STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE AND VETERANS AFFAIRS

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE ET DES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Thursday, March 30, 2000

• 0900

[English]

The Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien (London—Fanshawe, Lib.)): I call to order today's meeting of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs.

Before we begin, I'll just recall for colleagues that there's a vote scheduled, with bells around 10.10 or 10.15 and the vote about 10.40 or so. Unfortunately we'll probably be interrupted, but 10.40 takes us almost to the end of our meeting anyway, so I'm sure we'll be getting in most of our questions—I hope—for you, Mr. Addy.

I want to welcome General Clive Addy, retired, Canadian Forces, to speak to us today as we again pick up our topic of overall RMA, specifically focusing on the missile defence system to a large extent.

Whichever you're going to address is fine—or both, and if that's the case, fine. That's just to give you the context. We're in RMA, and some witnesses are zeroing in on missile defence and others are not.

We're certainly happy to have your testimony today. Welcome, sir.

Major-General Clive Addy (Ret.) (National Chairman, Federation of Military and United Services Institutes of Canada): Thank you very kindly, Mr. Chairman. In fact, I will deal with RMA, but only as an amateur in it, as most of us are. In other words, what does that buzzword encompass and what are the limitations of it?

My purpose today, Mr. Chairman, was to talk to you today about what I have considered a concern amongst the Federation of Military and United Services Institutes of Canada, which I represent: that is, that Defence Strategy 2020 and the focus on RMA is a bit fuzzy and may lead to things that we may not wish upon us for the defence of our country.

I think, Mr. Chairman, that I circulated the paper a while ago, about two and a half weeks ago. I trust that some of you had a chance to glance through it. If you'll permit me, all I'll do is read the front end, and perhaps the RMA portion, which you'll find at page 6, and then I'll go straight to the conclusions, which deal more directly with the kinds of issues you might wish to question me upon. But I stress that my knowledge of in-depth technology as we progress is that of a generalist, not of a scientist or a technician. I also stress that what I'm looking at is the security of Canada as a whole and our participation in our alliances and various operations.

In view of the military institutes, the Canadian Forces are embarking upon a major organizational and doctrinal change with the document called Defence Strategy 2020, a strategy that diverges—and in my view, widely—from the strategic and militarily balanced underpinnings of government policy in the broadly supported 1994 defence white paper. The white paper resulted, in great part, from the excellent work of the 1994 parliamentary Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy.

The white paper was well regarded by the defence community. It was reviewed and found to be very sound by every Minister of National Defence since its release. This was in great measure because it directed the Canadian Forces to have a multipurpose combat capability that could generate forces for any contingency and operation up to and including a large conventional war.

It is my view that this multipurpose combat capability is being displaced or even abandoned in favour of a “narrow niche” military expeditionary capability focused at the low-to-medium scale of conflict, whose high-tech costs risk dwarfing our forces and will not meet our national needs. There are many factors that recommend a new high-tech military to the senior departmental leadership. There are serious defects within Defence Strategy 2020 that must be considered prior to embarking on a new course and that may not justify abandoning the general tenets of the defence white paper.

That is my thesis.

Following this, I do a little study of what has happened since the white paper was published, which I believe is a bit familiar to all of you. So for the translators, and if you'll follow me, I'm on page 6.

• 0905

It's clear that the continued funding problem and the partial implementation of the white paper has had a pronounced impact on Defence Planning Guidance 2000 and Defence Strategy 2020. This impact borders on desperation, brought about by continued fiscal flagellation of DND leaders. Defence Planning Guidance 2000, a departmental document, not a government policy document, focused on funding the first five years of Strategy 2020, and states, “Defence as a share of Gross Domestic Product will continue to hold just above the 1% threshold.”

Furthermore, it goes on to say:

Continuation of the current budget apportionment between personnel, operations and maintenance, would result in a declining capital budget and leave little room to re-equip and modernize the Canadian Forces.

The vice-chief group document further states that:

...personnel costs are consuming an increased portion of the defence budget, largely at the expense of capital.

The tone of Defence Planning Guidance 2000 is very clear. Without significant additional funds, the Canadian Forces will be forced to make further personnel reductions and will face “rust-out”. The problem is that the Canadian Forces were already reduced to 60,000 from the recommended 67,000 in 1994. The white paper policy does reflect 60,000. Many experts still believe that the 66,700 recommended in the 1994 presentation is indeed still the baseline.

As far as defence strategy is concerned, I'll skip, if you will, Mr. Chairman, to page 8.

There are certain areas of concern. The first area of concern I would like to underline is that if you follow all of the technology recommendations, coming primarily from the United States.... There are very few armed forces, including those of the United States, that could afford all of these benefits or all of these uses.

Secondly, in the study that was conducted by Dr. Treddenick, which I've cited in this, you will note that to spend more money on capital and to integrate the RMA recommendations, which he thought were fine, would imply either an increase to our budget or a serious decrease to our forces. The figures used in his treatise were from reducing our forces anywhere from 60,000 to 29,000—quite significant and quite focused.

It's obvious that no country of NATO, particularly not Canada, can afford all of the RMA. The task here will be this: What does it mean? What are those elements that are vital to us and how do we choose?

The areas of concern in my paper are the ones I will read to you now. The senior leadership of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces appear to have decided to go along for the ride, but there are many factors that must be considered before the trip along the RMA route takes place.

First, there is a concern with the strategic assessment used to base Defence Strategy 2020 and the vice-chief's guidance upon. My view is that it may be too benign. Secondly, there are foreign policy considerations with regard to Defence Strategy 2020. Third, there are costs associated with the RMA that may make it too expensive for Canada. Lastly, there are serious operational implications in adopting a force relying too heavily upon RMA.

The strategic assessment, produced as part of defence strategy, provided a very optimistic strategic outlook as to the potential challenges that Canada would face in the first 20 years of the 21st century. Defence Strategy 2020 hinges its entire analysis on the fact that the United States will remain the dominant military power for the foreseeable future. It states that ethnic unrest, religion, economic disparity, and the depletion of strategic resources would remain threats to regional stability and would lead to more humanitarian intervention missions, such as those operations conducted in the Balkans, in East Timor, and in Africa. With our Prime Minister's visit to Israel and his public promise to help with any UN forces that may be required, it is something else that is coming to fruition.

Furthermore, it stated that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems would continue as a threat to global harmony and it stressed the importance of high technology and the revolution in military affairs.

Defence Strategy 2020 also stressed that cyber- and bio-terrorism threats and many other asymmetric, non-conventional military attacks, usually directed at economic targets, were rising phenomena that threatened Canada's interests in the future.

• 0910

Lastly, because of the United States' stature as the world's foremost military power, Canada would have at least five years' warning prior to the emergence of any significant conventional military threat on the international scene. This view was upheld by the Vice-Chief of Defence Staff when he said:

There is no direct, immediate, conventional military threat to Canada and the risk of global conflict which could give rise to such a threat is very low.

The Conference of Defence Associations released its own strategic assessment this year, and in that assessment it defined the world as somewhat less benign. Like Defence Strategy 2020, it also stated that the United States was the world's dominant military power and that would not likely change. The CDA assessment also stated that there would be an increased risk of peace enforcement operations due to the breakdown of nation states, listing the same phenomena as the departmental assessments. Furthermore, CDA pointed once again to the emergence of asymmetric threats to Canadian security.

Where CDA differed largely from the Department of National Defence strategic assessment is on the likelihood of serious conventional military conflict. The CDA executive summary states that future world security will revolve around the interests of major players, such as the United States, a recovered Russia, China, Japan, India, and perhaps a united Europe. Any number of possibilities exist for conflict within this group. Thus the CDA assessment did not discount the possibility of major war or interstate conflict, as the departmental assessment does. Where the threat environment within Canadian jurisdiction might be relatively benign, the threat environment outside of Canada remains high, according to the CDA.

Both the departmental document and the CDA assessment were compiled by recognized authorities in the defence community. The DND assessments were more benign and the CDA assessments more hard-hitting.

In the last year we have seen a great number of threats and areas of instability, such as the Balkans and Kosovo. We have seen a phased air war campaign and the employment of naval and ground forces on a lesser scale than demanded by the white paper, yet on a scale we are admittedly unable to sustain. Who would have predicted that Kosovo could have developed so quickly into a major regional war? We have seen a joint force deployment to East Timor with the Australians. Russia is in a ground war with Chechnya. India and Pakistan have fought a battle over Kashmir yet again, which threatened to become a major regional war. China is at odds with Taiwan over President Lee's call for state-to-state relations. No one has a crystal ball. As recently as in the last six months, there have been changes in policy and the doubling of the defence budget in Russia. Although these are not direct threats, they are indicators of what is going on in the various countries around the world. It's benign, but not quite that benign.

What is not in dispute is that globalization has led to a Canada and Canadians engaged in business throughout the world. Canada is a member of NATO; the Canada-U.S. defence agreement, of which NORAD is its component; the United Nations; and the G-8, and as such cannot isolate itself from the rest of the world.

For those of you who are following along or are translating, I'd like to take you to page 15 and get to the conclusion.

The Federation of Military and United Services Institutes of Canada believes that the basic tenets of the 1994 white paper are still applicable today. Canada must structure and equip the Canadian Forces for the most probable types of operations they will face. The Canadian Forces must be joint, credible, modern, flexible, and, I underline, sustainable. Canada must not deploy things it cannot sustain. We must be able to project power and influence abroad with our allies. The Canadian Forces must be interoperable with our allies, and that implies coalition operations with the United States and other like-minded nations.

There must be an RMA component—and I underline that—to our medium-sized military, but it must not dominate the entire force structure or compromise the present policy of Canada, the 1994 white paper, without a thorough public and national review. We must retain the potential to fight a war.

• 0915

As Major-General Lewis MacKenzie said in respect of our approach to committing our troops to UN operations, we are constantly structuring for the best case and hoping nothing goes wrong.

Strategy 2020 is another dangerous example of the same disease, but on a grander scale. Canada must have the potential to respond and expand if the benign strategic assessment proves false. Canada must rely upon, fund, and nurture an effective reserve force as a basis for mobilization in the event of a major disaster or a war.

The Canadian Forces need the capability to expand, in order to engage in conflict at the higher end of the scale of combat, beyond the two battle group or battalion group or brigade levels that we find already impossible to sustain. To have such a structure the Canadian Forces need an immediate infusion of additional funds and the base level of at least $900 million a year, and you know that from the February 28 budget, which followed my paper, we got about 50% of this.

Most importantly, the Canadian Forces must not decline below the current regular force personnel ceiling of 60,000 soldiers, sailors, and air crew. In addition it is my view that the Canadian Forces should rethink, increase, and fund its reserve capability beyond the levels foreseen in the white paper and should do so in all services.

I conclude by defining Strategy 2020 as a one-spot, one-shot armed forces; in other words, deployable rapidly, of limited size, and with little sustainability. I say a one-spot, one-shot armed forces is not the defence policy we need for Canada in the 21st century.

Mr. Chairman, you've changed.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.): Yes, there has been a transformation.

MGen Clive Addy: Mr. Chairman, that concludes my official testimony. I've left the papers. I'm open to questions on any part of that document. If you would like an explanation on anything else, I'm certainly open to any other questions.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Pratt): Thank you for your testimony, Major-General Addy.

We'll have rounds of questioning from both sides of the committee here, starting with Mr. Laurin for seven minutes.

[Translation]

Mr. René Laurin (Joliette, BQ): Mr. Chairman, I'd like General Addy to give me more specific information on the institution he represents, the Federation of Military and United Services Institutes of Canada. What is the role of this federation?

MGen Clive Addy: This federation groups 29 institutions established in Canada, two of which are in Quebec, one in Montreal and the other in Quebec City.

Mr. René Laurin: Which ones are they?

MGen Clive Addy: The Institut militaire de Québec and the Institut militaire de Montréal. As you know the members of the Institut militaire de Québec meet at the Citadelle. Our federation numbers some 9,000 officers retired from the Canadian Forces and members of the RCMP.

Mr. René Laurin: Fine. Are those members all retirees?

MGen Clive Addy: Most of them are. In some institutes, like the Quebec City one, many members of the regular forces go to the meetings and presentations that are given there from time to time.

Mr. René Laurin: Is this more than a social club?

MGen Clive Addy: It is mostly a social club, although this federation does pursue another very specific goal which is to make the population aware of Canada's safety and ensure the well-being of the Canadian Forces. Is that okay?

Mr. René Laurin: Yes, thank you. My other question is more technical and has to do with your presentation. You said that the Canadian army did not have the indirect fire armament or the long- range artillery needed to support land forces. What do you mean by indirect fire armament?

MGen Clive Addy: These are canon and other artillery pieces.

Mr. René Laurin: When you use artillery canon, don't you fire directly on the enemy? Is that what you actually said?

MGen Clive Addy: No.

Mr. René Laurin: What does indirect fire mean?

MGen Clive Addy: When you engage in direct fire, the shell moves along a line parallel to the ground, whereas when you use indirect fire, the trajectory is non-linear.

Mr. René Laurin: That doesn't mean that you shoot a canon round without having any specific target?

MGen Clive Addy: Oh no, no. I do hope we're not in that habit, Mr. Laurin.

Mr. René Laurin: You know, I'm not a military person and I'm not familiar with indirect fire.

MGen Clive Addy: No, that's what that means.

Mr. René Laurin: I was wondering if, upon sighting the enemy, you just send a shot off to his side to scare him.

MGen Clive Addy: No, no. For example, you can camouflage a canon in a spot that is not visible from where the target is and then shoot on that target indirectly.

Mr. René Laurin: Fine. Thank you for this information.

MGen Clive Addy: It was a pleasure.

• 0920

Mr. René Laurin: I hope my ignorance didn't leave you with a bad impression.

MGen Clive Addy: Not at all.

Mr. René Laurin: In your brief, you indicate that the fundamental principles in the White Paper on Defence are still valid today.

MGen Clive Addy: Yes.

Mr. René Laurin: On the other hand, you say that the Canadian army doesn't have what it takes to respond to the White Paper principles.

MGen Clive Addy: Yes.

Mr. René Laurin: So, one of two things: either we re-examine the White Paper principles to determine if we're going to maintain them, either we give the army the means necessary to attain the objectives set out in the White Paper.

MGen Clive Addy: That's exactly my thesis, Mr. Laurin.

Mr. René Laurin: You have given us a few examples of promises made in the White Paper that weren't always kept, for example, replacing the Sea Kings with new helicopters. You also said that the TRUMP destroyers should be replaced within the next decade as well as multirole support ships.

Taking into account the evolution and revolution in...

MGen Clive Addy: In military affairs.

Mr. René Laurin: ... military affairs, should we continue standing on principle and saying that as we don't make war the same way it was made 10 or 20 years ago, then we'll just stay in this position and maintain principles which are perhaps dated? Those principles were perhaps valid when they were set down, but if we don't make war the same way anymore, should we stick to them or shouldn't we review our position?

MGen Clive Addy: That is a very good question, Mr. Laurin. My institute and I believe that the 1994 White Paper principles are still valid and if there has to be a debate, well then, let's have it. We shouldn't decide to change everything in the Canadian Forces orientation based simply on a document coming from the department without having had a debate on military policy. Do you understand this point of view fully?

Mr. René Laurin: Yes.

MGen Clive Addy: Once the debate will have taken place on military policy, I hope—may God hear me—that we'll allocate whatever funds are necessary to implement this military policy. At the present time, we have a military policy without the necessary funds. The department is looking for another orientation on its own based on present-day principles, in the absence of a policy endorsed by Parliament.

Mr. René Laurin: In its 1994 White Paper, the government was saying that Canada should be ready to make war against the best and alongside the best.

MGen Clive Addy: Yes.

Mr. René Laurin: It had been established that some 60,000 to 70,000 soldiers were needed and, at some point, we even had almost 100,000 soldiers.

If you don't need that many people anymore because war is waged using more modern means like lasers or guided missiles, shouldn't we bite the bullet and decide that tomorrow morning, the army shouldn't have 60,000 men but maybe only 30,000?

MGen Clive Addy: Mr. Laurin, I absolutely agree if any analysis actually shows this thesis is the right one. But this analysis also must be done at the national level. If we were to compare our present security program to that of the other NATO countries, the amounts we put into this as well as the number of people in regular and reserve forces, maybe we might decide that we could decrease our numbers and have an absolutely perfect element that could do just about nothing and would have no influence. That's the trend that I'm sort of questioning.

Sixty thousand troops is not an enormous number. When we compare our staffing numbers and expenditures in matters of defence and what the other democratic countries who are part of the G-8 put into it, can we say we're actually doing our share, Mr. Laurin? Sixty thousand soldiers is a minimum. It's even lower than the minimum we tried to define in 1964, which was 67,000 troops. We examined the Defence budget based solely on a budget and in the absence of any principles. We gave the Department of Defence the task of ensuring Canada's security and it did its best. I am not criticizing the military people attempting to define what they can do within the limits of the budget they're granted, but I am emphasizing the importance of reorienting our defence policy. There must absolutely be a debate on this reorientation of our defence policy. What does Canada wants its military to do to ensure its security? The debate hasn't changed at that level.

• 0925

Mr. René Laurin: General, we can compare that to the European identity of security and defence. They are thinking of setting up an army of some 60,000 troops for all the countries of the European Union.

MGen Clive Addy: Yes.

Mr. René Laurin: While...

MGen Clive Addy: And we are talking about reserve forces of how many people, Mr. Laurin?

Mr. René Laurin: I don't remember very well. In any case, I don't even know if there is any talk of reserve for the European Union.

MGen Clive Addy: Yes.

Mr. René Laurin: However, I do know they are talking about 60,000 combat-ready troops.

MGen Clive Addy: Yes.

Mr. René Laurin: They'd be ready to move to different theatres of war. Canada alone would have the same 60,000 troops plus a reserve force.

MGen Clive Addy: I would dare point out, Mr. Laurin, that they are ready to set up a deployable force of 60,000 troops.

Mr. René Laurin: Yes.

MGen Clive Addy: All we have is a deployable battalion.

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Pratt): Mr. Laurin, unfortunately I'm going to have to cut you off there. You're already a minute and some over your time.

Mr. Earle, do you have any questions?

[Translation]

Mr. René Laurin: I will be back on the second round.

[English]

Mr. Gordon Earle (Halifax West, NDP): Yes.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Pratt): Go ahead.

Mr. Gordon Earle: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

You mentioned the United States being one of the dominant powers and you also touched upon the importance of our military maintaining its international relations and cooperation with other countries. Given that the United States is the main leader in the RMA, and our major ally, what sorts of cooperative arrangements do you see in terms of our military and the military of the U.S.? I'm thinking here specifically of the national missile defence system that's being worked on by the United States. Perhaps you might offer some comment.

MGen Clive Addy: I have to admit first, if I might sir, that I am an armoured corps officer and I was very frightened of missiles during my whole career. If you're talking of national missile defence, you had, I believe, as a witness here a while ago General George Macdonald, a personal friend and the deputy commander of NORAD. I've read all of his documents and I've read the CINC NORAD's documents as well.

I think, if you look at our white paper or any other document, the defence of our own country is the most important step we must think about in security, and NORAD is an integral part in the defence of that country. And the evolution of NORAD, just as the evolution of the army or the navy, must be taken into account.

There is an international political implication to the ballistic missile defence system that must be resolved by Canada, and that is whether ballistic missile defence violates the arms treaty with the Soviet Union, whether negotiations would go well, etc. But in effect, the bottom line is that we must take our fair share of NORAD if we are going to be a credible ally, otherwise we must protect our sovereignty within Canada.

I think it's an important element, to respond to your specific question. Otherwise, we have historical background of some of the things that happened during the Cuban crisis. I'm not sure you'd want that to happen again, as a Canadian—no control over the missiles and weapons that are flying over your personal country.

Mr. Gordon Earle: Right. You also mentioned that you felt there should be a component of RMA within our—

MGen Clive Addy: I'm not a proponent of going back to sticks and charging with horses.

Mr. Gordon Earle: Right, but you also mention that you felt it should not dominate our military strategy.

MGen Clive Addy: I did indeed.

Mr. George Earle: How do you draw the line in terms of that domination, particularly if we sometimes automatically support what the larger power—the U.S.—is doing? If they're calling the shots, how can we control our level of RMA?

MGen Clive Addy: I think, if I read very carefully what General Macdonald said, there are certain elements that are not defined yet. We have to renew our NORAD commitment in, I believe, May 2001, and we have to give them 12 months' notice. My watch says we have a very short time to make up our minds to do this.

What does it mean? What is the implication of ballistic missile defence in this case? I think Canada should take part in examining it and should have a mortgage on it as to its impact on international relations with the Soviet Union.

• 0930

I mentioned the aspect of the Soviet Union. You should know that the Russian budget has just doubled, they have service in high schools for all of their citizens across the country—and all of this within the last six months. And Mr. Putin, with the support of the military, has just been elected.

So it's not going to be an easy thing. If you wanted a “we'll do this” answer from a retired tanker, I'm afraid you're not going to get it. But I'm aware of the difficulties.

I guess the bottom line is we must be part of the defence of our part of the northern continent with the Americans. We can't turn a blind eye and pretend we're good guys and we won't take part in any of that, because there are still risks. You may believe in them or more less, but there are still risks, and we must be part of it.

Mr. Gordon Earle: You mentioned also the importance of the reserves and the idea of funding and nurturing an effective reserve force as a basis for national mobilization. I noted just recently that there was some news about cutting back on a number of militia units in existence, and I was wondering what your thoughts are on that. I was thinking particularly of the Halifax Rifles from my area. I know they made a pitch to try to become re-established, but that was pretty much turned down. It seems that rather than establishing units, we are cutting back on them.

So what are your thoughts on that in terms of—

MGen Clive Addy: I might start on a personal note. General Ned Amey is one of my constant beraters...to go to the archives and find out about the Halifax Rifles.

More seriously, to turn to my thoughts on the reserves, part of my major concern about Strategy 2020 is that it is all upfront armed forces in being. If you read and scratch the paper behind that, there is very little reference to the reserves other than what we call augmentation, which is man-for-man replacement.

If you look at what the state of the reserves is today, I can in a nutshell tell you that—I'll take the militia, for instance—they should have a strength of 18,000 and they can recruit only 11,000. They can get only 11,000 in there. Why? What's the big problem? Well, it's not an attractive business when you're not funded and you don't have the equipment in the armouries.

Is reorganization of all of this important? I think it is. I think it is very important. But I think there is a fundamental principle here that we should know, and that is what is the role of those reserves? Let's make sure it is beyond just providing man for man to operations like East Timor and Kosovo. What is that role? Let's be clear about it.

Secondly, if you do restructure, and cancel a regiment with 100 years or more of history, and you say, “You no longer exist because we are going to form this other unit”, make sure this other unit you form is equipped, manned, trained, and encouraged, and that it's given the resources to do so. What you don't want is a smaller version of what you have today, because it is useless.

At the same time, you'll see in 2020 that they're counting on a reserve they are not sustaining to augment themselves. Looking down the future, this is something that's going to destroy itself. It doesn't make sense.

So those are my criticisms and my opinions. I think there should be a larger reserve as the requirement for regular force diminishes. I think there should be.

Mr. Gordon Earle: And finally...do I have one minute?

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Pratt): Mr. Earle, that's it for you, unfortunately.

Mr. Gordon Earle: Okay, thank you.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Pratt): Mr. O'Reilly.

Mr. John O'Reilly (Haliburton—Victoria—Brock, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you very much, Major-General Addy, for coming here again today. It's always good to hear your opinion.

Mr. Earle, the Halifax Rifles were disbanded along with 80 other units in about 1954, one of which was mine, and I'm not asking for my 45th Medium to be re-established. So you're going to have a tough time with that, because there are about 80 other people in line who want to get into that. This is a side thing.

Major-General Addy, do you think the Airborne should be re-formed?

MGen Clive Addy: It depends what kind of capabilities we want. If you want an honest opinion, I do not believe it should have been struck down, if that's what you're trying to get at.

Mr. John O'Reilly: No, I agree with you—

MGen Clive Addy: If there is a requirement for a light unit of that type, I do believe that one should be formed.

Mr. John O'Reilly: I thought the disbanding of the Airborne was a mistake in my own mind—

MGen Clive Addy: Yes.

Mr. John O'Reilly: —because it had that rapid capability and was able to handle it.

But I have some problems with your talking about replacing the Leopard tank. I realize you're a tank person, so I have to be careful, as an artillery person—

MGen Clive Addy: No, don't, please don't.

Mr. John O'Reilly: —but when we looked back on the Gulf War and we saw the fields and deserts littered with tanks that have absolutely no defence against the AWACS, the smart missiles, the satellite types of communications. In going to Cheyenne Mountain in Colorado Springs, I found that the whole U.S. protection and attack is based on satellite, not on ground observation or not even on their AWACS any more. I think their theme is more “in your face from outer space” in what they deal with.

• 0935

So I wonder why you would think we need tanks. To start with, I think tanks were held back in the recent conflicts because they're just sitting targets for anything that flies. Maybe in the Second World War tanks played a major role, but I don't see how they would play a role now in the type of warfare being fought, which brings us to RMA and the restructuring.

Also, you indicate that we've lost our capacity to refuel in the air and that there are no airlift capabilities. I wonder if you have you ever been to Colorado Springs—

MGen Clive Addy: Yes, I have.

Mr. John O'Reilly: —and gone to Cheyenne Mountain.

MGen Clive Addy: Yes, I have.

Mr. John O'Reilly: I wonder how you can think that tanks would play any role in warfare.

Anyway, I'll let you answer some of those. Those are my concerns after visiting there.

MGen Clive Addy: May I start by saying that I would always like to be on the winning side.

Mr. John O'Reilly: Yes.

MGen Clive Addy: And when I'm on the winning side—

Mr. John O'Reilly: No problem with that.

MGen Clive Addy: —tanks are extremely useful.

Take the Russians that are now going to Chechnya: like it or not, they are using tanks. On that same thing in Kosovo, if I might take you to that point rather than the Gulf, which is a very flat piece of ground, extremely well chosen—any armour theoretician would loved to have been there—there were tanks on both sides, those tanks that didn't have the protection of air defence that they require and those tanks that did, and they also took a major part in the rapid war and victory in the Gulf War.

Mr. John O'Reilly: That's the difference between fighting with the United States and being on their side.

MGen Clive Addy: Yes. I started off by saying that I always like to be on the winning side, but when you're on the winning side you'd better come to the party with the equipment required to do all of the job. “All of the job” also includes victory on the ground, and tanks are part of the victory on the ground.

But, Mr. O'Reilly, let me stop. The tank is a mechanism. I am not wedded to the tank. The tank is a protected piece of firepower that provides direct firing support to infantry. That's what a tank is. If we can find and devise, in the RMA, a better way to do that 24 hours a day, then I will be the first one to buy one, but at the present time there is no other way to do that. Until we can find something to replace that capability, there is still the requirement for the tank on the battlefield. The attack helicopter does part of it and new anti-tank weapons do part of it, but at this stage nothing does the same thing.

There's a story that people will tell you. We sent tanks to Kosovo and had our reconnaissance vehicles there and they were going through the roads. One of the nice things about reconnaissance vehicles is that they are silent and have no impact. But when a tank rolled down the road doing the same job, everybody calmed down. I don't know why that is. Do you?

Mr. John O'Reilly: I've never been run over by a tank, so I'll have to—

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

Mr. John O'Reilly: In the artillery, we just blew them up, so it didn't make any difference.

But anyway, it depends on who you're fighting and on what the purpose of it is.

MGen Clive Addy: Absolutely.

Mr. John O'Reilly: If we're aligned with the United States as part of the peacekeeping component, not the attack component, then I don't see that we need tanks, because the United States has—

MGen Clive Addy: But sir, if I may be so bold, I will say that when these things occur, sometimes you don't have the choice as to what side you must be on and what you contribute to. When you contribute to an alliance and you're a member, you're paying as a member of that alliance and you take part in that alliance. You have judgment, of course, as to whether you take part in the conflict. But to say “I'm just going in for the peacekeeping of that part once you guys are finished”.... We are part of the group called NATO.

Mr. John O'Reilly: But I don't see that Canada has any capacity to send tanks overseas—

MGen Clive Addy: Oh?

Mr. John O'Reilly: —so therefore we're talking about something that, to me, is rooted in the Second World War philosophy of the value of Canada having tanks. That's my thrust: what would we do with them if we had them, other than train?

• 0940

MGen Clive Addy: Well, if we have tanks, and we have some—we have very few—what we have with tanks now, the improved tanks, is that we maintain the professional skill to be able to take part, if needed, in conventional war or in what they call “interstate conflict” with our allies. That skill must be maintained. It's not required day to day, necessarily, but you can't tell me nor can I tell you when next it will be. Therefore, that skill must be maintained. The protection of the infantry on the ground, the direct fire support in relation to the threat of the enemy, must be maintained as a capability of our land forces. The tank provides that.

Mr. John O'Reilly: I see—

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Pratt): Excuse me, Mr. O'Reilly. I'll have to cut you off there. You're over your time.

We'll go back to the opposition now, with Mr. Laurin.

[Translation]

Mr. René Laurin: Major-General, I would like to get back to what I was raising in my questions before. According to just about all modern documents, we are told that tomorrow's war will be a war of information. War will be waged based on information, the soldiers will be better informed, informatics will be used as well as guided weaponry and missiles. Today, you can aim for the fifth- floor window of a building some thousands of kilometres away. So we need fewer soldiers. We are more inclined to think that today, we need soldiers more for peacekeeping missions, in fewer numbers, but also to ensure the country's security within its own borders, for disasters like the Ice Storm, floods, and so on.

So, as fewer people are needed and taking into account also that new modern weaponry costs way more than whatever we may pay our soldiers, can Canada actually afford this equipment to continue to support the stronger nations and fight against stronger nations? All that equipment is very expensive. Do you think that Canada can afford it?

MGen Clive Addy: I will answer your question by commenting on your basic premise, if you don't mind, Mr. Laurin. First, about this matter of numbers of people and technology, I would say that in effect, when everything is fine, we have the technology needed not only to aim at a window, but also to hit a given room in whatever neighbourhood we choose. On the other hand, it does not work all the time. I can quote you an article from Maclean's where they say that when there is cloud cover, like in Kosovo, the pilots and the missiles just could not penetrate the cloud cover and so on. So there are always some limits. Yes, the equipment is expensive and if we want to take our country's security seriously, we must have the funds we need both for the equipment and the personnel. What concerns me is your premise that we presently have lots of personnel and that by saving money by reducing personnel, we would have a better army or a more modern army, more effective, more this, that, the other thing.

My premise is this: we have already reached the minimum required to ensure peacekeeping and maintain security within our own borders. We can't decrease the number of people now. That is my premise. If you want proof of that, just take what the Chief of National Defence said when he was here; that was on November 24, I believe. He told you clearly, at that time, that he thought our limit has been reached.

Now, let's look at the troops deployed at that time: 4,000 people: not 60,000, but 4,000. We were stretched to the limit. And now, with the threats we see coming in the years ahead, we'll possibly need more than that if we take the present state of the world into account just to ensure peacekeeping. So I'm telling you that my premise is that all we have is a minimum of troops. We'll determine what part of the defence program they'll be assigned to or what arms they'll use and what army corps they'll belong to. That is justifiable.

• 0945

The other aspect is that it is going to be expensive for us to equip people with modern technology and give our armed forces the required modern armament and equipment. That's my thesis, my answer.

Mr. René Laurin: Major-General, when you talk about ensuring this country's security, what are you thinking about precisely? Are you thinking of attacks that could come from abroad or national disasters?

MGen Clive Addy: I'm referring to two aspects. First, our history teaches us that we've been very lucky here, in Canada. We made war and our major wars were in other countries. I hope it will be the same in the future. But we still participated in those wars and the risks are still there. We may well have to participate in conflicts between States again. I think that possibility still exists. There are a lot of people who, like the ones in 1930, thought there would be no more wars. I don't think human nature is as benevolent as is thought in that philosophy. That's my first premise.

My second is that within Canada there are threats. The threats are not as major as a global attack against our territory, but they come from non-conforming States, what the Americans call “rogue State” such as Korea with its missiles. That's a possibility. There's also the possibility of being under attack with other kinds of missiles or from other kinds of threats. There are still huge nuclear powers in this world.

Mr. René Laurin: Do you share the opinion...

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Pratt): Your time has expired. You're well over your five minutes. I'm going to have to go to Mr. Proud.

Mr. George Proud (Hillsborough, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Addy, it's good to see you again and have you back with us.

Do you think, for instance, that Canada should be placing more emphasis on Canada-U.S. cooperation and probably, if we have to, less on Canada-NATO cooperation?

MGen Clive Addy: Canada indeed has more in common with the U.S. Canada, for a long time, I think.... Correct me if I'm wrong, but I think that in about 1988 we started having more trade across the Pacific Ocean than we did across the Atlantic Ocean, and our greatest trading partner is the United States. So it would behoove us to put more emphasis, I would suggest, on our relationship with the United States. But it's a bit the relationship of a mouse with a bear, if I might say so, and our relationship to NATO is beneficial to us because that gives us another forum for a second opinion. Therefore I would never, ever belittle our relationships with NATO. They're vital.

Does that answer your question, sir?

Mr. George Proud: Yes, that's fine.

It seems apparent that the Americans are becoming increasingly annoyed with Canada's low level of military spending. Do you think this recent influx of money into the budget will change their opinion on this to some degree?

MGen Clive Addy: I really wish it would. I think the amounts it represents.... The measuring tool, sir, of relationships and contributions of modern countries is based on percentage of GDP. I would suggest that the amounts of moneys that were put into the budget in relation to a growing GDP are keeping us at about 1.1% of GDP. As I recall, your own motion from this particular committee was to increase that to a higher level.

Mr. George Proud: Yes.

MGen Clive Addy: I don't think the amounts of money given over the next five years are going to do that. I'm not an accountant, but I believe it's not very much in relation to GDP. That is the measure used by other NATO countries and it is the measure used by the United States to evaluate whether you're doing your fair share.

Mr. George Proud: To what extent, then, do you think this will affect the possibility of future joint RMA activities between us and the United States?

MGen Clive Addy: I guess that's the crux of what I'm talking about, isn't it? In order to do that, we may end up sacrificing a whole bunch of personnel just so we can have a very small piece of a pie to maintain influence with the United States.

And at what expense? I would say that it will be our inability to go beyond what they call levels one and two of mobilization. That's what we'll be sacrificing.

Mr. George Proud: May I ask you a question on NMD?

MGen Clive Addy: By all means.

Mr. George Proud: The report of the commission to assess the ballistic missile threat to the United States concluded that there are concerted efforts by a number of overtly or potentially hostile nations to acquire ballistic missiles with biological or nuclear payloads, and that this poses a growing threat to the United States, its deployed forces, and its friends and allies. This is a great concern to many people. Do you think the threat is real?

• 0950

MGen Clive Addy: I am not knowledgeable enough to say how real it is, but I do think it is a concern, and I think it's a major concern. I think there are rogue states. I think our closest one is North Korea. I think it is a rogue state. If it treats its people like that and it does have the wherewithal, what would it take to make it do these kinds of things? I think there is that potential. If we have nothing and it hits the city of Vancouver, just think of what that would do.

How much are they asking us to invest, and what could we do about it? I think we should think about what we could do about it. In terms of whether NATO missile defence is the only thing we can do about it, I doubt it. There are other pressures that can be brought to bear.

I do think you should take seriously the question of, or the words, “rogue threats”. Whether you take them as seriously as some literature that I have read has indicated, I'd be a little more skeptical. I don't think we are under threat from a ballistic missile from Iraq, for instance. I really don't.

Mr. George Proud: They say the claim is made by some people that the NMD is not presently technically possible. Do you know anything about this? Have you heard anything?

MGen Clive Addy: No, but as much as I do know, I think you were briefed at Cheyenne Mountain on the trials that took place. I think they're batting .500 right now. They have another couple of trials taking place this summer, sir, and they have some big decisions to make.

We're talking theory here, right? It's on ballistic missile defence at the present time. The actual components thereof, although they've been drafted out in a concept, are not working models yet. Now is the time to decide on the political scale whether we should get interested and involved in them or not.

The Chair: General, I'm sorry I had to leave the meeting for a few minutes, and I want to thank my colleague, Vice-Chair Pratt, for standing in for me.

Before I go to Mr. Earle, just for your information and recall, colleagues, this question of technology has come up several times. I don't remember a witness on either side of the argument—and we've had both sides of the argument, pro and con, on the idea of an NMD—really questioning that the technology for this will work sooner or later, and many say sooner. I guess it's just a matter of time, and many predict it won't be long. It is therefore a real decision for this government to face, likely in the near future.

Just with that reminder, I'll go now to Mr. Earle for five minutes.

Mr. Gordon Earle: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I just want to return particularly to the funding issue, which you so aptly described in your paper and also touched upon in response to Mr. Proud's question.

As you have indicated, we have seen the cutting of the numbers of troops down to about 60,000. You also indicated that perhaps it should be up at the level of 67,000. We have also seen pretty much a lack of support for building up and mobilizing the reserves. It was very clearly stated by my colleague Mr. O'Reilly that there's very little chance of re-establishing the Halifax Rifles and units such as those. With that kind of trend, we seem to be cutting and not fulfilling the requirements for the people side of things.

As you indicated, we haven't even fulfilled the requisite equipment needs set out in the 1994 white paper. How realistic is it, then, for us to even consider becoming involved in the RMA and these kinds of joint ventures on the NMD and those kinds of things? How realistic is it for us to be putting our efforts in that direction if we haven't fulfilled the other requirements that you feel are so important?

MGen Clive Addy: I have a concern in that to respond to this question, I will be assuming your premise that it's an either/or situation. My response is that it isn't an either/or situation.

As a modern nation, we must maintain a regular force capable of responding to those immediate requirements, and one that is equipped and funded to the best ability in order to operate with our allies. That costs money. At the same time, we must be able to look after what's going on at home, and also be prepared to go to higher levels if ever we require it.

That doesn't mean we have to buy a whole bunch of ships that sit in the harbour and rust for twenty years because we think we're perhaps going to go to war and so on. But we have to have people and the intellectual ability and knowledge across our country to be able to respond to that, and also to respond to natural disasters. And those people can respond to natural disasters. That's what the white paper generically implied. But that's not what is going to happen if your budget is so restricted that all you can do is produce that front end. That's why I call them the one-shot, one-spot armed forces, but they're not the solution to Canadian security.

• 0955

Mr. Gordon Earle: You also mentioned that we have to maintain the potential to fight a war. I know that wasn't an either/or either, but I'm sure you agree that we also have to emphasize the importance of our peacekeeping role. Just focusing on the peacekeeping role for a moment, what do you see as the implications of the RMA for Canada's involvement in future peacekeeping roles, or do you see any implications there?

MGen Clive Addy: I think the first thing is information. You probably see from the space.... You did go to Cheyenne Mountain, and you saw the vast amount of visual, technical, and electronic information that is available to analyse and to look at that piece of ground that you're going onto, to be able to communicate, to observe, and to spy on what's going on in that ground that you might get involved in. I think that's a large component.

The other thing is how you deliver the people and how you logistically support them. I think the RMA has a lot to do with that and with new computer systems for logistical control. I told you stories of the first deployment that went to Yugoslavia, and of how many of those container loads sat on the port docks and got rusty because nobody knew what was in them. They didn't have time to open them, so they just ordered stuff immediately in little boxes so that they knew what it was. A lot of that stuff stayed there because we didn't know how to control logistics. That's an expensive proposition. That will help us in that domain.

On the ground, observation and the collation of information are important as well. That's what peacekeeping is: keeping your eyes open and watching what's going on. The collation and collection of that is helped largely through the RMA.

On the platform and projectile aspects of it, I'd say it's less so if you're just presuming that peacekeeping is only observing. But with anything beyond observing, once you get into peacemaking of any type, you're into high tech—very much so.

If I can say so, for any armed force—army, navy and air force—they have expressions. If you can get behind the decision cycle and somebody asks what that means, well, if you can make a move on somebody before he knows you're making it, and if you can also make a move on his next part before he has time to react, that's what is meant by getting in the decision cycle. The revolution in military affairs gives you the information, the platforms, and the weaponry you need in order to do that. That's what the RMA does. It allows people to go into battle knowingly, not blind, as they have throughout history.

Mr. Gordon Earle: Do you see any role for RMA at the end of a military conflict, for example, dealing with the aftermath, the nuclear fallout, the toxins, and all of the kinds of things that we see as the result of the conflict?

MGen Clive Addy: That's a very good question. Yes, I do see that, because a lot of things we use to protect ourselves—the types of chemical and biological identifiers and so on—could be used and should be used in those kinds of events.

Beyond that, I haven't given your question any thought, but I can see that there are capabilities, possibilities, certainly what they call damage reports, and looking at roads that are coming in. That kind of stuff from satellite imagery would be quite valuable in a major chaos. You've seen the pictures of Chechnya and the capital of Chechnya that come to you now by satellite. Think of ten years ago. That didn't exist ten years ago.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Earle.

General, unfortunately, not all of the committee was able to go to Cheyenne Mountain, although a number of other colleagues have been there at other times. Just as a brief comment on Mr. Earle's questions, one of the main messages we heard there was that, more and more, military combat will involve accessing all the information you can while denying it to the enemy. That came home very clearly in spades.

Colleagues may have seen on TV recently the LAV-RECCE, the reconnaissance vehicle built in a great riding in the country here—I forget which one now—but it's showing the new screens and all the new information that they're getting that's available to our people in those vehicles. There's more and more information all the time.

• 1000

That's a 30-minute bell, so we—

A voice: That's just for the opening of the House.

The Chair: Oh, then we still have time.

Let me go now to Mr. Pratt.

Mr. David Pratt: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Major-General Addy, based on your comments today, there seems to be an underlying theme that there's this disconnect between the white paper and the internal policy documents of the Department of National Defence. It begs the question of a major review of the white paper and rethinking our overall defence policy. I would appreciate your comments as to when you feel this committee should be doing that. Clearly, we're in a run-up now to an election. Is this something you would like to see us do before the next election, or would you see it as the first item of business for the next national defence committee for what would be, I guess, the 37th Parliament?

MGen Clive Addy: If I were a politician, I would like to see it after. But I'm a general, and I would like to see it before.

Mr. Pratt, quite frankly, one of the reasons I accepted the position I'm in is that I found it shameful that in this country of ours national defence and foreign affairs was not a topic that affected Canadians in elections. It wasn't an issue in elections. I would like to see it be an issue. I don't want it to become a deadly issue, but I'd like to know what Canadians want. I would like to know what Canadians want directly at the ballot box. So I would prefer that the debate commence. If the policy occurs afterwards, that's fine. But I would certainly like to see the debate commence before the election. That's my personal opinion as a general, retired.

Mr. David Pratt: With regard to the white paper, I think that with very few exceptions, you would find around this table many very strong supporters of the white paper, and people—I don't think I'm out of line here—who would also like to see more money put into the defence budget. What you seem to be saying, though, in terms of your comments earlier this morning, is that from your standpoint the focus should be our alliance relationship and the need to deal with preparations for what would be described as a conventional war.

Maybe the situation with China is not a good example, because there seem to be some very strong words being exchanged between Taiwan and the mainland, but generally speaking, over the last 48 months or so what we've seen is not conventional war but humanitarian intervention. I'm thinking in terms of the Balkans, of course, East Timor, and situations like that. In your view, understanding the scarce resources we have available to us right now, should we not be putting more planning and more emphasis on the issue of medium-scale to low-intensity conflicts and humanitarian interventions and looking toward developing over the next few years a larger capability that really reflects what is in the white paper? I would appreciate getting your comments on that.

MGen Clive Addy: I have several comments on that, if I might. I'll just give you some information I have.

I'll go to Russia to start. I'm not anti-Russian, please understand, but these things do occur in various countries. Russia adopted a first use of nuclear weapons if attacked by outside forces. That's the first time they've taken that measure and stated that they would. It reinstated military training for high school students, doubled its capital portion of the defence budget, called up 20,000 reserves, and called for the re-establishment of some form of political commissar system. In the last three weeks China has threatened to fire nuclear weapons at the U.S. west coast if it intervenes on behalf of Taiwan in any future Taiwan confrontation.

This is the benign world we're talking about. I'll just leave that aside.

I accept your point, however, that we should focus on that primary alliance and being part of that as well. But I think the important thing for Canada to realize is that that focus is based on what we now think will happen. Like in a life insurance project, you have to be honest and realistic enough to say that my crystal ball is probably as accurate as all of the crystal balls we've seen in the world in the past 20 years.

• 1005

So what do I have in the back? What is it—the intellectual power, the military knowledge, and all of that—that I'm dedicating just in case my guess is wrong? I don't see that as part of the concept of 2020. I think that's important. It's not just our reserves; it's our schools, the talent pool, the leadership education, all of that. It has to be there, and that's the security of Canada.

By the way, if you have enough of that and it's reasonable, you can fight forest fires and floods with them, but if you don't, you can't.

Mr. David Pratt: Very briefly to wind up, I just came back from Zambia, where I attended a conference dealing with the conflict in the Great Lakes Region of Africa. This is more of a foreign policy question, I suppose. In terms of where Canada should be in the world and if there is the resolve within the United Nations to take some action in the Great Lakes Region—what is happening there is essentially a world war—would you feel that Canada has a role to play there?

MGen Clive Addy: This is a foreign affairs question, and I'm giving you a Canadian citizen's reply, and not that of a general, in this case. I think northern countries have blatantly tried to avoid the issue of Africa because it is so complex and does not have an immediate impact on their economies at this time.

I have a very good friend, whom you know, who has just retired, and I know of the problems he goes through and what has hurt him. I think I share the same moral values as he does.

I find that, yes, there's a role we could play, but certainly not a puppet role or a symbolic role. If we go there, we must go there properly equipped, with full knowledge and support that our aim is to do good in those countries, and that if “good” implies the use of force, we know that it does—and not these half-baked types of things we try to deploy at times.

Mr. David Pratt: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Pratt.

I probably should have welcomed Mr. Pratt back at the start of the meeting. He had been gone for some time. He is doing very good work for the government, as you know. I think maybe we're going to call him the envoy of the Canadian government to Africa. He's kind of our resident expert on Africa. It's nice to have him back with us today.

Mr. David Pratt: It's kind of you to say that.

The Chair: It's good to have you back, Mr. Pratt.

[Translation]

My dear friend, Mr. Laurin, you have five minutes, please.

Mr. René Laurin: Major-General, I'd like to get back to this matter of evaluating the threat. In your opinion, does whatever constitutes a potential threat for the USA also threaten Canada?

MGen Clive Addy: That question is a bit too all-encompassing for me to answer that way. If you're talking about a threat against the USA as a global national territory within North America...

Mr. René Laurin: No, that's not my question.

Presently, the USA are evaluating potential threats. That's what gives them justification for wanting to deploy a defence system. The decision hasn't been made yet, but we can feel it coming. That is what's encouraging them to deploy an intercontinental ballistic system.

Their evaluation is that the potential threat comes from Korea, China and Iraq. As Canada is a very great friend of the USA, if these potential enemies of the US were to execute their apprehended threat against the US, would this necessarily represent a threat for Canada? Canada has never made an evaluation of the potential threat against us, but assuring Canada's security might not be the same thing as assuring the security of the US. What do you think?

MGen Clive Addy: I think that assuring Canada's security isn't the same thing. The threat against the USA is not only military and physical but also psychological in the sense that the Americans are seen as a major threat by quite a number of countries elsewhere in the world for philosophical reasons. There are countries that are ready, not to attack them, but rather to take a stab at them and hurt them because the US is the giant. We're their neighbour. It is possible that, in such circumstances, we might get some fall-out due to what is happening with our neighbour. Besides, when you're well protected at home and your little next door neighbour is a friend, sometimes it's less complicated for the enemy to beat up on the smaller neighbour just to rub it in.

• 1010

So those possibilities exist. Are they the same? I explained a few moments ago that in my personal opinion, the level of threat for Canada and the US is quite different but the personalities are just about the same.

Mr. René Laurin: In your opinion, can Canada afford to evaluate the threats differently than the US?

MGen Clive Addy: Yes, yes.

Mr. René Laurin: Could that go so far as to say to the US that we don't have the same conception and evaluation of the threat as they do and that we're not ready to approve the deployment of an anti-missile system?

MGen Clive Addy: Yes, but once we've done that analysis, it might very well be that we'll have to contribute more to defence, including missiles. We shouldn't jump to conclusions immediately, Mr. Laurin, and believe that at the end of the day we'll wind up with fewer needs than we have at the present.

Mr. René Laurin: But we still have to undertake the analysis.

MGen Clive Addy: No doubt about that. I can tell you that in any analysis, there are two elements: there is the external threat and there are national interests. The two are joined together.

So, the American national interest may be far different from Canada's. The trade will be equal, but the diplomatic and political interests across the world could be quite different; actually, I think they are already. What threatens the national interest is quite different for the US as compared to Canada.

Mr. René Laurin: But that doesn't force Canada to feel it has to be party to that thing.

MGen Clive Addy: I never said we had to jump as soon as somebody barked. I never said that. I'm not predicting that and will never predict that. But we have to undertake a realistic analysis of the environment we're living in. Nor should we look at Americans as the big bad boys of this planet. You've never had such a great power in the history of the world that has been as benevolent: just compare it to previous empires, whether the Romans or the Greeks, that were into all kinds of conquering.

We have to undertake an objective analysis from Canada's point of view in the present-day world. I assure you that we have to be in a position to recognize that missiles, from Korea or elsewhere, do constitute a threat against our critical points such as the cities of Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver. What should we do? Should we do all that on our own? We should ally ourselves with someone who already has a whole slew of other information. That is what I call reasonable.

Mr. René Laurin: Major-General, I have no experience in the art of war, but it seems to me that I can't conceive that to attack the USA, another country might decide to attack Canada, with whom it has no quarrel. Canada isn't an enemy. Canada is even a friendly country for those other countries. Now, just because they are not able to attack the US, they'd suddenly decide to start by attacking Canada which is a friend of the US?

MGen Clive Addy: Mr. Laurin, let's look at the phenomenon from the perspective of the RCMP. What is the biggest gate open on the USA? It's Canada.

Mr. René Laurin: Yes, but that's terrorism.

MGen Clive Addy: I'm not saying it's the same thing materially speaking, but I am saying that from a philosophical point of view you choose the weakest point to enter the other one's territory. That's what you choose.

[English]

The Chair: Gentlemen, thank you.

There have been two rounds, and then they give even the chairman a few questions. Then I'll go back to Mr. Earle.

Just on our colleague's point, I don't think it's any secret that Niagara Falls for a long time was on the target list of enemy countries. Maybe it still is. You don't take out Niagara Falls without affecting the whole eastern seaboard, and it doesn't stop at the Canadian-American border.

So much of our economy is interlinked with the United States economy that I don't think we can just separate our defence from theirs. I don't think it's realistic that we can do that. That's why I think we have to take a serious look at this missile defence system.

• 1015

I have a couple of questions, General. I'm following up on my colleague Mr. Pratt on the white paper question. I'm mulling the same thing over in my mind, as are a number of us here. How often do you think the Canadian government—and I'm not talking parties now—should engage in a full white paper exercise? Given that our last white paper was in 1994, do you think it's time for a new one or for an update of the current one, just an updated version? Could you respond to that?

MGen Clive Addy: Honestly, I think the 1994 white paper demands debate at this time at the parliamentary level. The decision as to whether they need a new one or whether they need to update the present one is a parliamentary decision. It is the Government of Canada's decision. Strategy 2020 assumes a change that has not been legitimately provided by Parliament. That's my genesis.

The Chair: Thank you.

What's the cycle? What do you think is a ballpark cycle?

MGen Clive Addy: I think you have to plan looking out for 15 years and adjust at about every five. If you're talking business these days, you're adjusting every 12 months.

The Chair: That's right.

MGen Clive Addy: For defence, I think five is a pretty good adjustment figure.

The Chair: Sure. That makes sense to me. A number of us here come from municipal political experience before federal. Certainly municipal councils have their five-year plans and they adjust them every year, as I recall.

MGen Clive Addy: Yes.

The Chair: The next issue is the size of the Canadian forces. Other witnesses have testified to this and I would be interested in your view. Given our current world commitments and the other commitments of our Canadian Forces for national disasters and so on and the unpredictability of those, of course, are we undersized right now, under-peopled? If so, by how many, in your view?

MGen Clive Addy: I think we're undersized at 60,000 to do the types of tasks that are being asked of us in the regular force. Some of that could be taken up by having a larger reserve force. What has happened is that we've been reducing both simultaneously. I think there's something silly there. I see it a bit like an hourglass; if you empty one, the other's filling up to a certain extent. Define what that potential is. The only difference in people is how ready and how likely the threat is. That's how much you do.

That's a simplistic view, Mr. Chairman, please understand.

The Chair: I appreciate that.

MGen Clive Addy: That's the way I would approach the problem. I would not go down below 60,000 in the regular force with a country like ours in the modern environment. I think it's damnable when we won't be doing our share either at home or abroad.

The Chair: Many of us agree with that. If you were to increase and defend that politically—it's a political decision and we defend it politically, as you know—how much increase would you go with?

MGen Clive Addy: On the regular force or the reserves?

The Chair: The regular force.

MGen Clive Addy: I actually think we'd need another 20,000, but I think we could survive with 10,000.

The Chair: Thank you.

MGen Clive Addy: Just a moment now. That's providing that you do the reserve thing.

The Chair: I heard you.

MGen Clive Addy: If you're going to take it out of the immediately reacting people, with those who take a little longer to react, you will sustain, support, train, and fund them as well.

The Chair: Yes. We certainly heard that. I think that's a point well made.

You referred to public opinion. I'm sure you know, but I want to re-emphasize this. The members of the cabinet and my colleagues have re-emphasized to me very recently the very clear public opinion in Canada for reinvesting in the military. We as a committee, on a non-partisan basis, took this consistently to the government in every venue we could. That was a major reason that we had a substantial increase in the last budget. Public opinion has swung over to be very supportive again of our Canadian Forces after some of the unfortunate situations that we all saw happen.

It's not a big topic at the doorstep in campaigning. I think that's true, although it comes up. Would you not agree that part of the reason it's not is that most Canadians take it as a given that we are a leading nation in peacekeeping and they want us to continue to be a leading nation in peacekeeping? If a party were to say we're going to withdraw from the world and we're just going to take care of the ice storms in Quebec and the Saguenay and western Canada and not be in peacekeeping, I suspect you'd see a heck of a debate then.

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This is a long-winded question. Don't you think some of it is that it's a given in the Canadian public's mind that they want us involved in the world?

MGen Clive Addy: Mr. Chairman, I am fully aware of the quandary of the popularity of peacekeeping and peacemaking, the respect that has been regained by our forces—I do say regained because we went through a bad period—and the affection the Canadian people have for their armed forces. At the same time, those same Canadian people say it shouldn't cost them anything. The quandary is that we're not very good at having the candour to be able to express clearly and concisely why and what we're paying for and what it costs.

The Chair: Agreed. The public gives us a reality check, and I think it's our job as government to sometimes have to give the public a reality check.

I repeat to you again that I assume every member on this committee has had consistent and repeated expressions of support from the public for increased funding to our armed forces. I know most of us have heard that. That was a major reason we were able to get the good increase we just had in February. Perhaps the public is a little more supportive about spending their tax dollar on it than we might think.

I'm out of time and I want to go to Mr. Earle.

Mr. Gordon Earle: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I just want to return to the international relations aspect of defence again. Lots of times when we're looking at issues like the NMD, it's kind of viewed as almost a bilateral thing between the U.S. and Russia because of treaties that may be signed and so forth. The reality is that we know that the outcome of whatever happens on these kinds of major issues will impact much more broadly than just on one or two countries.

What is your view about the concept of perhaps submitting some of these issues to the United Nations for a more formal review, which would be sanctioned by the weight of that body, when it comes to decisions like whether or not a country should deploy NMD and that sort of issue? How do you feel about it being raised to more of an international level to get that kind of scrutiny?

MGen Clive Addy: The defence of your country is ultimately your own decision. That element of sovereignty is not in question even in the United Nations. What kind of weapon you use is based on what treaties you belong to and what you've signed with the United Nations and whether one thing violates another.

Referring your defence to the United Nations, be you any country, whether I should get involved in this or get involved in that, I don't recommend. That body is less than decisional, etc. I would suggest that when an alliance wants to go into conflict, it should refer its desire, causes, reasons, and types and limitations of the conflict to the United Nations body. I really regret that it wasn't done in Kosovo, but then again I'm also caught by the fact of what would have happened if it had been. Would it have been any different? Those are chances that leaders of state have to take.

To get back to the aspect of the NMD, I would suggest that the ABM Treaty is the key element. The possessors of those kinds of missiles that have signed up to the treaty see this neither as a threat nor as an increase in the threats to war, etc., but rather as diminishing that particular risk. If they agree to that, fine. If they don't, there is still a debate. It's a more complex one, but it's still our decision to make as Canadians. That's the important thing. It would be so nice if everybody said that's a good idea. Life's not like that.

Mr. Gordon Earle: I have one further question. Africa was mentioned earlier. You pointed out, I believe rightly so, that lots of times economic interests are what determine how we get involved in countries and so forth. Would you not feel that perhaps in the case of Africa there may be a social or racial component involved as well? Quite often we are quick to jump into certain countries and slow to jump into other countries. Even with some of our immigration practices and so forth, quite often the countries where there's a black population are the last ones we serve, or we have to be prompted in a very strong way before we get involved, even though the humanitarian crisis might be worse than what's taking place in other areas.

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Would you not agree there may be a little more to it than the economics, in terms of our involvement?

MGen Clive Addy: Oftentimes they're one and the same, in that the economic reasons are probably based on racism too. But I wouldn't just say Africa either. If you look at places like South America and places where there were conflicts before, we not only ignored them but pretended it was natural for them to be happening. Look at places right now like Burma, or Myanmar as they call it, and what's going on there, and Cambodia.

I think our “national interests” have been oriented on a northern hemisphere basis, for political, military, and perhaps even historically racist reasons. I'd say that is a factor. I don't say it's a dominant one. But I also say it's changing.

Mr. Gordon Earle: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Earle.

Mr. Bertrand is next, and Mr. Pratt has some more. That's a thirty-minute bell, so we still have lots of time.

Mr. Bertrand.

[Translation]

Mr. Robert Bertrand (Pontiac—Gatineau—Labelle, Lib.): Major- General, it's a pleasure to have you before us again. I'd like a specific point of information and then I'll have a few questions. In your presentation, you mentioned that our Air Force doesn't have any tanker planes.

MGen Clive Addy: Yes.

Mr. Robert Bertrand: I thought we had some because we sent some last year to Aviano when we sent the 18 CF-18s.

MGen Clive Addy: Do you mean American or Canadian? I am sorry, but I think that they converted the Airbus. I am not sure.

Mr. Robert Bertrand: It seems to me we sent some, if memory serves. I don't remember what kind of aircraft it was.

MGen Clive Addy: Yes.

Mr. Robert Bertrand: But we had sent one or two with the CF-18 we sent during last year's Kosovo conflict. As I said, I could be wrong.

MGen Clive Addy: You may be right, Mr. Bertrand, but to my knowledge, the facts I have pointed out come from the public research I did. It could very well be that an airbus was converted for the mission. That is possible. I don't know. Normally, they were C-130s, but most of the C-130s were sent to the Land of Nod.

[English]

Mr. Robert Bertrand: Another point I'd like to ask you about, General, is airlift. As you know, there are different schools of thought on this. I'd like to have your opinion on whether Canada should go in on it alone, to acquire more strategic air lift, or as we've seen how good it worked during the last Kosovo war, maybe we should become a partner with NATO. As you know, everything boils down to—

MGen Clive Addy: Cash.

Mr. Robert Bertrand: —cash.

MGen Clive Addy: Yes. Because airlift is predominantly, but not solely, a factor in projecting your forces outside of the continent of North America, I suggest that it would be wise of us not to invest solely and on our own in a bunch of aircraft that may or not be compatible with others. I don't think anybody but the United States—as I think the Chief of Defence Staff stated quite rightly—has its own airlift, except Russia, but they can't afford to fuel it. I think that was the quote he used to this body at that time. That is quite accurate.

I don't think Canada, on its own, should have the amount of airlift that would be required, for instance, to lift everything that must be deployed immediately. But Canada must be part of a group, so if that airlift is required, it is available within reasonable time. That's the catch-all: the availability of aircraft at given times and places. That's my response.

Mr. Robert Bertrand: I have one last question, and I think I know what the answer is. You said the Canadian Armed Forces would need a minimum increase of 10,000 soldiers. Which arm of the Canadian Armed Forces do you think these 10,000 soldiers should go to?

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MGen Clive Addy: I think there should be some in every one, actually. I would leave that decision to the Chief of the Defence Staff, I really would. I know the army is calling. I don't know just how many the air force and navy have, and I would be presumptuous to assume they don't need people as well.

Mr. Robert Bertrand: Merci beaucoup.

The Chair: Merci, Monsieur Bertrand.

Mr. Pratt.

Mr. David Pratt: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

One issue that is coming up, certainly within NATO, is the whole issue of ESDI. I think it's largely an American fear at this point, but there seems to be a growing gap between European defence capabilities and North American defence capabilities—mostly American defence capabilities. That gap is in large part, I suppose, a technological gap between the capabilities of the Americans and the Europeans. I'd be interested in your comments with respect to whether or not you see that chasm—for lack of a better term—between the Americans and the Europeans having an affect on how we address our defence issues.

MGen Clive Addy: I think it does and I think it should. I was asked by Mr. Proud a while ago whether our linkages should be more toward the Americans than NATO. My response was that quite obviously we have more security interests with the United States than with the whole of NATO, as a body. But we still have significant relationships with that body, if only to buffer the influence the Americans have upon us. I think that was the content of what I said.

The split between Europe and the United States is evolving. I think it's a natural one and we can play a major role in it. On the ground during the Cold War days, we were very good at that and did that quite regularly. The players at that time were not a united Europe, so the Americans could split the defence—no pun intended—with the Europeans, between the British and French particularly, and the Germans. Now that they are more or less united, it's a little more difficult for them.

So there is a role for us to play in facilitating, understanding, contacting, and so on. Unfortunately we've emptied most of the headquarters in which we had that kind of influence in the past. We're going to pay that price, but I think there is a role for us to play there.

I don't know if that's what you're getting at. When they get into research, they will never be as technologically proficient as the United States. The United States will have to give on its capability to drag along everyone else. It's good of us to be their neighbour and help the others be dragged along, because we will be defining the basis of NATO-level standardization, not the Americans. The Americans will try, as they have before, to define a plateau that none of these people can afford.

Mr. David Pratt: One of the interesting things about what's happening in Europe is certainly the merging of defence companies there. Again, it seems to be building more toward a fortress Europe, with its own type of defence companies that are producing certain types of equipment, with the Americans trying desperately to sell into that market. Do you have any comments on that aspect of what's unfolding? I say that from the standpoint of Canadian procurement, because we're under pressure to buy from the Europeans, but we're obviously under even more significant pressure to buy from the Americans, in terms of large capital projects.

MGen Clive Addy: As I was saying before, they are united now. Before they were just as parochial, but you could play one against the other. As they become united in their arms production, in more and more of these aspects, they carry a heck of a lot of weight, as they do politically, in excluding products that are not built within the organization.

On what it means for Canada, I guess the gist of your question is whether we should be just going to a sole source—the United States. Will we be forced...or should we keep our feet in procurement? Should we be selling to both of them? I guess those decisions are made at a level and in a domain I'm not expert in. But I wouldn't stop selling to both, because militarily it has a good impact on us.

Mr. David Pratt: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The Chair: Okay, Mr. Pratt.

General Addy, thank you very much, on behalf of the committee and my colleagues here, for joining us today and sharing your expertise. Do you have a comment before we adjourn?

MGen Clive Addy: Yes, I do. I have followed very closely the work of this committee. Uncharacteristically—I don't go around throwing bouquets at anyone—I admired two things in particular about this. I've watched other witnesses appear and I've sat in the back. As a retired general, Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for the efforts your committee has brought forth. I wish you had been listened to more forcefully, but life's like that, and I thank you and your colleagues.

I'd like to point out another aspect. I find it one of the most apolitical committees I have to deal with. There's less party politics and more interest in the defence of Canada and those kinds of issues. I congratulate you all for being part of that. It's a pleasure for me to take part in that.

Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you very much. Thank you for your kind words. We strive to be non-partisan and we usually succeed.

Thank you very much, colleagues.

The meeting is adjourned.