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# Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security

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EVIDENCE

**Tuesday, February 6, 2007**

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**Chair**

**Mr. Garry Breitkreuz**

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## Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security

Tuesday, February 6, 2007

• (1140)

[English]

**The Chair (Mr. Garry Breitkreuz (Yorkton—Melville, CPC)):** I'd like to call to order the public portion of this meeting.

This is the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, meeting 29. We are meeting with regard to Standing Order 108(2), studying the issue of arming Canada Border Services Agency officers.

We'd like to welcome our witnesses to the table: from the Customs and Excise Union, Mr. Ron Moran; from the Northgate Group, Mr. Juneau-Katsuya; and from *Blue Line* magazine, Mr. Lymburner.

You have with you additional people to give you assistance. As you make your opening remarks, you can introduce them and also give us your position, as well, within the organization.

Normally we allow up to 10 minutes for opening remarks. I will let all of you make those opening remarks, and then we will begin with questions from our committee.

Mr. Moran, if you're ready, you may begin. Welcome to the committee.

[Translation]

**Mr. Ron Moran (National President, Customs Excise Union Douanes Accise):**

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, committee members. I am very pleased to be appearing once again before you today.

My name is Ron Moran. I'm the National President of the Customs Excise Union Douanes Accise, our CEUDA. With me today is CEUDA's National Vice-President, Mr. Jean-Pierre Fortin. We are both employed as border officers for the Canada Border Services Agency and we have a combined 52 years of experience working for border services.

We are pleased to be back here as you focus on issues surrounding the government's decision to provide training and equipment to arm Canada Border Services officers. As you know, arming border guards has long been one of our agency's key demands.

Let me first say that we have been following your committee's deliberations very closely. We understand that your job is to obtain information about issues that are important to you. Therefore, I will keep my preliminary remarks brief, to allow time for as many questions as possible.

For over 22 years, CEUDA has been lobbying the government to arm its members. Furthermore, it has been demanding for more than 26 years that officers no longer work alone. I don't intend to review two decades of history, but I would like to share with you some important information of a general nature concerning the arming of border guards to give you a better understanding of the reasons why CEUDA has taken this stand and why we applaud the government's decision.

In May of 1998, Canada customs services underwent the most significant change in their history. The House of Commons unanimously passed Bill C-18, a Liberal bill that for the first time ever, authorized customs officers to enforce the Criminal Code at points of entry into Canada. Among other things, passage of this bill meant that as customs officers, we could arrest drunk drivers, child molesters, persons in possession of stolen property and any individual in respect of whom law enforcement officials had issued an arrest warrant.

Passage of this bill meant that in practical terms, those individuals representing our country's first line of defence began taking on duties that historically, had been handled only by police officers. It also meant that customs officers became members of the only law enforcement agency in North America to handle this type of arrest, namely criminal arrests — the most dangerous of all —, without the benefit of a gun for protection.

We have come a long way since then.

• (1145)

[English]

Despite initial resistance from management, today officers at just about all points of entry find themselves enforcing the Criminal Code. Not surprisingly, when we were assigned the task of enforcing the Criminal Code it became obvious that there was a tremendous difference between dealing with someone who failed to declare a bottle of wine or a carton of cigarettes versus pulling drunk drivers out of vehicles or wrestling down someone wanted for one crime or another and who has chosen to resist arrest.

As our focus continued to move toward enforcement, we started to interdict serious criminality, including drug and currency smuggling, as well as a significant volume of persons seeking to illegally bring firearms, often fully loaded and ready to go, into Canada. It may surprise some of you to know that between January 2000 and May 2005, for example, 324 times our officers were involved in narcotics and currency seizures of a value of more than \$1 million. Those of you familiar with modern organized crime will appreciate that just about every time, the conveyances being used were escorted and monitored by individuals known as enforcers. This means that 324 times during that period, or one and a half times per week, we were the only thing standing between organized crime and \$1 million or more of their drugs or their money. You should also know that we seize more weapons than all police forces combined.

Life is such that there are countless situations in which we find ourselves where it is simply impossible to withdraw in accordance with current CBSA policy—which, by the way, means we are supposed to let the danger enter Canada to potentially harm Canadians. Yes, police can be called ahead of time when we know what to expect, but in our business, danger tends to show up unexpectedly, a situation made worse by antiquated lookout systems, which we can discuss further if you wish.

Many of you will know that, in 2005, CEUDA commissioned an independent study of the risks faced by our officers, when we learned that the supposedly independent study, awarded to a company called ModuSpec, had been unilaterally and secretly altered by management in 2003 to remove a recommendation for an armed presence at identified land border crossings.

The choice of the word “altered”, by the way, was that of Liberal Senator Colin Kenny and his committee as a result of their investigations and inquiries of CBSA on this matter.

I hope you can imagine how outraged the officers were to learn of such dishonesty, which, in our minds, equated to playing Russian roulette with the lives of our members. It was one thing for the government to bury its head in the sand over the need for arming the border, but it was quite another to be burying evidence just because this evidence didn't agree with the position taken.

The president of the Northgate Group, which is the company that we had retained, is appearing before you today and can answer your questions, but I can say that its methodology, scope, and analysis were patently, incomparably superior to the altered ModuSpec report. We posted the Northgate report—unedited, I might add—on our website and gave a copy to pretty much anyone who was prepared to read it.

CEUDA has continued to survey its members, and our response rates are very high: 91% on the subject of individual officers' wishes regarding sidearms; and 100% on the land border port of entry site survey.

I would be happy to share the results in detail with you, but they demonstrate two key points, with which I will close my remarks.

We surveyed 2,400 officers who work at land border crossings, and we obtained a response rate of, as I've stated, 91%. The question to them was, do front line officers want, or feel that there is a need for, sidearms? Of the 2,200 officers who responded, 88% want a

sidearm, and an additional 10% who don't personally want a sidearm agree that the job requires one.

Another question asked of the officers was, do police respond quickly to calls from our members at the border? Our members have told us, time and time again, that in just about every instance the answer is a firm no. The opposition spin, backed by no evidence, has by contrast always been yes.

● (1150)

We asked our good friends at CBSA about this via an access to information request. We are still sorting through the response—the disorganized response, frankly—which numbers in the thousands of pages, but we can nonetheless confirm the following.

Information was provided for only 178 of the 1,065 points of entry serviced by CBSA, and of those, CBSA could not provide known distance to a police detachment for 62 locations. Of a total of 119 land border points of entry, 37 had police response times in the range of two hours or more.

Contrary to assertions from CBSA, there are no individual agreements with ports of entry and local police in relation to pursuit and apprehension of persons running the port, and we understand that even the unreliable CBSA data show approximately 900 such runners each year, with an unacceptably low rate being apprehended.

Also worth noting is the fact that hundreds of persons every year for whom arrest warrants are outstanding are released into Canada by CBSA officers because the police are unable to respond.

In closing, CEUDA salutes the government and MPs who have chosen to provide the protection of our members, which is clearly overdue. Equally, it is long past time that Canadians were not put at risk because of the CBSA policy to let known danger enter Canada rather than interdict it properly, with properly trained, equipped, and resourced enforcement officers, right at the points of entry.

If anyone thinks this is speculation, you may want to talk to Priscilla de Villiers. Her daughter was raped and killed by Jonathon Yeo, a Canadian sex offender who, because he was in violation of his bail, was turned back by U.S. Customs at the border, but he was ordered not stopped by Canada Customs because he had a suicide note and a shotgun in his vehicle. Nina de Villiers would be alive today if our officers were not constrained by such dangerous policies.

Like you, we have serious concerns about both the cost and the delay in getting this initiative completed, and we hope these hearings will contribute at long last to getting that important job done.

*Merci beaucoup.* Thank you.

**The Chair:** Thank you very much for your presentation.

We will now go to Mr. Juneau-Katsuya from the Northgate Group.

**Mr. Michel Juneau-Katsuya (President and Chief Executive Officer, Northgate Group):** Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

It is an honour to be able to assist and to present today.

[Translation]

Before I begin, I would like to point out that I am here to speak mainly about the methodology and about the study we conducted. I was getting ready to do just that a few moments ago, but just to give you an idea of who I am and where I'm coming from, I will summarize my career very briefly.

I have been working in the field of law enforcement for over 29 years. I began my career in the late 1970s with the RCMP, and subsequently continued working for CSIS, finally retiring after 21 years with this service. Therefore, I have been working in the field of law enforcement since the start of my professional career and I have long worked with customs officers in particular.

• (1155)

[English]

I'd like to address the issue of the methodology we've used and the way we went about it. I know that last week Mr. Cullen had certain concerns and raised certain doubts about the objectivity of the study, so I'd like to shed a little bit more light on our methodology.

We were brought in by CEUDA after CEUDA had requested from three different firms the submission of a proposal to do this kind of study. So we were not hand-picked, necessarily, by CEUDA; we went through a certain selection process. We demonstrated that we had a fairly good knowledge of the work, what we needed to do and what we were to accomplish.

It was very clear and very important, and it was stated right at the beginning to the CEUDA members and the executive committee that we were not going to necessarily seek the answer that somebody might suggest, we were going to seek exactly what the findings and the facts led us to.

To that effect, CEUDA answered right away, an answer that was also presented to Minister McLellan at that time, that whatever conclusions Northgate would come to, CEUDA would follow them and they would put to rest, if need be, the issue for good. That was stated to the minister and to Monsieur Jolicoeur as well at that time.

So how did we go about our methodology? First and above all, we were not going to try to demonstrate that there was a need for the border officers to be armed. What we were going to demonstrate, first and above all, was the type of risk and danger they are facing.

[Translation]

After identifying the risks and dangers that border services officers face, we examined various possible ways of resolving safety issues for the men and women who work at our borders. We considered different solutions, ranging from providing an armed police presence to possibly arming customs officers. This led us to the conclusion that it was necessary and imperative that custom officers be armed.

I have often used the following analogy. I worked as a police officer myself. Officers who work in downtown Toronto, Vancouver or Montreal may never have to confront an arms dealer, a drug trafficker, a mule for an organized crime ring, a terrorist or some other criminal.

[English]

What needs to be understood is that the border point is like a funnel: everybody has to go through. What police officers may never encounter in their entire careers, border officers are likely to meet at least once a year, if not once a month—sometimes more, depending on how busy the point is. The risk faced by those people is superior to the risk faced by police officers, and yet we do arm police officers.

I want to stress again that we are not members of CEUDA. We have never been customs officers. We have never been members of that union. We were really seeking to try to objectively investigate their situation.

We have conducted the study fairly...more extensive than the ModuSpec report. We have found also that we were not the only ones who actually recommended that border officers should be armed. We actually identified six reports that were written by different entities. Two reports came from CBSA itself. One report came from the Auditor General. Two reports came from the Senate committee. I'll dare to say that the first, non-edited, report from ModuSpec even recommended that border officers should be armed.

Everybody had various perspectives or degrees of understanding, but I'd like to put before you that I'll dare to say that the Northgate report is by far the most extensive report on the situation for the border services ever performed anywhere in the western world. We've searched for it, and even in the United States they have not conducted a study as thorough as the one we've conducted.

We went out and interviewed 387 officers face to face. We visited over 40 sites. The people with whom we spoke came from more than 50 different locations. It is twice as much in every aspect as the ModuSpec report. The ModuSpec report was very important because of the reason that Mr. Moran mentioned, but it was important to demonstrate and go even further than what they had performed and done.

On that note, I'll finish my introduction in order to give plenty of time for debate and discussion.

• (1200)

[Translation]

I hope that I've been able to review the essential points and that I've not gone over my allotted time. Thank you.

[English]

**The Chair:** Thank you very much.

We will now go to Mr. Lymburner from *Blue Line* magazine.

**Mr. Morley Lymburner (Publisher, Blue Line Magazine):** Thank you, Mr. Chair, members of the House committee, and ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for permitting us to come here today to speak about issues concerning Canada's national security as it relates to the Canada Border Services Agency.

I would like to introduce to you Mr. Dave Brown. Mr. Brown has been an assignment writer and tactical firearms editor for *Blue Line* magazine for just over 10 years now. Dave will be sharing with you his experiences in training and equipping officers of the CBSA in the Manitoba area.

*Blue Line* has been publishing monthly for the past 18 years. It is a publication directed at the broad-based law enforcement community across Canada. As such, we have had an ear to the ground about law enforcement issues for quite some time.

Living and working daily with police and others involved in law enforcement has given us quite a unique view on policing and security issues in Canada. Much of our contact has been at arm's length and as keen observers of the industry.

I would like to assist you with a perspective you may or may not have heard in the past and present, with a couple of logical conclusions which, at your discretion, you could place in the realm of possible, probable, or simply blue-sky thinking.

You have been in receipt of a package of past commentaries, articles, and news pieces drawn from past editions of *Blue Line* magazine, which you may refer to at your leisure.

I feel that your concern about border security is not one that's easy to get a handle on. It is fraught with a myriad of interconnected issues and a multitude of agencies, levels of government, and management and labour relations concerns. However, when it comes down to simply deciding if arming CBSA officers is a wise move, there is no confusion. There can be no debate on the issue and there is certainly no rational argument that can be brought to counter the logic.

I have stated in the past that this government simply has to consider what is reasonable under the circumstances. Points I have brought up in the past are numerous. Almost every illegal revolver or pistol in Canada today has come within a few metres or two of a member of the Canada Border Services Agency, and I think that's something to think about.

If other levels of this same Canadian government have decided that fisheries officers and certain members of the Ministry of the Environment should carry sidearms, then the concept of a CBSA officer being armed to protect our borders is most certainly not a far stretch to the imagination.

The message being sent out to smugglers, criminals, and even terrorists is enhanced incredibly by an armed officer at the border crossing. Being greeted by an officer with a sidearm at a border point of entry is not viewed by any other country in the world as being out of the ordinary. In fact, a simple sidearm would be viewed by most as being rather lax.

However, I think this group should be thinking far beyond the simple matter of arming border officers today. They must think of the future and they must think of the best manner in which to efficiently execute a wide range of law enforcement functions so that efficiency is a primary concern.

In the recently released book *Police Innovation: Contrasting Perspectives*, by Cambridge professors David Weisburd and Anthony A. Braga, there is a statement about America's system of

criminal justice that I most certainly would apply to Canada's system as well. It goes as follows :

America's system of criminal justice is overcrowded and overworked, undermanned, underfinanced, and very often misunderstood. It needs more information and more knowledge. It needs more technical resources. It needs more coordination among its many parts. It needs more public support. It needs the help of community programs and institutions in dealing with offenders and potential offenders. It needs, above all, the willingness to reexamine old ways of doing things, to reform itself, to experiment, to run risks, to dare. It needs vision.

In my estimation, the CBSA has capabilities and potential far beyond its current functions. The idea that certain levels of action required to be taken must be delegated to another enforcement agency is simply not operationally or fiscally prudent in this day and age. The CBSA officer making an arrest and handing the person over to a police officer for the sole purpose of processing and prosecuting is horribly flawed. The officers within the CBSA unit should not have to sap away resources from another police service to help them perform their jobs. If an arrest is made by an Ottawa police officer, he does not call in an OPP officer to continue the process and investigation.

●(1205)

In the case of the CBSA, too many of their functions involve having to trip over parallel investigations of which they are not notified, nor even invited to be a part. Of particular concern to me is an entire branch of the RCMP that is set up to perform the exact same tasks that should be kept entirely within the CBSA investigations branch. Why should taxpayers be supporting two separate agencies to perform the same function? In the day and age when police resources are stretched to the breaking point, why are we insisting CBSA officers call police to their aid, and at the expense of local municipalities?

A good part of this talk can be transposed over many other investigative enforcement branches of other federal departments. The Canadian Coast Guard and parks warden services are two more that are told to call police for assistance if firearms are required. This is no longer viable. Each enforcement branch must be equipped, trained, and ready to perform all their enforcement responsibilities.

Last year I visited a nuclear power facility to update our readers on the advancements made there in security over the 15 years since I'd done a story on the facility. Originally I was not impressed. Many years ago, when they told me that their security personnel were trained to hold off an armed attack on the plant for 15 minutes—because that was how long the test studies had shown it would take to get an armed officer on site—the guards were unarmed. In this remote location, that would mean one officer with one gun, a .38 revolver with six shots. When I returned, a more enlightened security branch head advised me that their tactical security personnel could secure and hold this facility better than any other agency or group they could call in. So they would be calling in the police to simply back them up.

If a private security firm can possess this kind of confidence, why can't the Canada Border Services Agency?

Thank you.

**The Chair:** Thank you very much.

The custom at this committee is to go now to a round of questions of seven minutes.

Oh, sorry, Mr. Brown, do you have some remarks as well?

**Mr. Dave Brown (Firearms Editor, Blue Line Magazine):** I have. I'll be very brief.

**The Chair:** My apologies. Go ahead.

**Mr. Dave Brown:** Thank you very much.

My name is Dave Brown. I'm a professional firearms instructor and also a tactical firearms editor with *Blue Line* magazine. I'm probably one of the very few civilians who has ever been in a similar position with a law enforcement magazine. I work with government agencies, military units, and police officers on firearms training. I'm not aligned with any particular agency or any firearms manufacturer in any way whatsoever, so you could probably consider me a sort of educated observer of this process.

What I'd like to contribute to the committee today is my experience with CBSA officers. I don't know if the committee is aware of this or not, but CBSA has done some basic firearm safety training for their officers for the past several years. Starting in 1999, I did the Canadian firearms safety course, which is a basic introductory level safety course, for CBSA officers in Manitoba. I have some statistics from that course. Hopefully I can answer for the committee whether these officers will be trained to the same high level as police officers.

Before I get into that I want to say that my philosophy is probably the same as everyone else's here: nobody really wants to live in a country where we have to arm our borders. But I also believe that if we are arming the borders, we need to provide the appropriate tools for the people who are protecting our borders and Canadians.

In 1999 we began training in Manitoba, and I trained a total of 127 officers on the Canadian firearms safety course, which is a 16-hour basic firearms course. At the end of the course there are two levels of testing: a written test on the theory in the course, and a practical hands-on component. Of all the officers who took the course, the average score on the written test was 95%. On the hands-on practical part, the average score of all the officers was 93%. Out of 127 officers, 20 of them achieved a perfect score on the written test, and seven of them achieved a perfect score on the practical test. I can also say that 94% of all the officers that took the course achieved 90% or more on the written test, and 83% of those officers achieved 90% or more on the practical test.

As Mr. Moran has said, 88% of his members surveyed were willing to be trained with firearms. Hopefully I have some evidence that out of those 88% who are willing to be trained, they would all perform to an extremely high level. I believe their professionalism would allow them to be trained to the same standards, if not higher, of any other police agency in North America.

Another thing I want to talk about is firearms selection. If firearms are to be given to the officers, they should be firearms that have been extensively tested, have been proven reliable, and have been chosen by other law enforcement agencies in North America. They do not want firearms that are new to the market and have never been tested. They don't want firearms that are not being used by another law enforcement agency. They don't want firearms that are now out of

production. They want the best firearms on the market, with consideration for the cost of the firearms and the cost of the training.

At *Blue Line* magazine, every four or five years we do a survey of all the firearms used by law enforcement agencies. Since 1998, every police agency in Canada has transitioned to a semi-automatic pistol of the design where the trigger function is described as a double action only, which is essentially the simple, basic firearms design. This is the only firearm that should be considered for any law enforcement officer in North America.

While most of the agencies since 1998 are fairly satisfied with their purchases, from 2003 until 2007 five police agencies in Canada have changed to an entirely different make and model of firearm. Out of those five agencies, 100% of them have transitioned from a Beretta semi-automatic pistol to another make; four of them have gone to the Glock semi-automatic pistol, and one of them has gone to the SiGARMS semi-automatic pistol.

• (1210)

Basically, based on that experience of the agencies in Canada, what I would suggest is that if the firearm doesn't say Glock or it doesn't say SiGARMS, then there would have to be some justification involved.

I think I'll just stop there and make myself available for questions.

**The Chair:** Thank you very much.

We probably have a lot of questions from around the table, so we're going to have to try to move along as quickly as we can.

Mr. Cullen, first of all.

• (1215)

**Hon. Roy Cullen (Etobicoke North, Lib.):** Thank you, Mr. Chair.

My thanks to all the witnesses.

Mr. Brown, I don't agree with your proposition that we live in a world where we do have to arm our borders. I think this is a very expensive proposition. In fact, we heard the other day that the \$781 million does not include reclassification of the border officers. I think you can get to \$1 billion very easily. I like to call it the "billion-dollar bordergate", because it's a total waste of taxpayers' money for very limited or no results.

If you look at what we've heard so far, we suspect that the deterrent effect will be minimal. Can you imagine criminals in the United States who are planning to run guns or run drugs—which I agree are serious matters—saying that they better not try it because the border guards are armed in Canada? I don't imagine that will happen. They're not looking for a confrontation, I suspect.

In fact, we heard from Mr. Jolicoeur, quite rightly, that the customs officers will be told not to engage, because these are heavily populated areas and we have innocent bystanders there. So we have guns that won't act as a deterrent, and they're not going to be used, quite rightly. So I don't see the benefit of it.

Mr. Moran, I'm sure you have an interest in Canada's public safety, but you're also the president of a union. Is it not the case that, notwithstanding what Mr. Jolicoeur said, they're going to have a new classification system? People who carry sidearms will be reclassified upwards, because they're going to be arguing that they should be classified as police officers. Certainly, as the president of a union, I'm sure you'll be fighting for that.

Whatever it bottoms out at, there is going to be an increased cost. In fact, the numbers that I've seen could mean that the treasury could be impacted by \$70 million to \$100 million a year from this reclassification, which could be \$15,000 per year. Maybe you could comment on that if you have different numbers, but that's a huge cost to the treasury.

It's a matter of negotiation, but I think there is a reality that these officers will be reclassified upwards. Frankly, I think that's another part of your agenda. Given that you're a union leader, I would be surprised if it were not.

I wonder if you could also comment—and I'll leave it here, although I could go on—on the numbers that you quoted in terms of the number of officers who do not want to be trained to carry a firearm. We heard testimony the other day that somewhere in the vicinity of 30% of the officers do not want sidearms or to be trained. We heard today that it's something more like 13%. Those numbers are clearly in conflict, so maybe you could clarify that.

Regardless of the number, what are you going to do or what is the CBSA going to do with those people? They can't all be sent off to airports.

I'll leave it at that, and maybe someone could comment, perhaps beginning with Mr. Moran.

**The Chair:** First of all, Mr. Moran, would you like to—

**Mr. Ron Moran:** Yes, thank you.

A long series of things has been touched upon here. First of all, I just want to clarify that it has never been.... In reviewing the testimony from last week, I was fascinated. It's really a leap to go from a sidearm as a tool to protect oneself, to an area where we would suggest that these officers should be shooting at cars as they're running the port.

We're the first to acknowledge that in a lot of cases, the U.S. side will do, for example, what they call an export check, which is a verification upon exit. A lot of individuals—usually older folks—tend to think they've cleared Canada Customs once they've gone through this check, and they will drive right by the Canadian office. Surely you're not suggesting we should open fire on individuals like that.

We've been accused repeatedly of trying to use the arming issue as a back door to try to get raises for our members. In other words, we've always been questioned about whether we really want to do this for the safety of the officers. Instead, it's been put that we're really just looking for a back door for raises. That really puts the whole issue in perspective in terms of where I suspect the opposition is coming from.

Mainly the motivation seems to be—and I hope you'll correct me if I'm wrong—that on the one hand, we shouldn't be arming the

border because we're getting into what is essentially a labour demand that has been very public, and governments should never cave in to that. So we'll subtract ourselves from the reality that we don't live in Mister Rogers' neighbourhood or in Disneyland and that these situations of danger are not going on, in spite of six reports that now say they are going on. We'll subtract ourselves from that, and for the image, we'll also not consider arming, as you've pointed out, for the money.

I really find it unsettling that the safety of the officers is a very distant fourth place on your list of top reasons why we should arm the border. The issue has always been about whether the officers....

It's important to note that we've been provided with bullet-proof vests for the past twelve or fifteen years, so there has been an acknowledgement that there is certainly the potential for us to get shot at. But the only goal has always been about the officers being exposed to that level of violence. In other words, if, for example, somebody opens fire on them, they will at least have a chance of making it back home to their families at the end of that particular shift.

And in terms of suggesting that it won't protect Canadians, the policy now is that we're to let known armed and dangerous individuals into Canada and for police to hopefully intercept and deal with them. The suggestion is to not intercept them at the points of entry when we know who they are, what they're capable of, and what they've done. When we know that the person should be apprehended, to suggest that not intercepting them right then and there is not in the best interests of Canadians.... I'm at a loss to try to make sense of that particular analysis as well.

● (1220)

**The Chair:** Does anyone else want to give a response to that?

**Hon. Roy Cullen:** I was just going to say that Mr. Jolicoeur himself said that officers would be trained not to interdict, which I think is quite appropriate. I therefore simply refute the claim that this is going to increase the safety of officers or the safety of Canadians.

Given that there's no tangible evidence that this is going to increase the safety of Canadians or the customs officers, why would we spend this kind of money? So I have the order right, sir. It does cost money, and if you're going to spend taxpayers' money, you should have some benefits.

I'd like to maybe bring in—

**The Chair:** You're out of time already, by half a minute.

**Hon. Roy Cullen:** I have half a minute? Okay.

I just want to—

**The Chair:** No, sorry, you're over your time.

Monsieur Ménard.

[Translation]

**Mr. Serge Ménard (Marc-Aurèle-Fortin, BQ):** Thank you for coming here to discuss an important issue. We are counting on you to enlighten us. I hope to have enough time to ask you all of the questions I want to ask.

First of all, can you tell me why you chose the Northgate Group to conduct this study?



**Mr. Ron Moran:** Michel provided you with an overview. We asked several organizations, including the Police Association and a number of other law enforcement agencies which we felt were qualified to do a study of this nature. We ended up with a short list of four firms, which we then approached. We interviewed three of them, with the fourth being unavailable. We made our final selection once we had interviewed all three firms.

**Mr. Serge Ménard:** When you invited these four firms to bid, did you tell them why you were looking for another organization to carry out this investigation?

**Mr. Ron Moran:** Absolutely, Mr. Ménard.

It was important to inform them, because they were likely to encounter a lack of cooperation on the part of the employer. Furthermore, they needed to know why we wanted our own study, namely because we had discovered that the study ordered by the government was supposed to be neutral. However, the report had been modified.

Therefore, we were bringing a firm into this somewhat hostile environment and we openly acknowledged our reasons for doing so.

Does that answer your question?

**Mr. Serge Ménard:** Yes.

What did this study cost you?

**Mr. Ron Moran:** It cost a little over \$150,000. Our biggest expense was travel costs, because we wanted a large sampling.

• (1225)

**Mr. Serge Ménard:** I understand.

Either Mr. Juneau-Katsuya or one of the other witnesses can answer my next question.

You evaluated the risks that customs officers can encounter and you came up with some figures that indicate a very high level of risk.

Did you examine some of the incidents that occurred in the past to ascertain if in fact your predictions for the future were justified?

**Mr. Michel Juneau-Katsuya:** Thank you for that excellent question.

We did indeed focus considerably on this problem area. Unfortunately, it is very difficult to find any data, but as we discovered over time, the Agency did not have the proper tools for collecting data.

However, as I noted in my opening remarks, we interviewed 383 people, all of whom related to us incidents in which they had been involved. They reported physical assaults — some had been hospitalized — serious verbal abuse and altercations leading to blows and various types of injuries. A customs officer working alone even died under mysterious circumstances. His lifeless body was discovered the following day.

A number of officers told us that we would have a difficult time collecting data because first of all, the agency does not collect this type of data and secondly, that they have no desire to become statistics. They also informed us of the existence of a policy whereby they must back off when in the presence of a violent criminal. Since

they have a family, they want to go home at night. So then, they back off and let the police take over.

**Mr. Serge Ménard:** In your testimony, you mentioned an edited copy of the ModuSpec inquiry. Have you read this unedited version?

**M. Michel Juneau-Katsuya:** We have indeed obtained a copy of this document.

**Mr. Serge Ménard:** Can it be readily obtained?

**M. Michel Juneau-Katsuya:** Yes.

**Mr. Serge Ménard:** Could you forward a copy to us?

**M. Michel Juneau-Katsuya:** I don't have one with me, but I can send a copy to the committee.

**Mr. Ron Moran:** If it can help you in some way, Mr. Ménard, the unaltered pages and the final report are reproduced in the Senate committee report. The two versions are appended to the Senate committee report released last year.

I'd be happy to send it to you.

**Mr. Serge Ménard:** So noted.

Could you still send us an unedited copy?

**Mr. Ron Moran:** Of course.

**Mr. Jean-Pierre Fortin (First National Vice-President, Customs Excise Union Douanes Accise):**

If you have no objections, Mr. Ménard, I'd like to comment on one of your questions concerning past incidents within our organization that have led us to call for border guards to be armed.

Historically, Revenue Canada was responsible for customs. Obviously, many of our officers never enjoyed being looked upon as tax collectors. In the past role, our main role was to collect taxes.

As my colleague mentioned, the passage of Bill C-18 by the Liberal government in 1998 brought about a change in culture and some recognition for the agency for which we now work.

I simply wanted to point that up. I won't take up any more of your time.

**Mr. Serge Ménard:** Mr. Brown, you mentioned courses that officers could take and the results achieved. I know that police academies conduct situation simulation exercises, generally using actors. Do the particular courses you spoke of include these kind of exercises?

[English]

**The Chair:** You have time for a brief response.

**Mr. Dave Brown:** The Canadian firearms safety course is a basic introductory-level safety course. It has nothing to do with law enforcement per se. So the training would be on how to handle a firearm safely, and it would be the same training given to any Canadian who wanted to acquire a firearm in Canada.

This was considered, at the time, to be a minimum level of training, so that customs officers would not be putting themselves or anyone else in any harm with seized firearms. They reported many situations in which they'd seized firearms that were found subsequently to be loaded, and unfortunately, without that level of training at the time, no one could unload the firearm safely. They simply didn't know how to handle it.

In fact, I was told about a situation in which someone had seized a firearm from an American trucker. It was loaded, and the only person who could unload the firearm was the trucker, who had been arrested and whose firearm had been seized. That was the only person who had the ability to unload the firearm.

So it was that basic level of safety training that they conducted in 1999. What you're describing would be a much higher level of training, and this would be in conjunction with the actual issuing of the firearms, which will be done in the future.

• (1230)

**The Chair:** Thank you very much.

Mr. Brown, please.

**Mr. Gord Brown (Leeds—Grenville, CPC):** Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I want to welcome our witnesses here today. I'm glad that we're finally getting to see the side of the people who put their lives on the line to protect us at the borders, who are also there working hard for us every day.

To Moran, last year Prime Minister Harper and Minister Day announced that this arming of border guards was going to go ahead. There was a great deal of push-back from the official opposition. I know that one of our former committee members, Mr. Holland, was quite public in that criticism. I believe at some point you and your union contacted him to discuss that. Can you maybe tell us a little bit about his response to that? Because I know he was quite public in his opposition.

I'm very concerned about the fact that the official opposition is taking the approach that your members are out there just looking to get a raise, and that all of these reports don't mean anything in terms of their safety. I find it, quite frankly, insulting to your members.

**Mr. Ron Moran:** It's insulting to our members and insulting to individuals such as Michel, because his credibility and objectivity are in question; I guess he's just doing this to assist us in getting a raise.

But beyond that, I guess what you're referring to is that when the comments about the cost were made...and don't get us wrong; we've mentioned that we have a lot of concern here. We also question where the numbers are drawn from. We are trying to...and I hope you will have more success than we did. I certainly invite you to try to get a breakdown and try to get a sense of how the numbers that are being suggested as costs are arrived at.

It went from \$1 billion to \$780 million, so I guess it's going in the right direction. But if you take that figure and you divide it by the 4,800 officers who are to be armed, you'll come up with a figure of \$167,000 per officer. It's just mind-boggling how you get into that range.

When the \$1-billion figure was thrown out initially, we contacted Mr. Holland's office. The response we got back was that Mr. Holland was not in opposition to arming, Mr. Holland was very concerned with the cost. So it was certainly refreshing for us to receive that type of information from the office of the then Liberal critic, and we're certainly prepared to share that piece of communication with anybody who wants to see it.

I guess that was your question...?

**Mr. Gord Brown:** Fair enough.

I have a great deal of concern—and I asked Mr. Jolicoeur about this last week—about the fact that, in my view, CBSA was deliberately dragging its feet. I think that might have been what we were hearing from him...or not from him, but I believe that's what I was seeing.

So I asked Mr. Jolicoeur specifically whether he had ever said that he would quit if this were to go ahead. He refused to answer.

However, do *you* believe—

**Hon. Roy Cullen:** On a point of order, Mr. Chairman, this came up at the last session, where we're sort of impugning the reputations of civil servants who have worked very responsibly for this country. To deal with innuendo or whatever it is...and to put it to this witness I don't think is appropriate.

• (1235)

**Mr. Gord Brown:** I haven't finished asking my question.

To Mr. Moran, do you believe CBSA is dragging its feet on this issue?

**Mr. Ron Moran:** When you are so entrenched in a position, as has been the case with the senior bureaucracy and with the people who were in government at the time, it's hard to believe there is a genuine shift in commitment. And when the same people now get mandated to actually implement this type of initiative...which, we're the first to recognize, is probably a fundamental one—if not *the* most fundamental one—in terms of the culture within the organization, if nothing else, in terms of the recognition that there is a focus on law enforcement that is being recognized.

It was recognized, as we pointed out, in 1998 when we began enforcing the Criminal Code. It was further enforced when customs and immigration services were carved right out of the homes where they had been, and were placed in their own agencies alongside the RCMP, CSIS, and the Correctional Service. So certainly the importance of focusing on law enforcement and public security was clear from government decisions.

I'm sorry for taking such a long circle to answer your question. But it makes it very difficult to accept that people who had such firm convictions...which I respect, and I hope people respect what I believe as well. To task the same group of people to now implement it....

I say this, and I say this to the senior managers as well: they have not taken the turn that would lead them to recognize that they are at the head of a law enforcement organization. This is the fundamental problem with a lot of what we're confronted with.

**Mr. Gord Brown:** Okay.

I know we don't have a whole lot of time, and I have a whole lot of questions. But I want to get a bit into ModuSpec, because I don't believe we're going to be able to hear from them to discuss the allegedly altered report.

To Mr. Juneau-Katsuya, could you tell us a bit about a comparison between the ModuSpec report and the Northgate report? I'm also interested in knowing whether you got any cooperation from CBSA in your attempt to carry out your report.

**Mr. Michel Juneau-Katsuya:** The length of the studies were quite different, one to the other. The report from ModuSpec was mandated by the government, by CBSA at that time, and they received full cooperation. By contrast, despite the invitation from the union directly to Ms. McLellan and to Mr. Jolicoeur to embark on this initiative, they refused to get on board. They issued an e-mail to all officers across Canada that said they would be charged if they were to speak with Northgate. They would be charged under section 107 of the Customs Act. They sent also a memo to all managers stating that they should not allow Northgate to go on-site.

We performed our interviews off-site, and interestingly, despite that, 383 people presented themselves within the timeframe we had. We also tried to sort of limit the period of time, for cost purposes, where we were, because we had to travel across Canada. We were able to visit 40 sites ourselves, and in many instances we were guided by the local management, which insisted on explaining to us what was going on.

In terms of the differences—

**The Chair:** Please wrap it up as quickly as you can.

**Mr. Michel Juneau-Katsuya:** Yes, this is just the last portion.

With regard to differences in terms of what we did, ModuSpec visited 21 sites, we visited 40. They interviewed 200 people, we interviewed 383 people.

What is also important to mention—and this will be my last comment—is that we're not only talking about border service officers, or what are commonly called customs officers, at the border point. We're also talking about regional intelligence officers and customs investigators. We see these people less, but they are on the road, and they are on the front lines tackling criminals right inland. So these people have a very risky job, because basically they're like plainclothes police officers without the gun.

• (1240)

**The Chair:** Okay, thank you.

We're now into the five-minute round.

Ms. Barnes.

**Hon. Sue Barnes (London West, Lib.):** Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much for being here. Because I have five minutes, I'd ask you for short answers.

The government has said it's not going to extend the arming to inland areas and airports. That's going to create a situation between those customs officers who are armed and those who are not.

How will you deal with that when you're doing your union negotiations? Are we going to have two levels of customs officers?

In the testimony last week they also talked about taking summer students away from any position and any area that does have armed border guards. Do you know what number of full-time officers—I would presume full-time officers, if they're not using students—would be required at the border points?

I'll give you that to start, and then I have some other quick questions that I'd like to get in, please, about the guns.

**Mr. Jean-Pierre Fortin:** Regarding students, we have always said that we have a certain position regarding students—

**Hon. Sue Barnes:** Yes, I'm aware of that.

**Mr. Jean-Pierre Fortin:** I guess you understand that, as were a student. I also was a student, back in 1982.

**Hon. Sue Barnes:** Mine was a longer time ago. It wasn't in the last 20 years.

**Mr. Jean-Pierre Fortin:** Regarding the student aspect, you are correct; I think CBSA has clearly indicated that they will not be armed.

Our position is the same as that of any law enforcement agency. The RCMP, for example, have a student program, which they call the cadet program. Those officers are not armed and not allowed to perform certain tasks—for example, to drive the car and other stuff.

**Hon. Sue Barnes:** I guess what I'm trying to ask you is, what are the numbers? I know that summer vacations happen for border officers. What increased numbers will you need for your borders? Have you done any evaluation?

If you take away the students, you're going to have to pay somebody to do those jobs. That's what I'm after, not the job description.

**Mr. Jean-Pierre Fortin:** To be clear, we don't have the exact numbers, but I think they're around 1,500.

Having said that, what we are proposing to CBSA is to hire seasonal officers: fully trained officers who would probably be the next officers to be offered those jobs on the line—full-time jobs, I mean.

**Hon. Sue Barnes:** My second part of the question was with respect to classification levels.

**Mr. Ron Moran:** Our position is very clear and very unambiguous: we do not support two levels, and will not be going to the table prepared to negotiate two levels.

We've always worked out of one national job description, which means you can be called upon to carry out any of the duties in the job description. The advantage to the employer, and I guess just as importantly to Canadians, is that it allows you a very flexible workforce.

In other words, if you have two levels, and if, God forbid, we had another situation like September 11, you would not be able to deploy the inland officers to the border if you had that requirement.

So there's good reason not to support two levels.

**Hon. Sue Barnes:** Thank you. I have some other questions.

With respect to the arming of the guards at the border, I know that police have protocols, and other people with guns have protocols. Obviously those guns...well, maybe not so obviously.

What happens to the guns at the end of the shift? Do they go home with the officer? Are protocols put in place for the safety of the firearm, not only for the work area but also in the non-work area?

**Mr. Jean-Pierre Fortin:** Well, right now, for CBSA we don't know. They're supposed to share these policies with us next week, on February 12, so we will be able to find out more then about what CBSA has in mind regarding the question you're asking.

**Hon. Sue Barnes:** I'm basically asking, do these guards take the guns home with them? I think I have some answer, maybe, from—

**Mr. Ron Moran:** The indication we're getting from CBSA is that they don't. Part of the cost of the \$781 million is the cost of the lockup and all of the procedures that go with it, as well as overtime and travel costs. A lot of people work from one office and are deployed to some of the other small offices. If they're called in for overtime, for example, they have to report to the bigger office to be deployed. There are a lot of costs involved in not letting officers go home with their sidearms, as is the case with all other law enforcement.

But I believe—this is my educated guess from the indications I'm getting at my level—that CBSA is contemplating lockup, which is increasing, by a large margin, the costs involved.

• (1245)

**Hon. Sue Barnes:** So we're going to have armouries at our border crossings now?

**Mr. Ron Moran:** Well, you have to have lockup and lockers. Some of those offices close in the middle of the night; you don't want them broken into, and then the firearms—

**The Chair:** Thank you very much.

**Hon. Sue Barnes:** He wanted to answer the question.

**Mr. Michel Juneau-Katsuya:** You're right; police departments have various policies about this, but in the vast majority of police departments in Canada—the extreme vast majority—police officers keep their guns. I would strongly recommend that customs officers should keep their guns and go home and be responsible for them.

One of the reasons is that they don't leave their uniforms. We had several testimonies during our research from customs officers where.... For instance, I vividly remember this young female customs officer who works at Dorval saying that during her shift, she seized some stuff from passengers coming off. She finished her shift at 3 o'clock in the morning and went to her car in the middle of the parking lot. She was in uniform, on her way home, and was subject to aggression twice—not once, but twice—by different individuals. They recognized her, and there was nobody there; she was still in uniform, and they knew she was the one who had seized their stuff.

So if they are trained, they should keep their guns. As well, as Mr. Moran was saying, sometimes they are deployed to other places. It would be an extra charge to the government and not efficient to keep those guns on site rather than to leave the guns with the officers, just as we do with all the police officers in Canada.

**The Chair:** Thank you.

Ms. Mourani.

[*Translation*]

**Mrs. Maria Mourani (Ahuntsic, BQ):** Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for joining us. I have a number of questions about peace officers. This is a fairly broad occupation. For instance, parole officers and corrections officers are also considered to be peace officers. Yet, they do not carry weapons, except when posted in security towers in certain maximum security facilities where a police squad is required or when responding to a riot. Otherwise, they are not armed.

I worked as a parole officer for nearly seven years, both in the community and in penitentiaries. The main reason given for not arming these officers was that weapons increased the risk of violence. Criminologists have long been debating the pros and cons of arming peace officers.

Consider, for example, the case of an unarmed border guard. As a general rule, in a dangerous situation, it's better for that guard to back off because removing himself from danger's path minimizes his risk of being attacked. In the case of an unlawful home entry, the first thing people are told is not to resist to avoid being harmed. People are told that even if they have a hunting rifle, they shouldn't use it because they face a greater risk of being attacked when they are armed. What are your views on the subject?

Also, we met last week with the Director of the Canada Border Services Agency. A woman was also present, but unfortunately, I've forgotten her name. I asked her how many agency employees had been killed or seriously injured and she replied that in fifteen years, no deaths or injuries had been reported.

**Mr. Michel Juneau-Katsuya:** We can supply you with the names of people who have been killed, of the officer who lost his life, of people who were either hospitalized, required stitches or were treated for various problems. These are real cases involving real people.

Getting back to what you said, with all due respect, there may be some confusion here. You're mixing apples and oranges. You're talking about parole officers and corrections officers. Let me just say two things. First, an ex-inmate certainly has no interest in assaulting the person responsible for keeping him out of jail or who has the authority to send him back to jail. Therefore, parole officers face a substantially lower risk at the outset because the ex-inmate wants to be on good terms with his parole officer.

In the case of those officers working in an institutional setting, weapons are close by and there are armed guards on site. If something were to happen, the inmates know full well that armed guards will appear at the scene very quickly.

Such is not the case at the border. There is no police or RCMP presence on site and when they are called in to provide back up, their arrival on the scene is calculated in hours, rather than in minutes.

It's important to understand that border entry posts are often remotely situated. Police officers patrol large areas and often find themselves as far away as they possibly can be from the border post. Occasionally, it may take them hours to arrive at the scene. For example, at the Lacolle border post in Quebec, the RCMP officer called upon to respond will be dispatched from Montreal and it could take quite some time for him to arrive on the scene.

As for senior management's policy of having border officers back off, situations are never black or white. For example, an officer may ask an individual to submit to a secondary inspection of his vehicle and upon inspecting the vehicle, the officer may discover a loaded weapon, drugs or some such thing.

It is a little known fact that last year, if memory serves me well, hundreds of millions of dollars worth of drugs were seized at the border. Recently, a vehicle carrying eight million dollars worth of drugs was intercepted in Canada. Obviously, when a vehicle carrying \$8 million worth of cocaine is intercepted, some people may want to take advantage of the fact that border guards are not armed.

● (1250)

**Mrs. Maria Mourani:** What you're saying...

[*English*]

**The Chair:** I'm sorry, but you've gone well over the time limit.

We actually have time for only two more questioners.

For the government side, Mr. Norlock, would you like to comment?

Do you have something to add, Mr. Fortin?

[*Translation*]

**Mr. Jean-Pierre Fortin:** I'd like to answer the member's question.

I know that you've looked into the problem of street gangs and involved the media in this on several occasions.

As you know, the majority of these individuals believe that we are armed. Clearly there has been a great deal of publicity, particularly on the US side, and reports from international travellers entering the country. In a number of countries, customs officers are armed. Our officers have a number of tools at their disposal. They carry expandable batons, cayenne pepper and so forth. All that's missing in their arsenal is a gun.

Recently, a number of individuals arrived at a border post in Quebec at 2 a.m. They had a cache of automatic weapons. The female customs officer was the only person on duty. How would you have liked her to respond? The individuals were armed to the teeth. You might say to me that had she had a gun, she would at least have been able to protect herself. However, there would also have been an increased risk of a violent confrontation.

Often, these individuals proceed right through the border post, with the shipment following close behind them. The same situation occurs at the other 107 unguarded posts that have abandoned by the

RCMP, as Mr. Juneau-Katsuya pointed out. That is the situation that we are facing today.

**Mrs. Maria Mourani:** You're saying that a gun would have made a difference.

**Mr. Jean-Pierre Fortin:** Had she been armed, the customs officer would at least been able to protect herself.

Mr. Cullen shared his concerns with us. RCMP experts hired by border services told us that we had the ideal infrastructure in place to protect travellers and officers. We serve as a natural road block and we can control the situation. That's what RCMP experts told us.

I visited some of the US border posts, as well as the Sûreté du Québec facilities in Nicolet and RCMP facilities. We are closely involved in the development of these facilities. We are in a position to form an opinion, even though border services hold different views.

● (1255)

[*English*]

**The Chair:** Thank you.

Our time is slipping away on us rapidly, but I think we're getting useful information, so I'm letting it go.

Mr. Norlock.

**Mr. Rick Norlock (Northumberland—Quinte West, CPC):** Thank you very much for coming this afternoon—now that it's the afternoon.

To Mr. Moran, senior management has indicated to this committee that border officers do not have the legal authority to pursue port runners. Do you agree with that statement?

**Mr. Ron Moran:** The legal authority?

**Mr. Rick Norlock:** Yes.

**Mr. Ron Moran:** No, the legal authority for pursuit exists under the act, under subsection 99.1(1).

**Mr. Rick Norlock:** So would that then therefore be a policy as opposed to a legal...?

**Mr. Ron Moran:** Absolutely. It is strictly based on policy. And that is what should occur.

There's confusion going on—which is not productive—between port running and the ability to protect oneself. The port running solution is and should be the ability to pursue. That's what we are talking about, and certainly what we're proposing in terms of a solution to port running.

So this would require no change in legislation, because the authority exists.

**Mr. Morley Lymburner:** I think it's important to understand this issue. I was a police officer for 25 years in Toronto, and I had to deal with military police officers who continually brought drunk drivers in for me to do breathalyzer tests on. Their policy was for me to carry the investigation. I would turn around and hand them the reports and say, start filling out your own reports, because I'm not going to babysit you; you're police officers, so you can do your own work.

It's basically the same situation. Why are we sapping away resources from, say, Windsor police department and the Niagara regional police department to do something that the CBSA has every authority to do but are not given the tools to do it properly? If somebody wants to run that border, why doesn't CBSA have a pursuit car fully fired up and ready to go to chase that car down, and communicate with the local police that we need some assistance but we're behind the runner?

I just do not understand that. I am completely at a loss to understand why a municipal police service should have to budget to help out the CBSA with anything.

**Mr. Rick Norlock:** The next question has to do with training, Mr. Moran.

Some of the last witnesses, in particular the RCMP, indicated that the training course that they would be giving the Canada Border Services Agency would be equivalent to their own training, but customized to meet the needs of CBSA. Have you had any conversation or have you done any research into what kind of training you would expect should be provided to your members?

**Mr. Ron Moran:** The understanding I have is that the average, specific to sidearm training for police officers, equates to roughly 40 hours, or two weeks. The CBSA is contemplating three weeks in order to add this customized element to it. Now, I don't pretend to be an expert by any definition, but this has most, if not all, of the experts to whom I brought this up raising their eyebrows as to how you get into a dimension where you justify an additional week for these officers.

If you ask me, from what I have gathered from the experts, it should be two weeks. The CBSA is hard set on making it a three-week course, and they are in the process of developing that. I have difficulty understanding...because you have to keep in mind that as part of the same decision of the government, they are also going to arm inland investigators, inland regional intelligence officers, as well as inland immigration enforcement officers.

The immigration people are the ones who go and knock on doors to tell people that they're coming to take them away and bring them back to their country. They work under very dangerous situations. They get into even more than the people at the border, exactly the same situations as a police officer. Why you would have to modify the course, knowing people like that are also going to be taking the same course, is also something that I'm still not able to understand.

**Mr. Dave Brown:** It's my understanding that the RCMP is going to be training the CBSA trainers, and then the trainers are going to go on to train the individual officers ultimately. The question I have then is this. The RCMP is doing a model of training that is not used by any other police agency in Canada. For most of the agencies in Canada, when they acquired their firearms, their trainers were trained by the manufacturers. For example, companies like Glock, Smith & Wesson, SiGARMS all run fairly significant training academies. They are well respected.

If I were going to buy 5,000 handguns from a company, why would I not want my trainers trained at their academy? I don't understand why we are using the relatively rare resources of the RCMP when there are better models for training and certainly much cheaper models for training.

• (1300)

**The Chair:** We're out of time.

**Mr. Rick Norlock:** Could I have one or two minutes, Mr. Chair? You were so generous with your time for the other side.

**The Chair:** I know. Okay, you have one minute.

**Mr. Rick Norlock:** Number one, I have 30 years of police experience, so I somewhat disagree with you, Mr. Brown, that it's actually...“train the trainer” is a common practice in policing.

To answer one of Ms. Barnes' questions with regard to taking a firearm home, for one of the largest police forces in Ontario, unless there's a specific reason why you need to take your gun home, it's left at the office, as it is, as far as I understand, with most smaller police forces in the province of Ontario. They're actually kept at the office.

Thank you very much for that extra time, Mr. Chair.

**The Chair:** Okay.

We really are out of time, but I promised you one minute. Do you have a quick question?

**Hon. Roy Cullen:** I have a very quick one. I had some others, but I won't ask them.

With regard to a question I'd put earlier, we heard testimony from Mr. Jolicoeur and others that 25% to 30% of the officers do not want to be trained to carry a sidearm. I heard numbers today of 13% to 15%.

Those numbers are at variance. Can you explain what's going on here?

**Mr. Michel Juneau-Katsuya:** In our study, out of 383 people who were directly interviewed, we had exactly 86% who said they wanted to be armed; 12% who said they needed to be armed, but they didn't feel qualified to carry arms; and 2% who said no, they should not have arms.

So the flat no was at 2%. If you add the 12% who said yes, they should be armed, but they didn't feel comfortable carrying a weapon, you could go up to 14%, but not above that.

**The Chair:** Okay. Thank you.

Does anybody have a final comment?

**Mr. Ron Moran:** Mr. Chair—

**The Chair:** Yes, go ahead.

**Hon. Sue Barnes:** Mr. Chair, I thought I was going to make a comment. I withdrew my question, but I said I wanted to comment.

**The Chair:** Okay.

Mr. Moran.

**Mr. Ron Moran:** But on the numbers, I think it's important that I clarify that these were the Northgate report numbers. We carried out a survey of strictly the border, the land border crossings. We had a 91% response; 2,200 officers responded.

So we drew from the border itself, and 88% said they wanted a sidearm. Another 10% said they didn't want one, but they recognized that the job requires one.

That's where our figures come from.

**Hon. Sue Barnes:** As the current critic from the official opposition, I can say it's not only a question of dollars—even though the dollars are tax dollars, and in terms of accountability, you should have to answer, as the government has to answer about the costs of this operation—but it also is a matter of public safety, as far as I'm concerned

It's not only the public safety of the guards serving at borders—I was an inland immigration officer for three years, too—but it's also the safety of the travelling public. I think we have to examine the safety of the travelling public with respect to the arming situation.

So I don't want the question that was posed by my colleague from the opposition to reflect where I'm coming from on this issue. At this point in time, I just want to make the statement that it's everybody's safety that's important.

**The Chair:** Thank you.

We're out of time. Does anybody else have a concluding comment?

**Mr. Michel Juneau-Katsuya:** Thank you very much.

I had the pleasure of working with customs officers for over 21 years in my official function as an RCMP and a CSIS officer. In my last position at CSIS, as a matter of fact, I was the national coordinator for the point-of-entry interdiction program for counter-terrorism. I worked with 3,000 of them on a regular basis.

As a very personal comment only, I had quite a lot of respect for the work they were doing then. Following this study, they earned not only more of my respect but they earned my gratitude. The conditions under which we found they were working were unbelievable. To see men and women, day and night, perform this all year long is only remarkable.

**The Chair:** I appreciate you saying that. I've had contact with border guards, and they tell me exactly the same thing, so I appreciate it.

Are there any other very brief comments?

• (1305)

**Mr. Dave Brown:** I only want to correct one misperception.

There seems to be an idea that sidearms are going to be used to protect physical facilities, like buildings and fences. A sidearm is and always will be for the protection of life. It's the only justification for a sidearm, and it is going to be an important part of their training.

**The Chair:** Monsieur Fortin.

**Mr. Jean-Pierre Fortin:** Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I have one last comment.

Well, I was glad to hear today that border services officers will have pay raises now. I can go back and tell them that, because it seems evident now....

**Voices:** Oh, oh!

**The Chair:** I would like to thank you all very much.

I'm sorry that we've gone over time.

Do you have a comment, Ms. Mourani?

[*Translation*]

**Mrs. Maria Mourani:** I'd like to ask a question, Mr. Chairman, given the rather troubling statistics presented.

On the one hand, the border officer maintains that no deaths or assaults have been reported in 15 years, whereas the witness here maintains otherwise. To which cases is he referring? The two statements are like night and day.

Could you send us by...?

**Mr. Michel Juneau-Katsuya:** I saw that you had a photocopy of the report...

**Mrs. Maria Mourani:** I haven't yet read it in its entirety.

**Mr. Michel Juneau-Katsuya:** We mention these incidents in the report. The problem, however, is that we are not authorized to systematically collect data. However, we have catalogued a number of major incidents and these are mentioned in the report.

**Mrs. Maria Mourani:** Could we obtain some additional information?

**Mr. Michel Juneau-Katsuya:** In that case, we would need to draw up another report ...

**Mrs. Maria Mourani:** I see.

**Mr. Michel Juneau-Katsuya:** ...so to speak, because data was not systematically catalogued. The report contained statistics, figures on the number of persons injured, and so forth.

[*English*]

**The Chair:** Thank you very much.

This meeting stands adjourned.







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