



House of Commons
CANADA

Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

FAAE • NUMBER 047 • 1st SESSION • 38th PARLIAMENT

EVIDENCE

Thursday, June 9, 2005

—
Chair

Mr. Bernard Patry

All parliamentary publications are available on the
"Parliamentary Internet Parlementaire" at the following address:

<http://www.parl.gc.ca>

Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

Thursday, June 9, 2005

•(0835)

[English]

The Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry (Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.)): Good morning, everyone.

The orders of the day for this 47th meeting of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade are for the study of the international policy statement. As witnesses this morning, we are pleased to have with us Mr. Roy Culpeper, president of the North-South Institute, and Ms. Kristiana Powell, researcher on conflict prevention, the North-South Institute.

Welcome, both of you.

You have a communication for us right away, so you can start, Mr. Culpeper.

Mr. Roy Culpeper (President, North-South Institute): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, I'd like to thank the committee for this opportunity to present our views on the international policy statement.

By way of a couple of preliminaries, the brief we submitted to the committee, and which has been circulated, was actually published in January of this year as a contribution to the then ongoing international policy review, and it was thus undertaken prior to the release of the statement in April. However, now that we've had a chance to look at the IPS, we believe that our brief still presents an alternative vision and policy framework to that of the government.

My other introductory remark is that I'm pleased to have here with me my colleague Kristiana Powell, who's been studying the issue of the responsibility to protect, particularly in an African context. She knows far more about these issues than I do and would be happy to speak about them, should committee members so desire, during the question period.

I'll just make a few brief points in my opening remarks. First, I would emphasize the strengths of the international policy statement.

In launching the IPR, or the review, 18 months ago, the Prime Minister was seeking a coherent and integrated international policy, and to renew Canada's engagement with a rapidly changing world. In so doing, he acknowledged what many experts and others had already recognized, the fact that in the last decade Canada has run down its capital in the international arena, and that there is a need to make our various policy instruments of diplomacy, defence, development—the three D's, and so on—work in concert through a whole-of-government approach.

The statement clearly recognizes the need to address the first of these issues by reinvesting in Canada's international engagement, particularly in the development and defence arenas. That, in our view, is clearly welcome. Although there are many worthwhile initiatives, some details are also open to criticism, including the lack of commitment to a date for reaching the 0.7% foreign aid target, which in our estimation will cost up to \$25 billion. But we feel it is eminently achievable by 2015 without going into deficit.

However—and this is my second point—the statement is weak in the area of greater coherence among the three D's and other channels of international policy. In our brief, we maintain that policy coherence cannot be achieved in the abstract; in order to achieve policy coherence, policy must be coherent around something, preferably a vision leading to a consistent set of policy objectives or a unifying policy framework. Our vision at the institute is a world of equitable and sustainable development, providing genuine human security from want and fear for our grandchildren and for generations to come.

We suggested in our brief that the UN Millennium Declaration, with its millennium development goals, provides Canada with such a unifying policy framework—although we admit that there are imperfections in the MDGs, the millennium development goals. However, as a universal declaration, the Millennium Declaration is additionally important because, if we adopted it as our framework, it would allow Canada's international policies to be coherent with those of other nation states as well.

Regrettably, the IPS does not seem to have any unifying vision or policy framework. This is amply demonstrated by the fact that the statement actually consists of five statements: four departmental chapters—the three D's, plus international commerce—plus an overview. The substance of the IPS actually appears in the four chapters rather than in the overview. Only the development chapter, which is perhaps the best among the four departmental chapters, speaks convincingly to the need for a whole-of-government approach. For example, little is said in the commerce chapter about development, apart from a token paragraph appearing at the very end. Yet development is not an alien concept to trade policy-makers. For example, during the Doha development round of multilateral trade negotiations, and the WTO ministerial meeting scheduled for December in Hong Kong, it is important that major progress be made in market access for developing country exports and, even more so, in ending northern subsidies of agricultural exports. All these facts are acknowledged.

●(0840)

It's also critical, in our view, that developing countries be given the flexibility to adopt policies that ensure trade actually contributes to human development in their countries.

There are perhaps some visionary glimpses in the statement that are gleaned from the Prime Minister's commendable speech to the UN General Assembly last September in which he spoke about the five responsibilities: the responsibility to protect, to deny, to respect, to build, and to the future. But these are not, unfortunately, developed into a coherent policy framework that cuts across and integrates the departmental chapters.

Putting aside the fact that a series of departmental chapters do not add up to an integrated whole-of-government policy, there are two conspicuously missing chapters, one on finance and one on the environment. In our brief, we maintain that finance is perhaps the most important international department by virtue of its engagement with the international financial institutions, its centrality to the G-7 process, and of course, its power over the purse in the domestic budgetary process.

Furthermore, it hardly bears pointing out that Canada's finance ministers have tended to be very engaged in the international agenda. Mr. Martin certainly was, and recently Mr. Goodale was a key player in the U.K.-led Commission for Africa. He's presently on his way to the G-7 finance ministers meeting prior to the Gleneagle summit, where he will be pressed by the U.K., France, and Germany to commit to a date for the 0.7% aid target and where, unfortunately, there is likely to be a continuing stalemate on multilateral debt relief.

Mr. Chairman, I believe there's a crowd of well-wishers outside L'Esplanade Laurier urging Mr. Goodale to do the right thing when he gets to his G-7 meeting.

However, my point here is that there is no discussion anywhere in the IPS about the key role of the international financial institutions, about issues such as policy conditionality, the demise of the so-called Washington Consensus, continuing international financial instability, or the precarious and rapidly growing imbalances in the global economy. All of this, in our view, adds up to a glaring omission in the IPS.

Furthermore, given the huge challenge of climate change, another such glaring omission, missing from the line-up of chapters, is a chapter on the environment.

My final point, Mr. Chairman, is that achieving policy coherence in practice is very difficult. We argue in our brief that a government serious about coherence must implement the policy framework with appropriate legislation and must monitor interdepartmental adherence through the machinery of cabinet and parliamentary review. There are some useful precedents for all of this in Sweden and the U.K.. However, this is also missing from the statement.

In our brief, we advocate putting human development at the centre of Canada's international policy framework. This is because development, in our view, is now the connecting tissue between poverty eradication, human rights and political freedoms, conflict prevention, environmental sustainability, and genuine human security. Investing in development has a large payoff in all of these

areas, which are interconnected. Yet development is far too important to be left primarily to the development agencies, which can only make a modest contribution with limited resources. Making substantial progress in development will require the concerted efforts of all departments and agencies, not just CIDA, but International Trade, Export Development Canada, National Defence, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Environment, Health, and so on.

I'd just like to mention that the very active campaign that's going on right now about making poverty history, conducted by civil society organizations, demonstrates that perhaps in Canada the people are ahead of the politicians on development issues.

Parenthetically, I would say that it may be better not to aim for policy coherence at all rather than coherence around the wrong vision or policy objectives. For example, if supreme priority were to be given to advancing Canada's economic interests, we would not want our development program to be oriented to this goal. In such a policy setting it would be better, in our view, to have an incoherent policy in which our development program is oriented towards human development objectives independent of Canada's overall commercial objectives, even though these two programs might be at cross purposes.

In this regard, if we are not clear on our own policy objectives and the policy framework we want to base our international policy on, this is a danger. By default, the U.S.-led war against terror could become the policy framework around which Canada's international policy is made coherent. There are some disturbing suggestions in the statement along these lines, particularly in the defence chapter and in the overview, and we've also seen evidence of this drift in the massive diversion of aid resources to Iraq and Afghanistan, which are now the two largest recipients of Canadian bilateral aid.

●(0845)

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would say that opportunities to review and improve Canada's international policy do not come along very often. We can do better. We urge the committee to say so to the government.

Thank you.

The Chair: Now we'll go with questions and answers. Do you want me to start with the Bloc?

Mr. Deepak Obhrai (Calgary East, CPC): No, no.

The Chair: I just want to be sure.

Mr. Deepak Obhrai: No, no. I will start.

The Chair: We have 40 minutes left; that's 10 minutes per party. We're going to go for 10 minutes. Either you split your time or you take all the time, for every party.

Mr. Deepak Obhrai: I just wanted to remind you that since I left, this committee has gone downhill. There are no Liberals over there.

The Chair: No, it's going up. It's the opposite.

You're on the show. Go ahead, Mr. Obhrai.

Mr. Deepak Obhrai: Thank you very much.

Thank you very much for coming and giving us your brief. Of course, I've had many contacts with your institute and with this thing.

I just want to draw on this point of 0.7%. That seems to be an issue of fixation whenever we talk about foreign aid policy and foreign aid issues.

I'm not here to defend the Liberals, but I'm here to say this: in all the times we have seen this issue of foreign aid, since the time foreign aid started, throwing money is the issue. What is currently happening with whatever money there is right now?

On my way back last year from going to the European Union in Ireland... They have a substantial budget. The Netherlands has a substantial budget. Countries such as China and India, the emerging markets, have joined the international aid foray. Everywhere, the point of going towards giving international aid is there.

The tsunami disaster showed that now the world responds to the disasters taking place around the world. Money is becoming not an issue. What is becoming an issue is its delivery, its effectiveness. If we look at the millennium goals and such things, there are still severe questions being raised about the current effectiveness. Don't you think we should first focus on that, before we say we want to achieve a certain target—the 0.7% that was picked up without looking at a real assessment of what has happened and is happening, and the dynamics that are changing?

Since I came here in 1997, 0.7% has been there, and we just keep sticking with it, but I still have a serious concern. Since you are an institute that is heavily involved in north-south dialogue, where a tremendous amount of aid is going, I would like to get your view on that point.

• (0850)

Mr. Roy Culpeper: Thank you, Mr. Obhrai.

I think you're absolutely right, aid effectiveness is an issue, and aid effectiveness needs lots of attention. There's lots of documented evidence about aid being diverted to areas or projects that have not served the people, and the poor particularly, very well. There's no question about that.

In my view, increasing aid effectiveness and increasing aid volume are not alternatives. Both have to be done. Even if we get to 0.7%, the amount of aid flowing to poor developing countries is actually quite modest. When you look at magnitudes flowing towards arms, towards conflicts, towards defence budgets, and so forth, it's not a very large amount of money. But it's still something worth aiming for, because a lot has to be done that cannot be done through other means.

For example, I referred in my remarks to the importance of trade as a development challenge. While trade can help do things such as create jobs and employment in developing countries, unfortunately trade won't do very much to build capacity, to reinforce the health systems and the education systems, and to strengthen governance in developing countries. These are the areas in which aid is critically needed, particularly in the poorest countries.

I would argue, maybe paradoxically, that first of all aid is not that important, but we need more of it, because it does do some pretty crucial things in some pretty crucial areas to some pretty distraught countries. I would agree with you that we need more effective aid. We need to mend our ways and be ever vigilant to make sure every

aid dollar is spent effectively. But even if we were to do that today, I would argue that more aid would be useful. Certainly that's the view of many experts, such as Jeffrey Sachs, who appeared before this committee not so long ago.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Obhrai, you have four minutes.

Mr. Deepak Obhrai: Going back to the same point, I went to the tsunami disaster area with the Prime Minister. What was noticed over there was that the money flow was coming in, but everybody was tripping over each other because there was so much money coming in to do these things. It was becoming evident that while delivery was there, this tripping over each other was causing concern, which brings us back to this 0.7% per year.

If we rise very rapidly towards that level without looking at other issues that you have rightly pointed out, agriculture being the first one—the subsidies in Europe and in America are killing the farmers in these countries in the south, which are unable to compete—no matter how much aid you throw in there, if that issue of the huge amount of subsidies there is not resolved, it's not going to get these countries out of their poverty.

In light of these issues, would it not be wise at this time for institutes such as yours and the NGOs you are dealing with in the south to say, why don't we focus on a whole comprehensive plan that includes removal of these subsidies, fighting on these levels, working with the World Bank, doing other things, so that, looking at it objectively right from the top, it covers every area?

This business of just saying we're going to raise.... The reason I'm raising this is that when I was in the Netherlands and Ireland, they were also giving out money. They were just doing what was good for them, not what was good for an overall development strategy. That is why I'm saying we need to have a plan that is complete, taking into account all the small issues, so it becomes more comprehensive for that country.

The Chair: Mr. Culpeper.

Mr. Roy Culpeper: Mr. Obhrai, I couldn't agree with you more. I'm delighted to hear to you saying so. In fact, the burden of our brief is to say exactly that—we need a comprehensive approach to development. At the end of the day, aid is important, but it's not necessarily the most important. In fact, it's relatively unimportant in the scheme of things. We need to attend to these other channels—trade, investment, and the kind of policy framework that's coming out of the World Bank. Is this the right framework to tackle poverty?

But I would be remiss if I didn't say aid was an important part of the whole package. The volume of resources, even under a 0.7% scenario, would be relatively modest. We are culpable for not making that rather meagre effort in mobilizing aid for developing countries, along with making reforms in agriculture, trade, and so forth.

• (0855)

The Chair: Mr. Day.

Mr. Stockwell Day (Okanagan—Coquihalla, CPC): The goal is something that must be aimed at. We continue to say that prosperity does not happen by accident, and poverty does not happen by accident. There are preconditions that determine each of those states. How do we get governments not committed to prosperity principles to commit to them while we still give them money? There are a number of regimes that will simply take the money, anything that doesn't go to NGOs. Even money that goes to NGOs can take the pressure off the regime to change their ways and bring in the conditions that lead to prosperity.

Mr. Roy Culpeper: Mr. Day, I'd say that you raised a very important issue. Ultimately, the prosperity of developing countries is in the hands of the governments and the people of those countries. We are outsiders, and there is only so much we can do, whether through meagre aid resources, the international policy dialogue, or other means.

The issue is, what kind of policy framework will lead to prosperity, to reducing poverty, and so forth? Here is where we get into more of a debating terrain. The lesson of the past 20 decades seems to indicate that many of the policies urged upon developing countries have led to prosperity for elites and the few at the top of the heap.

Mr. Stockwell Day: I want to get into a discussion on that. When countries uphold democratic values, individual freedoms, human rights, the freedom to own property, the freedom of enterprise, it is not just the elites that benefit. Standards rise across the board. It is frustrating to deal with regimes that don't recognize this.

Mr. Roy Culpeper: That's actually not true. If you look at the work of—

Mr. Stockwell Day: No, it is true, 100% true.

Mr. Roy Culpeper: No, look at Anthony Atkinson's work from Oxford University. Inequalities are actually widening at a rapid pace, and widening across the world.

Mr. Stockwell Day: Send me the evidence of one country that is not democratic—

The Chair: Mr. Day, I'm going to ask Mr. Culpeper to give us a written answer for this. Can you give us a written answer to this question?

Mr. Roy Culpeper: Which answer?

The Chair: Could you write an answer that you could give to the clerk, please?

Mr. Roy Culpeper: Yes, with pleasure.

The Chair: Thank you.

Madame Lalonde, s'il vous plaît.

[*Translation*]

Ms. Francine Lalonde (La Pointe-de-l'Île, BQ): Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask you a question.

Might we take the time to discuss with a panel of individuals the issue of the means of development? There are questions that come up constantly and it seems to me that if we had answers to these, we would be able to move forward. We would put Mr. Stockwell Day's question once, we would get the answers, and we would move on. It is my hope that we might move on.

Mr. Culpeper, you are suggesting that development or a positive fight against poverty be the cross-cutting consistent theme in Canada's international policy. I would like you to develop this further, because this fits with what I would like to see. We have heard other statements which, directly or indirectly, lead to that. You stated most eloquently that Canada will most certainly lose its influence, which has already begun to diminish, if it does not commit 0.7% of its GDP to development assistance.

First of all, tell us about the need to establish this consistent link.

Secondly, there is an issue that no one has spoken about and that is important to underscore in your report. I gleaned this information from your media release of May 2005. In it, you state "there is no explicit mention of the importance of evidence-based research as an input into international development policy and strategy".

But that is it precisely: a study of what works and what does not work would resolve this debate between a rate of 0.7% or... We are talking here only about money and efficiency. Here in Canada, we have been slashing budgets for ten years now, in the name of efficiency. I have already told the minister to stop talking to us about efficiency, to stop opposing efficiency and funds allocated.

Do you mean to tell us that Norway and the other Scandinavian countries do not have an efficient strategy because they devote 0.7% of their GDP to development assistance?

I would like to hear what you have to say in this regard.

●(0900)

Mr. Roy Culpeper: Thank you, Madam Lalonde. If you will allow me, I will answer in English.

[*English*]

Let me say this about coherence. First of all, it seems very self-evident to me that if we don't have the Minister of Finance and the Department of Finance on board with our overall development strategy, then basically, what are we doing? What we do through CIDA and through our development program amounts to a charitable activity. That's not what development is about. Development is about equity and changing and transforming economic and social prospects and situations. It's not simply about handouts to the poor. Certainly that's not how I see it. And if it is, let's stop it, because it's not doing anything. It's just perpetuating poverty.

I agree with Mr. Day that we need to put into motion programs and strategies that will actually transform the prospects for the poor. We must tackle the issue at the roots, and by that I don't mean just giving title, to take his example, to poor peasants. Hernando De Soto, who favours this approach, says that if you own a tin shack in a *favela*, then you should have property, 30 square feet, and you can take that to the bank and get a loan and suddenly become a rich capitalist. I think that's a lot of nonsense.

An hon. member: He does not say that. Let's be fair.

The Chair: No, no. It's okay.

Mr. Roy Culpeper: He's not an advocate of land reform. I would say fine, what we need is more land for the poor; we don't need to simply give them title to the pitiful amounts they happen to be occupying. But that's where he stopped short. If we don't talk about land reform and land redistribution, then the prospects for the poor will go nowhere. In fact, giving title to poor urban slum-dwellers or poor rural dwellers is almost a guarantee to ensure they will become indebted and even poorer in the future. I think we have to be very careful and very thorough when we think through development strategies and transformation, because that's what it's about.

On Ms. Lalonde's second point, what are we talking about here? Essentially, we're talking about different countries facing very different opportunities and prospects for development, and there's no blueprint that will work in every country. Each country essentially has to develop its own strategy, one that will work for it, for its people, for its opportunities, and for its constraints. No one outside of the country should be entitled to impose a strategy on a developing country.

If they are willing to embark on strategies that impoverish their people further, then I think the donors have a right not to support those countries and those strategies. But certainly, if countries are able to design and implement development strategies that do in fact benefit their poor and they're designed and owned by those countries, then I think we have an obligation to support those countries.

• (0905)

[Translation]

The Chair: Mr. Paquette.

Mr. Pierre Paquette (Joliette, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You stated that trade alone is not enough to combat poverty, and I am in complete agreement with you on that. One of this Committee's sub-committees is doing a study on emerging markets. We would like to see the Canadian government, in the context of its concerns with regard to emerging markets, set out guidelines for corporations in order that they be more socially responsible. You too mention this in your release. The problem seems to be on the rise. We have seen that in Brazil and China, even though these are two emerging markets, inequalities are glaring and ever growing. A study of this issue in Brazil was published just last week as a matter of fact. How can we suggest to the Canadian government that it ensure that Canadian businesses be more socially responsible in the context of their investments or their trade with emerging markets and with all of our trading partners? Through what means will we be able to promote this corporate social responsibility?

[English]

The Chair: Monsieur Culpeper.

Mr. Roy Culpeper: Thank you.

I have a rather mixed view of corporate social responsibility. On the one hand, it is something, let's say, conscientious companies can and should do in order to at least not do any harm in the countries where they operate. On the other hand, to simply entrust to corporate social responsibility a betterment of conditions in the countries in which they operate is a little naive.

It's interesting that the debate on corporate social responsibility, to which we were contributors when this issue first arose in the late 1990s—we published a Canadian development report on Canadian corporate social responsibility—has evolved to the point where now some companies are saying, look, it's difficult if some companies are exercising corporate social responsibility and others are not; that's not a level playing field. Typically, what you have is that big companies that have public profiles and, if you want, reputational capital, cannot afford to be irresponsible, because that's bad for the share price. They want to be seen to be on the cutting edge of corporate social responsibility.

But if on the other hand the smaller competitors are literally getting away with murder and not paying the consequence on the stock market, then there's something wrong with this picture. Now you're getting larger companies even suggesting that instead of a very voluntary approach to corporate social responsibility, to corporate behaviour, maybe we should move towards a more regulated approach. This would apply equal rules for all companies, and we would not simply have a situation where the big companies have to do things that are responsible and the smaller companies don't.

That's certainly the direction we advocate in our brief in which the world should go, and this is something Canada can't do by itself. You need a universal code of conduct for corporations that will be administered through, for example, the UN, which has this thing called the Global Compact, which I think is pretty weak because it simply relies on the goodwill and the voluntary behaviour of companies.

The Chair: Thank you.

Now we'll go to Mr. MacAulay, please.

Hon. Lawrence MacAulay (Cardigan, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Welcome. Good morning.

You talk about the transformation of the prospects for the poor. I'd like you to comment on one thing. We have a number of people who have come before this committee and they talk about.... Where I'm going is Farmers Helping Farmers in different countries around the world; help goes from this country to other countries, and one of the best examples of what we have sent to other countries is supply management, which is looked at by other countries as a subsidy, and the WTO has given us a run on this all the time. You talk about the transformation of prospects for the poor in other countries. In my opinion, this would be a basic principle to start from in poorer countries in order to make sure they have some quality of life.

I'd like your opinion on that first.

• (0910)

Mr. Roy Culpeper: I'm not quite sure what you're getting at. You're talking about people-to-people contact?

Hon. Lawrence MacAulay: We have supply management in the agricultural sector in this country, and it's viewed by other countries as a subsidy. It's a system that's being attacked all the time, and I imagine you've heard of it being used in third world countries in order to raise the prospects for people who are living in poverty-stricken areas. Would you have a view to express on the problem we're facing here? Plus, if we don't have it here, it's pretty hard to export it or to send people to other countries in order to take them out of their poverty situation.

Mr. Roy Culpeper: I think supply management can actually be a very useful tool for people and for sectors that use it efficiently and wisely. Certainly, I would say this is the experience of the Canadian Wheat Board, for example, in Canada.

Hon. Lawrence MacAulay: And the dairy products...which is what Farmers Helping Farmers do in a lot of third world countries around the world, or some at least.

Mr. Roy Culpeper: I think those can be useful tools.

Now, the reason I'm being a bit contingent on this is that quite often in developing countries marketing boards and so forth have been lightning rods for corruption and for graft and have been mismanaged. So it seems to me that if these kinds of devices are used, it's exceptionally important that the system of governance within which they operate is transparent, that the mechanisms work effectively, and that they are not vectors for corruption. If they are, they are not only failing, but they're contributing bad things to their countries and their environments.

Hon. Lawrence MacAulay: I like you to comment on the fact that we've injected billions of dollars into the defence budget, and we're talking about peacemaking and peacekeeping. Do you feel this is an important move for the government? We've been criticized for not putting enough money into defence; now we put billions of dollars into defence. I'd like you to comment on...in effect, to be able to respond to disasters and respond where you need to respond to put stability in countries that need to have stability put in place and then kept in place.

Mr. Roy Culpeper: Let me start on this, and then I'll ask my colleague Kristiana to add something.

If that's in fact the intention, and I believe it is, that our reinvestment in our armed forces is to give Canada a greater capacity to act to work towards not only peace but sustainable peace—i.e., after the guns stop firing, after the troops have been demobilized, as they start to reintegrate into society, that's when problems often start to arise—it seems to me quite important to ensure that the transition from conflict to peace is thought through and that there are programs that serve to ensure conflict won't break out again.

I think that in chaotic situations, where conflict is pervasive and chronic, the role of our armed forces can be very crucial and helpful. What I'd like to see is a greater integration, and this goes back to the point about coherence, in what we're doing to respond to those kinds of situations. There's our responsibility to protect, integrating intervention on the one hand with long-term development on the other, because if you don't have that integration, it's a recipe for conflict to go on.

My final point would be to let's make sure our investment in our armed forces is in fact for peace and not a contingency to support

further coalitions of the willing to effect regime change in other countries.

• (0915)

Hon. Lawrence MacAulay: Peacemaking is not one of your desires, then, instead of peacekeeping? You think the emphasis should be strictly on peacekeeping, not peacemaking?

Mr. Roy Culpeper: I'd use the term, "peace building", or "sustainable peace".

Hon. Lawrence MacAulay: But you have to create the peace first.

Mr. Roy Culpeper: Absolutely. Yes, that part of the spectrum is actually fairly straightforward.

I'll ask my colleague Kristiana to jump in on this.

Mrs. Kristiana Powell (Researcher, Conflict Prevention, North-South Institute): Thank you for your question.

I'll only add to what Roy has said, inasmuch as spending in defence is an important contribution, one tool in a range of tools to deliver on a much broader spectrum of responsibilities that bridge prevention, reaction, and rebuilding. I think the risk arises when we funnel too many of our resources into crisis response without developing a longer-term vision of how we might remain engaged over the long term to alleviate the root causes of conflict that led to violence in the first place.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. MacAulay, go ahead, please.

Hon. Lawrence MacAulay: What you feel is that if we get involved in the peacemaking, we could be involved in the country longer than we decided to be, like Vietnam and that type of thing.

Do you think the funding should go more to NGOs, or where should our funding go? I know in your opinion we don't spend enough dollars on aid. We want to get to 0.7%, and of course, there are never enough dollars for whatever we want to do anywhere in government. Do you feel that the money spent by this country should be through NGOs, or should it be country to country? Should it be like we do with a lot of countries, even with China, where it's not country to country, but situation to situation? How do you feel about that?

Mr. Roy Culpeper: I think a mixture of channels is always best.

Hon. Lawrence MacAulay: Do you feel this is the proper road for us to take?

Mr. Roy Culpeper: Okay, I'll answer your first question. I think a mixture of channels is always best because that gives donors opportunities to judge the effectiveness issue. Going through governments might not always be the most effective channel. Going through NGOs affords a degree of experimentation, different approaches, different groups and so forth. Regrettably, what seems to be happening is that our NGO windows seem to be narrowing in Canada, and I would express concern and regret about that. I would share your concerns on that particular issue.

As to the 25-country list, in our brief we actually talked about a maximum of 20 countries, and they should all be poor countries. Some of the countries on the list of 25—Ukraine, for example—don't seem to qualify in that particular regard. What we're told in the statement is that two-thirds of the aid would go to 25 countries. Well, that does represent an increasing concentration, but it's not a huge quantum leap over the situation we have now, so perhaps a bit of further narrowing might be in order.

Hon. Lawrence MacAulay: Do you think it should be fewer than 25 countries, possibly, for our emphasis?

Mr. Roy Culpeper: I think the issue is that there should be not only focus but also coordination. This doesn't actually—

Hon. Lawrence MacAulay: With other countries?

Mr. Roy Culpeper: Exactly. There's a danger that all of the donors will focus on the same dozen or two dozen countries. I think it would also be a mistake, a shortcoming, if that were the outcome of the focus. I think it's quite important that through the DAC and the OECD donor countries coordinate which countries they focus on, so that we don't simply triage a bunch of countries to say, well, sorry, you didn't make the cut.

The Chair: Thank you.

Now we'll go to Ms. McDonough.

Ms. Alexa McDonough (Halifax, NDP): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Ms. Powell and Mr. Culpeper, not just for your appearance before the committee and your comprehensive brief, as always, but for your steady flogging, your long-term commitment to working for a more comprehensive, coherent, collaborative, consolidated approach to our foreign affairs and international development commitments as a nation.

I'm really delighted that you chose to reference early in your remarks the Make Poverty History campaign. I think it's particularly significant that you've chosen to talk about the importance of finance, both domestically and in terms of international financial institutions, in your comments, and have cited this really as an omission. Perhaps it is somewhat significant or prophetic that this morning at the finance ministry there are literally hundreds of people saying, please, Mr. Goodale, when you go to meet with the G-8 finance ministers, let's not disgrace Canada and drag our heels and be seen as one of the literal laggards instead of a leader at Gleneagle in a few short weeks..

I have a couple of questions I would like to pursue, but I want to say one other thing. I would hate to think—and I'm sure other committee members would hate to think—that you would go away despairing of the possibility that the consistent, persistent, substantive arguments that have been put before this committee by literally dozens of respected witnesses have fallen on deaf ears, and that we're all sitting here saying that we actually think we should give up on the 0.7% because we've been doing it for decades and it hasn't worked, so let's just turf it. That is not the position that has been presented to this committee again and again by every single reputable expert on the subject. It's certainly not the view held by the majority of members of the committee. In fact, it's somewhat historic that the three opposition party leaders put to the Prime Minister on

the eve of the last budget the importance of our moving ahead on this. I hope we're going to see Canada doing that in the near future.

You talked about the importance of coherence and pointed out some of the areas where there perhaps isn't total coherence. I don't want to get bogged down on this structural issue, but I'm wondering if you could comment briefly on whether you think the decision to split Foreign Affairs and International Trade is problematic in terms of that objective, or where you think there is a case that can be made either way, and which side you would come down on. In other words, how crucial do you feel this is, and what would be your advice, since it's an open question to ask?

• (0920)

Mr. Roy Culpeper: Thank you.

I'm actually agnostic on the issue of the division, but let me say this. I think the most important thing is to have a coherent policy that is accepted and adopted and implemented by all departments. In order for that to happen, leadership has to come from the top. If the Prime Minister and the cabinet aren't making this happen, it's not going to happen. It's not going to happen whether we have separate departments of trade and foreign affairs, or whether we have an integrated Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. The logic of having to put departments together in order to get coherent policy would ultimately lead us to a single international department in which we have foreign affairs, international trade, CIDA, and maybe defence. Everything we do would be lumped into a super mega-department of international affairs. I don't think that would necessarily get us where we want to go.

There is some merit in specialization and so forth, as long as in the final analysis the different departments are not singing from different song books, that in fact they are all working together towards a common purpose. That common purpose must be very explicitly stated, and understood, and implemented, and monitored. If all those things are done, then I think we can happily have separate departments of international trade and foreign affairs. But if in fact it's a symptom of the fact that international trade wants to go off in this direction and foreign affairs and development want to go off in a different direction, I think that might speak to a deeper problem, which needs to be addressed.

Ms. Alexa McDonough: Thank you.

The Chair: Ms. McDonough.

Ms. Alexa McDonough: You spoke about corporate responsibility and underscored the difficulty the most responsible corporations have in being undermined by irresponsible practices. Obviously that is a reason to try to move beyond some vague notion of voluntary responsibility.

I'm wondering if you've had an opportunity to look at the private member's bill introduced by Ed Broadbent. It builds on a lot of his work done on corporate responsibility over the years internationally, which I guess, in the simplest form, aims to internationalize the Westray bill. It basically says that Canadian corporations should not be free, while enjoying the benefits of being a Canadian corporation, to go abroad and do unthinkable things to men, women, and children in other countries that our laws here would forbid them to do in Canada. It's not a total approach, because we need an international regime, but do you think that's an important step for Canada to take in the direction of getting our own house in order and putting our money where our mouth is, so to speak? Have you had a chance to look at it?

• (0925)

Mr. Roy Culpeper: I was actually involved to some extent in the initiative that Mr. Broadbent had on the private sector a few years ago. I'm not actually acquainted with his current private member's bill, which seems to be very much in the vein of what that particular initiative came up with.

I think it may help. But as I said to Mr. Broadbent at the time, it would not be sufficient in and of itself without an international framework, and if it only served to disadvantage Canadian companies where other non-Canadian companies were not being forced by a legal framework to behave properly in their foreign dealings, then it may even have a negative effect.

So I would say that such domestic initiatives are important but have to be complemented by initiatives on the international stage, and I think there are elements of that already. For example, I alluded to Kofi Annan's Global Compact in the year 2000 or 2001. While that definitely falls under the genre of a voluntary approach, at least there's some thinking going on and some experience and a possible vehicle to deepen that into a more codified and regulated approach.

The history of this issue is interesting. Going back to the 1970s, there was an immense amount of work on corporate codes of conduct under the CTC, the Commission for Transnational Corporations at the UN, which was ultimately abandoned in 1992 at the Earth Summit. It's taken a much more voluntary course since then.

I would really urge that we renew those efforts at the international stage, because in the final analysis, even if we were to act alone, this wouldn't guarantee that other countries wouldn't continue to act irresponsibly, and the consequences for people in the developing countries where such companies misbehave would still be very negative. What would we have accomplished for them?

The Chair: You have one minute left, Ms. McDonough.

Ms. Alexa McDonough: Yes. I think you touched on a key issue at the very end.

If our trade policies and our development policies don't actually result in improved conditions and prospects for the poor, then what's the point of our efforts anyway? Not so much here in detail, but before the International Human Rights Committee, there have been appalling examples of where Canadian companies have not only done unspeakable things to foul the environment and create huge problems in people's lives that you couldn't possibly call development, they've also destroyed Canada's reputation because Canada is

associated with them. In some cases there have been links with CIDA where CIDA seems to have actually been advancing some of the unsavoury practices.

So I guess, back to the issue of an international regime, can you enlighten us a little bit on why the more progressive and proactive measures seemed to come unravelled at the Earth Summit?

Mr. Roy Culpeper: Well, I think the mood changed quite drastically in the 1980s and 1990s towards a very much more market-driven approach in which regulation and codification and so forth was basically jettisoned. That was the deal in the Earth Summit. I don't think the fight should be given up, because the stakes are much too high.

• (0930)

Ms. Alexa McDonough: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you.

Before closing, Mr. Culpeper, I just wanted to make a comment. You mentioned in the beginning that Ms. Powell was working on issues related to conflict prevention and the responsibility we have to protect in Africa. All members are really interested in these issues, as many of our colleagues even outside of this committee are working with international bodies like *I'APF*, the Francophonie, and also with the Commonwealth and the IPU.

I would like to know if you have any papers or any resources to guide us, as parliamentarians, on how we can reach our colleagues on these international issues. If you do, could you provide them to the clerk, please?

Ms. Powell.

Mrs. Kristiana Powell: Thanks for asking. In fact, I brought several copies of a paper we just published on the African Union and the responsibility to protect. It draws on the case studies of the African Union and Darfur and its mission in Burundi. This also will be available on our website. In two weeks' time, we'll have a policy brief based on the discussion of that paper among a council of experts that will help to flesh out some tangible policy options for Canada.

The Chair: Thank you very much, both of you, for your time here.

We'll recess for two minutes for the next witnesses.

Thank you.

• (0931)

(Pause)

• (0939)

The Chair: We're starting back now.

Following the second point on our agenda, we are looking at Canada's role in promoting peace and security in the areas affected by the tsunami in Asia and at Canada's capability to respond to international humanitarian catastrophes.

As witnesses, we have, from Kontras Aceh, Ms. Evi Zain, coordinator; from KAIROS, Canadian Ecumenical Justice Initiatives, Ms. Nancy Slamet, program officer, international human rights, Asia and the Middle East; and from Development and Peace, Mr. Jess Agustin, program officer for Asia.

Welcome, all of you. I understand we're to start with Ms. Slamet. Please.

Mrs. Nancy Slamet (Programme Officer, International Human Rights (Asia/Middle East), KAIROS (Canadian Ecumenical Justice Initiatives)): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much for the invitation to appear before this committee. I believe you've all received background information on my organization, KAIROS, and the international human rights work it does in partnership with civil society organizations in Canada and around the world.

I'm here today to provide a brief overview of the policy recommendations we and our partners have made to the Canadian government regarding human rights and humanitarian concerns in Aceh. Along with a number of organizations that have a long history of supporting human rights, justice, and democracy in Indonesia—these include the Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace, Rights and Democracy, and Alternatives—KAIROS has been vigorously advocating for peace, human rights, and civilian-led emergency relief and reconstruction since the tsunami hit Aceh. We developed our advocacy calls in consultation with our partners in Aceh, including one who is here today from Kontras, the Commission for Disappearances and Victims of Violence.

Given that the Canadian public and government have given generously to the tsunami-affected regions, including Aceh, I'm certain you share our concern that emergency aid and reconstruction be used appropriately and be delivered in the most efficient and effective way. Toward this end, KAIROS and its partners take the following positions and make the concomitant recommendations to the Canadian government.

First of all, we insist that ending the armed conflict in Aceh is a necessary precondition for genuine reconstruction and human rights in the region. Last week, the UN's special envoy for tsunami relief, former U.S. president Bill Clinton, agreed with this position by saying that an end to the war is critical if Aceh is to fully recover from the tsunami earthquake disaster.

We recommend that Canada work for peace in Aceh by demonstrating strong support for a non-militaristic approach to resolving the region's long-standing conflict. Toward this end, Canada should press for an immediate ceasefire and support continued peace talks and a peace process that involves civil society representation. Furthermore, we firmly believe ending both militarism and impunity and fostering civil society development are essential elements in ensuring civilian supremacy over the military in Indonesia and enabling meaningful Acehese people's participation in the peace and reconstruction processes.

We call on Canada to work toward this end by pressing the Indonesian government to remove the recently introduced civil order status in Aceh and any restrictions on civil liberties, including any constraints on the work of human rights defenders; to strengthen civil society by providing the democratic space and financial support it needs to rebuild and take part in the reconstruction process; and allow for the independent and full investigation of human rights abuses committed since intense military operations were launched in Aceh in 1989, and bring the perpetrators to justice.

We assert that upholding human rights and providing for the safety of civilians in Aceh is intricately linked with ensuring effective aid and reconstruction in the region. While the Canadian government has stated—and I quote—that the “protection of civilians and humanitarian workers is a priority for all of us”, it is of great concern to KAIROS and our partners that Canada approves of the military's role in emergency and reconstruction efforts. Given the Indonesian military's record of brutality and violence against the civilian population, we have strong reason to believe its role in relief and reconstruction severely compromises the safety and human rights of civilians throughout the region. We have received a number of reports that corroborate this position, which my colleague from Kontras Aceh will discuss in greater detail.

In order to ensure the security of both locals and internationals and guarantee fair and safe humanitarian access, we urge Canada to support civilian-led humanitarian and reconstruction operations without any military involvement. Indeed, the primacy of civilian oversight and coordination of humanitarian operations in conflict zones is one of the important principles and practices of good humanitarian donorship, which Canada has endorsed.

• (0940)

Some of our specific recommendations include the following.

We call on Canada to press the Indonesian government to allow international organizations to provide assistance outside military channels. It is essential to allow aid organizations to deliver assistance according to the humanitarian principles of impartiality and neutrality for there to be safe and fair access to humanitarian aid. Specifically, this means lifting current regulations requiring military escorts and permission for travel outside Banda Aceh and West Aceh.

We also call on Canada to press the Indonesian government for meaningful participation by civil society in the reconstruction process. This includes encouraging Indonesia to promote broad-based civilian input into the reconstruction plans for the region and supporting local organizations, directly or through international NGOs that partner with them, to carry out reconstruction work.

Third, we call on Canada to press the Indonesian government to allow unrestricted access to the entire region by international and Indonesian civil society organizations, to allow for international monitoring and media reporting on relief and reconstruction efforts and human rights conditions.

Finally, we ask that Canada take rigorous steps to ensure that aid efforts are not compromised by military and government corruption, by putting into place adequate monitoring and accountability mechanisms. We also ask that Canadian aid not be used for military purposes.

• (0945)

The Chair: Thank you.

Mrs. Nancy Slamet: I'm sorry. I have a last paragraph.

The Chair: Go ahead.

I thought you were finished. I'm sorry.

Mrs. Nancy Slamet: As a donor to tsunami relief and reconstruction in Aceh, it is Canada's rightful place to demand accountability and to ensure there is genuine recovery in the region. We urge the committee to recommend that the Canadian government take strong action on these pressing and critical concerns that KAIROS and its partners have raised today.

More detailed recommendations on how Canada should channel its material and political support for peace, democratic and military reform, and civilian-led reconstruction in Aceh are included in the reports and documents that will be provided to all committee member at a later date.

Meanwhile, my colleagues from Kontras Aceh and Development and Peace will elaborate on the points I have raised here.

Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you.

We'll now go to Mrs. Zain, please.

Mrs. Evi Zain (Coordinator, KONTRAS Aceh): Thank you for this opportunity to speak to you about the human rights situation in Aceh.

Today I would like to tell you about the history of conflict in Aceh, the human rights situation since the tsunami, and the peace process. I will end by making recommendations to the Canadian government.

On the history of conflict in Aceh, since the Indonesian independence there has been conflict between the central government and Aceh over control of the land and resources. Over the years, the Acehnese people have become economically marginalized and resentment has grown.

An armed separatist movement was born in 1976. Since that time, the Government of Indonesia has conducted military operations in the region. The people of Aceh haven't stopped hurting from the war between those parties, which has resulted in hundreds of thousands of gross human rights abuses and casualties, hundreds of thousands of displaced persons, the destruction of social services and infrastructure, and also obstructions of civil liberties.

Under pressure from the international community, there were peace negotiations between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement from 2000 until 2003. There was a reduction in violence and an opening up of civil society during that time. However, in May 2003 the talks collapsed, because government was labelling it a terrorist organization. Indonesian authorities arrested and jailed the GAM negotiators.

Martial law and civil emergency periods. At the same time, martial law was declared in Aceh and the largest military operation in Indonesia since the invasion of East Timor was launched. According to investigations by Kontras Aceh and other human rights organizations, this offensive resulted in thousands of gross human rights violations during this time. Hundreds of schools were burned and Aceh's economy suffered greatly. It is important to note that while the Free Aceh Movement is also responsible for abuse, most

human rights violations were committed against the civilian population by the Indonesian military, which does not distinguish between GAM members and civilians.

Then, at the end of December 2004, the tsunami-earthquake disaster hit Aceh and made the existing crisis of armed conflict even worse.

Some of the key concerns following the tsunami disaster include the following.

First, there is the continuation of armed conflict and human rights violations despite the humanitarian disaster.

Military combat operations and human rights violations continue.

Civil liberties continue to be severely restricted under both civil emergency and current civil order status.

Human rights abuses result from the military's central role in emergency relief and reconstruction.

Even with many restrictions on our work, Kontras Aceh has recorded over 100 cases of human rights abuses from January to May 2005. Abuses include torture, arbitrary arrest, sexual violence, killings, disappearances, and house raids.

Kontras Aceh has also received many reports of human rights abuses by the military in camps. Almost all IDP camps are effectively under military control and have military posts near them. Some of the incidents of abuse that have been reported include sexual violence and harassment of women, and the arbitrary arrest and detention of youth and others who are suspected of being GAM members.

In the overall information for the field it was indicated that illegal rations collected by the military in Indonesia and police personnel...
[Inaudible]

The heavy presence of the Indonesian military in Aceh clearly does not provide any security. This is further proven from the results of monitoring activities that show that only a month after the tsunami there were 34 shooting incidents, which only add to the existing IDP crisis in Aceh. More details of these abuses are included in the human rights reports presented by Kontras Aceh and others at this year's UN Commission on Human Rights.

I will say that peace talks today have resumed but are fragile and inadequate. The Indonesian legislature has withdrawn support, and the negotiations need civil society participation.

There are also problems with emergency relief operations. The majority of incoming aid is channeled through the government of Indonesia and its military and police. Some is kept, some is sold, and very little reaches the people in need. For example, many international NGOs deliver aid to the military-controlled posts in the internally displaced persons camps, and not directly to the people in need. Many local NGOs refuse to cooperate with the military in this way because they do not trust them.

There are also several instances where aid has been kept by the military, such as in West Aceh, where most of the destruction took place and where there is very little civilian control. Kontras and other organizations have received reports of aid having been sold in East Aceh. Furthermore, we learned that in many parts of Aceh there was discrimination in food delivery, especially to people who were suspected of being GAM members.

We have limited space for civilian participation in every aspect of post-tsunami and emergency relief. For example, there are cases of humanitarian volunteers being detained and interrogated by the military because they were conducting needs assessments and delivering aid in IDP camps. They also restricted humanitarian access.

This is a problem not only for international organizations, but also for civilians in Aceh. For example, IDPs in Biruen are forbidden to speak with international humanitarian aid workers, agencies, and journalists. In South Aceh, the military and the police extort money from the aid and transport vehicles. This practice began during martial law and did not stop, even during the tsunami crisis.

Foreigners are required to obtain permission and military escort outside Banda Aceh and West Aceh. This is because the military does not want internationals to see that just 15 kilometres outside Banda Aceh there is uncontrolled violence, where armed conflict and resulting human rights abuses continue.

• (0950)

Also, we have problems with weak coordination of incoming aid. Some camps have a lot of aid; some camps have poor aid.

And also, there are problems with the reconstruction process. The reconstruction process has a blueprint and a master plan developed by a national planning agency. It did not involve all sectors of civil society, especially the survivors of the conflict or the survivors of the tsunami.

For example, in February 2005 there was a civil society meeting in Banda Aceh to give input into the construction blueprint process, but the meetings was banned by the military and police authorities. The meeting was moved to Medan in order to avoid the military and police. As we know, in January and February the government made meeting ...*[inaudible]*...about promotion of private investment interests in Aceh, and so many private companies coming to Aceh to make assessments by themselves.

The military are involved in the reconstruction process. The military made announcements in the newspaper from the military commander of Iskandar Muda and said the military has to be involved in reconstruction in the name of protection for the reconstruction process.

I will say that much of the political aid ignores human rights concerns in Aceh. The rights of people displaced by ongoing conflict and the tsunami continue to be violated by the Indonesian government and the military, yet many governments, international NGOs, and the UN do not apply enough pressure upon the Government of Indonesia to stop conflict or human rights abuses in Aceh. Furthermore, they are keeping silent about these abuses and are complying with regulations imposed by the Indonesian government.

For all the reasons above, Kontras Aceh takes the following position.

First, the Government of Indonesia must end military operations in the name of a security approach and open the democratic space for civil society in Aceh.

Second, a peace negotiation process must continue, involving civil society, particularly the survivors of violence and the survivors of the tsunami.

Third, the international and UN agencies working in Aceh must monitor and report on the human rights situation, or they become complicit in the human rights violations.

Fourth, the international community must monitor the recovery and peace process in Aceh.

Fifth, the Indonesian military must be removed as an actor in the reconstruction process.

And last, Kontras Aceh calls on the Canadian government to press for an immediate ceasefire and end to the military operations in Aceh; to vigorously support a peaceful resolution to the conflict by encouraging the continuation of peace talks and supporting the inclusion of meaningful civil society participation in peace negotiations; to denounce human rights violations; to ensure that funds are not lost to corruption in the recovery and reconstruction process in Aceh; to promote meaningful civil society participation in the planning and reconstruction process without intimidation and restrictions.

In closing, I would like to say that the Canadian people must know that the money they send to Aceh will not help unless there is peace and space for civilian participation in peace negotiations and the planning, monitoring, and control of the reconstruction process in Aceh.

Thank you for your attention and for your concern.

• (0955)

The Chair: Mr. Agustin.

[Translation]

Mr. Jess Agustin (Programme Officer - Asia, Development and Peace): Good morning.

[English]

Good morning.

Thank you very much again for this opportunity to present to you our understanding of the situation in Aceh.

Unprecedented has been the word used to describe the tsunami tragedy; unprecedented indeed has been the scale and scope of death and destruction. Even photos and films fail to capture the extent of the destruction, including the effective loss of much community capacity to respond, and the simultaneous impact on communities in ten countries rather than in one or two. Equally so, and most touching, was the unprecedented global response and generosity shown by citizens in every part of the world, including Canada.

During the emergency phase, the Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace responded through our network of local partners. We have been working in Indonesia for the past 10 years in conjunction with Caritas Internationalis member organizations.

In each of the affected countries, the Caritas Internationalis network conducted emergency assessments to inform the preparation of relief and recovery programs and operating budgets. Members of Caritas Internationalis, including Development and Peace, work together to fund and implement the joint Caritas Internationalis response. Local partners implement the programs, but also frequently draw on the support and technical expertise available throughout the extensive Caritas network.

During this crucial reconstruction phase, which is the focus now of my presentation, we in the international community have also been given an unprecedented opportunity to rebuild the lives of the people in societies already torn by conflict and strife. We're given this unique opportunity to build from the ground up, not only the physical infrastructure, but also the social infrastructure in a way that is deeply rooted in genuine peace and democracy. The latter is, of course, even more challenging and difficult, particularly in a region that has been isolated for decades and heavily militarized, and where civil society has been repressed and weakened.

In our rush to build houses, roads, and bridges, which the UNDP has called the "tyranny of rush", I'm afraid that donor countries and international organizations may overlook or gloss over this important dimension of reconstruction and rehabilitation. Just yesterday, I was reading one accountability report of an international organization that, interestingly enough, failed to report or mention the fact that one of the difficulties in the operating environment in Aceh is not only the scale of the devastation, but also the long-standing civil conflict in the region and the pervasive presence of the military.

There can be many reasons for this failure to look at this dimension of the problem. One, there is the persistent fear that access to the region may be denied at any time, or any day, by some political whim of the government or the bureaucracy and the powerful military, or vice versa, who may withdraw permission to operate in the field. Moreover, the private sector in the country and abroad fear that it may not get the piece of the pie called contracts, and simply ignore corruption or take project shortcuts that dismiss the real needs of the people.

The other reason is the pressure on many international organizations in their home countries to disburse the unprecedented amount of funds raised from the public—our organization, for example, raised more than \$20 million, or more than our annual budget—and consequently, the public demand for accountability and high expectations for quick and concrete realization of the reconstruction. We have yet to inform, let alone educate, the public that it will take a long time to rebuild, and that to make it happen we must first create the conditions necessary to allow people to participate in the reconstruction process.

Indeed, to enter into the realm of peace promotion and building civil society or introducing democratization, one enters into complexity and, invariably, controversy. Our organization, Development and Peace, has the unique privilege of engaging with a variety of actors and groups in Aceh. During my second visit in late

May, my colleagues and I met with international organizations, donor countries, and UN agencies on one side; and local Acehnese organizations, both in exile and in hiding during the martial law period, on the other side; and Java-based organizations on yet another side. I was struck by how each one has a different perception or analysis of the situation in Aceh.

• (1000)

Some international organizations and donor countries tend to see the situation as normal, while others recognize the impediments to their operations. Just last week, a group of five international NGOs, including a member of our Caritas confederation, met with Bill Clinton, the UN special envoy for tsunami relief, to express concerns and raise critical conditions to be met for successful reconstruction.

Our local partners, especially in remote areas, describe a human rights situation that has not changed at all. It is the same pre-tsunami and post-tsunami. The threatening presence of the military is everywhere. Human rights violations continue and the culture of fear is present and alive. They say that the voice of the people was not heard when the blueprint for a master plan for reconstruction and rehabilitation was being drafted.

We were quite amazed at the grassroots level that people were not fully attuned to the peace negotiations taking place in Helsinki. We were expecting that there would be some excitement among the people, as it offers the best hope and possibly the last chance for long-lasting peace. When I asked about this, the response we received from the people was almost in whispers. Either people are not aware of this or they are scared to talk about it openly. We were even told by one donor country official that these peace talks are really minor and insignificant in the scheme of things in Aceh.

In the meetings with our partners in Aceh that we organized last May, they gave a long list of concerns and challenges they encountered. The next few months will be critical as the blueprint for the reconstruction and rehabilitation moves from a general plan to detailed implementation. Let me give some concrete examples.

Despite the enormous amount of money available, and despite the many players in the field, the issue of temporary shelters or barracks and the condition of the internally displaced remains a serious problem. The management of these barracks and the policy with regard to the internally displaced constantly changes and is inconsistent. This ranges from inappropriate and unsanitary conditions to sexual harassment and assaults on women in these temporary shelters.

Also, local organizations and beneficiaries are disconnected from international donors and agencies. Communities may not know much about their entitlement and what they are becoming a part of. International organizations may have a lot of infrastructure and funds, but the people don't actually know what they're doing. We witnessed contradictory approaches of international organizations in the area. One doles out funds, literally giving cash, while the other engages in a participatory approach to reconstruction. The work of the latter is undermined, as people would rather receive cash than participate in meetings and consultations.

During the relief and reconstruction process, few organizations have been monitoring and reporting on human rights—Kontras is an exception—including civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights. It is important to link the different issues, particularly in relation to resolving the explosive issue of land rights, human rights, and peacebuilding.

There is a stigma attached to human rights organizations. The military has succeeded in labelling these groups as part of GAM, or the armed separatist group, when all they're concerned about is the protection of the basic human rights of the Acehese people. Almost daily warnings are issued to these organizations. They are told that their human rights monitoring is not part of the reconstruction process and that they are endangering other international organizations.

• (1005)

We urge the Canadian government to do the following. I'm just repeating some of the recommendations here.

Canada must press for full and unrestricted access. Local organizations and their overseas partners need to secure their ability to remain and continue working in the province and to continue to bring in expertise in order to make long-term program plans.

People living in areas of strategic military importance must not be neglected in the reconstruction of Aceh.

Access must be given to humanitarian organizations to reach out to these people.

Canada must be firm in ensuring that all sectors of Acehese society are consulted and can fully participate in every aspect of the reconstruction process without fear of intimidation. Without people's participation, transparency and accountability, recovery and development cannot be achieved.

All organizations involved in the recovery and development process must be accountable to the people of Aceh. International donors have to put the long-term interests and well-being of the Acehese first, instead of putting the short-term disbursement of funds as quickly as possible first, which only creates unintended dependency and horizontal conflict among the people. People should continue to have access to information, and the media should continue to be able to report on the ongoing recovery and reconstruction process.

One of the organizations we are supporting is an organization of independent journalists, who are monitoring the flow of funds and the reconstruction projects. Most importantly, it is extremely difficult to realize genuine participation if there is no democratic space and

openness to do so. Canada, therefore, must be more active rather than timid in this regard and should openly support peace negotiations and maintain pressure on GAM and the Government of Indonesia to capitalize on recent positive developments and progress towards a peaceful solution. Canada must also support the involvement of local groups and movements in the peace process and other innovative peacemaking activities and non-militaristic approaches to resolving societal conflicts.

Finally, the lifting of the state of emergency is a positive step. It is vital that international pressure is put on the military to respect the return to civilian rule. However, Canada must join with the international community in sending a clear message to the Indonesian government to withdraw the Indonesian army from Aceh. Our partners have witnessed many young men having to flee from their villages to avoid terror and harassment from the Indonesian army. The latter has made the civilians, especially those in rural areas and communities in the foothills, hostages in the conflict. There will be no genuine ceasefire or peace if large contingents of the Indonesian army continue to be present in Aceh.

As I said at the outset of my presentation, all of us are given this extraordinary and unprecedented opportunity to be engaged, to reconstruct and rebuild in a way that respects and involves the Acehese people. The international community already has voluminous books and documents on the lessons learned in past emergency situations and disasters. We have formulated codes of conduct, methodologies and guidelines, e.g. *Principles of Good Donorship, Sphere, Do No Harm*. We have the support of the public. They have given us incredible resources. We must not squander this enormous goodwill and golden opportunity.

Canada is well respected, and it can play a more active and direct role in ensuring that the preconditions for genuine reconstruction and development—namely, peace, participation of people, civilian supremacy over the military, respect for human rights, and democracy—are met.

Thank you very much.

• (1010)

The Chair: Thank you.

Now we'll go to questions and answers. There will be five minutes for each group. We'll start with Mr. Obhrai.

Mr. Obhrai, go ahead, please.

Mr. Deepak Obhrai: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much for coming and giving this presentation.

I do understand the absolute situation in Aceh province. Actually, we just heard that the peace talks have collapsed. The Government of Indonesia has refused to negotiate with the rebels. It's come out on the BBC just now. But when I listen to you on this—and in the tsunami disaster, of course, that was the province that got hit the hardest—I think your wish list is too big. It's too much for progress. There's no denying the fact that human rights violations have been abused. But if you look at Indonesia historically, the way it was under Suharto and the military, you see that it was the establishment, those who were in power, who used it. Of course, we all know the Indonesian military does not have a very good human rights record, and Aceh has indicated that problems are severe over there since the tsunami disaster.

I was in Indonesia, and now there has been a historical change. You have an elected government that has come in now, after such a long dictatorship. There is hope that things will go....

Looking at all these things, from your perspective, would it not be concentrating on the small steps where we can put pressure? Canada cannot put pressure on everything you've just stated. What we would like you to do is to identify for us one or two key areas, so Canada can then go and put pressure on the Indonesian government and say, look, this is what we feel you need to address: the issue in Aceh, human rights abuses—

•(1015)

The Chair: Do you want an answer?

Mr. Deepak Obhrai: This is my suggestion. I'm absolutely in no way disregarding what you've just said. I know what you just said is true. I've been there, I've seen it, and we know historically. I'm just wondering, from our perspective, if you could identify one or two areas where we could put pressure on the Indonesian government.

Mrs. Nancy Slamet: Yes, thank you.

Just to begin, I would like to say, first, thank you for the news update. I think that only confirms that there is a very important need for increased international pressure on the Indonesian government to resume peace talks at this point, because, as we've all said, peace is a precondition for genuine reconstruction in the area.

If we are to see the billions of dollars that were poured into that region put to any use—and this is not just a matter of accountability in terms of numbers, but in terms of lives—Canada needs to press Indonesia to return to the negotiation table and ensure that an armed solution to the conflict isn't pursued any longer at the cost of lives and human rights.

The Chair: Thank you.

Are there any other comments concerning this question?

Mr. Agustin.

Mr. Jess Agustin: I think if we're going to identify two things, one is that Canada is not seen as a country that's a colonizer, but if we begin to really reach out to the civil society, I think we'll have a better chance of pushing for people's participation, to really support community organizations. We get into this cycle where we become part of the multilateral agencies, where we want to contribute to these big projects rather than to really small ones. I think Canada has the ability to really support the small organizations, civil society

organizations. And that's difficult, because donor countries want to support bridges, big buildings, and so on.

But as I said, Canada must put most of its resources toward building the social infrastructure that's needed. If there's no participation of people, particularly in terms of building the peace and so on.... Because there's a lot of controversy over this blueprint, and we're entering into the critical phase. If people are not participating, then we have a very serious problem.

[Translation]

The Chair: We now move on to Mr. Clavet.

Mr. Roger Clavet (Louis-Hébert, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank the witnesses for their presentation and for all of the additional documentation, which is very detailed and of very high quality.

One calamity often hides another. Their had to be this tsunami in order for the international community to realize—perhaps we had forgotten—that there are other rather unbelievable things going on in Indonesia.

Canada's assistance was announced quite quickly and there began correspondence between groups such as KAIROS. In a letter of May 5, which is in the documentation, the minister of Foreign Affairs, Pierre Pettigrew... It looks like cut and paste: in January, February, March, April and May, two ministers gave the same answer word for word. You can place one on top of the other. It was said that the national Indonesian armed forces participated very well, that they cooperated and that it was a favourable response. I would like to hear your reaction and your opinion with regard to the interpretation given by these two ministers. The tsunami killed tens of thousands of people, and we were told that Canadian aid was being properly delivered by the army. However, all of the documentation that you have presented to us says the opposite. I would like to hear your reaction.

[English]

The Chair: Mrs. Slamet.

[Translation]

Mrs. Nancy Slamet: Thank you for your comments.

[English]

I'm thankful that we have heard at least from some of the members that there's a recognition of the very dire human rights condition in Aceh by the Canadian government, that there are human rights violations. This is why it is of great surprise and of course concern to us that the official statements by the Canadian government indicate that the military's playing a positive role overall, and I indicated that in my statements earlier. There's ample evidence to the contrary, and we do call on Canada to take a stand for a withdrawal of the military from reconstruction relief operations and insist that it's the civilian populations, local and international, who should lead that process, if there is to be genuine reconstruction.

•(1020)

[*Translation*]

Mr. Roger Clavet: Last January, I was of those who accompanied the Prime Minister of Canada to Asia in order to apprise ourselves of the damage inflicted by the tsunami upon neighbouring countries. There was of course Thailand, Sri Lanka and India. The Prime Minister's visit did not include Indonesia.

How do you react to that? Was it an indication that the Canadian government perhaps had interests to defend in this part of the world, in Indonesia? How do you react when so much money is invested in documentation telling us that much has been done over the last five months—and that the army is in a good position? How do you interpret Canada's absence, in its tour of the affected countries? Indonesia is the country that suffered the most.

The Chair: Mr. Agustin.

[*English*]

Mr. Jess Agustin: Let me put my answer in a kind of context. I think there is a general fear among the international donors not to alienate a fragile transition to democracy. So the approach has always been to say that we recognize the problem, we recognize, as the statement was made earlier, that there are human rights violations. But we do not want to publicly criticize the civilian government, because it might only undermine us. There's also fear that in economic trade and negotiations we might be disadvantaged to press for a clear statement that there are human rights violations in Aceh.

The second one is that every time one speaks about human rights violations in Aceh, there's an automatic association that we are supporting separation and independence, and that's not the case. I think Canada and other donor countries really have an excellent opportunity to be open about this and say that there are human rights violations, that we're very concerned about the role of the military, because one analysis says there is really a battle going on between the civilian government and the military for control. You have on one hand the government, which has full control of all these billions of bilateral money, and then you have the Indonesian military, which has also control of resources, the oil and logging, and some of the oil companies are paying them for security reasons. So the military will not abandon this area.

This is where I think the donor countries, including Canada, should in fact support the government, to make sure the military is withdrawn from its role. We might be dreaming, because that's the same situation all over Indonesia, but Aceh is a good opportunity for us because the world is focusing on Aceh. If we miss this opportunity, we will not be able to press the same sort of concerns as we have in other parts of Indonesia where human rights violations happen. Right now, everybody is focusing on Aceh. If we just look at the reconstruction as a physical reconstruction and we don't press for these human rights violations, then I think the reconstruction will not succeed.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Agustin.

We'll now go to Ms. McDonough.

Ms. Alexa McDonough: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I know our time is very short. I want to ask a couple of quick questions and perhaps say at the outset that if there's insufficient time to fully respond in the meeting itself, you might follow up and share responses with the whole committee.

Certainly you've indicated again today—and I know we've had a chance to meet previously—that the work is done by human rights activists and protectors at great risk, in many cases with horrible consequences. I want to ask you, when you urge that Canadian aid not be used for military purposes, whether you can give us a concrete sense of the ways in which Canadian aid may now be getting used for military purposes. Again, if it's not such a great idea for you to put that on the public record, I don't want to put anybody at risk.

Second, in the urging of the withdrawal of the military, can you give us some sense of what the capacity is of either civilian police force or alternate law enforcers to ensure that there is in fact a maintenance of peace? In the vacuum that one could imagine happening with the withdrawal, unless there is something else put in place, what could happen in that situation as well seems quite worrisome.

Finally, I think you indicated that the United Nations has not been as proactive in its protection of human rights. I'm wondering whether you have a response as yet from your intervention before the UN Human Rights Commission, and if not, when you would anticipate that.

•(1025)

The Chair: Mrs. Zain, it's your turn.

Mrs. Evi Zain: Thank you.

On this question, there is a lot to answer.

First, on the question about what Canadians can do—for example, little things for Aceh—the report from Pettigrew himself does not really help in giving information about Aceh and the aid they give to the Acehnese. It's totally the opposite of what has happened in the field.

I will say that there is no democratic space in Aceh for us to speak out, as there is here. I come here and I can speak out with you, but there is no place there for me to speak out about what I want to say, what the Indonesians, the Acehnese want to say.

We have been dealing with the military for almost thirty years, so you can imagine, even after the tsunami, the military, with their guns still hanging, delivering food to us. How can the people ask for food, even when they are so hungry? I didn't want to ask, because if I asked, they would say, look, this man and this woman really need the military. Who wants to speak out under a gun? Who wants to not vote? We are loyal to our government under the gun.

All the people there, all the international communities there, know what happened in Aceh. I'm so sad that the peace talks have collapsed, because from 2000 to 2003 there were efforts by peace workers to build a society where people could inform and express themselves, to say what they want, to say what they need for the future of Aceh. But now it's collapsed again. Many countries have supported with money to rebuild Aceh, but not for building peace, only for the investment. That's what I'm saying. I'm so sad about that.

I have been at the UN twice, and I gave a report. The Indonesian special ambassador said to me, why did you give a report to the UN? It happened.

The Indonesian military conducting military operations has resulted in rape and sexual abuse of the women. After the tsunami, forty women were left naked in the sun. It's...*[Inaudible]*...from Bande Aceh.

You can imagine how the civil society is really dead there in terms of the fear. Even now, we are suffering and afraid. Even now, when I go home, I don't know what will happen to me, because I can speak out here, but not in my country.

I will say that civil society in Aceh has not collapsed. The military is making all the rules, not only for defence from abroad, but they are making the rules for the political and social life of the civilians in Aceh. They have backed up ExxonMobil. ExxonMobil is using the military to protect their compound and their fields from the Acehese, who they call rebels.

The civil society in Aceh has the potential to deal with the conditions. For example, one day after the tsunami, many of the civil society in Aceh went hand in hand to help, before the UN came in to help. We were working closely with the other communities that were suffering. We helped many people.

• (1030)

The Chair: Mrs. Zain, this is all the time we have. I'm very sorry that we don't have any more time, but on behalf of my colleagues, I must thank you, and all the group, for appearing in front of the committee this morning. We hope the peace talks will resume in your country.

Thank you again for being here.

We'll recess for two minutes, and then we are going in camera for future business.

Thank you.

[Proceedings continue in camera]

• (1045)

[Translation]

The Committee resumes in public.

[English]

The Chair: Now we'll go to the notice of motion from Madam Guergis.

Ms. Helena Guergis (Simcoe—Grey, CPC): We propose an amendment to the second paragraph, the third-last sentence from the

bottom. We'd like to add in the following after "immediately": "through a plan".

The Chair: That's "through a plan". Okay.

Now, I understand that there were many discussions among all the members. I don't know who wants to lead the discussion, Mr. McTeague or Madame McDonough.

Hon. Dan McTeague (Pickering—Scarborough East, Lib.): Chair, there is what appears to be a proverbial consensus. We want to achieve unanimity. I'm going to let Madame McDonough speak, and then I'd like to make amendments.

The Chair: Sure.

Madame McDonough, go ahead.

Ms. Alexa McDonough: Very briefly, I'm pleased that there does appear to be an emerging consensus here. I think it's important, having heard for at least two and a half years consistent urging that this committee take some leadership, that we now do so. The timeframe is critical.

So I simply want to move this motion. I believe there's been agreement that there be a deletion in the preamble of the words on the final line: "to join the majority of G-8 and all fifteen European Union countries".

We don't need to go into a discussion about why, but I think it makes sense, because it may create certain misperceptions that are not intended.

I'd so move, and if Dan wants to—

• (1050)

The Chair: Yes, Mr. McTeague.

Hon. Dan McTeague: Chair, I would confirm with Ms. McDonough that we delete from her motion from after the word "Scotland", in paragraph one, up to the word "by".

[Translation]

Mme Francine Lalonde: In which paragraph?

L'hon. Dan McTeague: It is in the first paragraph. We would remove the text after the word "Scotland".

Ms. Francine Lalonde: I do not understand.

The Chair: Excuse me, Mr. McTeague.

Let me explain. The paragraph would end following the words "prior to the upcoming Gleneagles Summit in Scotland, by:". We would remove the words "to join the majority of G-8 and all fifteen European Union countries". Is that alright?

[English]

Merci.

Go ahead, Mr. McTeague. Any other changes?

Hon. Dan McTeague: Madame McDonough, can I proceed?

Ms. Alexa McDonough: Yes.

Hon. Dan McTeague: All right. Mr. Sorenson may have others that he wishes.

The second amendment would be amending paragraph two by replacing the first line to now read “To accept and act upon the near”, and then there would be a continuation.

The Chair: All right. I agree.

Hon. Dan McTeague: We'll keep the paragraph.

Now, hang on a second.

Mr. Deepak Obhrai: What is the precise wording? What is he saying?

The Chair: Before it said “By accepting”, but you need good wording, so it will say “To accept and act upon the near”. It is just clerical work, in a certain sense.

Mr. McTeague.

Hon. Dan McTeague: The other one, Chair, would be to remove everything from after the word “date”, in the second paragraph.... Hang on, we're going to remove all of the...?

Ms. Beth Phinney (Hamilton Mountain, Lib.): Third line, second paragraph.

Hon. Dan McTeague: So on the third line, second paragraph: “among them, Stephen Lewis”, all the way down to.... Which word do you have?

Ms. Beth Phinney: “CIDA”.

Hon. Dan McTeague: To “CIDA”, that's correct.

Then, of course, it would read on: “to honour the Millennium Development Goals”, etc.

The Chair: Okay.

Mr. Maurizio Bevilacqua (Vaughan, Lib.): That's good, right? Everybody agrees?

Some hon. members: Agreed.

Hon. Dan McTeague: So this would be deleting the words, starting on line 3 of paragraph 2, after the word “date”, up to the word “CIDA” on line 17. We're getting rid of all the people she had cited.

Ms. Alexa McDonough: With all due respect.

Hon. Dan McTeague: With all due respect, of course.

[Translation]

Ms. Francine Lalonde: You are keeping the end of the paragraph?

[English]

The Chair: *Oui, oui*, “to honour the Millennium Development Goals”, and we're adding—

[Translation]

Hon. Dan McTeague: Yes, we are keeping everything following the word “CIDA”: “and commit immediately...”

[English]

Kevin, I've done it here. Do you want to do the fourth and fifth?

Mr. Kevin Sorenson (Crowfoot, CPC): Well, are the fourth and fifth dealing with the—

Hon. Dan McTeague: Amending line 19 by inserting a comma after the word—

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Yes, I don't have it. It just keeps going.

Hon. Dan McTeague: Okay.

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: You have those, Helena?

Ms. Helena Guergis: Yes.

Hon. Dan McTeague: Chair, just a moment.

The Chair: Fine, sure.

Hon. Dan McTeague: Thanks. I just want to make sure the record demonstrates clearly that there is consensus in this committee and that I'm not the only one who's providing the amendments.

The fourth one would be amending line 19 in the English version—

Ms. Beth Phinney: In the second paragraph?

Hon. Dan McTeague: In the second paragraph, by inserting—

Mr. Deepak Obhrai: She wants to do it.

Hon. Dan McTeague: You want to do it? Go ahead.

Ms. Helena Guergis: The fourth paragraph, isn't it?

The Chair: We'll start with what, the fourth paragraph, “Introducing legislation”, or the previous one?

Ms. Helena Guergis: “Introducing legislation”.

The Chair: Fine. Go ahead.

Ms. Helena Guergis: And after the word, “legislation”, insert “prior to the next federal budget”, taking out “before the end of the 2005 calendar year”.

The Chair: Okay.

Ms. Helena Guergis: Then “which establishes”.

[Translation]

Ms. Francine Lalonde: We would therefore have the words “prior to the next federal budget”?

The Chair: Yes.

● (1055)

[English]

Hon. Dan McTeague: Madame Guergis, before you go to that one, I want to make sure I have this other amendment in, because we may have skipped it. I'll go back to it.

Ms. Helena Guergis: Okay.

Hon. Dan McTeague: So everybody follow me. Chair, I'm going to back to amending line 19 by inserting a comma after the word “immediately”, and adding the words “through a plan to increase Canada's aid budget”—

The Chair: That was already done by Ms. Guergis.

Hon. Dan McTeague: Yes, I got the wrong paragraph.

Ms. Helena Guergis: I did it right at the top.

The Chair: That's where she put it and it was accepted.

Hon. Dan McTeague: Okay, thank you. I know a person who was hung on a comma. Lord Haw-Haw, I believe.

The Chair: Any other amendments, Mr. McTeague?

Hon. Dan McTeague: Madame Guergis, do you want to do the last amendment I have here?

Ms. Helena Guergis: I don't have another amendment.

Hon. Dan McTeague: The amendment I'm looking at is amending line one in paragraph three by replacing, after the word, "legislation"—

The Chair: No, it's done. That's paragraph four.

Hon. Dan McTeague: Why is that line one? What have I done here?

Mr. Deepak Obhrai: Dan, wake up.

Ms. Helena Guergis: He can't hear me today.

Hon. Dan McTeague: I'm not waking up here, folks. I think I have had my fourth cup of coffee, so we'll leave it at that. Thank you.

The Chair: Okay, I will resume. If I understand it properly, in the first paragraph, we're stopping at "Scotland".

Second paragraph, we insert "to accept an act" and we delete "from 2003 to date". We delete "among them" till the last word, "CIDA". Then, after the third line, "immediately accept through a plan". That's what was proposed. In paragraph four, "introducing legislation prior to the next budget".

Ms. Alexa McDonough: This is not substantive. What the parliamentary secretary may have been trying to deal with is that in the second last line of paragraph two, after it says "to increase Canada's aid budget by", it should probably say "12% to 15%". Further in that line, it should read "annually to achieve an aid level". It's not substantive, only grammatical.

In the French it's probably—

[*Translation*]

Ms. Francine Lalonde: I am not following at all. Are you talking about the grammar in the English version?

Hon. Dan McTeague: There are issues of syntax. This does not happen often, so we must take advantage of it.

[*English*]

The Chair: All agreed with the amendments?

[*Translation*]

Ms. Francine Lalonde: One minute, please.

The Chair: Yes, Ms. Lalonde?

Ms. Francine Lalonde: In the French version, at the beginning of the second paragraph, is it the government or the committee that we are talking about when we say "qu'il souscrive"?

The text says: "... le comité demande au gouvernement du Canada...".

The Chair: It must read "de souscrire".

Ms. Francine Lalonde: It should read "que le gouvernement [...] souscrive...".

[*English*]

Ms. Beth Phinney: First paragraph.

[*Translation*]

The Chair: It should say: "... le comité demande au gouvernement du Canada avant [...] de souscrire aux recommandations quasi unanimes...".

[*English*]

Mr. Schmitz told me that in the third paragraph, just to be sure—because we say, in the first one, "To accept and to act"—we should say "To improve our aid effectiveness" in the third paragraph. It's just a question of the syntax.

All agreed? Oui, Madame Lalonde.

[*Translation*]

Ms. Francine Lalonde: The paragraphs should all begin...

The Chair: They should all begin in the same way, indeed. It is a matter of syntax.

Ms. Francine Lalonde: Very well.

(The amendment is carried).

[*English*]

The Chair: Thank you.

(Motion as amended agreed to)

The Chair: Should we report it to the House?

Some hon. members: Agreed.

[*Translation*]

Ms. Francine Lalonde: I hope that we will be more successful this time than before the Kananaskis Summit.

[*English*]

The Chair: Thank you.

The meeting is adjourned.

Published under the authority of the Speaker of the House of Commons

Publié en conformité de l'autorité du Président de la Chambre des communes

**Also available on the Parliamentary Internet Parlementaire at the following address:
Aussi disponible sur le réseau électronique « Parliamentary Internet Parlementaire » à l'adresse suivante :
<http://www.parl.gc.ca>**

The Speaker of the House hereby grants permission to reproduce this document, in whole or in part, for use in schools and for other purposes such as private study, research, criticism, review or newspaper summary. Any commercial or other use or reproduction of this publication requires the express prior written authorization of the Speaker of the House of Commons.

Le Président de la Chambre des communes accorde, par la présente, l'autorisation de reproduire la totalité ou une partie de ce document à des fins éducatives et à des fins d'étude privée, de recherche, de critique, de compte rendu ou en vue d'en préparer un résumé de journal. Toute reproduction de ce document à des fins commerciales ou autres nécessite l'obtention au préalable d'une autorisation écrite du Président.