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Chair

Mr. Bernard Patry

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• (0905)

[Translation]

The Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry (Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.)):
I call the meeting to order.

[English]

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), we resume our study of the international policy review.

[Translation]

Our witness this morning is from the International Development Research Centre.

[English]

We have the pleasure of having with us Robert Greenhill, who is a visiting senior executive. Mr. Greenhill just finished a book, *Making a Difference? External Views on Canada's International Impact*. It's not that big, but there are a lot of things to read inside.

Also, I just want to point out that we have the pleasure this morning of having, from the parliamentary study tour with CIDA's ODACE, Official Development Assistance in Central Europe, 15 MPs and senators from the countries of Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic. Welcome to all our colleagues from other countries. It's a pleasure for us to have you here this morning.

Now we're going to start. We'll hear from Mr. Greenhill. I understand that you have a presentation to give us first, before we go to questions and answers.

Please, Mr. Greenhill.

Mr. Robert Greenhill (Visiting Senior Executive, International Development Research Centre): Thank you, Dr. Patry and honourable members. It's a real pleasure to be here with you today.

I understand that most of you just received the documentation yesterday, so what I will try to do is provide in 10 or 15 minutes a brief overview of the findings and then open it up for questions and answers. I also hope for comments and suggestions, because what I'm putting forward to you today is actually an interim report, and I can think of no better group to get feedback from on what further research should be done for the final report than this group here today.

Let me give you a little bit of background. I'm actually an Albertan by origin, living in Quebec, having spent the necessary few years as a rite of passage in Toronto. So I've seen a little bit of Canada. I've also seen a lot of the world. Over the last 15 years I've

been an international strategist, first with MacKenzie and Company, the international strategy consulting firm, and then with Bombardier in the last five years as the president of Bombardier International.

About a year and a half or two years ago, around the period that led up to the invasion of Iraq, I basically decided I wanted to shift my attention full time to issues of international public policy, my hope being to provide the same kind of strategic rigour and focus to international policy issues that I had to international business issues. One key question I had when looking at that was how Canada could have the biggest, most positive impact on the world.

It's a pretty basic question, but a critical one. And in my mind, if you want to find out how you can be better, you need to find out how you're doing. And if you want to find out how you're doing, the key way to do that is to ask. But when I asked other people who had spent more time in international policy than me, I found it was something that actually hadn't ever been done before. There'd never been a systematic review of how Canada was perceived in terms of impact by international policy elites.

So what I decided to do was to apply something called the Delphi method, which is, when looking at a very complex issue, getting a heterogeneous group of experts to provide their independent views on the same question. By understanding where there is similarity in the responses and differences in responses, you can understand how clear the solution is.

Well, when applying this to public policy, what I meant is the following. I basically tried to identify 40 different actors from around the world—different actors in terms of geography, so Latin America, Africa, Europe, United States, Asia; and different actors ideologically, so on the one hand the socialist Gareth Evans, who was a foreign minister for Australia and is now president of the International Crisis Group, and Henry Kissinger on the other hand. I also asked people with different areas of expertise—so, Jeffrey Sachs, who would have deep experience in international development, or Richard Haass, who would have a strong understanding of international politics—having a heterogeneous perspective to determine whether or not there were some similar views on how Canada was perceived.

So that was the approach. And it included people like Francisco Sagasti, who was a former strategic planner at the World Bank, and Hage Geingob, who was a former SWAPO freedom fighter and the first Prime Minister of Namibia,

•(0910)

[Translation]

and François Heisbourg, Director of the Strategic Research Foundation in France.

[English]

So there was a combination of different people.

I basically asked everybody the same questions: Has Canada had an impact over the last 15 years, since 1989, and if so, where and why? The reason for 15 years was that's since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War. So my question was have we made a difference in this post-Cold War period? And by making a difference, we mean not just that we were there and people were happy to see us, because we're everywhere, and people are always happy to see us, but did we actually change things because we were involved? Were outputs different because Canada had played an important role?

The second question was where Canada should and could make a difference in the future.

One key finding was that the answers that came out were very consistent. You know, former SWAPO freedom fighters and Henry Kissinger and Gareth Evans may not agree on a lot of things—they certainly don't agree on their views of the world—but they actually agree in large part on their views of Canada: the kind of role we've played, where we've been successful, where we haven't been successful, where we could make a difference in the future. In large part it is highly congruent across these different people.

Overall, the findings were, for me as a patriotic Canadian, both exciting and disappointing—or sobering.

[Translation]

The findings of our study are sobering and exciting. They are sobering in that they portray a Canada whose international performance, and to a certain extent, international reputation, have fallen over the last 15 years. In particular, our influence on U.S. foreign policy, our contribution to international security, and our role in development are perceived to have declined significantly. The context going forward is seen as even more challenging. Institutions in which Canada played an important role, such as the G8 and NATO, are seen to be losing influence. Increasingly, active major players such as China, Brazil, India, Mexico, and sharply focused niche players such as Norway, are seen to be taking on roles traditionally held by Canada. As one European put it, the current trends are against Canada's influence.

[English]

In that sense, there were a lot of sobering findings. The findings are exciting and they highlight bright spots where Canada really did make a difference. There was a strong view that Canada took a courageous and important role against apartheid in supporting majority rule in South Africa in the early and mid-1990s. Canada's role in the human security agenda, including land mines and the responsibility to protect, are seen to have made a major difference.

Canada is showing through NAFTA and the free trade agreement that it is possible to balance closer economic integration with

reconfirmed political independence. This was seen as being confirmed in spades by our position on Iraq, which was also seen as important.

The Observer sketched out a future in which Canada can make a tremendous difference, if we choose to. Interviews describe a world fraught with important challenges, which they see our increasingly outmoded international institutions as ill-equipped to resolve. Canada is seen to have a unique geopolitical position that, combined with the right strategy, could allow us to make a significant difference in the future.

These international experts had five sets of specific recommendations, which I'd like to communicate to you today.

First of all, we need to improve our effectiveness in our contribution to international security. Under this head, there are three areas: developing a stand-alone air mobile brigade that we are prepared to deploy; assisting in police and indigenous security training; and taking a lead role in post-conflict reconstruction. These are areas where security experts from the United States, from Europe, as well as leaders from Africa thought Canada could not only play an important role but in many cases a unique role. As one American said, "Your soldiers with their maple leaf are a lot more welcome than our GIs in many of these parts of the world".

The second area where people strongly and consistently recommended that Canada retake its leadership position was in our role as a leader of international development. I would like to quote: "In the '70s and '80s, Canada belonged to the like-minded countries making a difference in development. Canada was truly one of the leaders. Canada has totally lost that in the last 15 years."

Development experts pointed to two issues: a crisis of funding, and an absence of sustained, focused leadership. That is not to say that Canada isn't doing good work. Canada is still doing some great work in certain areas. In information and communication technologies in Africa and the Middle East, we have had a real impact. In Tanzania, an IDRC and CIDA project has reduced mortality rates in target areas by 46%. It's probably the most successful health-care development intervention in the last 15 years in Africa. However, these tend to be scattered and uncoordinated spots of light in an otherwise very dark and gloomy development context.

So what do we need? We need more aid and better aid. First, keep the minister in long enough to make a difference. One of the comparisons that was made between CIDA and other development agencies was the incredible role played by the Blair government in transforming DFID, their Department for International Development, from being a fairly mediocre international agency to being the one that is consistently recognized as the best in the world. It did not take magic. It did not take blowing it up. It took consistent leadership and real commitment. They put in place a powerful minister, Claire Short. They gave her a real mandate. They kept her there for six years. She created a team with a focus and a determination to make a difference.

The sense was that Canada could do the same and more. But first, keep the minister in long enough to make a difference. Don't change them every 18 months. Have the CIDA minister, not Finance, represent Canada at the World Bank. Do we care where the money is coming from, or do we care where the money is going? This is what the U.K., Norway, and other development leaders have done.

Focus by area of expertise and by region. Commit to world-class capacity in the focus areas. Make sure that we become money-smart, that we provide expertise and not just funding. Review internal operations to speed decision-making and reduce unnecessary bureaucracy. And keep at it: do not change priorities from year to year or from minister to minister.

The sense was that with these simple but fundamental changes, CIDA could vie with DFID to again become the best development agency in the world. That would help with the quality.

While improved quality of aid is necessary, it is not sufficient. Six countries have now met the 0.7% of GDP to international development. Another six, most recently Germany, have committed to meet it before 2015. This means that over half of OECD's development assistance committee members have actually met or committed to 0.7%.

One international observer I interviewed said, "Canada needs to make a concrete commitment to 0.7% if it does not want to lose all credibility in development."

• (0915)

Development is the second real area where people from the right, from the left, and from various regions around the world thought Canada could make a difference.

The third area is acting as a global think tank on tough international issues and governance challenges. Canada is seen as being able to play a privileged role in bringing together in a disinterested way some of the best thinkers from around the world to deal with tough international issues and come up with the right solutions, and then to use our position on the G-8, with the Commonwealth, at APEC, with the Francophonie to actually translate those policy recommendations into real policy actions, not just convening but following through.

The "responsibility to protect" concept that came out of the Canadian-convened International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty is seen as a perfect example of this. It's an important new concept, which basically says that countries not only have the right to govern within their borders, they have the responsibility to govern within their borders responsibly; and where they don't, the international community not only has the right but the responsibility to intervene. This is a very important change in international norms.

It was something that was put forward under Lloyd Axworthy when he formed this international commission. What's interesting on this is the international commission of course delivered its report right after 9/11, when there was a new Minister of Foreign Affairs, and to a certain extent, it was dead on arrival. And yet, because of the commitment of a number of Canadian leaders from different parties, and because of the commitment of Canadians internationally—David Malone, at the International Peace Academy, Bruce

Jones at the United Nations, civil servants such as Peter Harder and Jonathan Fried—this concept has actually regained momentum.

And in the last few months the high-level panel looking at UN reform actually supported this. The Secretary General, in his response to the UN high-level panel's recommendations, endorsed the concept. This is a place where Canada could be making a major difference in the world, and if we do, it will be because we not only had a good idea and a good phrase to go with it, but we actually helped carry it through. Acting as a global think tank is a place where Canada could also make a difference.

The fourth recommendation was on crafting the next North American agenda. There's a sense in both the United States and Mexico that North American issues, whether on security, immigration, or energy, are going to become more important. Of the three players, Canada is probably seen as the most objective in putting forward the right sequencing and nature of further conversations.

The final area is using our post-secondary education system to build relationships with a new generation of decision-makers around the world.

These were five specific recommendations that the international experts came up with. The key to renewed relevance is differentiation and focus. The recommendation was to decide on a few areas, invest deeply, and become indispensable. In those areas, Canada should be considered pre-eminent in terms of expertise, capabilities, and resources.

An important point here is that while most of the experts believed we could do all this, most believed we will not do it. Most believed we will fail to actually play the role we should play, and that's because interviews identified three elements that were seen to be missing in Canada's approach today: first, a willingness to make clear choices; second, a consistency in those choices and in our strategic posture toward key partners, including the United States and the UN over time; third, a determination to build world-class assets in those niche areas where Canada has chosen to lead.

I was asked what I would be recommending as part of this committee's review of the upcoming international policy statement. I would recommend three things. First, we don't need an international policy statement; we need international policy actions. The world is actually tired of Canadian rhetoric. It is looking for good, pragmatic, effective Canadian actions. If this international policy statement helps us channel and refine our approach so it leads to better actions, then it's a very important first step. But it is at best a first step.

What outcomes will we change as a result of this statement and the strategy it comes from? Will we talk about a new brigade that could prevent a Rwanda or a Darfur, or will we soon have a new brigade that is deployed and that does prevent another Rwanda? Will we talk about the importance of international assistance, or will we provide real increases and more effective international assistance that would actually move us towards 0.7% before 2015? That's what the world cares about.

● (0920)

Secondly, this can't be a party's or even a government's international policy statement. If we are going to actually have an impact in the world and have the consistent strategy that's necessary to do this, this needs to be our country's international policy statement. It's critical to have a multi-partisan approach to international policy if we're going to have the consistency that leads to credibility and an impact over time.

One of the things that has struck me in this study has been the way in which countries such as Australia, France, the U.K., and historically the United States, although not so much in the last few years, despite having very raucous domestic political debates, have in different ways determined fashions whereby they can have bi-partisan or multi-partisan approaches to foreign policy. Certainly they have debates on specific issues. France has a consistency in its international approach, whether the government is Gaullist or whether it's socialist. The Australians have a consistent attitude towards the United States, again whether it's the right or the left that's in power.

It's incredibly important for a country of our size to have the consistency that comes from a truly national approach to foreign policy.

Thirdly, our strategy has to be not copying others but complementing others. We are unique as a country. We can make a difference in a way that is very different from other G-8 countries. In fact, let me give you a quote: "Canada could play a leadership role, a distinct role, a role very different from the United States." It is not surprising to hear some of us say that. What was surprising to me was to hear that being said by an American, who would be considered right wing, who actually sees in the world today, with an overstretched United States, with tremendous military obligations, being able to win wars but not win the peace.

He, like so many other observers, saw Canada as being able to play an incredibly important complementary role, not trying to be a mini-me of the United States or of France or of the U.K. or of Australia, but being truly distinctive and providing interventions that actually complement and complete the contributions already being made by our international allies.

So when we look at what we are doing, we shouldn't try to be 3% of everything. We should try to be 10% or 30% of those areas where we can really make a difference. This would be the approach that reflects our values. It would help address our national interests and it will make us proud to be engaged citizens of the world.

For these three reasons—the need to move from rhetoric to actions, the critical need to have a consistent, multi-partisan foreign policy, and the need to focus on areas where we can complement and complete the actions of others—I think this committee is going to have an incredibly important role to play in the next few months. In particular, if we enter into a period of political instability at a partisan level, it will be critical that this committee provides an approach towards our foreign policy to actually rise above particular partisan concerns. Aid orphans in Rwanda, people involved in reconstructing their lives in Afghanistan and Haiti, and people looking to us to come up with new international institutions to bridge the developing

and developed world should not have to wait for us to settle our internal domestic issues before Canada has a consistent foreign policy.

Thank you very much.

● (0925)

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Greenhill.

Now we'll go to questions and answers, and we'll start with Mr. Day, please.

Mr. Stockwell Day (Okanagan—Coquihalla, CPC): Thank you, Mr. Greenhill.

There is always a tension in dealing with other countries in terms of human rights vis-à-vis trade and whether our trade considerations trump human rights. At what point, how vigorously, and in how robust a manner should a country raise its concerns? I'm thinking now specifically related to China with their human rights record, which still needs much improvement, and yet we also want trade. Could you reflect on that, especially given your experience at Bombardier?

Specifically, though you may not have been involved, I will use this as an example. Bombardier has received significant loan guarantees from this government, and our information is that they are involved in the planning of the railway into Tibet, which people concerned about the Tibet question are seeing as a way of cultural subjugation of the Tibet situation by bringing masses, in fact tens of thousands, of Chinese into that area.

So can you comment on the tension between trade and human rights and how we address that, and specifically the Tibet railway question and Bombardier's involvement?

Mr. Robert Greenhill: Let me answer in three ways, Mr. Day.

I actually visited Tibet in 1999. I took a two-month sabbatical from Bombardier at a point when I thought I just needed to spend more time as a citizen of the world getting to know Asia. Part of that involved my wife and me travelling across China and going into Tibet—not from China, actually, but from Nepal. I think any lover of liberty should visit Tibet, because one then sees the dangers of authoritarianism. So as a Canadian citizen, I think that anything we can do in a constructive and positive way to improve the situation in Tibet is a good thing.

Now, let me talk about the issue as a former Bombardier executive. As a company, I think Bombardier is a great company; I think it's a world-class company and I am proud to have been part of that company. I was not involved in the conversations around this recent locomotive purchase, done by the joint venture out of Qingdao, so I actually can't comment on that.

I can comment on the approach I took as a president of Bombardier International, which was to make sure that in all of our actions we actually tried to provide a positive example in three ways. We tried to actually have very high standards of health and safety for our workers, including by my personally inspecting all the different facilities I was involved with. We tried to make sure we were actually at the cutting edge of environmental protection. The third thing we tried to do was to make sure we provided opportunities for nationals in these different countries to rise to the very highest level within the organization. In fact, when I came to Bombardier International, the three heads of our different groups involving China were all expats, but by the time I left they were all Chinese nationals. That was one specific way to try to make a difference.

At a more systematic level, I was very actively involved with Transparency International's business principles. Transparency International has a business principles group, which basically is trying to come up with a consistent set of principles that a corporation should be adopting for their internal or external practices in dealing with specific issues of corruption. I sat on their steering committee for that. I was also involved with our legal counsel in reviewing our internal practices to make sure they actually met this new "A-quality" approach.

By trying to deal with issues of corruption and trying to show the right actions in specific activities, I think Bombardier provided very positive role models in the areas it was involved in. That's what I would say as a Bombardier executive, and I think that's the appropriate role for a company to be looking at.

Coming back to the issue of Tibet, I don't know if you've visited the country yet, but I think you should, because one of the ways in which we can change things positively there is just by letting light shine on it. One way to let light shine on it is by being a witness to it ourselves.

• (0930)

Mr. Stockwell Day: And the first part of the question—how far does a country like Canada go in terms of shining the light on China's human rights record when they threaten loss of business opportunity?

Mr. Robert Greenhill: Well, I think any approach to something like that actually has to be a coordinated approach. Canada by itself can provide a lot of words; Canada with Europe, with Australia, with India, and with the United States can provide a lot more impact.

India has been much closer to this issue than we have ever been. So one of the things I'd want to do—and this is getting way outside my area of competence—is to find out what India's advice on this would be, and I'd want to see whether or not we couldn't, in the future, have the kind of relationship with India on these kinds of issues that we had in the past during the time of Nehru and Pearson, when Canada and India were in the developing world trying to come up with a moral approach to international policy. Tibet might not be a bad place to start.

[Translation]

The Chair: Mr. Paquette, you have the floor.

Mr. Pierre Paquette (Joliette, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Once again I'd like to tell you how stimulating your comments and report are for the committee. I think they tie in with a number of our intuitive observations that we will be working on over the coming months. You are the third person to have spoken to us in the past few weeks about the importance for Canada to devote 0.7 per cent of its GDP to international development. We heard from Mr. Sachs on April 6 and we also heard the outgoing president of the World Bank. All three of you explained to us, in one way or another, that the lack of a firm commitment relating to this 0.7 per cent, particularly in the context of the Millennium Development Goals, was seriously undermining Canada's credibility.

I'd like you to explain to us why this 0.7 per cent is becoming important at the present time, in relation to the situation two or three years ago, with reference to the leadership that Canada can show in the field of international development.

• (0935)

Mr. Robert Greenhill: Thank you, Mr. Paquette.

I do indeed think that the 0.7 per cent target is becoming increasingly important now, particularly after the courageous and difficult decision made by Germany to adopt the same target two weeks ago. At the present time, Germany is running a deficit of almost 3 per cent of its GDP. It is already spending a larger percentage of its GDP than we are for defence. It is already devoting a larger percentage of its GDP, and three times as much in absolute dollars, on development issues than we are. In such a context, it would have been easy for Germany to say that this would be too much. But it did decide to go ahead.

So the first change was the fact that the 0.7 per cent target, one that had remained theoretical for about 30 years, is no longer a theoretical one but one that will either be achieved or not. At the present time, most of the members of the DAC, in the OECD, have already set this concrete objective. Three members of the G7 have established this objective. There will be a meeting of the G7 this summer. Germany, France and the U.K. all find themselves in much more difficult financial situations than we do, they all have international commitments in matters of defence and development that are greater than ours, and they all intend to go ahead with this.

On the other side are Italy, Japan and the United States.

[English]

We have the coalition of the willing, and the coalition of the unwilling. This time, we should join the coalition of the willing.

The second reason I think it's absolutely important is that the international context has changed. I think one could say that much of the aid moneys in the seventies and eighties may have been wasted, may have in fact led to destructive behaviour. But for any of us who've actually travelled in Africa or other parts of the developing world, there are more competent, courageous leaders in charge of those countries that have received a democratic mandate than at any other time in history. They are also dealing with some of the most difficult situations in terms of the impact of civil wars, some of the debt burdens that they've inherited from their despotic regimes, and of course the ravaging effect of HIV/AIDS.

So actually, in this context, probably for the first time, we can say, I think with a fair degree of certainty—and I think that would be Jeff Sachs' argument—that we know this money will be spent well. We can ensure there's political oversight. We also know the interventions that are necessary. We know how with another billion dollars we can save a million lives in Africa. We know through the IDRC and CIDA's work what interventions have to take place in terms of hiring front-line workers, in terms of rebuilding clinics, in terms of putting in place proper diagnostic and distribution systems.

We can monitor directly where that money is going. We can say money, interventions, impact. So we can say, I think for the first time, that money won't be wasted. We know that if we're going to change the vicious cycle in Africa, where you have economic degradation, environmental degradation, social hopelessness, emigration....

Some countries have lost 80% of all their university graduates. Ghana's problem isn't that they don't have university graduates; it's that they can't keep any. South Africa's problem isn't that they don't have nurses; it's that they're all working with the NHS in the U.K.

The way to reverse that downward cycle is to actually, within the next five or ten years, put in place the injection of cash necessary to create the virtuous cycle, so they can actually take control of their own destiny.

So I would say, for political reasons, in terms of what has happened with the OECD and the G-7 commitments, and for the practical and moral reasons in terms of how the money can be used, the time is now to make that commitment.

The other key point is that with Germany having just taken that courageous step, if Canada takes a perhaps less courageous but equally important step to also go to 0.7%, the momentum going into the G-7 or G-8 meeting will be tremendous. If Canada steps back now, Canada will break that momentum.

[Translation]

The Chair: Mr. Boudria now has the floor.

• (0940)

Hon. Don Boudria (Glengarry—Prescott—Russell, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[English]

First I have a couple of reactions, and then questions.

First of all, sir, I agree very much with you that one of our approaches to international development has to be to have ministers there longer than they otherwise have been. I was one who was at CIDA for less than a year. When I left there my reaction to my deputy minister was, “Madame Labelle, this is the only time in my life I ever received a promotion and was sad to have had it”, because I enjoyed the role so much. That was the reaction, I'm told, of my predecessor, Pierre Pettigrew, who was there just before me and for a period that was somewhat similar. And then he left, and so on.

I think you're right. We need to raise the profile of that position somehow. You talk about the World Bank as being a component. I want to add another one for you to think about.

[Translation]

It concerns our role within the Francophonie.

When I was Minister for International Cooperation, I was at the same time the minister responsible for the Francophonie. Almost all the member countries of the Francophonie with the exception of us, France and Belgium, and one or two others, are countries that receive aid. The fact that the Minister of International Cooperation is at the same time the minister responsible for the Francophonie does allow for such a niche. You were telling us that Canada should be developing more niches. We find ourselves in an extraordinary position. We are not the former colonial power as was France. That means that we can provide aid and exercise a certain influence without being perceived as a threat. I think that that is a niche. I'll be interested in hearing your reaction to this.

[English]

I also want to raise this issue with you. Is there a role for greater parliamentary diplomacy? It's not raised very much, but I like talking about that. Maybe it's because I'm into it up to my armpits; I chair a number of parliamentary association friendship groups and what have you. I invite you to talk about that.

As well, when you talked about the size of our aid, you made no mention of tied aid versus untied. For instance, there are countries that have a greater proportion of aid but also at the same time have a greater proportion of tied aid—and very, very tied aid—to the point where sometimes you wonder whether it is aid at all or just more taking advantage of commercial opportunities.

Could you react to some of this? And I'm sorry if I talked a lot.

Mr. Robert Greenhill: I think those are three great comments.

[Translation]

As for the role that the minister responsible for CIDA may play within the Francophonie, I think that it is an interesting idea that the same person should be responsible for both areas. It is clear that member countries of the Francophonie often do receive international aid, as you said. Moreover, Canada can play a role distinct from that of France in western Africa as well as in countries like Haiti. So I think it is a good idea.

[English]

With respect to the issue of parliamentary diplomacy, clearly one of the elements that came out is horizontal engagement, whether it's parliamentarians getting together with one another, whether it's provincial governments actually linking up with state governments in places like Mexico and sharing ideas on health care and education, or whether it's actually the private sector linking up with the private sector in other countries in terms of chambers of commerce and also committees looking at governance, to actually transfer best practices there. I think these kinds of areas would be incredibly important.

On the parliamentary one, it's also a way to inform and engage people perhaps before they actually become ministers or leaders of the country. As so many people know, once you're a minister, it's tough to actually learn more because you're so busy doing things, right? You're basically coming in with the intellectual capital you've built before. If we can engage with these people before they become ministers, we can help build their intellectual capital on issues of parliamentary democracy, so I think it's an excellent point.

In terms of tied aid versus untied aid, I have a very clear view on that. There should be no tied aid. I think it's often destructive, in that it doesn't help but hurts the development efforts. People buy the wrong product or use it in the wrong way simply because they can get it for free, even if there's then later on a cost of operating it that may actually increase the burden to that country.

It's also not the right way for a company to sell a product. If a product is good, the basic concept is that you can provide it at a cost that is less than its value so someone else wants to buy it. If it doesn't meet that formula, it shouldn't be getting sold.

● (0945)

[Translation]

Hon. Don Boudria: Thank you.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you.

Now we'll go for five minutes.

Mrs. McDonough.

Ms. Alexa McDonough (Halifax, NDP): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you very much for your presentation this morning. I had only a chance to very briefly review your paper.

I have to say that if this were part of an organized roll-out of what we're going to do now that this committee has been utterly paralyzed for almost a year with the promised foreign policy review paper—delayed and delayed—I would stand up and cheer, because something needs to break the log jam.

Reference has been made to the brilliance and persuasiveness of the testimony brought before us by James Wolfensohn and Jeffrey Sachs. I joined the committee in early 2003, and I remember the occasion on which Stephen Lewis made a presentation, not as comprehensive, as you'll understand—it was more focused on Africa—but with very similar arguments, which I think it is fair to say were well received by all political parties.

You may know, and if you're not aware of this I would be happy to make you aware, of an all-party letter that was put to the Prime Minister by the three opposition leaders in the lead-up to the budget, pleading the case for moving to 0.7% ODA, pleading the case that we put in place a legislative framework that would then guide CIDA's operation and get us on the path. You referred specifically to Germany. Others have referred to both Sweden and the U.K. You have referred to the U.K. as well.

I am wondering if you could at this point clarify further your comments about how it is not an international policy review statement that's needed, it's action on the things that are long

overdue, well known, and oft recommended to this committee. Where would you see this committee going from here, if we can cooperate and collaborate going from here to break the paralysis, to break the constipation that has been the result of nothing forthcoming from government?

Mr. Robert Greenhill: What would be important is to determine what the bedrock is on which we want to build a foreign policy and what's the bedrock that actually clearly, regardless of partisan affiliation, reflects our values and our national interest.

One bedrock element has to be the issue of international security. That was the area where the rhetoric reality gap was seen by many people to be the largest and the most exasperating.

So what's the reality? What is it that this committee expects should be the capability of Canada to project force abroad for good? Is it to have an international air mobile brigade? What would that look like? That would be one element.

The second element is, what's our commitment to development? Are we going to have a legislative mandate for CIDA? Are we going to have a minister who's in there for a certain number of years? Will we actually make it a request? Will we have a program to move towards 0.7%? Will we have some criteria for impact that we'll be reviewing on an annual basis?

I don't see that as being partisan. It is not for me to decide whether it is partisan. But what would be useful would be if those are bedrock elements of where we think Canada can make a difference, regardless of the government in power, it would be wonderful to have that as an all-party recommendation coming out of this.

The other element that I think would be awfully useful would be to have some criteria for success in terms of actions that you will be using as a committee to review and judge the government in power, whatever that government is. That would take those few elements.

The interesting thing is there isn't a long list of things that we should be doing. There are just a few very important things that we can be doing that the world really needs us to do. Security and development are the two most important ones.

Ms. Alexa McDonough: Could you just comment on the disarmament and small arms controlling?

Mr. Robert Greenhill: On land mines, Canada has had an impact. In small arms, Keith Krause, who's a Canadian in Switzerland with the small arms survey—he helped set it up—is making a difference.

One element that is important that came out in this report that I mentioned today is Canada makes a certain difference. Canada's ability to make a difference has declined in the last 15 years, but can go up again. While Canada's ability to make a difference has declined, Canadians making a difference continue to go up around the world. The Keith Krause land-mines survey monitor is an example of that.

● (0950)

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Greenhill.

Now we'll go to Mr. McTeague.

Hon. Dan McTeague (Pickering—Scarborough East, Lib.): Mr. Greenhill, thank you for being here today, and for your very interesting remarks in advancing an international policy statement. I notice you want us to back up rhetoric with action. Of course, you talked about the importance of the statement over the next few years, in terms of how it will direct future foreign policy.

In your statement, I think you referred to the national approach to foreign policy. You used the words “values” and “interests” almost interchangeably, and yet there is a very important distinction that I think we're going to have to come to grips with here. Certainly those words have been used by others who've appeared before this committee, and no doubt in the future others will do the same. There is, obviously, a quantifiable difference notionally and thematically between fantasy and fact, and reality and romanticism, in terms of how we see foreign policy. I think Canadians understand the significance and the importance—and you've pointed out the right and the left supporting this within the Canadian political spectrum—but practically speaking, pragmatically speaking, how do you see Canada's role in terms of doing better work?

You talked about doing 3% everywhere rather than 10% or 15% here and there. I'm wondering, how do you focus Canada's limited energies in a way that gives it maximum punch in various regions of the world, particularly given our geographic limitations? Many of us believe that perhaps it's time to start to concentrate on North America. There are issues of sovereignty here, and issues as a result of what's happening in the Arctic, for instance, with the melting of the ice cap and the opening of the Northwest Passage. Certainly there are things we can do elsewhere, but obviously, as you pointed out, we can't do everything. Where are the hot spots that you believe Canada should be involved with, and to what degree, and on what subjects?

Mr. Robert Greenhill: Boy, that's a great set of questions.

Let me tell you my view. I've thought a lot about interests and a lot about values. They're obviously not the same thing, but they're often not that distinct. It really is like a Venn diagram: you've got interests, you've got values, and sometimes they don't intersect but they often do, particularly for an open, internationalist country like Canada. It is in accordance with our values that we'd like to have a stable, prosperous world where the rule of law reigns. It's absolutely in keeping with our national interests that we have a stable international environment where the rule of law reigns.

I'd actually like to quote something here. What's interesting is that it's from a European who is a member of a great power. For him, the idea of being able to use might, at least traditionally, has effect: “When one is modest militarily and limited economically it is important to be virtuous, to have a very consistent policy, to be consistent in one's actions, and to have a reputation for no ulterior motives.” Now, that's also in accordance with our values, but clearly he thought it was in accordance with our national interests, because that's the way people will listen to us. Maybe you can be large and duplicitous and get away with it sometimes, but you can't be modest-sized and duplicitous and get away with it.

So at a tactical level, values and interests coincide, but at a strategic level they also coincide, and not only at the global point, as I was mentioning. Our interest, from a values and interests point of

view, is to have an internationally stable situation. If we look at infectious diseases, it's the same thing. It's absolutely in accordance with our values to try to stop millions of people from dying of infectious diseases in other parts of the world. It's also in keeping with our interests. The issue of actually providing more prosperous societies that actually have stable democratic systems and an effective liberal rule of law is also in accordance with our interests as well as values, because that's the way we're going to stop situations like the al-Qaeda in the future.

I actually did my master's on international relations, in particular the period from 1919 to 1945. I often asked myself, when did stopping Hitler go from being a question of values to being a question of interest? If we had actually been a little more forceful in our application of values, we wouldn't have had to be so desperately involved in the use of force to impose our national interest from 1939 to 1945.

There's also an element of international trade and international trade rules. We're ensuring that there's a level playing field so that Canadian companies have the same rights as others. That might be an example. You see, that's primarily national interest, but for much of what I was talking about, particularly on the issues of international security and international development, the two highly coincide.

• (0955)

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Greenhill.

Now we'll go to Ms. Stronach, please.

Ms. Belinda Stronach (Newmarket—Aurora, CPC): Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Greenhill. I appreciate your comments and the way you look at things in a comprehensive way. I agree with you that now is the time not for more reviews but for action. The timing is critical, particularly in light of this weekend's G-8 finance ministers' meeting.

I have two questions. First, will the blueprint for the integrated international policy review be complete without a firm commitment, including a timetable, to meet the 0.7% challenge? Second, with the opportunity that's before us this weekend with the finance ministers' meeting, is there an opportunity for Canada to play a pivotal role, to be the swing vote to bring others on side? And if we don't do this, will we further cede our global leadership to others by default?

Mr. Robert Greenhill: Two direct and great questions.

Ms. Stronach, my answer to your first question is no. The international policy statement of strategy will not be complete without a clear commitment to reach 0.7% before 2015, and without, as Germany did by committing to 0.5% by 2006, clear interim steps.

As to your second question, it's a great opportunity, but it's one of several opportunities. If Canada actually took up the challenge put forward by Germany and accelerated the momentum by making a positive decision at this finance ministers' meeting, that would be great. If it doesn't happen, though, I don't think it will be the last opportunity. There will be the G-8 leaders' meeting. Also, in September, down in New York, there'll be the meeting of the United Nations to look at the reform of the UN, where they will also be looking at the commitment countries are making to international development.

So we probably have at least three kicks at this, and the sooner the better, but better later than not at all. I would say that those would be the key opportunities for Canada to make a positive difference.

The Chair: Mr. Sorenson.

Mr. Kevin Sorenson (Crowfoot, CPC): I thank you again for coming here. I look forward to my flight home today so I can actually read through the little booklet you wrote, "Making a Difference? External Views on Canada's International Impact".

As I go through this brochure a little bit, I see that you're hitting on a lot of the high points. You've talked about the 0.7% and different things. But rather than trying to meet all these goals in short timelines, how do we formulate a systematic approach where they can all be met? What are the priorities?

You talk about rebuilding a relationship with the United States. You talk about the 0.7%. One of the things that has taken quite a few pages is Canada's role in security and national security. I'm wondering if you can expand on that a little bit.

You say our first priority is enhancing protection of Canadian sovereignty and continental defence. You say that such an approach would involve new levels of cooperation with the United States, and you suggest that it may even mean going into the ballistic missile defence system.

You also talk about making a distinct contribution to international security. Could you expand a little on our national security and how we're viewed internationally in this area?

• (1000)

Mr. Robert Greenhill: With regard to a systematic approach, let me talk about defence and let me start with the issue of national sovereignty and effective control of our borders.

One of the items that people said was absolutely critical was to make sure that perimeter security works. We need a more effective coast guard. We need to make sure that, as a global warming opens up the Northwest Passage, we have effective security and sovereignty over our northern reaches.

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: When you talk about perimeter security, Canada's role in continental security, do you think that we need more open borders while taking care of our perimeter, or are you speaking only of securing Canada's perimeter?

Mr. Robert Greenhill: Let me go through it systematically, almost step by step.

Ballistic missile defence was mentioned by a number of American experts as being an area where Canada could be involved—nobody said we have to be involved. My sense on that is there was a debate,

there was a decision, and we now move on, especially as that was actually not an area where we'd be changing the outcome anyhow.

So where are the areas where we can change the outcomes? Well, having an effective coast guard, able to communicate effectively with the American coast guard, actually helps in terms not only of terrorist issues but also in terms of smuggling and people-trafficking issues, and so on. For us to actually protect our own borders, first and foremost, and in a way that also helps provide security to our American neighbours, would be an area that probably makes sense to focus on. The issue of opening up the north and ensuring there's appropriate oversight there probably also makes sense. Those would be at the level of North America.

Internationally, what everybody was saying, first and foremost, was that an air-mobile, stand-alone brigade would allow Canada to make a huge, distinctive contribution. Why is that? Well, because there aren't a lot of air-mobile brigades out there. The only countries who can do it right now are the United States, the U.K., and France—and Australia can use sea-mobile brigades within its region—all of whom are very stretched right now.

Secondly, in addition to the issue of capacity is the issue of credibility and how we're perceived. There's a sense that actually having effective, competent, bilingual, and disinterested peace-keepers or peacemakers—without any colonial involvement—who could be flown in completely under Canadian leadership and logistic control could make a huge difference, particularly in areas of Africa. People could then be moved in quickly to deal with issues before they break out and could be there to help stabilize them afterwards. That was a place that the Americans, the Europeans, the Africans, and the Asians all saw Canada's number one security contribution as being.

So if I were looking at the budgets of defence as part of this review, I would be asking, how do we ensure that, within the limited funds we have, we can project 5,000 people where we need them and how we need them?

The Chair: Thank you.

Now we'll go back to Mr. McTeague.

Hon. Dan McTeague: That's an interesting point that I want to take up, because it seems to me there has been an increase in the defence budget. There has been, of course, an increase in personnel—or at least in salaries to personnel last year. The notion of rapid deployment has certainly gained tremendous credence over the past little while in terms of Canada being able to respond to certain areas.

Without knowing what is in the international policy statement, I'm wondering if you might be able to piece out for this committee whether Canada has the ability right now to meet its current commitments in places like Haiti and Afghanistan, and to do the kinds of things you just suggested, notwithstanding the additional resources.

Is there a greater expectation, for instance, that Canada become involved in other places around the world, and how do you separate military involvement, as you've suggested, from developmental priorities? It seems to me that some are very concerned about the possibility of the two being mixed.

•(1005)

Mr. Robert Greenhill: It actually links with the question the previous speaker asked, which I wasn't able to get to; that was, where are the real areas of concern?

The big areas of concern are probably the Caucasus, the Middle East, and Africa—and then Haiti. Haiti is an exception, a very sad exception in an otherwise very positive situation generally in the Americas since the 1970s.

I think what we could ask is where we can actually make a difference in a few areas along that swath. If we're doing international security, having 5,000 people we can deploy probably is realizable within the commitments that have recently been made.

It is a question whether we actually have the ability to make the choices, within the overall defence expenditures, to free them up and focus, and whether we have the political will to actually deploy the forces once they're available.

In terms of where one would focus our efforts, on the development side there are security interventions, there is pure development and poverty reduction, and then there is the nexus of the two in areas like Haiti or Afghanistan and other areas, where we actually need a combined approach, even though that is challenging.

Within that, if I were asked to choose a place where Canada is uniquely positioned to make a real difference, if we have the courage and determination to do it, it would be Haiti.

Haiti is a place where we speak the language, we have the demographic connection, we are in the same hemisphere, and we don't have the baggage the United States and France have with regard to it. And it's a place where we've failed, even though we said before we wouldn't, and it is a place where we really don't have the right to fail again.

It is also a place where, because it's an island, because it's six or seven million people, if we actually do show the courage and the conviction and a consistency in our approach, we should be able—not in two years, but in ten or twenty years—to really help turn that society and country around in a positive way.

If I were looking at the nexus of the two in saying where in the nexus area Canada can make a difference, it's not in places like Iraq; it's in places like Haiti.

Hon. Dan McTeague: The Prime Minister led a successful round as finance minister with 20 leading nations. There are strong proposals, and of course the United Nations is proceeding with looking at various options, including the take-up on some of the notions running from the responsibility to protect.

I would like to get your comments on the significance of Canada's working towards involving emerging nations, which not only have considerable weight economically but now of course have the potential, ironically, for turning from being what were once countries needing development to being able to help other nations. What are your observations?

Mr. Robert Greenhill: I think it is a great role for us to play. I think it fits with this Prime Minister's way of doing things, but also it

fits with the Canadian way of doing things, which is actually building coalitions, working with others in a collaborative way.

I mentioned the role Canada and India used to play in the 1950s. It is the kind of role I think people welcome us trying to play with things like the G-20. When I was doing my interviews, it was certainly the kind of role people thought Canada was well positioned to play, because we are a G-8 member but we're not seen as threatening.

But I guess if we're going to do that, we would have to make it a national priority, not just the priority of one person, and we'd need to make sure that was an approach we had built into the strategy

Hon. Dan McTeague: That's not rhetoric; it's action, accordingly.

Mr. Robert Greenhill: Yes.

To build on that, the concept of the L-20 is a challenging one. It is challenging because actually the idea of having 20 different leaders who don't know one another very well getting together in a room for two or three days with the expectations and televisions of the world upon them and having that result in something concrete is challenging. But it's a *beau défi*; it's a *beau risque*. It's something worth trying to do, and it is something that is necessary to do, because it is clear that the G-8, the OECD, and the other western and northern-oriented international gatherings do not reflect—they never reflected the population, but they no longer reflect the economic or political realities of the world today.

Canada is as well positioned as anybody to try to make this happen.

•(1010)

[*Translation*]

The Chair: Thank you.

I know recognize Mr. Desrochers.

Mr. Odina Desrochers (Lotbinière—Chutes-de-la-Chaudière, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, Mr. Greenhill.

In one of your conclusions, you mention the fact that France and Australia do show a certain consistency in matters of foreign policy regardless of who happens to be in power, whether it be the Gaullists, socialists or another group. When it comes to Canada, as you can see, there are always two clashing philosophies. The case of Iraq and the missile defence system are examples of this.

What would your advice be to the Canadian government for it to consolidate its position towards Europe and the United States and to show a greater consistency in matters of foreign policy?

Mr. Robert Greenhill: Quite clearly, it would amount to giving more power to a committee such as yours. One of the reasons why the United States has a more bipartite approach is that the Senate plays a primordial role when it comes to treaties. It already used this power to reject the American position concerning the Society of Nations. That was in 1920, if my memory serves me right. That is something that presidents must take into account whenever they take an international initiative.

[English]

The approach the British use in annual debates on foreign policy in the House is another way. There are different mechanisms. It can't just be that we think it's a good idea to have a multi-partisan approach. Processes or structures have to be put in place to encourage or demand a multi-partisan approach to international policy, if we want it to be effective.

I haven't actually heard it discussed much in Canada, but a worthy issue for discussion in this committee would be whether there are mechanisms we can put in place or learn from others that would help encourage and enforce a much more multi-partisan and therefore much more consistent and effective approach to international affairs.

[Translation]

Mr. Odina Desrochers: Mr. Greenhill, our Parliament is essentially a replica of the British Parliament. It operates in basically the same manner.

I'd like to know whether the British model resembles a multipartite model or whether Great Britain is also confronted with the type of situation that prevails in Canada.

Mr. Robert Greenhill: Honestly, I would not be able to compare the parliamentary systems to the presidential ones. I would not venture to make a comment on this subject.

Nonetheless, I can say that in Great Britain, the Conservatives and the Labour Party have always taken pretty much the same approach to the United States, for example. That does not mean that there are no variations from one prime minister to another. The fact remains that after 1945, and particularly after Suez in 1956, it became the way in which Great Britain was to exercise its influence on the world and on Washington. This approach has been maintained very consistently. It was possible within the framework of the parliamentary system. We may agree with this approach or not, but at least there is clear consistency.

Mr. Odina Desrochers: Mr. Greenhill, does that mean that Canada finds itself torn between the desire to support the European approach and the American approach?

Mr. Robert Greenhill: No, the split implies different Canadian approaches. If we take as an example our position with respect to the United States, we can say that at least three approaches are involved, and they're all Canadian. One of them, somewhat in the style of Brian Mulroney, takes the stand that we are very close friends, that we will remain so, and that we will end up acting jointly. Another of these approaches, more in the style of Lloyd Axworthy, tends to focus on feelings and memories related to the Vietnam War. It is more inclined to advocate caution and assumes that the vision of the United States and the existing hierarchy are state-centred and do not really respond to the needs of the population. The present-day reality, given the importance of civil society, results in us working together. To a certain extent, we seem to think that we can be the state representatives of an approach that tends to go beyond state control. This is a very different approach.

The third approach is of a more transactional nature. Since we are neighbours, we decide that we will work together when it is possible but that that will not always be the case. In recent years, the

Department of Foreign Affairs has adopted this approach, which is somewhat of an intermediate one.

So there are three approaches and they are all Canadian. Our strategy toward the United States cannot contain these three approaches. The approach changes whenever there is a new Minister of Foreign Affairs.

• (1015)

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Bevilacqua, it is your turn.

[English]

Mr. Maurizio Bevilacqua (Vaughan, Lib.): Thank you very much.

I just had an opportunity to go through your statement, but I'll read it a little more carefully.

It's kind of neat that you sit around with—what is it?—40 people from 19 different countries, and they tell you what they think. Without telling me the names, who are these people?

Mr. Robert Greenhill: They're all on the back of this.

Hon. Maurizio Bevilacqua: Concerning the quotes—

Mr. Robert Greenhill: It's actually important. There are folks from India, the former science minister from India; a Norwegian professor of war studies in London; from the Center for Global Development, Nancy Birdsall; the former finance minister from Portugal; Jermyn Brooks, who is the executive director of Transparency International; Rick Burt, who is the U.S. chief negotiator in the strategic arms reductions talks; Patrick Cammaert, who is Dutch, who is a military adviser to the UN on international peacekeeping; and so on. The list is here.

In terms of the approach, just to be clear on that, it was the Chatham House Rule, so the names of the people are public, and I have quotes from the interviews, but the quotes are not attributed to an individual person. Those were the rules of engagement.

Hon. Maurizio Bevilacqua: What kind of contact do these individuals have with Canada? Are they observers; are they...?

Mr. Robert Greenhill: The idea was actually not to have Canadian experts, but to have international experts. So there would be people who were defence experts, such as the number three in defence, Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, the Director for Strategic Affairs at the Ministry of Defence in France; John Hamre, who is the director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in the U.S.; or Mike Peters, who is the executive vice-president at the Council on Foreign Relations, but is also a former executive assistant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and was himself in combat in Iraq and Vietnam. That would be on the defence side.

Similarly, on development, it was people like Simon Maxwell, who is the head of the ODI, the Overseas Development Institute, in the U.K.; Eveline Herfkens, who is the former development minister from the Netherlands and is now responsible for implementing the millennium development goals, replying directly to Kofi Annan; and Nancy Birdsall, who I had mentioned, from the Center for Global Development.

What I tried to do in each case was to have people who would be some of the world's top experts in their specific area, whether it was development, defence, or diplomacy, and to ask those people, "With your global view of the world, did you, when looking at things that mattered over the last 15 years, see where Canada had made a difference?"

That was the approach. What it wasn't doing was asking people who would be experts in Canada what they thought Canada's role in the world was. I'd asked two or three, but the concern was that they, like we, would think in everything we were involved in, we made a difference.

Hon. Maurizio Bevilacqua: So these conversations take place, and they give their perspective. What's the common trend? If there was one thing that they had common ground on, what would it be?

Mr. Robert Greenhill: I think the common ground with everybody would have been that Canada has an opportunity to make a difference by leveraging the fact that we're seen as disinterested and engaged and have still a real moral authority as well as some real physical assets to back up the things we care about. In that sense, we'd be seen as unique.

This was, to me, one of the big surprises. You can always talk about the idea of us being disinterested, being engaged, but not being a great power, and so on, but what's interesting is that somebody took me through the G-8 and said, okay, let's look at the G-8 on a difficult international issue—for example, coming up with a new nuclear fuel cycle regime or something like that. You say, well, the United States is the most powerful country, but in many cases, any time it goes in, people think it has an agenda. So there are certain things it can't do with the perception of objectivity. For similar reasons, Britain and France have the same concerns.

Germany, Italy, and Japan tend not to be as engaged on many international issues as we are and tend not to have two elements we have that are actually very important: first, a real ability to craft effectively in both English and French; and secondly, being perceived as being close to the United States not only geographically, but historically in terms of how we can work together on specific files.

It was when I was actually in Europe talking to them about where Canada can make a difference that I became convinced that there are areas where we really can play a unique disinterested but engaged role. That's why the global think-tank issue is so important, and that's why in the whole area of responsibility to protect we were probably better able than any country to bring that together and make it happen and make it acceptable to people to look at.

• (1020)

The Chair: Go ahead.

Hon. Maurizio Bevilacqua: While you were talking to these individuals, did you ever find yourself in a position where perhaps you felt their assessment of Canada was not fair?

Mr. Robert Greenhill: Well, there are certainly people I have very strong disagreements with on a variety of issues, but take a specific issue, land mines, for example: was it a good thing or a bad thing? Well, half the people thought it was good, a quarter thought it was bad, and a quarter thought it was fine but actually useless. I have

a point of view on land mines, which is that actually it was a good thing, so I disagreed with half the people on that.

In terms of their perception of Canada and in terms of their description of us, I would say people's view of us is pretty consistent. We have a very clear and consistent international profile, and I didn't find myself disagreeing with it.

Even people who have recently been very critical of our policies have a great deal of hope and expectation that we can do good things in the future. I didn't come across anybody who was actually dismissive of our ability to make a difference. I came across some who were frustrated about our inability to make a real difference in the last few years, but I shared that frustration, so I didn't disagree.

Hon. Maurizio Bevilacqua: You did say they place us in the middle when it comes to engagement. You said that Italy, Germany, and France were not as engaged as Canada.

Mr. Robert Greenhill: No, I said Germany, Japan, and Italy.

Hon. Maurizio Bevilacqua: Sorry, I'll take France out of it.

That's interesting, because you're talking about the G-8 and you're talking about two countries already that are not as engaged as we are, yet we're being made to feel as if we're not engaged enough.

I'm going to tell you something. I'm not going to buy everything people say about our country as "the truth". I'm going to be challenging it throughout the process, because I'm not so certain people have a clear understanding of exactly the type of contribution we have made. One of our flaws as a country is that perhaps we are not as loud in telling people exactly what contribution we have made in world affairs.

Mr. Robert Greenhill: Well, I guess it depends on how you look at it. Have we made some contributions? Yes. Have we made enough of a contribution? No. Were we the first people to have international peacekeepers? Yes. Were we number 34 in UN peacekeeping operations? Yes. Have we been only contributing 2% of the west's contribution to international peacekeeping in the last few years? Yes. Have we declined from 0.5% to 0.25% of GDP devoted to development? Yes.

We are doing more than others, but we are not doing as much as we have done, and I don't think we're doing as much as we as Canadians would like to do. I don't know if that means we're agreeing, disagreeing, or violently agreeing on that part.

• (1025)

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Bevilacqua, just with respect to Germany, there's always a political interest for Germany to reach the 0.7%. The fact is, they're looking to get a permanent seat in the United Nations. That's a big interest for them, though given that point of view, it doesn't mean what they're doing is not good.

Mrs. McDonough.

Ms. Alexa McDonough: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'm going to try to fit in three quick questions. I'm most interested in what you have to say about them.

First, you cited the fact that Canadians wearing the maple leaf are more welcome and are better received in most parts of the world than are American GIs. I'm wondering if you would comment on the very obvious increasing pressure for us to become more closely and deeply integrated with the U.S.—economically, militarily, culturally, energy-wise, you name it—and whether that considerable asset of Canada being seen to be independent may start to wither internationally, and what the implications are.

Second, I wonder if you could comment on one of the Prime Minister's now-announced pet projects, which is Canada Corps. I was struck that Jeffrey Sachs, or it may have been James Wolfensohn, made the comment that it's the 0.7% that's needed and it's money that's needed, and yes, Canadian expertise is important, but don't send them people instead. People are worried about the possibility that in the absence of doing a lot of things we need to do, Canada Corps is being tossed out there as a token effort. I am wondering if you could comment on where that ought to fit.

Finally, and in some ways most important to the amount of frustration this committee is experiencing, it's seven months since we've had the agenda of this committee twisted and distorted while we wait and wait and wait for the international policy review. I wonder if you have any suggestions about how we ought to, at this point, deal with an international policy review if it comes.

I note that you and Jennifer Welsh have expressed mutual admiration for one another. I'm not asking if you have any secrets to divulge, but do you have any sense about where that is and what kind of a process you think should now happen if there is an international policy review forthcoming? And finally, to get a sense of your own relationship to that, have you had any direct input yourself into that international policy review to date? We don't know whether it's still sitting on the corner of the Prime Minister's desk or not. Maybe you could tell us.

Mr. Robert Greenhill: Okay, so you have four questions.

In terms of integration with the United States, I'm not afraid of the United States. The more one travels, the more one realizes there are elements of their approach to things that coincide with ours, not surprisingly. There are also areas where we have a very distinctive approach, which I think can be a very complementary approach. I actually think one of the positive things in the last 15 years, where we have made a difference, is that we've shown that you actually can have closer economic integration, such as through FTA and NAFTA, while preserving, or in some cases enhancing, your political independence. The decision on Iraq was seen by many as being a clear example, which actually one smaller developing country said was a real inspiration to other countries, not because they agreed or

disagreed on a specific issue, but because of the fact that we could do it.

That would be my sense of the approach towards the United States. I would say that it is pretty clear that our neighbourhood issues, such as how we have an effective border, should not contaminate the positions we take on issues outside of North America. They should be considered distinct. So we should do what's in our national interest in accordance with our values on both, distinctively.

Second, in terms of Canada Corps, the idea of engaging Canadians around the world I think is good for the world. I also think it's really good for Canadians. I actually don't know a lot about the details, but conceptually that is my thought.

In terms of suggestions for an approach, I think it would be a real shame if the international policy statement comes out, whenever it will be, and gets torn apart for purely partisan reasons, and we actually end up having even less coherence in our foreign policy than we did before. What would be great, in what will clearly be a season of heightened partisanship, would be if this committee is able to agree on the bedrock principles that go beyond party that everybody can say they agree on. There may be elements where we say this, this, and this we don't agree with and we want to have a good debate, but these areas we all agree on, and it would be wonderful if 0.7% were one of those areas on which all parties would agree. Elements of security might be another, but you would have a much greater sense of the mechanics of that than I would.

In terms of input, this came out originally in December or January. I provided input into the international policy review in the sense that I made sure that the folks who were running the review got a copy of it. Whether or not this or anything else that's being put into it will be reflected in what comes out, I guess we'll find out.

• (1030)

Ms. Alexa McDonough: Do you have any views on a process, once that report comes out, that you think would be constructive or not, in terms of dialogue with Canadians? I mean, there are great expectations out there about something that people wait and wait and wait for.

Mr. Robert Greenhill: I think what's clear is that you can't have an international policy strategy without an international policy debate, so as soon as it comes out it would be great to have it debated. I assume as part of that that elements will stand firm and elements will get changed and improved. It would also be wonderful if at the end, whatever the general elements are, they had as much non-partisan or cross-partisan support as possible. I don't have more detailed suggestions than that to make.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Greenhill.

Now we'll go for one question with Mr. McTeague, then Mr. Menzies after. You will have five minutes, Mr. Menzies.

Hon. Dan McTeague: Mr. Greenhill, I want to come back to the do good, feel good approach that some want to talk about in terms of what the future approaches to foreign policy should be. How do we continue to put so much emphasis on continental security and on hemispherical development?

You talked earlier about the questions of Haiti. You also mentioned in the context of Haiti that obviously there had been failure there. How would you see that Canada's long-term commitment to a country like Haiti or to border security might not become so all-encompassing that it would basically sap the resources of our ability to do things elsewhere around the world? It's a massive undertaking for a country to look after and come to the *secours* of another nation.

[Translation]

In my view, these problems will continue. Previously, in our exchange on the last issue, you said that there was a feeling of failure in our policies towards Haiti. Of course, the final outcome was not appreciated. I would like you to tell us what could have been done and what we should do in the long term without undermining our other obligations such as North American border security, for example.

[English]

Mr. Robert Greenhill: I guess there are two ways of looking at it. One is we spend about \$20 billion a year on our international engagement in development, defence, and diplomacy. So if we were to spend \$200 million a year in Haiti for the next 10 or 20 years—which is a lot—it would be about 1%. We'd have to decide, is it worth 1%?

I use the example of Haiti because it is connected to a continent in which so many good things have happened. If we compare the situation in the 1970s to the situation today in places like Brazil and other parts of Latin America and in Central America, we have made incredible progress. Haiti and Cuba are probably the two places that have not progressed.

Now, you know what? Canada is probably limited in what it could do in Cuba. There's probably a lot we could try to do in Haiti. At the end of the day, it's up to the people of Haiti, the people who are there, and the hundreds of thousands of skilled Haitians who have left because they saw no future for themselves or their families there. It's up to them to actually turn that country around. It's up to us to do all we can to help, and I would suggest it's an area where we are as well positioned as any country to really try to make a difference.

The Chair: Mr. Menzies, go ahead, please.

Mr. Ted Menzies (Macleod, CPC): Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you, Mr. Greenhill for your comments.

I would like to go back to your answer to Ms. McDonough, or your comments about non-partisanship when we're trying to achieve these goals. I might mention, and you may have seen the letter jointly signed by the leaders of the opposition committing the present opposition in this country to at some point achieving those goals. So hopefully within the next year you're going to see things change here, and we'll be able to be in the position where instead of going away from that 0.7%, we'll actually have the opportunity to head towards that and be able to achieve that.

I have some questions. Certainly we'd all like to have assurances that the money gets to where it's supposed to be, and I feel that there's a pretty strong public perception out there, a push-back, as to "Does my money get where it's supposed to be?" How do we overcome that? If it is a misconception or if it's true, how do we overcome that, and how do we physically make sure that the money doesn't get sidetracked and go to the wrong people for the wrong reasons? How do we guarantee that and how do we prove to taxpayers, whose money it is, that it is properly used?

• (1035)

Mr. Robert Greenhill: Well, that's fundamental, especially as it's pretty clear that in the past it was misused. Particularly during the period of the Cold War—which was "this is our guy", or for the other side, it was their guy—a lot of money went in without any kind of oversight. There was probably a lot of development money that had a destructive rather than a constructive effect.

In a sense, perceptions are a lag measure of performance. If you've been doing something a certain way and then you change today, well, you know what? Most people are going to remember what you were doing before, right? It's a little like that challenge here, but it's in a sense a good challenge, because it should make people very focused on that.

I guess there are three ways in which it can be done. Clearly if you look at places like Africa, there are huge variations in governance from a place like Ghana, which has gone from a dictatorship in the seventies under Rawlings to actually a pretty robust democracy at this point, to Zimbabwe, on the other extreme. Nigeria is somewhere in between.

So how does one do it? There are probably three ways. First, increasingly people are looking at measures of good governance as actually a key condition for aid assistance. The challenge account that the U.S. government put into place uses good government as a key criterion. That's one approach. So you actually reward people who are engaging in the right behaviours and you have some kind of an objective process to measure that.

Secondly, the Dutch probably spend twice as much on aid as we do, even though they're quite a smaller country. They probably spend 0.8% or 0.9% of GDP on aid today. They are a people who don't like to waste money. They're hard-nosed business folks. So you combine this and say, well, how in the world are they able to justify it? They also spend more on defence than we do and they have a difficult fiscal situation. So you have to believe they've been asking these same questions.

What they did was this. They worked closely with their Auditor General, who built the capacity to audit the projects and initiatives in the recipient countries. They actually built the Auditor General capacity in a Namibia, or in a Rwanda, or in a Tanzania, so those people themselves could do it. They took ownership of it. That way they knew there wasn't a Dutch guild that was being wasted. That's the kind of approach we could have.

The third element is also focused on what your outcomes are. I mentioned something called TEHIP, which is the Tanzania Essential Health Interventions Project. It was about a \$20-million project under IDRC and CIDA leadership. They went out and systematically identified in certain areas what the mortality rates were, what people were actually dying of, what the right interventions were in terms of training front-line health care workers to provide the right interventions in the right way. They tracked it. In one area they reduced the mortality rate by 43%, and in another place by 46%. They were able to actually link dollars to specific interventions. How many people were hired? How many dispensaries were set up? How many cases of malaria were dealt with? How many bed nets were distributed? How many kids didn't die as a result?

That would be the kind of thing we could do, because that was done in two or three areas in Tanzania for that \$20 million over five years. Basically the cost of that project is \$1 per capita. So for about \$30 million, you could extend that in the same kind of focused way, where you trace the money not only in terms of what it's being spent on, but in terms of the impact it's having on kids who aren't dying across Tanzania. That's the kind of thing that could be done today. That's the kind of rigorous approach a guy like Jeffrey Sachs and others have been contributing to international development.

So my sense would be that if Canadians were asking, if we're going to spend \$1 billion more, would that actually save lives and educate kids and actually improve the situations of Africans, we could say yes in a way that we couldn't have ten years ago.

• (1040)

The Chair: Okay.

Now we'll go to the last one with Monsieur Paquette.

[*Translation*]

Mr. Pierre Paquette: I'd like to put a very quick question to you. I was rather surprised to note that there was no discussion at all of civil society in your document. I worked for 15 years with the Confédération des syndicats nationaux. When travelling to Brazil, for example, I observed that there is a great deal of investment undertaken by the German, Italian and French unions. Attempts have been made to do this with CIDA but it appears to be far more difficult than for others.

When a German company arrives in Brazil, it is not perceived as a nasty imperialist but simply as the union undertaking to help us set up the single group of affiliated trade unions.

I'd like to know whether you think that Canada could make better use of the significant presence of Canadian and Quebec civil society throughout the world.

Mr. Robert Greenhill: Yes, of course.

One of the problems of this approach is that world experts in this matter tend to consider interactions among people from the point of view of state control. In my opinion, that is a significant shortcoming of this approach. In Africa and particularly in Latin America, it is not only civil society and non-governmental organizations but also cooperative organizations such as Investissement Desjardins that are already playing or are able to play an important role in a more committed and down-to-earth approach. It is clear that civil society does have an important role to play in development.

[*English*]

The Chair: Mr. Greenhill, thank you very much for appearing this morning. It was very interesting.

I have one final comment. An international policy statement will be coming out, and we're told it will be next Tuesday. They didn't tell me what year, but I really feel it's going to be this year. On behalf of my colleagues, the committee would be very interested in receiving your written comments on the mandate.

Thank you very much, once again.

[*Translation*]

Thank you for being with us this morning, Mr. Greenhill.

[*English*]

According to our rules, we have 15 minutes concerning motions. The next motion on the floor is from Ms. McDonough.

You have the floor, Ms. McDonough, concerning Eritrea and Ethiopia.

Ms. Alexa McDonough: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Very much in the spirit of all-party collaboration and cooperation in trying to figure out how we can take the original motion that I presented, which then resulted in Lloyd Axworthy coming before the committee and making some good suggestions, I tried to think about how we could get on with debating a more comprehensive motion and one that really took under advisement Dr. Axworthy's testimony.

What I did—just to remind all members—was circulate proposed clauses to be added to the existing motion, in advance of today's meeting. Procedurally—I certainly seek your direction on this—I would propose or ask for unanimous consent for the new clauses to be added, because there aren't changes to the existing motion. Procedurally I would ask if there could be unanimous consent to add those clauses. They've been circulated in advance. Then I propose that we debate that new comprehensive clause, which would be before us.

I did that so every committee member could have a chance to consider whether they felt it was a faithful and constructive response to Lloyd Axworthy's testimony, and so that we could move forward at this meeting. I would ask for unanimous consent for those clauses to be added. It doesn't imply that everybody is endorsing or adopting the clauses at this point. It simply adds them to the existing motion so that then becomes the motion we debate.

• (1045)

The Chair: Fine, I accept the way that you labelled it. I see the way you labelled it is the proper way. You need to get unanimous consent that all the members accept that you're adding some clauses. If there's no unanimous consent for you to do it, I need somebody else to do an amendment on your principal motion.

I ask the question. Does everyone accept the motion of Mrs. McDonough with the additional clauses for the sake of discussion?

Mr. Stockwell Day: I appreciate the difficulties of time that Ms. McDonough has faced. We have looked at these and we have no problem, speaking for the Conservatives, in adopting this unambiguously.

Hon. Dan McTeague: Mr. Chair, I recognize five of the six points that responded to our intervention in the subcommittee. They're there. The first one I have difficulty with: "Recognizes that Ethiopia's five-point peace plan proposal is a step in the right direction." The simple reason for that—I just want to alert Ms. McDonough—is the plan may be the only means of delaying the further process of demarcation to the boundary between Ethiopia and Eritrea, while giving the appearance of being positive without—

Ms. Alexa McDonough: I think you're debating the content.

Hon. Dan McTeague: No, I'm not debating it. I'm simply saying I want to signal that it is a concern from this side if you're asking for unanimous consent. This is an issue that I'm going to want to remove if we proceed with giving unanimous consent at this point. The short answer has to be explained in order to understand that there's a number of very significant steps here that I do support.

The Chair: Do you accept that they're added?

Hon. Dan McTeague: Yes, I do.

The Chair: That's what we wanted.

How about the Bloc? They agree.

Now the floor is yours. You can present your full motion, please.

Ms. Alexa McDonough: I would like to move the comprehensive motion that's now before us.

Our time is short. I think it's been a useful, constructive process. Certainly Dr. Axworthy's testimony added to our insights into what was happening, which of course is where the additional clauses came from. I would simply like to move the full motion, then, at this point, ask for support, and move to a debate on that comprehensive motion that now is before us.

I just want to reinforce this, because we don't have time to go all through the measures. The sense of urgency is evident. We have had a good many Ethiopian Canadians and Eritrean Canadians come before us to express desperation about the conditions there, which are really devastating for people, particularly with respect to the alarm about the amassing of armaments on both sides of the border. We do need to try to act with urgency and put forward a report to the government to ask that they step up to the plate and demonstrate some leadership, speaking directly to what is happening there.

The Chair: Are there any comments?

Monsieur Paquette.

[*Translation*]

Mr. Pierre Paquette: Mr. Chairman, first of all the French version is so badly worded that we are uncomfortable with it. Ms. Lalonde made some remarks to me from her bed. If we continue to work on this motion, I would like to have a new French version prepared. I also had understood Ms. McDonough to say the last time that we would have the opportunity to contribute to the wording of this motion.

Secondly, while I understand the urgency of the situation, before going any farther on this debate, we would like to hear from Ms. Carroll who is supposed to appear before the committee next Tuesday. In our view, the major issue involves the CIDA programs in Ethiopia. Our only weapon in bringing about a change in Ethiopia

is the fact that CIDA does have programs and that it has identified Ethiopia as a priority, whereas Eritrea does not receive any Canadian aid. It would in fact amount to a double standard. We would like Ms. Carroll to explain to us why CIDA has taken this approach. We could amend one of the paragraphs to clearly indicate that CIDA aid would be conditional on Ethiopia's response, particularly to the initiatives taken by the United Nations.

So the way in which the motion is drafted does create a serious difficulty for me.

Furthermore, I have reservations with respect to the first element that was added. But that is part of the debate. Good enough.

• (1050)

The Chair: The first answer is that Ms. Carroll will be appearing before the committee on May 10.

Mr. Pierre Paquette: On May 10?

The Chair: Yes, I asked our clerk. I also have some reservations on the way certain subjects are worded. That does not mean that I am not in agreement with the substance. I do agree on the substance.

Ms. McDonough, you are presenting the motion in its present form to the committee members. I would have preferred you to meet the members of each political party so that when we came to our meeting, we would be able to come to an agreement on the final wording acceptable to all the political parties.

[*English*]

I must also say the translation is just awful. Sometimes I don't see the relevance in the wording. It's totally opposite to the English version and it's misleading at times to our francophone colleagues.

Ms. Alexa McDonough: That's a concern for sure. Those who have far more expertise in the French language than I do are the ones to say so. In view of that—and I'm just trying to take under serious advisement the concerns raised—I think we can't deal with it today without having the French version improved or corrected.

Secondly, to delay any further discussion until the CIDA minister comes before the committee shows a terrible absence of any sense of urgency on our part. What I would like to do, in the spirit of trying to move this forward, is to suggest we set aside time after our next meeting to pick up on and further the discussion—that is, after the French version has been improved.

In the meantime, I'm very happy to speak and collaborate further with any members. If there's an appetite for us to have either a full committee discussion around that or a representative from each party meet briefly before our next meeting to try to move it forward, I'm happy to do that. Surely we are not so inept we can't figure out how to deal with this and move it forward.

The Chair: I will answer you like this. I think on the government side, on the ministerial side, they would agree to send you in writing, not the opposition text where they have some problems, maybe, with the wording itself... I think you should meet more than briefly. You could have an hour's discussion with a member of every party to try to focus and get a consensus at that time on a motion. I would prefer that. I heard you and members agree to perform in such a way.

Mr. Day.

Mr. Stockwell Day: I always bristle about being motivated by the tyranny of the urgent, but these items are urgent, and anything we can do to work with Ms. McDonough along the lines you suggest I think we want to do.

Related to that, and I won't disrupt the order here, I have a motion I would like to be considered, hopefully before 11 o'clock, for unanimous consent. If we don't get it, I understand. I do have it here in French.

It is related to the Ethiopian question. Their elections are coming up on May 15. There are serious human rights problems in Ethiopia and also concerns about the election. I am going to be asking for the government to send an electoral monitoring team of observers to Ethiopia.

I am just putting that on notice. It may come up today, if we have time. If not, I will send this around and ask for it to be dealt with at the next meeting.

Ms. Alexa McDonough: I am just scrambling to look at it. So this motion is on the order paper now.

If we can wrap up, if there is agreement.... I guess I am just looking for some nod or some indication whether there is agreement for a representative of each of the four parties to meet before our meeting on Tuesday—and I will take the responsibility to try to coordinate that, hoping it is not an impossible mission. I am certainly happy for us to move directly to deal with Mr. Day's proposal, if people consider it straightforward.

Am I seeing agreement?

•(1055)

The Chair: I am going to finish with you first.

Ms. Alexa McDonough: Okay. Is there somebody from each of the four parties willing to—

The Chair: You contact them, and I think you will see they will be willing.

Okay?That's fine.

Is there anything else? We have two minutes left.

Mr. Stockwell Day: Mr. Chairman, this is a straightforward, non-partisan item simply asking the government whether we could look at sending a monitoring team to Ethiopia to monitor the elections. I have it in English and in French.

[*Translation*]

I realize it is not perfect.

[*English*]

Anyway, I'm asking for that.

The Chair: First of all, Mr. Day, I have the motion, but your motion reads: That, in the opinion of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the government should send a monitoring team to Ethiopia to observe and report on the general elections to be held there on May 15, 2005, and that the Chair report the same to the House.

I must say that, internationally speaking, we cannot request to go to such another country. Any international observer or country observer or international association that goes to an election in such other country, or any country in the world, goes at the request of that country. If we do not have any request from Ethiopia, Canada cannot send a team over there to look at it.

It does not mean we should not engage in negotiations with the Ethiopian government to see if they would be willing, in a certain sense, that we send some observers. This way, I think it would be great; I agree with it. But because it is for May 15 and we will have a meeting next week, I want to be sure it's phrased in a certain way so that we could get the approval of the ministerial side.

For today we could postpone it, until next week, and rephrase it, if you agree.

Mr. Stockwell Day: Yes. I have put it on the record now. Yes, we'll look at rephrasing this. I'll work with the minister's office on it, too.

The Chair: Thank you.

The meeting is adjourned.

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