

**Management Response and Action Plan
Reports of the Auditor General of Canada
Report – Arctic Waters Surveillance
Publication: Fall 2022**

The French is located below in the document

The complete Report Arctic Waters Surveillance – can be found [here](#)

Audit Recommendation	Departmental Response	Planned Actions	Description of Final Expected Outcome	Sector Responsible for Action/Point of Contact	Expected MAP Implementation Date
<p>Recommendation 1. Paragraph 6.36, page 14</p> <p>National Defence, Transport Canada and Fisheries and Oceans Canada and the Canadian Coast Guard, working together, should take concrete actions to address the long-standing gaps in Arctic maritime domain awareness, particularly the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> the inability to track vessels continuously and to identify non-emitting vessels the barriers that prevent efficiently sharing and integrating relevant information about vessel traffic in Arctic waters. 	<p>Agreed. National Defence, Transport Canada and Fisheries and Oceans Canada and the Canadian Coast Guard agree with the recommendation and will continue taking steps to reduce gaps in Arctic maritime domain awareness, limitations of existing surveillance capabilities including that of small vessels, and barriers to information sharing.</p> <p>We will take a risk-based approach to maritime domain awareness in the Arctic as we do for the east and west coasts, Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Seaway. As part of the Marine Security Operation Centre (MSOC) Information Sharing Protocol and MSOC third-party review, we will incorporate measures to identify gaps in monitoring, assessing and reporting on maritime domain awareness and way forward on operational flexibility, options and tools. Legislative, regulatory, and</p>	<p>1. Transport Canada (leading the Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group) will update Canada's Maritime Security Strategic Framework and supporting strategies – including the Arctic Maritime Security Strategy and Maritime Domain Awareness Strategy.</p> <p>2. Transport Canada is reviewing legislation and regulations to address potential gaps and ensure that the marine transportation security framework continues to be appropriate to modern threats and risks to the marine transportation system.</p>	<p>1. The Maritime Security Strategic Framework will enable a coordinated approach in addressing a range of maritime security challenges and interests. The Arctic Maritime Security Strategy will provide a unified, integrated approach to Arctic maritime security that recognizes the efforts and contributions of departments and agencies associated with the Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group (including Fisheries and Oceans</p>	<p>Action Item 1 – Transport Canada Marine Safety and Security</p> <p>Action Item 2 – Transport Canada Marine Safety and Security</p>	<p>Approval of Maritime Security Strategic Framework by the Assistant Deputy Minister Marine Security Committee – March 2023</p> <p>Approval of Arctic Maritime Security Strategy by the Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group – June 2023</p> <p>Approval of Maritime Domain Awareness Strategy by the Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group – June 2023</p>

	<p>other impediments will also be considered in renewal efforts. The Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group's Maritime Domain Awareness and Arctic Maritime Security implementation strategies will further focus our collective efforts for the development of a risk management approach that defines significant risks and corresponding mitigation measures. We will prepare action plans that clearly identify our respective responsibilities in this regard.</p>		<p>Canada, the Canadian Coast Guard, National Defence and Transport Canada). The Maritime Domain Awareness Strategy will outline a process to organize and use current national capabilities to identify, assess, and address maritime domain awareness issues through the engagement of stakeholders both at home and abroad.</p> <p>2. Potential legislative and regulatory gaps are identified and addressed, ensuring that the security of Canada's marine transportation system recognizes and addresses threats and risks.</p>		<p><i>Marine Transportation Security Act Modernization</i> (included as part of Bill C-33: <i>Strengthening the Port System and Railway Safety in Canada Act</i>) – Tabled in Parliament November 2022</p> <p><i>Marine Transportation Security Regulation Modernization</i> initiative – Spring 2024 pre-publication</p>
<p>Recommendation 2: Paragraph 6.66, page 23</p> <p>To address delays in the delivery of equipment to replace and improve the key federal capabilities used for maritime surveillance in the Canadian Arctic and the risk that several types of</p>	<p>Agreed. National Defense, Transport Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada and the Canadian Coast Guard, and Public Services and Procurement Canada agree that it is important to acquire equipment in a timely manner and manage capability risks associated with Arctic water surveillance.</p>	<p>3. Transport Canada has exercised options for acquiring equipment in a timelier manner and developing contingency plans to address the risk posed by critical equipment failure in support of the National Aerial Surveillance Program. Transport Canada will continue to use the Dash 7 aircraft as the primary aircraft for Arctic surveillance</p>	<p>3. Increased inventory of Dash 7 parts. This will help address ongoing issues and will go a long way to optimize the availability of parts during the operational season (May to December) over the next few</p>	<p>Action Item 3 – Transport Canada Aircraft Services Directorate</p> <p>Action Item 4 – Transport Canada Aircraft Services Directorate</p> <p>Action Item 5 – Transport Canada Aircraft Services Directorate</p>	<p>Action Item 3 – September 2023</p> <p>Action Item 4 – 2026/27</p> <p>Action Item 5 – March 31, 2025</p>

<p>equipment may cease operating before being replaced, National Defence, Transport Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, the Canadian Coast Guard, and Public Services and Procurement Canada should:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identify options and take action to acquire equipment in a timely manner • Develop and approve contingency plans to address the risk of having reduced surveillance capabilities in the event that key satellites, ships, or aircraft cease to operate before they are replaced. 	<p>Regarding Transport Canada's air asset capacity, the department currently uses the Dash 7 aircraft to perform surveillance in the Arctic and has not developed a lifecycle replacement plan. However, the department is in the process of procuring a remotely piloted aircraft system, which is scheduled for delivery in early 2023. The system is expected to augment the department's surveillance capacity in the Arctic.</p>	<p>pending a long-term strategy for the fleet.</p> <p>Transport Canada is working on a strategy to acquire a substantial inventory of Dash 7 parts to increase aircraft serviceability. Due to the limited availability of parts, Transport Canada intends to procure a presently available large package of replacement parts to augment its existing stock. Additionally, TC will continue to utilize both its internal and commercial engineering services to develop and have approved alternate parts, aircraft modifications, and repair designs to address issues.</p> <p>4. In relation to developing and approving contingency plans to address the risk of having reduced surveillance capabilities in the event that key satellites, ships, or aircraft cease to operate before they are replaced, TC ASD will continue to seek funding to update avionics on the other NASP aircraft to enable them to operate in Northern Domestic Airspace. With this improved capacity, the Dash 8 fleet will be able to act as a contingency for the Dash 7.</p> <p>5. The Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS), which is scheduled for delivery in 2023 is</p>	<p>years</p> <p>4. Avionics upgrades on NASP Fleet (dependent on funding from Whales 2.0 Initiative). One aircraft modernized per year starting in 2024/25 over three years.</p> <p>5. As a developmental capability, following the training of</p>	<p>Action Item 6 – Transport Canada Aircraft Services Directorate</p>	<p>Action Item 6 – March 31, 2025</p>
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		<p>expected to augment Transport Canada's surveillance capacity in the Arctic.</p> <p>6. Transport Canada has already identified the lack of infrastructure as an issue in the Arctic and has submitted and been approved for funding in the Oceans Protection Plan to build a hangar in Iqaluit.</p> <p>The Request for Proposals for the hangar will be released in Q4 of fiscal year 22/23. If economically feasible, the construction will start in fiscal year 2023/24 and be completed in 2024/25. The new hangar will support the maintenance of aircraft operating in the region and allow for the possibility of extending surveillance operations into late fall or winter.</p> <p>The facility will also support the operations of the new remotely piloted aircraft system.</p> <p>This infrastructure can also enhance the support provided to the Arctic operations of other government departments.</p>	<p>personnel and the development of regulations and standards, RPAS is planned to be added to NASP fleet as an operational asset in 2025.</p> <p>6. NASP Complex in Iqaluit</p>		
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