshrined in our export controls legislation.

In September 2019, Canada acceded to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and placed the ATT assessment criteria directly into Canadian law. Under the law, controlled goods and technology cannot be exported from Canada where there is a substantial risk that they could be used to commit or to facilitate serious violations of international humanitarian law, international human rights law, or serious acts of gender-based violence. Other criteria which would lead to a permit application denial include a substantial risk that the arms or munitions could be used to undermine peace and security or to further international organized crime or terrorism. Canada has one of the most robust legal applications of this Treaty in the world.

Until recently Turkey ██████████ in terms of Canada's export controls, given their membership and adherence to the four multilateral export control regimes (i.e. the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Australia Group), as well as being a member of NATO and having effective export control mechanisms. ██████████
██████████
██████████

On October 11, 2019, in response to Turkey's military incursion into north-eastern Syria, the Government of Canada announced a temporary suspension on the issuance of all new permits for the export of controlled goods and technology to Turkey. Exporters who were issued permits for the export of such items to Turkey prior to October 11, 2019 may continue to export against those permits during their period of validity.

In April 2020, Canada significantly narrowed the scope of its policy to include only military goods and technology. While restrictions continue to apply to military exports to Turkey, during the permit review process Canada is considering whether there are exceptional circumstances, including but not limited to NATO cooperation programs, that might justify issuing an export permit for military items on a case-by-case basis.

The Government of Canada has stated that it continues to monitor developments in Turkey and the surrounding region, and will take appropriate action should credible evidence be found regarding the misuse of any controlled Canadian good or technology, including to commit or to facilitate serious violations of international human rights or humanitarian law.

Project Ploughshares Report

Project Ploughshares recently released a report entitled *Killer Optics: Exports of Wescam Sensors to Turkey – A Litmus Test of Canada's Compliance with the Arms Trade Treaty*. The report claims that a Canadian company L3 Harris Wescam (Wescam) exported a large number of Electro Optical/Infra-Red (EO/IR) imaging and targeting

sensor systems that can be used for tracking targets and guiding munitions to the Turkish military in 2019, based on Statistics Canada data.

Project Ploughshares further alleges that the Turkish military has committed serious breaches of international humanitarian law (IHL) and other violations, particularly when conducting airstrikes, and that Wescam sensors, mounted on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), have been used extensively by Turkey in its recent military activities. Project Ploughshares asserts that Canada is therefore violating the ATT obligations by permitting exports of Wescam sensors.

The department notes that Turkish drones have been used in Turkey's military and security operations - both domestically and internationally - and they have both defensive and offensive capabilities, depending on how they are tasked. Notably, the TB2 UAV are always used for the purposes of observation, surveillance, identification and targeting of targets, but some versions of the TAI ANKA drones also carry weapons.

Turkey's justification of its cross-border military operations in Iraq and Syria relied heavily on an argument of national security related to the activities of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). While Canada does not always support Turkey's military actions - as was the case with Operation Peace Spring - like most of our like-minded counterparts we support the position that Turkey, a NATO ally, has legitimate security concerns, specifically related to the activities of the PKK which is a listed terrorist organization in Canada.

The Turkish military is, by-and-large, a professional army that acts in accordance with its international obligations. While Operations Olive Branch and Peace Spring both resulted in the displacement of civilians, there is no clear evidence that suggest a deliberate targeting of civilians or civilian infrastructure.

The Ploughshares report relies heavily on two UN reports (9 August 2018 and 28 January 2020), as well as an Amnesty International Report (Oct 2019), which itself relies primarily on accounts reported by the Kurdish Red Crescent (affiliated with the self-administration in the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria). The Kurdish Red Crescent is not formally affiliated with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). While we do not doubt KRC's credibility, their assessment should not be equated with an ICRC assessment.

The UN reports that list incidents in which civilians were killed as a result of Turkish military operations are limited to the two military operations (Olive Branch and Peace Spring) in which the Turkish side specifically targeted the Peoples Protection Unit (YPG) armed group - which they perceive to be the Syrian branch of the PKK. In these military operations, Turkey relied extensively on the Syrian armed opposition groups (SNA) to conduct the ground offensive. The department's initial assessment (in line with likeminded) is that the Turkish military did not/not engage in the deliberate and purposeful targeting of civilians or civilian infrastructure.

In its May 2020 memorandum to the Minister, the department noted that there had been no substantiated evidence of the Turkish Armed Forces committing human rights violations in Syria, either in Idlib or northeast Syria during OPS. [REDACTED]

In Libya, since 2019 Turkey has provided weapons, drones, and reportedly over 16,500 Syrian mercenaries to Libya in support of Government of National Accord (GNA)-aligned forces, with which Turkey has a security agreement as of December 2019. A November 2019 UN Panel of Experts report on Libya found Turkey to be "routinely" in violation of UN sanctions on Libya related to arms, which were in force before the Turkey-GNA security agreement. A UN Panel of Experts report from December 2019 found that Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones, and possibly one Karayel drone, were exported to Libya for use by the GNA. While there have been unconfirmed reports that Turkish drones have killed civilians in Libya and thereby contributed to violations of IHL, there has been no conclusive evidence to-date that Turkey has committed violations of IHL in Libya. The United Nations and NGOs have very limited access to most of Libya due to ongoing conflict and instability, severely complicating the collection of evidence on alleged violations of international humanitarian law in Libya

(e.g. testimonies, forensic evidence).

[REDACTED] A separate classified assessment has been shared with ministerial and deputies offices through normal channels.

Permit Analysis

[REDACTED] . A number of foreign competitors in the US, France, Italy, Israel and even in Turkey manufacture similar cameras / technologies that can be used in such UAVs. [REDACTED]

While it is known that some Bayraktar TB-2 UAVs possess Wescam sensors due to its high quality, the proportion that do is not known. At this juncture, it would be impossible to credibly guess a percentage. We do not presently have the necessary information to make such an estimate, however officials are making best efforts to obtain information that would assist in this regard. [REDACTED]

Wescam has received permits from GAC for camera surveillance systems destined directly to Turkey (the main consignees in these instances are [REDACTED] both of which supply the Turkish government). None of the permits issued to Wescam for items destined to Turkey from January 1, 2016 to September 27, 2020 indicate an end use in Libya, Azerbaijan or Armenia. Information related to current valid previously issued permits to Turkey is provided in the attached tables.

There appear to be no applications, nor any valid permits in EXCOL for L3 Wescam items destined directly to Libya, Azerbaijan or Armenia.

There are presently [REDACTED] applications in EXCOL that are "under review" for Wescam camera systems going via Turkey ([REDACTED] is the consignee) onwards to the Azerbaijan Airforce. These applications are currently under consultation.

Recent Interactions [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Positions of Like-Minded Countries

The attached Annex sets out an up to date comparative chart on the position of key partner countries' controls over strategic exports to Turkey, as well their relative commercial exposure.

Although most of our like-mindeds imposed exports restrictions on Turkey following the October 2019 incursion into Syria, Canada's decision to immediately suspend all new export permits to Turkey went beyond our like-mindeds and immediately became a bilateral irritant with Turkey. Since Canada updated its exports control policy in April to only restrict Group 2 permits, its approach appears to be most closely aligned with the more restrictive of EU members, who are either not issuing permits for any military items or only for military items who are either not issuing permits for any military items to Turkey or not issuing permits for military items to Turkey for end use in Syria, for military use or other uses. [REDACTED] have placed no restrictions on military exports to Turkey, which they are assessing on a case-by-case basis.

Next Steps

The Department is pursuing a wide range of steps in order to ascertain more information and proactively monitor the situation closely.

The Department could consider a number of different steps from an export controls perspective, depending on the additional information that becomes available.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. Given the new outbreak in violence over Nagorno-Karabakh, Canada's Ambassador to Turkey raised our concerns about alleged use of Turkish drones equipped with Canadian technology with the Turkish MFA Head of Americas (ADM-eq) on September 29. This conversation will continue with Turkey to reaffirm our export controls regime and seek assurances about end use.

[REDACTED]

In the interim, officials continue to engage with DND and allies, as well as with GAC's legal bureau to gather information related to allegations in Syria, Canada's ATT obligations, and Canada's arms embargo to Libya.

The Embassy in Ankara, including our DND Defence Attaché, continues to engage local government, likeminded countries, and other key stakeholders, including civil society, as well as frequently monitor social media and NGO reporting.

The Department's Intelligence Bureau (IND) has prepared a detailed assessment, which will be shared separately due to its classification. IND will continue to monitor intelligence reporting and will continue to provide detailed and tailored intelligence assessments working with key Canadian and FVEY intelligence partners.

The Export Controls Bureau remains in close contact with [REDACTED] and is awaiting further information from the company.

Author's name/division or mission/tel.: Korecky/TIR/613-291-0347

Approval bureau/mission: TFMA

Consulted divisions: TIE/ECE/JLT/JLH/INA

From: Korecky, Judy -TIR
Sent: September-30-20 5:31 PM
To: Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Catherine Gosselin (Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca) <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; Picard, Beatrix -TIR <Beatrix.Picard@international.gc.ca>
Subject: FW: UPDATE ON POSSIBLE LINKAGES TO ALLEGED USE OF TURKISH DRONES IN CONFLICT ZONES

Hi Aliya,

Further to a quick discussion with Guy Boileau, I am sending to you a slightly revised version of the Sitrep document that provides additional context on one point. For awareness, the insertion is in italics below.

While it is known that some Bayraktar TB-2 UAVs possess Wescam sensors due to its high quality, the proportion that do is not known. *At this juncture it would be impossible to credibly guess a percentage. We do not presently have the necessary information to make such an estimate, however officials are making best efforts to obtain information that would assist in this regard, including reaching out to Wescam.*

I will share the revised version of this document with consultees and other interested parties in a separate email.

Judy

From: Korecky, Judy -TIR
Sent: September-30-20 5:01 PM
To: Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: UPDATE ON POSSIBLE LINKAGES TO ALLEGED USE OF TURKISH DRONES IN CONFLICT ZONES

Hi Aliya and Catherine,

Attached find a clean version without the "draft" watermark. Is it sufficient to send it to you in this manner?

Judy

From: Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>
Sent: September-30-20 4:37 PM
To: Korecky, Judy -TIR <Judy.Korecky@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: UPDATE ON POSSIBLE LINKAGES TO ALLEGED USE OF TURKISH DRONES IN CONFLICT ZONES

Hi Judy,

Aliya just called to ask whether you would be able to remove the "draft" watermark from the document as she isn't able to do that at her end. I also tried and wasn't able to remove it. Strange, no?

Thank you!

Catherine

613.410.6521

From: Korecky, Judy -TIR <Judy.Korecky@international.gc.ca>
Sent: September-30-20 3:53 PM
To: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; McCardell, Sandra -EGM <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Anderson, Ian -EGM <Ian.Anderson@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -BCD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Brisson, Julien -ECE <Julien.Brisson@international.gc.ca>; Nelson, David -IGR <David.Nelson@international.gc.ca>; Temorshuizen, Cindy -IGD <Cindy.Temorshuizen@international.gc.ca>; Friele, Shawn -IFM <Shawn.Friele@international.gc.ca>; Funtek, Katharine -TID <Katharine.Funtek@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE <Kamiliya.Akkouche@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Picard, Beatrix -TIR <Beatrix.Picard@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; Hughes, Steven -INA <Steven.Hughes@international.gc.ca>; Jones, Paul -INA <Paul.Jones@international.gc.ca>; Pilloud, Marc -ECE <Marc.Pilloud@international.gc.ca>; Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE <Kamiliya.Akkouche@international.gc.ca>; Brisson, Julien -ECE <Julien.Brisson@international.gc.ca>; Netley, Rebecca -JLH <Rebecca.Netley@international.gc.ca>; Thompson, Kevin -JLTA <Kevin.Thompson@international.gc.ca>; Fetz, Thomas -JLH <Thomas.Fetz@international.gc.ca>; Utting, Elizabeth -JLH <Elizabeth.Utting@international.gc.ca>; St-Pierre, Nicolas -JFM <Nicolas.St-Pierre@international.gc.ca>; Amegan, Karim -JLH <Karim.Amegan@international.gc.ca>; LaTorre, Jason -DMT <Jason.LaTorre@international.gc.ca>; Farid, Sohrab -DMA -USS <Sohrab.Farid@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INA <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Gagnon, Felix -JLTA <Felix.Gagnon@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>
Subject: UPDATE ON POSSIBLE LINKAGES TO ALLEGED USE OF TURKISH DRONES IN CONFLICT ZONES

Good afternoon o/MINA,

Attached please find a Situational Update Report with annexes to provide an update on possible linkages to alleged use of Turkish drones with Canadian sensors in conflict zones. This document has been widely consulted within the department.

Judy

Judy Korecky

Deputy Director, Export Controls Policy Division | Directrice adjointe, Direction de la politique en matière des contrôles à l'exportation
judy.korecky@international.gc.ca
Telephone | Téléphone: 343-203-4332
125 rue Sussex Drive, Ottawa K1A 0G2
Global Affairs Canada | Affaires mondiales Canada
Government of Canada | Gouvernement du Canada



FW: Turkey: Additional Analysis

From: "Boileau, Guy -DMT" <guy.boileau@international.gc.ca>
To: "Boileau, Guy -DMT" <guy.boileau@international.gc.ca>
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2020 18:04:54 -0500
Attachments: Group 2 items to Turkey (including MDPs) v.1 (003).docx (35.99 kB); Military Exports to Turkey 2019-2014.docx (23.23 kB)

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT
Sent: October 6, 2020 4:58 PM
To: *MINA-Dept Unit
Cc: *DMT-Policy ; *TFM-Policy ; Anand, Shalini -TIE ; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE ; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR ; Grant, Alison -ECE ; Turner, Andrew -ECE ; Graham, Molly -EGM
Subject: FW: Turkey: Additional Analysis

MINA-DU: further to the call between MINA and DMT last evening, pls find below and attached further analysis pertaining to Turkey and export controls. This has been DMT approved.

Summary of the kind of goods in the Group 2 list of valid permits to Turkey.

Turkey is a significant purchaser of Canadian controlled goods and technology. Various Canadian companies are involved at various stages in the supply and provision of systems, subsystems, parts and components of a diverse range of military programs. These can be categorized into the following:

- *Parts, components, and accessories for [redacted]*
- *Parts, components, avionics and other accessories for various aircraft platforms made in other countries, including the [redacted] as well as the [redacted]*
- *Flight simulators, and their corresponding parts, components and technical data*
- *Parts, components, subsystems and their corresponding technical data and assistance related to the development of Turkish satellites (including military satellites)*
- *Parts, components and subsystems (including GPS anti-jam devices) to be integrated into various bombs, missiles, rockets and other ordnances*
- *Parts, components and technical data to be integrated into various armoured vehicles ([redacted])*
- *Technical data and assistance for the development of [redacted]*
- *Production tools and machines for the manufacturing of ammunition and cartridges of various calibres*
- *Riflescopes, sights and their corresponding parts and components*
- *Rocket motors and other components for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)*
- *Electro-Optical and Infrared systems to be incorporated into various aerial platforms (including UAVs)*
- *Naval equipment (including cables and arresting harness for helicopter retrieval system, sonobuoys, various modules, etc.) to be integrated into warships and other naval platforms.*
- *Technical data and assistance related to the development and construction of a wind tunnel (to test aircraft and missiles)*
- *IED disruptors, as well as protective equipment for military personnel*

Attached is a more streamlined list of valid permits to Turkey for Group two that are current valid. The table also includes the now suspended Wescam permits (in red).

Since 2016 (pre and post 2019 period), number of Wescam cameras that have been shipped and number of Wescam cameras that have not/not yet been shipped. If exact number is not feasible, a solid estimate would be grateful with accompanying caveats.

Total number of Wescam cameras exported to Turkey since 2016, and cameras not yet exported

Exported		Not yet exported	
New	Repaired	New	Repaired
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]

Notes:

- The numbers above are only for Wescam complete surveillance systems and does not include parts and components of the surveillance systems.
- Exported cameras cover exports since 2016 (pre and post 2019 exports).

- The “not exported” figures pertain only to the ██████ Wescam valid permits (now suspended) as they could still be exported should the suspension be lifted.
- * This is the number of cameras the exporter would be allowed to export under their permits. This number could represent cameras ready to be exported and cameras under production or not yet produced. The permit suspension prevents the exporter from exporting these cameras.
- ** This represents the number of repaired cameras that would be allowed to be exported. Our system does not allow us to determine whether these cameras are in Canada or still with the end user. The permit suspension prevents these cameras from being exported. It is unlikely that the end-user would send the cameras in its possession for repairs in Canada during the suspension given that they would be unable to have their cameras back.

Profile of Canadian exports of military goods to Turkey over the last 5 years.

Please see the second attachment for summary and details. Since 2014, the largest exports to Turkey subcategory have consisted of “imaging or countermeasure equipment” (ECL 2-15) valued at \$230,703,300; “fire control, and related alerting and warning equipment” (ECL 2-5) valued at \$161,555,998; and “electronic equipment and military spacecraft” (ECL 2-11) valued at \$55,049,592.

LIST OF PERMIT ISSUED TO TURKEY FOR GROUP 2 ITEMS THAT ARE CURRENTLY VALID
(except the ones in red font, which are currently suspended)

	Ref. Id.	Issue Date	Expiry Date	Overall Goods Description	Final Consignee	Country	Applicant
1	862901-3	Mar 5, 2019 4:22:50 PM	Mar 31, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Rocket motors for drones.		Multiple Destinations	Magellan Aerospace, Winnipeg
2	874953-5	Aug 8, 2019 4:43:21 PM	Aug 31, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Parts, accessories, technical data & tooling for the F35 program, F18 program as well as EH101, Apache helicopters.		Multiple Destinations	Magellan Aerospace, Winnipeg
3	865024-8	Apr 17, 2019 4:39:20 PM	Apr 30, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Riflescopes, weapon sights, and their parts and components.		Multiple Destinations	ELCAN OPTICAL TECHNOLOGIES / RAYTHEON
4	829203-7	Sep 1, 2017 3:41:00 PM	Dec 31, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Technical assistance for the design, procurement, construction, start-up of a wind tunnel for aerodynamic testing of civilian and military aerospace vehicles.	TÜBITAK SAGE	Turkey	AIOLOS ENGINEERING CORPORATION
5						Turkey	
6		Dec 3, 2018 8:33:07 AM	Dec 31, 2020 12:00:00 AM	Circuit Card Assemblies (CCA's) for the Surveillance Systems		Turkey	L-3 / WESCAM INC.
7	858519-5	Dec 7, 2018 2:58:15 PM	Dec 31, 2020 12:00:00 AM	Parts and components of the ASIST helicopter retrieval system	The Republic of Turkey	Turkey	
8	823345-9	Jul 19, 2017 11:10:31 AM	Jul 31, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Antennas, tube amplifiers, power modules, multiplexers and other components for the co-development and production of a military satellite	Aselsan Elektronik Sanayi Ve Ticaret A.S.	Turkey	MACDONALD DETTWILER & ASSOC. CORPORATION
9	840862-6	Mar 15, 2018 2:21:59 PM	Mar 31, 2022 12:00:00 AM	Technical data to support the design, development, manufacturing, test, training and launch of a military satellite	Tubitak Space Technologies Research Insitute	Turkey	MACDONALD DETTWILER & ASSOC. CORPORATION
10	843815-8	May 8, 2018 2:54:11 PM	Apr 30, 2022 12:00:00 AM	Parts and components for the Landing Gear Systems for the F-35 Aircraft programs.	BARUT INSAN KAYNAKLARI DANISMANLIGI VE BURO	Turkey	GOODRICH AEROSPACE CANADA LTD.
11	823345-9	Jul 19, 2017 11:10:31 AM	Jul 31, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Various hardware for the co-development and production of a military satellite.	Turkish Aerospace Industries, Inc. (TAI)	Turkey	MACDONALD DETTWILER & ASSOC. CORPORATION
12	833789-1	Nov 7, 2017 3:21:35 PM	Dec 31, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Production machines to make ammunition (including cups, cases, bullets and primers)	Norm Sanayi Urunleri Imalat ve Dis Ticaret Ltd. Sti	Turkey	MAGNUM INTEGRATED TECHNOLOGY LTD

LIST OF PERMIT ISSUED TO TURKEY FOR GROUP 2 ITEMS THAT ARE CURRENTLY VALID
(except the ones in red font, which are currently suspended)

	Ref. Id.	Issue Date	Expiry Date	Overall Goods Description	Final Consignee	Country	Applicant
13	840862-6	Mar 15, 2018 2:21:59 PM	Mar 31, 2022 12:00:00 AM	Technical data to support the design, development, manufacturing, test, training and launch of a military satellite	Undersecretariat for Defence Industries	Turkey	MACDONALD DETTWILER & ASSOC. CORPORATION
14	843815-8	May 8, 2018 2:54:11 PM	Apr 30, 2022 12:00:00 AM	Parts and components for the Landing Gear Systems for the F-35 Aircraft programs.	Baran Kesici Takimler ve Metal İşleme Sanayi Tic. Ltd. Sti.	Turkey	GOODRICH AEROSPACE CANADA LTD.
15	841667-1	Mar 15, 2018 1:59:56 PM	Apr 30, 2022 12:00:00 AM	Technical Data and Hardware to assist in the test, integration and support of an Antenna Turntable Subsystem for final integration and use with spectrum monitoring and direction finding equipment.	ENOVAS Engineering Consultancy Computer Industry and Trade LLC.	Turkey	MACDONALD DETTWILER & ASSOC. CORPORATION
16		Feb 20, 2019 1:10:33 PM	Feb 28, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Test Equipment for the Wescam EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems and Surveillance Systems.		Turkey	L-3 / WESCAM INC.
17	854168-8	Sep 21, 2018 10:54:00 AM	Dec 31, 2022 12:00:00 AM	Case & Bullet Manufacturing Line production equipment and tools	ZSR Patlayıcı Sanayi A.S.	Turkey	MAGNUM INTEGRATED TECHNOLOGY LTD
18	855370-9	Oct 12, 2018 10:24:59 AM	Dec 31, 2020 12:00:00 AM	Angular Continuous Threat Detector (part and component of a bomb/missile)	Aselsan Elektronik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S.	Turkey	Excelitas Canada Inc.
19		Nov 6, 2018 11:07:00 AM	Nov 30, 2022 12:00:00 AM	Completed, semi-finished and assembly kits for Wescam EO/IR Surveillance/Camera Systems		Turkey	L-3 / WESCAM INC.
20	843815-8	May 8, 2018 2:54:11 PM	Apr 30, 2022 12:00:00 AM	Parts and components for the Landing Gear Systems for the F-35 Aircraft programs.	FSK Havacılık ve Uzay Sanayi Makina Ticaret A.S.	Turkey	GOODRICH AEROSPACE CANADA LTD.
21						Turkey	
22	837439-6	Jan 10, 2018 2:22:08 PM	Dec 31, 2020 12:00:00 AM	Technology for naval deck handling equipment and mission bay handling systems. This technology is for use on military vessels.		Turkey	ROLLS-ROYCE CANADA LIMITED
23	852310-9	Aug 23, 2018 1:32:24 PM	Dec 31, 2022 12:00:00 AM	Software to assists in the development and evaluation of flight instrument procedures and Air Traffic Control Charts.	Turkish Air Force	Turkey	MDA Systems Ltd.
24	854180-2	Oct 18, 2018 6:20:47 PM	Oct 31, 2020 12:00:00 AM	Technical data and software in support of a proposal for Acoustic Systems, in support of the modernization of the CN-235 aircraft.		Turkey	General Dynamics Mission Systems - Canada
25		Jan 11, 2019	Jan 31, 2022	EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems		Turkey	L-3 / WESCAM INC.

LIST OF PERMIT ISSUED TO TURKEY FOR GROUP 2 ITEMS THAT ARE CURRENTLY VALID
(except the ones in red font, which are currently suspended)

Ref. Id.	Issue Date	Expiry Date	Overall Goods Description	Final Consignee	Country	Applicant
26	5:43:21 PM Dec 7, 2018 2:56:40 PM	12:00:00 AM Dec 31, 2020 12:00:00 AM	Hardware (including spares replacement and warranty parts), software (including software updates) and technology (including drawings, documentation, installation and technical support) for incorporation into a simulator	TICARET A.S	Turkey	CAE Inc.
27	Feb 21, 2019 11:07:52 AM	Oct 31, 2020 12:00:00 AM	antenna		Turkey	
28	859923-3 Dec 20, 2018 5:49:20 PM	Dec 31, 2020 12:00:00 AM	Repair and maintenance parts for the helicopter recovery assist, secure and traverse system	The Republic of Turkey	Turkey	
29	863616-7 Feb 25, 2019 9:27:38 AM	Feb 28, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Site installation, acceptance test and Training for the Visual Interactive Synthetic Training Application (VISTA) Software.	Turkish Navy	Turkey	LOCKHEED MARTIN CANADA INC.
30	Jul 1, 2020 4:31:29 PM	Jul 1, 2021 12:00:00 AM			Turkey	
31	Mar 12, 2019 4:36:38 PM	Mar 31, 2021 12:00:00 AM	EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems including ancillary equipment; Ground Boresight Modules (BSM) Mission Grips Assemblies.		Turkey	L-3 / WESCAM INC.
32	Apr 9, 2019 2:58:05 PM	Apr 30, 2021 12:00:00 AM	antenna (Turkey	
33					Turkey	
34	871581-1 May 31, 2019 3:20:16 PM	May 31, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Quad Port Module (To be incorporated onto a prototype processor for internal company research and development)	Tektronik Muh. VE TIC A.S.	Turkey	
35	Jul 8, 2019 10:32:09 AM	Jul 31, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Software (including software updates), technology (including drawings, documentation, installation and technical support) for F16 Weapons and Tactical Trainer (WTT)	CAE Inc.	Turkey	CAE Inc.
36	Aug 14, 2019	Aug 31, 2023	Wescam EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems.		Turkey	L-3 / WESCAM INC.

LIST OF PERMIT ISSUED TO TURKEY FOR GROUP 2 ITEMS THAT ARE CURRENTLY VALID
(except the ones in red font, which are currently suspended)

Ref. Id.	Issue Date	Expiry Date	Overall Goods Description	Final Consignee	Country	Applicant
	11:20:40 AM	12:00:00 AM				
37	Sep 17, 2019 1:37:35 PM	Sep 30, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Software (including software updates) and technology (including drawings, documentation, installation and technical support) for the AW139 Full Flight Simulator for permanent military end-use by the Qatar Emiri Air Force.	CAE Inc.	Turkey	CAE Inc.
38	Jun 12, 2019 3:43:13 PM	Jun 30, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Software (including software updates) and technology (including drawings, documentation, installation and technical support) for the end use of Turkish Land Forces located in Turkey.	CAE Inc.	Turkey	CAE Inc.
39	872980-6 Jun 14, 2019 5:22:00 PM	Jun 30, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Ship Infrared Signature Naval Threat Countermeasure Simulator	ASELSAN Elektronik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S	Turkey	WR Davis Engineering Limited
40	Sep 27, 2019 10:05:34 AM	Nov 30, 2020 12:00:00 AM	IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems including ancillary equipment.		Turkey	L-3 / WESCAM INC.
41	Sep 27, 2019 10:08:26 AM	Dec 31, 2021 12:00:00 AM	/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems including ancillary equipment.		Turkey	L-3 / WESCAM INC.
42	Aug 30, 2019 12:10:27 PM	Aug 31, 2021 12:00:00 AM) antenna		Turkey	
43	Sep 24, 2019 3:53:04 PM	Sep 30, 2023 12:00:00 AM	Temporary export of quantity of Handcontroller Assemblies and Mission Grip Assemblies, and Lot Cable Assemblies to support demonstrations in Turkey.		Turkey	L-3 / WESCAM INC.
44					Turkey	
45	Jun 25, 2019 10:49:33 AM	Jun 30, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Hardware (including spares, replacement and warranty parts), software (including software updates), technology (including drawings, documentation, installation and technical support) for Weapons and Tactical Trainer (WTT) system.		Turkey	CAE Inc.
46	Oct 7, 2019 10:22:05 AM	Oct 31, 2023 12:00:00 AM	Components of the Wescam series surveillance systems		Turkey	L-3 / WESCAM INC.
47	Aug 29, 2019 12:38:58 PM	Aug 31, 2023 12:00:00 AM	Repaired Wescam Surveillance systems, repaired components and sub-assemblies		Turkey	L-3 / WESCAM INC.

LIST OF PERMIT ISSUED TO TURKEY FOR GROUP 2 ITEMS THAT ARE CURRENTLY VALID
(except the ones in red font, which are currently suspended)

Ref. Id.	Issue Date	Expiry Date	Overall Goods Description	Final Consignee	Country	Applicant
48	May 6, 2020 4:22:17 PM	May 6, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Wescam surveillance systems, components and sub-assemblies		Turkey	L-3 / WESCAM INC.
49	878730-6 Sep 19, 2019 10:06:05 AM	Sep 30, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Distribution manifold. Suspension element of a military vehicle.	FNSS Savunma Sistemleri	Turkey	Horstman Systems Inc.
50	Oct 4, 2019 2:43:21 PM	Sep 30, 2023 12:00:00 AM	Repaired Wescam surveillance systems, repaired components and sub-assemblies, related technical data and software.		Turkey	L-3 / WESCAM INC.
51	Oct 8, 2019 1:41:01 PM	Mar 1, 2021 12:00:00 AM	equipment, related technical data and software		Turkey	
52	May 7, 2020 10:00:25 AM	May 7, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Repaired surveillance systems, repaired components and sub-assemblies, related technical data and software.		Turkey	L-3 / WESCAM INC.
53	May 7, 2020 9:57:46 AM	May 7, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Wescam surveillance systems, components and sub-assemblies, related technical data and software.		Turkey	L-3 / WESCAM INC.
54	893293-4 Jun 26, 2020 7:40:59 PM	Jan 31, 2021 12:00:00 AM	TALON software application; allows detailed analysis of captured and simulated pulse data.	ESEN System Integration	Turkey	Telemus Warfare Inc.
55	840862-6 Mar 15, 2018 2:21:59 PM	Mar 31, 2022 12:00:00 AM	Technical data for the military TUMSIS X-Band communication payload for the TURKSAT-6A satellite.	C Tech Bilisim Tek. Sanayi ve Tic. A.S. (C-Tech)	Turkey	MACDONALD DETTWILER & ASSOC. CORPORATION
56	841980-1 Mar 22, 2018 12:44:31 PM	Apr 30, 2022 12:00:00 AM	Technical data related to the GÖKTÜRK Replacement (GÖKTÜRK-Y) Electro-Optical Satellite	Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI)	Turkey	MACDONALD DETTWILER & ASSOC. CORPORATION
57	Aug 20, 2018 9:02:38 AM	Sep 30, 2022 12:00:00 AM	Repaired Wescam surveillance systems, related technical data and software		Turkey	L-3 / WESCAM INC.
58	832061-2 Nov 7, 2017 12:11:27 PM	Dec 31, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Complete production line and facilities (i.e. cups, cases, bullets and primers) for the production of ammunition cartridges (for various small-arm calibres).	Norm Sanayi Urunleri Imalat ve Dis Ticaret Ltd. Sti	Turkey	MAGNUM INTEGRATED TECHNOLOGY LTD

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	Ref. Id.	Issue Date	Expiry Date	Overall Goods Description	Final Consignee	Country	Applicant
59	840862-6	Mar 15, 2018 2:21:59 PM	Mar 31, 2022 12:00:00 AM	Technical data related to the military TUMSIS X-Band communication payload for the TURKSAT-6A satellite.	ASELSAN Electronic Industries Inc.	Turkey	MACDONALD DETTWILER & ASSOC. CORPORATION
60	840862-6	Mar 15, 2018 2:21:59 PM	Mar 31, 2022 12:00:00 AM	Technical data related to the military TUMSIS X-Band communication payload for the TURKSAT-6A satellite.	Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI)	Turkey	MACDONALD DETTWILER & ASSOC. CORPORATION
61	843815-8	May 8, 2018 2:54:11 PM	Apr 30, 2022 12:00:00 AM	Prototype parts, components, and assemblies of the F-35 Aircraft Landing Gear System and related technical data and technical assistance.	ALP Aviation	Turkey	GOODRICH AEROSPACE CANADA LTD.
62	893271-0	Jul 24, 2020 12:43:33 PM	Jul 24, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Components of the ELINT (Electronics Intelligence) system and EMS (Electronic Support Measures) system, related technical assistance and software..	Turkish Aerospace Industries, Inc.	Turkey	Telemus Warfare Inc.
63						Turkey	
64	853856-7	Oct 23, 2018 10:14:21 AM	Oct 31, 2020 12:00:00 AM	Multi-function display unit (MFD) for an aircraft.		Turkey	General Dynamics Mission Systems - Canada
65		Nov 6, 2018 9:19:49 AM	Nov 30, 2020 12:00:00 AM	Wescam surveillance systems, components and sub-assemblies		Turkey	L-3 / WESCAM INC.
66		Jan 30, 2019 8:57:50 AM	Jan 31, 2022 12:00:00 AM	Wescam surveillance systems, components and sub-assemblies, related technical data and software.		Turkey	L-3 / WESCAM INC.
67	860780-3	Dec 28, 2018 8:12:39 AM	Dec 31, 2020 12:00:00 AM	Cable assemblies, distribution manifolds, driver interface units and controllers to support the suspension installation of both 6x6 and 8x8 Armoured Personnel Carrier Vehicles	FNSS Savunma Sistemleri A.S,	Turkey	Horstman Systems Inc.
68		Apr 26, 2019 9:52:24 AM	Apr 30, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Technical data and technical assistance related to the Weapons and Tactical Trainer (WTT)/ Forward Air Controller Sensor (FACS		Turkey	CAE Inc.

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Ref. Id.	Issue Date	Expiry Date	Overall Goods Description	Final Consignee	Country	Applicant	
69	893284-5	Jun 26, 2020 7:48:25 PM	Dec 31, 2020 12:00:00 AM	Electronic receiver support components of the ELINT (Electronics Intelligence) system	Turkish Aerospace Industries, Inc.	Turkey	Telemus Warfare Inc.
70		Aug 9, 2019 10:09:11 AM	Dec 31, 2020 12:00:00 AM	Technical data, technical assistance and software related to the A400M Cockpit Maintenance Operational System (CMOS) program	CAE INC.	Turkey	CAE Inc.
71		Aug 30, 2019 12:10:27 PM	Aug 31, 2021 12:00:00 AM	equipment, related technical data and software		Turkey	
72	854184-8	Sep 21, 2018 10:55:01 AM	Dec 31, 2022 12:00:00 AM	Manufacturing lines for case and bullet, 5.56 X 45mm ammunition, 7.62 X 51mm ammunition, 7.62 X 39mm ammunition and related technical assistance.	ZSR Patlayici Sanayi A.S.	Turkey	MAGNUM INTEGRATED TECHNOLOGY LTD
73	869666-3	May 3, 2019 1:28:30 PM	May 31, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Replacement Barrel, Bolt Body and Magazine for a Bolt Action Rifle	TURKMAN Teknoloji A.S.	Turkey	CADEX INC.
74	872047-7	Jun 4, 2019 10:27:54 AM	Jun 30, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Technical assistance related to a wind tunnel building interface design of a planned 0.61m x 0.61m supersonic blowdown wind tunnel.	ROKETSAN Roket Sanayii ve Tic. A.S.	Turkey	AIOLOS ENGINEERING CORPORATION
75		Aug 29, 2019 12:40:00 PM	Aug 31, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Spares, replacements, software, technical data and technical assistance related to the AW139 Full Flight Simulator device trainer.		Turkey	CAE Inc.
76	862111-9	Feb 4, 2019 10:18:38 AM	Feb 28, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Ride Height Control System (RHCS) for incorporation into a military vehicle suspension system.	FNSS Savunma Sistemleri A.S,	Turkey	Horstman Systems Inc.
77		Aug 13, 2019 9:35:07 AM	Aug 31, 2023 12:00:00 AM	Repaired Wescam surveillance systems, components, sub-assemblies and related technical data and software		Turkey	L-3 / WESCAM INC.
78		Aug 14, 2019 9:26:06 AM	Aug 31, 2023 12:00:00 AM	Components of the Wescam surveillance system		Turkey	L-3 / WESCAM INC.
79	878732-4	Sep 17, 2019	Sep 30, 2021	Recovery Mode Software for the Ride Height System Controller used	FNSS Savunma	Turkey	Horstman Systems Inc.

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	Ref. Id.	Issue Date	Expiry Date	Overall Goods Description	Final Consignee	Country	Applicant
		4:21:18 PM	12:00:00 AM	in a suspension system of a military vehicle	Sistemelri		
80		Oct 9, 2019 1:48:21 PM	Sep 30, 2023 12:00:00 AM	Spare components of the Wescam surveillance system		Turkey	L-3 / WESCAM INC.
81		Sep 27, 2019 3:10:38 PM	Jan 31, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Wescam surveillance systems, components and sub-assemblies.		Turkey	L-3 / WESCAM INC.
82		May 6, 2020 4:27:18 PM	May 6, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Wescam surveillance systems components and sub-assemblies.		Turkey	L-3 / WESCAM INC.
83		May 6, 2020 4:24:17 PM	May 6, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Wescam surveillance systems components and sub-assemblies.		Turkey	L-3 / WESCAM INC.
84		May 7, 2020 9:59:05 AM	May 7, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Wescam surveillance systems components and sub-assemblies.		Turkey	L-3 / WESCAM INC.
85		Aug 30, 2019 12:10:27 PM	Aug 31, 2021 12:00:00 AM	equipment, related technical data and software		Turkey	
86	893275-6	Jul 24, 2020 12:34:12 PM	Jul 24, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) Pulse Analyzer System (PAS) and related technical data and software.	ENOVAS Engineering Consultancy Computer Industry and Trade LLC	Turkey	Telemus Warfare Inc.
87	893281-8	Jul 24, 2020 12:41:12 PM	Jul 24, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Components of the ELINT (Electronics Intelligence) system and EMS (Electronic Support Measures) system.Wes	Turkish Aerospace Industries, Inc.	Turkey	Telemus Warfare Inc.

LIST OF PERMIT ISSUED TO TURKEY FOR GROUP 2 ITEMS THAT ARE CURRENTLY VALID
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Military Exports to Turkey (2019-2014)

- Table 1 provides information on the value of military exports to Turkey since 2014. This information is publically reported in Canada's annual *Report on the Export of Military Goods* and is derived from export permit utilization reports submitted by Canadian exporters.
- Military exports are defined as those goods and technologies controlled in Group 2 of the *Export Control List*. Group 2 is divided into 22 subcategories of military items which are described in Table 2. Most of Canada's allies publically report on military exports against these 22 subcategories, which are negotiated multilaterally by the participating members of the Wassenaar Arrangement.
- Since 2014, the largest exports to Turkey by subcategory have consisted of "imaging or countermeasure equipment" (ECL 2-15) valued at \$230,703,300; "fire control, and related alerting and warning equipment" (ECL 2-5) valued at \$161,555,998; and "electronic equipment and military spacecraft" (ECL 2-11) valued at \$55,049,592.
- The cameras exported by WESCAM are mostly controlled under ECL 2-15 and ECL 2-5.
- There have been no exports of conventional arms (i.e. LAVs, airplanes, tanks etc.) or small arms and light weapons, as defined by the *UN Register of Conventional Arms*, to Turkey since 2014. The only conventional arms transfer reported in the UN Register was of a training rifle reported by Turkey to have been imported from Canada in 2012.
- Canada only reports small arms and light weapons exports to the UN Register when these are destined to consignees that are either military or police forces in the destination country.
- In 2019, Canada exported 183 rifles, and their associated spare parts and components, worth almost CAD \$2 million to distributor in Turkey who is supplying them to the Turkish Ministry of Defence.

Table 1 - Group 2 Military Exports to Turkey 2019-2014

Category of Group 2	2019	2018	2017	2016	2015	2014	Total
2-1.	\$1,995,150.00	\$40,559.00	\$0.00	\$1,600.00	\$1,600.00	\$7,500.00	\$2,046,409.00
2-2.	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00
2-3.	\$0.00	\$1,180.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$1,180.00
2-4.	\$31,924.80	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$141,136.40	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$173,061.20
2-5.	\$59,831,034.01	\$66,375,367.00	\$32,189,457.74	\$769,140.00	\$544,876.00	\$1,846,123.00	\$161,555,997.75
2-6.	\$345,462.09	\$1,249,367.90	\$703,652.78	\$17,330.00	\$171,164.00	\$0.00	\$2,486,976.77
2-7.	\$0.00	\$37,736.64	\$79,846.40	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$8,164.00	\$125,747.04
2-8.	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00
2-9.	\$19,000.00	\$25,490.76	\$20,890.76	\$116,416.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$181,797.52

2-10.	\$2,101,040.96	\$2,736,255.62	\$3,428,299.60	\$555,008.86	\$369,537.00	\$191,940.00	\$9,382,082.04
2-11.	\$19,636,100.24	\$27,811,321.32	\$7,433,606.86	\$168,064.00	\$0.00	\$500.00	\$55,049,592.42
2-12.	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00
2-13.	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00
2-14.	\$571,309.54	\$8,940.00	\$127,751.00	\$1,274,350.00	\$323,832.00	\$846,894.00	\$3,153,076.54
2-15.	\$116,046,883.17	\$76,733,638.00	\$32,452,646.04	\$34,541.17	\$4,034,089.00	\$1,401,503.00	\$230,703,300.38
2-16.	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$11,140.14	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$11,140.14
2-17.	\$309,867.78	\$737,113.78	\$2,706,312.00	\$260,232.00	\$122,357.00	\$0.00	\$4,135,882.56
2-18.	\$0.00	\$216,457.50	\$873,786.86	\$4,247.88	\$0.00	\$43,581.00	\$1,138,073.24
2-19.	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00
2-20.	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00
2-21.	\$628,085.58	\$183,521.01	\$1,077,360.65	\$848,634.88	\$1,847,410.00	\$1,619,272.00	\$6,204,284.12
2-22.	\$2,001,919.71	\$1,455,129.30	\$9,618.03	\$52,814.14	\$142,689.00	\$921,440.00	\$4,583,610.18
Total	\$203,517,777.88	\$177,612,077.83	\$81,103,228.72	\$4,254,655.47	\$7,557,554.00	\$6,886,917.00	---

Table 2 - Group 2 of Canada's Export Control List

ECL Category	Illustrative Examples
2-1	Smooth-bore weapons with a calibre of less than 20 mm, other arms and automatic weapons with a calibre of 12.7 mm or less and accessories
2-2	Smooth-bore weapons with a calibre of 20 mm or more, other weapons or armament with a calibre greater than 12.7 mm, projectors and accessories
2-3	Ammunition and fuse-setting devices, and specially designed components
2-4	Bombs, torpedoes, rockets, missiles, other explosive devices and charges, and related equipment and accessories specially designed for military use; and specially designed components
2-5	Fire control, related alerting and warning equipment, and related systems; test and alignment and countermeasure equipment specially designed for military use; and

ECL Category	Illustrative Examples
	specially designed components and accessories
2-6	Ground vehicles and components
2-7	Chemical or biological toxic agents, riot control agents, radioactive materials, and related equipment, components and materials
2-8	Energetic materials and related substances
2-9	Vessels of war, special naval equipment and accessories, and components specially designed for military use
2-10	Aircraft, lighter-than-air vehicles, unmanned airborne vehicles, aero-engines and aircraft equipment, related equipment and components, specially designed or modified for military use
2-11	Electronic equipment, military spacecraft and components not controlled elsewhere
2-12	High-velocity kinetic energy weapon systems and related equipment, and specially designed components
2-13	Armoured or protective equipment and constructions and components
2-14	Specialized equipment for military training or for simulating military scenarios, simulators specially designed for training in the use of any firearm or weapon controlled in 2-1 or 2-2, and specially designed components and accessories
2-15	Imaging or countermeasure equipment, specially designed for military use, and specially designed components and accessories
2-16	Forgings, castings and other unfinished products the use of which in a controlled product is identifiable by material composition, geometry or function, and which are specially designed for any products controlled in 2-1 to 2-4, 2-6, 2-9, 2-10, 2-12 or 2-19

ECL Category	Illustrative Examples
2-17	Miscellaneous equipment, materials, libraries and specially designed components
2-18	Equipment for the production of products referred to in the Munitions List
2-19	Directed energy weapon systems, related or countermeasure equipment and test models, and specially designed components
2-20	Cryogenic and superconductive equipment, and specially designed components and accessories
2-21	Software
2-22	Technology

FW: Turkey Group 2 permits and follow up on 3:30 pm oMINA briefing ++

From: "Boileau, Guy -DMT" <guy.boileau@international.gc.ca>
To: "Boileau, Guy -DMT" <guy.boileau@international.gc.ca>
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2020 18:01:37 -0500

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT
Sent: October 25, 2020 3:33 PM
To: Anand, Shalini -TID ; *MINA-Dept Unit
Cc: Sproule, David -ECD ; Turner, Andrew -ECE ; Grant, Alison -ECE ; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR ; Yendall, Jonathan -INP ; Mishra, Rachna -ELB ; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE ; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR ; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR ; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR ; *TFM-Policy ; Sproule, David -ECD ; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN ; *USS-DMA Advisors ; Christie, Bruce -TFMA ; Thompson, Kevin -JLTA ; Mallett, Erika -TIE ; *DMT-Policy
Subject: RE: Turkey Group 2 permits and follow up on 3:30 pm oMINA briefing ++

MINA-DU, DMT has approved the following message for onward transmission to oMINA.

With thanks

GuyB.

Dear oMINA

Further to the 3:30 briefing with oMINA on Friday, during which officials discussed the valid group 2 permits to Turkey, below is: a) a brief summary of the context that I provided at the outset; b) a response to the question that Ally asked during the line by line permit review; and c) further details on the P&WC engines that were raised via a Radio Canada media question, about which I gave a heads up (likely coming to you via the Lbranch).

Context/Update on our reviews of valid permits with consultation partners:

- a. To date, at MINA's direction, [REDACTED] and thus, there are presently [REDACTED]
- b. As mentioned, we've asked our consultation partners twice about the list of valid Group 2 (military goods) permits for items going directly to Turkey. We have asked if there are any concerns about these valid permits and to date, there have been no concerns raised. Given that the information and intelligence is still coming in and that the situation is evolving, we are planning to go back to consultee partners next week for a third time to validate this;
- c. Finally, we are trying to broaden our data mining of valid permits to look at non-Group 2 permits as well, but given the limitations of our system, this will take time to pull together and review. We are aiming to have an update towards the end of next week, depending on other requests/pressures.

RE: 854184-8 (MAGNUM INTEGRATED TECHNOLOGY LTD) - Ally was asking who the end users are for the ammunition that would be manufactured by ZSR Patlayici Sanayi A.S.

Per the End Use Statement in the file, the end user of the export is ZSR Patlayici Sanayi A.S., as they will be using the machinery to manufacture the ammunition themselves. However, the consignee website and they appear to sell to both commercial and military. Most of the ammo listed is typically called "NATO rounds" because NATO allies uses them in their missions, and the facility is NATO certified. However, NATO rounds are also very popular with sport shooters who have rifles that shoot .308 because they are cheaper to buy and fit the .308 chamber. There is also an M43 round listed, used in SKS

and AK-47 rifles used by both civilians and military.

Pratt & Whitney Canada to Turkey: question about exports to Turkey of engines for the [REDACTED] aircraft

Ref ID	Submit Date	Description	Consignee	Country	End Use	Status
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Request to export civil certified PT6A-turboprop engines [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Turkey	for installation on the [REDACTED]	Expired [REDACTED] (Approved) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Request to export civil certified PT6A-turboprop engines [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Turkey	for installation on the [REDACTED] aircraft.	Expired [REDACTED] (Approved) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Request to export civil certified PT6A-turboprop engines [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Turkey	for installation on the [REDACTED] aircraft	Expired [REDACTED] (Approved) [REDACTED]

FW: UPDATE ON POSSIBLE LINKAGES TO ALLEGED USE OF TURKISH DRONES IN CONFLICT ZONES

From: "Boileau, Guy -DMT" <guy.boileau@international.gc.ca>
To: "Boileau, Guy -DMT" <guy.boileau@international.gc.ca>
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2020 18:06:46 -0500
Attachments: Unnamed Attachment (68 bytes); L3WESCAM PERMITS TO TURKEY after Oct 11 2019 announcement (w. PUR as of Sept 25 2020) - V2.docx (18.23 kB); L3WESCAM PERMITS TO TURKEY from Jan 1 2016 to Oct 11 2019 V2.docx (30.44 kB); Annex A - Country Positions Export Controls Turkey -Sept 28 2020 - CLEAN.docx (37.96 kB); Sitrap - possible permit linkages to alleged use of Turkish drones with Canadian sensors in conflict zones.September 30 2020.final.2.docx (38.9 kB)

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT
Sent: September 30, 2020 3:59 PM
To: *MINA-Dept Unit
Cc: Jason Latorre ; *MINT-Dept Unit
Subject: FW: UPDATE ON POSSIBLE LINKAGES TO ALLEGED USE OF TURKISH DRONES IN CONFLICT ZONES

You may wish to cut and past the actual report (last attachment) in the email when sending to oMINA. This was approved by DMT.

From: Korecky, Judy -TIR <Judy.Korecky@international.gc.ca>
Sent: September 30, 2020 3:53 PM
To: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMA-Advisors@international.gc.ca>; McCardell, Sandra -BGM <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -BGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Anderson, Ian -BGM <Ian.Anderson@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Brisson, Julien -ECE <Julien.Brisson@international.gc.ca>; Nelson, David -IGR <David.Nelson@international.gc.ca>; Temorshuizen, Cindy -IGD <Cindy.Temorshuizen@international.gc.ca>; Friele, Shawn -IFM <Shawn.Friele@international.gc.ca>; Funtek, Katharine -TID <Katharine.Funtek@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE <Kamiliya.Akkouche@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Picard, Beatrix -TIR <Beatrix.Picard@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; Hughes, Steven -INA <Steven.Hughes@international.gc.ca>; Jones, Paul -INA <Paul.Jones@international.gc.ca>; Pilloud, Marc -ECE <Marc.Pilloud@international.gc.ca>; Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE <Kamiliya.Akkouche@international.gc.ca>; Brisson, Julien -ECE <Julien.Brisson@international.gc.ca>; Netley, Rebecca -JLH <Rebecca.Netley@international.gc.ca>; Thompson, Kevin -JLTA <Kevin.Thompson@international.gc.ca>; Fetz, Thomas -JLH <Thomas.Fetz@international.gc.ca>; Utting, Elizabeth -JLH <Elizabeth.Utting@international.gc.ca>; St-Pierre, Nicolas -JFM <Nicolas.St-Pierre@international.gc.ca>; Amegan, Karim -JLH <Karim.Amegan@international.gc.ca>; LaTorre, Jason -DMT <Jason.LaTorre@international.gc.ca>; Farid, Sohrab -DMA -USS <Sohrab.Farid@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INA <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Gagnon, Felix -JLTA <Felix.Gagnon@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>
Subject: UPDATE ON POSSIBLE LINKAGES TO ALLEGED USE OF TURKISH DRONES IN CONFLICT ZONES

Good afternoon o/MINA,


Attached please find a Situational Update Report with annexes to provide an update on possible linkages to alleged use of Turkish drones with Canadian sensors in conflict zones. This document has been widely consulted within the department.

Judy

Judy Korecky

Deputy Director, Export Controls Policy Division | Directrice adjointe, Direction de la politique en matière des contrôles à l'exportation
judy.korecky@international.gc.ca

Telephone | Téléphone: 343-203-4332
125 rue Sussex Drive, Ottawa K1A 0G2
Global Affairs Canada | Affaires mondiales Canada
Government of Canada | Gouvernement du Canada



COMPARISON OF ISSUED PERMITS FOR TURKEY TO WESCAM

Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Country of Destination	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Status	Permit Utilization (as of Sept 25, 2020)
	2019/11/06	Permanent export of EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems, sub-assemblies, including provisions for repairs, technical data and software		Turkey	For integration and installation unto the to be used for surveillance operations	Presidency of Defence Industries (SSB)		Issued permit on May 6, 2020 per BPTS: 01794-2020	This permit has not been utilized
	2019/11/06	Permanent export of EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems, sub-assemblies, including provisions for repairs, technical data and software		Turkey	For integration and installation unto the prototype	Note:		Issued permit on May 6, 2020 per BPTS: 01794-2020	This permit has not been utilized.
	2019/08/26	Permanent export of EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems, sub-assemblies, including provisions for repairs, technical data and software		Turkey	For installation and integration unto the to be used for surveillance and targeting.	Military and law enforcement agencies under the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of the Interior		Issued permit on May 6, 2020 per BPTS: 01794-2020	This permit has been utilized for up to
	2019/10/28	Permit amendment		Turkey	To be used as			Amendment	

Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Country of Destination	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Status	Permit Utilization (as of Sept 25, 2020)
		request (PAR) to extend permit validity by a year on a temporary export for [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems	[REDACTED]		loaner systems for training purposes.	[REDACTED]		permit was re-issued on May 7, 2020 per BPTS: 01794-2020. Extended validity date until May 7, 2021.	Temporary export permit. No permit utilization required
	2019/10/30	Permit amendment request (PAR) to extend permit validity by a year on a temporary export for [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems and accessories.	[REDACTED]	Turkey	To be used to demonstrate the system's capabilities in the scope of police, maritime surveillance and army reconnaissance; the system will be used for flight demonstration on a [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		Amendment permit was re-issued on May 7, 2020 per BPTS: 01794-2020. Extended validity date until May 7, 2021.	Temporary export permit. No permit utilization required
	2019/12/05	Permit amendment request (PAR) to extend permit validity by a year on a permanent export of repaired [REDACTED] surveillance systems [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Turkey	Consignee is an authorized Wescam Service Provider and will use the items for in-country repairs of the [REDACTED]	Turkish Ministry of Defence. Turkish Ministry of the Interior [REDACTED]		Amendment permit was re-issued on May 7, 2020 per BPTS: 01794-2020. Extended validity date	This permit has been utilized for up to [REDACTED]

Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Country of Destination	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Status	Permit Utilization (as of Sept 25, 2020)
		repaired/replacement components and sub-assemblies and related technical data and software			series surveillance systems; repaired systems to be returned to its foreign owners.			until May 7, 2021.	
Total									

Summary/Additional Notes:

Under BPTS: 01794-2020 Wescam received:

- [REDACTED] export permits and [REDACTED] amended permit for Turkey
- The [REDACTED] new permits were for a total of [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems to be used in the UAVs of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], with the Turkish MOD and Ministry of the Interior as the primary end-users.
- All [REDACTED] permit amendment requests (PARs) are for extension of the permit validity by a year.
- [REDACTED] of PARs are related to the temporary exports of [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems to be used in UAVs.
- [REDACTED] of PARs is for the [REDACTED] model of Wescam's surveillance system. This export is for the return of repaired systems in Canada and various components and sub-assemblies of the [REDACTED] to be used for in-country repair (in Turkey) by consignee [REDACTED] as an authorized Wescam Service Provider. If [REDACTED] is unable to undertake repair in Turkey, it sends the system back to Wescam in Canada to be repaired.
- The second Ref ID in the last [REDACTED] entries (highlighted in red) is the new file under which the amended permits were issued, given that the permits expired while the PARs were under review.

Additional notes:

- No end user(s) in Libya, Syria, Azerbaijan and Armenia have been identified in the end use documentation provided by the consignees.
- The stated end-use in the End-Use Statements are also highlighted in yellow font.

PERMITS ISSUED TO L3 WESCAM FOR TURKEY (from January 1, 2016 to October 11, 2019)

No.	Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Status
1	[REDACTED]	2016/05/25	Temporary export of quantity [REDACTED] Model [REDACTED] Stabilized Optical Sensor Systems and replacement parts	[REDACTED]	For integration and ground tests	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Permit expired on 2018/05/31
2	[REDACTED]	2016/08/10	Permanent export of quantity [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems [REDACTED] including ancillary equipment	[REDACTED]	For installation and integration into UAVs	Turkish Army	[REDACTED]	Permit expired on 2017/07/11
3	[REDACTED]	2016/09/29	[REDACTED] Humidity Indicator Installation Tools (Test Equipment for Wescam [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance Systems)	[REDACTED]	To test Wescam [REDACTED] Series EO/IR Surveillance Systems	Ministry of Defence of Turkey	[REDACTED]	Permit expired on 2016/10/19
4	[REDACTED]	2016/11/22	[REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems [REDACTED] including ancillary equipment	[REDACTED]	For installation and integration into UAVs	Ministry of Defence of Turkey	[REDACTED]	Permit expired on 2017/07/12
5	[REDACTED]	2017/01/05	Purge kit, ground boresight module, mission grip handcontroller	[REDACTED]	Auxiliary equipment for [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems	Ministry of Defence of Turkey, Ministry of the Interior of Turkey Turkish Gendarmerie	[REDACTED]	Permit expired on 2017/01/11
6	[REDACTED]	2017/01/16	Test Equipment for the Wescam [REDACTED] Series EO/IR Surveillance Systems.	[REDACTED]	For diagnosis and testing activities of [REDACTED] and/or [REDACTED] Series Systems	Ministry of Defence of Turkey Ministry of the Interior of Turkey	[REDACTED]	Permit expired on 2017/05/10
7	[REDACTED]	2017/01/17	Circuit Card Assemblies, Camera Assemblies, Cable Assemblies, Wiring Harness Assemblies, Lens Assemblies, Motor Gearbox, etc.	[REDACTED]	For integration into Wescam [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance Systems	Ministry of Defence of Turkey Ministry of the Interior of Turkey	[REDACTED]	Permit expired on 2018/01/08
8	[REDACTED]	2017/01/24	[REDACTED] each of Handcontrollers and [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	For demonstration	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Permit expired on [REDACTED]

No.	Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Status
			Mission Grips (for Wescam EO/IR Surveillance Systems), Simulator Kits, Emulator Kits, lot of cables, and Wescam Kinetics					2019/05/30
9		2017/02/03	Test Equipment (for Wescam EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems), repaired EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems , repaired/replacement parts (for Wescam EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems) and Controlled Technical Data relating to Wescam's EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems		For diagnosis and testing activities and repair/replacement of Systems			Permit expired on 2018/02/02
10		2017/02/21	EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems (including ancillary equipment; Ground Boresight Modules (BSM); Mission Grips Assemblies and Purge Kits - Maintenance Kits (for Wescam Systems)		For installation and integration into UAVs	Ministry of Defence of Turkey		Permit expired on 2019/01/11
11		2017/03/21	Temporary export of Handcontroller Assemblies, Mission Grip Assemblies, Cable Assemblies, Simulators and Emulators, Kinetic and eLearning	WESCAM Inc., Care of: IDEF-International Defence Industry Fair 2017	For exhibition in a defence fair	L3 WESCAM		Permit expired on 2019/07/11
12		2017/03/28	Temporary export of Handcontroller Assemblies, Mission Grip Assemblies and Cable Assemblies		For demonstration			Permit expired on 2019/05/30
13		2017/05/10	Test Equipment for the Wescam Series EO/IR Surveillance Systems.		For diagnosis and testing activities of and/or Series Systems			Permit expired on 2017/05/10

No.	Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Status
14		2017/05/26	Provision of technical assistance documents, training course(s) and training documents, and maintenance software for project development/marketing information		For military and government end use			Permit expired on 2017/05/29
15		2017/07/11	Permanent export of EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems (including ancillary equipment)		For installation and integration into UAVs	Turkish Army		Permit expired 2017/07/12
16		2017/07/11	Permanent export of EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems including ancillary equipment		For installation and integration into UAVs	Ministry of Defence of Turkey Ministry of the Interior of Turkey		Permit expired on 2017/07/12
17		2017/08/14	Permanent export of EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems including ancillary equipment; Ground Boresight Modules (BSM); Mission Grips Assemblies and Purge Kits - Maintenance Kits (for Wescam systems)		For installation and integration into UAVs	Ministry of Defence of Turkey		Permit expired on 2019/07/16
18		2017/08/31	Software source code to be used in troubleshooting	Wescam Inc. c/o	This is so that WESCAM employees can effectively and efficiently track down the observed problems and link them to lines in the source code.			Permit expired on 2017/09/01
19		2017/09/18	Permanent export of quantity EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems including ancillary equipment; quantity Ground Boresight Modules (BSM)	Turkish Ministry of Int'l Affairs-National Police	For anti-terrorism operations	Turkish National Police		Permit expired on 2019/08/29

No.	Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Status
20		2017/11/01	Permanent export of quantity [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems [REDACTED] including ancillary equipment	[REDACTED]	For installation and integration into UAVs	Turkish Naval Forces	[REDACTED]	Permit expired on 2019/09/27
21		2017/11/01	Permanent export of quantity [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems [REDACTED] including ancillary equipment	[REDACTED]	For installation and integration into UAVs	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Permit expired on 2019/09/27
22		2017/11/20	Desiccant Assembly (for Wescam [REDACTED] Series EO/IR Surveillance Systems)	[REDACTED]	To repair Wescam [REDACTED] Series EO/IR Surveillance Systems	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Permit expired on 2017/11/28
23		2017/12/08	Permanent export of [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems [REDACTED] including ancillary equipment; [REDACTED] Ground Boresight Modules (BSM); [REDACTED] Mission Grips Assemblies and [REDACTED] Purge Kits - Maintenance Kits (for Wescam [REDACTED] Systems)	[REDACTED]	For installation and integration into UAVs	Ministry of Defence of Turkey	[REDACTED]	Permit expired on 2019/09/27
24		2018/01/08	Repaired Wescam [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] Series EO/IR Surveillance Systems, repaired/replacement Sub Assemblies (for Wescam [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance Systems and Technical Assistance (documents, course(s)/material and software).	[REDACTED]	For repair and replacement of parts	[REDACTED] Ministry of Defence of Turkey Ministry of the Interior of Turkey	[REDACTED]	Permit expired on 2018/01/08
25		2018/01/17	Temporary export of a PC with Wescam [REDACTED] Simulator Software	[REDACTED]	For demonstration and evaluation	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Permit expired on 2018/01/30
26		2018/01/22	Permanent export of [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems [REDACTED] including ancillary equipment	[REDACTED]	For installation and integration into UAVs	Turkish Land Forces	[REDACTED]	Permit was cancelled on 2018/11/15
27		2018/01/22	Purge Kit (for Wescam [REDACTED] Series EO/IR Surveillance Systems)	[REDACTED]	For repair of cameras	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Permit expired on 2018/02/02

No.	Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Status
28		2018/01/25	Temporary export of EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems		For demonstration			Permit expired on 2018/02/05
29		2018/02/02	Test Equipment (for Wescam EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems), repaired EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems , repaired/replacement parts (for Wescam EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems) and Controlled Technical Data relating to Wescam's EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems		For diagnosis and testing activities and repair/replacement	Ministry of Defence of Turkey Ministry of the Interior of Turkey		Permit expired on 2018/02/02
30		2018/02/15	EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems, Hand Controller Assemblies, Mission Grip Assemblies, Lot Cable Assemblies and Lot Circuit Card Assemblies (CCA)		For replacement in case of failure during demonstrations			Permit expired on 2018/02/20
31		2018/02/20	Spare parts/components for Wescam Series and Series EO/IR Surveillance/Camera Systems		To repair existing systems	Ministry of Defence of Turkey Ministry of the Interior of Turkey Undersecretariat of Defence Industries		Permit expired on 2018/03/05
32		2018/02/20	Spare parts/components for Wescam Series and Series EO/IR Surveillance/Camera Systems		To repair existing systems	Ministry of Defence of Turkey Ministry of the Interior of Turkey Undersecretariat of Defence Industries		Permit expired on 2018/03/05
33		2018/02/22	EO/IR Surveillance		For installation and	Ministry of Defence		Permit expired on

No.	Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Status
			and Targeting Systems ([REDACTED] including ancillary equipment; [REDACTED] Ground Boresight Modules (BSM) and [REDACTED] Mission Grips Assemblies	[REDACTED]	integration into UAVs	of Turkey Undersecretariat of Defence Industries		2018/03/13
34	[REDACTED]	2018/03/06	Repaired Wescam [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] Series EO/IR Surveillance Systems, repaired/replacement Sub Assemblies (for Wescam [REDACTED] Series EO/IR Surveillance Systems and Technical Assistance (documents, course(s)/material and software).	[REDACTED]	To repair existing systems	[REDACTED] Ministry of Defence of Turkey Ministry of the Interior of Turkey Undersecretariat of Defence Industries	[REDACTED]	Permit expired on 2018/03/26
35	[REDACTED]	2018/03/08	Test Equipment and Technical Data (for the Wescam [REDACTED] Series EO/IR Surveillance Systems).	Wescam Inc. Field Service Representative (FSR) c/o [REDACTED]	To perform repairs	Wescam Inc. Field Service Representative (FSR) [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Permit expired on 2018/03/16
36	[REDACTED]	2018/03/13	[REDACTED] Repaired/Upgraded [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems, [REDACTED] MOD Kit [REDACTED] Incl: Software/Firmware; [REDACTED] - [REDACTED] [REDACTED] MOD Kit [REDACTED] Incl: Software/Firmware; [REDACTED] [REDACTED] MOD Kit [REDACTED] Incl: [REDACTED] Wiring Harness Cable [REDACTED] MOD Kit [REDACTED] Incl: Wiring Harness; Cable, [REDACTED] MOD Kit [REDACTED] MOD Kit [REDACTED] Incl: [REDACTED] Wiring Harness; Cable [REDACTED] MOD Kit [REDACTED] Including: [REDACTED] Wiring Harness; Cable	[REDACTED]	For upgrades into [REDACTED] systems	[REDACTED] Ministry of Defence of Turkey Ministry of the Interior of Turkey Undersecretariat of Defence Industries	[REDACTED]	Permit expired on 2018/08/13
37	[REDACTED]	2018/04/04	Permanent export of [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	For installation and	Turkish Gendarmerie	[REDACTED]	Permit expired on

No.	Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Status
			EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems including ancillary equipment		integration into UAVs			2018/11/15
38		2018/05/23	Permanent export of quantity EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems including ancillary equipment		For installation and integration into UAVs	Turkish Police		Permit expired on 2020/05/26
39		2018/05/23	Permanent export of quantity EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting System including ancillary equipment		For installation and integration into UAVs			Permit expired on 2018/06/07
40		2018/06/26	Provision of technical assistance documents, training course(s) and training documents, and maintenance software for project development/marketing information		For quotation and/or marketing			Permit expired on 2020/05/28
41		2018/07/05	Permanent export of spare parts/components for Wescam EO/IR Surveillance/Camera Systems		To perform repairs			Permit expired on 2018/07/10
42		2018/08/13	Repaired/Upgraded EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems, MOD Kit Incl: Software/Firmware; MOD Kit Incl: Software/Firmware; MOD Kit Incl: Wiring Harness Cable		For upgrades into D systems	Ministry of Defence of Turkey Ministry of the Interior of Turkey Undersecretariat of Defence Industries		Permit expired on 2018/08/13

No.	Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Status
			MOD Kit Incl: Wiring Harness; Cable, MOD Kit MOD Kit Incl: Wiring Harness; Cable MOD Kit Including: Wiring Harness; Cable					
43		2018/08/17	Repaired Wescam EO/IR Surveillance Systems, repaired/replacement Sub-Assemblies (for Wescam EO/IR Surveillance Systems under warranty) and Technical Assistance (documents, course(s)/material and software)		To perform repairs			Permit issued on 2018/08/20 and valid until 2022/09/30
44		2018/10/15	Permanent export of completed, semi- finished and assembly kits for Wescam EO/IR Surveillance/Camera Systems, repaired systems and semi- finished systems and technical assistance		For installation and integration into UAVs	Turkish Land Forces Turkish Gendarmerie Turkish National Police Turkish Naval Forces		Permit issued on 2018/11/06 and valid until 2022/11/30
45		2018/10/25	each, and EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems, Land Controller Assemblies, Mission Grip Assemblies, Lot Cable Assemblies, Simulators, Kinetics, Boresight Modules, Laptops with moving map software and Lot Circuit Card Assemblies (CCA)		For replacement in case of failure during demonstrations			Permit issued on 2020/07/06 and valid until 2020/11/30
46		2018/11/22	Circuit Card Assemblies (CCA's)		For replacement of CCA's previously exported			Permit issued on 2018/12/03 and valid until 2020/12/31
47		2018/11/27	EO/IR Surveillance and		For installation and			Permit issued on

No.	Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Status
			Targeting Systems and related items		integration into UAVs			2019/01/30 and valid until 2022/01/31
48		2018/11/28	EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems and related items		For installation and integration into UAVs	Ministry of Defence of Turkey Ministry of the Interior of Turkey		Permit issued on 2019/01/14 and valid until 2022/01/31
49		2019/01/11	EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems including ancillary equipment; Ground Boresight Modules (BSM); Mission Grips Assemblies and Purge Kits - Maintenance Kits (for Wescam Systems)	Turkish Aerospace Industries, Inc. (TAI)	For installation and integration into UAVs	Ministry of Defence of Turkey		Permit expired on 2019/01/14
50		2019/02/06	Test Equipment for the Wescam Series EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems and Series EO/IR Surveillance Systems.		For diagnosis and testing activities of Series and/or Series Systems owned/used by end users	Ministry of Defence of Turkey Ministry of the Interior of Turkey Baykar Sanayi Ve Ticaret A.S.		Permit issued on 2019/02/20 and valid until 2021/02/28
51		2019/03/07	Permanent export of EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems including ancillary equipment; Ground Boresight Modules (BSM) and Mission Grips Assembly		For installation and integration into UAVs	Ministry of Defence of Turkey		Permit issued on 2019/03/12 and valid until 2021/03/31
52		2019/07/10	Permanent export of EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems including ancillary equipment; Ground Boresight Modules (BSM); Mission Grips Assemblies and Purge Kits - Maintenance Kits (for Wescam)		For installation and integration into UAVs	Ministry of Defence of Turkey		Permit expired on 2019/07/16

No.	Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Status
53		2019/08/01	Repaired EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems, Ground Boresight Modules (GBSM) and Controlled Technical data		To perform repairs	Ministry of Defence of Turkey Turkey National Police		Permit issued on 2019/08/13 and valid until 2023/08/31
54		2019/08/07	Boresight Modules for Wescam EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems		For repair and replacement of parts	Ministry of Defence of Turkey Ministry of the Interior of Turkey		Permit issued on 2019/08/14 and valid until 2023/08/31
55		2019/08/13	Wescam EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems, and their parts and components		For installation and integration into UAVs	Presidency of the Republic of Turkey		Permit issued on 2019/08/14 and valid until 2023/08/31
56		2019/08/20	Repaired EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems, Ground Boresight Modules (GBSM) and Controlled Technical data - Documents, Training and Software		To perform repairs	Turkish Air Force		Permit issued on 2019/08/29 and valid until 2023/08/31
57		2019/08/29	Permanent export of quantity EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems including ancillary equipment; quantity Ground Boresight Modules (BSM)	Turkish Ministry of Int'l Affairs-National Police	For anti-terrorism operations	Turkish National Police		Permit issued on 2019/09/03 and valid until 2020/09/30
58		2019/08/28	Temporary export of quantity each of Handcontroller Assemblies and Mission Grip Assemblies, and quantity lot Cable Assemblies		For demonstration			Permit issued on 2019/09/24 and valid until 2023/09/30
59		2019/09/13	Various spare parts for Wescam		For repair and	Turkish Land Forces		Permit issued on

No.	Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Status
			Series EO/IR Surveillance Systems		replacement of parts	Turkish Gendarmerie Turkish National Police Turkish Naval Forces		2019/10/09 and valid until 2023/09/30
60		2019/09/21	Temporary export of quantity [redacted] each of Handcontroller Assemblies and Mission Grip Assemblies, and quantity [redacted] lot Cable Assemblies	Turkish Ministry of Internal Affairs / Turkish National Police	For demonstration	Turkish Ministry of Internal Affairs / Turkish National Police	[redacted]	Permit issued on 2019/10/07 and valid until 2023/10/31
61		2019/09/23	Repaired [redacted] EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems, Repaired Ground Boresight Modules for [redacted] Systems and Controlled Technical Data - document, training and software	Turkish Republic Governorship VAN/General Directorate of Security of VAN	For anti-terrorism operations	Ministry of the Interior of Turkey Turkish National Police	[redacted]	Permit issued on 2019/10/04 and valid until 2023/09/30
62		2019/09/27	Permanent export of quantity [redacted] EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems [redacted] including ancillary equipment	[redacted]	For installation and integration into UAVs	Turkish Naval Forces	[redacted]	Permit issued on 2019/10/14 and valid until 2020/11/30
63		2019/09/27	Permanent export of quantity [redacted] EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems [redacted] including ancillary equipment	[redacted]	For installation and integration into UAVs	[redacted]	[redacted]	Permit issued on 2019/10/11 and valid until 2021/12/31
64		2019/09/27	Permanent export of [redacted] EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems ([redacted] including ancillary equipment; [redacted] Ground Boresight Modules (BSM); [redacted] Mission Grips Assemblies and [redacted] Purge Kits - Maintenance Kits (for Wescam [redacted] Systems)	[redacted]	For installation and integration into UAVs	Ministry of Defence of Turkey	[redacted]	Permit issued on 2019/10/01 and valid until 2021/01/31

Observations

- The timeframe (between January 1, 2016 to October 11, 2019) has been chosen in order to compare the above finding with the Ploughshare's report.
- Note that during this timeframe (between January 1, 2016 to October 11, 2019), [REDACTED] in terms of Canada's export controls, given their membership and adherence to the 4 multilateral export control regimes (i.e. the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Australia Group), as well as being a member of NATO and having effective export control mechanisms. [REDACTED]
- On October 11, 2019, in response to Turkey's military incursion into Syria, the Government of Canada announced the temporary suspension on the issuance of all new permits for the export of controlled goods and technology to Turkey. [REDACTED]
- Permits issued after October 11, 2019 have been addressed in the other table.
- Between January 1, 2016 to October 11, 2019, a total of [REDACTED] permits have been issued to L3 Wescam to Turkey. Out of these [REDACTED] permits issued:
 - [REDACTED] have now expired
 - [REDACTED] has been cancelled (at the request of applicant)
 - [REDACTED] are currently valid [REDACTED] of these permits will be expiring by the end of November 2020).
- In terms of the consignees, there are various entities that have received L3 Wescam products in Turkey, including [REDACTED] etc. These are all well-known and reputable defence companies in Turkey.
- Most of the L3 Wescam products were intended to be installed and integrated into various UAV platforms built by these Turkish defence companies (but not in all cases).
- In terms of the end users, they are mostly the military, as well as government and law enforcement agencies within Turkey. However, there have also been [REDACTED] instances where the end users have been specifically identified as the [REDACTED] and the [REDACTED]
- No end user(s) in either **Libya, Syria, Azerbaijan or Armenia** have been identified in the end use documentation provided by the consignees.

POSSIBLE EXPORT PERMIT LINKAGES TO ALLEGED USE OF TURKISH DRONES IN CONFLICT ZONES

ISSUE

- There are media reports and allegations that Turkey has transferred or sold drones to the Azerbaijani armed forces, possibly with Canadian technology, that are being used in the recent flare-up of large-scale military attacks between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh. The Armenian National Committee of Canada alleges that Azerbaijan is using Turkish made Bayraktar TB2 drones.
- A recent report by Project Ploughshares claims that Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones allegedly used by the Turkish military in Syria and Libya may have been used in conjunction with sensors obtained from a Canadian company L3 Harris Wescam (Wescam).
- Officials are seeking to determine the veracity of these claims and to determine whether there are any potential export control issues.
- Canada's policy approach towards exports of Group 2 items to Turkey has not changed since April 2020.

Canadian Export Controls and Turkey

Canada has one of the strongest export controls systems in the world, and respect for human rights is enshrined in our export controls legislation.

In September 2019, Canada acceded to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and placed the ATT assessment criteria directly into Canadian law. Under the law, controlled goods and technology cannot be exported from Canada where there is a substantial risk that they could be used to commit or to facilitate serious violations of international humanitarian law, international human rights law, or serious acts of gender-based violence. Other criteria which would lead to a permit application denial include a substantial risk that the arms or munitions could be used to undermine peace and security or to further international organized crime or terrorism. Canada has one of the most robust legal applications of this Treaty in the world.

Until recently [REDACTED] in terms of Canada's export controls, given their membership and adherence to the four multilateral export control regimes (i.e. the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Australia Group), as well as being a member of NATO and having effective export control mechanisms. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

On October 11, 2019, in response to Turkey's military incursion into north-eastern Syria, the Government of Canada announced a temporary suspension on the issuance of all new permits

for the export of controlled goods and technology to Turkey. Exporters who were issued permits for the export of such items to Turkey prior to October 11, 2019 may continue to export against those permits during their period of validity.

In April 2020, Canada significantly narrowed the scope of its policy to include only military goods and technology. While restrictions continue to apply to military exports to Turkey, during the permit review process Canada is considering whether there are exceptional circumstances, including but not limited to NATO cooperation programs, that might justify issuing an export permit for military items on a case-by-case basis.

The Government of Canada has stated that it continues to monitor developments in Turkey and the surrounding region, and will take appropriate action should credible evidence be found regarding the misuse of any controlled Canadian good or technology, including to commit or to facilitate serious violations of international human rights or humanitarian law.

Project Ploughshares Report

Project Ploughshares recently released a report entitled *Killer Optics: Exports of Wescam Sensors to Turkey – A Litmus Test of Canada’s Compliance with the Arms Trade Treaty*. The report claims that a Canadian company L3Harris Wescam exported a large number of Electro Optical/Infra-Red (EO/IR) imaging and targeting sensor systems that can be used for tracking targets and guiding munitions to the Turkish military in 2019, based on Statistics Canada data.

Project Ploughshares further alleges that the Turkish military has committed serious breaches of international humanitarian law (IHL) and other violations, particularly when conducting airstrikes, and that Wescam sensors, mounted on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), have been used extensively by Turkey in its recent military activities. Project Ploughshares asserts that Canada is therefore violating the ATT obligations by permitting exports of Wescam sensors.

The department notes that Turkish drones have been used in Turkey’s military and security operations - both domestically and internationally -- and they have both defensive and offensive capabilities, depending on how they are tasked. Notably, the TB2 UAV are always used for the purposes of observation, surveillance, identification and targeting of targets, but some versions of the TAI ANKA drones also carry weapons.

Turkey’s justification of its cross-border military operations in Iraq and Syria relied heavily on an argument of national security related to the activities of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). While Canada does not always support Turkey’s military actions -- as was the case with Operation Peace Spring -- like most of our like-minded counterparts we support the position that Turkey, a NATO ally, has legitimate security concerns, specifically related to the activities of the PKK which is a listed terrorist organization in Canada.

The Turkish military is, by-and-large, a professional army that acts in accordance with its international obligations. While Operations Olive Branch and Peace Spring both resulted in the displacement of civilians, there is no clear evidence that suggest a deliberate targeting of civilians or civilian infrastructure.

The Ploughshares report relies heavily on two UN reports (9 August 2018 and 28 January 2020), as well as an Amnesty International Report (Oct 2019), which itself relies primarily on accounts reported by the Kurdish Red Crescent (affiliated with the self-administration in the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria). The Kurdish Red Crescent is not formally affiliated with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). While we do not doubt KRC's credibility, their assessment should not be equated with an ICRC assessment.

The UN reports that list incidents in which civilians were killed as a result of Turkish military operations are limited to the two military operations (Olive Branch and Peace Spring) in which the Turkish side specifically targeted the Peoples Protection Unit (YPG) armed group – which they perceive to be the Syrian branch of the PKK. In these military operations, Turkey relied extensively on the Syrian armed opposition groups (SNA) to conduct the ground offensive. The department's initial assessment (in line with likemindeds) is that the Turkish military did not/not engage in the deliberate and purposeful targeting of civilians or civilian infrastructure.

In its May 2020 memorandum to the Minister, the department noted that there had been no substantiated evidence of the Turkish Armed Forces committing human rights violations in Syria, either in Idlib or northeast Syria during OPS. [REDACTED]

In Libya, since 2019 Turkey has provided weapons, drones, and reportedly over 16,500 Syrian mercenaries to Libya in support of Government of National Accord (GNA)-aligned forces, with which Turkey has a security agreement as of December 2019. A November 2019 UN Panel of Experts report on Libya found Turkey to be "routinely" in violation of UN sanctions on Libya related to arms, which were in force before the Turkey-GNA security agreement. A UN Panel of Experts report from December 2019 found that Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones, and possibly one Karayel drone, were exported to Libya for use by the GNA. While there have been unconfirmed reports that Turkish drones have killed civilians in Libya and thereby contributed to violations of IHL, there has been no conclusive evidence to-date that Turkey has committed violations of IHL in Libya. The United Nations and NGOs have very limited access to most of Libya due to ongoing conflict and instability, severely complicating the collection of evidence on alleged violations of international humanitarian law in Libya (e.g. testimonies, forensic evidence).

[REDACTED] A separate classified assessment has been shared with ministerial and deputies offices through normal channels.

Permit Analysis

[REDACTED] A number of foreign competitors in the US, France, Italy, Israel and even in Turkey manufacture similar cameras / technologies that can be used in such UAVs. [REDACTED]

While it is known that some Bayraktar TB-2 UAVs possess Wescam sensors due to its high quality, the proportion that do is not known. Wescam has received permits from GAC for camera surveillance systems destined directly to Turkey (the main consignees in these instances are [REDACTED] both of which supply the Turkish government). None of the permits issued to Wescam for items destined to Turkey from January 1, 2016 to September 27, 2020 indicate an end use in Libya, Azerbaijan or Armenia. Information related to current valid previously issued permits to Turkey is provided in the attached tables.

There appear to be no applications, nor any valid permits in EXCOL for L3 Wescam items destined directly to Libya, Azerbaijan or Armenia.

There are presently [REDACTED] applications in EXCOL that are “under review” for Wescam camera systems going via Turkey ([REDACTED] is the consignee) onwards to the Azerbaijan Airforce. These applications are currently under consultation.

Recent Interactions with [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Positions of Like-Minded Countries

The attached Annex sets out an up to date comparative chart on the position of key partner countries’ controls over strategic exports to Turkey, as well their relative commercial exposure.

Although most of our like-minded imposed exports restrictions on Turkey following the October 2019 incursion into Syria, Canada’s decision to immediately suspend all new export permits to Turkey went beyond our like-mindeds and immediately became a bilateral irritant with Turkey. Since Canada updated its exports control policy in April to only restrict Group 2 permits, its approach appears to be most closely aligned with the more restrictive of EU members, who are either not issuing permits for any military items or only for military items who are either not issuing permits for any military items to Turkey or not issuing permits for military items to Turkey for end use in Syria, for military use or other uses. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] have placed no restrictions on military exports to Turkey, which they are assessing on a case-by-case basis.

Next Steps

The Department is pursuing a wide range of steps in order to ascertain more information and proactively monitor the situation closely.

The Department could consider a number of different steps from an export controls perspective, depending on the additional information that becomes available.

[REDACTED]

Given the new outbreak in violence over Nagorno-Karabakh, Canada's Ambassador to Turkey raised our concerns about alleged use of Turkish drones equipped with Canadian technology with the Turkish MFA Head of Americas (ADM-eq) on September 29. This conversation will continue with Turkey to reaffirm our export controls regime and seek assurances about end use.

[REDACTED]

In the interim, officials continue to engage with DND and allies, as well as with GAC's legal bureau to gather information related to allegations in Syria, Canada's ATT obligations, and Canada's arms embargo to Libya.

The Embassy in Ankara, including our DND Defence Attaché, continues to engage local government, likeminded countries, and other key stakeholders, including civil society, as well as frequently monitor social media and NGO reporting.

The Department's Intelligence Bureau (IND) has prepared a detailed assessment, which will be shared separately due to its classification. IND will continue to monitor intelligence reporting and will continue to provide detailed and tailored intelligence assessments working with key Canadian and FVEY intelligence partners.

The Export Controls Bureau remains in close contact with [REDACTED] and is awaiting further information from the company.

Author's name/division or mission/tel.: Korecky/TIR/613-291-0347

Approval bureau/mission: TID

Consulted divisions/missions/departments: TIE/ECE/JLT/JLH/INA

FW: Turkey Group 2 permits and follow up on 3:30 pm oMINA briefing ++

From: "Grant, Alison -ECE" <alison.grant@international.gc.ca>
To: "Coleman, Robert -ECE" <robert.coleman@international.gc.ca>, "Pilloud, Marc -ECE" <marc.pilloud@international.gc.ca>
Cc: "Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE" <kamiliya.akkouche@international.gc.ca>, "Brisson, Julien -ECE" <julien.brisson@international.gc.ca>, "Turner, Andrew -ECE" <andrew.turner@international.gc.ca>
Date: Mon, 26 Oct 2020 14:57:04 -0400

For info only.

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT
Sent: October 25, 2020 3:33 PM
To: Anand, Shalini -TID ; *MINA-Dept Unit
Cc: Sproule, David -ECD ; Turner, Andrew -ECE ; Grant, Alison -ECE ; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR ; Yendall, Jonathan -INP ; Mishra, Rachna -ELB ; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE ; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR ; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR ; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR ; *TFM-Policy ; Sproule, David -ECD ; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN ; *USS-DMA Advisors ; Christie, Bruce -TFMA ; Thompson, Kevin -JLTA ; Mallett, Erika -TIE ; *DMT-Policy
Subject: RE: Turkey Group 2 permits and follow up on 3:30 pm oMINA briefing ++

MINA-DU, DMT has approved the following message for onward transmission to oMINA.

With thanks
 GuyB.

Dear oMINA

Further to the 3:30 briefing with oMINA on Friday, during which officials discussed the valid group 2 permits to Turkey, below is: a) a brief summary of the context that I provided at the outset; b) a response to the question that Ally asked during the line by line permit review; and c) further details on the P&WC engines that were raised via a Radio Canada media question, about which I gave a heads up (likely coming to you via the Lbranch).

A) Context/Update on our reviews of valid permits with consultation partners:

- a. To date, at MINA's direction, we [REDACTED] and thus, there are presently [REDACTED]
- b. As mentioned, we've asked our consultation partners twice about the list of valid Group 2 (military goods) permits for items going directly to Turkey. We have asked if there are any concerns about these valid permits and to date, there have been no concerns raised. Given that the information and intelligence is still coming in and that the situation is evolving, we are planning to go back to consultee partners next week for a third time to validate this;
- c. Finally, we are trying to broaden our data mining of valid permits to look at non-Group 2 permits as well, but given the limitations of our system, this will take time to pull together and review. We are aiming to have an update towards the end of next week, depending on other requests/pressures.

- B) RE: 854184-8 (MAGNUM INTEGRATED TECHNOLOGY LTD)** - Ally was asking who the end users are for the ammunition that would be manufactured by ZSR Patlayici Sanayi A.S.

Per the End Use Statement in the file, the end user of the export is ZSR Patlayici Sanayi A.S., as they will be using the machinery to manufacture the ammunition themselves. However, the consignee website and they appear to sell to both commercial and military. Most of the ammo listed is typically called "NATO rounds" because NATO allies use them in their missions, and the facility is NATO certified. However, NATO rounds are also very popular with sport shooters who have rifles that shoot .308 because they are cheaper to buy and fit the .308 chamber. There is also an M43 round listed, used in SKS and AK-47 rifles used by both civilians and military.

C) Pratt & Whitney Canada to Turkey: question about exports to Turkey of engines for the [REDACTED] aircraft

Ref ID	Submit Date	Description	Consignee	Country	End Use	Status
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Request to export [REDACTED] civil certified PT6A- [REDACTED] turboprop engines [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Turkey	for installation on the [REDACTED]	Expired [REDACTED] [REDACTED] (Approved [REDACTED])

					aircraft.	
		Request to export civil certified PT6A- turboprop engines		Turkey	for installation on the aircraft.	Expired (Approved
		Request to export civil certified PT6A- turboprop engines		Turkey	for installation on the aircraft	Expired (Approved

FW: re: Additional information from Wescam on Turkey issue

From: "Anand, Shalini -TID" <shalini.anand@international.gc.ca>
To: *DMT-Policy <d-dmt-policy@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *USS-DMA Advisors <d-uss-dmaadvisors@international.gc.ca>, *MINA-Dept Unit <d-mina-dept-unit@international.gc.ca>, *TFM-Policy <d-tfm-policy@international.gc.ca>, "Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE" <marieeve.roymarcoux@international.gc.ca>, "Gosselin, Catherine -TIR" <catherine.gosselin@international.gc.ca>, "Senkiw, Jillian -TIR" <jillian.senkiw@international.gc.ca>, "Bastien, Jean-François -TIR" <jean-francois.bastien@international.gc.ca>, "Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE" <joonhyuk.yoon@international.gc.ca>, "Mallett, Erika -TIE" <erika.mallett@international.gc.ca>, "Schonfeld, Benjamin -TIR" <benjamin.schonfeld@international.gc.ca>, "Hamilton, Kevin -IGR" <kevin.hamilton@international.gc.ca>, "Yendall, Jonathan -INP" <jonathan.yendall@international.gc.ca>, "Grant, Alison -ECE" <alison.grant@international.gc.ca>, "Sproule, David -ECD" <david.sproule@international.gc.ca>, "Carrière, Sébastien -IGN" <sebastien.carriere@international.gc.ca>, "Turner, Andrew -ECE" <andrew.turner@international.gc.ca>, "Christie, Bruce -TFMA" <bruce.christie@international.gc.ca>
Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2020 20:06:58 -0400

Dear Guy:

If DMT is comfortable with the message below, please send to oMINA (DLU copied). Sending to you, as I'm not sure if he prefers to see first, given that I believe the questions came from his discussion with MINA.

Warmly,
S.

Dear oMINA:

Further to the tweets in the media with potentially downed Wescam video footage and images, we reached out to the company to support the analysis coming from geos and I branch. Bottom line: they have indicated that some of the images may be their product, but it is difficult to confirm. We've also included some analysis of the end use statements that Wescam pointed to in their comments.

Wescam feedback:

1. Important to note that responses are based on viewing of the digital images/videos found in the links, however we are not able to comment on their authenticity
2. The external product representations contained in the video as well as the other images are consistent with a WESCAM produced [REDACTED]. We are unable to determine if that specific camera was removed from the aircraft wreckage shown in the links.
3. The camera shown in the image seems to have had the circular electronic interface board removed for display purposes. It also shows some visible damage but we cannot correlate the level of damage of the turret with the aircraft wreckage. We have seen a number of crashed units which tend to be damaged beyond economic repair. The crash scene we have seen in various tweets shows expected destruction of the aircraft. The turret is installed on the belly of the aircraft and we would expect significant damage. The turret itself is also cleaner than expected post-crash, but not conclusive.
4. Part number, product name and serial number on the [REDACTED] tag shown in the image is consistent with our naming conventions.
5. S/N [REDACTED] is shown on the product tag in the image. A system with this serial number was delivered in September 2020 under permit number [REDACTED] approved in September 2019 for end user Turkish Naval Forces. (Permits and EUS attached)
6. As in point 2, the video tweeted does show what looks like the external housing of the WESCAM ([REDACTED]). Note that the RCPS, as well as the other components/parts shown loose or on the ground (and which were edited into the video) are not components or subassemblies of the [REDACTED]. We cannot tell if it was the same system as the one which was shown disassembled in the other images.

EUS Analysis:

-The permit was for the proposed export of [REDACTED] EO/IR systems to [REDACTED] in Turkey. According to the EUS, the [REDACTED] would be installed into the [REDACTED]. The EUS also states that "the [REDACTED] systems will be delivered to and used by the final end user Turkish Naval Forces, who will use the [REDACTED] system for the purpose of surveillance and

targeting". It further states that "the imported goods will not be diverted, re-exported or transferred to a non-listed party for any reason".

-As far as export controls is concerned, L3's obligation was to deliver their products to [REDACTED] as the per the terms of their issued permit. This seems to be have been done. Furthermore, [REDACTED] undertaking was to incorporate the [REDACTED] into their [REDACTED] platforms. This also seems to have been done.

-Therefore, the incorporation of the [REDACTED] sensors into the [REDACTED] platforms was in itself the end use.

Footage and images sent to company for analysis:

<http://asbarez.com/197714/artsakh-forces-down-turkish-bayraktar-drone/>

Note: serial/part number at 0:25.

<https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1318281456955916289>

<https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/armenia-turkey-azerbaijan-nagorno-karabakh-drone-champagne-1.5770144>

<https://twitter.com/armgov>

FW: ANKRA - request for input on G&M allegations

From: "Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE" <kamiliya.akkouche@international.gc.ca>
To: "Pilloud, Marc -ECE" <marc.pilloud@international.gc.ca>
Date: Tue, 29 Sep 2020 11:54:39 -0400
Attachments: Unnamed Attachment (68 bytes)

Found it below – it's ESA's comment.

From: Grant, Alison -ECE
Sent: Wednesday, September 23, 2020 8:09 PM
To: Mishra, Rachna -ELB
Cc: Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE ; Pilloud, Marc -ECE ; Coleman, Robert -ECE ; Meester, Derek -ELB -TRPLI ; Hill, Andrew -ELB
Subject: RE: ANKRA - request for input on G&M allegations

Thank Rachna and team!

From: Mishra, Rachna -ELB <Rachna.Mishra@international.gc.ca>
Sent: September 23, 2020 9:14 PM
To: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE <Kamiliya.Akkouche@international.gc.ca>; Pilloud, Marc -ECE <Marc.Pilloud@international.gc.ca>; Coleman, Robert -ECE <Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca>; Meester, Derek -ELB -TRPLI <Derek.Meester@international.gc.ca>; Hill, Andrew -ELB <Andrew.Hill@international.gc.ca>
Subject: Re: ANKRA - request for input on G&M allegations

Alison - Derek provided ELB input on Libya to your team verbally today.

Our input on the separate tasking (briefing note) is with ELD for review and we'll have it to you first thing tomorrow.

On Sep 23, 2020, at 9:05 PM, Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca> wrote:

Thanks very much to the ANKRA team and ESA for all this work and quick turnaround. We will use to prepare a response for oMINA that will first be consulted with TIE and lawyers who may have elements to add.

Alison

— — —
 Director, Eastern Europe and Eurasia
 Cell: 613-462-2747

On Sep 23, 2020, at 8:35 PM, Minkova, Nicole -ESA <Nicole.Minkova@international.gc.ca> wrote:

Good evening,

ESA concurs with ANKRA's assessment below of Turkey's 2020 operations in Idlib, in particular that undertaking these operations very likely prevented (further) massive displacement and exacerbation of the existing humanitarian crisis by halting the regime's aggressive advances.

A few other notes to contextualize the Syria context:

- A key military difference between the Turkish incursion into the northeast (OPS) and the Idlib operation (OSS) is that the 2019 OPS was mainly a ground operation (supported by artillery) by Turkish military and Turkish-backed troops, while drone/UAV technology was mainly used for intel/surveillance rather than for airstrikes. This is when the alleged IHL violations were reportedly mainly committed by Turkish-backed forces, and not the Turkish military themselves. In Idlib 2020, there was more of an emphasis on the use of armed drone technology against regime forces, although as noted, Canada did not condemn Turkey's OSS as we did OPS – and this was partly due to the difference in context in the two situations.
- The Kurdish Red Crescent, the group reporting on IHL violations at the hands of Turkish or Turkish-backed troops, is not formally affiliated with the ICRC. While HQ does not doubt KRC's credibility, their assessment should not be equated with an ICRC assessment.

Approved: ESA/Kumar

Thank you,

Nicole Minkova
Senior Desk Officer, Syria | Chargée de dossiers principal, Syrie
nicole.minkova@international.gc.ca
Tel : 613-291-9013
A6-209, 125 Sussex Drive, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K1A 0G2
Global Affairs Canada | Affaires mondiales Canada
Government of Canada | Gouvernement du Canada



From: Schoenauer, Andrea -ANKRA -GR <Andrea.Schoenauer@international.gc.ca>
Sent: September 23, 2020 11:24 AM
To: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Helal, Marie-Thérèse -IRC <Marie-Therese.Helal@international.gc.ca>; Ben Sayeh, Fatma -ANKRA -GR <Fatma.BenSayeh@international.gc.ca>; Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE <Kamiliya.Akkouche@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Pilloud, Marc -ECE <Marc.Pilloud@international.gc.ca>; Coleman, Robert -ECE <Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Khokhar, Jamal -ANKRA -HOM/CDM <Jamal.Khokhar@international.gc.ca>; Braithwaite, Todd -ANKRA -DR <Todd.Braithwaite@international.gc.ca>; Kumar, Apeksha -ESA <Apeksha.Kumar@international.gc.ca>; Galligan, Gregory -BERUT -GR <Gregory.Galligan@international.gc.ca>; Meester, Derek -ELB -TRPLI <Derek.Meester@international.gc.ca>; Mishra, Rachna -ELB <Rachna.Mishra@international.gc.ca>; Hughes, Steven -INA <Steven.Hughes@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INA <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Wimmer, Christopher -ISTBL -TD <Christopher.Wimmer@international.gc.ca>; Gilker, Naomi -ISTBL -TD <Naomi.Gilker@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: ANKRA - request for input on G&M allegations

Alison,

We have reviewed the full Ploughshare report, including researching the sources used.

On the technical aspects it is well researched and provides a fact-based portrayal of the UAV systems used by Turkish security forces.

There is no doubt that Turkish drones have been used in Turkey's military and security operations -- both domestically and internationally -- and they have both defensive and offensive capabilities, depending on how they are tasked.

Like most of our like-minded counterparts, ANKRA supports the position that *Turkey has legitimate security concerns, specifically related to the activities of the PKK – also a listed terrorist organization in Canada.*

Turkey's justification of its cross-border military operations in Iraq and Syria relied heavily on an argument of national security related to the activities of the PKK. In Iraq it was Operation Claw, and in Syria Operation they were Operations Olive Branch and Peace Spring.

In Idlib, Turkey continues to assert that its military intervention is with a view to protecting civilians and prevent an exacerbated humanitarian crisis.

For the allegations regarding IHL violations:

The Ploughshares report relies heavily on two UN reports ([9 August 2018](#) and [28 January 2020](#)), as well as an [Amnesty International Report](#) (Oct 2019), which itself relies primarily on accounts reported by the Kurdish Red Crescent (affiliated with the self-administration in NES).

It is noteworthy, that while these reports provide some evidence related to possible violations of IHL as a result of Turkish air strikes – the evidence relates only to the Olive Branch and Peace Spring Operations, for a total number of 7-8 incidents directly associated with the Turkish military.

The Ploughshare reports extrapolates some of its arguments related to IHL violations based on the findings in these reports. It is these very generalized arguments that were picked up by both the G&M and CBC articles.

There are credible allegations of IHL abuses by Turkish-backed *factions* in all three Turkish military operation zones (Olive Branch, Euphrates Shield, Peace Spring). While Turkey can certainly bear some responsibility for the actions of these non-state armed actors, it is important to distinguish between the actions of those players and those of the Turkish military.

Likeminded counterparts agree that the Turkish military is, by-and-large, a professional army that acts in accordance with its international obligations. While Operations Olive Branch and Peace Spring both resulted in the displacement of civilians, there is no clear evidence that suggests a deliberate targeting of civilians or civilian infrastructure – though, that possibility remains.

For northern Iraq, there are a number of allegations reported by local NGOs or media sources about the impact of airstrikes on civilians, including the displacement of civilians.

There is no substantiated evidence that Turkey has violated IHL in either Idlib or Libya. That said, the UN Panel of Experts report from December 2019 found that Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones, and possibly one Karayel drone, were exported to Libya, for use by the GNA. [REDACTED] Since it predates the December 2019 security agreement between Turkey and the GNA, Turkey cannot rely on this argument, as it currently does.

For consideration:

- *How does one explain that the UAV transfers to GNA noted in Panel of Experts Report were made prior to the export freeze on armed goods that came into effect in Oct. 2019?*
- *Also, how does one proceed further? That is, to identify what, if any, mitigation is possible for potential future exports, given the possibility of transfer to GNA/Libya.*

[REDACTED] September 23, that [REDACTED] has not found any credible evidence that the Turkish military directly violated IHL in its operations. Likewise, nor is [REDACTED] aware of any transfers by the Turkish army of its military equipment to illicit or non-state actors.

Regional stability and security:

Part of the obligation under ATT is to ensure that exports do not threaten regional peace and security. *Turkey is a signatory to the ATT, but has not yet ratified the treaty.*

In Idlib, in particular, there is a strong argument that Turkey's March 2020 military operation succeeded in halting an aggressive Syrian regime offensive which resulted in massive civilian displacement and threatened a new wave of migration into Turkey and further afield to the EU.

In Libya, Turkey's reached a security agreement with the U.N.-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) and its support prevented the fall of the GNA in Tripoli and again took a stance against Russian expansion in the region.

As a NATO ally, Turkey is expected to comply with and act in accordance with its international obligations. While Canada does not always support Turkey's military actions, as was the case for Operation Peace Spring, Canada recognizes that Turkey has legitimate security concerns.

The UAVs in question are used as an offensive system and while the Bayraktar TB2s systems are used for surveillance and targeting, their targeting can imply offensive action. However, this would be the case globally, not just in Turkey. That is, [REDACTED] exports its products to over 80 countries, including UK, Australia, Japan, Spain, Germany, Jordan, USA, UAE, etc. – many of whom would use drones in a similar manner.

Best,
Andrea

Drafted: ANKRA/Schoenauer
Consulted: ANKRA/CDA, ANKRA/HOM, ISTBL/TD
Approved: ANKRA/HOM

From: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>

Sent: September-23-20 4:38 AM

To: Helal, Marie-Thérèse -IRC <Marie-Therese.Helal@international.gc.ca>; Ben Sayeh, Fatma -ANKRA -GR <Fatma.BenSayeh@international.gc.ca>; Schoenauer, Andrea -ANKRA -GR <Andrea.Schoenauer@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE <Kamiliya.Akkouche@international.gc.ca>; Pilloud, Marc -ECE <Marc.Pilloud@international.gc.ca>; Coleman, Robert -ECE <Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Khokhar, Jamal -ANKRA -HOM/CDM <Jamal.Khokhar@international.gc.ca>; Braithwaite, Todd -ANKRA -DR <Todd.Braithwaite@international.gc.ca>; Kumar, Apeksha -ESA <Apeksha.Kumar@international.gc.ca>; Galligan, Gregory -BERUT -GR <Gregory.Galligan@international.gc.ca>; Meester, Derek -ELB -TRPLI <Derek.Meester@international.gc.ca>; Mishra, Rachna -ELB <Rachna.Mishra@international.gc.ca>; Hughes, Steven -INA <Steven.Hughes@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INA <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: ANKRA - request for input on G&M allegations

Looping in ESA/BERUT, ELB/TRPLI for awareness and in case of input.

Also INA in case of any high-side reporting that may be useful on this issue.

Please direct all information to ECE/Akkouche. Thank you.

From: Grant, Alison -ECE

Sent: September 22, 2020 8:09 PM

To: Helal, Marie-Thérèse -IRC <Marie-Therese.Helal@international.gc.ca>; Ben Sayeh, Fatma -ANKRA -GR <Fatma.BenSayeh@international.gc.ca>; Schoenauer, Andrea -ANKRA -GR <Andrea.Schoenauer@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE <Kamiliya.Akkouche@international.gc.ca>; Pilloud, Marc -ECE <Marc.Pilloud@international.gc.ca>; Coleman, Robert -ECE <Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Khokhar, Jamal -ANKRA -HOM/CDM <Jamal.Khokhar@international.gc.ca>; Braithwaite, Todd -ANKRA -DR <Todd.Braithwaite@international.gc.ca>
Subject: ANKRA - request for input on G&M allegations

We have now been tasked with providing a response to MINA on the allegations in the Chase article linked below from today's Globe.

TIE has put together a helpful summary of the [REDACTED] permits issued to Turkey in May (attached).

We would be grateful if ANKRA could provide considered views on the allegations by Thursday, including consultation with ANKRA-DR.

Your response will also form part of the briefing to MINA on Turkey export permits scheduled for Monday September 28. A second request related to that briefing will follow.

Thank you!
 Alison

From: Grant, Alison -ECE

Sent: September 22, 2020 1:29 PM

To: Helal, Marie-Thérèse -IRC <Marie-Therese.Helal@international.gc.ca>; Ben Sayeh, Fatma -ANKRA -GR <Fatma.BenSayeh@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE <Kamiliya.Akkouche@international.gc.ca>; Pilloud, Marc -ECE <Marc.Pilloud@international.gc.ca>; Coleman, Robert -ECE <Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca>

Subject: FW: erikRE: [REDACTED] Permits

Heads-up that there is a Globe article that is gathering some attention. See highlight. I haven't received a formal tasking yet but if we do we will rely on post to provide views. This is on the [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED] These are Group 2 but MINA has approved recent permits for these exceptionally.

<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-canada-accused-of-breaching-obligations-under-arms-trade-treaty-by/>

From: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>

Sent: September 22, 2020 1:04 PM

To: Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>; Farid, Sohrab -DMA -USS <Sohrab.Farid@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR

<Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Funtek, Katharine -TID <Katharine.Funtek@international.gc.ca>; Schonfeld, Benjamin -TIR <Benjamin.Schonfeld@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Alday, Corazon -TIE <Corazon.Alday@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>; Mallett, Erika -TIE <Erika.Mallett@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Beland, Marc -ECE <marc.beland@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: erikRE: Permits

I think the checking of these allegations would more likely fall to the geographic, but we can support their effort. We can provide more of a technical assessment on the permits, which we're working on. Copying E-branch.

From: Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>
Sent: September 22, 2020 12:58 PM
To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Farid, Sohrab -DMA -USS <Sohrab.Farid@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Funtek, Katharine -TID <Katharine.Funtek@international.gc.ca>; Schonfeld, Benjamin -TIR <Benjamin.Schonfeld@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Alday, Corazon -TIE <Corazon.Alday@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>; Mallett, Erika -TIE <Erika.Mallett@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: erikRE: Permits

Thanks Shalini.

FYI – I'm told MINA has also asked USS to look into the allegations outlined in the most recent article but not sure if this request has made it to you yet. It would be super helpful to get sense of the timeline on this part.

Aliya

From: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>
Sent: September 22, 2020 12:27 PM
To: Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Funtek, Katharine -TID <Katharine.Funtek@international.gc.ca>; Schonfeld, Benjamin -TIR <Benjamin.Schonfeld@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Alday, Corazon -TIE <Corazon.Alday@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>; Mallett, Erika -TIE <Erika.Mallett@international.gc.ca>
Subject: erikRE: Permits

Got it – we're working on a summary chart, and a few bullets to summarize the memo. Will get back to you today.

Warmly,
S.

From: Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>
Sent: September 22, 2020 12:23 PM
To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Funtek, Katharine -TID <Katharine.Funtek@international.gc.ca>; Schonfeld, Benjamin -TIR <Benjamin.Schonfeld@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Subject: Permits

Hi Shalini –

As discussed on the phone with Ally just now – can we please get a detailed item description of these permits:

Items and Stated End Use: The items in the [REDACTED] export permit applications are all Group 2 (Munitions List) items. The total value of these items is approximately \$ [REDACTED]. There are [REDACTED] export permit applications (ref id: [REDACTED]) from L3 Wescam for its [REDACTED] camera electro-optical infrared surveillance system, and supporting parts and technology ([REDACTED]). There are also [REDACTED] permit amendment requests (PARs) from the company (ref id: [REDACTED]) for temporary exports that are part of the same series of [REDACTED] camera surveillance systems. The [REDACTED] PAR (ref id: [REDACTED]) is a permanent export pertaining to the [REDACTED] camera surveillance system, support components, spares and repairs. The distinction between the [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] series of surveillance systems is that the [REDACTED] components (e.g. [REDACTED] and other specially designed components) are sourced from non-U.S. supply chains, meaning that the [REDACTED] series is not subject to U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) controls. Conversely, the [REDACTED] contains ITAR controlled items. All of the items in these [REDACTED] export permits/PARs are intended to be integrated into [REDACTED] UAVs. The UAVs with these surveillance systems can be used [REDACTED].

Thank you!

Aliya

Aliya Mawani

Senior Departmental Advisor | Conseillère ministérielle principale
Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs | Bureau du Ministre des Affaires étrangères
Aliya.mawani@international.gc.ca
Telephone | Téléphone: 343-203-5953

FW: Analysis of permits linkages to media/Ploughshare report

From: "Grant, Alison -ECE" <alison.grant@international.gc.ca>
To: "Coleman, Robert -ECE" <robert.coleman@international.gc.ca>, "Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE" <kamiliya.akkouche@international.gc.ca>, "Pilloud, Marc -ECE" <marc.pilloud@international.gc.ca>
Date: Mon, 28 Sep 2020 22:28:40 -0400
Attachments: L3WESCAM PERMITS TO TURKEY after Oct 11 2019 announcement (w. PUR as of Sept 25 2020) - V2.docx (18.23 kB); L3WESCAM PERMITS TO TURKEY from Jan 1 2016 to Oct 11 2019 V2.docx (30.44 kB)

FYI for all

Kamiliya – tomorrow perhaps you can enter this data in the Drone Squad doc. Tks.

From: Anand, Shalini -TIE
Sent: September 28, 2020 12:15 PM
To: *MINA-Dept Unit
Cc: *TFM-Policy ; *USS-DMA Advisors ; *DMT-Policy ; Christie, Bruce -TFMA ; Funtek, Katharine -TID ; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR ; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE ; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE ; Grant, Alison -ECE ; Coleman, Robert -ECE
Subject: Analysis of permits linkages to media/Ploughshare report

Dear Aliya:

Please see two documents attached, which comprise our analysis of possible export permit linkages to the ploughshare report (i.e. L3 Wescam permits destined to Turkey).

We have reviewed (by hand) the permits issued to L3 Wescam for items destined to Turkey since October 11, 2019 (approved by MINA), and there is no documentation in the export permit files submitted by the company to indicate end use of these items in Libya/Azerbaijan/Armenia (see attachment 1 for details).

We have reviewed (by hand) the permits issued to L3 Wescam for items destined to Turkey prior to October 11, 2019 (we used Jan 1 2016 to Oct 11 2019 permit submission dates to attempt to align what is our system with allegations in the Ploughshare report). Again, there is no documentation in the export permit files submitted by the company to indicate end use of these items in Libya/Azerbaijan/Armenia

This aligns with the information provided to us by the company to date.

Please see a more detailed analysis in each of these documents.

Warmly,
S.

COMPARISON OF ISSUED PERMITS FOR TURKEY TO WESCAM

Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Country of Destination	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Status	Permit Utilization (as of Sept 25, 2020)
	2019/11/06	Permanent export of EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems, sub-assemblies, including provisions for repairs, technical data and software		Turkey	For integration and installation into the [redacted] to be used for surveillance operations	Presidency of Defence Industries (SSB)		Issued permit on May 6, 2020 per BPTS: 01794-2020	This permit has not been utilized
	2019/11/06	Permanent export of EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems, sub-assemblies, including provisions for repairs, technical data and software		Turkey	For integration and installation into the prototype [redacted]	[redacted] Note: [redacted]		Issued permit on May 6, 2020 per BPTS: 01794-2020	This permit has not been utilized.
	2019/08/26	Permanent export of EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems, sub-assemblies, including provisions for repairs, technical data and software		Turkey	For installation and integration into the [redacted] to be used for surveillance and targeting.	Military and law enforcement agencies under the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of the Interior		Issued permit on May 6, 2020 per BPTS: 01794-2020	This permit has been utilized for up to [redacted]
	2019/10/28	Permit amendment		Turkey	To be used as [redacted]			Amendment	

Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Country of Destination	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Status	Permit Utilization (as of Sept 25, 2020)
		request (PAR) to extend permit validity by a year on a temporary export for [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems	[REDACTED]		loaner systems for training purposes.	[REDACTED]		permit was re-issued on May 7, 2020 per BPTS: 01794-2020. Extended validity date until May 7, 2021.	Temporary export permit. No permit utilization required
	2019/10/30	Permit amendment request (PAR) to extend permit validity by a year on a temporary export for [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems and accessories.	[REDACTED]	Turkey	To be used to demonstrate the system's capabilities in the scope of police, maritime surveillance and army reconnaissance; the system will be used for flight demonstration on a [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		Amendment permit was re-issued on May 7, 2020 per BPTS: 01794-2020. Extended validity date until May 7, 2021.	Temporary export permit. No permit utilization required
	2019/12/05	Permit amendment request (PAR) to extend permit validity by a year on a permanent export of repaired [REDACTED] surveillance systems [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Turkey	Consignee is an authorized Wescam Service Provider and will use the items for in-country repairs of the [REDACTED]	Turkish Ministry of Defence. Turkish Ministry of the Interior		Amendment permit was re-issued on May 7, 2020 per BPTS: 01794-2020. Extended validity date	This permit has been utilized for up to [REDACTED]

Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Country of Destination	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Status	Permit Utilization (as of Sept 25, 2020)
		repaired/replacement components and sub-assemblies and related technical data and software			series surveillance systems; repaired systems to be returned to its foreign owners.			until May 7, 2021.	
Total									

Summary/Additional Notes:

Under BPTS: 01794-2020 Wescam received:

- [REDACTED] export permits and [REDACTED] amended permit for Turkey
- The [REDACTED] new permits were for a total of [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems to be used in the UAVs of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] with the Turkish MOD and Ministry of the Interior as the primary end-users.
- All [REDACTED] permit amendment requests (PARs) are for extension of the permit validity by a year.
- [REDACTED] of PARs are related to the temporary exports of [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems to be used in UAVs.
- [REDACTED] of PARs is for the [REDACTED] model of Wescam's surveillance system. This export is for the return of repaired systems in Canada and various components and sub-assemblies of the [REDACTED] to be used for in-country repair (in Turkey) by consignee [REDACTED] as an authorized Wescam Service Provider. If [REDACTED] is unable to undertake repair in Turkey, it sends the system back to Wescam in Canada to be repaired.
- The second Ref ID in the last [REDACTED] entries (highlighted in red) is the new file under which the amended permits were issued, given that the permits expired while the PARs were under review.

Additional notes:

- No end user(s) in Libya, Syria, Azerbaijan and Armenia have been identified in the end use documentation provided by the consignees.
- The stated end-use in the End-Use Statements are also highlighted in yellow font.

PERMITS ISSUED TO L3 WESCAM FOR TURKEY (from January 1, 2016 to October 11, 2019)

No.	Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Status
1		2016/05/25	Temporary export of quantity [REDACTED] Model [REDACTED] Stabilized Optical Sensor Systems and replacement parts	[REDACTED]	For integration and ground tests	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Permit expired on 2018/05/31
2		2016/08/10	Permanent export of quantity [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems [REDACTED] including ancillary equipment	[REDACTED]	For installation and integration into UAVs	Turkish Army	[REDACTED]	Permit expired on 2017/07/11
3		2016/09/29	[REDACTED] Humidity Indicator Installation Tools (Test Equipment for Wescam [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance Systems)	[REDACTED]	To test Wescam [REDACTED] Series EO/IR Surveillance Systems	Ministry of Defence of Turkey	[REDACTED]	Permit expired on 2016/10/19
4		2016/11/22	[REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems [REDACTED] including ancillary equipment	[REDACTED]	For installation and integration into UAVs	Ministry of Defence of Turkey	[REDACTED]	Permit expired on 2017/07/12
5		2017/01/05	Purge kit, ground boresight module, mission grip handcontroller	[REDACTED]	Auxiliary equipment for [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems	Ministry of Defence of Turkey, Ministry of the Interior of Turkey Turkish Gendarmerie	[REDACTED]	Permit expired on 2017/01/11
6		2017/01/16	Test Equipment for the Wescam [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance Systems.	[REDACTED]	For diagnosis and testing activities of [REDACTED] and/or [REDACTED] Series Systems	Ministry of Defence of Turkey Ministry of the Interior of Turkey	[REDACTED]	Permit expired on 2017/05/10
7		2017/01/17	Circuit Card Assemblies, Camera Assemblies, Cable Assemblies, Wiring Harness Assemblies, Lens Assemblies, Motor Gearbox, etc.	[REDACTED]	For integration into Wescam [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance Systems	Ministry of Defence of Turkey Ministry of the Interior of Turkey	[REDACTED]	Permit expired on 2018/01/08
8		2017/01/24	[REDACTED] each of Handcontrollers and [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	For demonstration	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Permit expired on [REDACTED]

No.	Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Status
			Mission Grips (for Wescam EO/IR Surveillance Systems), Simulator Kits, Emulator Kits, lot of cables, and Wescam Kinetics					2019/05/30
9		2017/02/03	Test Equipment (for Wescam EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems), repaired EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems, repaired/replacement parts (for Wescam EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems) and Controlled Technical Data relating to Wescam's EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems		For diagnosis and testing activities and repair/replacement of Systems			Permit expired on 2018/02/02
10		2017/02/21	EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems (including ancillary equipment; Ground Boresight Modules (BSM); Mission Grips Assemblies and Purge Kits - Maintenance Kits (for Wescam Systems)		For installation and integration into UAVs	Ministry of Defence of Turkey		Permit expired on 2019/01/11
11		2017/03/21	Temporary export of Handcontroller Assemblies, Mission Grip Assemblies, Cable Assemblies, Simulators and Emulators, Kinetic and eLearning	WESCAM Inc., Care of: IDEF-International Defence Industry Fair 2017	For exhibition in a defence fair	L3 WESCAM		Permit expired on 2019/07/11
12		2017/03/28	Temporary export of Handcontroller Assemblies, Mission Grip Assemblies and Cable Assemblies		For demonstration			Permit expired on 2019/05/30
13		2017/05/10	Test Equipment for the Wescam Series EO/IR Surveillance Systems.		For diagnosis and testing activities of and/or Series Systems			Permit expired on 2017/05/10

No.	Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Status
14		2017/05/26	Provision of technical assistance documents, training course(s) and training documents, and maintenance software for project development/marketing information		For military and government end use			Permit expired on 2017/05/29
15		2017/07/11	Permanent export of EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems (including ancillary equipment)		For installation and integration into UAVs	Turkish Army		Permit expired 2017/07/12
16		2017/07/11	Permanent export of EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems including ancillary equipment		For installation and integration into UAVs	Ministry of Defence of Turkey Ministry of the Interior of Turkey		Permit expired on 2017/07/12
17		2017/08/14	Permanent export of EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems (including ancillary equipment; Ground Boresight Modules (BSM), Mission Grips Assemblies and Purge Kits - Maintenance Kits (for Wescam Systems)		For installation and integration into UAVs	Ministry of Defence of Turkey		Permit expired on 2019/07/16
18		2017/08/31	Software source code to be used in troubleshooting	Wescam Inc. c/o	This is so that WESCAM employees can effectively and efficiently track down the observed problems and link them to lines in the source code.			Permit expired on 2017/09/01
19		2017/09/18	Permanent export of quantity EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems including ancillary equipment; quantity Ground Boresight Modules (BSM)	Turkish Ministry of Int'l Affairs-National Police	For anti-terrorism operations	Turkish National Police		Permit expired on 2019/08/29

No.	Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Status
20		2017/11/01	Permanent export of quantity [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems [REDACTED] including ancillary equipment	[REDACTED]	For installation and integration into UAVs	Turkish Naval Forces	[REDACTED]	Permit expired on 2019/09/27
21		2017/11/01	Permanent export of quantity [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems [REDACTED] including ancillary equipment	[REDACTED]	For installation and integration into UAVs	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Permit expired on 2019/09/27
22		2017/11/20	Desiccant Assembly (for Wescam [REDACTED] Series EO/IR Surveillance Systems)	[REDACTED]	To repair Wescam [REDACTED] Series EO/IR Surveillance Systems	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Permit expired on 2017/11/28
23		2017/12/08	Permanent export of [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems [REDACTED] including ancillary equipment; [REDACTED] Ground Boresight Modules (BSM); [REDACTED] Mission Grips Assemblies and [REDACTED] Purge Kits - Maintenance Kits (for Wescam [REDACTED] Systems)	[REDACTED]	For installation and integration into UAVs	Ministry of Defence of Turkey	[REDACTED]	Permit expired on 2019/09/27
24		2018/01/08	Repaired Wescam [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] Series EO/IR Surveillance Systems, repaired/replacement Sub Assemblies (for Wescam [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance Systems and Technical Assistance (documents, course(s)/material and software).	[REDACTED]	For repair and replacement of parts	[REDACTED] Ministry of Defence of Turkey Ministry of the Interior of Turkey	[REDACTED]	Permit expired on 2018/01/08
25		2018/01/17	Temporary export of a PC with Wescam [REDACTED] Simulator Software	[REDACTED]	For demonstration and evaluation	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Permit expired on 2018/01/30
26		2018/01/22	Permanent export of [REDACTED] EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems ([REDACTED] including ancillary equipment	[REDACTED]	For installation and integration into UAVs	Turkish Land Forces	[REDACTED]	Permit was cancelled on 2018/11/15
27		2018/01/22	Purge Kit (for Wescam [REDACTED] Series EO/IR Surveillance Systems)	[REDACTED]	For repair of cameras	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Permit expired on 2018/02/02

No.	Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Status
28		2018/01/25	Temporary export of EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems		For demonstration			Permit expired on 2018/02/05
29		2018/02/02	Test Equipment (for Wescam EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems), repaired EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems , repaired/replacement parts (for Wescam EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems) and Controlled Technical Data relating to Wescam's EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems		For diagnosis and testing activities and repair/replacement	Ministry of Defence of Turkey Ministry of the Interior of Turkey		Permit expired on 2018/02/02
30		2018/02/15	EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems, Hand Controller Assemblies, Mission Grip Assemblies, Lot Cable Assemblies and Lot Circuit Card Assemblies (CCA)		For replacement in case of failure during demonstrations			Permit expired on 2018/02/20
31		2018/02/20	Spare parts/components for Wescam -Series and Series EO/IR Surveillance/Camera Systems		To repair existing systems	Ministry of Defence of Turkey Ministry of the Interior of Turkey Undersecretariat of Defence Industries		Permit expired on 2018/03/05
32		2018/02/20	Spare parts/components for Wescam Series and Series EO/IR Surveillance/Camera Systems		To repair existing systems	Ministry of Defence of Turkey Ministry of the Interior of Turkey Undersecretariat of Defence Industries		Permit expired on 2018/03/05
33		2018/02/22	EO/IR Surveillance	Turkish	For installation and	Ministry of Defence		Permit expired on

No.	Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Status
			and Targeting Systems including ancillary equipment; Ground Boresight Modules (BSM) and Mission Grips Assemblies		integration into UAVs	of Turkey Undersecretariat of Defence Industries		2018/03/13
34		2018/03/06	Repaired Wescam and Series EO/IR Surveillance Systems, repaired/replacement Sub Assemblies (for Wescam Series EO/IR Surveillance Systems and Technical Assistance (documents, course(s)/material and software).		To repair existing systems	Ministry of Defence of Turkey Ministry of the Interior of Turkey Undersecretariat of Defence Industries		Permit expired on 2018/03/26
35		2018/03/08	Test Equipment and Technical Data (for the Wescam Series EO/IR Surveillance Systems).	Wescam Inc. Field Service Representative (FSR) c/o	To perform repairs	Wescam Inc. Field Service Representative (FSR)		Permit expired on 2018/03/16
36		2018/03/13	Repaired/Upgraded EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems, MOD Kit Incl: Software/Firmware; MOD Kit Incl: Software/Firmware; MOD Kit Incl: Wiring Harness Cable MOD Kit Incl: Wiring Harness; Cable, MOD Kit MOD Kit Incl: Wiring Harness; Cable MOD Kit Including: Wiring Harness; Cable		For upgrades into systems	Ministry of Defence of Turkey Ministry of the Interior of Turkey Undersecretariat of Defence Industries		Permit expired on 2018/08/13
37		2018/04/04	Permanent export of		For installation and	Turkish Gendarmerie		Permit expired on

No.	Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Status
			EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems including ancillary equipment		integration into UAVs			2018/11/15
38		2018/05/23	Permanent export of quantity EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems including ancillary equipment		For installation and integration into UAVs	Turkish Police		Permit expired on 2020/05/26
39		2018/05/23	Permanent export of quantity EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting System (including ancillary equipment		For installation and integration into UAVs			Permit expired on 2018/06/07
40		2018/06/26	Provision of technical assistance documents, training course(s) and training documents, and maintenance software for project development/marketing information		For quotation and/or marketing			Permit expired on 2020/05/28
41		2018/07/05	Permanent export of spare parts/components for Wescam EO/IR Surveillance/Camera Systems		To perform repairs			Permit expired on 2018/07/10
42		2018/08/13	Repaired/Upgraded EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems, MOD Kit Incl: Software/Firmware; MOD Kit Incl: Software/Firmware; MOD Kit Incl: Miring Harness Cable		For upgrades into systems	Ministry of Defence of Turkey Ministry of the Interior of Turkey Undersecretariat of Defence Industries		Permit expired on 2018/08/13

No.	Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Status
			MOD Kit Incl: Wiring Harness; Cable, MOD Kit MOD Kit Incl: Wiring Harness; Cable MOD Kit Including: Wiring Harness; Cable					
43		2018/08/17	Repaired Wescam EO/IR Surveillance Systems, repaired/replacement Sub-Assemblies (for Wescam EO/IR Surveillance Systems under warranty) and Technical Assistance (documents, course(s)/material and software)		To perform repairs			Permit issued on 2018/08/20 and valid until 2022/09/30
44		2018/10/15	Permanent export of completed, semi-finished and assembly kits for Wescam EO/IR Surveillance/Camera Systems, repaired systems and semi-finished systems and technical assistance		For installation and integration into UAVs	Turkish Land Forces Turkish Gendarmerie Turkish National Police Turkish Naval Forces		Permit issued on 2018/11/06 and valid until 2022/11/30
45		2018/10/25	each, and EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems, Hand Controller Assemblies, Mission Grip Assemblies, Lot Cable Assemblies, Simulators, Kinetics, Boresight Modules, Laptops with moving map software and Lot Circuit Card Assemblies (CCA)		For replacement in case of failure during demonstrations			Permit issued on 2020/07/06 and valid until 2020/11/30
46		2018/11/22	Circuit Card Assemblies (CCA's)		For replacement of CCA's previously exported			Permit issued on 2018/12/03 and valid until 2020/12/31
47		2018/11/27	EO/IR Surveillance and		For installation and			Permit issued on

No.	Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Status
			Targeting Systems and related items		integration into UAVs			2019/01/30 and valid until 2022/01/31
48		2018/11/28	EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems and related items		For installation and integration into UAVs	Ministry of Defence of Turkey Ministry of the Interior of Turkey		Permit issued on 2019/01/14 and valid until 2022/01/31
49		2019/01/11	EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems including ancillary equipment; Ground Boresight Modules (BSM); Mission Grips Assemblies and Purge Kits - Maintenance Kits (for Wescam systems)		For installation and integration into UAVs	Ministry of Defence of Turkey		Permit expired on 2019/01/14
50		2019/02/06	Test Equipment for the Wescam Series EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems and Series EO/IR Surveillance Systems.		For diagnosis and testing activities of Series and/or Series Systems owned/used by end users	Ministry of Defence of Turkey Ministry of the Interior of Turkey		Permit issued on 2019/02/20 and valid until 2021/02/28
51		2019/03/07	Permanent export of EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems including ancillary equipment; Ground Boresight Modules (BSM) and Mission Grips Assembly		For installation and integration into UAVs	Ministry of Defence of Turkey		Permit issued on 2019/03/12 and valid until 2021/03/31
52		2019/07/10	Permanent export of EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems including ancillary equipment; Ground Boresight Modules (BSM); Mission Grips Assemblies and Purge Kits - Maintenance Kits (for Wescam Systems)		For installation and integration into UAVs	Ministry of Defence of Turkey		Permit expired on 2019/07/16

No.	Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Status
53		2019/08/01	Repaired EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems, Ground Boresight Modules (GBSM) and Controlled Technical data		To perform repairs	Ministry of Defence of Turkey Turkey National Police		Permit issued on 2019/08/13 and valid until 2023/08/31
54		2019/08/07	Boresight Modules for Wescam EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems		For repair and replacement of parts	Ministry of Defence of Turkey Ministry of the Interior of Turkey		Permit issued on 2019/08/14 and valid until 2023/08/31
55		2019/08/13	Wescam EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems, and their parts and components		For installation and integration into UAVs	Presidency of the Republic of Turkey		Permit issued on 2019/08/14 and valid until 2023/08/31
56		2019/08/20	Repaired EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems, Ground Boresight Modules (GBSM) and Controlled Technical data - Documents, Training and Software		To perform repairs	Turkish Air Force		Permit issued on 2019/08/29 and valid until 2023/08/31
57		2019/08/29	Permanent export of quantity EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems including ancillary equipment; quantity Ground Boresight Modules (BSM)	Turkish Ministry of Int'l Affairs-National Police	For anti-terrorism operations	Turkish National Police		Permit issued on 2019/09/03 and valid until 2020/09/30
58		2019/08/28	Temporary export of quantity each of Handcontroller Assemblies and Mission Grip Assemblies, and quantity lot Cable Assemblies		For demonstration			Permit issued on 2019/09/24 and valid until 2023/09/30
59		2019/09/13	Various spare parts for Wescam		For repair and	Turkish Land Forces		Permit issued on

No.	Ref ID	Date Submitted	Item Description	Consignee	Stated End-use	End-User	Total Value	Status
			Series EO/IR Surveillance Systems		replacement of parts	Turkish Gendarmerie Turkish National Police Turkish Naval Forces		2019/10/09 and valid until 2023/09/30
60		2019/09/21	Temporary export of quantity [redacted] each of Handcontroller Assemblies and Mission Grip Assemblies, and quantity [redacted] lot Cable Assemblies	Turkish Ministry of Internal Affairs / Turkish National Police	For demonstration	Turkish Ministry of Internal Affairs / Turkish National Police	[redacted]	Permit issued on 2019/10/07 and valid until 2023/10/31
61		2019/09/23	Repaired [redacted] EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems, Repaired Ground Boresight Modules for [redacted] Systems and Controlled Technical Data - document, training and software	Turkish Republic Governorship VAN/General Directorate of Security of VAN	For anti-terrorism operations	Ministry of the Interior of Turkey Turkish National Police	[redacted]	Permit issued on 2019/10/04 and valid until 2023/09/30
62		2019/09/27	Permanent export of quantity [redacted] EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems [redacted] including ancillary equipment	[redacted]	For installation and integration into UAVs	Turkish Naval Forces	[redacted]	Permit issued on 2019/10/14 and valid until 2020/11/30
63		2019/09/27	Permanent export of quantity [redacted] EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems ([redacted] including ancillary equipment	[redacted]	For installation and integration into UAVs	[redacted]	[redacted]	Permit issued on 2019/10/11 and valid until 2021/12/31
64		2019/09/27	Permanent export of [redacted] EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems ([redacted] including ancillary equipment; [redacted] Ground Boresight Modules (BSM); [redacted] Mission Grips Assemblies and [redacted] Purge Kits - Maintenance Kits (for Wescam [redacted] Systems)	[redacted]	For installation and integration into UAVs	Ministry of Defence of Turkey	[redacted]	Permit issued on 2019/10/01 and valid until 2021/01/31

Observations

- The timeframe (between January 1, 2016 to October 11, 2019) has been chosen in order to compare the above finding with the Ploughshare's report.
- Note that during this timeframe (between January 1, 2016 to October 11, 2019), [REDACTED] in terms of Canada's export controls, given their membership and adherence to the 4 multilateral export control regimes (i.e. the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Australia Group), as well as being a member of NATO and having effective export control mechanisms. [REDACTED]
- On October 11, 2019, in response to Turkey's military incursion into Syria, the Government of Canada announced the temporary suspension on the issuance of all new permits for the export of controlled goods and technology to Turkey. [REDACTED]
- Permits issued after October 11, 2019 have been addressed in the other table.
- Between January 1, 2016 to October 11, 2019, a total of [REDACTED] permits have been issued to L3 Wescam to Turkey. Out of these [REDACTED] permits issued:
 - [REDACTED] have now expired
 - [REDACTED] has been cancelled (at the request of applicant)
 - [REDACTED] are currently valid (3 of these permits will be expiring by the end of November 2020).
- In terms of the consignees, there are various entities that have received L3 Wescam products in Turkey, including [REDACTED] etc. These are all well-known and reputable defence companies in Turkey.
- Most of the L3 Wescam products were intended to be installed and integrated into various UAV platforms built by these Turkish defence companies (but not in all cases).
- In terms of the end users, they are mostly the military, as well as government and law enforcement agencies within Turkey. However, there have also been [REDACTED] instances where the end users have been specifically identified as the [REDACTED] and the [REDACTED]
- No end user(s) in either **Libya, Syria, Azerbaijan or Armenia** have been identified in the end use documentation provided by the consignees.

FW: MINA briefing on Group 2 Export Permits to Turkey - 11am-noon on September 28th

From: "Grant, Alison -ECE" <alison.grant@international.gc.ca>

To: "Coleman, Robert -ECE" <robert.coleman@international.gc.ca>, "Pilloud, Marc -ECE" <marc.pilloud@international.gc.ca>, "Turner, Andrew -ECE" <andrew.turner@international.gc.ca>, "Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE" <kamiliya.akkouche@international.gc.ca>, "Brisson, Julien -ECE" <julien.brisson@international.gc.ca>

Date: Fri, 11 Sep 2020 12:48:16 -0400

To note.

Andrew – if you can alert ANKRA so we can received, in advance, a summary of the situation on the ground we can use to start the briefing, that would be helpful. I would suggest that ANKRA lead in consultation with BERUT and TRPLI (as we often reference Turkey's involvement in the Libyan conflict in our permits, even though this has nothing to do with the rationale for the presumptive denial policy in place).

On the case by case review of permits, I know Marc has all details though expect that T-branch will lead that part and we will support.

Thanks all!

From: Mawani, Aliya -MINA

Sent: September 11, 2020 12:40 PM

To: McCardell, Sandra -EGM ; Grant, Alison -ECE ; Funtek, Katharine -TID ; Christie, Bruce -TFMA ; *TFM-Policy ; Kinnear, Jocelyn -TIR ; Anand, Shalini -TIE ; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE ; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR ; Schonfeld, Benjamin -TIR ; Sproule, David -ECD

Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit ; *USS-DMA Advisors ; *DMT-Policy

Subject: MINA briefing on Group 2 Export Permits to Turkey - 11am-noon on September 28th

Dear All,

We have a time identified for a MINA briefing on Group 2 Export Permits to Turkey – 11am-noon on September 28th.

o/MINA has suggested that we structure this the same way as recent KSA briefings, with a short overview of situation on the ground, followed by a case by case review of permits.

We will be in touch with further detail next week, but please consider this a placeholder in the meantime.

Aliya

Aliya Mawani

Senior Departmental Advisor | Conseillère ministérielle principale

Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs | Bureau du Ministre des Affaires étrangères

Aliya.mawani@international.gc.ca

Telephone | Téléphone: 343-203-5953



Global Affairs | Affaires mondiales
Canada | Canada

FW: REVISED VERSION: UPDATE ON POSSIBLE LINKAGES TO ALLEGED USE OF TURKISH DRONES IN CONFLICT ZONES

From: "Korecky, Judy -TIR" <judy.korecky@international.gc.ca>

To: "McCardell, Sandra -EGM" <sandra.mccardell@international.gc.ca>, "Graham, Molly -EGM" <molly.graham@international.gc.ca>, "Anderson, Ian -EGM" <ian.anderson@international.gc.ca>, "Sproule, David -ECD" <david.sproule@international.gc.ca>, "Hamilton, Kevin -IGR" <kevin.hamilton@international.gc.ca>, "Brisson, Julien -ECE" <julien.brisson@international.gc.ca>, "Nelson, David -IGR" <david.nelson@international.gc.ca>, "Temorshuizen, Cindy -IGD" <cindy.temorshuizen@international.gc.ca>, "Friele, Shawn -IFM" <shawn.friele@international.gc.ca>, "Funtek, Katharine -TID" <katharine.funtek@international.gc.ca>, "Gosselin, Catherine -TIR" <catherine.gosselin@international.gc.ca>, "Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE" <joonhyuk.yoon@international.gc.ca>, "Grant, Alison -ECE" <alison.grant@international.gc.ca>, "Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE" <kamiliya.akkouche@international.gc.ca>, "Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE" <marieeve.roymarcoux@international.gc.ca>, "Anand, Shalini -TIE" <shalini.anand@international.gc.ca>, "Picard, Beatrix -TIR" <beatrix.picard@international.gc.ca>, "Bastien, Jean-François -TIR" <jean-francois.bastien@international.gc.ca>, "Hughes, Steven -INA" <steven.hughes@international.gc.ca>, "Jones, Paul -INA" <paul.jones@international.gc.ca>, "Pilloud, Marc -ECE" <marc.pilloud@international.gc.ca>, "Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE" <kamiliya.akkouche@international.gc.ca>, "Brisson, Julien -ECE" <julien.brisson@international.gc.ca>, "Netley, Rebecca -JLH" <rebecca.netley@international.gc.ca>, "Thompson, Kevin -JLTA" <kevin.thompson@international.gc.ca>, "Fetz, Thomas -JLH" <thomas.fetz@international.gc.ca>, "Utting, Elizabeth -JLH" <elizabeth.utting@international.gc.ca>, "St-Pierre, Nicolas -JFM" <nicolas.st-pierre@international.gc.ca>, "Amegan, Karim -JLH" <karim.amegan@international.gc.ca>, "Yendall, Jonathan -INA" <jonathan.yendall@international.gc.ca>, "Gagnon, Felix -JLTA" <felix.gagnon@international.gc.ca>, "Senkiw, Jillian -TIR" <jillian.senkiw@international.gc.ca>

Date: Fri, 02 Oct 2020 16:08:39 -0400

Attachments: Unnamed Attachment (68 bytes)

Hello all,

For your records - sharing a revision version of the Turkey Sitrep report that was sent yesterday evening to o/MINA correcting a minor error.

Judy

From: Korecky, Judy -TIR
Sent: October-01-20 7:15 PM
To: *MINA-Dept Unit ; Mawani, Aliya -MINA
Cc: Funtek, Katharine -TID ; Catherine Gosselin (Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca) ; Anand, Shalini -TIE ; Marie Eve -TIE Roy Marcoux (MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca) ; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR (Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca) ; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR ; *DMT-Policy ; *TFM-Policy ; *USS-DMA Advisors ; Picard, Beatrix -TIR ; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE ; Pilloud, Marc -ECE ; Grant, Alison -ECE ; Coleman, Robert -ECE ; Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE ; Alday, Corazon -TIE
Subject: REVISED VERSION: UPDATE ON POSSIBLE LINKAGES TO ALLEGED USE OF TURKISH DRONES IN CONFLICT ZONES

Hello o/MINA,

It has come to our attention that there is a error in the last paragraph of the Permit Analysis Section of the report sent yesterday, specifically with respect to the number of applications under review for end-use by the Azerbaijan Airforce. See correction immediately below:

There are presently [REDACTED] applications in EXCOL that are "under review" for Wescam camera systems going via Turkey [REDACTED] is the consignee) onwards to the Azerbaijan Airforce.

A revised copy of the report is below.

Judy

UNCLASSIFIED

POSSIBLE EXPORT PERMIT LINKAGES TO ALLEGED USE OF TURKISH DRONES IN CONFLICT ZONES

ISSUE

There are media reports and allegations that Turkey has transferred or sold drones to the Azerbaijani armed forces, possibly with Canadian technology, that are being used in the recent flare-up of large-scale military attacks between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh. The Armenian National Committee of Canada alleges that Azerbaijan is using Turkish made Bayraktar TB2 drones.

A recent report by Project Ploughshares claims that Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones allegedly used by the Turkish military in Syria and Libya may have been used in conjunction with sensors obtained from a Canadian company L3 Harris Wescam (Wescam).

Officials are seeking to determine the veracity of these claims and to determine whether there are any potential export control issues.

Canada's policy approach towards exports of Group 2 items to Turkey has not changed since April 2020.

Canadian Export Controls and Turkey

Canada has one of the strongest export controls systems in the world, and respect for human rights is enshrined in our export controls legislation.

In September 2019, Canada acceded to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and placed the ATT assessment criteria directly into Canadian law. Under the law, controlled goods and technology cannot be exported from Canada where there is a substantial risk that they could be used to commit or to facilitate serious violations of international humanitarian law, international human rights law, or serious acts of gender-based violence. Other criteria which would lead to a permit application denial include a substantial risk that the arms or munitions could be used to undermine peace and security or to further international organized crime or terrorism. Canada has one of the most robust legal applications of this Treaty in the world.

[REDACTED] in terms of Canada's export controls, given their membership and adherence to the four multilateral export control regimes (i.e. the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Australia Group), as well as being a member of NATO and having effective export control mechanisms. [REDACTED]

On October 11, 2019, in response to Turkey's military incursion into north-eastern Syria, the Government of Canada

announced a temporary suspension on the issuance of all new permits for the export of controlled goods and technology to Turkey. Exporters who were issued permits for the export of such items to Turkey prior to October 11, 2019 may continue to export against those permits during their period of validity.

In April 2020, Canada significantly narrowed the scope of its policy to include only military goods and technology. While restrictions continue to apply to military exports to Turkey, during the permit review process Canada is considering whether there are exceptional circumstances, including but not limited to NATO cooperation programs, that might justify issuing an export permit for military items on a case-by-case basis.

The Government of Canada has stated that it continues to monitor developments in Turkey and the surrounding region, and will take appropriate action should credible evidence be found regarding the misuse of any controlled Canadian good or technology, including to commit or to facilitate serious violations of international human rights or humanitarian law.

Project Ploughshares Report

Project Ploughshares recently released a report entitled *Killer Optics: Exports of Wescam Sensors to Turkey – A Litmus Test of Canada’s Compliance with the Arms Trade Treaty*. The report claims that a Canadian company L3 Harris Wescam (Wescam) exported a large number of Electro Optical/Infra-Red (EO/IR) imaging and targeting sensor systems that can be used for tracking targets and guiding munitions to the Turkish military in 2019, based on Statistics Canada data.

Project Ploughshares further alleges that the Turkish military has committed serious breaches of international humanitarian law (IHL) and other violations, particularly when conducting airstrikes, and that Wescam sensors, mounted on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), have been used extensively by Turkey in its recent military activities. Project Ploughshares asserts that Canada is therefore violating the ATT obligations by permitting exports of Wescam sensors.

The department notes that Turkish drones have been used in Turkey’s military and security operations - both domestically and internationally – and they have both defensive and offensive capabilities, depending on how they are tasked. Notably, the TB2 UAV are always used for the purposes of observation, surveillance, identification and targeting of targets, but some versions of the TAI ANKA drones also carry weapons.

Turkey’s justification of its cross-border military operations in Iraq and Syria relied heavily on an argument of national security related to the activities of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). While Canada does not always support Turkey’s military actions – as was the case with Operation Peace Spring – like most of our like-minded counterparts we support the position that Turkey, a NATO ally, has legitimate security concerns, specifically related to the activities of the PKK which is a listed terrorist organization in Canada.

The Turkish military is, by-and-large, a professional army that acts in accordance with its international obligations. While Operations Olive Branch and Peace Spring both resulted in the displacement of civilians, there is no clear evidence that suggest a deliberate targeting of civilians or civilian infrastructure.

The Ploughshares report relies heavily on two UN reports ([9 August 2018](#) and [28 January 2020](#)), as well as an [Amnesty International Report](#) (Oct 2019), which itself relies primarily on accounts reported by the Kurdish Red Crescent (affiliated with the self-administration in the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria). The Kurdish Red Crescent is not formally affiliated with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). While we do not doubt KRC’s credibility, their assessment should not be equated with an ICRC assessment.

The UN reports that list incidents in which civilians were killed as a result of Turkish military operations are limited to the two military operations (Olive Branch and Peace Spring) in which the Turkish side specifically targeted the Peoples Protection Unit (YPG) armed group – which they perceive to be the Syrian branch of the PKK. In these military operations, Turkey relied extensively on the Syrian armed opposition groups (SNA) to conduct the ground offensive. The department's initial assessment (in line with likemindeds) is that the Turkish military did not/not engage in the deliberate and purposeful targeting of civilians or civilian infrastructure.

In its May 2020 memorandum to the Minister, the department noted that there had been no substantiated evidence of the Turkish Armed Forces committing human rights violations in Syria, either in Idlib or northeast Syria during OPS. [REDACTED]

In Libya, since 2019 Turkey has provided weapons, drones, and reportedly over 16,500 Syrian mercenaries to Libya in support of Government of National Accord (GNA)-aligned forces, with which Turkey has a security agreement as of December 2019. A November 2019 UN Panel of Experts report on Libya found Turkey to be "routinely" in violation of UN sanctions on Libya related to arms, which were in force before the Turkey-GNA security agreement. A UN Panel of Experts report from December 2019 found that Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones, and possibly one Karayel drone, were exported to Libya for use by the GNA. While there have been unconfirmed reports that Turkish drones have killed civilians in Libya and thereby contributed to violations of IHL, there has been no conclusive evidence to-date that Turkey has committed violations of IHL in Libya. The United Nations and NGOs have very limited access to most of Libya due to ongoing conflict and instability, severely complicating the collection of evidence on alleged violations of international humanitarian law in Libya (e.g. testimonies, forensic evidence).

The department has no evidence [REDACTED] A separate classified assessment has been shared with ministerial and deputies offices through normal channels.

Permit Analysis

It is difficult to ascertain if the drones/UAVs in all instances in question came from Turkey. If they were, it would be difficult to determine definitively whether there are any Canadian parts on the specific UAVs/drones used in these conflict zones. A number of foreign competitors in the US, France, Italy, Israel and even in Turkey manufacture similar cameras / technologies that can be used in such UAVs. It also would need to be determined who is operating the UAVs (Turkish, or Libyan/Azerbaijani forces) – this may be difficult.

While it is known that some Bayraktar TB-2 UAVs possess Wescam sensors due to its high quality, the proportion that do is not known. At this juncture, it would be impossible to credibly guess a percentage. We do not presently have the necessary information to make such an estimate, however officials are making best efforts to obtain information that would assist in this regard, [REDACTED]

Wescam has received permits from GAC for camera surveillance systems destined directly to Turkey (the main consignees in these instances are [REDACTED] both of which supply the Turkish government). None of the permits issued to Wescam for items destined to Turkey from January 1, 2016 to September 27, 2020 indicate an end use in Libya, Azerbaijan or Armenia. Information related to current valid previously issued permits to Turkey is provided in the attached tables.

There appear to be no applications, nor any valid permits in EXCOL for L3 Wescam items destined directly to Libya, Azerbaijan or Armenia.

There are presently [REDACTED] applications in EXCOL that are "under review" for Wescam camera systems going via Turkey ([REDACTED] is the consignee) onwards to the Azerbaijan Airforce. These applications are currently under consultation.

Recent Interactions with [REDACTED]

Positions of Like-Minded Countries

The attached Annex sets out an up to date comparative chart on the position of key partner countries' controls over strategic exports to Turkey, as well their relative commercial exposure.

Although most of our like-minded countries imposed exports restrictions on Turkey following the October 2019 incursion into Syria, Canada's decision to immediately suspend all new export permits to Turkey went beyond our like-minded countries and immediately became a bilateral irritant with Turkey. Since Canada updated its exports control policy in April to only restrict Group 2 permits, its approach appears to be most closely aligned with the more restrictive of EU members, who are either not issuing permits for any military items or only for military items who are either not issuing permits for any military items to Turkey or not issuing permits for military items to Turkey for end use in Syria, for military use or other uses. [REDACTED] have placed no restrictions on military exports to Turkey, which they are assessing on a case-by-case basis.

Next Steps

The Department is pursuing a wide range of steps in order to ascertain more information and proactively monitor the situation closely.

The Department could consider a number of different steps from an export controls perspective, depending on the additional information that becomes available.

In the interim, officials continue to engage with DND and allies, as well as with GAC's legal bureau to gather information related to allegations in Syria, Canada's ATT obligations, and Canada's arms embargo to Libya.

The Embassy in Ankara, including our DND Defence Attaché, continues to engage local government, likeminded countries, and other key stakeholders, including civil society, as well as frequently monitor social media and NGO reporting.

The Department's Intelligence Bureau (IND) has prepared a detailed assessment, which will be shared separately due to its classification. IND will continue to monitor intelligence reporting and will continue to provide detailed and tailored intelligence assessments working with key Canadian and FVEY intelligence partners.

The Export Controls Bureau remains in close contact with [REDACTED] and is awaiting further information from the company.

Author's name/division or mission/tel.: Korecky/TIR/613-291-0347

Approval bureau/mission: TFMA

Consulted divisions: TIE/ECE/JLT/JLH/INA

Hello all,

For your records - sharing a revision version of the Turkey Sitrep report that was sent yesterday evening to o/MINA correcting a minor error.

Judy

From: Korecky, Judy -TIR <Judy.Korecky@international.gc.ca>
Sent: September-30-20 3:53 PM
To: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMA-Advisors@international.gc.ca>; McCardell, Sandra -EGM <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Anderson, Ian -EGM <Ian.Anderson@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Brisson, Julien -ECE <Julien.Brisson@international.gc.ca>; Nelson, David -IGR <David.Nelson@international.gc.ca>; Temorshuizen, Cindy -IGD <Cindy.Temorshuizen@international.gc.ca>; Friele, Shawn -IFM <Shawn.Friele@international.gc.ca>; Funtek, Katharine -TID <Katharine.Funtek@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE <Kamiliya.Akkouche@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Picard, Beatrix -TIR <Beatrix.Picard@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; Hughes, Steven -INA <Steven.Hughes@international.gc.ca>; Jones, Paul -INA <Paul.Jones@international.gc.ca>; Pilloud, Marc -ECE <Marc.Pilloud@international.gc.ca>; Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE <Kamiliya.Akkouche@international.gc.ca>; Brisson, Julien -ECE <Julien.Brisson@international.gc.ca>; Netley, Rebecca -JLH <Rebecca.Netley@international.gc.ca>; Thompson, Kevin -JLTA <Kevin.Thompson@international.gc.ca>; Fetz, Thomas -JLH <Thomas.Fetz@international.gc.ca>; Utting, Elizabeth -JLH <Elizabeth.Utting@international.gc.ca>; St-Pierre, Nicolas -JFM <Nicolas.St-Pierre@international.gc.ca>; Amegan, Karim -JLH <Karim.Amegan@international.gc.ca>; LaTorre, Jason -DMT <Jason.LaTorre@international.gc.ca>; Farid, Sohrab -DMA -USS <Sohrab.Farid@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INA <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Gagnon, Felix -JLTA <Felix.Gagnon@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>
Subject: UPDATE ON POSSIBLE LINKAGES TO ALLEGED USE OF TURKISH DRONES IN CONFLICT ZONES

Good afternoon o/MINA,

Attached please find a Situational Update Report with annexes to provide an update on possible linkages to alleged use of Turkish drones with Canadian sensors in conflict zones. This document has been widely consulted within the department.

Judy

Judy Korecky

Deputy Director, Export Controls Policy Division | Directrice adjointe, Direction de la politique en matière des contrôles à l'exportation
judy.korecky@international.gc.ca

Telephone | Téléphone: 343-203-4332

125 rue Sussex Drive, Ottawa K1A 0G2

Global Affairs Canada | Affaires mondiales Canada

Government of Canada | Gouvernement du Canada



FW: Turkey: Additional Analysis

From: "Grant, Alison -ECE" <alison.grant@international.gc.ca>
To: "Coleman, Robert -ECE" <robert.coleman@international.gc.ca>, "Pilloud, Marc -ECE" <marc.pilloud@international.gc.ca>
Date: Tue, 06 Oct 2020 17:05:50 -0400
Attachments: Group 2 items to Turkey (including MDPs) v.1 (003).docx (35.99 kB); Military Exports to Turkey 2019-2014.docx (23.23 kB)

Here is all the info in one place. You can delete my other random emails with this in pieces.



From: Boileau, Guy -DMT
Sent: October 6, 2020 4:58 PM
To: *MINA-Dept Unit
Cc: *DMT-Policy ; *TFM-Policy ; Anand, Shalini -TIE ; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE ; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR ; Grant, Alison -ECE ; Turner, Andrew -ECE ; Graham, Molly -EGM
Subject: FW: Turkey: Additional Analysis

MINA-DU: further to the call between MINA and DMT last evening, pls find below and attached further analysis pertaining to Turkey and export controls. This has been DMT approved.

Summary of the kind of goods in the Group 2 list of valid permits to Turkey.

Turkey is a significant purchaser of Canadian controlled goods and technology. Various Canadian companies are involved at various stages in the supply and provision of systems, subsystems, parts and components of a diverse range of military programs. These can be categorized into the following:

- *Parts, components, and accessories for [REDACTED]*
- *Parts, components, avionics and other accessories for various aircraft platforms made in other countries, including the [REDACTED] as well as the [REDACTED]*
- *Flight simulators, and their corresponding parts, components and technical data*
- *Parts, components, subsystems and their corresponding technical data and assistance related to the development of Turkish satellites (including military satellites)*
- *Parts, components and subsystems (including GPS anti-jam devices) to be integrated into various bombs, missiles, rockets and other ordnances*
- *Parts, components and technical data to be integrated into various armoured vehicles [REDACTED]*
- *Technical data and assistance for the development of [REDACTED]*
- *Production tools and machines for the manufacturing of ammunition and cartridges of various calibres*
- *Riflescopes, sights and their corresponding parts and components*
- *Rocket motors and other components for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)*
- *Electro-Optical and Infrared systems to be incorporated into various aerial platforms (including UAVs)*
- *Naval equipment (including cables and arresting harness for helicopter retrieval system, sonobuoys, various modules, etc.) to be integrated into warships and other naval platforms.*
- *Technical data and assistance related to the development and construction of a wind tunnel (to test aircraft and missiles)*
- *IED disruptors, as well as protective equipment for military personnel*

Attached is a more streamlined list of valid permits to Turkey for Group two that are current valid. The table also includes the now suspended Wescam permits (in red).

Since 2016 (pre and post 2019 period), number of Wescam cameras that have been shipped and number of Wescam cameras that have not/not yet been shipped. If exact number is not feasible, a solid estimate would be grateful with accompanying caveats.

Total number of Wescam cameras exported to Turkey since 2016, and cameras not yet exported

Exported		Not yet exported	
New	Repaired	New	Repaired
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Notes:

- The numbers above are only for Wescam complete surveillance systems and does not include parts and components of the surveillance systems.
- Exported cameras cover exports since 2016 (pre and post 2019 exports).
- The “not exported” figures pertain only to the ██████ Wescam valid permits (now suspended) as they could still be exported should the suspension be lifted.
- * This is the number of cameras the exporter would be allowed to export under their permits. This number could represent cameras ready to be exported and cameras under production or not yet produced. The permit suspension prevents the exporter from exporting these cameras.
- ** This represents the number of repaired cameras that would be allowed to be exported. Our system does not allow us to determine whether these cameras are in Canada or still with the end user. The permit suspension prevents these cameras from being exported. It is unlikely that the end-user would send the cameras in its possession for repairs in Canada during the suspension given that they would be unable to have their cameras back.

Profile of Canadian exports of military goods to Turkey over the last 5 years.

Please see the second attachment for summary and details. Since 2014, the largest exports to Turkey subcategory have consisted of “imaging or countermeasure equipment” (ECL 2-15) valued at \$230,703,300; “fire control, and related alerting and warning equipment” (ECL 2-5) valued at \$161,555,998; and “electronic equipment and military spacecraft” (ECL 2-11) valued at \$55,049,592.

LIST OF PERMIT ISSUED TO TURKEY FOR GROUP 2 ITEMS THAT ARE CURRENTLY VALID
(except the ones in red font, which are currently suspended)

	Ref. Id.	Issue Date	Expiry Date	Overall Goods Description	Final Consignee	Country	Applicant
1	862901-3	Mar 5, 2019 4:22:50 PM	Mar 31, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Rocket motors for drones.		Multiple Destinations	Magellan Aerospace, Winnipeg
2	874953-5	Aug 8, 2019 4:43:21 PM	Aug 31, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Parts, accessories, technical data & tooling for the F35 program, F18 program as well as EH101, Apache helicopters.		Multiple Destinations	Magellan Aerospace, Winnipeg
3	865024-8	Apr 17, 2019 4:39:20 PM	Apr 30, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Riflescopes, weapon sights, and their parts and components.		Multiple Destinations	ELCAN OPTICAL TECHNOLOGIES / RAYTHEON
4	829203-7	Sep 1, 2017 3:41:00 PM	Dec 31, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Technical assistance for the design, procurement, construction, start-up of a wind tunnel for aerodynamic testing of civilian and military aerospace vehicles.	TÜBITAK SAGE	Turkey	AIOLOS ENGINEERING CORPORATION
5						Turkey	
6		Dec 3, 2018 8:33:07 AM	Dec 31, 2020 12:00:00 AM	Circuit Card Assemblies (CCA's) for the Surveillance Systems		Turkey	L-3 / WESCAM INC.
7	858519-5	Dec 7, 2018 2:58:15 PM	Dec 31, 2020 12:00:00 AM	Parts and components of the ASIST helicopter retrieval system	The Republic of Turkey	Turkey	
8	823345-9	Jul 19, 2017 11:10:31 AM	Jul 31, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Antennas, tube amplifiers, power modules, multiplexers and other components for the co-development and production of a military satellite	Aselsan Elektronik Sanayi Ve Ticaret A.S.	Turkey	MACDONALD DETTWILER & ASSOC. CORPORATION
9	840862-6	Mar 15, 2018 2:21:59 PM	Mar 31, 2022 12:00:00 AM	Technical data to support the design, development, manufacturing, test, training and launch of a military satellite	Tubitak Space Technologies Research Insitute	Turkey	MACDONALD DETTWILER & ASSOC. CORPORATION
10	843815-8	May 8, 2018 2:54:11 PM	Apr 30, 2022 12:00:00 AM	Parts and components for the Landing Gear Systems for the F-35 Aircraft programs.	BARUT INSAN KAYNAKLARI DANISMANLIGI VE BURO	Turkey	GOODRICH AEROSPACE CANADA LTD.
11	823345-9	Jul 19, 2017 11:10:31 AM	Jul 31, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Various hardware for the co-development and production of a military satellite.	Turkish Aerospace Industries, Inc. (TAI)	Turkey	MACDONALD DETTWILER & ASSOC. CORPORATION
12	833789-1	Nov 7, 2017 3:21:35 PM	Dec 31, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Production machines to make ammunition (including cups, cases, bullets and primers)	Norm Sanayi Urunleri Imalat ve Dis Ticaret Ltd. Sti	Turkey	MAGNUM INTEGRATED TECHNOLOGY LTD

LIST OF PERMIT ISSUED TO TURKEY FOR GROUP 2 ITEMS THAT ARE CURRENTLY VALID
(except the ones in red font, which are currently suspended)

	Ref. Id.	Issue Date	Expiry Date	Overall Goods Description	Final Consignee	Country	Applicant
13	840862-6	Mar 15, 2018 2:21:59 PM	Mar 31, 2022 12:00:00 AM	Technical data to support the design, development, manufacturing, test, training and launch of a military satellite	Undersecretariat for Defence Industries	Turkey	MACDONALD DETTWILER & ASSOC. CORPORATION
14	843815-8	May 8, 2018 2:54:11 PM	Apr 30, 2022 12:00:00 AM	Parts and components for the Landing Gear Systems for the F-35 Aircraft programs.	Baran Kesici Takimler ve Metal İşleme Sanayi Tic. Ltd. Sti.	Turkey	GOODRICH AEROSPACE CANADA LTD.
15	841667-1	Mar 15, 2018 1:59:56 PM	Apr 30, 2022 12:00:00 AM	Technical Data and Hardware to assist in the test, integration and support of an Antenna Turntable Subsystem for final integration and use with spectrum monitoring and direction finding equipment.	ENOVAS Engineering Consultancy Computer Industry and Trade LLC.	Turkey	MACDONALD DETTWILER & ASSOC. CORPORATION
16		Feb 20, 2019 1:10:33 PM	Feb 28, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Test Equipment for the Wescam Surveillance and Targeting Systems and Series EO/IR Surveillance Systems.		Turkey	L-3 / WESCAM INC.
17	854168-8	Sep 21, 2018 10:54:00 AM	Dec 31, 2022 12:00:00 AM	Case & Bullet Manufacturing Line production equipment and tools	ZSR Patlayıcı Sanayi A.S.	Turkey	MAGNUM INTEGRATED TECHNOLOGY LTD
18	855370-9	Oct 12, 2018 10:24:59 AM	Dec 31, 2020 12:00:00 AM	Angular Continuous Threat Detector (part and component of a bomb/missile)	Aselsan Elektronik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S.	Turkey	Excelitas Canada Inc.
19		Nov 6, 2018 11:07:00 AM	Nov 30, 2022 12:00:00 AM	Completed, semi-finished and assembly kits for Wescam EO/IR Surveillance/Camera Systems		Turkey	L-3 / WESCAM INC.
20	843815-8	May 8, 2018 2:54:11 PM	Apr 30, 2022 12:00:00 AM	Parts and components for the Landing Gear Systems for the F-35 Aircraft programs.	FSK Havacılık ve Uzay Sanayi Makina Ticaret A.S.	Turkey	GOODRICH AEROSPACE CANADA LTD.
21						Turkey	
22	837439-6	Jan 10, 2018 2:22:08 PM	Dec 31, 2020 12:00:00 AM	Technology for naval deck handling equipment and mission bay handling systems. This technology is for use on military vessels.		Turkey	ROLLS-ROYCE CANADA LIMITED
23	852310-9	Aug 23, 2018 1:32:24 PM	Dec 31, 2022 12:00:00 AM	Software to assists in the development and evaluation of flight instrument procedures and Air Traffic Control Charts.	Turkish Air Force	Turkey	MDA Systems Ltd.
24	854180-2	Oct 18, 2018 6:20:47 PM	Oct 31, 2020 12:00:00 AM	Technical data and software in support of a proposal for Acoustic Systems, in support of the modernization of the CN-235 aircraft.		Turkey	General Dynamics Mission Systems - Canada
25		Jan 11, 2019	Jan 31, 2022	EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems		Turkey	L-3 / WESCAM INC.

LIST OF PERMIT ISSUED TO TURKEY FOR GROUP 2 ITEMS THAT ARE CURRENTLY VALID
(except the ones in red font, which are currently suspended)

Ref. Id.	Issue Date	Expiry Date	Overall Goods Description	Final Consignee	Country	Applicant
26	5:43:21 PM Dec 7, 2018 2:56:40 PM	12:00:00 AM Dec 31, 2020 12:00:00 AM	Hardware (including spares replacement and warranty parts), software (including software updates) and technology (including drawings, documentation, installation and technical support) for incorporation into a simulator		Turkey	CAE Inc.
27	Feb 21, 2019 11:07:52 AM	Oct 31, 2020 12:00:00 AM	antenna		Turkey	
28	859923-3 Dec 20, 2018 5:49:20 PM	Dec 31, 2020 12:00:00 AM	Repair and maintenance parts for the helicopter recovery assist, secure and traverse system	The Republic of Turkey	Turkey	
29	863616-7 Feb 25, 2019 9:27:38 AM	Feb 28, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Site installation, acceptance test and Training for the Visual Interactive Synthetic Training Application (VISTA) Software.	Turkish Navy	Turkey	LOCKHEED MARTIN CANADA INC.
30	Jul 1, 2020 4:31:29 PM	Jul 1, 2021 12:00:00 AM			Turkey	
31	Mar 12, 2019 4:36:38 PM	Mar 31, 2021 12:00:00 AM	EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems including ancillary equipment; Ground Boresight Modules (BSM) Mission Grips Assemblies.		Turkey	L-3 / WESCAM INC.
32	Apr 9, 2019 2:58:05 PM	Apr 30, 2021 12:00:00 AM	antenna		Turkey	
33					Turkey	
34	871581-1 May 31, 2019 3:20:16 PM	May 31, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Quad Port Module (To be incorporated onto a prototype processor for internal company research and development)	Tektronik Muh. VE TIC A.S.	Turkey	
35	Jul 8, 2019 10:32:09 AM	Jul 31, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Software (including software updates), technology (including drawings, documentation, installation and technical support) for Weapons and Tactical Trainer (WTT)	CAE Inc.	Turkey	CAE Inc.
36	Aug 14, 2019	Aug 31, 2023	Wescam EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems.		Turkey	L-3 / WESCAM INC.

LIST OF PERMIT ISSUED TO TURKEY FOR GROUP 2 ITEMS THAT ARE CURRENTLY VALID
(except the ones in red font, which are currently suspended)

Ref. Id.	Issue Date	Expiry Date	Overall Goods Description	Final Consignee	Country	Applicant
	11:20:40 AM	12:00:00 AM				
37	Sep 17, 2019 1:37:35 PM	Sep 30, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Software (including software updates) and technology (including drawings, documentation, installation and technical support) for the AW139 Full Flight Simulator for permanent military end-use by the Qatar Emiri Air Force.	CAE Inc.	Turkey	CAE Inc.
38	Jun 12, 2019 3:43:13 PM	Jun 30, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Software (including software updates) and technology (including drawings, documentation, installation and technical support) for the end use of Turkish Land Forces located in Turkey.	CAE Inc.	Turkey	CAE Inc.
39	872980-6 Jun 14, 2019 5:22:00 PM	Jun 30, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Ship Infrared Signature Naval Threat Countermeasure Simulator	ASELSAN Elektronik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S	Turkey	WR Davis Engineering Limited
40	Sep 27, 2019 10:05:34 AM	Nov 30, 2020 12:00:00 AM	EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems (including ancillary equipment.		Turkey	L-3 / WESCAM INC.
41	Sep 27, 2019 10:08:26 AM	Dec 31, 2021 12:00:00 AM	EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems (including ancillary equipment.		Turkey	L-3 / WESCAM INC.
42	Aug 30, 2019 12:10:27 PM	Aug 31, 2021 12:00:00 AM	antenna (Turkey	
43	Sep 24, 2019 3:53:04 PM	Sep 30, 2023 12:00:00 AM	Temporary export of quantity of Handcontroller Assemblies and Mission Grip Assemblies, and Hot Cable Assemblies to support demonstrations in Turkey.		Turkey	L-3 / WESCAM INC.
44					Turkey	
45	Jun 25, 2019 10:49:33 AM	Jun 30, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Hardware (including spares, replacement and warranty parts), software (including software updates), technology (including drawings, documentation, installation and technical support) for Weapons and Tactical Trainer (WTT) system.		Turkey	CAE Inc.
46	Oct 7, 2019 10:22:05 AM	Oct 31, 2023 12:00:00 AM	Components of the Wescam series surveillance systems		Turkey	L-3 / WESCAM INC.
47	Aug 29, 2019 12:38:58 PM	Aug 31, 2023 12:00:00 AM	Repaired Wescam Surveillance systems, repaired components and sub-assemblies		Turkey	L-3 / WESCAM INC.

LIST OF PERMIT ISSUED TO TURKEY FOR GROUP 2 ITEMS THAT ARE CURRENTLY VALID
(except the ones in red font, which are currently suspended)

Ref. Id.	Issue Date	Expiry Date	Overall Goods Description	Final Consignee	Country	Applicant
48	May 6, 2020 4:22:17 PM	May 6, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Wescam surveillance systems, components and sub-assemblies		Turkey	L-3 / WESCAM INC.
49	878730-6 Sep 19, 2019 10:06:05 AM	Sep 30, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Distribution manifold. Suspension element of a military vehicle.	FNSS Savunma Sistemleri	Turkey	Horstman Systems Inc.
50	Oct 4, 2019 2:43:21 PM	Sep 30, 2023 12:00:00 AM	Repaired Wescam surveillance systems, repaired components and sub-assemblies, related technical data and software.		Turkey	L-3 / WESCAM INC.
51	Oct 8, 2019 1:41:01 PM	Mar 1, 2021 12:00:00 AM	equipment, related technical data and software		Turkey	
52	May 7, 2020 10:00:25 AM	May 7, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Repaired surveillance systems, repaired components and sub-assemblies, related technical data and software.		Turkey	L-3 / WESCAM INC.
53	May 7, 2020 9:57:46 AM	May 7, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Wescam surveillance systems, components and sub-assemblies, related technical data and software.		Turkey	L-3 / WESCAM INC.
54	893293-4 Jun 26, 2020 7:40:59 PM	Jan 31, 2021 12:00:00 AM	TALON software application; allows detailed analysis of captured and simulated pulse data.	ESEN System Integration	Turkey	Telemus Warfare Inc.
55	840862-6 Mar 15, 2018 2:21:59 PM	Mar 31, 2022 12:00:00 AM	Technical data for the military TUMSIS X-Band communication payload for the TURKSAT-6A satellite.	C Tech Bilisim Tek. Sanayi ve Tic. A.S. (C-Tech)	Turkey	MACDONALD DETTWILER & ASSOC. CORPORATION
56	841980-1 Mar 22, 2018 12:44:31 PM	Apr 30, 2022 12:00:00 AM	Technical data related to the GÖKTÜRK Replacement (GÖKTÜRK-Y) Electro-Optical Satellite	Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI)	Turkey	MACDONALD DETTWILER & ASSOC. CORPORATION
57	Aug 20, 2018 9:02:38 AM	Sep 30, 2022 12:00:00 AM	Repaired Wescam surveillance systems, related technical data and software		Turkey	L-3 / WESCAM INC.
58	832061-2 Nov 7, 2017 12:11:27 PM	Dec 31, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Complete production line and facilities (i.e. cups, cases, bullets and primers) for the production of ammunition cartridges (for various small-arm calibres).	Norm Sanayi Urunleri Imalat ve Dis Ticaret Ltd. Sti	Turkey	MAGNUM INTEGRATED TECHNOLOGY LTD

LIST OF PERMIT ISSUED TO TURKEY FOR GROUP 2 ITEMS THAT ARE CURRENTLY VALID
(except the ones in red font, which are currently suspended)

Ref. Id.	Issue Date	Expiry Date	Overall Goods Description	Final Consignee	Country	Applicant
59	840862-6 Mar 15, 2018 2:21:59 PM	Mar 31, 2022 12:00:00 AM	Technical data related to the military TUMSIS X-Band communication payload for the TURKSAT-6A satellite.	ASELSAN Electronic Industries Inc.	Turkey	MACDONALD DETTWILER & ASSOC. CORPORATION
60	840862-6 Mar 15, 2018 2:21:59 PM	Mar 31, 2022 12:00:00 AM	Technical data related to the military TUMSIS X-Band communication payload for the TURKSAT-6A satellite.	Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI)	Turkey	MACDONALD DETTWILER & ASSOC. CORPORATION
61	843815-8 May 8, 2018 2:54:11 PM	Apr 30, 2022 12:00:00 AM	Prototype parts, components, and assemblies of the F-35 Aircraft Landing Gear System and related technical data and technical assistance.	ALP Aviation	Turkey	GOODRICH AEROSPACE CANADA LTD.
62	893271-0 Jul 24, 2020 12:43:33 PM	Jul 24, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Components of the ELINT (Electronics Intelligence) system and EMS (Electronic Support Measures) system, related technical assistance and software..	Turkish Aerospace Industries, Inc.	Turkey	Telemus Warfare Inc.
63					Turkey	
64	853856-7 Oct 23, 2018 10:14:21 AM	Oct 31, 2020 12:00:00 AM	Multi-function display unit (MFD) for an aircraft.	Aselsan Elektronik Sanayi Ve Ticaret A.S.	Turkey	General Dynamics Mission Systems - Canada
65		Nov 6, 2018 9:19:49 AM	Nov 30, 2020 12:00:00 AM	Wescam surveillance systems, components and sub-assemblies	Turkey	L-3 / WESCAM INC.
66		Jan 30, 2019 8:57:50 AM	Jan 31, 2022 12:00:00 AM	Wescam surveillance systems, components and sub-assemblies, related technical data and software.	Turkey	L-3 / WESCAM INC.
67	860780-3 Dec 28, 2018 8:12:39 AM	Dec 31, 2020 12:00:00 AM	Cable assemblies, distribution manifolds, driver interface units and controllers to support the suspension installation of both 6x6 and 8x8 Armoured Personnel Carrier Vehicles	FNSS Savunma Sistemleri A.S,	Turkey	Horstman Systems Inc.
68		Apr 26, 2019 9:52:24 AM	Apr 30, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Technical data and technical assistance related to the Weapons and Tactical Trainer (WTT)/ Forward Air Controller Sensor (FACS	Turkey	CAE Inc.

LIST OF PERMIT ISSUED TO TURKEY FOR GROUP 2 ITEMS THAT ARE CURRENTLY VALID
(except the ones in red font, which are currently suspended)

	Ref. Id.	Issue Date	Expiry Date	Overall Goods Description	Final Consignee	Country	Applicant
69	893284-5	Jun 26, 2020 7:48:25 PM	Dec 31, 2020 12:00:00 AM	Electronic receiver support components of the ELINT (Electronics Intelligence) system	Turkish Aerospace Industries, Inc.	Turkey	Telemus Warfare Inc.
70		Aug 9, 2019 10:09:11 AM	Dec 31, 2020 12:00:00 AM	Technical data, technical assistance and software related to the A400M Cockpit Maintenance Operational System (CMOS) program	CAE INC.	Turkey	CAE Inc.
71		Aug 30, 2019 12:10:27 PM	Aug 31, 2021 12:00:00 AM	equipment, related technical data and software		Turkey	
72	854184-8	Sep 21, 2018 10:55:01 AM	Dec 31, 2022 12:00:00 AM	Manufacturing lines for case and bullet, 5.56 X 45mm ammunition, 7.62 X 51mm ammunition, 7.62 X 39mm ammunition and related technical assistance.	ZSR Patlayici Sanayi A.S.	Turkey	MAGNUM INTEGRATED TECHNOLOGY LTD
73	869666-3	May 3, 2019 1:28:30 PM	May 31, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Replacement Barrel, Bolt Body and Magazine for a Bolt Action Rifle	TURKMAN Teknoloji A.S.	Turkey	CADEX INC.
74	872047-7	Jun 4, 2019 10:27:54 AM	Jun 30, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Technical assistance related to a wind tunnel building interface design of a planned 0.61m x 0.61m supersonic blowdown wind tunnel.	ROKETSAN Roket Sanayii ve Tic. A.S.	Turkey	AIOLOS ENGINEERING CORPORATION
75		Aug 29, 2019 12:40:00 PM	Aug 31, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Spares, replacements, software, technical data and technical assistance related to the AW139 Full Flight Simulator device trainer.		Turkey	CAE Inc.
76	862111-9	Feb 4, 2019 10:18:38 AM	Feb 28, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Ride Height Control System (RHCS) for incorporation into a military vehicle suspension system.	FNSS Savunma Sistemleri A.S,	Turkey	Horstman Systems Inc.
77		Aug 13, 2019 9:35:07 AM	Aug 31, 2023 12:00:00 AM	Repaired Wescam surveillance systems, components, sub-assemblies and related technical data and software		Turkey	L-3 / WESCAM INC.
78		Aug 14, 2019 9:26:06 AM	Aug 31, 2023 12:00:00 AM	Components of the Wescam surveillance system		Turkey	L-3 / WESCAM INC.
79	878732-4	Sep 17, 2019	Sep 30, 2021	Recovery Mode Software for the Ride Height System Controller used	FNSS Savunma	Turkey	Horstman Systems Inc.

LIST OF PERMIT ISSUED TO TURKEY FOR GROUP 2 ITEMS THAT ARE CURRENTLY VALID
(except the ones in red font, which are currently suspended)

	Ref. Id.	Issue Date	Expiry Date	Overall Goods Description	Final Consignee	Country	Applicant
		4:21:18 PM	12:00:00 AM	in a suspension system of a military vehicle	Sistemelri		
80		Oct 9, 2019 1:48:21 PM	Sep 30, 2023 12:00:00 AM	Spare components of the Wescam surveillance sytem		Turkey	L-3 / WESCAM INC.
81		Sep 27, 2019 3:10:38 PM	Jan 31, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Wescam surveillance systems, components and sub-assemblies.		Turkey	L-3 / WESCAM INC.
82		May 6, 2020 4:27:18 PM	May 6, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Wescam surveillance systems components and sub-assemblies.		Turkey	L-3 / WESCAM INC.
83		May 6, 2020 4:24:17 PM	May 6, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Wescam surveillance systems components and sub-assemblies.		Turkey	L-3 / WESCAM INC.
84		May 7, 2020 9:59:05 AM	May 7, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Wescam surveillance systems components and sub-assemblies.		Turkey	L-3 / WESCAM INC.
85		Aug 30, 2019 12:10:27 PM	Aug 31, 2021 12:00:00 AM	equipment, related technical data and software		Turkey	
86	893275-6	Jul 24, 2020 12:34:12 PM	Jul 24, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) Pulse Analyzer System (PAS) and related technical data and software.	ENOVAS Engineering Consultancy Computer Industry and Trade LLC	Turkey	Telemus Warfare Inc.
87	893281-8	Jul 24, 2020 12:41:12 PM	Jul 24, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Components of the ELINT (Electronics Intelligence) system and EMS (Electronic Support Measures) system.Wes	Turkish Aerospace Industries, Inc.	Turkey	Telemus Warfare Inc.

LIST OF PERMIT ISSUED TO TURKEY FOR GROUP 2 ITEMS THAT ARE CURRENTLY VALID
(except the ones in red font, which are currently suspended)

Military Exports to Turkey (2019-2014)

- Table 1 provides information on the value of military exports to Turkey since 2014. This information is publically reported in Canada's annual *Report on the Export of Military Goods* and is derived from export permit utilization reports submitted by Canadian exporters.
- Military exports are defined as those goods and technologies controlled in Group 2 of the *Export Control List*. Group 2 is divided into 22 subcategories of military items which are described in Table 2. Most of Canada's allies publically report on military exports against these 22 subcategories, which are negotiated multilaterally by the participating members of the Wassenaar Arrangement.
- Since 2014, the largest exports to Turkey by subcategory have consisted of "imaging or countermeasure equipment" (ECL 2-15) valued at \$230,703,300; "fire control, and related alerting and warning equipment" (ECL 2-5) valued at \$161,555,998; and "electronic equipment and military spacecraft" (ECL 2-11) valued at \$55,049,592.
- The cameras exported by WESCAM are mostly controlled under ECL 2-15 and ECL 2-5.
- There have been no exports of conventional arms (i.e. LAVs, airplanes, tanks etc.) or small arms and light weapons, as defined by the *UN Register of Conventional Arms*, to Turkey since 2014. The only conventional arms transfer reported in the UN Register was of a training rifle reported by Turkey to have been imported from Canada in 2012.
- Canada only reports small arms and light weapons exports to the UN Register when these are destined to consignees that are either military or police forces in the destination country.
- In 2019, Canada exported 183 rifles, and their associated spare parts and components, worth almost CAD \$2 million to distributor in Turkey who is supplying them to the Turkish Ministry of Defence.

Table 1 - Group 2 Military Exports to Turkey 2019-2014

Category of Group 2	2019	2018	2017	2016	2015	2014	Total
2-1.	\$1,995,150.00	\$40,559.00	\$0.00	\$1,600.00	\$1,600.00	\$7,500.00	\$2,046,409.00
2-2.	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00
2-3.	\$0.00	\$1,180.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$1,180.00
2-4.	\$31,924.80	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$141,136.40	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$173,061.20
2-5.	\$59,831,034.01	\$66,375,367.00	\$32,189,457.74	\$769,140.00	\$544,876.00	\$1,846,123.00	\$161,555,997.75
2-6.	\$345,462.09	\$1,249,367.90	\$703,652.78	\$17,330.00	\$171,164.00	\$0.00	\$2,486,976.77
2-7.	\$0.00	\$37,736.64	\$79,846.40	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$8,164.00	\$125,747.04
2-8.	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00
2-9.	\$19,000.00	\$25,490.76	\$20,890.76	\$116,416.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$181,797.52

2-10.	\$2,101,040.96	\$2,736,255.62	\$3,428,299.60	\$555,008.86	\$369,537.00	\$191,940.00	\$9,382,082.04
2-11.	\$19,636,100.24	\$27,811,321.32	\$7,433,606.86	\$168,064.00	\$0.00	\$500.00	\$55,049,592.42
2-12.	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00
2-13.	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00
2-14.	\$571,309.54	\$8,940.00	\$127,751.00	\$1,274,350.00	\$323,832.00	\$846,894.00	\$3,153,076.54
2-15.	\$116,046,883.17	\$76,733,638.00	\$32,452,646.04	\$34,541.17	\$4,034,089.00	\$1,401,503.00	\$230,703,300.38
2-16.	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$11,140.14	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$11,140.14
2-17.	\$309,867.78	\$737,113.78	\$2,706,312.00	\$260,232.00	\$122,357.00	\$0.00	\$4,135,882.56
2-18.	\$0.00	\$216,457.50	\$873,786.86	\$4,247.88	\$0.00	\$43,581.00	\$1,138,073.24
2-19.	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00
2-20.	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00
2-21.	\$628,085.58	\$183,521.01	\$1,077,360.65	\$848,634.88	\$1,847,410.00	\$1,619,272.00	\$6,204,284.12
2-22.	\$2,001,919.71	\$1,455,129.30	\$9,618.03	\$52,814.14	\$142,689.00	\$921,440.00	\$4,583,610.18
Total	\$203,517,777.88	\$177,612,077.83	\$81,103,228.72	\$4,254,655.47	\$7,557,554.00	\$6,886,917.00	---

Table 2 - Group 2 of Canada's Export Control List

ECL Category	Illustrative Examples
2-1	Smooth-bore weapons with a calibre of less than 20 mm, other arms and automatic weapons with a calibre of 12.7 mm or less and accessories
2-2	Smooth-bore weapons with a calibre of 20 mm or more, other weapons or armament with a calibre greater than 12.7 mm, projectors and accessories
2-3	Ammunition and fuse-setting devices, and specially designed components
2-4	Bombs, torpedoes, rockets, missiles, other explosive devices and charges, and related equipment and accessories specially designed for military use; and specially designed components
2-5	Fire control, related alerting and warning equipment, and related systems; test and alignment and countermeasure equipment specially designed for military use; and

ECL Category	Illustrative Examples
	specially designed components and accessories
2-6	Ground vehicles and components
2-7	Chemical or biological toxic agents, riot control agents, radioactive materials, and related equipment, components and materials
2-8	Energetic materials and related substances
2-9	Vessels of war, special naval equipment and accessories, and components specially designed for military use
2-10	Aircraft, lighter-than-air vehicles, unmanned airborne vehicles, aero-engines and aircraft equipment, related equipment and components, specially designed or modified for military use
2-11	Electronic equipment, military spacecraft and components not controlled elsewhere
2-12	High-velocity kinetic energy weapon systems and related equipment, and specially designed components
2-13	Armoured or protective equipment and constructions and components
2-14	Specialized equipment for military training or for simulating military scenarios, simulators specially designed for training in the use of any firearm or weapon controlled in 2-1 or 2-2, and specially designed components and accessories
2-15	Imaging or countermeasure equipment, specially designed for military use, and specially designed components and accessories
2-16	Forgings, castings and other unfinished products the use of which in a controlled product is identifiable by material composition, geometry or function, and which are specially designed for any products controlled in 2-1 to 2-4, 2-6, 2-9, 2-10, 2-12 or 2-19

ECL Category	Illustrative Examples
2-17	Miscellaneous equipment, materials, libraries and specially designed components
2-18	Equipment for the production of products referred to in the Munitions List
2-19	Directed energy weapon systems, related or countermeasure equipment and test models, and specially designed components
2-20	Cryogenic and superconductive equipment, and specially designed components and accessories
2-21	Software
2-22	Technology

FW: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

From: "Grant, Alison -ECE" <alison.grant@international.gc.ca>
To: "Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE" <kamiliya.akkouche@international.gc.ca>, "Coleman, Robert -ECE" <robert.coleman@international.gc.ca>, "Pilloud, Marc -ECE" <marc.pilloud@international.gc.ca>, "Brisson, Julien -ECE" <julien.brisson@international.gc.ca>
Cc: "Turner, Andrew -ECE" <andrew.turner@international.gc.ca>
Date: Tue, 20 Oct 2020 21:17:58 -0400

Drone squad – fyi. Thanks Andrew for pulling together today.

From: Boleau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boleau@international.gc.ca>

Sent: October 20, 2020 4:24 PM

To: Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Mishra, Rachna -ELB <Rachna.Mishra@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Colleagues: DMT has approved the report and it is now being shared with oMINA (pasted below). Thank you, once again. As updates become available, thank you in advance for keeping us posted so that DMT/USS and oMINA have the very latest. GuyB.

- ANKRA Defence Attaché has made several attempts to outreach to the Turkish military. A detailed response is not expected any time soon. ANKRA HOM will engage with the Turkish MFA to emphasize the importance of the military-to-military talks to moving this issue forward.
- While it is impossible to independently verify the situation on the ground (OSCE monitoring suspended for months due to COVID), INA will continue to report on all latest intelligence. The latest footage of downed drones (if genuine) certainly appears to show a [REDACTED]
- The Department is following up with other countries that may be supplying drone parts/technology to Turkey and Azerbaijan to gather additional information, including [REDACTED] ANKRA Defence Attache indicates that his contacts report that [REDACTED] [REDACTED] While [REDACTED] has yet to respond, it seems that [REDACTED]
- If no further intelligence becomes available, the Department may contact the company for its input and assessment of the video.
- JLTA along with PER and the relevant Geographic Divisions are assessing the situation as it pertains to Turkish drones in Libya.
- All consultation partners have advised that for the time being they have no further intel/info to suggest that we should consider suspending any additional permits that are still valid to Turkey.
- GAC and OGDs are working on a review of the situation on the suspended permits in question, with a view to providing MINA consolidated advice on options/next steps.
- WRT to the [REDACTED] the companies had already shipped items against those permits, so there is no urgent action required.

From: Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>

Sent: October 20, 2020 2:02 PM

To: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Boleau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boleau@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD

<David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Hello Guy,

Please find below a report on the current situation as well as the updated version of the Critical Path. Please let us know if you have any questions.

Andrew

- ANKRA Defence Attache has initiated outreach to Turkish military, but has yet to receive a response. ANKRA HOM will engage with the Turkish MFA to emphasize the importance of the military-to-military talks to moving this issue forward.
- While it is impossible to independently verify the situation on the ground (OSCE monitoring suspended for months due to COVID), INA will continue to report on all latest intelligence. The latest footage of downed drones (if genuine) certainly appears to show a [REDACTED]
- The Department is following up with other countries that may be supplying drone parts/technology to Turkey and Azerbaijan to gather additional information, including [REDACTED] ANKRA Defence Attache indicates that his contacts report that [REDACTED] [REDACTED] While [REDACTED] has yet to respond, it seems that [REDACTED]
- If no further intelligence becomes available, the Department may contact the company for its input and assessment of the video.
- JLTA along with PER and the relevant Geographic Divisions are assessing the situation as it pertains to Turkish drones in Libya.
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- GAC and OGDs are working on a review of the situation and the suspended permits in question, with a view to providing MINA consolidated advice on options/next steps.
- WRT to the [REDACTED] the companies had already shipped items against those permits, so there is no urgent action required.

Follow-up to MINA briefing on Turkish drones – Next steps

Immediate Actions:

- 1) [REDACTED] for controlled goods and inform companies (after letters are vetted by legal and green-lit by oMINA) – done
- 2) Send question to Minister on likewise [REDACTED] for controlled goods, to suspend Canadian exports of controlled goods to conflict zone – done

Actions on Monday:

- 1) Engagement with Turkey.
 - **Recommendation to MINA:** That outreach to Turkey be done by MINA to his counterpart on Monday, given their good personal relationship, their recent discussion on exports, and to seek Turkey's views on regional events (Nagorno-Karabakh, Eastern Mediterranean). Guidance from MINA requested this weekend – TPs would be prepared this weekend if MINA agrees. - done
 - If not MINA, a diplomatic demarche will be done by EGM/Sandra McCardell to the Turkish Ambassador in Ottawa as early as possible on Monday. – done
 - Given the serious impact that suspending these permits, and making a statement about it, will have on our relations with Turkey, it is important that engagement with Turkey happen prior to any press announcement. There are [REDACTED] valid [REDACTED] permits valued at over [REDACTED] that the Minister is seeking to suspend. - done
- 2) Officials (IFM) requests that DND hold consultations with Turkish military on end use of UAVs with [REDACTED] technology (possibly via their Defence Attaché in Ankara) – requested and following up

- 3) Officials (TIE) informs [REDACTED] about the suspension, and suspension to be undertaken in system - done
- 4) Communications released on suspensions.
 - There are likely issues of commercial confidentiality in releasing a statement referring to a specific product or company. There are also concerns about the negative impact a statement referring to Turkey will have on our bilateral relationship. The communications product will be drafted with these concerns in mind. - done

Other actions:

- 1) Officials (ECE) request to ANKRA to reach out to both [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] counterparts to confirm with confidence existence of their components on Turkish UAVs – done and waiting for [REDACTED] reply
- 2) Officials (TIE) to re-send [REDACTED] Turkey permits that are under review to consultation partners to allow for further input, given change in circumstances. - done
- 3) [REDACTED]
- 4) Officials (TIE) to provide more information to respond to MINA question about intelligence on export permits after they are shipped (supported by IND) – following up
- 5) [REDACTED]

From: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>

Sent: Tuesday, October 20, 2020 1:45 PM

To: Boleau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boleau@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Guy – this is coming very shortly, apologies for delay in pulling together the points, we have all been in different meetings.

Alison

From: Boleau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boleau@international.gc.ca>

Sent: October 20, 2020 12:50 PM

To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Thanks Shalini, what is requested is one report to oMINA on Azerbaijan so your input yesterday should be captured in the one consolidated report being requested. I should have mentioned as well DMT's specific point about "there were to have been contacts through the military and also either other possible suppliers: eg [REDACTED]"

Kevin, Jonathan, Alison, assume this is being compiled and we'll be able to receive soon today?

With thanks

From: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 20, 2020 12:44 PM
To: Boleau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boleau@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Guy, I will let I-branch colleagues respond to your two points below, as they are leading on intel reporting.

TIE's input from yesterday remains the same, which I think addresses the first question to a degree. For item 2, I am coordinating with the i-branch, and if needed, TIE will reach out to the company to support efforts to validate whether the picture/video in the tweet shows [REDACTED] items.

From: Boleau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boleau@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 20, 2020 12:37 PM
To: Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Colleagues – a quick follow-up on this request for one consolidated report re Azerbaijan covering: 1) whether we have any intel the issue of military goods destined to Turkey that may be in Azerbaijan; and 2) the tweet that MINA sent to DMT last night (immediately below).

Can we expect the report within the next hour in DMOs?
 With thanks
 GuyB.

From: Boleau, Guy -DMT
Sent: October 19, 2020 9:38 PM
To: Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INA <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Colleagues, with apologies for another message this evening, in addition to the requested information below, DMT has requested that the report also provide what we know (and not know yet and what we are doing to find out) about the air defense units of the Artsakh Defense Army shooting down Azerbaijan UAVs. See tweet below MINA just sent to DMT about this. Thank you once again for the consolidate report by Noon tomorrow for DMT approval.

<< File: IMG_5681.png >>

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT
Sent: October 19, 2020 8:03 PM
To: Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INA <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Glad to see that everyone that should be copied now are (including oUSS who I am now copying).

I will kindly ask I-E-T Branches to pls coordinate one response/report for tomorrow by Noon on our efforts thus far, and next steps, after which we will seek DMT approval, and then submit to oMINA.

With thanks to everyone

GuyB.

From: Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 19, 2020 7:53 PM
To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INA <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Looping in INA on the question of intel gathering and assessment (see highlighted line below). I will let INA reply, but my understanding is that an assessment has been made, high side, specific to likelihood of UAVs from Turkey being used by Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Regarding mil-to-mil contacts, the CDA in ANKRA submitted a Note Verbale to the Turkish MoD on 9 October, requesting a meeting on a urgent basis. The NV specified that we are seeking specific information on the possible re-export of UAV components by Turkey to Azerbaijan, pursuant to reports in the Turkish media and MINA's decision to suspend specific export permits. We equipped the CDA with detailed background to aid him in his demarche. The CDA has made three follow up enquiries (Thursday, Friday and today). Last week he was told that the Turkish Armed Forces were gathering the responses to his questions, and that he would be called for a meeting when they were in a position to reply. Today, however, he was informed that this is "a very sensitive topic" and that a response or invitation for a meeting will "not be for a while."

It bears noting that the Turks are unlikely to be easily motivated to cooperate with us at this time, when it comes to information sharing on this file. We can continue to push, but a timely and detailed response through the Turkish Armed Forces / MoD is probably more than we can hope for at this point.

KH

From: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>
Sent: Monday, October 19, 2020 7:21 PM
To: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Absolutely, looping in Kevin, David and Alison in I-branch and E-branch, respectively, both of DMT's questions/issues fall to their teams (I inadvertently didn't include them in my last message – I've been having outlook issues).

What I recall from an Ibranch update is that the DA in Turkey tried to set up a demarche, but has not had any success. That said, I understand that the DA has been reaching out to likeminded countries to determine how they are treating exports to Turkey linked to UAVs. Kevin Hamilton will have to confirm and will be better placed to respond to your two messages below.

I will add that all of this will feed into the memo and analysis noted under bullet four below, which the T-branch is leading on, with considerable input from DND, I branch and E-branch.

Hope this helps a little.

Warmly,
S.

From: Boleau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boleau@international.gc.ca>

Sent: October 19, 2020 6:37 PM

To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Sorry for the second message, DMT just wrote to me saying: "There were to have been contacts through the military and also either other possible suppliers: eg [REDACTED]"

Pls let me know about bringing back-in E Branch and I Branch (and I forgot, oUSS as well).

From: Boleau, Guy -DMT

Sent: October 19, 2020 6:35 PM

To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Hi Shalini, thank you for this. It has been shared with DMT. In the meantime, it is my understanding that there's been some correspondence bw MINA and Turkey as to whether we have any intel the issue of military goods destined to Turkey that may be in Azerbaijan. DMT has asked for a report to be submitted to oMINA tomorrow on this, noting specifically who is working on intel gathering, what we know and don't know. I note that in your reply that E-Branch was removed. Grateful if you can let me know whether you prefer looping-in E Branch (and I Branch) or whether you prefer that I reply all to this message and include both Branches. What you provided below is form a significant part of the report but would need to know if there's been any work on this by E and I Branches and our Post and what we have heard thus far (and next steps).

With thanks

GuyB.

From: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>

Sent: October 19, 2020 10:40 AM

To: *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Subject: FW: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Dear Guy:

Further to the exchange below, here is a brief update for DMT/oDMT awareness.

- We have twice circulated the list of all valid/not expired export permits to Turkey to our consultation partners and asked them to review with a critical lens, and advise whether they have intel/info to suggest that we should consider suspending any additional permits.

- To date, they have all come back and indicated that they do not have further intel/info that suggest that we need to suspend additional permits to Turkey at this time.
- They now have this list and will advise us if they get intel/info that changes this recommendation. (oMINA is aware)
- WRT to the suspended permits for [REDACTED] T-branch is working across GAC/government on a review of the situation and the permits in question, with a view to providing MINA consolidated advice on options/next steps.
- WRT to the [REDACTED] the companies had already shipped items against those permits, so there is no urgent action required. oMINA is aware.

Let me know if any further info is required on our approach.

Warmly,
S.

From: Boleau, Guy -DMT

Sent: October 8, 2020 12:21 PM

To: Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>

Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>; Coleman, Robert -ECE <Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions

Salut Marie-Eve and team, just a quick follow-up to the message below. Do you think a response by end of day would be feasible?

With thanks
GuyB.

From: Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>

Sent: October 6, 2020 5:23 PM

To: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Boleau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boleau@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>

Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>; Coleman, Robert -ECE <Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions

And TIR/Bastien

From: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>

Sent: October 6, 2020 5:19 PM

To: Boleau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boleau@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>

Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>; Coleman, Robert -ECE <Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions

Looping in ECE/Coleman.

From: Boleau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boleau@international.gc.ca>

Sent: October 6, 2020 5:18 PM

To: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions

Salut Marie-Eve: As you saw, DMT has approved the analysis and it is now being shared with oMINA.

DMT has asked whether now we can verify if we have any reason to believe that any of the military goods to Turkey might be in Azerbaijan? DMT specifically referenced, for example, the UAV engines for instance in Group 2-10.

With thanks

From: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 6, 2020 4:18 PM
To: Boleau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boleau@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>
Subject: FW: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions

Bonjour Guy,

Tel que discuté, voici les réponses avec les changements demandés.

Laisse-moi savoir si tu as des question ou commentaires.

Marie Eve

From: Boleau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boleau@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 5, 2020 7:55 PM
To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>
Subject: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions

Hi Shalini and Marie-Eve, with apologies for the eventing message, DMT just received a call from MINA re Turkey. We have been asked for the following analysis by Noon tomorrow please:

1. Summary of the kind of goods in the Group 2 list of valid permits to Turkey that was submitted to oMINA today. If we could draw-out the kind of goods included in the attached table you produced that would be grateful (e.g. DMT asked as an example whether it included rifles).

Turkey is a significant purchaser of Canadian controlled goods and technology. Various Canadian companies are involved at various stages in the supply and provision of systems, subsystems, parts and components of a diverse range of military programs. These can be categorized into the following:

- Parts, components, and accessories for [REDACTED]
- Parts, components, avionics and other accessories for various aircraft platforms made in other countries, including the [REDACTED] as well as the [REDACTED]
- Flight simulators, and their corresponding parts, components and technical data
- Parts, components, subsystems and their corresponding technical data and assistance related to the development of Turkish satellites (including military satellites)
- Parts, components and subsystems (including GPS anti-jam devices) to be integrated into various bombs, missiles,

- rockets and other ordnances*
- *Parts, components and technical data to be integrated into various armoured vehicles ([REDACTED])*
 - *Technical data and assistance for the development of [REDACTED]*
 - *Production tools and machines for the manufacturing of ammunition and cartridges of various calibres*
 - *Riflescopes, sights and their corresponding parts and components*
 - *Rocket motors and other components for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)*
 - *Electro-Optical and Infrared systems to be incorporated into various aerial platforms (including UAVs)*
 - *Naval equipment (including cables and arresting harness for helicopter retrieval system, sonobuoys, various modules, etc.) to be integrated into warships and other naval platforms.*
 - *Technical data and assistance related to the development and construction of a wind tunnel (to test aircraft and missiles)*
 - *IED disruptors, as well as protective equipment for military personnel*

Here is the list of valid (and suspended) Group 2 permits to Turkey, with the changes requested:

<< File: Group 2 items to Turkey (including MDPs) v.1 (003).docx >>

2. Since 2016 (pre and post 2019 period), number of Wescam cameras that have been shipped and number of Wescam cameras that have not/not yet been shipped. Understand this may be challenging given return and repair. If exact number is not feasible, a solid estimate would be grateful with accompanying caveats.

Total number of Wescam cameras exported to Turkey since 2016, and cameras not yet exported

Exported		Not yet exported	
New	Repaired	New	Repaired
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Notes:

- The numbers above are only for Wescam complete surveillance systems and does not include parts and components of the surveillance systems.
- Exported cameras cover exports since 2016 (pre and post 2019 exports).
- The "not exported" figures pertain only to the [REDACTED] Wescam valid permits (now suspended) as they could still be exported should the suspension be lifted.
- * This is the number of cameras the exporter would be allowed to export under their permits. This number could represent cameras ready to be exported and cameras under production or not yet produced. The permit suspension prevents the exporter from exporting these cameras.
- ** This represents the number of repaired cameras that would be allowed to be exported. Our system does not allow us to determine whether these cameras are in Canada or still with the end user. The permit suspension prevents these cameras from being exported. It is unlikely that the end-user would send the cameras in its possession for repairs in Canada during the suspension given that they would be unable to have their cameras back.

3. Grateful if we could receive a profile of the type of Canadian exports of military goods to Turkey over the last 5 years, (e.g. whether we have shipped any LAVs to Turkey).

<< File: Military Exports to Turkey 2019-2014.docx >>

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to let me know.

Guy R. Boileau

Deputy Director | Directeur adjoint
Office of the Deputy Minister of International Trade | Cabinet du Sous-ministre du Commerce international
guy.boileau@international.gc.ca

Tel. 343-203-5965

Global Affairs Canada | Affaires mondiales Canada

Government of Canada | Gouvernement du Canada

<< OLE Object: Picture (Device Independent Bitmap) >>

Military Exports to Turkey (2019-2014)

- Table 1 provides information on the value of military exports to Turkey since 2014. This information is publically reported in Canada's annual *Report on the Export of Military Goods* and is derived from export permit utilization reports submitted by Canadian exporters.
- Military exports are defined as those goods and technologies controlled in Group 2 of the *Export Control List*. Group 2 is divided into 22 subcategories of military items which are described in Table 2. Most of Canada's allies publically report on military exports against these 22 subcategories, which are negotiated multilaterally by the participating members of the Wassenaar Arrangement.
- Since 2014, the largest exports to Turkey by subcategory have consisted of "imaging or countermeasure equipment" (ECL 2-15) valued at \$230,703,300; "fire control, and related alerting and warning equipment" (ECL 2-5) valued at \$161,555,998; and "electronic equipment and military spacecraft" (ECL 2-11) valued at \$55,049,592.
- The cameras exported by WESCAM are mostly controlled under ECL 2-15 and ECL 2-5.
- There have been no exports of conventional arms (i.e. LAVs, airplanes, tanks etc.) or small arms and light weapons, as defined by the *UN Register of Conventional Arms*, to Turkey since 2014. The only conventional arms transfer reported in the UN Register was of a training rifle reported by Turkey to have been imported from Canada in 2012.
- Canada only reports small arms and light weapons exports to the UN Register when these are destined to consignees that are either military or police forces in the destination country.
- In 2019, Canada exported 183 rifles, and their associated spare parts and components, worth almost CAD \$2 million to distributor in Turkey who is supplying them to the Turkish Ministry of Defence.

Table 1 - Group 2 Military Exports to Turkey 2019-2014

Category of Group 2	2019	2018	2017	2016	2015	2014	Total
2-1.	\$1,995,150.00	\$40,559.00	\$0.00	\$1,600.00	\$1,600.00	\$7,500.00	\$2,046,409.00
2-2.	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00
2-3.	\$0.00	\$1,180.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$1,180.00
2-4.	\$31,924.80	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$141,136.40	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$173,061.20
2-5.	\$59,831,034.01	\$66,375,367.00	\$32,189,457.74	\$769,140.00	\$544,876.00	\$1,846,123.00	\$161,555,997.75
2-6.	\$345,462.09	\$1,249,367.90	\$703,652.78	\$17,330.00	\$171,164.00	\$0.00	\$2,486,976.77
2-7.	\$0.00	\$37,736.64	\$79,846.40	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$8,164.00	\$125,747.04
2-8.	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00
2-9.	\$19,000.00	\$25,490.76	\$20,890.76	\$116,416.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$181,797.52

2-10.	\$2,101,040.96	\$2,736,255.62	\$3,428,299.60	\$555,008.86	\$369,537.00	\$191,940.00	\$9,382,082.04
2-11.	\$19,636,100.24	\$27,811,321.32	\$7,433,606.86	\$168,064.00	\$0.00	\$500.00	\$55,049,592.42
2-12.	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00
2-13.	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00
2-14.	\$571,309.54	\$8,940.00	\$127,751.00	\$1,274,350.00	\$323,832.00	\$846,894.00	\$3,153,076.54
2-15.	\$116,046,883.17	\$76,733,638.00	\$32,452,646.04	\$34,541.17	\$4,034,089.00	\$1,401,503.00	\$230,703,300.38
2-16.	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$11,140.14	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$11,140.14
2-17.	\$309,867.78	\$737,113.78	\$2,706,312.00	\$260,232.00	\$122,357.00	\$0.00	\$4,135,882.56
2-18.	\$0.00	\$216,457.50	\$873,786.86	\$4,247.88	\$0.00	\$43,581.00	\$1,138,073.24
2-19.	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00
2-20.	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00
2-21.	\$628,085.58	\$183,521.01	\$1,077,360.65	\$848,634.88	\$1,847,410.00	\$1,619,272.00	\$6,204,284.12
2-22.	\$2,001,919.71	\$1,455,129.30	\$9,618.03	\$52,814.14	\$142,689.00	\$921,440.00	\$4,583,610.18
Total	\$203,517,777.88	\$177,612,077.83	\$81,103,228.72	\$4,254,655.47	\$7,557,554.00	\$6,886,917.00	---

Table 2 - Group 2 of Canada's Export Control List

ECL Category	Illustrative Examples
2-1	Smooth-bore weapons with a calibre of less than 20 mm, other arms and automatic weapons with a calibre of 12.7 mm or less and accessories
2-2	Smooth-bore weapons with a calibre of 20 mm or more, other weapons or armament with a calibre greater than 12.7 mm, projectors and accessories
2-3	Ammunition and fuse-setting devices, and specially designed components
2-4	Bombs, torpedoes, rockets, missiles, other explosive devices and charges, and related equipment and accessories specially designed for military use; and specially designed components
2-5	Fire control, related alerting and warning equipment, and related systems; test and alignment and countermeasure equipment specially designed for military use; and

ECL Category	Illustrative Examples
	pecially designed components and accessories
2-6	Ground vehicles and components
2-7	Chemical or biological toxic agents, riot control agents, radioactive materials, and related equipment, components and materials
2-8	Energetic materials and related substances
2-9	Vessels of war, special naval equipment and accessories, and components specially designed for military use
2-10	Aircraft, lighter-than-air vehicles, unmanned airborne vehicles, aero-engines and aircraft equipment, related equipment and components, specially designed or modified for military use
2-11	Electronic equipment, military spacecraft and components not controlled elsewhere
2-12	High-velocity kinetic energy weapon systems and related equipment, and specially designed components
2-13	Armoured or protective equipment and constructions and components
2-14	Specialized equipment for military training or for simulating military scenarios, simulators specially designed for training in the use of any firearm or weapon controlled in 2-1 or 2-2, and specially designed components and accessories
2-15	Imaging or countermeasure equipment, specially designed for military use, and specially designed components and accessories
2-16	Forgings, castings and other unfinished products the use of which in a controlled product is identifiable by material composition, geometry or function, and which are specially designed for any products controlled in 2-1 to 2-4, 2-6, 2-9, 2-10, 2-12 or 2-19

ECL Category	Illustrative Examples
2-17	Miscellaneous equipment, materials, libraries and specially designed components
2-18	Equipment for the production of products referred to in the Munitions List
2-19	Directed energy weapon systems, related or countermeasure equipment and test models, and specially designed components
2-20	Cryogenic and superconductive equipment, and specially designed components and accessories
2-21	Software
2-22	Technology

FW: Tweets: Additional information from Wescam re Turkey

From: "Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE" <joonhyuk.yoon@international.gc.ca>
To: "Pilloud, Marc -ECE" <marc.pilloud@international.gc.ca>, "Coleman, Robert -ECE" <robert.coleman@international.gc.ca>
Date: Mon, 26 Oct 2020 09:41:55 -0400
Attachments: 1711201006 and -1 - EUS.pdf (147.89 kB)

Robert, Marc,

As discussed, here is the email from DMT to oMINA.

As you can see both your DG and Director have been copied.

Jo

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT
Sent: October 25, 2020 3:27 PM
To: Anand, Shalini -TID; *MINA-Dept Unit
Cc: *USS-DMA Advisors; *TFM-Policy; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE; Mallett, Erika -TIE; Schonfeld, Benjamin -TIR; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR; Yendall, Jonathan -INP; Grant, Alison -ECE; Sproule, David -ECD; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN; Turner, Andrew -ECE; Christie, Bruce -TFMA; *DMT-Policy
Subject: Tweets: Additional information from Wescam re Turkey

MINA-DU, MINA had requested information on tweets in the media with potentially downed Wescam images. The following message has been reviewed and approved by DMT and can be shared with oMINA.

With thanks

Dear oMINA:

Further to the tweets in the media with potentially downed Wescam video footage and images, we reached out to the company to support the analysis coming from geos and I branch. Bottom line: they have indicated that some of the images may be their product, but it is difficult to confirm. We've also included some analysis of the end use statements that Wescam pointed to in their comments.

Wescam feedback:

1. Important to note that responses are based on viewing of the digital images/videos found in the links, however we are not able to comment on their authenticity
2. The external product representations contained in the video as well as the other images are consistent with a WESCAM produced [REDACTED]. We are unable to determine if that specific camera was removed from the aircraft wreckage shown in the links.
3. The camera shown in the image seems to have had the circular electronic interface board removed for display purposes. It also shows some visible damage but we cannot correlate the level of damage of the turret with the aircraft wreckage. We have seen a number of crashed units which tend to be damaged beyond economic repair. The crash scene we have seen in various tweets shows expected destruction of the aircraft. The turret is installed on the belly of the aircraft and we would expect significant damage. The turret itself is also cleaner than expected post-crash, but not conclusive.
4. Part number, product name and serial number on the [REDACTED] tag shown in the image is consistent with our naming conventions.
5. S/N [REDACTED] is shown on the product tag in the image. A system with this serial number was delivered in September 2020 under permit number [REDACTED] approved in September 2019 for end user Turkish Naval Forces. (End-Use Statement – EUS - attached)

6. As in point 2, the video tweeted does show what looks like the external housing of the WESCAM () Note that the RCPS, as well as the other components/parts shown loose or on the ground (and which were edited into the video) are not components or subassemblies of the (). We cannot tell if it was the same system as the one which was shown disassembled in the other images.

EUS Analysis:

-The permit was for the proposed export of () EO/IR systems to () in Turkey. According to the EUS, the () would be installed into the (). The EUS also states that "the () systems will be delivered to and used by the final end user Turkish Naval Forces, who will use the () system for the purpose of surveillance and targeting". It further states that "the imported goods will not be diverted, re-exported or transferred to a non-listed party for any reason".

-As far as export controls is concerned, L3's obligation was to deliver their products to () as per the terms of their issued permit. This seems to have been done. Furthermore, () undertaking was to incorporate the () into their () platforms. This also seems to have been done.

-Therefore, the incorporation of the () sensors into the () platforms was in itself the end use.

Footage and images sent to company for analysis:

<http://asbarez.com/197714/artsakh-forces-down-turkish-bayraktar-drone/>

Note: serial/part number at 0:25.

<https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1318281456955916289>

<https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/armenia-turkey-azerbaijan-nagorno-karabakh-drone-champagne-1.5770144>

<https://twitter.com/armgov>

FW: UPDATE ON POSSIBLE LINKAGES TO ALLEGED USE OF TURKISH DRONES IN CONFLICT ZONES

From: "Grant, Alison -ECE" <alison.grant@international.gc.ca>
To: "Pilloud, Marc -ECE" <marc.pilloud@international.gc.ca>
Date: Thu, 01 Oct 2020 12:12:27 -0400
Attachments: Unnamed Attachment (68 bytes)

GOOD CATCH!

From: Anand, Shalini -TIE
Sent: October 1, 2020 12:12 PM
To: Korecky, Judy -TIR; Pilloud, Marc -ECE; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE; Alday, Corazon -TIE
Cc: Grant, Alison -ECE; Coleman, Robert -ECE; Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE
Subject: RE: UPDATE ON POSSIBLE LINKAGES TO ALLEGED USE OF TURKISH DRONES IN CONFLICT ZONES

Hi all:

My apologies, I think I made a mistake and that there are only █ permits under review with end use as Azerbaijan. Jo will confirm.

If this is the case, Judy, please update your report accordingly.

Warmly,

S.

From: Anand, Shalini -TIE
Sent: October 1, 2020 12:08 PM
To: Korecky, Judy -TIR <Judy.Korecky@international.gc.ca>; Pilloud, Marc -ECE <Marc.Pilloud@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Coleman, Robert -ECE <Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca>; Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE <Kamiliya.Akkouche@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: UPDATE ON POSSIBLE LINKAGES TO ALLEGED USE OF TURKISH DRONES IN CONFLICT ZONES

Jo:

Can you pls send the permit numbers to Marc?

Thank you.

Warmly,

S.

From: Korecky, Judy -TIR <Judy.Korecky@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 1, 2020 8:56 AM
To: Pilloud, Marc -ECE <Marc.Pilloud@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Coleman, Robert -ECE <Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca>; Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE <Kamiliya.Akkouche@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: UPDATE ON POSSIBLE LINKAGES TO ALLEGED USE OF TURKISH DRONES IN CONFLICT ZONES

Hi Marc,

Looping in TIE who can speak to the status of the permits (some of them may have not yet gone for consultation).

Judy

From: Pilloud, Marc -ECE <Marc.Pilloud@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October-01-20 7:56 AM
To: Korecky, Judy -TIR <Judy.Korecky@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Coleman, Robert -ECE <Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca>; Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE <Kamiliya.Akkouche@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: UPDATE ON POSSIBLE LINKAGES TO ALLEGED USE OF TURKISH DRONES IN CONFLICT ZONES

Thanks Judy for your hard work on this.

Would you or your team be able to send us the list of [redacted] Wcam permits onwards to AZ? We were only aware of [redacted] permits (one of which ECE provided a recommendation and we are currently reviewing [redacted])

This is the sentence in the document: There are presently [redacted] applications in EXCOL that are "under review" for Wescam camera systems going via Turkey [redacted] is the consignee) onwards to the Azerbaijan Airforce. These applications are currently under consultation.

Marc

De : Korecky, Judy -TIR <Judy.Korecky@international.gc.ca>
Envoyé : 30 septembre 2020 3:53
À : *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>
Cc : *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; McCardell, Sandra -EGM <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Anderson, Ian -EGM <Ian.Anderson@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -BCD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Brisson, Julien -ECE <Julien.Brisson@international.gc.ca>; Nelson, David -IGR <David.Nelson@international.gc.ca>; Termorshuizen, Cindy -IGD <Cindy.Termorshuizen@international.gc.ca>; Friele, Shawn -IFM <Shawn.Friele@international.gc.ca>; Funtek, Katharine -TID <Katharine.Funtek@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE <Kamiliya.Akkouche@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Picard, Beatrix -TIR <Beatrix.Picard@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; Hughes, Steven -INA <Steven.Hughes@international.gc.ca>; Jones, Paul -INA <Paul.Jones@international.gc.ca>; Pilloud, Marc -ECE <Marc.Pilloud@international.gc.ca>; Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE <Kamiliya.Akkouche@international.gc.ca>; Brisson, Julien -ECE <Julien.Brisson@international.gc.ca>; Netley, Rebecca -JLH <Rebecca.Netley@international.gc.ca>; Thompson, Kevin -JLTA <Kevin.Thompson@international.gc.ca>; Fetz, Thomas -JLH <Thomas.Fetz@international.gc.ca>; Utting, Elizabeth -JLH <Elizabeth.Utting@international.gc.ca>; St-Pierre, Nicolas -JFM <Nicolas.St-Pierre@international.gc.ca>; Amegan, Karim -JLH <Karim.Amegan@international.gc.ca>; LaTorre, Jason -DMT <Jason.LaTorre@international.gc.ca>; Farid, Sohrab -DMA -USS <Sohrab.Farid@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INA <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Gagnon, Felix -JLTA <Felix.Gagnon@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>
Objet : UPDATE ON POSSIBLE LINKAGES TO ALLEGED USE OF TURKISH DRONES IN CONFLICT ZONES

Good afternoon o/MINA,

Attached please find a Situational Update Report with annexes to provide an update on possible linkages to alleged use of Turkish drones with Canadian sensors in conflict zones. This document has been widely consulted within the department.

Judy

Judy Korecky

Deputy Director, Export Controls Policy Division | Directrice adjointe, Direction de la politique en matière des contrôles à l'exportation

judy.korecky@international.gc.ca

Telephone | Téléphone: 343-203-4332

125 rue Sussex Drive, Ottawa K1A 0G2

Global Affairs Canada | Affaires mondiales Canada

Government of Canada | Gouvernement du Canada



FW: UPDATE ON POSSIBLE LINKAGES TO ALLEGED USE OF TURKISH DRONES IN CONFLICT ZONES

From: "Grant, Alison -ECE" <alison.grant@international.gc.ca>
To: "Pilloud, Marc -ECE" <marc.pilloud@international.gc.ca>
Cc: "Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE" <kamiliya.akkouche@international.gc.ca>
Date: Thu, 01 Oct 2020 12:16:03 -0400
Attachments: Unnamed Attachment (68 bytes)

Marc – please correct in our master drone doc.

From: Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE
Sent: October 1, 2020 12:15 PM
To: Anand, Shalini -TIE; Korecky, Judy -TIR; Pilloud, Marc -ECE
Cc: Grant, Alison -ECE; Coleman, Robert -ECE; Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE; Alday, Corazon -TIE
Subject: RE: UPDATE ON POSSIBLE LINKAGES TO ALLEGED USE OF TURKISH DRONES IN CONFLICT ZONES

I checked on EXCOL and there are only [REDACTED] permit applications for L3 Wescam to Turkey, and for end user in Azerbaijan: [REDACTED] & [REDACTED]. All the other ones are for end users in Turkey (& there is 1 in [REDACTED]).

I suspect the number "[REDACTED]" stated in the document seems to be a bona fide mistake (or a typo).

Jo

From: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 1, 2020 12:08 PM
To: Korecky, Judy -TIR <Judy.Korecky@international.gc.ca>; Pilloud, Marc -ECE <Marc.Pilloud@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Coleman, Robert -ECE <Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca>; Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE <Kamiliya.Akkouche@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: UPDATE ON POSSIBLE LINKAGES TO ALLEGED USE OF TURKISH DRONES IN CONFLICT ZONES

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Can you pls send the permit numbers to Marc?

Thank you.

Warmly,

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Subject: RE: UPDATE ON POSSIBLE LINKAGES TO ALLEGED USE OF TURKISH DRONES IN CONFLICT ZONES

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To: Korecky, Judy -TIR <Judy.Korecky@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Coleman, Robert -ECE <Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca>; Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE <Kamiliya.Akkouche@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: UPDATE ON POSSIBLE LINKAGES TO ALLEGED USE OF TURKISH DRONES IN CONFLICT ZONES

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Marc

De : Korecky, Judy -TIR <Judy.Korecky@international.gc.ca>
Envoyé : 30 septembre 2020 3:53
À : *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>
Cc : *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; McCardell, Sandra -EGM <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Anderson, Ian -EGM <Ian.Anderson@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -BCD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Brisson, Julien -ECE <Julien.Brisson@international.gc.ca>; Nelson, David -IGR <David.Nelson@international.gc.ca>; Termorshuizen, Cindy -IGD <Cindy.Termorshuizen@international.gc.ca>; Friele, Shawn -IFM <Shawn.Friele@international.gc.ca>; Funtek, Katharine -TID <Katharine.Funtek@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE <Kamiliya.Akkouche@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Picard, Beatrix -TIR <BeatrixPicard@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; Hughes, Steven -INA <Steven.Hughes@international.gc.ca>; Jones, Paul -INA <Paul.Jones@international.gc.ca>; Pilloud, Marc -ECE <Marc.Pilloud@international.gc.ca>; Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE <Kamiliya.Akkouche@international.gc.ca>; Brisson, Julien -ECE <Julien.Brisson@international.gc.ca>; Netley, Rebecca -JLH <Rebecca.Netley@international.gc.ca>; Thompson, Kevin -JLTA <Kevin.Thompson@international.gc.ca>; Fetz, Thomas -JLH <Thomas.Fetz@international.gc.ca>; Utting, Elizabeth -JLH <Elizabeth.Utting@international.gc.ca>; St-Pierre, Nicolas -JFM <Nicolas.St-Pierre@international.gc.ca>; Amegan, Karim -JLH <Karim.Amegan@international.gc.ca>; LaTorre, Jason -DMT <Jason.LaTorre@international.gc.ca>; Farid, Sohrab -DMA -USS <Sohrab.Farid@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INA <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Gagnon, Felix -JLTA <FelixGagnon@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>
Objet : UPDATE ON POSSIBLE LINKAGES TO ALLEGED USE OF TURKISH DRONES IN CONFLICT ZONES

Good afternoon o/MINA,

Attached please find a Situational Update Report with annexes to provide an update on possible linkages to alleged use of Turkish drones with Canadian sensors in conflict zones. This document has been widely consulted within the department.

Judy

Judy Korecky

Deputy Director, Export Controls Policy Division | Directrice adjointe, Direction de la politique en matière des contrôles à l'exportation

judy.korecky@international.gc.ca

Telephone | Téléphone: 343-203-4332

125 rue Sussex Drive, Ottawa K1A 0G2

Global Affairs Canada | Affaires mondiales Canada

Government of Canada | Gouvernement du Canada



FW: ZEGR1373 Flash Report – Major Escalation along the Nagorno-Karabakh Front

From: "Grant, Alison -ECE" <alison.grant@international.gc.ca>
To: "Coleman, Robert -ECE" <robert.coleman@international.gc.ca>, "Brisson, Julien -ECE" <julien.brisson@international.gc.ca>
Cc: "Pilloud, Marc -ECE" <marc.pilloud@international.gc.ca>
Date: Wed, 30 Sep 2020 19:19:59 -0400

Robert – I think this question might still be outstanding with ECE. This was an EXCOL we approved to Azerbaijan. Not sure you caught but I flipped to you guys to check with post to see if there is a re-assessment of our non-objection. Did you see?

Alison

From: Mawani, Aliya -MINA
Sent: September 30, 2020 7:17 PM
To: Anand, Shalini -TIE ; *MINA-Dept Unit
Cc: *TFM-Policy ; *USS-DMA Advisors ; *DMT-Policy ; McCardell, Sandra -EGM ; Graham, Molly -EGM ; Anderson, Ian -EGM ; Sproule, David -ECD ; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR ; Brisson, Julien -ECE ; Nelson, David -IGR ; Termorshuizen, Cindy -IGD ; Friele, Shawn -IFM ; Funtek, Katharine -TID ; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR ; Korecky, Judy -TIR ; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE ; Christie, Bruce -TFMA ; Grant, Alison -ECE ; Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE ; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE
Subject: RE: ZEGR1373 Flash Report – Major Escalation along the Nagorno-Karabakh Front

Shalini,

Thank you for all the information provided. Ally has reviewed this – as well as the report provided by TIR earlier today and is still looking to confirm what is the department's assessment of these vehicles now (i.e. does the assessment on these vehicles still stand?).

Thank you and please feel free to call if anything is unclear,

Aliya

From: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>
Sent: September 28, 2020 9:04 PM
To: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; McCardell, Sandra -EGM <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Anderson, Ian -EGM <Ian.Anderson@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Brisson, Julien -ECE <Julien.Brisson@international.gc.ca>; Nelson, David -IGR <David.Nelson@international.gc.ca>; Termorshuizen, Cindy -IGD <Cindy.Termorshuizen@international.gc.ca>; Friele, Shawn -IFM <Shawn.Friele@international.gc.ca>; Funtek, Katharine -TID <Katharine.Funtek@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Korecky, Judy -TIR <Judy.Korecky@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE <Kamiliya.Akkouche@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>
Subject: FW: ZEGR1373 Flash Report – Major Escalation along the Nagorno-Karabakh Front

Dear Aliya:

As per our morning briefing/questions below, please see attached charts, which contain details on permits under review and that have been issued/not expired to Armenia and Azerbaijan, respectively.

Warmly,

S.

From: Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>
Sent: September 28, 2020 8:54 AM
To: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; McCardell, Sandra -EGM <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Anderson, Ian -EGM <Ian.Anderson@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR

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Subject: RE: ZEGR1373 Flash Report – Major Escalation along the Nagorno-Karabakh Front

Shalini,

Thanks again for the information provided yesterday. To clarify re: first question on end use permits, O/MINA is referring to the EUS for the May 2020 permits. They are also asking if your team can please review any relevant permits prior to the Sept 2019 announcement that no new permits would be issued?

Follow-up questions:

-Can o/MINA please get a list of the [REDACTED] permits that remain valid for Armenia and Azerbaijan?

[REDACTED] In the briefing it was discussed that these were [REDACTED] and that in its review of this export, the department has taken into consideration the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. The department concluded that they did not believe these vehicles would be used to commit human rights violations. **Does the assessment on these vehicles still stand?**

Many thanks. Please feel free to call if anything is unclear. I'm keeping T-branch and geo on the same track for visibility given that everything's linked. Hope that works,

Aliya

From: Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>

Sent: September 27, 2020 10:03 PM

To: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>

Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; McCardell, Sandra -EGM <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Anderson, Ian -EGM <Ian.Anderson@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Brisson, Julien -ECE <Julien.Brisson@international.gc.ca>; Nelson, David -IGR <David.Nelson@international.gc.ca>; Termorshuizen, Cindy -IGD <Cindy.Termorshuizen@international.gc.ca>; Friele, Shawn -IFM <Shawn.Friele@international.gc.ca>; Funtek, Katharine -TID <Katharine.Funtek@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Korecky, Judy -TIR <Judy.Korecky@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE <Kamiliya.Akkouche@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: ZEGR1373 Flash Report – Major Escalation along the Nagorno-Karabakh Front

Thank you Alison.

From: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>

Sent: September 27, 2020 9:42 PM

To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>

Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; McCardell, Sandra -EGM <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Anderson, Ian -EGM <Ian.Anderson@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Brisson, Julien -ECE <Julien.Brisson@international.gc.ca>; Nelson, David -IGR <David.Nelson@international.gc.ca>; Termorshuizen, Cindy -IGD <Cindy.Termorshuizen@international.gc.ca>; Friele, Shawn -IFM <Shawn.Friele@international.gc.ca>; Funtek, Katharine -TID <Katharine.Funtek@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Korecky, Judy -TIR <Judy.Korecky@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE <Kamiliya.Akkouche@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: ZEGR1373 Flash Report – Major Escalation along the Nagorno-Karabakh Front

Just three comments to add in highlight.

From: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>

Sent: September 27, 2020 8:38 PM

To: Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>

Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; McCardell, Sandra -EGM <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Anderson, Ian -EGM <Ian.Anderson@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Brisson, Julien -ECE <Julien.Brisson@international.gc.ca>; Nelson, David -IGR <David.Nelson@international.gc.ca>; Termorshuizen, Cindy -IGD <Cindy.Termorshuizen@international.gc.ca>; Friele, Shawn -IFM <Shawn.Friele@international.gc.ca>; Funtek, Katharine -TID <Katharine.Funtek@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Korecky, Judy -TIR <Judy.Korecky@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE <Kamiliya.Akkouche@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: ZEGR1373 Flash Report – Major Escalation along the Nagorno-Karabakh Front

Hi Aliya:

See below in red.

Warmly,

S.

From: Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>

Sent: September 27, 2020 7:54 PM

To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>

Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; McCardell, Sandra -EGM <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Anderson, Ian -EGM <Ian.Anderson@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Brisson, Julien -ECE <Julien.Brisson@international.gc.ca>; Nelson, David -IGR <David.Nelson@international.gc.ca>; Termorshuizen, Cindy -IGD <Cindy.Termorshuizen@international.gc.ca>; Friele, Shawn -IFM <Shawn.Friele@international.gc.ca>; Funtek, Katharine -TID <Katharine.Funtek@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Korecky, Judy -TIR <Judy.Korecky@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE <Kamiliya.Akkouche@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: ZEGR1373 Flash Report – Major Escalation along the Nagorno-Karabakh Front

Importance: High

Shalini,

Thanks very much for this. I've shared with o/MINA.

I understand the challenges you and Alison have flagged in terms of substantiating the veracity of the claims and have underscored these to o/MINA, but as you can imagine they are keen to be kept informed on what the department is doing to verify the claims and/or any further details about the EUS on the May permits.

Here are some additional follow-up questions:

- what do the end use statements for the permits to Turkey say? My apologies, which permits? The [REDACTED] under review in our system for L3 Wescam, which are presently in consultation?
- Who/what is being consulted/engaged on these claims beyond DND and allies? I will leave it to geo to answer this, as I believe that they are engaging with their post teams on the ground and that includes DND defense attache. As TIE notes GAC is also engaging the company. Also, we are considering recommendations to engage with Turkey. Post will continue to review publicly available information.
- if these were re-exported or re-sold to Libya or Azerbaijan, would this be counter to the company's EUS? If it is indeed counter, would there be an official report coming to MINA [REDACTED]? Yes, if they were re-sold to Libya or Azerbaijan and the EUS' didn't state that, [REDACTED]. However, we do not yet have concrete proof that these were Turkish UAVs with Canadian cameras on them in either Libya or Azerbaijan cases. Only unsubstantiated reporting at this stage.
- Given what officials know at this stage - will they recommend MINA [REDACTED]? Recommendations for Canada's response are coming via the geographic and DMs offices. Recommendations are being discussed with USS on options for the overall conflict. On Turkey export permits there are discussions planned with oMINA tomorrow and MINA on Friday.
- do officials have a follow up call with the company planned in light of recent allegations? I sent an email to the company today to get more information/insight into the Turkey permits and possible links to Azerbaijan/Armenia, to build on what they shared on Friday's call.
- can you share a read out of Friday's call with Wescam please?

Of course, was going to flag these updates on the Monday briefing with oMINA/Chick, but below please see the read out.

-L3 wescam senior officials confirmed that as far as they are aware the L3 wescam products being sent to

Turkey were not for end use in Libya nor for resale to Libya

-L3 wescam confirmed that the intended end use for their products in Turkey was/is for inclusion on UAVs

-L3 wescam agreed to review the May 2020 permits that MINA approved, and confirm what has been shipped to date against these permits

- Is the analysis of the Ploughshares report ongoing?

We have provided our analysis of the info we have to date on both Belarus and Libya allegations in the report, respectively (from an export controls lens). If more information becomes available, we will review that as well. We are following up on oMINA questions from a few days ago.

Many thanks,

Aliya

From: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>

Sent: September 27, 2020 5:52 PM

To: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>

Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; McCardell, Sandra -EGM <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Anderson, Ian -EGM <Ian.Anderson@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Brisson, Julien -ECE <Julien.Brisson@international.gc.ca>; Nelson, David -IGR <David.Nelson@international.gc.ca>; Termorshuizen, Cindy -IGD <Cindy.Termorshuizen@international.gc.ca>; Friele, Shawn -IFM <Shawn.Friele@international.gc.ca>; Funtek, Katharine -TID <Katharine.Funtek@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Korecky, Judy -TIR <Judy.Korecky@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE <Kamiliya.Akkouche@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: ZEGR1373 Flash Report – Major Escalation along the Nagorno-Karabakh Front

Hi Aliya:

We spoke. I've provided a brief export controls overview, building on the reporting below from the geo. But, essentially this is a somewhat similar situation to the alleged use of Turkish drones being used in Libya, in that our ability to validate the veracity of the claims is fairly limited from an export controls perspective.

Brief export controls analysis:

-It's difficult for us to ascertain if the drones/UAVs are Turkish

-If indeed they are Turkish, then it would be difficult to say definitively whether there are any Canadian parts on these specific UAVs/drones

-That said, we know that L3 Wescam has received permits from GAC for camera surveillance systems destined directly to Turkey (the main consignees in these instances are ██████████ and ██████████ both of which supply the Turkish government).

-Following a company call on Friday afternoon, senior Wescam officials confirmed that the company had no knowledge of their systems going onto Turkish UAVs that were destined for re-sale or use in Libya (we did not ask them about Azerbaijan/Armenia at the time)

-Indirect items are very difficult to data mine for in our system, however, it appears that there are presently ██████████ applications in our system that are "under review" for Wescam camera systems going via Turkey (██████████ is the consignee) onwards to the Azerbaijan Airforce (these are under consultation, and all of them would be captured under the Turkey group 2 presumptive denial policy – so would eventually come to MINA for decision)

-There appear to be no applications, nor any expired or valid permits in our system for L3 Wescam permits directly to Armenia

-There appear to be no applications, nor any expired or valid permits in our system for L3 Wescam permits directly to Azerbaijan

Warmly,
S.

From: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>

Sent: September 27, 2020 2:33 PM

To: Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; McCardell, Sandra -EGM <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Anderson, Ian -EGM <Ian.Anderson@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Brisson, Julien -ECE <Julien.Brisson@international.gc.ca>; Nelson, David -IGR <David.Nelson@international.gc.ca>; Termorshuizen, Cindy -IGD <Cindy.Termorshuizen@international.gc.ca>; Friele, Shawn -IFM <Shawn.Friele@international.gc.ca>; Funtek, Katharine -TID <Katharine.Funtek@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Korecky, Judy -TIR <Judy.Korecky@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE <Kamiliya.Akkouche@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: ZEGR1373 Flash Report – Major Escalation along the Nagorno-Karabakh Front

Aliya

The extent of what we know is in highlighted para below. TIE may be able to supplement. We will also reach out to DND to see if they have further info on allegations that AZ military forces using this type of drone.

Alison

From: Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>
Sent: September 27, 2020 1:49 PM
To: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; McCardell, Sandra -EGM <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Anderson, Ian -EGM <Ian.Anderson@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Brisson, Julien -ECE <Julien.Brisson@international.gc.ca>; Nelson, David -IGR <David.Nelson@international.gc.ca>; Termorshuizen, Cindy -IGD <Cindy.Termorshuizen@international.gc.ca>; Friele, Shawn -IFM <Shawn.Friele@international.gc.ca>; Funtek, Katharine -TID <Katharine.Funtek@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Korecky, Judy -TIR <Judy.Korecky@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Subject: Re: ZEGR1373 Flash Report – Major Escalation along the Nagorno-Karabakh Front

Alison, Shalini,

MINA has asked if we investigate the allegations that cameras sold by Canadian companies to Turkey would have been used in this attack/conflict.

Also, O/MINA has just heard from the Armenian National Committee of Canada that Azerbaijan is using the Turkish made Bayraktar TB2 drones. Do we know of any Canadian connection here?

Thanks,

Aliya

Sent from my iPhone

On Sep 27, 2020, at 1:18 PM, Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca> wrote:

To share with o/MINA, report from ANKRA below.

In addition here is the latest on OSCE management of the conflict:

The Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group (Igor Popov of the Russian Federation, Stephane Visconti of France, and Andrew Schofer of the United States of America) made the following statement today (Sept 27): The Co-Chairs view with concern reports of large scale military actions along the Line of Contact in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone. We strongly condemn the use of force and regret the senseless loss of life, including civilians. The Co-Chairs appeal to the sides to cease hostilities immediately and to resume negotiations to find a sustainable resolution of the conflict. The Co-Chairs call on the sides to take all necessary measures to stabilize the situation on the ground and reiterate that there is no alternative to a peaceful negotiated solution of the conflict

The Minsk Group has not been able to travel to the contact line (for COVID restrictions on the Azeri side). We believe they are

already engaged with both parties, but we should not expect more than press statements in coming days, if only to allow discreet diplomacy work.

There will be a number of meetings this week at the OSCE at the working level where the conflict is likely to dominate discussions. At the Permanent Council meeting on October 1, we expect both the Armenian and Azerbaijan Ambassadors to raise the conflict. We think it likely that the EU and U.S. will also speak, while being careful to not appear to be taking sides.

From: Schoenauer, Andrea -ANKRA -GR <Andrea.Schoenauer@international.gc.ca>
Sent: September 27, 2020 12:25 PM
To: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Brisson, Julien -ECE <Julien.Brisson@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Khokhar, Jamal -ANKRA -HOM/CDM <Jamal.Khokhar@international.gc.ca>; Helal, Marie-Thérèse -IRC <Marie-Therese.Helal@international.gc.ca>; Ben Sayeh, Fatma -ANKRA -GR <Fatma.BenSayeh@international.gc.ca>; Akkouché, Kamiliya -ECE <Kamiliya.Akkouché@international.gc.ca>; Pepin-Hallé, Véronique -VOSCE -GR <Veronique.Pepin-Halle@international.gc.ca>; Nelson, David -IGR <David.Nelson@international.gc.ca>; Ben Sayeh, Fatma -ANKRA -GR <Fatma.BenSayeh@international.gc.ca>; Brisson, Julien -ECE <Julien.Brisson@international.gc.ca>; Helal, Marie-Thérèse -IRC <Marie-Therese.Helal@international.gc.ca>; Schoenauer, Andrea -ANKRA -GR <Andrea.Schoenauer@international.gc.ca>; Laporte, Eric -BNATO -GR <Eric.Laporte@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Nordeste, Bruno -MOSCO -GR <Bruno.Nordeste@international.gc.ca>; Wynne-Hughes, Antonia -USS -DMA <Antonia.Wynne-Hughes@international.gc.ca>; Ghadhban, Sahar -MOSCO -GR <Sahar.Ghadhban@international.gc.ca>; Alexander, Vera -BNATO -DHOM/CDMA <Vera.Alexander@international.gc.ca>; Reil, Leonard -IGR <Leonard.Reil@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Coe, Aaron -MOSCO -GR <Aaron.Coe@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Barbarie, Daniel -VOSCE -GR <Daniel.Barbarie@international.gc.ca>; Fowler, Craig -MOSCO -DR <Craig.Fowler@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Bradley -MOSCO -DR <Bradley.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Auger-Voyer, Francis -MOSCO -SP <Francis.Auger-Voyer@international.gc.ca>; Braun, Rebecca -MOSCO -CS <Rebecca.Braun@international.gc.ca>; Khokhar, Jamal -ANKRA -HOM/CDM <Jamal.Khokhar@international.gc.ca>; Laporte, Eric -BNATO -GR <Eric.Laporte@international.gc.ca>; Vidal, Maeva -BNATO -GR <Maeva.Vidal@international.gc.ca>; Steenweg, Rick -VOSCE -GR <Rick.Steenweg@international.gc.ca>; Pepin-Hallé, Véronique -VOSCE -GR <Veronique.Pepin-Halle@international.gc.ca>; Hinton, Anthony -PRMNY -GR <Anthony.Hinton@international.gc.ca>; penelope.angelopoulos@pco-bcp.gc.ca; NEBOJSA.BJELAKOVIC@forces.gc.ca; McIntyre, Elizabeth -IGR <Elizabeth.McIntyre@international.gc.ca>; Reil, Leonard -IGR <Leonard.Reil@international.gc.ca>; Cayer, Natasha -PARIS -GR <Natasha.Cayer@international.gc.ca>; Alexander, Vera -BNATO -DHOM/CDMA <Vera.Alexander@international.gc.ca>; Solomon, Kate -BNATO -GR <Kate.Solomon@international.gc.ca>; Nelson, David -IGR <David.Nelson@international.gc.ca>; Brimmell, Blair -IGR <Blair.Brimmell@international.gc.ca>; Kim, Clare Min Jeong -IGR <ClareMinJeong.Kim@international.gc.ca>; Aubrey, Bryce <Bryce.Aubrey@pco-bcp.gc.ca>; Braithwaite, Todd -ANKRA -DR <Todd.Braithwaite@international.gc.ca>; White, Nathan -ANKRA -GR <Nathan.White@international.gc.ca>; Mitchell, Ryan -rcmp-grc <ryan.mitchell@rcmp-grc.gc.ca>; Jacobs, Oscar -ANKRA -IM <Oscar.Jacobs@international.gc.ca>; Wimmer, Christopher -ISTBL -TD <Christopher.Wimmer@international.gc.ca>; Reil, Leonard -IGR <Leonard.Reil@international.gc.ca>; Sorel, Valerie -ANKRA -MO -CS <Valerie.Sorel@international.gc.ca>; Russo, Eric -ANKRA -SP <Eric.Russo@international.gc.ca>; Babin, Mathieu -IGR <Mathieu.Babin@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INA <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Watts Poole, Margaret -INA <Margaret.WattsPoole@international.gc.ca>; Hughes, Carlton -INA <Carlton.Hughes@international.gc.ca>; Tan, Jonathan -PRMNY -GR <Jonathan.Tan@international.gc.ca>; Hinton, Anthony -PRMNY -GR <Anthony.Hinton@international.gc.ca>
Subject: ZEGR1373 Flash Report – Major Escalation along the Nagorno-Karabakh Front

Flash Report – Major Escalation along the Nagorno-Karabakh Front

Summary

- Major military escalation unfolds between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
- Armenia declares martial law, calls for military recruitment in defense of the homeland.
- Azerbaijani parliament declared a state of war, Security Council met this afternoon.
- Turkey declares support for Azerbaijan while Russia reinforces its support to Armenia.
- Information warfare an important dimension of the conflict, shows possible use of TB2 drones by Azerbaijani side.

Military Escalation: This morning, Armenia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson tweeted that "Azerbaijan has launched [an] air attack and shelling against Artsakh, Nagorno-Karabakh." She then claimed that Armenia had shot down two helicopters and three UAVs in response. The Azerbaijan Ministry of Defense (MOD) confirmed the loss of one helicopter and added that they "decided to launch a counter-offensive operation along the entire front." This major escalation comes almost a week after an Azerbaijani soldier was killed in a cross-border attack on Monday, September 21. Serious skirmishes appeared to continue throughout the day, with the Azerbaijani MOD saying that their "counter-offensive" is striking Armenian command posts, maneuver forces, military equipment, and facilities with artillery and aviation assets. Azerbaijan also claims to have "liberated" 5 villages, but the Armenian side denied these claims. Nagorno-Karabakh authorities have confirmed the death of two civilians. The Armenian MOD has also alleged that Azerbaijan has been using its largest calibre multiple launch rocket system – which have maximum ranges of 200km.

Both sides have long-range systems. If Armenia's claims are true, then this greatly increases the risk that the two sides begin striking military targets or even cities deep in either Armenia or Azerbaijan.

Armenia declares martial law: In the afternoon, Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan declared martial law and called "on the personnel attached to the troops to report to their territorial military recruitment offices. For the sake of the homeland, for the sake of victory." The Prime Minister stated that Armenia considered Azerbaijan to have declared war. There are reports that Armenia plans on declaring independence for the Nagorno-Karabakh region, including areas under Azerbaijani control.

Azerbaijani Security Council meets, Parliament declares state of war: President Ilham Aliyev held an extraordinary session of the Security Council as a result of the escalation. Azerbaijan also claimed that it had captured a number of villages in Karabakh and killed 10 Armenian soldiers. Azerbaijani officials insisted that there was no need to call for general mobilisation, but the Azerbaijani parliament has declared a state of war and issued curfews in some cities and regions. Aliyev spoke with Turkish President Erdogan today. The latter reaffirmed that Turkey and Azerbaijan were "one nation, two states," and vowed to support Azerbaijan "with all [our] means." Turkey has condemned Armenia for violating the ceasefire with attacks "against international law." The Turkish Minister of Defence and Foreign Minister have reiterated President Erdogan's support, saying that Turkey would support Azerbaijan "in any way it wishes." There are rumours (and some video footage) that suggests that Turkey has facilitated the travel of Syrian fighters to fight on behalf of Azerbaijan. (*Comment: Turkey facilitated the transfer of thousands of Syrian soldiers to fight in Libya, on behalf of the Government of National Accord*).

Turkey – Russia dimension: Many commentators have been quick to highlight that these latest clashes have taken on a much more obvious Turkey - Russia dimension. Turkish reporter Ragip Soylu, for example, highlighted that the escalation comes after Russia sent military advisors and hardware to Armenia, while Turkey deployed troops and trainers to Azerbaijan. Many observers are suggesting that this is a new front between Russia and Turkey, following Syria and Libya. Breaking reports suggest that Russian warplanes have been flying over Idlib as of this afternoon. Foreign Minister Cavusoglu has reportedly spoken to his counterpart, Sergei Lavrov to discuss the clashes. Reports indicate that Russia has called for an immediate ceasefire. A declaration of war could activate the Collective Security Treaty Organization's (CSTO), where Russia (and four other post-Soviet states) would have to come to Armenia's defence. Turkey and Russia will likely seek to deescalate the situation, not least given the potential for casualties given the possible ground presence of both Russian and Turkish soldiers (the latter in the area for military exercises).

Information warfare reveals possible use of Bayraktar TB2 drones. The Armenian side has been quick to release video footage wherein they claim to have destroyed several important pieces of Azerbaijani military equipment. The Azerbaijani side did not respond immediately, but has started releasing its own video images, most notably of UAV footage hitting Armenian targets. Military analysts on twitter were quick to note that the footage bore a striking similarity to the footage released by Turkey's MOD during its military operation in Idlib earlier this year, during which they relied heavily on Bayraktar TB-2 drones. In June, Turkey and Azerbaijan announced that Baku would purchase 6 TB2s from Turkey, but there is n clear confirmation that this deal was completed. The claims that the UAVs used by Azerbaijan are Turkish drones are only press reports, and the U.S. Embassy in Baku confirmed that these reports remain unsubstantiated.

Comment/early analysis: If the fighting continues, and Turkey insists on lending its full support to Azerbaijan, Russia will likely support Armenia in the fighting – given not only the CSTO, but also the security arrangement that the two countries have. Russia could increase its pressure on Turkey by supporting the Syrian regime in resuming its offensive on Idlib province which would drive hundreds of thousands, if not 1-2 million, displaced persons toward the border with Turkey. Turkey). ANKRA HOM has reached out to the U.S. Ambassador and the Chief of Political Section in Baku.

The US Embassy has issued a statement referencing the Minsk Group Co-Chairs' statement;

The EU has called for negotiations to reach a ceasefire; the U.K. has issued a statement via Minister for the European Neighbourhood, Wendy Morton, calling on restraint and also referring to the Minsk Group Co-Chairs' statement.

ANKRA HOM has reached out to the Azerbaijani Ambassador, but has not yet heard back.

Drafted: ANKRA/Schoenauer

Approved: ANKRA HOM

FW: re: Turkey oMINA briefing Monday

From: "Grant, Alison -ECE" <alison.grant@international.gc.ca>
To: "Coleman, Robert -ECE" <robert.coleman@international.gc.ca>, "Pilloud, Marc -ECE" <marc.pilloud@international.gc.ca>
Cc: "Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE" <kamiliya.akkouche@international.gc.ca>
Date: Mon, 28 Sep 2020 21:58:03 -0400

Updated annexes.

From: Anand, Shalini -TIE
Sent: September 28, 2020 9:30 PM
To: *MINA-Dept Unit
Cc: *TFM-Policy ; *USS-DMA Advisors ; *DMT-Policy ; Funtek, Katharine -TID ; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR ; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE ; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE ; Mallett, Erika -TIE ; Schonfeld, Benjamin -TIR ; Grant, Alison -ECE ; *DCB-Management/Gestion ; *DCB
Subject: RE: re: Turkey oMINA briefing Monday

Hi Emily:

At this morning's Turkey/export permits briefing, Ally requested an updated breakdown of what is in the Annexes for the Turkey memo (referenced in the trail below). Accordingly, please see below. I've also attached slightly updated annexes, as colleagues included a few more notes under some of the permits.

DCB colleagues: grateful if you could once again update CCM.

Warmly,
S.

The permit applications have been divided into three Annexes from lower to higher risk permit applications. Each Annex provides details on each permit application, including a description of the exceptional circumstances that apply:

- **Annex A** contains [REDACTED] for Group 2 items. It includes indirect exports to Turkey via a likeminded country, which means that the item would be subject to a likeminded country's export controls regime; exports of items being returned to the original owners of items after repair in Canada; extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, for non-offensive purposes; and applications that comply with the precedent set in memorandum BPTS 01794-2020 (same applicant, end-user and end-use), which you [MINA] approved [noting that some of these permits have been the subject of media attention recently].
- **Annex B** contains [REDACTED] fully consulted applications for Group 2 items for which no concerns or objections were raised.
- **Annex C** contains [REDACTED] applications of Group 2 items for which consultations partners noted some concerns relating to regional conflicts and diversion, but did not raise a formal objection.

From: Anand, Shalini -TIE
Sent: September 27, 2020 6:49 PM
To: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Funtek, Katharine -TID <Katharine.Funtek@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>; Mallett, Erika -TIE <Erika.Mallett@international.gc.ca>; Schonfeld, Benjamin -TIR <Benjamin.Schonfeld@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; *DCB-Management/Gestion <D-DCB-Management_Gestion@international.gc.ca>; *DCB <D-DCB@international.gc.ca>
Subject: re: Turkey oMINA briefing Monday

Dear Aliya:

For tomorrow's briefing with Ally, please see attached updated Turkey annexes, which accompany memo BPTS 3389-2020. New permits have been added (in yellow) and we have re-circulated these to consultation partners for a second check and to provide any additional notes/context, given the changing dynamics in the region. Accordingly, there are now a total of [REDACTED] permit applications at a value of [REDACTED] for the Minister's consideration. We have also updated the attached decks.

DCB colleagues, please save this email and these Annexes into CCM mercury (no need to save the decks).

Warmly,
S.

FW: PM Call with Armenia

From: "Brisson, Julien -ECE" <"/o=dfait-maeci/ou=exchange administrative group (fydibohf23spdlt)/cn=recipients/cn=brissoj2169">
To: "Lussier, Vincent" <vincent.lussier@pco-bcp.gc.ca>
Cc: "Turner, Andrew -ECE" <andrew.turner@international.gc.ca>
Date: Fri, 09 Oct 2020 11:23:51 -0400
Attachments: IB_LBP-#13917396-v1-Armenia - PM Call Note .DOCX (309.18 kB); IB_LBP-#13907478-v1-Background Note - Nagonro-Karabakh (MINA Europe Tour).DOCX (77.11 kB)

Allo Vincent,

See attached for the PM-Ar call. More coming once we get a readout of the MINA-Turkey call at 1pm.

Best,

Julien

From: Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 9, 2020 11:17 AM
To: Brisson, Julien -ECE <Julien.Brisson@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE <Kamiliya.Akkouche@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: PM Call with Armenia

Very good.

Thanks.

Approved
ECD/Sproule

PS: and do keep it refreshed with devts on any Moscow FM's negotiations.

From: Brisson, Julien -ECE <Julien.Brisson@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 9, 2020 11:06 AM
To: Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE <Kamiliya.Akkouche@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: PM Call with Armenia

Made the changes and added responsive on foreign fighters which is consistent with what we have been saying in our official statements.

Julien

From: Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 9, 2020 10:25 AM
To: Brisson, Julien -ECE <Julien.Brisson@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE <Kamiliya.Akkouche@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: PM Call with Armenia

Julien,

From the trivial to more substantive.

Add a 0 to the \$100,000

- Canada was pleased to support Armenia's efforts in combating COVID-19 via our Canadian Fund for Local Initiatives (\$100,00) and through the Armenian Red Cross (\$260,000).

What is missing (I didn't notice it) is a mention of the accusation that Azerbaijan is using mercenaries from Syria at Tukey's behest. It is quite likely the PM will raise it and our PM needs to be able to respond. If you can add that in the context and add a responsive line on that, I will look at this again and get back to you quickly.

d

From: Brisson, Julien -ECE <Julien.Brisson@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 9, 2020 9:57 AM
To: Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE <Kamiliya.Akkouche@international.gc.ca>
Subject: FW: PM Call with Armenia

Good morning David,

PCO notified us that the PM intends to call his Armenian counterpart next week. They asked us to provide them with a draft call note (attached for your approval). We will provide them with the attached background note which you already approved for the MINA trip and we will also provide them with a readout of the MINA-Turkey FM call which is taking place this afternoon.

We are still trying to confirm whether or not the PM will call President Erdogan.

Best,

Julien Brisson

Senior Political Desk Officer & Trade Commissioner | Chargé de dossiers principal & Délégué commercial
Central Asia and the Caucasus | L'Asie centrale et le Caucase
Eastern Europe and Eurasia Division (ECE) | Relations Europe de l'Est et Eurasie
Julien.Brisson@international.gc.ca
Tel: 1 (343) 203-3716 | m: 1 (343) 549-8297
A7-121, 125 prom. Sussex, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
K1A 0G2

Global Affairs Canada | Affaires mondiales Canada
Government of Canada | Gouvernement du Canada
 Global Affairs Canada | Affaires mondiales Canada

From: Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 9, 2020 9:44 AM
To: Brisson, Julien -ECE <Julien.Brisson@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: PM Call with Armenia

From: Brisson, Julien -ECE <Julien.Brisson@international.gc.ca>
Sent: Wednesday, October 7, 2020 3:40 PM
To: Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>
Subject: FW: PM Call with Armenia

Voilà! First draft.

From: Lussier, Vincent <Vincent.Lussier@pco-bcp.gc.ca>
Sent: October 6, 2020 4:17 PM
To: Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Brisson, Julien -ECE <Julien.Brisson@international.gc.ca>
Subject: PM Call with Armenia

Andrew and Julien,

Reference my last email, I will need a call note for an increasingly likely PM engagement with his Armenian counterpart. I attached the most recent documents on the matter that we produced for the PMO, FDPA and PM. Please don't share these products. The BN on Export permits is being reviewed by my ADM but was already reviewed by your export control division earlier today.

The PM now knows quite a bit on the matter so best to keep the note short and to the point (2 items per talking point should do it). I'm assuming that discussions will include Canada's position and overall reaction to the conflict (including our cancellation of export permits to Turkey), Canada's intentions going forward – specifically what Canada can do in support of Armenia.

I don't yet have a timeline for this but will keep you apprised of anything I get from PMO.

Thanks,
Vince

Major Vincent Lussier

000130

Analyst, Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat
Privy Council Office / Government of Canada
Work Cell: 613-297-6877 / Personal Cell: [REDACTED]

Analyste, Secretariat pour la politique étrangère et la défense
Bureau du Conseil Privé / Gouvernement du Canada
Portable travail: 613-297-6877 / Portable perso: [REDACTED]

TELEPHONE CALL WITH NIKOL PASHINYAN PRIME MINISTER OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

Spouse: Anna Hakobyan

SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS

Nagorno-Karabakh

- We are deeply concerned by the situation, particularly the shelling of civilian areas. Minister Champagne reached out immediately to Foreign Minister Mnatsakanyan and has issued two joint statements with the UK calling for an immediate end to the violence. I have also asked him to travel to Europe to consult with our allies on this crisis.
- We firmly support the statements made by the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group. We urge all external parties and friends of both states to redouble their efforts in support of an end to hostilities and to refrain from taking actions that risk exacerbating the crisis.
- A comprehensive resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is overdue. That can only be delivered through a negotiated settlement and not through military action. All parties must urgently return to the negotiating table to work toward this aim without preconditions.
- How can Canada support the resumption of negotiations?

Turkish Drones in Nagorno-Karabakh

- We are aware of the allegations made that Canadian technology is being used in this conflict. Officials are investigating these claims.
- In light of these allegations, and in line with Canada's robust export control regime, Canada suspended the relevant export permits to Turkey on October 5 to allow time to further assess the situation

Reforms


- Canada looks forward to working closely with the Government of Armenia to advance initiatives to support gender equality, and empower women and girls, and to strengthen civil society and the democratic process.
- Canada is proud to support initiatives that promote gender equality, and empower women and girls, and strengthen civil society and the democratic process. For instance, in late 2019, Canada provided funds for the Parliamentary Centre project "Supporting Parliamentary Reform in Armenia".

- Canada is also happy to continue to support Armenia through the Arnold Chan Initiative for Democracy, a \$100,000 fund for projects that aim to strengthen the democratic process and the development of democratic institutions.

COVID-19

- Canada was pleased to support Armenia's efforts in combating COVID-19 via our Canadian Fund for Local Initiatives (\$100,000) and through the Armenian Red Cross (\$260,000).

Consular



Responsive – Syrian Fighters in Nagorno-Karabakh

- *We are aware of reports of foreign fighters participating in the conflict. That is why we urge all external parties and friends of both states to redouble their efforts in support of an end to hostilities and to refrain from taking actions that risk exacerbating the crisis.*

Responsive - Opening an Embassy in Yerevan

- *Canada's Embassy in Moscow and Honorary Consulate in Yerevan have proven effective in supporting robust relations with Armenia.*
- *The decision to open a Canadian Embassy is driven by a number of factors, importantly growing commercial trade relations.*

CONTEXT

- This call will discuss Canada's views on the hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the region of Nagorno-Karabakh (NK). You last spoke to Prime Minister Pashinyan on the margins of the Munich Security conference in 2020.

Nagorno-Karabakh

- Nagorno-Karabakh was an autonomous region within the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic. The ethnic Armenian Karabakhis declared independence in 1991, triggering a three-year war that pitted Azerbaijan against the Karabakhi separatists and Armenia, until a ceasefire was reached in May 1994. The war and the expulsion

of Azerbaijanis from Armenia, from Nagorno-Karabakh, and from seven adjacent territories occupied by Armenia resulted in over a million refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). Today, Nagorno-Karabakh and the seven adjacent territories account for almost 14% of Azerbaijani territory; they remain occupied by Armenian and separatist forces. On 27 September, fighting broke out between the armed forces of Armenia and Azerbaijan along the line of contact in Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan said it had launched a military operation in response to shelling along the so-called Line of Contact. The Armenian government accused Azerbaijan of launching an air and artillery attack on civilian settlements in Nagorno-Karabakh, including in the regional capital of Stepanakert. The fighting has involved armour, air power, and artillery of calibres up to long-range missiles. Widespread sustained fighting between Azerbaijani and Armenia has continued along the line of contact, each day since. Political rhetoric from both sides remained aggressive, with both sides claiming to have inflicted heavy casualties on the other. Azerbaijan announced that it had successfully “liberated” several villages and a set of strategic heights in Nagorno-Karabakh. Turkey has denied media reports that it shot down an Armenian fighter plane and is sending Syrian fighters to help Azerbaijan. The claims by either side remain difficult to verify. On October 9, Russia confirmed that Armenia and Azerbaijan had agreed to meet in Moscow for negotiations.

Canada and the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

- Canada’s position on Nagorno-Karabakh has emphasized the importance of a peaceful resolution to the conflict, the importance of the OSCE’s involvement, and the principles of non-use of force, territorial integrity, and self-determination. Armenia and Azerbaijan are pleased with Canada’s support for the Minsk Process. Both Azerbaijan and Armenia would like Canada to take a stronger position on NK, and condemn the other as an aggressor. While Canada recognizes Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, its position does not prejudice the form of a future settlement of the NK question within the Minsk Group.
- On September 29, Minister Champagne and UK FM Raab issued a joint statement condemning the violence and calling for a peaceful, negotiated resolution through the framework provided by the OSCE’s Minsk process. A second joint statement was issued on October 5, reiterating the urgent need to end the continuing military action and urged all external parties and friends of both states to redouble their efforts in support of an end to hostilities.
- On Sunday October 4, at least 3000 members of the Armenian diaspora in Montreal gathered to protest in the hope that the government condemns Azerbaijani aggression and no longer sell military material to Turkey. There are over 63 000 Canadians that claim Armenian ancestry.
- On October 5, following allegations of Canadian technology was being used by Azerbaijani forces in the conflict, Minister Champagne announced that the relevant export permits to Turkey were temporarily suspended pending investigation.

International Reactions to the Conflict

- The US, France, Russia, Iran, Germany, the UK, the CTSO, Uzbekistan, China, the OSCE, the UN, and the Council of Europe have called for restraint and resumption

of peace talks. With the exception of Turkey, no country has taken a stance in support of either Armenia or Azerbaijan.

- Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian, and U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo issued a joint statement on October 5 as fighting between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces continued to rage with both sides shelling major cities amid growing concerns for the safety of civilians. Lavrov, Le Drian, and Pompeo, whose countries are the co-chairs of the Minsk Group of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which has spearheaded peace efforts over Nagorno-Karabakh since the early 1990s, condemned "in the strongest terms the unprecedented and dangerous escalation of violence." The ministers "stress unconditionally that recent attacks allegedly targeting civilian centers - both along the Line of Contact and on the territories of Azerbaijan and Armenia outside the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone - and the disproportionate nature of such attacks constitute an unacceptable threat to the stability of the region." They also urged the sides to accept an "immediate and unconditional" cease-fire and to "commit now to resuming the settlement process" under the auspices of the Minsk Group.

Canada's export permits to Turkey

- The Canadian media has recently reported about Canada having sold Group 2 (Munitions List) goods to Turkey, specifically referring to airborne sensors and imaging technology, with a view of increasing search and detection capabilities of armed drones. It is possible that drones equipped with Canadian technology have been lent or sold to Azerbaijan by Turkey for the purpose of delivering lethal effects on the battlefield in the current conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh.
- It is difficult to ascertain if the drones/UAVs used by Azerbaijani forces came from Turkey. If they did, it would be difficult to determine definitively whether there are any Canadian parts on the specific UAVs/drones used in these conflict zones. A number of foreign competitors in the [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] manufacture similar cameras / technologies that can be used in such UAVs.
- There are currently [REDACTED] valid permits directly to Turkey, of which [REDACTED] are for L3/Wescam. These [REDACTED] permits, highlighted in red in the chart (SEPCOR), have been suspended by the Minister of Foreign Affairs as of October 5, 2020. Note that some of these permits were issued before Turkish incursion into Syria and thus had not been affected by the October 2019 suspension of new permits.

COVID-19


- Through the Canada Fund for Local Initiatives MOSCO is channeling \$100,000 towards enhancing the access of social, psychological, and medical services for vulnerable groups, in particular women and girls, directly stemming from the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic in Armenia. Additionally, Canada has contributed \$260,000 through the Armenian Red Cross. Armenia is the worst hit country in the Caucasus. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and his family tested positive on June 1.

Reforms

- In 2018, you launched the "Arnold Chan Initiative for Democracy" when you visited Armenia for the Francophone Summit (he also made a bilateral visit) The Initiative

leverages the Canada Fund for Local Initiatives and offers up to \$100,000 annually for projects that aim to strengthen the democratic process and the development of democratic institutions in Armenia. Arnold Chan was a Canadian Member of Parliament active in his support for the Armenian community, who passed away in 2017. Canada has also been funding a project to support the Armenian parliament through Canada's Parliamentary Centre.

Consular Case



Armenian Genocide

- In 2009, Armenia and Turkey sought to normalize bilateral relations by signing the two bilateral "Zurich Protocols," a process which Canada welcomed, but Armenia declared them null and void in March 2018. Turkey continues to claim that normalization is out of the question without the return of Azerbaijani territories occupied by Armenian backed-separatists. Prior to the new outbreak in violence, Prime Minister Pashinyan had shown willingness to establish diplomatic relations with Turkey, but remained adamant that Ankara must recognize the Armenian genocide by Turkey.

BIOGRAPHY

NIKOL PASHINYAN PRIME MINISTER OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA



Nikol Pashinyan assumed office in May 2018 with the backing of the Republican Party that had ruled under ex-president Serzh Sargysan (resigned as PM after a series of protests). His role has since solidified with a massive electoral win in December 2018.

Pashinyan, is a former journalist. From 1999 to 2012, he was editor-in-chief of the daily newspaper Haykakan Zhamanak

(Armenian Times). Before becoming an MP in 2012, he was widely recognized as a prisoner of conscience, having spent one year and 11 months in prison between June 2010 and May 2011.

Nikol Pashinyan is married. He has three daughters and a son. He speaks Armenian, Russian, English and some French. He began his entertainment career at the age of 17, by joining a local KVN team (a popular comedy competition in the post-Soviet countries).



Conflict Over Nagorno-Karabakh

Latest Developments

- On September 27, fighting broke out between the armed forces of Armenia and Azerbaijan along the line of contact in Nagorno-Karabakh. Widespread sustained fighting between Azerbaijani and Armenia has continued, each day since.
- The two sides have reported 244 deaths since the fighting erupted, including 60 civilians, but the actual toll will be much higher as both sides claim to have inflicted heavy military casualties.
- Azerbaijan's offensive appears to have led to the capture of several towns and strategic heights in Nagorno-Karabakh and adjacent districts. Recently, both sides started shelling major cities leading to growing concerns for the safety of civilians.

Current Position (if needed)

- Canada's position on Nagorno-Karabakh has emphasized the importance of a peaceful resolution to the conflict, the importance of the OSCE's involvement, and the principles of non-use of force, territorial integrity, and self-determination.
- Azerbaijan has been facing domestic pressure that time was "running out" for them to reach a peace agreement that would involve the return of lost territory. It is likely seeking to compel Armenia to the negotiating table after capturing strategic locations to give it an upper hand.
- Armenia has been "winning the peace" by continuing to settle Nagorno-Karabakh. While Armenia's 2018 'Velvet Revolution' brought about expectations of a reset in the peace process, this has not occurred, fueling Azeri fears that peace cannot be achieved through negotiation, particularly given that the OSCE Minsk Process is seen not to have produced any results.

Background

Nagorno-Karabakh (known in Armenia as Artsakh) is a historical flashpoint between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which has been the object of a protracted territorial and ethnic conflict between both sides since before the fall of the Soviet Union. Instability in this region carries high risks of spillover into surrounding countries, potentially involving regional powers, particularly Turkey and Russia which have competing regional interests. A major escalation could endanger pipelines transporting Caspian oil through Azerbaijan and Georgia towards Europe. An autonomous region within the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic, ethnic Armenian Karabakhis declared independence in 1991. This triggered a three-year war that pitted Azerbaijan against the Karabakhi separatists and Armenia. The war and the expulsion of Azerbaijanis from Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and from seven adjacent territories occupied by Armenia resulted in over a million refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). Nagorno-Karabakh and the seven adjacent territories account for almost 14% of Azerbaijani territory; they remain occupied by Armenian and separatist forces.

Peace Process

Armenia and Azerbaijan maintain mutually-exclusive negotiating positions around modalities for determining the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh, making reaching a consensus very difficult. In particular, the question of return of the seven occupied territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh is a contentious issue for both sides. Armenia views the security of the corridor connecting the region to Armenia through two Armenian-controlled districts as vital for the broader security of Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan considers the return of occupied territories and the right of return for IDPs as a condition for the beginning of normalization of relations (secured in UNSC Resolution 822). Under the auspices of the OSCE, the Minsk Group (co-chaired by France, Russia and the United States) continues to play the central mediating role in the conflict. The most recent talks came on January 28-30, when both Foreign Ministers met in Geneva with the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group. Despite hopes for an opening with the newly-elected Armenian government, no progress was made.



Canada and the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

Canada's position on Nagorno-Karabakh has emphasized the importance of a peaceful resolution to the conflict, the importance of the OSCE's involvement, and the principles of non-use of force, territorial integrity, and self-determination. Both Azerbaijan and Armenia would like Canada to take a stronger position on Nagorno-Karabakh, and condemn the other as an aggressor. While Canada recognizes Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, its position does not prejudge the form of a future settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh question within the Minsk Group.

CURRENT CONFLICT

On 27 September, fighting broke out between the armed forces of Armenia and Azerbaijan along the line of contact in Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan said it had launched a military operation in response to shelling along the so-called Line of Contact. The Armenian government accused Azerbaijan of launching an air and artillery attack on civilian settlements in Nagorno-Karabakh, including in the regional capital of Stepanakert. The fighting has involved armour, air power, and artillery of calibres up to long-range missiles. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced via Facebook on September 27, that the government has decided to declare martial law and a total mobilization. Later that day, Azerbaijan declared the same, calling for partial mobilization and curfews in select areas.

Widespread sustained fighting between Azerbaijani and Armenia has continued in the region, each day since. Political rhetoric from both sides remained aggressive, with both sides claiming to have inflicted heavy casualties on the other. Azerbaijan announced that it had successfully "liberated" several villages and a set of strategic heights in Nagorno-Karabakh. The claims by either side remain extremely difficult to verify.

The co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, called for 'an immediate end' to the hostilities a return to negotiations without preconditions. Armenia welcomed the statement while Azerbaijan questioned the credibility and value of the Minsk Group. Azerbaijan has long felt that the significant Armenian diaspora in all three co-chair States tilts the group in Armenia's favour. President Erdogan also responded to the OSCE in a speech to the Turkish Parliament, where he said that calls for a ceasefire between Azerbaijan and Armenia are unacceptable. Armenia has called for Turkey to be removed from the Minsk Group.

Azerbaijan's Domestic Pressures

Azerbaijan has often expressed its desire to "recapture" territory in Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding districts held by Armenian and local forces since the early 1990s. The longstanding "frozen conflict" and Armenia's efforts to settle the region fed domestic rhetoric that feared that time was running out for Azerbaijan to reach a peace agreement that would involve the return of lost territory. Additionally, July's clashes exposed a groundswell of popular sentiment in support of war with Armenia during an unprecedented spontaneous protest in the Azerbaijani capital. The demonstration unnerved a political establishment unused to mass protests and which was confronting a challenging post-pandemic world, with an economy yet to be weaned off oil and gas dependency.

Armenia – 26 Years of Winning the Peace

This new war follows a volatile two-year period. In April 2018, Armenia witnessed a 'Velvet Revolution' which was accompanied by hopes of a corresponding reset in the peace process, which have not been fulfilled. Armenians believe that Nagorno-Karabakh is an extension of Armenia, and the control of the adjacent districts provides Armenia with a security buffer. For this reason, Armenia prefers the status quo and has worked to strengthen its hold on the region through settlement programs. The loss of some of these territories will likely result in a counteroffensive by Armenia in the future. The lack of progress has fed domestic rhetoric in Azerbaijan that no peace can be achieved through negotiation.

Turkey's Signalling



Turkey is supporting Azerbaijan, both diplomatically and materially, in a context of growing regional military and diplomatic assertiveness. As a small state that, unlike Georgia or Ukraine, does not directly confront Russia in its territorial conflict, military action comes with serious risks of international isolation for Azerbaijan. Turkey's longstanding (dating back to closing borders with Armenia in 1993) but now increasingly explicit support has reduced that risk. In July 2020, contacts between Turkish and Azerbaijani defence officials intensified and large-scale joint exercises followed. Turkey has denied media reports that it shot down an Armenian fighter plane and is sending Syrian fighters to help Azerbaijan. There is concern that Turkey's material and vocal support could create a situation in which a miscalculation spreads the conflict to the broader region.

Russo-Azerbaijani Estrangement

Russia has not "chosen a side." Despite its substantial political, economic and military support to Armenia, Russia's public statements call on "both sides" to reduce tensions. However, Russia-Azerbaijan relations appear to have deteriorated since the fighting in July 2020, with Azerbaijan publicly criticizing Russia's alleged supplying of military goods to Armenia. For now, Yerevan is emphasizing that Russian support is not needed, but this could certainly change in a conflict that Prime Minister Pashinyan has framed as 'existential'. Russia is the largest supplier of military equipment to both Armenia and Azerbaijan and has around 3,000 troops stationed at a base near Yerevan in Armenia. The Collective Treaty Security Organization (CTSO), led by Russia and of which Armenia is a member, could be used to justify Russia's entry in the conflict.

Iran's Balancing

Armenia and Iran enjoy cordial relations on the basis of a long shared history and cultural ties. Iran is one of the only two neighbors with whom Armenia maintains open border crossings, making it a vital regional and economic partner. Iran and Azerbaijan have an uneasy bilateral relationship, not least because of the millions of Azerbaijanis that live in northern Iran. Calls for the unification of Azerbaijan threatens Tehran, who therefore seeks to undermine the Azerbaijani government by quietly supporting Armenia. In the current conflict, Iran has publicly called for a ceasefire but has also affirmed its support for Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. Since Russia is a steadfast supporter of Armenia, Iran's interests with Russia overlap in this conflict.

IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADA

There are media reports and allegations that Turkey has transferred or sold drones to the Azerbaijani armed forces, possibly with Canadian technology, that are being used in the recent flare-up of large-scale military attacks between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh. In light of these allegations, and in line with Canada's robust export control regime, Minister Champagne on October 5th suspended the relevant export permits to Turkey to allow time to further assess the situation. This is likely to have a negative impact on commercial and political relations with Turkey.

That Canada has not publicly condemned the actions of Azerbaijan or Turkey in the conflict has [REDACTED] the Armenian government. However, after suspending relevant export permits Turkey likely suspects Canada is not neutral.

(Mandatory)

Branch: ECE

Last name: Brisson

Phone Number: 343-549-8297

Highest level of approval: ECD

FW: Turkey: Additional Analysis

From: "Boileau, Guy -DMT" <guy.boileau@international.gc.ca>
To: *MINA-Dept Unit <d-mina-dept-unit@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *DMT-Policy <d-dmt-policy@international.gc.ca>, *TFM-Policy <d-tfm-policy@international.gc.ca>, "Anand, Shalini -TID" <shalini.anand@international.gc.ca>, "Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE" <marieeve.roymarcoux@international.gc.ca>, "Gosselin, Catherine -TIR" <catherine.gosselin@international.gc.ca>, "Grant, Alison -ECE" <alison.grant@international.gc.ca>, "Turner, Andrew -ECE" <andrew.turner@international.gc.ca>, "Graham, Molly -EGM" <molly.graham@international.gc.ca>
Date: Tue, 06 Oct 2020 16:58:24 -0400
Attachments: Group 2 items to Turkey (including MDPs) v.1 (003).docx (35.99 kB); Military Exports to Turkey 2019-2014.docx (23.23 kB)

MINA-DU: further to the call between MINA and DMT last evening, pls find below and attached further analysis pertaining to Turkey and export controls. This has been DMT approved.

Summary of the kind of goods in the Group 2 list of valid permits to Turkey.

Turkey is a significant purchaser of Canadian controlled goods and technology. Various Canadian companies are involved at various stages in the supply and provision of systems, subsystems, parts and components of a diverse range of military programs. These can be categorized into the following:

- *Parts, components, and accessories for [REDACTED]*
- *Parts, components, avionics and other accessories for various aircraft platforms made in other countries, including the [REDACTED] as well as [REDACTED]*
- *Flight simulators, and their corresponding parts, components and technical data*
- *Parts, components, subsystems and their corresponding technical data and assistance related to the development of Turkish satellites (including military satellites)*
- *Parts, components and subsystems (including GPS anti-jam devices) to be integrated into various bombs, missiles, rockets and other ordnances*
- *Parts, components and technical data to be integrated into various armoured vehicles [REDACTED]*
- *Technical data and assistance for the development of [REDACTED]*
- *Production tools and machines for the manufacturing of ammunition and cartridges of various calibres*
- *Riflescopes, sights and their corresponding parts and components*
- *Rocket motors and other components for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)*
- *Electro-Optical and Infrared systems to be incorporated into various aerial platforms (including UAVs)*
- *Naval equipment (including cables and arresting harness for helicopter retrieval system, sonobuoys, various modules, etc.) to be integrated into warships and other naval platforms.*
- *Technical data and assistance related to the development and construction of a wind tunnel (to test aircraft and missiles)*
- *IED disruptors, as well as protective equipment for military personnel*

Attached is a more streamlined list of valid permits to Turkey for Group two that are current valid. The table also includes the now suspended Wescam permits (in red).

Since 2016 (pre and post 2019 period), number of Wescam cameras that have been shipped and number of Wescam cameras that have not/not yet been shipped. If exact number is not feasible, a solid estimate would be grateful with accompanying caveats.

Total number of Wescam cameras exported to Turkey since 2016, and cameras not yet exported

Exported		Not yet exported	
New	Repaired	New	Repaired
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Notes:

- The numbers above are only for Wescam complete surveillance systems and does not include parts and components of the surveillance systems.
- Exported cameras cover exports since 2016 (pre and post 2019 exports).
- The "not exported" figures pertain only to the [REDACTED] Wescam valid permits (now suspended) as they could still be exported should the suspension be lifted.
- * This is the number of cameras the exporter would be allowed to export under their permits. This number could represent cameras ready to be exported and cameras under production or not yet produced. The permit suspension prevents the exporter from exporting these cameras.

- ** This represents the number of repaired cameras that would be allowed to be exported. Our system does not allow us to determine whether these cameras are in Canada or still with the end user. The permit suspension prevents these cameras from being exported. It is unlikely that the end-user would send the cameras in its possession for repairs in Canada during the suspension given that they would be unable to have their cameras back.

Profile of Canadian exports of military goods to Turkey over the last 5 years.

Please see the second attachment for summary and details. Since 2014, the largest exports to Turkey subcategory have consisted of “imaging or countermeasure equipment” (ECL 2-15) valued at \$230,703,300; “fire control, and related alerting and warning equipment” (ECL 2-5) valued at \$161,555,998; and “electronic equipment and military spacecraft” (ECL 2-11) valued at \$55,049,592.

Fwd: Critical path?

From: "Grant, Alison -ECE" <alison.grant@international.gc.ca>
To: "Turner, Andrew -ECE" <andrew.turner@international.gc.ca>, "Brisson, Julien -ECE" <julien.brisson@international.gc.ca>
Cc: "Coleman, Robert -ECE" <robert.coleman@international.gc.ca>, "Pilloud, Marc -ECE" <marc.pilloud@international.gc.ca>
Date: Sat, 03 Oct 2020 10:49:58 -0400
Attachments: Suspension Export Permits AA MINO STM.docx (19.68 kB); ATT00001.htm (189 bytes)

Andrew, Julien - can you verify for political language? ESP first para as not sure it is only line of contact anymore?

Omina will not like reference to "sides".

The final para is the one I proposed yesterday and hope it sticks as it could be much worse.

Thanks

Director, Eastern Europe and Eurasia
 Cell: 613-462-2747

Begin forwarded message:

From: "Phan, Trinh -LCCA"
Date: October 2, 2020 at 11:38:25 PM EDT
To: "Anand, Shalini -TIE", "Grant, Alison -ECE", "Thompson, Kevin -JLTA", "Gosselin, Catherine -TIR", "Gagnon, Felix -JLTA", "Kang, Rosa -JLTA"
Cc: "Turner, Andrew -ECE", "Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE", "Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE", "Sharma, Vikas -LCC", "Samaan, Valérie -LCF"
Subject: RE: Critical path?

Good evening,

Apologies for the weekend request. Please see attached the draft STM for your teams' input. Grateful if I can get your feedback by 17h00 tomorrow – Saturday, if possible.

Thank you in advance.

Trinh

From: Anand, Shalini -TIE
Sent: October 2, 2020 8:02 PM
To: Grant, Alison -ECE; Thompson, Kevin -JLTA; Mawani, Aliya -MINA; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR; Gagnon, Felix -JLTA; Kang, Rosa -JLTA
Cc: Turner, Andrew -ECE; Boileau, Guy -DMT; Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE; Clark, Nancy -USS -DMA; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE; Sharma, Vikas -LCC; Samaan, Valérie -LCF; Phan, Trinh -LCCA
Subject: RE: Critical path?

Looping in Trinh Phan.

From: Anand, Shalini -TIE
Sent: October 2, 2020 7:36 PM
To: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Thompson, Kevin -JLTA <Kevin.Thompson@international.gc.ca>; Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Gagnon, Felix -JLTA <Felix.Gagnon@international.gc.ca>; Kang, Rosa -JLTA <Rosa.Kang@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE <Kamiliya.Akkouche@international.gc.ca>; Clark, Nancy -USS -DMA <Nancy.Clark@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Sharma, Vikas -LCC <Vikas.Sharma@international.gc.ca>; Samaan, Valérie -LCF <Valerie.Samaan@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Critical path?

I like this approach, as it does not pose problems from a commercial confidentiality perspective; [REDACTED]

TIR and Comms may have additional feedback.

From: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 2, 2020 7:27 PM
To: Thompson, Kevin -JLTA <Kevin.Thompson@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Gagnon, Felix -JLTA <Felix.Gagnon@international.gc.ca>; Kang, Rosa -JLTA <Rosa.Kang@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE <Kamiliya.Akkouche@international.gc.ca>; Clark, Nancy -USS -DMA <Nancy.Clark@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Sharma, Vikas -LCC <Vikas.Sharma@international.gc.ca>; Samaan, Valérie -LCF <Valerie.Samaan@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Critical path?

If there is a way we could avoid a statement it would be highly preferable in terms of relations with Turkey.

Perhaps it could be just media lines they put out saying:

“Due to the ongoing hostilities between Azerbaijan and Armenia, Minister Champagne has decide to suspend a number of permits for specific controlled goods, to allow time for investigation to ensure they are not being used in the conflict. Due to commercial confidentiality we cannot say more at this time.”

That would be ideal from my (Turkey) point of view.

From: Thompson, Kevin -JLTA <Kevin.Thompson@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 2, 2020 7:21 PM
To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Gagnon, Felix -JLTA <Felix.Gagnon@international.gc.ca>; Kang, Rosa -JLTA <Rosa.Kang@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE <Kamiliya.Akkouche@international.gc.ca>; Clark, Nancy -USS -DMA <Nancy.Clark@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Sharma, Vikas -LCC <Vikas.Sharma@international.gc.ca>; Samaan, Valérie -LCF <Valerie.Samaan@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Critical path?

Ok.

An additional point, not to necessarily add to the list below., but I want to be comfortable from a legal perspective that we can publically announce that we are suspending permits for a particular company, without breaching commercial confidentiality.

If we have sensitivity from a commercial confidentiality perspective about speaking publicly about permits that we have or have not issued, then wouldn't the same sensitivity apply in cases where we have suspended pre-existing permits. Country specific suspensions are one thing. Company specific suspensions might be another.

Does anyone recall whether the Department publicly announced the suspension of the Terradyne permits back in 2017?

From: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 2, 2020 7:06 PM
To: Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Thompson, Kevin -JLTA <Kevin.Thompson@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE <Kamiliya.Akkouche@international.gc.ca>; Clark, Nancy -USS -DMA <Nancy.Clark@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; Sharma, Vikas -LCC <Vikas.Sharma@international.gc.ca>; Samaan, Valérie -LCF <Valerie.Samaan@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Critical path?

I just caught one more element in my notes, which is for JLT/PER follow up, and I've added it below. Hopefully between us, we've caught everything.

Warmly,
S.

From: Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 2, 2020 6:53 PM
To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Thompson, Kevin -JLTA <Kevin.Thompson@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE <Kamiliya.Akkouche@international.gc.ca>; Clark, Nancy -USS -DMA <Nancy.Clark@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; Sharma, Vikas -LCC <Vikas.Sharma@international.gc.ca>; Samaan, Valérie -LCF <Valerie.Samaan@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Critical path?

Re-adding LCC and adding LCF so everyone is on the same page.

From: Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 2, 2020 6:51 PM
To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Thompson, Kevin -JLTA <Kevin.Thompson@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE <Kamiliya.Akkouche@international.gc.ca>; Clark, Nancy -USS -DMA <Nancy.Clark@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Critical path?

Looping in the rest of the DLU.

From: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 2, 2020 6:12 PM
To: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Thompson, Kevin -JLTA <Kevin.Thompson@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>; Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE <Kamiliya.Akkouche@international.gc.ca>; Clark, Nancy -USS -DMA <Nancy.Clark@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Critical path?

Hi Alison:
Great start. Thank you. I've filled in the blanks and added to the list below.
Warmly,
S.

From: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 2, 2020 5:56 PM
To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Thompson, Kevin -JLTA <Kevin.Thompson@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>; Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE <Kamiliya.Akkouche@international.gc.ca>; Clark, Nancy -USS -DMA <Nancy.Clark@international.gc.ca>
Subject: Critical path?
Importance: High

Shalini, Kevin x 2, Catherine

Here is stab at a critical path following the briefing with MINA. Can you fill in the blanks or improve it? Thanks. Not sure who else might want to add to this so please feel free to loop in. I missed a lot of the phone conversation at the Shalini/Aliya/Kevin

end of the table – could not hear what was agreed with Minister and staff.

Alison

Follow-up to MINA briefing on Turkish drones -- Next steps

Immediate Actions:

- 1) [redacted] for controlled goods and inform companies (after letters are vetted by legal and green-lit by oMINA) (TIE)
- 2) Send question to Minister on likewise [redacted] for controlled goods (TIE)

Actions on Monday:

- 1) Engagement with Turkey.
 - There are [redacted] valid L3 Wescam permits valued at over [redacted] that the Minister is seeking to suspend.
 - Given the serious impact that suspending these permits will have on our relations with Turkey, it is important that engagement with Turkey happen to give them a heads-up and register our concern prior to any press announcement.
 - Our recommendation is that this outreach to Turkey be done by MINA to his counterpart on Monday morning, given their good personal relationship and Turkey's current frustration with Canada on other issues (consular).
 - If not, a diplomatic demarche will be done by EGM/Sandra McCardell to the Turkish Ambassador in Ottawa as early as possible Monday.
- 2) DND to request consultations with Turkish military on end use of UAVs with Canadian L3 Wescam technology (IGR)
- 3) L3 Wescam to be informed of suspension, and suspension to be undertaken in system.
- 4) Press statement on suspension of L3 Wescam permits to Turkey to be issued.
 - [redacted] I branch to provide more information to respond to MINA question about intelligence on export permits after they are shipped (TIE can add a line indicating that when we are provided with intelligence we review the information and recommend suspending or cancelling permits – as we did recently in another case)

Other actions:

- 1) Request to ANKRA Defence Attache to reach out to both [redacted] and [redacted] counterparts to ascertain/confirm existence of their components on Turkish UAVs
- 2) [redacted]
- 3) TIE to re-send L3 Turkey permits that are under review to consultation partners to allow for further input, given change in circumstances.
- 4) [redacted]

Statement

Statement from Minister Champagne on suspension of export permits

October xx, 2020 - Ottawa, Ontario - Global Affairs Canada

The Honourable François-Philippe Champagne, Minister of Foreign Affairs today issued the following statement:

“Canada continues to be concerned by the ongoing Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict along the Line of Contact in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone resulting in shelling of settlements and civilian casualties.

“We call on the sides to take all necessary measures to stabilize the situation on the ground and reiterate that there is no alternative to a peaceful negotiated solution of the conflict.

“As a party to the Arms Trade Treaty, Canada is committed to playing its part to combat the illicit trade of weapons and to protect lives. Due to the ongoing hostilities, Canada has decided to suspend a number of permits for specific controlled goods, to allow time for investigation to ensure they are not being used in the conflict.”

Contacts

Syrine Khoury
Press Secretary
Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs
Syrine.Khoury@international.gc.ca

Media Relations Office
Global Affairs Canada
343-203-7700
media@international.gc.ca

Follow us on Twitter: [@CanadaFP](https://twitter.com/CanadaFP)

Like us on Facebook: [Canada's foreign policy - Global Affairs Canada](https://www.facebook.com/Canada%27s-foreign-policy-Global-Affairs-Canada)

Fwd: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

s.20(1)(c)

From: "Grant, Alison -ECE" <alison.grant@international.gc.ca>
To: "Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE" <kamiliya.akkouche@international.gc.ca>, "Pilloud, Marc -ECE" <marc.pilloud@international.gc.ca>, "Coleman, Robert -ECE" <robert.coleman@international.gc.ca>
Date: Mon, 26 Oct 2020 18:27:47 -0400

For your records on [REDACTED] and drones/exports.

Director, Eastern Europe and Eurasia
 Cell: 613-462-2747

Begin forwarded message:

From: "Sproule, David -ECD"
Date: October 26, 2020 at 6:05:15 PM EDT
To: "El Kabiri, Reda -MINA"
Cc: "Grant, Alison -ECE" , "Turner, Andrew -ECE" , "McCardell, Sandra -EGM" , "Khokhar, Jamal -ANKRA -HOM/CDM"
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Reda,

For your dissemination.

david

26 October Discussion with Ambassador LeClaire/MOSCO

Representation: Ambassador LeClaire said

- The early approval of the HonCon by O/MINA which was expected to be signed off by CFM today will provide a presence on the ground after a long absence for reasons well known.
- MOSCO can establish a more frequent HOM and FPDS visit schedule to Yerevan once the COVID situation abates.
- might also consider more extended TDs for MOSCO staff to provide consular support, especially if conflict continues beyond COVID period
- Functions undertaken by a special envoy would be undertaken by Ambassador and her staff as part of their work on Armenia.

26 October Discussion with Turkish Ambassador Uras: he said

Drones [REDACTED]

- The October 16th suspension of permits was disappointing after progress achieved with more flexible procedures in April after of freeze on Group 2 exports in in October 2019.
- This is particularly regretful for a NATO ally.

Military to Military

- ECD stressed that it was in everyone's interest to ascertain the facts as soon as possible and noted our military to military requests (through our CDA in Ankara) for information/talks on the use of the Canadian equipment [REDACTED]

david

From: El Kabiri, Reda -MINA
Sent: October 25, 2020 7:22 PM
To: Grant, Alison -ECE ; Boileau, Guy -DMT ; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR
Cc: McLaughlin, Emily -MINA ; Mawani, Aliya -MINA ; Turner, Andrew -ECE ; Anand, Shalini -TID ; Yendall, Jonathan -INP ; Mishra, Rachna -ELB ; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE ; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR ; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR ; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR ; *TFM-Policy ; Sproule, David -ECD ; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN ; *USS-DMA Advisors ; *MINA-Dept Unit ; *DMT-Policy ; McCardell, Sandra -EGM ; Christie, Bruce -TFMA
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Hi again! This is probably already in your plans but I just wanted to flag that o/MINA expressed a strong interest in obtaining timely readouts of the scheduled phone call between ECD and Turkish HOM, as well as ANKRA HOM outreach with senior levels at the MFA.

Merci beaucoup,
 Reda (on call for MINA-DLU)
 Mobile: 613-404-7244

From: El Kabiri, Reda -MINA
Sent: October 25, 2020 1:48 PM
To: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>
Cc: McLaughlin, Emily -MINA <Emily.McLaughlin@international.gc.ca>; Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TID <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Mishra, Rachna -ELB <Rachna.Mishra@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; McCardell, Sandra -EGM <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Absolutely thank you Alison. This is why we expect this may need to happen in a secure room given the nature of mil-mil discussions. Aliya will be picking this one tomorrow for the DLU.

Reda (on call for MINA-DLU)
 Mobile: 613-404-7244

From: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 25, 2020 1:43 PM
To: El Kabiri, Reda -MINA <Reda.ElKabiri@international.gc.ca>; Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>

Cc: McLaughlin, Emily -MINA <Emily.McLaughlin@international.gc.ca>; Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TID <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Mishra, Rachna -ELB <Rachna.Mishra@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; McCardell, Sandra -EGM <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Reda – we will respond tomorrow. To be clear this seems to be a follow up on the question of Turkey's response to the mil-mil consultations.

Alison

From: El Kabiri, Reda -MINA <Reda.ElKabiri@international.gc.ca>

Sent: October 25, 2020 10:21 AM

To: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>

Cc: McLaughlin, Emily -MINA <Emily.McLaughlin@international.gc.ca>; Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TID <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Mishra, Rachna -ELB <Rachna.Mishra@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; McCardell, Sandra -EGM <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Bonjour,

Apologies for this Sunday email (this can wait Monday morning). o/MINA would be keen to get a **status update on this investigation**.

Should you believe that the update will have to be in a secure room, o/MINA exempt is willing to come in person so please let us know and the MINA-DLU will send invitations for a meeting in secure room. If an email (or encrypted email) would be enough considering the information you will be sharing tomorrow, we would be grateful to obtain the update tomorrow as soon as deemed possible.

Many thanks!!

Reda (on call for MINA-DLU)

Mobile: 613-404-7244

From: McLaughlin, Emily -MINA <Emily.McLaughlin@international.gc.ca>

Sent: October 21, 2020 8:30 PM

To: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Mishra, Rachna -ELB <Rachna.Mishra@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; McCardell, Sandra -EGM <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Merci Guy (and others).

Shared with oMINA.

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 21, 2020 8:16 PM
To: McLaughlin, Emily -MINA <Emily.McLaughlin@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Mishra, Rachna -ELB <Rachna.Mishra@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; McCardell, Sandra -EGM <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Hi Emily – DMT agrees with the recommendation outlined in Alison’s message.
 Gtg to oMINA.
 GuyB.

From: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 21, 2020 7:00 PM
To: Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>; Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Mishra, Rachna -ELB <Rachna.Mishra@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; McCardell, Sandra -EGM <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>
Subject: Re: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

My recommendation is that we wait to see how HOM and our entreaties here to Turkish Embassy have an impact. I raised this today with Turkish DHOM and emphasized that mil-mil engagement is required and will help move this file forward. HOM is likewise connecting with MFA counterparts in Ankara with same message and also welcoming President Erdogan’s offer to provide information, expressed in his call with our PM on Friday. That information could be conveyed through these mil-mil channels. Let’s reassess within several days if we don’t see progress.

Alison

Director, Eastern Europe and Eurasia
 Cell: 613-462-2747

On Oct 21, 2020, at 6:53 PM, Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca> wrote:

Aliya:

Just to be clear and make sure oMINA understands: We are not having any problems *connecting with the Turkish military, as such. Our contacts with them are deep and varied.

But, on that point, perhaps others will have ideas on how oMINA might be of help in persuading Turkish officials to be a bit more forthcoming...

KH

From: Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>
Sent: Wednesday, October 21, 2020 4:46 PM
To: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Mishra, Rachna -ELB <Rachna.Mishra@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; McCardell, Sandra -EGM <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Dear All,

Thanks very much for putting together this useful update.

O/MINA noted the repeated outreach attempts to the Turkish military and is asking if the department assesses that MINA/their office could assist in making the defence connection – or if there are other ways in which they could be helpful?

Grateful for your views. Thanks,

Aliya

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 20, 2020 4:24 PM
To: Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Mishra, Rachna -ELB <Rachna.Mishra@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Colleagues: DMT has approved the report and it is now being shared with oMINA (pasted below). Thank you, once again. As updates become available, thank you in advance for keeping us posted so that DMT/USS and oMINA have the very latest.

GuyB.

- ANKRA Defence Attaché has made several attempts to outreach to the Turkish military. A detailed response is not expected any time soon. ANKRA HOM will engage with the Turkish MFA to emphasize the importance of the military-to-military talks to moving this issue forward.
- While it is impossible to independently verify the situation on the ground (OSCE monitoring suspended for months due to COVID), INA will continue to report on all latest intelligence. The latest footage of downed drones (if genuine)

- certainly appears to show a TB-2 UAV with [REDACTED] on board. s.20(1)(c)
- The Department is following up with other countries that may be supplying drone parts/technology to Turkey and Azerbaijan to gather additional information, including [REDACTED] ANKRA Defence Attache indicates that his contacts report that [REDACTED] has suspended any UAV-related exports (they are still providing though spare parts and components to support [REDACTED]). While [REDACTED] has yet to respond, it seems that [REDACTED] are used in Turkish drones, however they are not a controlled item/defence item/dual-use item.
 - If no further intelligence becomes available, the Department may contact the company for its input and assessment of the video.
 - JLTA along with PER and the relevant Geographic Divisions are assessing the situation as it pertains to Turkish drones in Libya.
 - All consultation partners have advised that for the time being they have no further intel/info to suggest that we should consider suspending any additional permits that are still valid to Turkey.
 - GAC and OGDs are working on a review of the situation on the suspended permits in question, with a view to providing MINA consolidated advice on options/next steps.
 - WRT to the [REDACTED] the companies had already shipped items against those permits, so there is no urgent action required.

From: Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>

Sent: October 20, 2020 2:02 PM

To: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>;

*MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Hello Guy,

Please find below a report on the current situation as well as the updated version of the Critical Path. Please let us know if you have any questions.

Andrew

- ANKRA Defence Attache has initiated outreach to Turkish military, but has yet to receive a response. ANKRA HOM will engage with the Turkish MFA to emphasize the importance of the military-to-military talks to moving this issue forward.
- While it is impossible to independently verify the situation on the ground (OSCE monitoring suspended for months due to COVID), INA will continue to report on all latest intelligence. The latest footage of downed drones (if genuine) certainly appears to show a TB-2 UAV with [REDACTED] on board.
- The Department is following up with other countries that may be supplying drone parts/technology to Turkey and Azerbaijan to gather additional information, including [REDACTED] ANKRA Defence Attache indicates that his contacts report that [REDACTED] has suspended any UAV-related exports (they are still providing though spare parts and components to support [REDACTED]). While [REDACTED] has yet to respond, it seems that [REDACTED] are used in Turkish drones, however they are not a controlled item/defence item/dual-use item.
- If no further intelligence becomes available, the Department may contact the company for its input and assessment of the video.
- JLTA along with PER and the relevant Geographic Divisions are assessing the situation as it pertains to Turkish drones in Libya.
- All consultation partners have advised that for the time being they have no further intel/info to suggest that we should consider suspending any additional permits that are still valid to Turkey.
- GAC and OGDs are working on a review of the situation and the suspended permits in question, with a view to providing MINA consolidated advice on options/next steps.
- WRT to the [REDACTED] the companies had already shipped items against those permits, so there is no urgent action required.

Follow-up to MINA briefing on Turkish drones – Next steps**Immediate Actions:**

- 1) [REDACTED] for controlled goods and inform companies (after letters are vetted by legal and green-lit by oMINA) – done
- 2) Send question to Minister on likewise [REDACTED] for controlled goods, to suspend Canadian exports of controlled goods to conflict zone – done

Actions on Monday:

- 1) Engagement with Turkey.
 - **Recommendation to MINA:** That outreach to Turkey be done by MINA to his counterpart on Monday, given their good personal relationship, their recent discussion on exports, and to seek Turkey's views on regional events (Nagorno-Karabakh, Eastern Mediterranean). Guidance from MINA requested this weekend – TPs would be prepared this weekend if MINA agrees. - done
 - If not MINA, a diplomatic demarche will be done by EGM/Sandra McCardell to the Turkish Ambassador in Ottawa as early as possible on Monday. – done
 - Given the serious impact that suspending these permits, and making a statement about it, will have on our relations with Turkey, it is important that engagement with Turkey happen prior to any press announcement. There are [REDACTED] valid [REDACTED] permits valued at over [REDACTED] that the Minister is seeking to suspend. - done
- 2) Officials (IFM) requests that DND hold consultations with Turkish military on end use of UAVs with Canadian [REDACTED] (possibly via their Defence Attaché in Ankara) – requested and following up
- 3) Officials (TIE) informs [REDACTED] about the suspension, and suspension to be undertaken in system. - done
- 4) Communications released on suspensions.
 - There are likely issues of commercial confidentiality in releasing a statement referring to a specific product or company. There are also concerns about the negative impact a statement referring to Turkey will have on our bilateral relationship. The communications product will be drafted with these concerns in mind. - done

Other actions:

- 1) Officials (ECE) request to ANKRA to reach out to both [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] counterparts to confirm with confidence existence of their components on Turkish UAVs – done and waiting for [REDACTED] reply
- 2) Officials (TIE) to re-send [REDACTED] Turkey permits that are under review to consultation partners to allow for further input, given change in circumstances. - done
- 3) [REDACTED]
- 4) Officials (TIE) to provide more information to respond to MINA question about intelligence on export permits after they are shipped (supported by IND) – following up
- 5) [REDACTED]

From: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>

Sent: Tuesday, October 20, 2020 1:45 PM

To: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Guy – this is coming very shortly, apologies for delay in pulling together the points, we have all been in different meetings.

Alison

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 20, 2020 12:50 PM
To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Thanks Shalini, what is requested is one report to oMINA on Azerbaijan so your input yesterday should be captured in the one consolidated report being requested. I should have mentioned as well DMT's specific point about "there were to have been contacts through the military and also either other possible suppliers: [REDACTED]

Kevin, Jonathan, Alison, assume this is being compiled and we'll be able to receive soon today?

With thanks

From: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 20, 2020 12:44 PM
To: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Guy, I will let I-branch colleagues respond to your two points below, as they are leading on intel reporting.

TIE's input from yesterday remains the same, which I think addresses the first question to a degree. For item 2, I am coordinating with the i-branch, and if needed, TIE will reach out to the company to support efforts to validate whether the picture/video in the tweet shows [REDACTED] terms.

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 20, 2020 12:37 PM
To: Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INP <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-

DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Colleagues – a quick follow-up on this request for one consolidated report re Azerbaijan covering: 1) whether we have any intel the issue of military goods destined to Turkey that may be in Azerbaijan; and 2) the tweet that MINA sent to DMT last night (immediately below).

Can we expect the report within the next hour in DMOs?

With thanks

GuyB.

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT

Sent: October 19, 2020 9:38 PM

To: Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INA <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Colleagues, with apologies for another message this evening, in addition to the requested information below, DMT has requested that the report also provide what we know (and not know yet and what we are doing to find out) about the air defense units of the Artsakh Defense Army shooting down Azerbaijan UAVs. See tweet below MINA just sent to DMT about this.

Thank you once again for the consolidate report by Noon tomorrow for DMT approval.

<< File: IMG_5681.png >>

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT

Sent: October 19, 2020 8:03 PM

To: Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INA <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Glad to see that everyone that should be copied now are (including oUSS who I am now copying).

I will kindly ask I-E-T Branches to pls coordinate one response/report for tomorrow by Noon on our efforts thus far, and next steps, after which we will seek DMT approval, and then submit to oMINA.

With thanks to everyone

GuyB.

From: Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>

Sent: October 19, 2020 7:53 PM

To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -INA <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Carrière, Sébastien -IGN <Sebastien.Carriere@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Looping in INA on the question of intel gathering and assessment (see highlighted line below). I will let INA reply, but my understanding is that an assessment has been made, high side, specific to likelihood of UAVs from Turkey being used by Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Regarding mil-to-mil contacts, the CDA in ANKRA submitted a Note Verbale to the Turkish MoD on 9 October, requesting a meeting on a urgent basis. The NV specified that we are seeking specific information on the possible re-export of UAV components by Turkey to Azerbaijan, pursuant to reports in the Turkish media and MINA's decision to suspend specific export permits. We equipped the CDA with detailed background to aid him in his demarche. The CDA has made three follow up enquiries (Thursday, Friday and today).). Last week he was told that the Turkish Armed Forces were gathering the responses to his questions, and that he would be called for a meeting when they were in a position to reply. Today, however, he was informed that this is "a very sensitive topic" and that a response or invitation for a meeting will "not be for a while."

It bears noting that the Turks are unlikely to be easily motivated to cooperate with us at this time, when it comes to information sharing on this file. We can continue to push, but a timely and detailed response through the Turkish Armed Forces / MoD is probably more than we can hope for at this point.

KH

From: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>

Sent: Monday, October 19, 2020 7:21 PM

To: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Absolutely, looping in Kevin, David and Alison in I-branch and E-branch, respectively, both of DMT's questions/issues fall to their teams (I inadvertently didn't include them in my last message – I've been having outlook issues).

What I recall from an Ibranch update is that the DA in Turkey tried to set up a demarche, but has not had any success. That said, I understand that the DA has been reaching out to likeminded countries to determine how they are treating exports to Turkey linked to UAVs. Kevin Hamilton will have to confirm and will be better placed to respond to your two messages below.

I will add that all of this will feed into the memo and analysis noted under bullet four below, which the T-branch is leading on, with considerable input from DND, I branch and E-branch.

Hope this helps a little.

Warmly,
S.

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>

Sent: October 19, 2020 6:37 PM

To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Sorry for the second message, DMT just wrote to me saying: "There were to have been contacts through the military and also either other possible suppliers: eg Germany."
Pls let me know about bringing back-in E Branch and I Branch (and I forgot, oUSS as well).

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT
Sent: October 19, 2020 6:35 PM
To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Hi Shalini, thank you for this. It has been shared with DMT. In the meantime, it is my understanding that there's been some correspondence bw MINA and Turkey as to whether we have any intel the issue of military goods destined to Turkey that may be in Azerbaijan. DMT has asked for a report to be submitted to oMINA tomorrow on this, noting specifically who is working on intel gathering, what we know and don't know. I note that in your reply that E-Branch was removed. Grateful if you can let me know whether you prefer looping-in E Branch (and I Branch) or whether you prefer that I reply all to this message and include both Branches. What you provided below is form a significant part of the report but would need to know if there's been any work on this by E and I Branches and our Post and what we have heard thus far (and next steps).

With thanks
GuyB.

From: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 19, 2020 10:40 AM
To: *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Subject: FW: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions (Azerbaijan)

Dear Guy:

Further to the exchange below, here is a brief update for DMT/oDMT awareness.

- We have twice circulated the list of all valid/not expired export permits to Turkey to our consultation partners and asked them to review with a critical lens, and advise whether they have intel/info to suggest that we should consider suspending any additional permits.
- To date, they have all come back and indicated that they do not have further intel/info that suggest that we need to suspend additional permits to Turkey at this time.
- They now have this list and will advise us if they get intel/info that changes this recommendation. (oMINA is aware)
- WRT to the suspended permits for [REDACTED] T-branch is working across GAC/government on a review of the situation and the permits in question, with a view to providing MINA consolidated advice on options/next steps.
- WRT to the [REDACTED] the companies had already shipped items against those permits, so there is no urgent action required. oMINA is aware.

Let me know if any further info is required on our approach.

Warmly,
S.

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT
Sent: October 8, 2020 12:21 PM
To: Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-

Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>; Coleman, Robert -ECE <Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions

Salut Marie-Eve and team, just a quick follow-up to the message below. Do you think a response by end of day would be feasible?

With thanks

GuyB.

From: Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 6, 2020 5:23 PM
To: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>; Coleman, Robert -ECE <Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca>; Bastien, Jean-François -TIR <Jean-Francois.Bastien@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions

And TIR/Bastien

From: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 6, 2020 5:19 PM
To: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>; Coleman, Robert -ECE <Robert.Coleman@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions

Looping in ECE/Coleman.

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 6, 2020 5:18 PM
To: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions

Salut Marie-Eve: As you saw, DMT has approved the analysis and it is now being shared with oMINA.

DMT has asked whether now we can verify if we have any reason to believe that any of the military goods to Turkey might be in Azerbaijan? DMT specifically referenced, for example, the UAV engines for instance in Group 2-10.

With thanks

From: Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 6, 2020 4:18 PM
To: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Senkiw, Jillian -TIR <Jillian.Senkiw@international.gc.ca>; Yoon, Joon Hyuk -TIE <JoonHyuk.Yoon@international.gc.ca>
Subject: FW: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions

Bonjour Guy,

Tel que discuté, voici les réponses avec les changements demandés.

Laisse-moi savoir si tu as des question ou commentaires.

Marie Eve

From: Boileau, Guy -DMT <Guy.Boileau@international.gc.ca>
Sent: October 5, 2020 7:55 PM
To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>; Roy Marcoux, Marie Eve -TIE <MarieEve.RoyMarcoux@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>
Subject: Turkey: MINA Follow-up Questions

Hi Shalini and Marie-Eve, with apologies for the eventing message, DMT just received a call from MINA re Turkey. We have been asked for the following analysis by Noon tomorrow please:

1. Summary of the kind of goods in the Group 2 list of valid permits to Turkey that was submitted to oMINA today. If we could draw-out the kind of goods included in the attached table you produced that would be grateful (e.g. DMT asked as an example whether it included rifles).





Turkey is a significant purchaser of Canadian controlled goods and technology. Various Canadian companies are involved at various stages in the supply and provision of systems, subsystems, parts and components of a diverse range of military programs. These can be categorized into the following:

- *Parts, components, and accessories for [REDACTED] aircraft.*
- *Parts, components, avionics and other accessories for various aircraft platforms made in other countries, including [REDACTED] as well as [REDACTED]*
- *Flight simulators, and their corresponding parts, components and technical data*
- *Parts, components, subsystems and their corresponding technical data and assistance related to the development of Turkish satellites (including military satellites)*
- *Parts, components and subsystems (including GPS anti-jam devices) to be integrated into various bombs, missiles, rockets and other ordnances*
- *Parts, components and technical data to be integrated into various armoured vehicles [REDACTED]*
- *Technical data and assistance for the development of [REDACTED]*
- *Production tools and machines for the manufacturing of ammunition and cartridges of various calibres*
- *Riflescopes, sights and their corresponding parts and components*
- *Rocket motors and other components for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)*
- *Electro-Optical and Infrared systems to be incorporated into various aerial platforms (including UAVs)*
- *Naval equipment (including cables and arresting harness for helicopter retrieval system, sonobuoys, various modules, etc.) to be integrated into warships and other naval platforms.*
- *Technical data and assistance related to the development and construction of a wind tunnel (to test aircraft and missiles)*
- *IED disruptors, as well as protective equipment for military personnel*


Here is the list of valid (and suspended) Group 2 permits to Turkey, with the changes requested:

<< File: Group 2 items to Turkey (including MDPs) v.1 (003).docx >>

2. Since 2016 (pre and post 2019 period), number of Wescam cameras that have been shipped and number of Wescam cameras that have not/not yet been shipped. Understand this may be challenging given return and repair. If exact number is not feasible, a solid estimate would be grateful with accompanying caveats.
Total number of Wescam cameras exported to Turkey since 2016, and cameras not yet exported

Exported		Not yet exported	
New	Repaired	New	Repaired
			

Notes:

- The numbers above are only for Wescam complete surveillance systems and does not include parts and components of the surveillance systems.
- Exported cameras cover exports since 2016 (pre and post 2019 exports).
- The “not exported” figures pertain only to the  Wescam valid permits (now suspended) as they could still be exported should the suspension be lifted.
- * This is the number of cameras the exporter would be allowed to export under their permits. This number could represent cameras ready to be exported and cameras under production or not yet produced. The permit suspension prevents the exporter from exporting these cameras.
- ** This represents the number of repaired cameras that would be allowed to be exported. Our system does not allow us to determine whether these cameras are in Canada or still with the end user. The permit suspension prevents these cameras from being exported. It is unlikely that the end-user would send the cameras in its possession for repairs in Canada during the suspension given that they would be unable to have their cameras back.

3. Grateful if we could receive a profile of the type of Canadian exports of military goods to Turkey over the last 5 years, (e.g. whether we have shipped any LAVs to Turkey).

<< File: Military Exports to Turkey 2019-2014.docx >>

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to let me know.

Guy R. Boileau

Deputy Director | Directeur adjoint
Office of the Deputy Minister of International Trade | Cabinet du Sous-ministre du Commerce international
guy.boileau@international.gc.ca
Tel. 343-203-5965
Global Affairs Canada | Affaires mondiales Canada
Government of Canada | Gouvernement du Canada
<< OLE Object: Picture (Device Independent Bitmap) >>

Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
United Arab Emirates							
	29/09/2019			2-11.a, 2-21.a, 2-22.a, 6-11.A.3.b.3, 6-11.E.2, 6-11.D.2		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> receivers, antenna, technology and software. End-Use: For installation of technology demonstrations to potential customers. End-User Country/Organization: Turkey/ Turkish Armed Forces Condition (s): Quarterly Reporting Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Exception: D – Permits by were raised by President Erdogan during his January 2020 call with PM Trudeau. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey’s sensitive domestic defense industry programs are monitored at the highest level and 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss.

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada’s values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada’s foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						decisions on these permits have a direct impact on bilateral relations. Although the final user is in the UAE, a refusal could be viewed as a lack of support from Canada to a NATO ally and impact our bilateral relations.
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Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status
Turkey						
	25/11/2019	CAE Inc. (St-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Quebec)		2-14, 2-21.a, 2-22.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> This is a permit amendment request to extend the validity date of the permit by 1 year (permit expired January 31, 2020; however given that a review was underway, JLT/Legal division has advised that the permit could be reinstated, if approved; it would reflect the original request for extension or amendment, from the date of approval). Export of hardware, software and technology related to the Image Generators program. End-Use: For the Full Mission Simulator Image Generator (for pilot training). End-User Country/End User: Turkey/Turkish Air Force Condition (s): Quarterly reporting Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns.

• I concur
 • I do not concur
 • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Exceptions: D – Permits for items used by Turkish Armed Forces are often raised at the highest level. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's military are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on bilateral relations with a NATO ally. • Exceptions: E – Export permit applications for an extension to an existing project from before Oct. 19.
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Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	25/11/2019	CAE Inc. (St-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Quebec)		2-21.a, 2-22.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item Description: This is a permit amendment request to extend the validity date by a year (permit expired on January 31, 2020; however given that a review was underway, JLT/Legal division has advised that the permit could be reinstated, if approved; it would reflect the original request for extension or amendment, from the date of approval). For the export of software and technology related to the [REDACTED] Image Generator program. End-Use: Items will be accessed by consignee from their own systems, to provide on-site support to the Turkish Air Force (for pilot training). End-User Country/End User: Turkey / [REDACTED] Condition (s): Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Exceptions: D – Permits for items used 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur. <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

					<p>by Turkish Armed Forces are often raised at the highest level. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's military are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on bilateral relations with a NATO ally.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Exception E – Export permit applications for an extension to an existing permit from before Oct. 19.
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Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;

b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);

c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;

d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;

e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and

f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref. ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
				2-22.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item Description: [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] JLT/Legal division has advised that the permit could be reinstated, if approved; it would reflect the original request for extension or amendment, from the date of approval) [REDACTED] [REDACTED] End-Use: [REDACTED] [REDACTED] End-User Country/End User: Turkey/ Turkish military. Condition (s): Consultations: Expedited consultation with DND and GEO, no objections raised. Exceptions: E – Export permit applications for an extension to an existing permit from 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						before Oct. 19.

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	30/08/2019	GENERAL DYNAMICS ORD./TACTICAL SYST.-CDA. INC. (Repentigny, Quebec)		2-1.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item description: Spare Firearm Parts, for Simunition® Conversion Kit (device that simulates ammunition for training purposes). End-Use: For maintenance of previously procured GDOTS Simunition® Conversion Kits. End-User Country/End-User: Turkey / Condition (s): Quarterly reporting. Consultations: Expedited consultation with DND and GEO, no objections raised. <p>Exception C – Items can only be used for training. Once installed, firearms cannot discharge live rounds, only simulated rounds.</p>	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptional Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	10/10/2019			2-11.a, 2-21.a.1, 2-22.a, 6-11.A.3.b.3, 6-11.D.2, 6-11.E.2		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item description: Antennas, technology and software upgrade downloads. End Use: For a drillship managed by The vessel's work is in the Eastern Mediterranean. End User Country / Organization: Turkey / Condition (s): Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Exceptions: C – GPS receiver, for navigation, going to civilian end user. Exception D – Permits by were raised by President Erdogan during his January 2020 call with PM Trudeau. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's sensitive domestic defense industry programs are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on bilateral 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur. <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss.

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

					relations with a NATO ally.
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Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada’s values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada’s foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref. ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	09/12/2019			2-11.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item description: Replacement parts and components for Aircraft Ship Integrated Securing and Traversing (ASIST) System. End Use: To be used by the Turkish Navy on their MILGEM class ships. End User Country / Organization: Turkey / Turkish Navy Condition (s): Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Exceptions: C – items secure helicopters to ship, serve no other purpose. Exceptions: D – permits raised repeatedly in July by MFA and TK Embassy. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on bilateral relations with a NATO ally. 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Exception F – Permit request to re-export parts that were exported under a previous permit but returned for warranty repairs.
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Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	22/01/2020			2-10.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item description: Various spares and subcomponents used in conjunction with the ASIST helicopter landing system. End Use: To be used on the SH-70 helicopter. End User Country / Organization: Turkey / Turkish Naval Forces Command Condition (s): Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Exceptions: C – items secure helicopters to ship, serve no other purpose. Exceptions: D – ██████ permits raised repeatedly in July by MFA and TK Embassy. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on bilateral relations with a NATO ally. 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	27/01/2020			2-10.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item description: cable cutter assemblies. Replacement of parts originally exported in June 2019. End Use: To be used in conjunction with the ASIST helicopter landing system on the SH-70 helicopter. End User Country / Organization: Turkey / Turkish Naval Forces Command Condition (s): Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Exceptions: C – items secure helicopters to ship, serve no other purpose. Exceptions: D – permits raised repeatedly in July by MFA and TK Embassy. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						<p>impact on bilateral relations with a NATO ally.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Exception F – Permit request to re-export parts that were exported under a previous permit but returned due to non-compliance.
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Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	05/03/2020			2-10.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item description: cable cutter assembly. Warranty replacement of defective part. End Use: To be used in conjunction with the ASIST helicopter landing system on the SH-70 helicopter. End User Country / Organization: Turkey / Turkish Naval Forces Command Condition (s): Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Exceptions: C – items secure helicopters to ship, serve no other purpose. Exceptions: D – permits raised repeatedly in July by MFA and TK Embassy. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on bilateral relations with a NATO ally. 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur. <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Exceptions: F – Permit request to re-export parts that were exported under a previous permit but returned for warranty repairs.
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Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref. ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	09/04/2020	ARMAMENT TECHNOLOGY INCORPORATED (Halifax, Nova Scotia)		2-1.d		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item Description: Export of () firearm sights, and () riflescopes. End Use: For commercial re-sale to law enforcement, security, military and civilian marksmen by the consignee. End-User Country/End-User: Turkey/ () EUS states no further re-export. Condition (s): Quarterly reporting Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Exception C – While this item is not used for self-defence purposes, it can help with targeting and avoidance of civilian casualties. In addition, these items are available widely on a commercial basis. 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptional Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex C: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status
Turkey						
					1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item description: Technical data <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 150px; height: 30px; background-color: #cccccc; margin-bottom: 5px;"></div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 150px; height: 30px; background-color: #cccccc; margin-bottom: 5px;"></div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 150px; height: 30px; background-color: #cccccc; margin-bottom: 5px;"></div> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> End Use Country / Organization: Turkey / Turkish Air Force Condition (s): Quarterly reporting. Consultations: Fully consulted, no objections, some risks pertaining to regional peace and security were raised. Note: while the value of this item is negligible, as it is a data transfer, the Department has been advised that

<input type="checkbox"/>	• I concur
<input type="checkbox"/>	• I do not concur
<input type="checkbox"/>	• I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend : exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a)Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b)Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada’s values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c)A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d)There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada’s foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e)Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f)Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex C: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Exceptions: D – bilateral relations. [REDACTED] permit raised repeatedly. In [REDACTED] This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on the bilateral relations with a NATO ally. • Exceptions: E – Export permit applications for an extension to an existing permit from [REDACTED]
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Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend : exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;

b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);

c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;

d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;

e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and

f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex C: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
880499-3	04/10/2019	Excelitas Canada Inc. (Vaudreuil, Quebec)	BMC	2-5.c, 2-22.a	28,265	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item Description: (4) special optical sensors that detect the angle of incidence of a laser beam and associated technology. The devices are called Excelitas Angular Continuous Threat Detectors. End-Use: For use in Laser Warning Receiver Systems to detect and provide angle-of-arrival information. End-User Country/Organization: Turkey/BMC. Condition (s): Consultation: Fully consulted, no objections, some risks pertaining to Turkey's active involvement in regional armed conflicts were raised. Note: BMC is one of the largest commercial military vehicle manufacturers in Turkey. Exceptions: C – Primary function is self-defence warning system. 	<input type="checkbox"/> I concur <input type="checkbox"/> I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend : exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex C: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	02/12/2019	Honeywell Limited (Mississauga, Ontario)		2-10.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item description: Generator Control Units used on the T-70 helicopter. End-Use: Generator control units will be installed in the Turkish Utility Helicopter T-70. These devices control the electrical power generators on the helicopter. End User Country / Organizations: Turkey / Turkish Military (various) Condition (s): Quarterly reporting Consultations: Fully consulted, no objections, but some risks pertaining to the final end use of this equipment were raised. Exception D – Permits linked to Turkey's sensitive domestic defense industry are raised repeatedly, including at the leaders level. A refusal of this permit could be seen as bilateral irritant and a lack of support to a NATO ally. 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend : exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status
United Arab Emirates						
	2019/09/25	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)	L3 / WESCAM TERRITORY DIRECTOR – MIDDLE EAST AND TURKEY	2-21.a.1; 2-22.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item Description: Technical assistance documents, training courses/materials and software related to the MX and CMX surveillance camera systems End-Use: To be used for the operation, maintenance and/or installation of the surveillance systems and transfer to third parties in consignee's assigned geographical coverage which is Middle East and Turkey; possible re-transfer to Turkey. End-User Country/End User: UAE/various end-users in the Middle East and Turkey Condition(s): None Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns (ECE was also consulted for the Turkey angle) Exception: D – Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at the leaders and ministerial levels. Wescam permits were raised in an April call between PM-Trudeau/Erdogan. Wescam permits were last raised during MINA's Sept. 17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to

<input type="checkbox"/>	I concur
<input type="checkbox"/>	I do not concur
<input type="checkbox"/>	I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's domestic UAV program are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on the bilateral relation with a NATO ally.

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status
					1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item Description: Technical data regarding [REDACTED] End-Use: [REDACTED] End-User Country/Organization: Turkey/ Turkey Ministry of National Defense Turkish Air Force. Condition (s): Consultations: Subject to the export controls of the [REDACTED] Fully consulted, no concerns. Exceptions: D – [REDACTED] raised repeatedly. [REDACTED]

- I concur
- I do not concur
- I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref. ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status
					1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item Description: Technical data related to [REDACTED] End-Use: [REDACTED] End-User Country/Organization: Turkey/ Republic of Turkey Ministry of National Defense Turkish Air Force. Condition (s): Consultations: Subject to the export controls of the [REDACTED] Fully consulted, no concerns. Exceptions: D – [REDACTED] raised repeatedly. [REDACTED]

• I concur
 • I do not concur
 • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada’s values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada’s foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
Turkey							
	2020/03/30	Telemus Warfare Inc. (Ottawa, Ontario)		2-11.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item description: Instantaneous Frequency Measurement (IFM) receiver (Digitizing receiver), for return after testing. End-Use: Used for detection and monitoring of radar signals. End User Country / Organizations: Turkey / ENOVAS Engineering Consultancy Condition (s): Quarterly reporting Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Exception : D – Telemus permits raised repeatedly including at Min level. Telemus permits were last discussed during MINA's Sept. 17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's domestic UAV program are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on bilateral relations with a NATO ally. Exception F – Request to re-export parts that were exported under a previous 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						permit but returned for repairs (Proof of import provided)	
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Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref. ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	2020/04/24	FIELD AVIATION COMPANY INC. (Mississauga, Ontario)		2-10. a, 2-22. a, 9-4. a.ii		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item description: (Modified Bombardier Challenger aircraft including all materials, associated spare parts and kits. End-Use: For surveillance and Information Communication. End User Country / Organizations: Turkey / Presidency of the Republic of Turkey. Condition (s): Quarterly reporting Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Exceptions: D – This permit was raised repeatedly. In July, Turkey asked for an urgent call with MINA to discuss the Field Aviation permit. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on bilateral relations with a NATO ally. Exception: E: Export permit applications 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
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- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada’s foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						<p>for an extension to an existing project from before Oct. 19.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Note: Department was advised that aircraft was already shipped against the company's previous permit, and that this permit is for materials/spare parts, no changes were requested to this permit. • Note: Export is limited to the (1) aircraft noted, serial number 5946, and does not allow a second aircraft to be exported if this permit is approved.
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Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

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- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	06/12/2019	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-5.d		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item Description: Ground Boresight Module/adaptor systems for the Wescam MX-15Di Surveillance Systems (a part for calibration of the camera system) End-Use: To be installed on a End-User Country/Organization: Turkey Condition (s): Quarterly reporting Consultations: Fully consulted, no objections. Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.) Exception: D – Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at the leaders and ministerial levels. Wescam permits were raised in an April call between PM-Trudeau/Erdogan. Wescam permits were last raised during MINA's Sept.17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to demonstrate that decisions 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
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- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status
	05/12/2019	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-5.b, 2-15.d, 2-21.a.1, 2-22.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item Description: This is a permit amendment request to extend validity date by a year (permit expired on March 31, 2020; however given that a review was underway, JLT/Legal division has advised that the permit could be reinstated, if approved; it would reflect the original request for extension or amendment, from the date of approval). The permit is for export of various spare parts and components of the CMX/MX-series surveillance camera systems and related technology and software. End-Use: Used by consignee to repair MX and CMX systems in Turkey. End-User Country/End User: Turkey / L3 Wescam. The EUS states the items will not be re-exported or transferred to another party. Condition (s): Quarterly reporting. Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.) Exception D – Wescam permits raised

<input type="checkbox"/>	• I concur
<input type="checkbox"/>	• I do not concur
<input type="checkbox"/>	• I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada’s values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
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- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

					<p>repeatedly including at the leaders and ministerial levels. Wescam permits were raised in an April call between PM-Trudeau/Erdogan. Wescam permits were last raised during MINA's Sept. 17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's domestic UAV program are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on the bilateral relation with a NATO ally.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Exception: E – Export permit applications for an extension to an existing project from before Oct. 19.
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Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
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- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	05/12/2019	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-5.b, 2-15.d, 6-9.A.6, 2-11.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item Description: This is a permit amendment request to extend the validity date by a year (permit expired March 31, 2020; however given that a review was underway, JLT/Legal division has advised that the permit could be reinstated, if approved; it would reflect the original request for extension or amendment, from the date of approval). The permit is for export of spare parts and components of the CMX/MX-series surveillance camera systems. End-Use: To perform surveillance, targeting, research, test and training by Turkish law enforcement authorities. End-User Country/End User: Turkey / [redacted] of Turkey. EUS states no further re-export to a third party. Condition (s): Quarterly reporting. Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.) Exception : D – Wescam permits raised 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

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- A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	02/12/2019	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-15.d, 6-9.A.6, 2-5.b, 2-21.a, 2-22.b		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item Description: This is a permit amendment request to extend the validity date by 1 year (permit expired on March 31, 2020; however given that a review was underway, JLT/Legal division has advised that the permit could be reinstated, if approved; it would reflect the original request for extension or amendment, from the date of approval). Permit allows a total export of surveillance & targeting camera systems, Ground boresight modules, mission grip assemblies and technical data. End-Use: To perform surveillance, targeting, research, test and training by Turkish law enforcement authorities. End-User Country/End User: Turkey / Turkish Ministry of Defense. Condition (s): Quarterly reporting. Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.) 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

					<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Exceptions: D – Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at the leaders and ministerial levels. Wescam permits were raised in an April call between PM-Trudeau/Erdogan. Wescam permits were last raised during MINA's Sept. 17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's domestic UAV program are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on the bilateral relation with a NATO ally.• Exceptions: E – Export permit applications for an extension to an existing permit from before Oct. 19.
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Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status
	02/12/2019	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-22.a, 2-21.a, 2-18		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item Description: This is a permit amendment request to extend the validity date by a year (permit expired March 31, 2020; however given that a review was underway, JLT/Legal division has advised that the permit could be reinstated, if approved; it would reflect the original request for extension or amendment, from the date of approval). Permit allows for a total of [redacted] master control units, [redacted] handcontroller assemblies, and controlled technical data. End-Use: To perform repairs of MX-series surveillance camera systems. End-User Country/End User: Turkey / L3. EUS states no further re-export. Condition (s): Quarterly reporting. Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Exception D – Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at the leaders and ministerial levels. Wescam permits were raised in an April call between PM-Trudeau/Erdogan. Wescam

<input type="checkbox"/>	I concur
<input type="checkbox"/>	I do not concur
<input type="checkbox"/>	I wish to discuss

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- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						<p>permits were last raised during MINA's Sept. 17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's domestic UAV program are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on the bilateral relation with a NATO ally.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Exception: E – Export permit applications for an extension to an existing project from before Oct. 19.
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Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

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- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	02/01/2020	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-15.d, 2-5.b		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item Description: This is a permit amendment request to extend permit by 1 year (permit expired April 30, 2020; however given that a review was underway, JLT/Legal division has advised that the permit could be reinstated, if approved; it would reflect the original request for extension or amendment, from the date of approval). Permit allows for a total of () surveillance & targeting camera systems. End-Use: To be installed on the () system, used for the purpose of surveillance and targeting. End-User: Turkey / Turkish Gendarmerie. EUS states no further re-export. Condition (s): Quarterly reporting. Consultation: Fully consulted, no concerns. Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.) Exception D – Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at the leaders and ministerial levels. Wescam permits were 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

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- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	26/05/2020	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-5.b, 2-15.d		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item Description: This is permit amendment request to extend permit for 1 year (permit expired June 30, 2020; however given that a review was underway, JLT/Legal division has advised that the permit could be reinstated, if approved; it would reflect the original request for extension or amendment, from the date of approval). Permit allows for a total export of surveillance and targeting camera systems, including ancillary equipment. End Use: The systems will be used for surveillance and targeting. End User Country/Organization: Turkey / Turkish National Police Conditions: Quarterly Reporting Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns: Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.) Exception D – Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at the leaders and 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

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- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
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- A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status
	28/05/2020	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-5.b, 2-15.d		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item Description: This is a permit amendment request to extend the validity date by a year (permit expired June 30, 2020; however given that a review was underway, JLT/Legal division has advised that the permit could be reinstated, if approved; it would reflect the original request for extension or amendment, from the date of approval). Permit allows for the export of surveillance and targeting camera system, including ancillary equipment. End-Use: To perform surveillance, targeting, research, test and training by Turkish law enforcement authorities. End-User Country/End User: Turkey / EUS states no further re-export to a non-listed party. Condition (s): Quarterly reporting. Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.)

<input type="checkbox"/>	I concur
<input type="checkbox"/>	I do not concur
<input type="checkbox"/>	I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
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- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Exception D – Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at the leaders and ministerial levels. Wescam permits were raised in an April call between PM-Trudeau/Erdogan. Wescam permits were last raised during MINA's Sept. 17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's domestic UAV program are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on the bilateral relation with a NATO ally.• Exception: E – Export permit applications for an extension to an existing project from before Oct. 19.
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Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

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- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	28/05/2020	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-21.a.1; 2-22.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item Description: This is a permit amendment request to extend the current permit by 1 year to June 30, 2023 (original permit expires June 30, 2022) For the export of technical assistance documents, training courses/materials and software and firmware related to the MX and CMX surveillance camera systems End Use: For a quotation/proposal on the surveillance systems, which requires the technical items. End User Country/Organization: Turkey / [REDACTED] Conditions: Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.) Exception D – Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at the leaders and ministerial levels. Wescam permits were raised in an April call between PM-Trudeau/Erdogan. Wescam permits were last raised during MINA's Sept.17 call with 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

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- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
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Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

					<p>Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's domestic UAV program are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on the bilateral relation with a NATO ally.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Exception: E – Export permit applications for an extension to an existing project from before Oct. 19.
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Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

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- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
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Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	06/07/2020	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-5.b, 2-11.a, 2-15.d, 2-14, 2-21.a.1		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item Description: This is a permit amendment request to extend the validity date by a year (permit expires on November 30, 2020) to provide continuous demonstration. Permit allows for a total of [redacted] CMX-15D EO/IR surveillance & targeting camera systems, [redacted] CMX-10D EO/IR surveillance & targeting camera systems [redacted] hand controller units, [redacted] mission grip assemblies, [redacted] desktop simulator kits, [redacted] laptops, [redacted] kinetic computers and [redacted] ground boresight modules. End-Use: Items will be used to demonstrate electro-optic and infrared system capabilities to the military, government and law enforcement. End-User Country/End User: Turkey [redacted] [redacted] Condition (s): Temporary condition. Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Precedent memo - BPTS 01794- 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur. <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

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- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
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Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						<p>2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Exception D – Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at the leaders and ministerial levels. Wescam permits were raised in an April call between PM-Trudeau/Erdogan. Wescam permits were last raised during MINA's Sept. 17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's domestic UAV program are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on the bilateral relation with a NATO ally. • Exception: E – Export permit applications for an extension to an existing project from before Oct. 19.
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Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	2020/07/21	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-5.b; 2-15.d; 2-21.a.1; 2-22.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item description: This is a permit amendment request to extend the validity date of the permit by a year to January 30, 2023 (permit expires on January 31, 2022). Export allows for a total of [redacted] CMX-22D EO/IR surveillance & targeting camera, [redacted] ground boresight modules, [redacted] mission grips and hand-controllers, and technical documents, training courses/ materials and operational software/firmware. End-Use: To be incorporated into the [redacted] platform for the purpose of surveillance and targeting. End User: Turkey / [redacted] Condition (s): Quarterly reporting Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.) Exception D – Wescam permits raised 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

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Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

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- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	2020/06/08	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-11.a, 2-15.d, 2-18.a, 2-21.a, 2-22.a, 6-9.A.6		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item description: Repair and return of MX-15 EO/IR surveillance camera systems, (CMX-15D and CMX-22D EO/IR surveillance and targeting camera systems, repair/replacement parts, test equipment and related technical data, training materials and software. End-Use: Repaired full systems are to be returned to their foreign owners; the replacement parts, test equipment and technology will be used for in-country repairs/maintenance. End User Country / Organizations: Turkey / Condition (s): Quarterly reporting Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.) Exception D – Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at the leaders and 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur... <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada’s values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada’s foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	2020/04/06	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-15.d, 2-18.a, 2-21.a, 2-22.a, 6-9.A.6		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item description: CMX-15D EO/IR surveillance and targeting camera systems for their own end use and CMX-22D EO/IR surveillance and targeting camera systems, as well as software. End-Use: For end use by [redacted] who will use the CMX-15D for sustainability and maintainability purposes and for after sales support. End User Country / Organizations: Turkey / SSB (Presidency of Defense industry) Condition (s): Quarterly reporting Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.) Exceptions: D – Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at the leaders and ministerial levels. Wescam permits were raised in an April call 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

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- A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
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Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						between PM-Trudeau/Erdogan. Wescam permits were last raised during MINA's Sept. 17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's domestic UAV program are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on the bilateral relation with a NATO ally.
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- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	2020/04/06	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-5.b, 2-15.d, 2-18.a, 2-21.a, 2-22.a, 6-9.A.6		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item description: () CMX-15D EO/IR surveillance and targeting camera systems, () CMX-22D EO/IR surveillance and targeting camera systems, () hand-controller assemblies, () ground boresight modules, repair/replacement parts, and test equipment to Turkey. End-Use: Used for the purpose of Surveillance and Targeting. End User Country / Organizations: Turkey / () Condition (s): Quarterly reporting Consultations Fully consulted no concerns. Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.) Exception D – Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at the leaders and ministerial levels. Wescam permits were raised in an April call between PM-Trudeau/Erdogan. Wescam 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur. <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss.

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

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- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

					<p>permits were last raised during MINA's Sept. 17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's domestic UAV program are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on the bilateral relation with a NATO ally.</p>
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- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	2020/05/13	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-15.d, 2-18.a, 2-21.a, 2-22.a, 6-9.A.6		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item description: CMX-15D EO/IR surveillance and targeting camera systems, ground boresight modules, handcontroller assemblies and technical documents. End-Use: Used for the purpose of Surveillance and Targeting. End User Country / Organizations: Turkey / Condition (s): Quarterly reporting Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.) Exception D – Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at the leaders and ministerial levels. Wescam permits were raised in an April call between PM-Trudeau/Erdogan. Wescam permits were last raised during MINA's Sept.17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to demonstrate that 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

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- A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
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- Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	2020/06/08	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-15.d		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item description: Various spare parts for the Wescam CMX-15D EO/IR surveillance and targeting camera systems. End-Use: Used in the repairs and maintenance of defective CMX-15D surveillance systems owned by military and law enforcement agencies that fall under Ministry of Defense of Interior. End User Country / Organizations: Turkey / [REDACTED] Condition (s): Quarterly reporting Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.) Exception D – Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at the leaders and ministerial levels. Wescam permits were raised in an April call between PM-Trudeau/Erdogan. Wescam permits were last raised during MINA's 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

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- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
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Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	2020/06/03	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-15.d		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item description: Return temporarily imported [redacted] produced parts for the Wescam CMX-15D EO/IR surveillance and targeting camera systems. End-Use: Items underwent an independent assessment in Canada. Used for the purpose of Surveillance and Targeting. End User Country / Organizations: Turkey / [redacted] Condition (s): Quarterly reporting Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.) Exception D – Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at the leaders and ministerial levels. Wescam permits were raised in an April call between PM-Trudeau/Erdogan. Wescam permits were last raised during MINA's Sept. 17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

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- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
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- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	2020/07/29	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-5.d; 2-11.a; 2-15.d; 2-18.a; 2-21.a.1; 2-22.a; 6-9.A.6		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item description: repaired CMX-15D EO/IR surveillance & targeting camera systems, and MX-15D EO/IR surveillance & targeting camera systems, replacement parts, related test equipment, technical data, training materials and software. End-Use: Foreign-owned items to be returned after repair. End User Country / Organizations: Turkey / Presidency of the Republic of Turkey and Presidency of Defence Industries Condition (s): Quarterly reporting Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.) Exception: D – Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at the leaders and ministerial levels. Wescam permits 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

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- There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
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Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

					<p>were raised in an April call between PM-Trudeau/Erdogan. Wescam permits were last raised during MINA's Sept. 17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's domestic UAV program are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on the bilateral relation with a NATO ally.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Exception: F – Request to re-export parts that were exported under a previous permit but returned for repairs (Proof of import provided)
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Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

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Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	2020/07/15	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-15.d		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Item description: Return temporarily imported [REDACTED] produced parts for the Wescam CMX-15D EO/IR surveillance and targeting camera systems. End-Use: Canada conducted an independent assessment of parts; the assessment had been completed and items are to be returned to consignee [REDACTED] End User Country / Organizations: Turkey / [REDACTED] Condition (s): Quarterly reporting Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns. Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.) Exception D – Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at the leaders and ministerial levels. Wescam permits were raised in an April call between PM-Trudeau/Erdogan. Wescam permits were last raised during MINA's 	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

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Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						<p>Sept. 17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's domestic UAV program are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on the bilateral relation with a NATO ally.</p>
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Fwd: ZEGR1373 Flash Report – Major Escalation along the Nagorno-Karabakh Front

From: "Grant, Alison -ECE" <alison.grant@international.gc.ca>
To: "Khokhar, Jamal -ANKRA -HOM/CDM" <jamal.khokhar@international.gc.ca>, "Schoenauer, Andrea -ANKRA -GR" <andrea.schoenauer@international.gc.ca>, "Ben Sayeh, Fatma -ANKRA -GR" <fatma.bensayeh@international.gc.ca>, "Helal, Marie-Thérèse -IRC" <marie-therese.helal@international.gc.ca>
Cc: "Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE" <kamiliya.akkouche@international.gc.ca>, "Coleman, Robert -ECE" <robert.coleman@international.gc.ca>, "Brisson, Julien -ECE" <julien.brisson@international.gc.ca>, "Pilloud, Marc -ECE" <marc.pilloud@international.gc.ca>, "Sproule, David -ECD" <david.sproule@international.gc.ca>
Date: Sun, 27 Sep 2020 18:57:10 -0400

More from TIE on my specific questions re end use of [REDACTED] exported to Turkey, and their possible transfer to Azeri armed forces. I think that if MINA does call Turkey that we should be requesting clarification on this.

Alison

Director, Eastern Europe and Eurasia
 Cell: 613-462-2747

Begin forwarded message:

From: "Anand, Shalini -TIE"
Date: September 27, 2020 at 6:08:36 PM EDT
To: "Grant, Alison -ECE", "Gosselin, Catherine -TIR"
Cc: "Sproule, David -ECD", "Funtek, Katharine -TID", "Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE", "Brisson, Julien -ECE"
Subject: RE: ZEGR1373 Flash Report – Major Escalation along the Nagorno-Karabakh Front

Hi Alison:

Please see responses below.

Warmly,
 S.

From: Grant, Alison -ECE
Sent: September 27, 2020 5:47 PM
To: Anand, Shalini -TIE ; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR
Cc: Sproule, David -ECD ; Funtek, Katharine -TID ; Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE ; Brisson, Julien -ECE
Subject: RE: ZEGR1373 Flash Report – Major Escalation along the Nagorno-Karabakh Front

Shalini, Catherine:

There are lots of images on twitter of drones being used against Armenian targets today by Azeri MFA. The Turkish chief architect of Turkish Bayraktar UAV systems (Selcuk Bayraktar) just retweeted a photo of drone operations with hashtag #Azerbaijan: <https://twitter.com/Selcuk/status/1310320454201217027?s=20>

It would be helpful to know the following:

-Are there restrictions in our export permit process on the onward sale of [REDACTED] Turkish UAV drones, to Azerbaijan or elsewhere?

Not exactly. The only restriction presently in place is on Turkey group 2 permits.

That said, [REDACTED] needs to indicate in their end-use documentation (provided by their clients/consignees) the intended end use of the products. That is the documentation that we rely upon to make our collective GoC assessment. So, if there were items being sent to [REDACTED] for use of the [REDACTED] in Azerbaijan, then this should have been in the documentation and the end users (whether the companies or Turkish government MOD should adhere to the promised end use).

s.15(1) - International

s.20(1)(c)

If we have issued any permits for items that are not being used for their stated end use, and we can prove this reasonably, then we have the ability to cancel them (which only has an impact if the items haven't yet been shipped); and to deny any additional permits.

-Is there a difference – for us as regulators – whether Turkey gave or sold UAVs with Cdn technology to Azerbaijan?

See above. And, if Turkey (the companies and/or government) didn't tell us they were going to do this in their end use documentation and either sold or gave Azerbaijan this tech, [REDACTED] Again, our recourse would be to cancel existing permits and/or deny permit applications in our system.

If we determined that the company was aware and misrepresented the situation, we can turn the case over to the RCMP in some instances (particularly if there are sanctions violations involved, which would be the case for Libya).

Thanks
Alison

From: Grant, Alison -ECE
Sent: September 27, 2020 2:24 PM
To: Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Funtek, Katharine -TID <Katharine.Funtek@international.gc.ca>; Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE <Kamiliya.Akkouche@international.gc.ca>; Brisson, Julien -ECE <Julien.Brisson@international.gc.ca>
Subject: FW: ZEGR1373 Flash Report – Major Escalation along the Nagorno-Karabakh Front
Importance: High

Shalini – is your group able to respond on this? The extent of our info is in the highlighted para below.

I imagine the only things we could report would be:

- Yes the Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones may include [REDACTED]
- Yes we are aware of reports that AZ military using this model of drone but this would need confirmation from DND? (see highlight – this is the extend of what we know)
- Any end use assurance Turkey is required to give that prevents export of drones with Cdn tech to Azerbaijan (can they do this or are they breaking our export permit guidelines?)

Alison

From: Mawani, Aliya -MINA <Aliya.Mawani@international.gc.ca>
Sent: September 27, 2020 1:49 PM
To: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Anand, Shalini -TIE <Shalini.Anand@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *MINA-Dept Unit <D-MINA-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *USS-DMA Advisors <D-USS-DMAAdvisors@international.gc.ca>; McCardell, Sandra -EGM <Sandra.McCardell@international.gc.ca>; Graham, Molly -EGM <Molly.Graham@international.gc.ca>; Anderson, Ian -EGM <Ian.Anderson@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Brisson, Julien -ECE <Julien.Brisson@international.gc.ca>; Nelson, David -IGR <David.Nelson@international.gc.ca>; Termorshuizen, Cindy -IGD <Cindy.Termorshuizen@international.gc.ca>; Friele, Shawn -IFM <Shawn.Friele@international.gc.ca>; Funtek, Katharine -TID <Katharine.Funtek@international.gc.ca>; Gosselin, Catherine -TIR <Catherine.Gosselin@international.gc.ca>; Korecky, Judy -TIR <Judy.Korecky@international.gc.ca>; Christie, Bruce -TFMA <Bruce.Christie@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; *TFM-Policy <D-TFM-Policy@international.gc.ca>
Subject: Re: ZEGR1373 Flash Report – Major Escalation along the Nagorno-Karabakh Front

Alison, Shalini,

MINA has asked if we investigate the allegations that cameras sold by Canadian companies to Turkey would have been used in this attack/conflict.

Also, O/MINA has just heard from the Armenian National Committee of Canada that Azerbaijan is using the Turkish made Bayraktar TB2 drones. Do we know of any Canadian connection here?

Thanks,

Aliya

Sent from my iPhone

On Sep 27, 2020, at 1:18 PM, Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca> wrote:

To share with o/MINA, report from ANKRA below.

In addition here is the latest on OSCE management of the conflict:

The Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group (Igor Popov of the Russian Federation, Stephane Visconti of France, and Andrew Schofer of the United States of America) made the following statement today (Sept 27): The Co-Chairs view with concern reports of large scale military actions along the Line of Contact in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone. We strongly condemn the use of force and regret the senseless loss of life, including civilians. The Co-Chairs appeal to the sides to cease hostilities immediately and to resume negotiations to find a sustainable resolution of the conflict. The Co-Chairs call on the sides to take all necessary measures to stabilize the situation on the ground and reiterate that there is no alternative to a peaceful negotiated solution of the conflict

The Minsk Group has not been able to travel to the contact line (for COVID restrictions on the Azeri side). We believe they are already engaged with both parties, but we should not expect more than press statements in coming days, if only to allow discreet diplomacy work.

There will be a number of meetings this week at the OSCE at the working level where the conflict is likely to dominate discussions. At the Permanent Council meeting on October 1, we expect both the Armenian and Azerbaijan Ambassadors to raise the conflict. We think it likely that the EU and U.S. will also speak, while being careful to not appear to be taking sides.

From: Schoenauer, Andrea -ANKRA -GR <Andrea.Schoenauer@international.gc.ca>
Sent: September 27, 2020 12:25 PM
To: Grant, Alison -ECE <Alison.Grant@international.gc.ca>; Brisson, Julien -ECE <Julien.Brisson@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Khokhar, Jamal -ANKRA -HOM/CDM <Jamal.Khokhar@international.gc.ca>; Helal, Marie-Thérèse -IRC <Marie-Therese.Helal@international.gc.ca>; Ben Sayeh, Fatma -ANKRA -GR <Fatma.BenSayeh@international.gc.ca>; Akkouche, Kamiliya -ECE <Kamiliya.Akkouche@international.gc.ca>; Pepin-Hallé, Véronique -VOSCE -GR <Veronique.Pepin-Halle@international.gc.ca>; Nelson, David -IGR <David.Nelson@international.gc.ca>; Ben Sayeh, Fatma -ANKRA -GR <Fatma.BenSayeh@international.gc.ca>; Brisson, Julien -ECE <Julien.Brisson@international.gc.ca>; Helal, Marie-Thérèse -IRC <Marie-Therese.Helal@international.gc.ca>; Schoenauer, Andrea -ANKRA -GR <Andrea.Schoenauer@international.gc.ca>; Laporte, Eric -BNATO -GR <Eric.Laporte@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <Andrew.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Nordeste, Bruno -MOSCO -GR <Bruno.Nordeste@international.gc.ca>; Wynne-Hughes, Antonia -USS -DMA <Antonia.Wynne-Hughes@international.gc.ca>; Ghadhban, Sahar -MOSCO -GR <Sahar.Ghadhban@international.gc.ca>; Alexander, Vera -BNATO -DHOM/CDMA <Vera.Alexander@international.gc.ca>; Reil, Leonard -IGR <Leonard.Reil@international.gc.ca>; Sproule, David -ECD <David.Sproule@international.gc.ca>; Coe, Aaron -MOSCO -GR <Aaron.Coe@international.gc.ca>; Hamilton, Kevin -IGR <Kevin.Hamilton@international.gc.ca>; Barbarie, Daniel -VOSCE -GR <Daniel.Barbarie@international.gc.ca>; Fowler, Craig -MOSCO -DR <Craig.Fowler@international.gc.ca>; Turner, Bradley -MOSCO -DR <Bradley.Turner@international.gc.ca>; Auger-Voyer, Francis -MOSCO -SP <Francis.Auger-Voyer@international.gc.ca>; Braun, Rebecca -MOSCO -CS <Rebecca.Braun@international.gc.ca>; Khokhar, Jamal -ANKRA -HOM/CDM <Jamal.Khokhar@international.gc.ca>; Laporte, Eric -BNATO -GR <Eric.Laporte@international.gc.ca>; Vidal, Maeva -BNATO -GR <Maeva.Vidal@international.gc.ca>; Steenweg, Rick -VOSCE -GR <Rick.Steenweg@international.gc.ca>; Pepin-Hallé, Véronique -VOSCE -GR <Veronique.Pepin-Halle@international.gc.ca>; Hinton, Anthony -PRMNY -GR <Anthony.Hinton@international.gc.ca>; penelope.angelopoulos@pco-bcp.gc.ca; NEBOJSA.BJELAKOVIC@forces.gc.ca; McIntyre, Elizabeth -IGR <Elizabeth.McIntyre@international.gc.ca>; Reil, Leonard -IGR <Leonard.Reil@international.gc.ca>; Cayer, Natasha -PARIS -GR <Natasha.Cayer@international.gc.ca>; Alexander, Vera -BNATO -DHOM/CDMA <Vera.Alexander@international.gc.ca>; Solomon, Kate -BNATO -GR <Kate.Solomon@international.gc.ca>; Nelson, David -IGR <David.Nelson@international.gc.ca>; Brimmell, Blair -IGR <Blair.Brimmell@international.gc.ca>; Kim, Clare Min Jeong -IGR <ClareMinJeong.Kim@international.gc.ca>; Aubrey, Bryce <Bryce.Aubrey@pco-bcp.gc.ca>; Braithwaite, Todd -ANKRA -DR <Todd.Braithwaite@international.gc.ca>; White, Nathan -ANKRA -GR <Nathan.White@international.gc.ca>; Mitchell, Ryan -rcmp-grc <ryan.mitchell@rcmp-grc.gc.ca>; Jacobs, Oscar -ANKRA -IM

000235

<Oscar.Jacobs@international.gc.ca>; Wimmer, Christopher -ISTBL -TD
<Christopher.Wimmer@international.gc.ca>; Reil, Leonard -IGR <Leonard.Reil@international.gc.ca>; Sorel,
Valerie -ANKRA -MO -CS <Valerie.Sorel@international.gc.ca>; Russo, Eric -ANKRA -SP
<Eric.Russo@international.gc.ca>; Babin, Mathieu -IGR <Mathieu.Babin@international.gc.ca>; Yendall, Jonathan -
INA <Jonathan.Yendall@international.gc.ca>; Watts Poole, Margaret -INA
<Margaret.WattsPoole@international.gc.ca>; Hughes, Carlton -INA <Carlton.Hughes@international.gc.ca>; Tan,
Jonathan -PRMNY -GR <Jonathan.Tan@international.gc.ca>; Hinton, Anthony -PRMNY -GR
<Anthony.Hinton@international.gc.ca>

Subject: ZEGR1373 Flash Report – Major Escalation along the Nagorno-Karabakh Front

Flash Report – Major Escalation along the Nagorno-Karabakh Front

Summary

- Major military escalation unfolds between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
- Armenia declares martial law, calls for military recruitment in defense of the homeland.
- Azerbaijani parliament declared a state of war, Security Council met this afternoon.
- Turkey declares support for Azerbaijan while Russia reinforces its support to Armenia.
- Information warfare an important dimension of the conflict, shows possible use of TB2 drones by Azerbaijani side.

Military Escalation: This morning, Armenia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson tweeted that “Azerbaijan has launched [an] air attack and shelling against Artsakh, Nagorno-Karabakh.” She then claimed that Armenia had shot down two helicopters and three UAVs in response. The Azerbaijan Ministry of Defense (MOD) confirmed the loss of one helicopter and added that they “decided to launch a counter-offensive operation along the entire front.” This major escalation comes almost a week after an Azerbaijani soldier was killed in a cross-border attack on Monday, September 21. Serious skirmishes appeared to continue throughout the day, with the Azerbaijani MOD saying that their “counter-offensive” is striking Armenian command posts, maneuver forces, military equipment, and facilities with artillery and aviation assets. Azerbaijan also claims to have “liberated” 5 villages, but the Armenian side denied these claims. Nagorno-Karabakh authorities have confirmed the death of two civilians. The Armenian MOD has also alleged that Azerbaijan has been using its largest calibre multiple launch rocket system – which have maximum ranges of 200km. Both sides have long-range systems. If Armenia’s claims are true, then this greatly increases the risk that the two sides begin striking military targets or even cities deep in either Armenia or Azerbaijan.

Armenia declares martial law: In the afternoon, Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan declared martial law and called “on the personnel attached to the troops to report to their territorial military recruitment offices. For the sake of the homeland, for the sake of victory.” The Prime Minister stated that Armenia considered Azerbaijan to have declared war. There are reports that Armenia plans on declaring independence for the Nagorno-Karabakh region, including areas under Azerbaijani control.

Azerbaijani Security Council meets, Parliament declares state of war: President Ilham Aliyev held an extraordinary session of the Security Council as a result of the escalation. Azerbaijan also claimed that it had captured a number of villages in Karabakh and killed 10 Armenian soldiers. Azerbaijani officials insisted that there was no need to call for general mobilisation, but the Azerbaijani parliament has declared a state of war and issued curfews in some cities and regions. Aliyev spoke with Turkish President Erdogan today. The latter reaffirmed that Turkey and Azerbaijan were “one nation, two states,” and vowed to support Azerbaijan “with all [our] means.” Turkey has condemned Armenia for violating the ceasefire with attacks “against international law.” The Turkish Minister of Defence and Foreign Minister have reiterated President Erdogan’s support, saying that Turkey would support Azerbaijan “in any way it wishes.” There are rumours (and some video footage) that suggests that Turkey has facilitated the travel of Syrian fighters to fight on behalf of Azerbaijan. (*Comment: Turkey facilitated the transfer of thousands of Syrian soldiers to fight in Libya, on behalf of the Government of National Accord*).

Turkey – Russia dimension: Many commentators have been quick to highlight that these latest clashes have taken on a much more obvious Turkey - Russia dimension. Turkish reporter Ragip Soylu, for example, highlighted that the escalation comes after Russia sent military advisors and hardware to Armenia, while Turkey deployed troops and trainers to Azerbaijan. Many observers are suggesting that this is a new front between Russia and Turkey, following Syria and Libya. Breaking reports suggest that Russian warplanes have been flying over Idlib as of this afternoon. Foreign Minister Cavusoglu has reportedly spoken to his counterpart, Sergei Lavrov to discuss the clashes. Reports indicate that Russia has called for an immediate ceasefire. A declaration of war could activate the Collective Security Treaty Organization’s (CSTO), where Russia (and four other post-Soviet states) would have to come to Armenia’s defence. Turkey and Russia will likely seek to deescalate the situation, not least given the potential for casualties given the possible ground presence of both Russian and Turkish soldiers (the latter in the area for military exercises).

Information warfare reveals possible use of Bayraktar TB2 drones. The Armenian side has been quick to release video footage wherein they claim to have destroyed several important pieces of Azerbaijani military equipment. The Azerbaijani side did not respond immediately, but has started releasing its own video images, most notably of UAV footage hitting Armenian targets. Military analysts on twitter were quick to note that the footage bore a striking similarity to the footage released by Turkey's MOD during its military operation in Idlib earlier this year, during which they relied heavily on Bayraktar TB-2 drones. In June, Turkey and Azerbaijan announced that Baku would purchase 6 TB2s from Turkey, but there is n clear confirmation that this deal was completed. The claims that the UAVs used by Azerbaijan are Turkish drones are only press reports, and the U.S. Embassy in Baku confirmed that these reports remain unsubstantiated.

Comment/early analysis: If the fighting continues, and Turkey insists on lending its full support to Azerbaijan, Russia will likely support Armenia in the fighting – given not only the CSTO, but also the security arrangement that the two countries have. Russia could increase its pressure on Turkey by supporting the Syrian regime in resuming its offensive on Idlib province which would drive hundreds of thousands, if not 1-2 million, displaced persons toward the border with Turkey. Turkey). ANKRA HOM has reached out to the U.S. Ambassador and the Chief of Political Section in Baku. [REDACTED], The US Embassy has issued a statement referencing the Minsk Group Co-Chairs' [statement](#); [REDACTED] The EU has called for negotiations to reach a ceasefire; the U.K. has issued a statement via Minister for the European Neighbourhood, Wendy Morton, calling on restraint and also referring to the Minsk Group Co-Chairs' statement. [REDACTED] ANKRA HOM has reached out to the Azerbaijani Ambassador, but has not yet heard back.

Drafted: ANKRA/Schoenauer

Approved: ANKRA HOM