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## **Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities**

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**EVIDENCE**

**Thursday, November 9, 2006**

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**Chair**

**Mr. Merv Tweed**

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## Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities

Thursday, November 9, 2006

• (1535)

[English]

**The Vice-Chair (Mr. Don Bell (North Vancouver, Lib.)):** We now have a quorum, so I'll call this Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities to order. The orders of the day are, pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), for an examination of security issues at the Montreal-Trudeau airport.

We have witnesses appearing today from the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority. We have: Mr. Jacques Duchesneau, president and chief executive officer; Mark Duncan, executive vice-president and chief operating officer; Kevin McGarr, vice-president and chief technology officer.

From Aéroports de Montréal, we have James Cherry, president and chief executive officer, and Normand Boivin, vice-president, airport operations.

There will also be, at the end of the meeting, approximately 10 minutes' committee business for the question of estimates.

Before we proceed, I want to mention that we had a notification from the Parliamentary Press Gallery of the intention to video-record today's meeting. This is not for television for CPAC; it would be for *Radio Canada*.

I'll just read this out:

The Parliamentary Press Gallery, in following the guidelines set out by the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, can with reasonable notice advise the Clerk of the Committee of their intent to video-record a committee meeting.

Notification was provided two hours in advance of the meeting, as the Notice had been amended the previous day on account of a change in meeting room. It is up to the members of the Committee to decide if reasonable notice has been given.

In other words, if there is objection to the video-recording, we should state so at this time; otherwise, we will just proceed.

Do I hear any objection? Hearing none, we'll just move ahead.

We'll move to the witnesses now. Mr. Duchesneau, I presume you're leading off for your group.

**Mr. Jacques Duchesneau (President and Chief Executive Officer, Canadian Air Transport Security Authority):** Yes, I am, Mr. Chair.

We're pleased to be here with you today.

[Translation]

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, for the purposes of our appearance today, I would like to reiterate that CATSA's main

objective is to protect the public and to provide a level of service in air transport security that is professional, effective and uniform across the country.

For your information, I will begin with a brief overview of the six responsibilities contained in the mandate of the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority. Those six responsibilities are described in the folder which was distributed to you. I will talk about them briefly.

The six responsibilities are: pre-board screening of passengers and their carry-on baggage; hold baggage screening; non-passenger screening in restricted areas of Class I and II airports; development of a restricted area identification card; administration of the Canadian Air Carrier Protective Program; and administration of Government of Canada funding agreements for supplementary police services.

Through these various security activities and elements, we have succeeded in accomplishing two things: reducing the risk of attacks against civil aviation and regaining the public's confidence in air transport. According to a survey conducted by Decima Research for CATSA in March 2006, 94% of the travelling public said they have confidence in the system in place to ensure air transportation security in Canadian airports.

I believe that this increased confidence comes from the fact that travellers who transit Canadian airports are protected by one of the most advanced air security systems in the world. Incidentally, CATSA has met ICAO—International Civil Aviation Organization—international security standards by screening 100% of checked baggage on international flights. In so doing, CATSA also met a national standard for domestic commercial flights in 89 Canadian airports.

[English]

Having said this, we must understand that in order to be truly effective, a security system must be viable. To create such a system, we must strike a balance between sufficient screening measures and detections of threats and risk on the one hand, and an efficient flow of travellers and baggage through screening points on the other. In order to maintain the efficiency of the air transport system, I believe it is unrealistic to have an environment of air transport security that is 100% infallible, an opinion shared by many experts in air transport security.

Why? It's because it is unrealistic to think we can eliminate 100% of the threats in civil aviation. In fact, such a screening would encumber the air transport network to the point of paralyzing it. That is why we have a multi-layered security system.

I would also argue that we must assign resources and staff according to threats and risks, whether it is through screening techniques or technologies. I would add that human capital must be integrated into the system and be used to its full potential. I firmly believe that any new security screening layer must, above all, improve the efficiency of the system. It must not encumber it in any way. It must never be superficial and bring no added value.

As the authority providing air transport security screening, CATSA strives to act in a preventive and proactive fashion. In this respect, we use the following model to guide our actions and strategies. We call it the AGILE model. Because terrorists are not static, we need to be agile.

AGILE is a five-part concept of action rather than reaction. It is based on flexibility rather than rigidity, and coordination rather than isolation.

The first phase of this model is assess. We have to better understand the environment we are working in by working closely with our partners in air transport security to keep abreast of the constantly changing threats to air transport throughout the world, and more particularly in Canada.

The second phase is to guard. By adding enhanced layers of security, we are better able to protect the travelling public, our airports, and our airplanes against potential attacks.

The third phase is to intervene. We need to ensure that we have sufficient mechanisms to intervene in the event of any incidents that threaten the security of our operations and travels.

The fourth and fifth phases are to learn and to evolve. These two phases are essential for ensuring that our practices and procedures remain relevant and effective.

• (1540)

[*Translation*]

In the area of continuous improvement, allow me to draw your attention to the following CATSA achievements.

First, screening services contracts include important clauses that encourage an improved uniform control process, an enhanced performance management program, and improvements in the code of ethics and bilingualism requirements.

Second, CATSA has developed the restricted area identification card, or RAIC, incorporating technology that identifies the fingerprints and iris of the card holder. By the end of December 2006, the authorities of 29 Class I and II airports will have replaced the previous restricted area pass with this new biometric identification card.

Third, with regard to non-passenger screening in restricted areas of airports, CATSA conducts random screening in 29 Class I and II airports in Canada of all persons with access to restricted areas under the authorization of Transport Canada and its security screening. CATSA applies this screening consistently to pilots, plumbers and

maintenance staff. This is just one of the many air transport security measures in Canada.

[*English*]

Mr. Chair, if we are determined to maintain a safe and efficient air transport system, I definitely believe that what is most important is to continually improve our screening methods and procedures. Although screening devices, barriers, and detectors are important, it is our courage and determination to preserve the values we cherish and to overcome adversity that remain our true instruments of action.

That is my testimony, Mr. Chair.

**The Vice-Chair (Mr. Don Bell):** Thank you.

Is Mr. Duncan or Mr. McGarr going to speak at this time?

**Mr. Jacques Duchesneau:** No. Put the burden on me.

**The Vice-Chair (Mr. Don Bell):** Thank you. That's fine. I gave you a little extra time anyhow because your presentation was concise.

Mr. Cherry.

**Mr. James Cherry (President and Chief Executive Officer, Aéroports de Montréal (Dorval and Mirabel)):** Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[*Translation*]

Members of the committee, ladies and gentlemen, my name is James Cherry and I am President and Chief Executive Officer of Aéroports de Montréal. I am accompanied today by Normand Boivin, Vice-President of Airport Operations.

We would like to thank you for giving us this opportunity to provide an overview of the system implemented at Montréal-Trudeau Airport to protect the public, civil aviation and airport facilities. We would like to begin, however, with a few definitions and clarifications.

We draw a distinction between the terms security and safety. Security consists in the prevention of unlawful acts, for example those perpetrated by organized crime or by terrorists, while airport or airline safety consists of the prevention of accidents. The two notions are often overlapping; a measure may cover both security and safety.

[*English*]

Risk is another notion that is closely tied to security and safety. At Montreal-Trudeau the risks are not the same in all areas of the airport facility. The security and safety measures deployed vary from one sector to the next according to the anticipated risk level.

As you can also appreciate, our security and safety system consists of several layers. Intelligence gathering is an initial line of defence and perimeter control is the second. Within the perimeter we have surveillance, which also involves several levels, and so on, down to searches, screening, and detection equipment.

[*Translation*]

Lastly, while security and safety are certainly major concerns, in our capacity as administrators our job is also to oversee efficient airport operations.

Members of the travelling public are willing to submit to all manner of requirements in terms of security and safety, but when they choose to fly, it is because they want to get from Point A to Point B in the shortest possible time. So fluidity of traffic and shorter wait times are also important considerations, as are costs.

Having made these clarifications, it is now my pleasure to present this overview of the key components of our security and safety system at Montreal-Trudeau.

Aéroports de Montréal is responsible for the management, operation and development of Montréal-Trudeau and Montréal-Mirabel airports under the terms of a lease entered into with Transport Canada in 1992. Overseeing security and safety at the airports is an integral part of our mission. We ensure that relevant laws and regulations are applied by the various stakeholders operating at the airport, and we apply the laws and regulations that come under our own jurisdiction.

• (1545)

[English]

As you can imagine, this is a very important and significant task. An airport such as Trudeau has a territory of about 13.5 square kilometres, including nearly 8.5 square kilometres of restricted area; a perimeter of 30 km, including 24 km of fence; more than 11 million passengers, and one million meeters and greeters annually; more than 150,000 tonnes of cargo annually; 550 daily flights; more than 20,000 employees; and 270 businesses, several of which also have direct runway access. There are also three million vehicle movements in and around the property every year.

Security and safety encompass several areas, including aircraft security; passenger and bag security; cargo security; safety of civil aviation operations; crime prevention—theft, drug trafficking, etc.; border protection—the airport is a port of entry; security of employees; public safety; and road safety.

[Translation]

The mandates of stakeholders involved in security and safety at Montréal-Trudeau are determined under Canadian laws and regulations. ADM is responsible for coordinating actions within its territory and facilities.

[English]

There is a chart in the papers you have in front of you. It shows a breakdown of the security responsibilities. Ultimate responsibility for civil aviation security rests with the Government of Canada. They've chosen to delegate certain of those authorities, as you can see in the chart, to other agencies within the government, and in the case of ADM, by virtue of a lease for certain portions as well. I'll get into the details a little bit of how those responsibilities break down, but you might want to make reference to that chart at page 5, which will be useful throughout.

[Translation]

First, we have the CBSA, the Canadian Border Services Agency, which is responsible for the Customs program; we have Citizenship and Immigration Canada's Intelligence, Interdiction and Enforcement program; the Canadian Food Inspection Agency's Import Inspection at Ports of Entry program; and the presence of inspectors

and specialized units in the passenger terminal, cargo area and sometimes on aircraft.

[English]

The RCMP has responsibility under the current system for federal airport investigation services, including organized crime and drug trafficking; the immigration and passport section, responsible for illegal immigrants and human trafficking; the customs and excise section of the RCMP that's responsible for smuggling; and the integrated national security enforcement team. As well, as part of the Canadian air carrier protection program, the RCMP is responsible for the air marshalls program.

Transport Canada has retained full responsibility for the regulation of air transport safety and security, the establishment of security and safety standards at all airports, the tests and audits of that system, and the reliability screening of airport staff. Together with the RCMP and CSIS, it is they who issue the directive to the airports to issue an airside pass.

CATSA, Mr. Duchesneau's organization, is responsible for passenger searches in Montreal's airports for three pre-boarding checkpoints, all the searches of checked baggage, supply of search and explosives-detection equipment, and the search of employees at main access points to the restricted areas. Their workforce is provided by Garda, a subcontractor.

[Translation]

The ADM Airport Patrol is a specialized law-enforcement agency with about 200 staff members. It is the only Canadian airport agency accredited by CALEA, a body that is similar to ISO for law enforcement agencies. The Airport Patrol's role includes surveillance, prevention, intervention and law enforcement. It is important to note that its members are unarmed.

Airport Patrol members are responsible for patrolling the entire territory, and act as first responders. The Patrol applies traffic and road safety regulations, and issues airside driver's permits. It possesses and operates specialized equipment for detecting explosives, managing bomb threats and suspicious packages, as well as threat information and assessment. Following a screening process by Transport Canada, it issues employee passes, and searches employees at access points to restricted areas in facilities under ADM control. Lastly, the Patrol develops emergency plans and procedures.

ADM also has a Fire Service.

ADM has a close relationship with the City of Montreal Police Force. The City of Montreal police officers are responsible for providing 911 services as first responders, including all criminal aspects. They are also responsible for public safety. Under a special agreement with ADM, they also have a series of specific responsibilities, including the responding to alarms at security checkpoints, ensuring a police presence in the U.S. customs pre-clearance section, and ensuring a police presence in the boarding area for flights to Ronald Reagan National Airport in Washington.

•(1550)

[English]

Another portion of our responsibility that's quite important is related to, as I mentioned, the large number of tenants that are on the airport property and that in fact form part of the perimeter. They are responsible—it's clearly indicated in their leases—for compliance with regulations and, if applicable, control of access to restricted areas within their own facilities. They are also subject to Transport Canada security intrusion testing—it happens frequently—and they're subject to the intrusion testing by the airport's own patrol visits program.

The airlines themselves have a great deal of responsibility in the system as well. They're responsible for the security of their aircraft. They're responsible for cargo security. They're responsible for the access control to their aircraft, and they're also responsible for the searches of their aircraft in threat situations.

One of the things that has been put in place that is relatively unique to Montreal is the significant network of information and intelligence sharing. We have three key committees involved in that. One is the airport operators committee, which groups ADM, the airlines, government agencies, Nav Canada, and the aviation service suppliers. It's the coordination of all operations.

We also have—I believe this is still unique to Montreal—a committee of law enforcement agency managers. All of the people who have any law enforcement responsibility at our airports have regular meetings to have information exchanges and coordination.

As well, our committee of partners for airport protection regroups law enforcement agencies, public security services, and CATSA. Its objective, obviously, is public safety.

We have a fully staffed operations coordination centre with a calls and distribution centre operational 24/7. It's managed by our airport patrol people as well. They're responsible also for emergency response coordination, which brings all internal and external players under a single command centre in the event of a crisis. When necessary, it can be supported by a mobile command post, which we control as well.

[Translation]

In conclusion, we would like to remind honourable members that major improvements have been made to the system over the years, notably in the wake of the events of September 11, 2001. Indeed, the security system in place at all major Canadian airports has been considerably strengthened.

Among other things, surveillance has been tightened for the entire airport territory and in all facilities. We have sophisticated equipment designed to protect civil aviation in this country. The police presence has been beefed up, enabling faster response times in case of incidents. Access by non-passengers to restricted areas is better controlled, and we are expecting delivery of the new biometrics-based restricted area passes, as mentioned earlier by Mr. Duchesneau.

Passenger and baggage searches have been made more systematic. For example, explosives-detection systems have been installed to ensure all checked baggage is inspected. Moreover, the list of items

prohibited on board aircraft has been adjusted in response to new threats. Lastly, new coordination mechanisms have been created.

I should add that, in the wake of recent media reports, without waiting to hear the results of the Transport Canada inquiry, we met individually with each of our tenants to remind them of their responsibilities with respect to control of access to restricted areas.

•(1555)

[English]

The system is therefore dynamic and is being constantly upgraded, and of course, additional enhancements can be made to it in the future. For example, we have previously suggested some avenues for improvement, such as part of the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority's five-year review, on which we made recommendations to this same committee in 2001. We've also noted that cargo security could be rendered more systematic by applying the same formula for the sharing of responsibilities as for passenger searches.

Finally, we remain open to any other initiative that aims to provide for enhanced cooperation among all stakeholders and improved security and safety in our airports.

[Translation]

Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for listening.

We are now ready to answer any questions you may have—provided, of course—that the information requested is not of a sensitive nature, and that it lies directly within our purview.

[English]

**The Vice-Chair (Mr. Don Bell):** Thank you.

Mr. Boivin, I presume you're available for questions. You don't have a presentation this time.

I would like to acknowledge that we have joining us Jeff Watson, who I gather is a new member of this committee. Welcome, Jeff.

We have, as replacement members, Stephen Owen from the Liberal side and Larry Miller from the Conservatives. Welcome.

Going into questions, Mr. McGuinty.

**Mr. David McGuinty (Ottawa South, Lib.):** Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Translation]

Gentlemen, thank you for being here today. We had been waiting for you for some time. I very much enjoyed your presentations.

[English]

I'd like to start, if I could, by recalling what shocked Canadians in September in a series of articles in *Le Journal de Montréal*. A journalist had covertly entered restricted areas of a major Canadian airport, borrowed a non-passenger uniform, potentially tampered with food, accessed a secure tarmac, reached the runway perimeter, got behind the wheel of a ground vehicle, got airside by borrowing a genuine CATSA uniform from a former employee. For most Canadians who saw this story, there are some serious questions about the security of our airports.

Also in September, a former airport screener, hired and employed by the private company Garda, blew the whistle because he was concerned about Canadian airport security. He still had his uniform because no one had bothered to ask for it back. Garda refused to comment about the story, citing their contractual relationship with the government, and the minister, who was asked twice to comment on it, declined to comment and said nothing about it. Eight weeks later, on November 6, Garda's contracts were all renewed—28 airports, \$220 million over two years to 2009.

I think you know where I'm going with this. I want to ask you about accountability. Our Senate colleagues on all sides of the House have been asking questions about this for two years.

First, what is CATSA's responsibility here? Second, who failed? And third, do you have enough money to do what you've been mandated to do as an organization?

**Mr. Jacques Duchesneau:** In relation to the incident in Montreal, I can give you part of the answer, and my colleague Mr. Cherry will complete the answer.

On accountability, CATSA is accountable. We're not pleased with the situation, and we took action. As a matter of fact, we took action back in 2005 when we were asked by a reporter to give certain details about uniforms. As of April 2005, we issued a security bulletin explaining the importance of the uniform, but I need to stress the point right away that the uniform itself does not give access to the restricted area. A uniform is a way to represent CATSA, but it's really the restricted area pass that gives access to the restricted area.

As of December 31 of this year, not only will we have a pass, but we will have a pass with biometrics. So even though you have a uniform, no matter what kind of uniform, you will not be in a position to access the restricted area.

From April 2005 on, we have put the onus on the service provider to get the uniforms back. As a matter of fact, in the bulletin that I referred to, we have a fine of \$900 for uniforms that are not returned. It so happened that they took action, and now we have uniform representatives working out of major airports for each of the service providers.

In September 2005, we did a first review, an audit, of 15 airports. There were some problems that were dealt with quickly, and solutions were brought forward. In December 2005, one of the major problems we had was shields, metal shields, that were held on a shirt with Velcro. The Velcro was not good enough, so they kept losing them. Now if you go through airports, you will see that we don't have metal shields anymore; it's all embroidered. CATSA's logo is embroidered on the shirt. So we solved that problem.

I need to refer to the article that brought all this together. They talked about over 1,000 uniforms being stolen. It was not 1,000 uniforms stolen, it was parts of the uniform, so the shield, and the name tag that you could have done anywhere around town. These were parts of the uniform. We could not have enough pieces to put one uniform together, and I think it is important for me to underline that aspect.

We did a second review of the uniform program in February 2006 at 20 other airports, and the note we have now is that this program is under control.

That's for the uniforms, and as I said in my opening remarks, we are responsible for six specific mandates. The other issues that you raise are the airports' responsibility.

• (1600)

**Mr. James Cherry:** I am going to respond to the portion of the question Mr. McGuinty asked with respect to the intrusions that took place in September 2006.

Let me begin, if you don't mind, by correcting some of the misperceptions in that event. There were a couple of things that were misstated. First of all, the journalist did in fact get hold of a vehicle, but it was on the ground side of the airport. It was never in a restricted zone. It was a Handlex vehicle, and it's well documented that the vehicle was not in the restricted zone, it was outside the restricted zone.

Most of the interventions he made were in areas in tenants' properties, where he got inside the building and there were open doors at the far end of the building—hangar doors, frankly—which would have given him access to the runway. He never did actually get access to the runway in any of those instances.

There were two times when he did get access to what we call the restricted zone. One time he went underneath the fence, on Ryan Avenue, which is in the general aviation area. This is about a mile and a half from the main terminal, to the east of the main terminal, where private airplanes land and take off. He went underneath the fence, had his picture taken and escaped back underneath the fence before the patrol came around and found him. But he was a long way from the operational area of the main tarmac and he didn't even approach the runway, didn't approach the taxiway. He was only on the other side of a restricted zone fence.

As I mentioned at the outset, we have about 30 kilometres of perimeter that are patrolled regularly, frequently, but we don't have somebody at every point along that perimeter constantly.

The other time he made an intrusion into what we call the restricted area, he was actually accompanied by somebody from one of our tenants. The tenant did not follow the protocol, because you're not allowed to bring somebody out on the tarmac unless...he was escorted, but he didn't have a "with escort" pass on. So he did gain access to the tarmac, but he was escorted. There was somebody with him. So he wasn't walking by himself on the tarmac at that point.

The one you made reference to, which frankly I do find the most troubling and the one that we've reacted... We've reacted in all instances, by the way, but I want to reassure people that the one everybody has taken very seriously was the intrusion in Cara, even though that's not even inside the restricted zone. The Cara kitchens are outside the restricted area of the airport.

Because of the nature of that intrusion, we were very concerned about it, as were the people from Cara, as were the people who use their food, the airlines. You can rest assured that steps have been taken to make certain there will not be a repeat of that. We have stepped up our vigilance in the case.... We have always been visiting these people and looking into their compliance with our rules, but we've stepped up those procedures to make sure there will not be a repeat of that.

Having said that, is a 30-kilometre perimeter absolutely leak proof? No, it is not. It is not armed, it is not electrified. It is a fence with barbed wire, but as you know, there are ways to get through or around fences like that. This is why I mentioned during the course of my presentation that there are layers of measures put into place. If somebody gets through that fence, there are patrols, and the patrols are frequent, and we can and do catch people who get over the fences with those patrols. It's a long way from Ryan Avenue, where this person got into the airport and over that fence to have his famous picture taken, to where the operational end of the airport is. A lot of opportunities to have him apprehended before that would have happened. As I said, he wasn't in there very long. He went in, had his picture snapped, and jumped back underneath again.

• (1605)

**The Vice-Chair (Mr. Don Bell):** Thank you.

Mr. Laframboise.

[*Translation*]

**Mr. Mario Laframboise (Argenteuil—Papineau—Mirabel, BQ):** Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, in spite of everything you have said, one fact remains: on September 11 of last year, a single man—journalist Fabrice de Pierrebourg—succeeded in circumventing all your security systems. That is a fact. That is why we are here today, and why you are here today.

**An hon. member:** Did you understand the answer—

**Mr. Mario Laframboise:** I did understand the answer, but it remains that what happened did indeed happen. My first question is to Mr. Duchesneau.

Mr. Duchesneau, something is worrying me and has prompted me to push my investigations further. Before you took up your current position, you sat on the Garda board of directors. That is a known fact. Since 2004, Garda has been responsible for security at Montréal-Trudeau Airport, and probably supplanted the former security manager or company for all kinds of reasons that I do not wish to know. Nonetheless, it remains that, at the time, you were well aware that a number of uniforms were not returned. It was clear at the time that something was wrong. I know that you subsequently made a number of changes to the uniforms. But it was known that a number of uniforms were missing. There were also a number of people who were not happy because they had been supplanted.

Later, in June 2006, an audit was carried out—correct me if I'm wrong—and the report by the Department of Transport, Infrastructure and Communities stated once again that there was no policy, and that people themselves had called for a uniform return and control policy. There was no such policy in place yet.

Today, you tell us that there will be a policy in place as of September.

That worries me, Mr. Duchesneau. For all kinds of reasons, among other things because companies have obtained contracts, companies too close to you because you once sat on the board of directors—I don't want to ask you about conflict of interest issues here—people believe that their security is threatened. I am worried about the fact that there are uniforms outside your control. Today, you said in the brief you tabled that the services contract signed with Garda contains a clause on improving the uniform control process.

I understand that they are your friends, but nonetheless uniforms from the preceding company are still in circulation. That was a company which was not happy with the way things went. There are companies who are not happy. Your friends, once again... Companies were supplanted, evicted, and Garda was awarded contracts to provide security elsewhere, not just in Montreal.

So in the industry there are people who are not happy about the way things have turned out. That worries me, because I wouldn't want to see incidents happen, and I wouldn't want to see things go further.

So do you think you have full control, at least over uniforms, given the way things turned out with the former company, and given the situation with Garda today? Can you assure me that those circulating uniforms will not cause problems?

**Mr. Jacques Duchesneau:** I understand your concern, Mr. Chair, but because you focused on the expression “friends” twice, I would like to clarify something from the outset.

When I applied for the position I currently occupy, the first page of my CV stated that I had held an administrative position within Garda that, at the time, had a staff of approximately 2,000. Today, Garda has more than 20,000 employees. So, when you refer to my friends, remember that the company I was involved with at the time and the company that calls itself Garda today are as different as day and night.

I would not want to infer from your comments — because that would be very hurtful to me — that you were implying something negative in your use of the word friends.

**Mr. Mario Laframboise:** But you know them very well. This begs another question. I did not think that you would react the way you did and I am compelled to mention that Unicom, another company whose board of directors you were a part of, was granted the airport's biometric monitoring contract.

I would be concerned if Unicom's competitors provided information, through technological means, to unreliable people. Do you understand?

**Mr. Jacques Duchesneau:** I understand your reasoning.

**Mr. Mario Laframboise:** They would be doing this to trap you because they are upset with you. I am concerned about this and that is why I am trying to determine what the situation is.

Are you comfortable with your relationship with the industry, in the position that you currently hold?



•(1610)

**Mr. Jacques Duchesneau:** Mr. Chairman, now it has been presented in that light I understand your concern. I can tell you, in fact, that given my commitment in the past, I am in no way responsible for awarding contracts.

I will let Mr. Duncan tell you how this works. I've withdrawn from those boards and declared those interests. Furthermore, when contracts are awarded, my organization's board replaces me, if you will. Nevertheless, my chief of operations is responsible for analyzing proposals and even drawing up the specifications, and proceeding with the analysis and presentation.

You're familiar with my past. Throughout my whole life I have been threatened in all sorts of ways by all sorts of people and I walk a straight line. I can look anyone in the eyes and tell them that I walk a straight line. That is not something I am worried about.

**Mr. Mario Laframboise:** Just so that we understand each other, I am not questioning any possible interests on your part. I told you this from the outset. The problem is that uniforms disappeared; previous companies did not hand them all in and that is a known fact.

Can we therefore expect other incidents such as those? Let's go back to biometrics, because...

**Mr. Jacques Duchesneau:** With respect to the uniforms, we were worried about this when the article was published in the Regina newspaper and was then published throughout the country. We took steps and I am comfortable with the current measures. I will be even more comfortable with them when all the biometric cards will have been deployed throughout the country. That's probably the best insurance policy you can have. It doesn't mean anything for someone to simply wear uniform, even if their photograph is on the first page of the *Journal de Montréal* in one of our uniforms—you could do that the same thing with any organization that has employees in uniform: you lend a uniform and someone takes a photo.

What you should be concerned about and what we are also concerned about is the possibility of someone having access to the restricted zone, not only with a uniform but with a pass. We are concerned about that but I can tell you that that is not what happened.

**Mr. Mario Laframboise:** Yet, given that we're talking about biometrics, we're being told that without any geosurveillance—because there is no surveillance nor are there any surveillance cameras—anybody could open the doors and get away, because you have no surveillance system. Geosurveillance is probably the responsibility of the ADM, the Montreal airport, but nobody has wanted to combine biometrics and geosurveillance. I'm not the only one who thinks that. There are people who are critical of biometric monitoring and who also want area surveillance to be used, that is, that cameras be installed for the purposes of surveillance at all the entrances; but that is not something you considered.

**Mr. Jacques Duchesneau:** And that isn't something that we will consider because we must not fall into the trap of magical thinking. I have here a biometric identification card. If we had geosurveillance, I could have left this at the office and you would have thought I was at the office all afternoon when I was here. So establishing security measures does not involve magical thinking. It's very important to point that out.

I heard a comment to the effect that geosurveillance would solve all our problems. But no, it won't solve all our problems. What I can tell you about this biometric card—and we often compare ourselves to other countries—is that in our case, it's not a dream, it's becoming a reality. By December 31st, all of our employees in the country's main airports will have this card. In other countries, tens of millions of dollars are being invested and they're still at the pilot project stage. So I think we should be given some credit for what has been accomplished.

In terms of the technological details, Mr. McGarr could provide you with more information.

Mr. McGarr.

**Mr. Kevin McGarr (Vice-President and Chief Technology Officer, Canadian Air Transport Security Authority):** With your permission, Mr. Chairman.

The technology that we developed for our identification card within regulated zones is the type of technology that can work with systems such as those you mentioned. We have conducted trials. This technology is compatible with geosurveillance, if ever people wanted to include that on the card.

Trials were conducted. It can work, but it is not our responsibility to include on that card more than two operations that were requested, that is, to, first, ensure through biometric monitoring that the person using the card is actually the person registered in the program and to, second, verify in real time that the card corresponds to a valid security code issued by Transport Canada. We conduct that verification through a central data bank. If the need or will existed, the card would be compatible with geosurveillance technologies.

•(1615)

[English]

**The Vice-Chair (Mr. Don Bell):** That's the time, Mr. Laframboise.

I've allowed both to go over, and I'll do the same for the Conservatives.

Mr. Fast.

**Mr. Ed Fast (Abbotsford, CPC):** Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to all of you for attending today.

I'm going to address my questions primarily to Mr. Duchesneau. I'm going to follow up on a question that was asked by Mr. McGuinty and wasn't answered. It has to do with the funding you receive.

CATSA was created in 2002. Is that correct?

**Mr. Jacques Duchesneau:** Correct, on April 1.

**Mr. Ed Fast:** Right, and you were appointed at that time?

**Mr. Jacques Duchesneau:** No, I was appointed in October. The chair of the board was the interim CEO for about six months during the search process.

**Mr. Ed Fast:** Who appointed you at that time?

**Mr. Jacques Duchesneau:** I'm appointed by the board.

**Mr. Ed Fast:** By the board itself.

**Mr. Jacques Duchesneau:** Yes. There were 183 candidates, and I went through five interviews. On October 3, I was selected by the board and officially nominated on October 4 by government.

**Mr. Ed Fast:** All right. I'd like to talk a bit about the funding you presently have. At the time you took over, what was the approximate operating budget for CATSA?

**Mr. Jacques Duchesneau:** About \$290 million. I can give you more details. But I think we need to look at it on a five-year basis. It's easier. We were given \$1.942 billion on a five-year period. The first year—I was wrong—it was \$170 million altogether, but we were just ramping up. Then it went up when we were deploying. We deployed equipment in all 89 airports so we used more of the budget. Now we're about \$57 million over what was originally given.

But you have to keep in mind that when we were created we only had four mandates. Then two mandates were added in November 2002. That is the non-passenger screening and the restricted area identification card. Also, over the last year, I hope because of the work we've done, the traffic has increased a lot in all airports across the country. We even went beyond the traffic that was there before 9/11.

**Mr. Ed Fast:** You're talking about capital funding as well as operational funding.

Let's talk about the operational funding. Do you remember what the operational budget was back in 2002-03?

**Mr. Jacques Duchesneau:** Yes, Mr. Chair, roughly \$170 million for the first year; \$234 million the second year, 2003-04; 2004-05, \$268 million; 2005-06, \$294 million; and 2006-07, \$347 million. That's the operating budget.

**Mr. Ed Fast:** Do you expect that budget to go up in the future?

**Mr. Jacques Duchesneau:** Not necessarily, because now that we've deployed, we need much less money than we needed when we were first created. So we have estimates that I cannot share with you because it's still pending a decision. But if the question is—and I think Mr. McGuinty asked the question and I failed to answer the question—do we have enough money to do our job, the answer to that is yes.

**Mr. Ed Fast:** You're absolutely certain of that.

**Mr. Jacques Duchesneau:** I'm comfortable with the amount of money. As a matter of fact, we were given another \$133 million this year.

**Mr. Ed Fast:** In terms of the capital that's been invested, do you believe that's sufficient at this time?

**Mr. Jacques Duchesneau:** So far, yes, because we've deployed. The equipment is good for a seven-year period. I would ask my COO to give you more details. But it also depends on the threats that we're facing. Liquids were there before, but not as much as they have been since August 10, for instance.

So we need to adapt. I think that's one of the main messages that I need to convey to you. The CATSA that you see in 2006 is totally different from the CATSA that was there in 2002. Why is it that we made some mistakes? And I would admit that we made mistakes. We had to learn how to run before we even knew how to walk. We had to respond quickly. And looking back, I am proud of the work that

has been done by the small group of people we have. I'm not bragging when I say that; I sincerely believe what I'm saying.

• (1620)

**Mr. Ed Fast:** With respect to the breach that took place in Montreal, you've obviously taken steps to ensure that breach doesn't occur again?

**Mr. Jacques Duchesneau:** Yes. Once again, I don't want to dodge the question. Mr. Chair, we've been asked that question many times before. I want to answer your question. But we need to go back to the six mandates that were given to us. This is not CATSA's responsibility. Go back to the six mandates: passengers and their carry-on baggage; the checked baggage; the non-passenger screening; the restricted area identification card; and managing two policing programs. That's it. So we have a shared responsibility here.

If you're asking me how we work with partners, I'd say much more than ever before. It's going well. ADM is a good partner. We work with policing services, with the airlines and the airports.

**Mr. Ed Fast:** I have a follow-up question on that.

You talked about the six areas that you're responsible for, and I understand you have three committees that tried to coordinate all the security and safety issues. However, I noticed there was no specific reference in your handout here to who's responsible for cargo, other than the airlines. Did I miss something?

**Mr. Jacques Duchesneau:** It's not part of our six mandates.

**Mr. Ed Fast:** No, I know it's not part of yours, but...

**Mr. James Cherry:** The answer is that you're absolutely right: that is who is responsible for the security of cargo today, according to the rules laid down by Transport Canada. By the way, pretty much everywhere in the world it's treated exactly the same way. The airlines—or the shippers, if it's done...*[Inaudible—Editor]*...are responsible for cargo, and the security of the cargo.

**Mr. Ed Fast:** Do you believe any changes are required or are you satisfied that is the way it should continue?

**Mr. James Cherry:** Well, let me answer it two ways. Let me say that, first of all, it's been suggested by some that the airlines don't take that seriously. I can assure you—and it's rare that I'm taking the side of the airlines—they take it very seriously. Their assets, their reputation, and their employees are at risk if they don't take it seriously. They take it very seriously. They look at security from a very serious point of view.

Could it be improved? I'm of the view that no system is perfect, and it can always be improved. Should we be doing more to perhaps alleviate some of that burden from the airlines and provide some more support in terms of cargo surveillance? It's something that a lot of people are looking at, and not only in this country, by the way. When we talk at airport conferences around the world, we find it's a preoccupation of our organizations and the airlines. Organizations that are like Transport Canada in other parts of the world see this as an issue and something that they have to deal with.

But I can tell you now that it's not going to be easy to do, and it's going to be quite expensive to do, as well. So I think when we do it—and I'm not suggesting that's a reason not to do it, but I'm saying when we do it—let's make sure we do it properly. It could always be improved. Security is something that has to evolve.

I like the phrase that Mr. Duchesneau uses about evolving, because the threat evolves constantly. Take the gels and liquids threat of August 10. Sure, we were aware that explosives could be created with gels and liquids before, but was it an imminent threat? Not up until that point. At that point, the threat evolved, and we took measures to counteract that threat. I think that's the environment we're in. It's dynamic, and it has to be that way.

**Mr. Ed Fast:** Do passenger airlines ever carry non-passenger cargo?

**Mr. James Cherry:** Yes, indeed.

**Mr. Ed Fast:** Do they mix?

**Mr. James Cherry:** Yes, indeed. In the numbers for Dorval airport, for Trudeau airport, there's about 150,000 tonnes of cargo carried every year in the belly of passenger airplanes, so about half our overall cargo volume is carried in the belly of passenger airplanes.

• (1625)

**Mr. Ed Fast:** So the security of that plane rests with the airlines, not with CATSA?

**Mr. James Cherry:** Indeed.

**Mr. Ed Fast:** Really?

**Mr. James Cherry:** For the cargo portion, absolutely, yes, it does.

**Mr. Ed Fast:** That's shocking. I'm very surprised.

**Mr. James Cherry:** That is the way their mandate has been laid down by Transport Canada, by the Government of Canada, and it is exactly the same situation as you would find in the United States—

**Mr. Ed Fast:** I understand.

**Mr. James Cherry:**—and everywhere else in the world. That's the way it's done today, unless you can tell me differently.

**Mr. Jacques Duchesneau:** No.

**Mr. James Cherry:** But that's my understanding of the way it's done everywhere.

**Mr. Ed Fast:** So if I were a terrorist and I was trying to find a more convenient way of getting access to a passenger plane, and I felt there was an airline that had weaker security in terms of its cargo, I would be tempted to focus in on that, would I not? There's no national standard and no international standard for that?

**Mr. James Cherry:** I couldn't speculate on that, and I don't know that my colleague Mr. Duchesneau could either.

**The Vice-Chair (Mr. Don Bell):** We'll have to come back the next round. That's been more than nine minutes.

**Mr. Ed Fast:** Thank you.

**The Vice-Chair (Mr. Don Bell):** Mr. Owen, I understand you're delegating your time to Mr. McGuinty.

**Hon. Stephen Owen (Vancouver Quadra, Lib.):** I'll just ask one question before I do that, if I may.

**The Vice-Chair (Mr. Don Bell):** All right, then. You're sharing your time, then. Go ahead.

**Hon. Stephen Owen:** I'm sharing. Thank you.

Mr. Cherry, in particular, you mentioned in your notes that the Montreal airport system is the only Canadian agency with accreditation by CALEA, which is similar to getting the ISO qualification. I'm delighted to hear that, but a little surprised to hear that other Canadian major airports aren't either required, expected, or self-motivated to seek that kind of accreditation.

**Mr. James Cherry:** They're not required or expected to. This is a motivation we had ourselves; we went out and sought this. There are a lot of airports in the U.S. that have that certification. It is a U.S.-based organization. Back in 2001-02 we started the steps to try to make our systems more rigorous, and just as for an ISO certification, we went into the process of documenting our processes and plans in order to retain that certification. I can also say that we've gone back every two years to be recertified, and we have been certified again.

We thought it was a very good process, a very thorough one that went into all levels of the security aspect of the airport, including and especially the preparation of standards, the preparation of emergency plans, the training of our people, and a whole myriad of other things.

But it was at our initiative; it was not a requirement.

**Hon. Stephen Owen:** Thank you. That might be something our committee may want to recommend for broader application.

Let me just say, by way of observation to all of you gentlemen on the important work you're doing and the success you've made, that risk assessment is, as you've mentioned, really a factor of two things—the likelihood of an occurrence and the consequence of an occurrence. Even when we're dealing with almost infinitesimal percentages of likelihood, the consequences are catastrophic. So your work is immensely important.

Thank you for what you do.

**The Vice-Chair (Mr. Don Bell):** Thank you.

Mr. McGuinty, you have approximately three minutes.

**Mr. David McGuinty:** Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I'd like to go back to the question of cargo screening. You just gave us the statistic that roughly 50% of all cargo carried out of Montreal... I don't know what it would be nationally, but it would be interesting to get that from Transport Canada. Can Canadians assume that half of the cargo carried in Canadian planes is on passenger planes?

**Mr. James Cherry:** I think we're pretty typical in that respect. It's in that ballpark, anyway.

**Mr. David McGuinty:** What percentage of Canadian passengers do you think are travelling on planes with unscreened cargo in the holds?

**Mr. James Cherry:** First of all, you shouldn't be thinking that there aren't any procedures at all taken by the airlines. The airlines have their own procedures. They screen the cargo. Is it screened by a third party agency? None of it is screened by a third party agency. But I think it's important to recognize, as I mentioned before, that the airlines have a very significant vested interest in this process. They have their assets, their employees, their reputation at stake.

**Mr. David McGuinty:** I understand all of that, for sure.

**Mr. James Cherry:** They take it very seriously.

**Mr. David McGuinty:** I used to act for airlines.

What percentage of passengers do you think travelling in Canada today are travelling on planes with unscreened cargo in the hold?

**Mr. James Cherry:** I honestly don't know the answer to that, but I could say that—

**Mr. David McGuinty:** Mr. Duchesneau, would you know offhand?

**Mr. Jacques Duchesneau:** I have no idea.

**Mr. David McGuinty:** Okay.

I'd like to turn to Mr. Duchesneau just for a second, because time is of the essence. I appreciate your patience, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Duchesneau, you have six mandates, six responsibilities. If mandated by Parliament, do you believe that CATSA would be able to evolve? As you say, there's a need to reinvent and reinvigorate yourselves on a continuing basis. Are you prepared? Do you think CATSA would be able to evolve and take on a seventh mandate, which is cargo screening?

•(1630)

**Mr. Jacques Duchesneau:** Mr. Chair, we're working with Transport Canada on committees. We're not the experts; we're learning. But yes, we're open for any mandate that the cabinet and government would give us.

**Mr. David McGuinty:** I was struck by a comment you made on page 2 of your presentation. You said that it is unrealistic to think we can eliminate 100% of the threats in civil aviation, and that such screening would, in fact, "encumber the air transport network to the point of paralyzing it".

What do you think it would cost if the Canadian airline civil aviation system were to shut down for a week—post 9/11, for example—if an incident were to occur in Canada? How much would it cost?

**The Vice-Chair (Mr. Don Bell):** A brief answer, if you can.

**Mr. Jacques Duchesneau:** I'm not in a position to give you an answer on this. It would cost a lot in terms of what happened on 9/11, if that is your question. But I'm not the expert on this.

**Mr. David McGuinty:** My question, Mr. Chair, is can we afford not to do this?

**The Vice-Chair (Mr. Don Bell):** That is your time. Thank you.

Do you have a quick answer, Mr. Duchesneau?

**Mr. Jacques Duchesneau:** It depends on the nature of the threat. That's what I've been trying to convey. We analyze the threat. We take Canadian measures to take care of Canadian problems. I don't

think we could leave you under the impression that there's no security surrounding cargo, even though I'm not the expert in cargo—I need to repeat that. I know from working with colleagues that there is security. But that is a government decision.

One thing I can assure you of, Mr. Chair, is that if we were given a mandate we would take it very seriously, as we have with the other mandates.

**The Vice-Chair (Mr. Don Bell):** Thank you.

Monsieur Carrier.

[*Translation*]

**Mr. Robert Carrier (Alfred-Pellan, BQ):** Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good afternoon, gentlemen.

We are members of Parliament but we are also people who regularly receive comments from the public. When I read everything that has been in the papers, I must admit that I do not feel reassured given the events that took place at the Montreal Pierre-Elliott-Trudeau international airport.

Mr. Duchesneau said that he assures responsibility and six very specific mandates. On the other hand, in the latest newspaper clippings I received, it says that Transport Canada conducted an investigation and that department officials do not want to issue recommendations nor disclose the shortcomings that were discovered. Mr. Cherry, for his part, is responsible for airport administration.

We've been talking about one event, but there could be more over the next few days or weeks. Who is ultimately responsible? Is it Transport Canada, that is not adequately monitoring what is happening at the airport, or is it the airport administrations or CATSA that have shortcomings?

**Mr. Jacques Duchesneau:** I'll give you an answer, and then let my colleague have the floor.

When we see articles like those, we know that the issue affects the security community as a whole. We all have to take it seriously. Whenever there is an incident, be it in Vancouver, Montreal or Halifax, we have to take measures.

In the first years after CATSA was established, I maintained that our role was primarily to manage fear. I think that is something we have succeeded in doing. I completely understand, Mr. Carrier, what you are saying about the effect such newspaper articles have on people. Yes, people may be worried. However, I should point out that the Canadian government has taken measures, and through CATSA and Transport Canada, it is internationally regarded as one of the leaders in this area.

Is the system full proof? No. However, we must ensure that people feel confident. When we ask passengers, we find that 94% feel confident. So we shouldn't overreact, but neither should we turn a deaf ear to comments of that nature. We do have to take measures.

•(1635)

**Mr. Robert Carrier:** I'll come back to my question.

Transport Canada investigated the incidents. Officials from the department say that they noted deficiencies and had them remedied. However, nothing of that was disclosed to the public. Personally, I do not believe that Transport Canada publicly confirmed that all means had been taken and that there would be no irregularities in the future. I also don't have any way to be sure that ADM has remedied the problems in the system. It's as if no one is assuming responsibility for the incident. I agree that we must not be alarmist and overreact to the smallest incident. Nonetheless, I do not have the impression that some person or body, at the end of the day, assumes responsibility.

Earlier in his presentation, Mr. Cherry said that he had met tenants individually to remind them of their responsibilities regarding controlling access to the restricted area. Personally, I don't find it reassuring to know that he met the tenants. Will those tenants take his remarks into account? Should it not be ADM's role to take measures to control that access, rather than asking tenants to do it? We are talking about a high-risk area. Moreover, there are tenants who don't necessarily listen to what their landlords or managers have to say.

**Mr. James Cherry:** Following the events, we did of course meet to explain everything and take necessary measures. I don't want to provide you with every detail on the measures we have taken, since this meeting is public and security is always a delicate issue.

Transport Canada officials visited all our tenants. In addition, we conducted tests to identify intrusions. Once again, I cannot give you all the details. If you set up an alarm system in your house, you won't print the access code in *Le Journal de Montréal*. The same goes for us. We have to protect certain security measures. But you can take it for granted we took the incident very seriously. There are limits, though. We cannot set up systems that are 100% full proof. Can we improve the system? Yes. Can we set up intrusion tests more frequently? Yes. In fact, that is what we have started to do.

As I was saying to Mr. McGuinty a few moments ago, we have to put things in perspective. There were two intrusions into the restricted area. One of the two occurred a mile and a half from the terminal building, under the fence, and the intruder quickly thought better and then took off. The other intrusion was in a restricted area, but the intruder was accompanied by the staff member of a company, a tenant. Those are the two instances where the restricted area was breached. The third incident, which I mentioned to Mr. McGuinty and found more significant—even though the restricted area was not involved—was the intrusion into Cara's premises. Cara prepares meals and food for flights by Air Canada and other carriers. In conjunction with officials from Air Canada and other airlines, we visited Cara to ensure that the company had indeed applied the new access control measures. We also visited other tenants to ensure they had taken the incidents seriously. We will continue to do this.

But is the system full proof? No, we cannot say it is, given that you can never eliminate the human factor. But we do know more monitoring is required. We have to see it all in perspective however even if someone were to get on the airfield we should bear in mind that the airfield is competently patrolled. The person might be able to get near a plane, but there are other levels of security in place to prevent genuine threats.

[English]

**The Vice-Chair (Mr. Don Bell):** Mr. Cherry, I've let you go on, but I must cut you off simply because of time. There'll be an opportunity for a further question.

Mr. Miller.

**Mr. Larry Miller (Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, CPC):** Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, for coming today.

In your expert opinion, how does the security at Trudeau airport stand up against other airports like Calgary or Edmonton? They're both constantly growing airports, basically handling a lot of traffic to the U.S. How would you say that Trudeau compares to one or both of them?

**Mr. Jacques Duchesneau:** I don't think my colleague is in a good position to answer that, but I've always said, ever since the story broke, that it was kind of unfair to have ADM get a beating the way it did, because it is a very good organization. We work pretty well with other airports across the country, and I don't want to diminish the quality of other airports, because that would not be fair.

In all airports, really, we work in cooperation and we've enhanced the quality of service. You really need to benchmark with other countries. When we do that, I think we should have our chins up.

•(1640)

**Mr. Larry Miller:** Mr. Duchesneau, I think this next question is for you as well. In the aftermath of 9/11, new measures were implemented at airports to basically increase police presence. With the Government of Canada, through CATSA, the government basically committed to assisting selected airports with these additional costs. So there are two questions here.

Would you be able to tell the committee which airports CATSA will be assisting with these additional costs? Second, what were the criteria you used for these particular airports to receive additional police presence and upgraded security?

**Mr. Jacques Duchesneau:** I'll start the answer and I'll ask my chief operating officer to give you the details.

All class I airports—those would be Vancouver, Edmonton, Calgary, Winnipeg, Toronto, Ottawa, Montreal, Halifax—and class II airports—

**Mr. Mark Duncan (Executive Vice-President and Chief Operating Officer, Canadian Air Transport Security Authority):** There are four class II airports that also have, basically, part-time police presence, so they have police presence during the peak hours, for example. But class I airports have a five-minute type of response to the screening point.

**Mr. Larry Miller:** For my information, which are the four class II airports?

**Mr. Mark Duncan:** Those are Kelowna, London...and I'm just going to have to—

**Mr. Larry Miller:** That's fine, if you don't have it right there.

**Mr. Mark Duncan:** I'll get it in a second.

**Mr. Larry Miller:** Certainly.

As to the other part of that question, what criteria were used to decide on these, just basically that, the fact that they were rated either class I or class II?

**Mr. Jacques Duchesneau:** For class I, there is a regulation that we need an armed presence and a response time of less than five minutes to intervene if there is an emergency. For class II, it's roughly the same thing. But once again, on regulation, Mr. Duncan is the expert, and I will let him respond.

**Mr. Mark Duncan:** Yes, there was a risk assessment done at the time, based on traffic volume—U.S. traffic, for example. Basically, a risk assessment was done at those airports, and those were the ones chosen.

There are 29 major airports in Canada that are class I and class II, but obviously the same level of security would vary, depending again on the volume.

Just taking Kelowna as an example, it exceeds one million passengers right now. Even though it's a class II airport, it's almost as large as some of the class I airports. So there are a number of criteria, which we work out with Transport Canada, and obviously it has to adjust, depending on the threats.

**Mr. Larry Miller:** Okay, but it basically comes down to the traffic flow through there. Thank you.

The next question will be for Mr. Cherry. I see that your organization employs an airport patrol force, which you talked about, and it's one of only seven airport forces to receive accreditation from the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies.

I have three questions on this, and I'll just give them all to you and you can answer. First, would you be able to elaborate on the capabilities of this patrol force in terms of dealing with security threats at the airport? Second, are there any jurisdictional disputes between this force and other police forces that are responsible for the same area? And third, could you elaborate on what sort of training and skills are required for this patrol force to basically receive this type of accreditation?

**Mr. James Cherry:** Sure. First of all, the main responsibilities are listed in the document that I have here. I'm just looking through it now.

They are responsible, for the most part, for the patrol of the perimeter and the application of all the rules with respect to the movement of traffic at the airport as well, in terms of the car traffic and truck traffic. They are responsible, as well, for the detection of explosives and to alert.

They're also responsible for the issuance of the airside passes once the people have met the criteria of Transport Canada. We have the responsibility to search all employees or to screen all employees who are going into the restricted areas of the airport.

They're also responsible for putting in place the plans and emergency procedures for any sort of emergency.

There are in fact no jurisdictional disputes right now. They are the first responder for any activity that happens at the airport, but they will call in—depending on the nature of the item—the Montreal

police, or the RCMP, depending on the issue. They dial 9-1-1, like any other citizen, and bring the police forces to bear.

There are no jurisdictional disputes. We have regular meetings with all the people responsible for the various law enforcement rules at the airport. Their efforts are coordinated regularly, and the cooperation level is very high.

In fact, we also have what we call *un poste de quartier*, a neighbourhood station, of the Montreal police force at the airport. So they're actually present in the airport. Normand can give you the exact details of how many officers are there at any point in time.

• (1645)

**Mr. Larry Miller:** That's not necessary.

**The Vice-Chair (Mr. Don Bell):** If you've briefed the answer, that's time, and we'll come back.

Did that answer your question?

**Mr. Larry Miller:** Yes.

**The Vice-Chair (Mr. Don Bell):** Before going around again, is there anyone else? Mr. Jean.

**Mr. Brian Jean (Fort McMurray—Athabasca, CPC):** Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'm quite interested in the biometrics that are going to be established in the 29 major airports. I'm wondering if you could expand on that.

First of all, I've taken it upon myself to find some information on some biometrics that are available. For instance, in the Orlando airport, Clear in particular has some information that I've received and I found it quite interesting.

But I'm wondering, what kind of biometrics? Are they iris-based or fingerprints, and if so, is there a recorded entry system? Is there video monitoring of entries? How do you monitor the new biometric systems?

**Mr. Jacques Duchesneau:** Mr. Chair, I'd ask Mr. McGarr to give the answer to this. I'm not a technology whiz. He is better than I am.

**Mr. Kevin McGarr:** If I may, Mr. Chair, on the biometric technologies that we are currently using, there are two included on the restricted area identification card. The first is a fingerprint biometric. We selected a pattern-based fingerprint technology that is developed by Bioscrypt. The second technology contained in the card is the iris identification. The patent for that technology is held by Iridian Technologies. The choice of the fingerprint was based on performance in international testing. Bioscrypt was found to be the best in false positives, the fastest, and the most effective. Those are the two technologies that we have used in the card.

As for complementary access control for the actual biometric authentication, we do synchronize that process with the legacy access control systems that are owned and operated by the airport authorities. We have integrated this biometric verification with the automated access rights afforded to non-passengers by the airport authority.

We have also, in the case of one of the airports in Kelowna, enhanced this ability through the introduction of a mantrap type of device that is developed in Canada by ADT using a technology developed by Newton Security Inc. The person enters the area to authenticate the biometric. Once the authentication is done and there is a match between the biometric template stored in the card and the live sample provided by the non-passenger, there is then a scan of the area done to ensure that there is only one person present in that area. And at that point, the exit door is unlocked and the non-passenger can access the restricted area. That also is backed up by a video surveillance system.

In all other instances, the airport authority has a guard on site to ensure that there is nobody tailgating or allowing an unauthorized person to gain access. It is a technology that is used in partnership with the airport authority and it is integrated with their existing legacy access control systems.

**Mr. Brian Jean:** Are these at all security entrances, or at all secure entrances? I understand there are two different types of entrances, or areas, in most airports: one area where only restricted personnel or unrestricted personnel with a guide, in essence, are allowed, and other places where some are allowed.

• (1650)

**Mr. Kevin McGarr:** These readers are currently being placed at all the access points that are designated by the airport authority to allow access to the restricted area within the air terminal building.

**Mr. Brian Jean:** Thank you.

Those are all my questions, Mr. Bell.

**The Vice-Chair (Mr. Don Bell):** Thank you.

Is there anyone else? That's it.

I just have one quick question myself. Mr. Duncan had a heads-up on this.

I was at the Air Transport Association conference in Victoria. This is not related directly to security, but it's an issue within the areas you're responsible for, Mr. Duchesneau and Mr. Duncan. I will ask the question, maybe.

On the control of the number of pieces of luggage, I had an experience in which a CATSA employee questioned how many pieces of luggage I was bringing through the screening process. My understanding is that this is not your responsibility. That's up to the airline. Am I wrong?

**Mr. Mark Duncan:** On the weight and the size of the item, it is up to the airline. That's a safety issue. But I'll just read the precise—

**The Vice-Chair (Mr. Don Bell):** I'm glad you were ready for this question.

**Mr. Mark Duncan:** I took your question seriously.

A screening authority shall not permit a person to pass beyond a screening checkpoint while they're in possession of more than two items of carry-on baggage. In applying this provision, the items set out in part 1 of schedule 5 shall be counted, and those set out in part 2 of that schedule shall not be counted.

I won't bore you with the two schedules, but schedule 1 is basically about your carry-on baggage: your computer case, your

fold-over bag, and so on. If you have three items that look like that, you will be stopped.

The other list is for purses. The purse has to be 11 inches by 12 inches by two inches. You're allowed to take two items plus a purse, or two items plus your coat, or two items plus other things. I think you were saying that it was interpreted slightly differently at another location, and that's entirely possible, because you can see that, depending on the size—

**The Vice-Chair (Mr. Don Bell):** I didn't want to take much time on that. I just wanted to get the answer, that was all.

Mr. McGuinty, Mr. Laframboise, and then Mr. Jean.

**Mr. David McGuinty:** I have a couple of quick questions, and I'd really appreciate shorter answers. I'm trying to get through some material here, over-prepared as I am.

I'll start with maybe a gratuitous comment about cargo screening. You know, in the wake of 9/11 and the commission report, with the ongoing Air India inquiry and even with the effects of the hurricane in the south of the United States, if you stopped a thousand citizens getting off the Montreal metro today and you asked them who is responsible for security in airplanes, I'll bet the overwhelming majority wouldn't say the airlines. I'll bet they would say that the government is responsible for security.

I want to go back to a couple of specific points on this issue. I met with a company recently that's in the business of basically ID cards, biometric readers and so on. This company already has 30,000 passengers in Orlando alone who have full biometric cards for expedited passenger screening at Orlando airport. At JFK, I think it's estimated at around 150,000 or 200,000, and growing rapidly.

I know you're talking about getting this done over a certain amount of time, but I just want to deposit that with you and move to another point, which is turnover at airports.

Your quarterly performance report, Mr. Duchesneau, which I commend you for producing, targets a 10% annual turnover rate. That seems high to me. Right now you're reporting an annual turnover rate of just under 15%.

When you were asked about this, I think your explanation was that there was a hot job market. Another way of putting this, I guess, is that the job benefits are simply not competitive with those in other careers. I understand your screeners make about half of what border guards make—on average, \$12.86 per hour.

Senator Kenny has been quoted as saying he's very concerned with the whole issue of how the government is going about hiring its screeners, in that you can't do it well with minimum wages and no benefits. You're going to have a very high turnover and you're always going to be training people, because people will be leaving jobs they don't like.

What's your plan going forward to reduce turnover?

I want to come back to the breaches. Mr. Cherry may want to correct me, but as I understand it, Garda was involved in some breaches and yet had its two-year contract of \$220 million renewed to 2009. Could anyone explain to me why Garda should have had that contract renewed?

•(1655)

**Mr. Jacques Duchesneau:** There were three questions there.

Perhaps I can ask Mr. McGarr to answer the first one, about Clear.

**Mr. Kevin McGarr:** We've been working very closely with the company that developed the solution currently being deployed in Orlando. We've met with them over the last year, looking at the feasibility of producing a similar type of program within the Canadian environment. We have developed a concept of operations, which is currently being studied. We have done a threat and risk assessment, which we have forwarded to Transport Canada. We are working very closely with the Canadian Airports Council and a number of individual airports on specific initiatives to see if this model would in fact serve the Canadian market well.

So this is an issue that we have been involved with for the last while, and we continue to be very interested. It is one of the solutions we are looking at in order to create a Canadian solution to our situation.

**Mr. Jacques Duchesneau:** On the job market, the turnover rate, and all that, yes, I was asked the question by Senator Kenny. The turnover rate right now is 12%. And yes, depending on the area we're talking about, it's different. Alberta, for instance, has a higher turnover rate, mainly because of the competition with other industries. I want to remind you that for federal agents in the United States, the TSA turnover rate is between 25% and 35%.

We just did a tour of the country for the second year in a row; we call that the "Sharing CATSA's Vision" tour, where we meet with front-line screeners. Obviously wages are an issue that they raise, but the commitment of those employees has nothing to do with the salary. It's really believing that they're making a difference in the security of this country, and they do. They like the training that we give them and they're asking for more training. They want to be recognized as a group that is dedicated to security. But wages are a problem, so much so that we addressed the issue with our board, and we just received a new mandate from our board to take a look at compensation as a whole. The decision was taken in 2002. Five years down the road we need to rethink the way we look at compensation, so it's going to be addressed soon.

I think I need to emphasize commitment. Really, they are committed. Whenever you go through an airport, talk to the people. I was impressed by the quality of their answers.

On the contract, since Mr. Duncan took care of that, I will let him answer the question.

**The Vice-Chair (Mr. Don Bell):** Very briefly, Mr. Duncan, if you can, please.

**Mr. Mark Duncan:** Very briefly, CATSA did a major request for proposals in 2003. We awarded a three-year contract to the winners of the RFPs, and in that contract we had a two-year option, at CATSA's option. That three-year contract is up in March 2007. We've done negotiations with the service providers and we're exercising that two-year option effective March 2007.

We've also put in major improvements into that contract through negotiation. The service provider has to report and he has a certain amount of money associated with this, a performance payment

program, in terms of meeting turnover targets, staffing targets, and also staffing to the peaks and valleys of the airport.

**The Vice-Chair (Mr. Don Bell):** Thank you.

Mr. Laframboise.

[*Translation*]

**Mr. Mario Laframboise:** Mr. Cherry, when we asked you earlier whether airfield security was full proof, you said that no—a response that I think comes rather easily to you. I can understand that, since your primary goal is not to manage security. Moreover, you joined ADM before September 2001.

Who is responsible for security in your organization? Is there someone in charge of security, or is it an ADM vice-president?

•(1700)

**Mr. James Cherry:** Security is the responsibility of Mr. Boivin, Vice-President of Airport Operations.

As I explained in my presentation, this is not a simple issue. Some aspects of security are completely outside our direct purview. For example, criminal activities on the airfield are the responsibility of a number of government agencies. However, whenever we obtain information on such activities, we are responsible for conveying it to the appropriate agencies.

I'd like to ask Mr. Boivin to answer.

**Mr. Normand Boivin (Vice-President, Operating, Aéroports de Montréal (Dorval and Mirabel)):** I am responsible for security.

**Mr. Mario Laframboise:** What experience do you have and how many people report to you?

**Mr. Normand Boivin:** Approximately 500 members of staff report to me. I have an indirect reporting relationship with those who work at the airport. However, as Mr. Cherry pointed out, the committee made up of managers in charge of applying the legislation meets regularly, makes any necessary observations, and decisions to ensure security and safety in the facilities.

A journalist passed under a fence one and a half kilometres from the terminal, then turned back. That is the kind of thing that happens, and that could happen again. Did he reach the aircraft? Did he represent a genuine threat to civil aviation by passing under a fence for 30 seconds? The answer, I would maintain, is no.

We cannot say the incident is negligible, but corrective measures have to be proportionate to the actual risk involved.

**Mr. Mario Laframboise:** That is not up to you to determine, Mr. Boivin, it is up to the people to determine whether their safety is threatened or not. Your duty is to respond.

Earlier, Mr. Cherry said that you conduct unscheduled inspections, probably spot checks, on your tenants. Do you have a service that conducts those checks?



**Mr. Normand Boivin:** We did more than that. We conducted visits, which lasted more than 30 seconds. We did not just show up to ask whether they had a program, then only to leave and thank them. We sat down with them to look closely at what they do and how they do it. We put our own services and the services of other people who can help us at our tenants' disposal. Then, we took measures regarding the means in place. We have a contractual relationship with the tenants.

Earlier, you asked whether tenants were serious about security. Most of our tenants have a very keen interest in security, because we implement measures for them. They are the ones who are responsible for the flights and who would be exposed to risk. So they are very concerned about security, and take measures to guard against the risks.

**Mr. Mario Laframboise:** As a member of Parliament, I have to ensure that the security of citizens is never threatened. Otherwise, I have to rely on journalists to do that job, and applaud them when they do.

I would like know about your measures. You conduct unscheduled inspections. Mr. Grégoire was sitting where you are on Tuesday, and said that at present 140 Transport Canada inspectors were engaged in conducting inspections, some of them on the ground.

In your view, is that sufficient? Would you prefer not to comment on the work of Transport Canada inspectors? Is it enough? If not, I will have to rely on journalists once again and encourage them to repeat their good work in identifying faults in the system—that is what has to be done if we are to ensure that such incidents do not happen again.

**Mr. Normand Boivin:** Personally, I find it unfortunate that you rely on the opinion of a single individual, whether we share that opinion or not.

I will not comment on the work of Transport Canada inspectors. I think they can answer that question themselves.

We work very closely with people from Transport Canada, as well as with people on Mr. Duchesneau's team, the Montreal police force, the Sûreté du Québec and the RCMP.

**Mr. Mario Laframboise:** Earlier, the other witness said the system would not be full proof, do you agree with that?

**Mr. Normand Boivin:** No one can guarantee a full-proof security system anywhere, even in prisons. If I told you that the system was full proof, I would be lying. Will we take measures to ensure that such incidents don't happen again? Absolutely. Have we already taken such measures? We are looking into them very seriously at the moment.

• (1705)

**Mr. Mario Laframboise:** Has security improved since the journalist came under the fence?

**Mr. Normand Boivin:** Absolutely.

**Mr. Mario Laframboise:** So we should thank him.

**Mr. Normand Boivin:** I beg your pardon?

**Mr. Mario Laframboise:** We can thank the journalist for that.

**Mr. Normand Boivin:** That is your opinion.

**Mr. James Cherry:** What I find unfortunate in these comments is this: when someone discovers a chink in the airport security system, we rely on that person to help us fix the problem.

If the journalist in question had genuinely taken those chinks seriously, he might not have waited three weeks before reporting the incident in the newspapers in a very sensationalist way. He could have come to see us well before that to tell us about the deficiencies that needed fixing. In fact, he did nothing for three weeks.

Is he serious? No. His job is to sell papers. Did he help improve airport security? Not at all.

[English]

**The Vice-Chair (Mr. Don Bell):** Mr. Cherry, that's time.

Mr. Jean.

**Mr. Brian Jean:** Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I've read reports about some wish to do some psychological profiling of passengers by CATSA. I'm wondering if you could expand on that. I'm quite disturbed about some areas, especially in regard to things that take place in other jurisdictions, other countries, such as racial profiling. I'd like to hear from you as far as that particular position on psychological profiling goes and why the desire to do that.

**Mr. Jacques Duchesneau:** We're not talking about psychological profiling but behavioural profiling, which is different. We haven't done anything with this other than talk about it as an option. Really, it's something that has been put forward by my counterpart in the United States, Mr. Hawley, as a way of making sure we put the right resources at the right place at the right time.

You must have seen in the papers this week, a couple of days ago, a letter from a senator that went through. Do we need to put the same effort, the same emphasis on every single passenger? My answer to this would be no. How do we find a way to make a difference between people who can represent a threat and people who don't represent a threat? But it's clear that even if we were to do behavioural pattern recognition or profiling, we would have to have cabinet approval for that, Transport Canada regulation. It is a way. Everyone would have to be screened anyway. Other countries do it, and it serves their purposes.

Maybe it's that we're a different country. That's something we can look at, but we are far away from doing it ourselves. Right now, as is mentioned in regulations, 100% of people boarding a plane in Canada have to be screened.

**Mr. Brian Jean:** I understand. It makes me uncomfortable because some jurisdictions, some countries, I would suggest—based on some readings I've done—use psychological profiling as opposed to racial profiling. I would find that extremely disturbing and I think most Canadians would.

You're suggesting that someone who's paid, as Mr. McGuinty put it, in the neighbourhood of \$12 an hour is able to do some serious psychological profiling on behaviours or otherwise, which the RCMP, for instance, are trained on for six months. I would find it extremely unlikely that you would find the quality of people necessary to do that after the training, with a 15% turnover.

Again, those are only my comments.

**Mr. Jacques Duchesneau:** Mr. Chair, I think it's a very good point. As I said, we're not there yet, and it would obviously need much more training than what we do. My only fear is that if we're still looking only for objects, we might miss the greater picture, so we need to put the efforts.... Whenever we put a system in place, terrorists will try to go around it. So we need to evolve, as I mentioned before, and we're not even anywhere close to bringing in racial profiling.

As a final comment on that, you need to realize that Customs do it every day; they do profiling. Is it racial profiling? I don't think it is. They simply decide on people who are coming into the country. They're not screened all the same way. In their case, if they miss, well, we might have lost some money. In our case, if we miss, lives can be lost. That's something we need to think about.

It works in other countries. Could it work in Canada? As I said, we're not there yet.

• (1710)

**Mr. Brian Jean:** Do you not see that the opportunity is really based on subjective measurements of tools, equipment, technology? A year after 9/11, I went through two security devices with a roll of duct tape and a jiffy knife, all the way to Ohio and I didn't find them until I got there. Obviously it wasn't intentional. Quite frankly, it made me very fearful that I could get through two security checkpoints—two major airports, in essence—with tools of that nature such as obviously were used by the 9/11 hijackers. I think the reality is that the only answer for this is technology, to move in that vein as fast as possible and put some serious investment in that so we can make sure the people aren't getting onto planes and other modes of transportation with dangerous materials.

**Mr. Jacques Duchesneau:** Sure. Bottom line, that's what we need to do.

Once again, we know that terrorists learn the way we work and they try to go around the system we put in place. What if they're not using metal weapons and are using ceramic weapons? Do we have the tools to do it? That's only an example. We need to evolve.

Two years from now, we'll come back here to say we don't think we have the right tools to defend ourselves against the threat that will be out there two years from now. That's why we need to assess; that's the first component of AGILE. We need to have a telescope telling us what's coming our way, before we see it at close range.

**Mr. Brian Jean:** Or maybe we need to go and find them before they find us.

**Mr. Jacques Duchesneau:** Good point.

**The Vice-Chair (Mr. Don Bell):** A quick final round. Mr. McGuinty, three minutes.

**Mr. David McGuinty:** Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

I think there is a telescope on the table, Monsieur Duchesneau, and I think it's pointing to one thing called “cargo”. I've had four conversations with presidents and CEOs of airport authorities, not Mr. Cherry, but others who have said that this is their nightmare scenario.

If we don't want to take the good advice or the findings of a journalist doing his job, Mr. Cherry, then we can perhaps listen to Senator Pat Carney quoting her son, a Boeing 747 pilot, who said: “It's all a farce. It makes me angry. This zip-lock bag obsession just detracts attention from all the real security measures that are not being implemented at our airports.”

I didn't say that. No journalist said that. A Boeing 747 pilot said it. It was quoted yesterday in the *National Post*, in an open letter to our public safety minister.

So I want to go back to a couple of things. To recap, Mr. Duncan, I take it, then, that in your negotiations with Garda there were no consequences, pecuniary or otherwise, for their failure, which was revealed by the *Journal de Montréal* articles this summer. Is that correct? They have a new contract that's performance based—you told me about a number of things—but there were no pecuniary or other consequences accruing to Garda as a result of their failure. Did I get that right?

**Mr. Mark Duncan:** I can go back into their performance for the last year—

**Mr. David McGuinty:** As a result of the breaches that were—

**Mr. Mark Duncan:** As a result of the breaches last year, their performance was assessed. I don't have the precise detail of that, but they did not get their full performance base because of those items.

**Mr. David McGuinty:** So there were consequences.

**The Vice-Chair (Mr. Don Bell):** You have about a minute, Mr. McGuinty.

**Mr. David McGuinty:** Can I just move forward, then? I take it there were consequences.

Mr. Duchesneau, am I to understand that Air Canada Cargo has publicly called for cargo screening to be passed to CATSA?

**Mr. Jacques Duchesneau:** I heard the comment.

**Mr. David McGuinty:** I've seen the letter. Have you seen the letter or the documents or a press release of any kind?

**Mr. Jacques Duchesneau:** No, I haven't seen a letter.

**Mr. David McGuinty:** Would it be helpful—and it's something I called on the minister to consider for the government to do, in the wake of the article in *Le Journal de Montréal*—to conduct random searches of cargo at airport warehouses on two fronts: one, for security in terms of what's in the cargo, and two, for drug purposes? Would it be helpful to do that, Mr. Cherry? You're on the front line of running a difficult business.

**Mr. James Cherry:** I appreciate the question, but I'm really not in a position to answer it. I'm not a security expert. I would have to defer to Mr. Duchesneau, who is far more competent in that area. I don't know if he's comfortable answering it, but I couldn't answer that question.

**Mr. Jacques Duchesneau:** I was going to refer the answer to Mr.

...

No, really, Mr. Chair, it is up to cabinet to make that decision as to whether we get the mandate or not. Obviously we're not blind; we know it could be an issue, and we're working closely. Mr. Forster, the ADM, was here two days ago and mentioned that he was given \$26 million to look at this. We assured the minister and the deputy minister that we would help them find a solution to it, but we're too early on. I'm really not an expert in cargo security.

• (1715)

**Mr. James Cherry:** I can add one very minor thing, Mr. McGuinty. I think, in fairness to the people at Transport Canada and other places, it's a very complex issue, and the airlines agree and acknowledge that it is. If it were an easy issue, it would have been applied a long time ago. In an area, especially in the United States, where the threat, I think, is much higher than it is here today, they're struggling with the same question. It's not an easy question, and I'd leave it up to greater minds than ours to sort it out. If it were easy, it would have been done a long time ago.

**The Vice-Chair (Mr. Don Bell):** Mr. Carrier.

[Translation]

**Mr. Robert Carrier:** I have a question about responsibility. I asked this earlier, but did not really get an answer.

In the public explanations we obtained, it seemed to be Transport Canada that conducted the investigation and identified deficiencies in the system that were then corrected. Yet, when you spoke earlier, you talked about all the measures you have implemented to enhance security.

I don't know whether I have missed something, but did ADM take a position and publicly respond to the situation? It seems to me it would be more reassuring to know that ADM took the necessary measures, rather than Transport Canada being forced to investigate and forcing you to take corrective measures.

**Mr. James Cherry:** That is a very good question. We have not received the results of the investigation. Transport Canada is responsible for conducting an investigation and making the final report public, or at least delivering it to us.

We realized that we could take certain measures to improve things. So we began to enhance security before Transport Canada initiated its investigation. In fact, we held a press conference several months ago, at the end of September, to announce that we had added measures and made improvements.

But please understand that we cannot provide the details. We issued a press release and held a press conference jointly with CATSA on September 27 or 28. That has already been done. I agree that journalists responded in a somewhat sensationalist way at the time. They said they had received no explanation. I apologize, but I believe that details and explanations are not necessary. As you said yourself, it is more important that we reassure the public by saying we have taken measures to improve the system in response to the incidents.

**Mr. Robert Carrier:** You said that Transport Canada did not forward its recommendations regarding the deficiencies they had identified.

Mr. James Cherry: We have not received anything.

Mr. Robert Carrier: I'm surprised to learn that you have not received the report, that Transport Canada, which has final responsibility, has not provided you with their report to help you identify the deficiencies that you have no doubt already corrected, as you said.

**Mr. James Cherry:** We received nothing officially from Transport Canada. But as I said, we had identified some deficiencies ourselves and taken measures to improve the system even before Transport Canada officials began their assessment, or investigation.

**Mr. Robert Carrier:** I'm disappointed, because Transport Canada is the public guarantee. It is the government department that takes final responsibility.

**Mr. Normand Boivin:** We should make clear that Transport Canada is aware of the measures we have taken since the article appeared in the paper. Even though they have not yet provided us with their official report, that does not mean there have been no discussions on what needs to be done; that does not mean they are unaware of what has happened, or dissatisfied with the measures we have taken. There's a difference between the paperwork that comes in the wake of such an incident, and the real action that is taken every day.

**Mr. Robert Carrier:** In the recommendations you will receive from Transport Canada, is there any possibility of broadening CATSA's mandate? Currently, CATSA has six specific mandates. Mr. Duchesneau already mentioned that if CATSA had an additional mandate, it would be ready to take it on. Have you already discussed the idea of giving CATSA some extra responsibility for security control?

**Mr. James Cherry:** Not in my presence.

**Mr. Normand Boivin:** The subject was not raised, except for the issue of freight, which has not been settled yet. The debate was about knowing who would screen the freight with the proper equipment. This discussion is currently going on. There is no other discussion about such possibilities, Mr. Duchesneau, unless I am mistaken. I have not heard of any additional things to speak of—

**Mr. Robert Carrier:** What is Transport Canada's recommendation?

• (1720)

[English]

**The Vice-Chair (Mr. Don Bell):** Okay, that's your time, Mr. Carrier.

There was nothing more from this side? We've reached the time of 5:20, but—

Thirty seconds?

**Mr. Ed Fast:** Perhaps I could go back to cargo. Again, for me, it comes as a complete surprise that cargo doesn't come under CATSA. It comes under no other regulatory authority or government agency. We've left it up to the airlines essentially to police themselves. And yes, I agree with Mr. Boivin that the airlines have a vested interest in making sure their cargo is secure and safe.

**Mr. James Cherry:** Transport would inspect them as well.

**Mr. Ed Fast:** Transport Canada inspects the airlines or the cargo?

**Mr. James Cherry:** My understanding is they carry out inspections to make sure the airlines have the procedures in place to monitor the security of the cargo.

**Mr. Ed Fast:** Is there an international standard for how cargo is screened?

**Mr. Normand Boivin:** Not that I know of.

Transport Canada has a regulation regarding transport or carrier security measures; there are some articles in there on cargo that need to be applied by the carriers. The carriers need to abide by those measures, and Transport inspects those measures.

So it's not to say there is nothing being done about cargo, but cargo is not being screened with X-ray equipment right now. That is not to say there is absolutely no security on cargo right now, as the airlines have to abide by the Transport Canada security measures.

Could they be improved? Yes.

**The Vice-Chair (Mr. Don Bell):** That's going to be the time.

Gentlemen, I'd like to thank all of you for appearing. I appreciate your being here and answering the questions today. Thank you.

Committee, we'll take a one- or two-minute break and then we'll resume and deal with the issue of main estimates. I don't think it will take very long for us to deal with them.

● (1720) \_\_\_\_\_ (Pause) \_\_\_\_\_

● (1720)

**The Vice-Chair (Mr. Don Bell):** Okay, we resume the meeting with respect to item two, committee business, main estimates.

Before we potentially have a series of votes, if there is agreement there are no changes to be made, we can deal with the estimates and have them adopted in full.

We will now proceed to the votes.

TRANSPORT  
Transport Department  
Vote 1—Operating expenditures.....\$234,692,000  
Vote 5—Capital expenditures.....\$76,455,000  
Vote 10—Grants and contributions.....\$296,228,000

Vote 15—Payments to the Jacques Cartier and Champlain Bridges Inc.....\$30,488,000

Vote 20—Payments to Marine Atlantic Inc.....\$80,980,000

Vote 25—Payments to VIA Rail Canada Inc.....\$169,001,000

Vote 30—Payments to the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority.....\$381,366,000

Canada Post Corporation

Vote 35—Payments to the Canada Post Corporation for special purposes.....\$147,210,000

Canadian Transportation Agency

Vote 40—Program expenditures.....\$23,173,000

National Capital Commission

Vote 45—Payment to the National Capital Commission for operating expenditures.....\$74,657,000

Vote 50—Payment to the National Capital Commission for capital expenditures.....\$16,713,000

Office of Infrastructure of Canada

Vote 55—Operating expenditures.....\$37,103,000

Vote 60—Contributions.....\$1,787,169,000

Vote 65—Operating funding for the Old Port of Montreal Corporation Inc.....\$18,800,000

Vote L70—Investment in contributed surplus of Parc Downsview Park Inc. for the purpose of allowing the completion of the transfer of lands from National Defence to Parc Downsview Park Inc.....\$2,492,000

Vote L75—To establish a borrowing authority of up to \$100,000,000 for Parc Downsview Park Inc.....

Transportation Appeal Tribunal of Canada

Vote 80—Program expenditures.....\$1,200,000

What is the pleasure of the committee?

**Mr. David McGuinty:** Mr. Chairman, on our side, we're prepared to recommend the estimates.

**The Vice-Chair (Mr. Don Bell):** Is there any further discussion?

(Votes 1 to 80 inclusive agreed to)

● (1725)

**The Vice-Chair (Mr. Don Bell):** Can I have a motion to report?

**Mr. Brian Jean:** Yes, I move that we report the estimates to the House.

(Motion agreed to)

**The Vice-Chair (Mr. Don Bell):** The meeting is adjourned.







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