EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Wednesday, November 27, 1996

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[English]

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): I'm about to be bold and daring. I'm going to start this meeting, more or less. I'm going to explain to you what happens, and by the time I'm finished I'm hoping I shall have my colleagues, who will have joined me. If not, I may have to stop for a moment, although I'm not inclined to do so.

My name is Ron Duhamel. I'm the co-chair of this committee.

[.Français]

Je copréside avec mon collègue, l'honorable Michel Dupuy, qui est absent aujourd'hui

and who asked me to extend his warmest wishes. It's unfortunate he's not here. He would have liked to have been able to be at the hearings, and particularly this one.

The format is a very simple one, actually. You are asked to make a brief presentation, we hope not to exceed seven minutes, because there are certain needs. We want to ask you questions and we would like you to challenge each other, perhaps, build on what was said, etc. To the extent possible we would like that respected.

Hello, Mr. Penson. How are you, sir? I'm delighted to see you.

I believe we can now begin. I stalled long enough.

What I'll do is pick numbers at random for the order. I hope you will not be offended. If you are, you can talk to me privately after the meeting.

From the Department of Finance we have Mr. Terry Collins-Williams, director. I take it you are the spokesperson. Would you like to begin?

Mr. Terry Collins-Williams (Director, International Economic Relations Division, International Trade and Finance Branch, Department of Finance): Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear before the joint subcommittees. We have listened carefully to the comments and proposals that have been presented by the witnesses before your hearings. I think we could best assist the subcommittees today by highlighting some key principles we believe will be helpful in assessing the proposals you have before you.

First I would like to speak to what we consider to be the overriding principle of balance. The application of anti-dumping and countervailing duties, by their nature, creates a dichotomy of interests. The law is set up for the purpose of protecting domestic industries from injurious dumping and from subsidization but must also take into account the risk of increased costs for downstream producers, retailers, and consumers.

A number of proposals have been placed before your subcommittees by users of the system to make changes in the law that will in their view enhance the effectiveness of it in providing protection. There have also been proposals aimed at ensuring greater flexibility to address the potential economic fallout resulting from the imposition of duties.

In a world of increasing globalization and international division of labour, openness of markets is critical to attracting investment and maintaining competitiveness. Our domestic firms must be able to source competitively priced inputs. According to an OECD study in 1993, Canadian manufacturers rely more on imported inputs then any manufacturers among our major trading partners, the United States, France, Germany, Japan, and the U.K.

At the same time, under international rules domestic producers facing injurious competition from dumped imports have a right to launch a complaint. They have a right to have their complaint fairly considered. If it is found that dumping or subsidization is causing injury, they have a right to receive remedial protection in the form of anti-dumping or countervailing duties. SIMA provides that legal framework for the imposition of such measures.

The challenge of balance is to provide effective protection when required without imposing unnecessary costs on other segments of our economy. For the most part we believe SIMA, in its twelve years of operation, has worked reasonably well.

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One of the key issues that has been raised in your hearings is the question of the public interest provision. The public interest provision of SIMA was intended to be used as a mechanism for reducing the negative impact that the imposition of duties might have on other sectors of the economy or on competition in the domestic market. These provisions of SIMA were developed in direct response to recommendations from a predecessor parliamentary committee, chaired by Mr. Mackasey. The current legislation, however, does not spell out the conditions under which public interest would arise, or what factors could be considered in its application.

In considering whether or not public interest provisions should be clarified, you might also want to consider other mechanisms that have been suggested to your subcommittees that could minimize the potential economic costs. I'm thinking specifically of the lesser duty rule, another issue that has been raised by many witnesses appearing before you.

Three of the four other major users of trade remedy measures among our trading partners - the European Union, Mexico, and Australia - provide for some use of a lesser duty rule, and one, the United States, does not. The application of a lesser duty rule would be consistent with the WTO agreement that governs anti-dumping measures as set out in article 9.1, ``Imposition and Collection of Anti-Dumping Duties'', which states:

It is desirable that the imposition be permissive in the territory of all Members, and that the duty be less than the margin if such lesser duty would be adequate to remove the injury to the domestic industry.

In addition to the principal balance, there are a number of other principles that might serve to guide the committee's assessment of the proposals before it. These would include access. Large, medium, and small companies can be injured by dumped imports. The system is already quite costly and the cost can present difficulties for smaller firms that may be reluctant to pursue a complaint once they realize its cost.

It is therefore important that proposals be assessed in terms of their potential to add to the complexity and thus the cost for complainants. We do not want to create a system that is so costly that small and medium-sized Canadian companies would be denied access to it.

The WTO rules require that parties follow certain procedural requirements and timeframes. Given the complexity of the investigation process, adequate time is required to ensure that the administering authorities can properly assess the information before them. Within these constraints, however, efforts must be made to ensure the system is as expeditious as possible and delivers remedies as quickly as possible.

On the question of procedural fairness, interested parties should, at the appropriate stages in the investigation, have a right to present their views and have them considered by the investigating authorities. This principle should be reinforced wherever possible in the law, but of course it must be weighed against the implications it has for the timeframe.

Parties have the right to know the reasons for the decisions that are made by our administering authorities. The impact of proposals to change the legislation on its transparency and the transparency of its decision-making must be borne in mind.

Finally, consistent with overall government objectives to improve the efficiency of government and streamline procedures, proposals for change should be assessed for their impact in this regard. There should be compelling reasons for increasing the administrative burden of the system, which, as I've said before, is already quite complex.

In summary, in assessing any proposals the subcommittee is going to consider for changes in the law, it is important to determine what their overall effect will be. The system will not be sustainable if the act cannot provide effective protection or if the burden of such protection becomes too costly for the rest of the economy.

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I would like to note before closing that the Government of British Columbia has indicated to me that it has provided its views on the SIMA review to the clerk of your subcommittees, with the request they be taken into account in the preparation of your report.

I hope this overview has been helpful to you. I'll be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): Thank you, Mr. Collins-Williams. It has indeed been very helpful and we will be no doubt addressing a number of questions to you for further clarification and elaboration.

[Translation]

We welcome Mr. John McNab, from the Trade Remedies Division of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Mr. McNab.

[English]

Mr. John McNab (Director, Trade Remedies Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for inviting representatives of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade to address you today.

I'd like to introduce my two colleagues, Mike Robertson and Steven Rhealt-Kihara, who are from the same division of the department.

Before starting I'd like to describe in a general way the role this department has in trade remedy matters. As you may know, the department is not directly responsible for either the Special Import Measures Act or its administration. The principal role in trade remedies of the department is to promote and defend Canadian interests with respect to trade remedy actions, whether in the form of anti-dumping, countervailing duties or safeguard measures taken by other countries against exports from Canada, or taken here against exports from other countries.

On the export side, we have the lead responsibility in ensuring that other countries, particularly the United States, conduct their trade remedy investigations in complete accordance with their international trade agreement obligations, as well as with their own domestic law. In addition, we promote Canadian interests by monitoring proposed changes to the trade remedy regimes of Canada's major trading partners to ensure their conformity with WTO requirements.

On the import side, we monitor the conduct of trade remedy investigations by Revenue Canada and the CITT and participate in the formulation of Canadian trade remedy policy as reflected in domestic law and regulation, to ensure that Canada is respecting its own international trade obligations.

Our participation is useful in part because this department often receives questions from our trading partners regarding our own trade remedy investigations. More broadly, this department has the lead responsibility for initiatives designed to eliminate the use of trade remedies between Canada and other specific trading partners, and participates fully, along with the Department of Finance and the Department of National Revenue, in the committees of the World Trade Organization established to apply disciplines on the use of anti-dumping and countervailing duty measures by its members.

For these reasons, our interest in SIMA review is less direct perhaps than that of our colleagues in Finance and National Revenue, but it is still very real. We recognize that trade remedy legislation is and must continue to be a balance between the needs of producers who may be injured by unfairly traded imports and the consumers and users of such imports as well as the economy at large.

Aside from helping to ensure that trade remedy legislation or practices are consistent with our trade agreement obligations, which of course goes without saying, our principal interest in the SIMA review process is that changes to SIMA could affect our ability to pursue future agreements on trade remedies and to defend Canadian exporters. It's often difficult to oppose the practices of others if we pursue the same practices ourselves.

The fundamental reform or elimination of trade remedy measures within NAFTA and especially anti-dumping provisions remains a priority objective for the government. While there is consensus on this long-term goal, there appears to be a split in the private sector as to the appropriate strategy in pursuit of this objective.

The steel industry in particular has long been of the view that adoption of the so-called tougher U.S. anti-dumping system would strengthen Canada's hand in pursuing trade remedy reform with the United States. However, some Canadian manufacturers, particularly users of imported inputs, from whom you've already heard, believe that a more restrictive Canadian trade remedy system will not only fail to make an impression on the United States but will adversely affect the Canadian economy.

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It remains to be seen whether the get-tough strategy will provide us with needed leverage with the United States in trade remedies. However, on trade remedies more generally the government intends to continue to work both multilaterally in the WTO and bilaterally with our NAFTA trading partners to improve disciplines on the use of trade remedies. In addition, we'll continue to challenge any country that appears to be acting inconsistently with its trade agreement obligations.

I would like to take a few moments during the meeting to comment on the recently concluded Canada-Chile free trade agreement, since I know this issue has been raised in earlier meetings of the subcommittees.

As you know, the agreement includes a provision that will phase out the use of anti-dumping duty measures between Canada and Chile over six years. This subcommittee has heard a lot of commentary, mainly opposition, to this particular provision of the agreement, and I hope it will be helpful for me to outline the basis for the inclusion of a dumping exemption in the agreement with Chile.

We should not forget that it has been the clearly stated policy of the government for many years that the use of dumping measures is not logical or appropriate between partners in a free trade agreement. Although some other countries have successfully negotiated such exemption provisions in other free trade agreements, the agreement with Chile is the first time it has been negotiated by Canada.

The anti-dumping exemption with Chile should be seen in the context of the transitional agreement with Chile in expectation that it will become a member of NAFTA in due course. Under the agreement with Chile, Canadian exports will have both preferential tariff and non-tariff access to that market. In addition, unlike their competitors in the United States, Canadian exporters, besides a tariff advantage, will have a preference in the use of anti-dumping measures. In our view this will provide them with an edge over their U.S. competitors.

More generally, we believe the reform of trade remedy law, in particular anti-dumping duty law, within the context of a free trade agreement with Chile will have a demonstration effect for the United States and therefore will contribute to the principal Canadian objective of fundamentally reforming the use of anti-dumping measures on Canadian exports to the U.S. While we recognize it is unlikely the United States will be persuaded in the short or medium term to eliminate anti-dumping measures with Canada, we believe the longer-term demonstration effect will be beneficial. At the very least it will raise the profile of the issue and encourage debate between sectors within the U.S.

I should note that the debate in the United States seems to be starting already, certainly in the U.S. trade press. A recent editorial in the Journal of Commerce very much was in support of the anti-dumping exemption negotiated between Canada and Chile. I believe a copy of the editorial from the Journal of Commerce has been handed to the clerk of the subcommittees.

There's also the concern of some industry groups about the possibility of increased imports from Chile. Canadian producers will still have recourse to normal safeguard provisions in the case of injury caused by increased imports. In addition, while Canada and Chile do not have a history of dumping problems, several provisions in the agreement are intended to assist in the transition to the anti-dumping exemption and to address unforeseen circumstances, should they arise.

First, it should be noted that anti-dumping is not eliminated immediately on implementation of the agreement. The exemption takes effect only when the tariffs on a given product have reached zero in both countries. This may take up to six years, depending on the product. This provides import-sensitive industries with time to adjust to new market conditions and an interim period within which they will continue to have full recourse to the use of anti-dumping measures, if needed.

Two other provisions are also designed to respond to industries concerned about the anti-dumping exemption. First, there is a review clause that requires both countries to re-evaluate the agreement within five years. Secondly, the agreement contains an exceptional circumstances clause that provides for special consultations on specific problems should they occur. Exceptional circumstances may include a situation where, for example, anti-dumping action by a third party against Chilean exports results in a diversion of these goods to the Canadian market.

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Also, the right to take safeguard action in circumstances where increased imports cause serious injury will remain. Finally, I would note that both countries will still have recourse to countervailing duty action in order to respond to injury caused by subsidized imports.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to present these remarks. I'd be pleased to respond to any questions you have.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): Thank you, Mr. McNab. I appreciate the clarification. While you're quite correct in saying some concern was voiced, I think it was apprehension because it wasn't understood very clearly exactly what all of the conditions that existed were.

I'd like to hear from Revenue Canada now. From the trade administration branch's anti-dumping and countervailing directorate, we have representatives Mr. Brimble and Monsieur Séguin.

Mr. Brimble.

Mr. Brian Brimble (Director General, Anti-dumping and Countervailing Directorate, Trade Administration Branch, Department of Revenue): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wish to thank the committee for this opportunity to present the views of Revenue Canada in the review of the Special Import Measures Act.

With me today is Mr. Robert Séguin, who is the director of policy and administration in the anti-dumping and countervailing directorate of Revenue Canada.

We have submitted a fairly detailed written submission so I'm not going to attempt to cover the entire contents of that document. I want to use this session to outline Revenue Canada's key concerns concerning SIMA, and then I would be glad to address any questions you might have. I should also point out that I'm limiting my comments to the administration of SIMA rather than commenting on any of the broader economic issues that you have been examining in this review.

As you are aware, the responsibility for the administration of SIMA is shared between Revenue Canada and the Canadian International Trade Tribunal. The anti-dumping and countervailing directorate is the specific body within Revenue Canada tasked with the responsibility for the administration of the legislation. Regional Revenue Canada officials help to carry out the enforcement of SIMA findings in terms of the assessment and collection of SIMA duties.

While SIMA may impact on a relatively small proportion of imports into Canada, its application has a high international profile and it remains a vital remedy for Canadian industries that find themselves being adversely affected by injurious dumping from offshore suppliers or by the unfair subsidization of goods by foreign governments.

Currently we are enforcing 39 dumping or subsidy injury findings and three price undertakings, covering a broad range of industrial and consumer goods exported to Canada from approximately 35 countries.

From an administrative perspective, Revenue Canada is very satisfied regarding the functioning of SIMA since its inception in 1984. In this respect we've identified very few administrative or technical problems with the legislation where we believe changes are necessary.

In 1984 SIMA was drafted to reflect the recommendations made by the Mackasey subcommittee. Some of these represented significant changes from the previous anti-dumping act, particularly in terms of Revenue Canada's administrative practices. For example, SIMA incorporated statutory timeframes for each phase of the SIMA investigations. The act also provided for the inclusion of provisions concerning the public disclosure of information. I believe we have successfully met the challenge of these changes.

As well, since 1984 SIMA has been amended to incorporate the changes brought about by the adoption of the FTA and NAFTA, which saw the creation of the binational panel process as a mechanism to resolve disputes arising out of SIMA decisions.

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In addition, SIMA underwent a number of significant changes in 1995 to reflect the results of the Uruguay round of multilateral trade negotiations insofar as they affected anti-dumping and countervailing duty measures.

Revenue Canada administers a number of trade-related programs, such as the tariff program, duties relief measures, customs valuation and origin determination. As well, we also administer a number of tax programs, including income tax, GST and excise duties.

Revenue Canada is committed to certain principles in the administration of the various tax and trade programs for which we have responsibility, including this legislation. These include such points as certainty, predictability, fairness, consistency, accessibility and transparency.

We strive to ensure that these principles underpin all our administrative practices with respect to all of Revenue Canada's programs. Practically speaking, in the context of SIMA, these principles translate into a number of important concepts. Let me outline what I believe are several of the most important.

First, Canadian industry, particularly small or medium-sized business, should not be restricted from using the SIMA program because of its cost or complexity.

Secondly, importers should know at the time they import goods whether the goods are subject to SIMA duties and be able to determine the amount of the duties owing.

Thirdly, provided that Revenue Canada rulings have been followed, importers should be able to have certainty that SIMA duties assessed at the time of the importation are final and they will not be subject to additional assessments at a later date that were not ascertainable at the time of the importation.

Last, the SIMA investigative process should be sufficiently open and transparent so that all of the parties can understand how Revenue Canada reaches its decisions and are able to defend their interests.

Given the importance of these administrative objectives to Revenue Canada, and to the various client groups involved in the SIMA process, we would urge the committee to evaluate possible changes to SIMA in light of these objectives.

Turning to some specific concerns regarding SIMA, I would point out that Revenue Canada promotes a self-assessment system for administering its programs that relies on the knowledge and honesty of individuals and businesses. The department makes every effort to provide a full range of services necessary to facilitate voluntary compliance with the law.

Our objective is to provide importers with the information necessary to establish whether the goods they are importing are subject to a SIMA finding. Further, importers should be able to determine the amount of dumping or countervailing duties in respect to the goods so that they may pay these duties at the same time as they account for other customs duties and taxes.

As we note in our written submission, we believe that the current low level of voluntary compliance is not acceptable concerning those imports where SIMA duties are owing. To address this problem, we are proposing that a more effective interest and penalty regime be built into SIMA, similar to that which is now found in other departmental legislation, such as the Customs Act, with respect to the payment of regular customs duties.

An effective interest and penalty regime should have the following features. First, there should be a clear statutory requirement for importers to self-assess SIMA duties. This means that once SIMA measures are in place, importers must clearly identify that their goods are subject to a SIMA finding and indicate the amount of SIMA duties that are payable. Secondly, SIMA duties should be paid at the same time as other customs duties and interest should be charged for late payments. Thirdly, the use of penalties under certain circumstances should be contemplated for the importers who fail to account for SIMA duties within the required timeframes without good reason.

A system of self-assessment and voluntary compliance depends on the importer having the information necessary to determine if the goods being imported are subject to a SIMA finding, and, if so, being able to calculate the margin of dumping or the amount of subsidy.

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This raises the second issue I want to talk about in respect of self-assessment. In the case of dumping duties, an importer has to know the margin of dumping of the goods in order to calculate the amount of anti-dumping duties owing. This is the amount by which the normal value of the goods exceeds the export price of the goods. The export price is usually known to the importer, since this is typically, but not always, the ex-factory selling price of the goods. The normal value is established by Revenue Canada through its investigations. It's the non-dumped selling price of the goods based on the exporter's selling prices in its domestic market or based on the cost of production of the goods.

When importers do not have access to the normal values, they are not in a position to self-assess. Therefore as a matter of policy Revenue Canada will disclose normal values to importers who need the information to assess their duty liability. But in cases where the exporters object to this disclosure and can demonstrate that the normal values are confidential, the department must withhold the normal values and assess the importations itself.

This problem could be overcome if SIMA had clearer provisions permitting the disclosure of normal values. We would advocate giving the deputy minister the discretion to disclose normal values under prescribed circumstances. We would envisage such disclosure as being the rule rather than the exception.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): Mr. Brimble, I'm sorry for interrupting, but you are going a bit beyond the time limit. Will you be completing very shortly? I hate to do this, but otherwise I'm going to have some opposition from the others.

Mr. Brimble: I see.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): Could you summarize the following points? is that possible?

Mr. Brimble: I had a full statement to make here. I apologize that it goes beyond the timeframes you have suggested.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): I take it you did not hear the timeframe. Is that correct? I don't mean today, but previously too.

Mr. Brimble: That's correct.

Mr. Grubel (Capilano - Howe Sound): I think it's in the record, isn't it? The papers will be available for people who write the report.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): Yes, of course they will be.

Mr. Brimble: If you wish, the paper is available.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): I do wish; it's absolutely essential.

How would you propose we resolve this?

Mr. Brimble: I would suggest I cover just one more point.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): Thank you. I'm sorry to do this to you, but please do so.

Mr. Brimble: The last point I will cover, then, is on cost and accessibility. I would like to raise a concern about the cost of the SIMA process for both private and public sectors. We're concerned the current level of cost and complexity of the SIMA process could be having a detrimental effect on the accessibility of the SIMA program to small and medium-sized companies which may want to utilize the SIMA process or which are required to defend their interests in a SIMA investigation.

To help address this problem, Revenue Canada attempts to provide whatever assistance we can to Canadian companies who intend to bring forward a complaint. This often involves our staff working closely with these companies to guide them through the process, particularly when they are preparing the complaint and trying to compile supporting evidence.

Notwithstanding the assistance we can provide, businesses still have to incur considerable costs throughout the process. While I don't have the precise figures, we do know these costs can be very significant and vary from case to case.

I appreciate that the current SIMA process reflects the requirements of our international trade obligations under the WTO and NAFTA and that there are probably a limited number of ways in which the current process could be made less costly, at least as far as Revenue Canada's role is concerned. However, having said this, I think it's important that the committee evaluate all recommendations for legislative or administrative change against the criteria of cost and accessibility to ensure the benefits that might be gained from a change of the law or to our administrative practices is worth increasing the cost of the SIMA process.

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The remaining points, I would point out, are in our brief. We feel probably equally strongly about the other points that are made, and I would invite people to read them at their leisure.

I wish to thank the committee for providing this opportunity to express our views regarding SIMA. I'd be happy to answer any questions.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): Thank you. Your points will be read.

I apologize for having had to speed up the process. I don't like to do that, but unfortunately I'm in an awkward situation. There will be bells ringing probably within the next hour. We do want to have an opportunity to question.

From the Canadian International Trade Tribunal, we have three representatives. Who will be the spokesperson? Mr. Eyton.

[Translation]

Mr. Anthony Eyton (President, Canadian International Trade Tribunal): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[English]

I thank you and the members of the two subcommittees for this opportunity to share our views about the operation of the Special Import Measures Act.

I think this legislative review comes at a very opportune time, inasmuch as we in the tribunal have been conducting an internal review of our own procedures and have involved the trade bar in this process.

We provided, through the clerk, a copy of a report that is being distributed to all interested parties about the revisions to our procedures. These procedures will further simplify and streamline the process by which we find injury in the tribunal, as we hope will be the outcome of your own process. I would like to come back to that in a few moments.

I'd like to introduce my two colleagues. In fact, Mr. Chairman, you've already done that, but I'd like to indicate their functions. Ron Eardmann is the executive director of our research branch, and Gerry Stobo is the general counsel of the tribunal.

I too have presented to the clerk a full statement, and I'll simply extract some of the points from our statement.

[Translation]

The Tribunal is an independent quasi-judicial agency which, as you know, conducts inquiries into commercial trade disputes and reports to Parliament through the Minister of Finance. It has seven members and 92 staff to assist in discharging its mandate. We have benefited from the wealth of accumulated experience of our members and staff in dealing, I think well, with the complex and diverse issues we face on a daily basis.

I note with particular pride the very high regard accorded to our work and decisions by the Federal Court and by the bi-national panels created under the NAFTA.

[English]

Since 1984 we have been involved in 83 dumping and subsidy inquiries. In almost 67% of these cases, the tribunal found injury to domestic producers. The arithmetic indicates to us the fact that in some 33% of the cases, no injury was found. I should point out that these percentages are roughly similar to the experience of our counterpart organization in the United States, the International Trade Commission.

Before I begin to discuss some of the legislative matters, I wish to make several remarks about two initiatives we have under way at the tribunal: the SIMA procedural review and the CITT rules amendment review.

As have you, we have heard some say that the current injury inquiry process is cumbersome, complex, and costly. I might say in passing that I don't think it's any more complex, cumbersome, or costly than the system in the United States, but it is somewhat different.

While we hear that concern, we must not lose sight of the fact that an open and fair trade remedies regime necessarily comes at some cost. It is important to remember that in dumping and subsidy cases, major economic interests are at stake. Even in cases in which the dollar value at issue is not large, the economic survival of businesses may be on the line. With those businesses go many jobs, both direct and indirect. Consequently, as do our colleagues with us here today, we take our responsibilities very seriously.

[Translation]

Consequently, we have dissected our SIMA procedures and tribunal rules in an effort to see what changes, short of legislative ones, can be made to make our procedures more user- friendly.

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We have sought the views of our stakeholders and on how to improve them. We have been pleased with the thoughtful and challenging responses received.

[English]

The tribunal will make changes to the way we conduct our pre-hearing activities to ensure that parties exchange important information in a timely way. We will also monitor the exchange of information and react quickly when we see delays arise. We will accelerate the distribution of the staff report, a key document used by counsel in their preparation for a case, by some two weeks. These and other changes that we are proposing in our procedures will, in my view, ensure that we will not in the future have hearings that last longer than two weeks.

I started this process of an internal review of our procedures after chairing a hearing looking into the question of galvanized steel. That hearing took four weeks, and I pledged to the group before me on that occasion when we closed it off that we would revise our procedures and shorten them. I think we will do that with these new procedures. I'm saying that we will not have hearings lasting longer than two weeks.

I would now like to comment on several of the issues of particular interest to you and to us and about which you have already heard various points of view. First of all is the question of bifurcation and to what extent the tribunal should be involved in issuing the preliminary determination on injury.

[Translation]

The Tribunal's expertise in SIMA cases is its ability to analyze the effects of dumping or unfair subsidies on domestic producers.

Currently, the legislation mandates Revenue Canada to make preliminary determinations regarding first, whether or not goods are being dumped or subsidized and, secondly, if so, whether there is a reasonable indication of injury to a domestic industry. If Revenue Canada concludes that both of theses factors have been demonstrated, the injury inquiry is initiated by the Tribunal. Revenue Canada continues towards its final determination of dumping while we begin to conduct our injury investigation.

[English]

You have heard some witnesses before this committee suggest that the tribunal should get involved in the injury determination process at an earlier stage. This could be done if the tribunal undertook the preliminary determination of the injury. It is interesting to note that we have been called upon in almost 70% of recent cases to do just that: to provide our advice at the initiation stage regarding the question of injury, even though the case is still with Revenue Canada at that time.

Recent experience has shown the value of early involvement in a case and the head start it allows us when confronted by the 120-day timeframe we face. This is a very difficult timeframe. We have to accomplish a great deal in that 120 days, and we do not wish to complicate the process further and make it increasingly difficult for us to accomplish our work within that 120 days. If a change were made to the act mandating the tribunal to conduct these functions - the preliminary determination of injury - the tribunal would be able to take early definitive decisions on such framework issues as what light goods are and what the domestic industry is. These are framework issues that we currently re-examine when we commence a section 42 inquiry. We are required to do so, and it takes up hearing time.

Early decisions in these matters would in many cases lead to an overall saving in time and cost for all parties. I don't wish to overemphasize the amount of savings, but it would lead to some savings in time and cost.

[Translation]

The second point I would like to comment on is the public interest. Many parties appearing before you have presented a variety of views on this issue. For example, some of the academic witnesses considered that there was a need for changes in the public interest provision to rebalance in SIMA the interests of domestic producers and those affected by the application of duties.

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These same witnesses and several others have suggested that SIMA should require the Tribunal to establish a lesser duty in each case where it makes a finding of injury. I would like to comment on both of these suggestions, starting with the public interest issue.

[English]

It is interesting to note that parties have actually requested that the tribunal conduct a public interest investigation in a relatively low percentage of cases, and most of these requests have concerned consumer goods. Our statistics show that since 1984 we have had 83 inquiries and there were requests for public interest investigations in only 13 cases. Of these requests, three progressed to a public interest investigation and the tribunal recommended a reduction in duties in two cases.

Based on our experience, I believe having some legislative guidance on the issue of public interest would assist the tribunal and parties in understanding what Parliament intends the balance of interest between the interests to be. I would suggest that at a minimum section 45 needs to be expanded and to include a non-exhaustive list of criteria we should be directed to look into when conducting a public interest investigation.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): I'm sorry to interrupt you too, sir, but there again, I've been generous with the time limit. I apologize, but I'm going to have to ask you to summarize, if you will, the final points. I'll try to make sure you can incorporate them in the discussion. I'm sorry about that.

Mr. Eyton: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have some remarks to make about lesser duty, because that's also an issue you've heard a great deal about, the two subcommittees. They are in my presentation. I think the lesser duty provisions might most easily be handled in a context of a public interest examination. There are grave problems with us trying to incorporate it into the section 42 hearing itself. There may also be problems for the parties that appear before us. Particularly the importers and exporters I'm sure would find it very difficult to deal with the subject of lesser duties during the course of a section 42 hearing.

Also in my remarks and in the longer statement I've left with your clerk I've made some points about the issue of confidential information and the importance we attach to the handling of confidential information in our proceedings. I certainly see the need for the Competition Bureau to have greater access to the process. Perhaps there is some means by which their expert staff could have access to that information, provided the undertakings are very strictly defined, because I would not wish the information gained in the conduct of our proceedings to be used in other proceedings, under other laws. This is very important to us. I am worried about the chilling effect that might arise should there be some increased access to the confidential information in the records of our proceedings.

The other points are in my extended or longer presentation, which I've left with you.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): Thank you, Mr. Eyton. Your paper will be read, and I appreciate your cooperation.

From Industry Canada, the Competition Bureau, represented by Mr. Lancop and Mr. Sadeque.

Mr. Robert Lancop (Chief, Division ``A'', Civil Matters Branch, Competition Bureau, Industry Canada): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving us the opportunity to appear before you today to present the views of the Competition Bureau of Industry Canada.

As you pointed out, I am here today with Zulfi Sadeque, who is the chief of international affairs at the Economics and International Affairs Branch, and Roy Hines, an adviser to the bureau on our submission, who is also a former member of the CITT.

[Translation]

The Competition Bureau is principally concerned with establishing a reasonable balance of producer and user interests in the design and application of Canada's anti-dumping and countervailing regimes.

The Competition Bureau's action, analysis and advice in this regard are grounded in the purpose of the Competition Act, which is to maintain and encourage competition in Canada. This mandate is carried out by the Director of Investigation and Research, and by the staff of the Competition Bureau, primarily through the enforcement and administration of the Competition Act, as well as through representations to regulatory tribunals and in various other policy deliberations.

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The Competition Bureau's attention to SIMA dates back to the deliberations of the Mackasey committee in 1982. At that time, the Director of Investigation and Research, Lawson Hunter, had strongly recommended that a public interest clause be included in the legislation.

His position was that, absent such a clause, anti-dumping and countervailing duties would not take into account the interests of consumers, retailers and interested parties of the industries using imported inputs.

We intervened in seven different cases before the Canadian International Trade Tribunal to talk about issues of important damages and of public interest. Each time, the Bureau recommended protecting the competition regime by implementing reduced duties in the cases where national industry is very concentrated.

[English]

The concept of public interest was included in SIMA to reconcile producer interests with those of consumers and downstream industries. However, the present method of dealing with the public interest in SIMA has not effectively incorporated interests other than those of the domestic producers. This reflects both the lack of a substantive definition of the public interest and the decision-making procedures put in place for its examination. Accordingly, our recommendations focus on the need to strike a better balance between, first, providing protection to Canadian producers against injurious dumped or subsidized imports, and second, the need to ensure the trade remedy actions do not unnecessarily limit competition in Canada or raise prices for consumers and downstream industries, which must in turn compete in both Canadian and foreign markets.

To this end, our recommendation is twofold. The public interest provision should be retained but changed from a recommendation to a decision and accompanied by the elaboration of a set of criteria to define the public interest, including the criteria of competition. More importantly, and consistent with the observed record in Canada and other jurisdictions, a lesser duty rule should be established as a separate test, incorporated as an integral element of a single CITT inquiry. Lesser duty should be defined in a manner designed to sustain production in industries affected by dumped and subsidized imports.

Our suggestions are broad but we believe practical. If the committee were to see the merit in our suggested options, their implementation would be complex but doable. In this regard, some of our important trading partners, including the European Union, Mexico, Australia, and New Zealand, employ lesser duty in their examination of dumping and subsidy cases.

We now present some of the reasoning behind our recommendations through the following three questions: first, why should the application of duties be constrained by public interest and lesser duty; second, why lesser duty; and third, why lesser duty in all cases?

On the first question, why constrain duties by public interest and lesser duty, in our submission we emphasize the significant economic costs associated with trade remedy actions. These are high prices for consumers, high prices for downstream industries and businesses, inefficient production in Canada in protected industries because of reduced competition, and reduced employment in user industries or even in protected industries themselves because of increased market power. All of these costs are greater when domestic competition is limited.

An obvious and supplementary question is why do we need a made-in-Canada response when the U.S. regime applies no limit on duties? The answer to this question lies in the differences between the Canadian and U.S. economies. First, trade accounts for a much greater percentage of our national income, and therefore anti-dumping actions are likely to be far more costly to Canadian consumers and industrial users than in the United States.

Second, Canadian domestic production tends to be more concentrated, and therefore duties are more likely to allow protected producers to exercise market power and to raise prices and profits unreasonably. This will lead to reduced employment and raise issues of fairness.

Third, the extensive foreign ownership of many Canadian industries means the benefits of protectionist actions may not flow to Canadians.

Finally, the U.S. is the only major user of trade remedies that does not apply limits associated with public interest or lesser duty as recommended by WTO agreements.

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Our second question is why a lesser duty? In the interest of fairness, any excess profits due to trade remedies should be limited, given the cost to users previously highlighted. Lesser duty would require the CITT to come to a view concerning the prices or profit necessary to sustain production, which it does not now do. It would deal with costs of production, including a normal rate of return. Data of that type are already available to the CITT and used in assessing material injury.

For that reason we have recommended integrating lesser duty and injury determinations. This would enable the process to be carried out relatively efficiently within one inquiry. Applying lesser duty to protect production in an affected industry is consistent with the central purpose of SIMA.

Our final question is, why lesser duty in all cases? Most importantly, there can be no justification for the application of duties in excess of those necessary to eliminate injury. Both the European Union and Australia apply lesser duty rules. The CITT did consider lesser duty in both the corn and beer cases but departed from this line of reasoning, citing the need for special circumstances before user interests might limit those producers.

We concluded that for the successful application of lesser duty it is necessary that it be applied in all cases. The use of a lesser duty rule at the CITT has the potential to mitigate concerns associated with the determination of normal value, especially where constructed values are used and in situations of short supply.

Several ancillary issues arise that concern the role of the director of investigation and research and the consistent treatment of lesser duty and public interest. These touch on undertakings, sunset and interim reviews, confidential information, and the director's discretion to intervene. These issues are discussed in our submission.

We'd be pleased to answer any questions the members of the committee may wish to raise. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): Thank you, Mr. Lancop.

I'd like to now proceed

[Translation]

to my colleague from the Official Opposition, Mr. Bélisle, who will start the first round of questioning. Mr. Bélisle.

Mr. Bélisle (La Prairie): Mr. McNab, could you tell us which other countries have tried to eliminate anti-dumping duties? Could you give us more information on that? How did that happen? Could you also tell us which other countries have implemented a policy similar to Canada's?

[English]

Mr. McNab: Anti-dumping measures have been eliminated between the member countries of the European Union and between Australia and New Zealand.

Mr. Grubel: Is this anti-dumping but not subsidy? Remedies for subsidies are still in place?

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): Anti-dumping has been eliminated - that's what we're talking about - but subsidies are still in place. Is that correct? Do we have confirmation on that?

Mr. McNab: My understanding, Mr. Chairman, is that in the European Union there are no countervailing duties between the member states either, but I believe that's not the case between Australia and New Zealand.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): Thank you.

[Translation]

Mr. Bélisle: Mr. McNab, when you say that Australia and New- Zealand are reconsidering their policy, is that true? Is it still true for New-Zealand and Australia?

[English]

Mr. McNab: If I understood the question correctly, Mr. Chairman, the free-trade arrangement between Australia and New Zealand is of the degree that they have decided to eliminate the use of anti-dumping provisions between the two countries.

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The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): But I believe Mr. Bélisle's question was also are they reconsidering what they've done or does it continue.

Mr. Steven Rhealt-Kihara (Trade Policy Officer, Trade Remedies Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade): They had a free trade agreement then and decided to eliminate it after it was in place for a number of years, but we're not aware of any reconsideration.

Mr. McNab: Perhaps you've already heard the -

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): Tell us what you told him.

Mr. Rhealt-Kihara: The Australia-New Zealand agreement was in place for a number of years before they decided to eliminate anti-dumping, so it didn't come with the agreement itself but was several years down the road. I'm not aware, and I don't think anyone else is, of any reconsideration of that particular provision. We'd be interested in any information you have on that, but we certainly don't know anything about it.

[Translation]

Mr. Bélisle: This answers my question. I read in your document, Mr. McNab, in the second paragraph of your introduction:

Our principal role in trade remedies is to promote and defend Canadian interests with respect to trade remedy actions, whether in the form of anti-dumping or countervailing duties or safeguard measures...

To illustrate what has been done in this field, do you have any specific examples of Canadian industries where you got involved these past few years?

[English]

Mr. McNab: Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I'll ask Mr. Robertson, who has been in this division during the recent years.

Mr. Mike Robertson (Deputy Director, Trade Remedies Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade): On the countervailing duty side, our department coordinates the response to the investigation anytime there is a countervailing duty investigation. So we're talking about, over the past number of years, magnesium, live swine, pork, the dreaded softwood lumber. In any of those investigations in which a Canadian business or sector is involved, the role of our department is to coordinate the response to the investigation and to ensure that the investigation is conducted in accordance with not only the international trade obligations of the United States but also their own law.

On the dumping side, our involvement is somewhat less direct. We advise and monitor the investigation, but it's mainly a matter of the pricing practices of private sectors. But we are there to give them a hand in understanding the investigative process, their rights and obligations under the WTO as well as U.S. domestic law, and also to intervene in areas in which the investigating authorities of other countries either are acting inconsistently with the WTO or have some leeway to make a decision, some flexibility.

The most recent one - and there are a number of individuals in this room who are quite well aware of this - is the flat-rolled steel cases in the United States in 1992 and 1993. The embassy in Washington, as directed by this department and in consultation with other departments, intervened 13 separate times on issues relevant to those investigations.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): If I may, I think part of my colleague's question was also how successful have we been?

Mr. Robertson: That depends on who you talk to.

[Translation]

Mr. Bélisle: I will reiterate my question, Mr. Chairman, if you will allow me. It is exactly the issue you raised. Could you tell us what is the average rate of success of Canadian companies in those cases? In how many cases have they won?

[English]

Mr. Robertson: Certainly on the flat-rolled steel cases we won two and lost two. On the countervailing duty cases over the past 15 years, I think our batting average is about 50%; we win - in other words, there is no injury found or they drop the case - about half of the time.

Is that satisfactory?

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): Yes, thank you, Mr. Robertson. I think Mr. Bélisle wanted a general idea.

Mr. Penson, you're next.

Mr. Penson (Peace River): Mr. McNab, I sympathize with the dilemma your department must face when you're trying to have further reforms to trade remedy law at the WTO and of course at the NAFTA, and at the same time we have pressure here in Canada to try to use this kind of system more and more. I'm just wondering how you reconcile that when your department is going to the WTO talks in Singapore here shortly to advance the cause of further trade liberalization.

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We hear around the table today that we should make this process easier and make it less costly for Canadian companies to use the process. My understanding is that it isn't a very big percentage, but Canada still is one of the leading users of trade law, especially in dumping. I just wonder how you can reconcile that fact.

Mr. McNab: While it's true Canada is a user of these laws, we're also seen as an active participant in the WTO, one that's pushing for reforms, liberalization, a truly global trading system. Even the fact that we are using the laws domestically doesn't take away from the efforts we've been conducting in the WTO, for example during the Uruguay Round negotiations, to achieve disciplines on the use of dumping and on the use of subsidies. Quite a number of reforms agreed on have been during the round on process, on procedures and dispute settlement, for example.

The inclusion of all the countries is a major change that was brought about as part of the Uruguay Round negotiations. All members of the WTO now, not just those which choose to be members of the subsidies code, are bound by the subsidies agreement, and the dumping agreement and the safeguards agreement. I think the result is that the disciplines in the exercise of these laws are expanding now to all our trading partners.

The fact that the rules are clearer doesn't mean we shouldn't use them. Greater discipline has been achieved, but as others around the table have suggested, it's up to every participating member of the WTO to assess the balance in their domestic climate between the users of the law and their obligations.

Mr. Penson: You've made the point in your presentation that we have to look at the economy at large. I assume you're saying the national interest of the country. I believe Canada has been served fairly well by taking a lead in trying to have trade liberalization and better definition of the subsidies code.

I do want to raise one point with you, though, and ask you for an idea of whether you think the anti-dumping provisions the United States uses, where there's a bit of a factor of harassment, if you like, especially in the steel industry, where the compliance is so difficult, couldn't be seen as a non-tariff barrier we could advance to the WTO on that basis, that this goes beyond normal requirements. When you are inventing ways to circumvent or make the process more cumbersome, it's really outside of that particular aspect and becomes a non-tariff barrier.

Mr. McNab: I think tightening the rules.... Perhaps the sense of harassment was one of the motivating forces behind the efforts that were put into the negotiating rounds of the Uruguay Round to tighten the rules, so for example there had to be a clear determination of the degree of support within the domestic industry before a case was brought or before it was pursued. Again I'll ask Mr. Robertson, who's very familiar with the steel cases between us and the United States, for his personal views on this.

Mr. Robertson: In general terms, because of our dependence on the United States market, what may be regarded as harassment is the sheer volume of material you have to provide in an investigation. The other thing is that their administration of their law is very inflexible, particularly in certain areas. Of course their method of collecting and enforcing an anti-dumping duty order is different from ours and does have a lot of uncertainties to it.

As far as the harassment factor is concerned, the low standards we have suggested the United States has had over the years for starting a case.... We would hope they haven't started any cases against us in the dumping area since the Uruguay Round went into effect.

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As Mr. McNab has said, the degree of industry support is an important factor in allowing them to start a case. Before now, they had a very low standard for starting a case. In fact, there were several situations where less than 25% of the industry supported launching a case and they went ahead anyway. Now, of course, they have to show that at least 50% of the industry supports the initiation of a case.

They've made a lot of changes in accordance with the Uruguay Round, but they are yet to be tested vis-à-vis Canada because they simply haven't taken any cases against us.

Mr. Penson: Okay.

Mr. Rhealt-Kihara: Just to clarify that point, Canada has several opportunities within the WTO and in other contexts to examine and scrutinize U.S. and other countries' legislations. And at those times, we, along with our colleagues in the finance and revenue departments, have taken the lead in many cases to make sure that all their legislation does live up to the WTO agreements and other obligations in those areas.

We would aggressively pursue any country that we feel was not living up to its obligations in the implementation, be it in their legislation or regulations or in the actual carrying out of any action.

Mr. Penson: As a further point, I would like to see Canada use.... It's tough for Canada to go to the WTO and ask for further improvements if we don't even use the processes that are there, such as the potential countervail action the United States was going to hit us with on softwood lumber. We accepted export quotas. That is a case in point. It could have gone to the WTO for a decision. It just seems ironic to me that we're one of those who are asking for these kinds of rules and yet when it comes time to use it we decide not to.

I won't ask you for an answer. That's a comment I'd like to make.

Voices: Oh, oh!

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): Very briefly, Mr. McNab.

Mr. McNab: In the case of softwood lumber, we did take a previous decision - not this decision - of the United States to the WTO when, in the last lumber case, they put a bonding requirement in from the time of initiation of the case to the preliminary determination. We took that to the WTO, the GATT, and we won.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): Mr. Campbell.

Mr. Campbell (St. Paul's): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Before I ask the two specific questions I have, I must say that we often hear the phrase ``faceless bureaucrats'', and I'm a member who's delighted to see you all in person. I know firsthand the fine work that you do in this area. All of you have had a great deal to do with the evolution of a complex and difficult area of the law.

And it's a pleasure, Mr. Chairman, to have them all with us today.

My first question concerns public interest and lesser duty. Several of you have spoken about those two areas, the current public interest provision and the possibility of adding a lesser duty rule, and what I'm wondering in my first question is are the two mutually exclusive? Is it an either/or situation? Would anybody like to comment on that?

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): Does anyone want to comment on that particular question? Is it either/or? Mr. Lancop.

Mr. Campbell: Or maybe it's both. In your brief I think you might have suggested that it's both.

Mr. Lancop: Yes. We've seen the concept of lesser duty incorporated within the thinking of the CITT in its early decisions in the corn and beer cases.

Initially, I think we came at the idea of public interest with the notion of clarifying it so that it would work more effectively, but we came to the view that it would be more efficient administratively to move it back to the material injury stage. We felt that if there was just a clarification of public interest we might end up with a bifurcation of the process, where public interest would be used with great regularity in order to either eliminate duties or reduce duties.

So that's how we came at it and that's why we arrived at the conclusion we did that it was more efficient to move it back to the material injury stage.

I don't know if that's helpful to you.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): Are there others who would like to add comments? Mr. Collins-Williams and then Mr. Eyton, in that order, please, gentlemen.

Mr. Collins-Williams: My answer to the question is that it is not an either/or situation. Quite frankly, it could be both.

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The lesser duty is a means by which you can reduce the level of duty. It could be applied in the context of a public interest determination. It could be applied automatically in every case, as our Competition Bureau colleagues would prefer. The effect of doing the latter would be to reduce the level of protection that SIMA presently provides to domestic producers.

Mr. Eyton: Since the CITT administers this particular provision, I do have a view that I've already expressed in part in my opening statement: we would much prefer to see it as an integral part of the public interest investigation, for a number of reasons.

First of all, to measure the level of duty that will reduce injury is no easy matter. There are many subjective judgments involved in that estimation and we do not wish to add that extra complication to the section 42 process since it would have a chilling effect, I believe, on a lot of smaller companies in coming forward with their cases to us and to Revenue Canada. So there's the extra cost and complication.

If you were to mix the lesser duty approach into the section 42 hearing, I think that exporters and importers - and perhaps domestic producers - would have a great deal of difficulty dealing with the concept of lesser duty during a section 42 injury process. Remember too that one-third of the cases we hear under section 42 when looking at injury do not proceed. We find no injury.

We would go through the extra process of estimating and hearing arguments on lesser duty and yet at the end of the day we would find no injury, so all of that would have been for nothing.

The comparisons between our process and the process that we see in the European Union are really not terribly relevant. Their institutions are different. They do not conduct their investigations with the same degree of transparent quasi-judicial processes that are a crucial part of the Canadian process. Theirs is a Star Chamber process. It's much different. Therefore, I think it's quite pointless to compare our processes with theirs.

Thank you very much.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): Yes, Mr. Campbell, a brief follow-up.

Mr. Campbell: Yes, very quickly. It's another question. I do have a follow-up to the first, but I'll wait until another round if we get that chance.

The second question really concerns the precedent that is now created by the agreement with Chile. I wanted to give our witnesses a chance to tell us why Canadian producers should be confident that the provisions of that agreement will provide them with as much or perhaps even greater protection than they have currently under the anti-dumping regime...or at least the same level of protection, perhaps achieved in a different way.

Does anybody want to comment?

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): Mr. McNab, will you comment briefly?

Mr. McNab: Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Of course when the anti-dumping exemption is fully in place at the end of six years the situation is going to be different from what it is at present. But as I mentioned in my remarks, there still are provisions in the agreement to provide protection to Canadian industries that think they are being threatened by surges in imports from Chile.

A provision in the agreement calls for a review of the exemption provision before the end of the fifth year, and the safeguard mechanisms, as I described, are available as well.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): So just to summarize, the mechanisms that currently exist will continue for a period of time. As well, there are other provisions for safeguarding. So unlike what our perception was - that all of a sudden it stopped - it has not ceased. There are mechanisms in place.

Mr. Campbell: Once in place will they be less costly, simpler and more accessible than the current regime? I know we're dealing with the future and we won't know until people start to use them....

Mr. McNab: You're dealing with the future.

You wouldn't be involved in an anti-dumping investigation, although there would be an investigation for safeguard protection. There are also provisions for consultations between the two parties in cases of exceptional circumstances, so if a Canadian industry thought that changes in the marketplace were such that consultations were required, there is a provision to cover that as well.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): You're feeling quite comfortable about this.

Mr. McNab: Yes. I think in the longer term the benefits that may flow from this in changing the thinking of people.... Ultimately, within NAFTA I think the benefits could certainly be there.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): But they want a couple of names and phone numbers to call.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): Thank you. Mr. Cullen.

Mr. Cullen (Etobicoke North): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you very much, gentlemen. I have two questions, one for Mr. Eyton and one for Mr. Lancop.

Given my experience with softwood lumber, I would love to get into my pet theory of net subsidies, but perhaps another day.

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Mr. Eyton, I understand that the CITT has proposed a new timetable for undertaking investigations and that public hearings are limited to ten days. Contrast that to the U.S., where, as I understand it, the process is undertaken in one day. Is there any particular reason for the difference?

Mr. Eyton: The ITC is set up to do quite a different job. It has more of an investigative role. Ours is both investigative and adjudicative. In its investigative role, it spends an enormous amount of time before that one- or two-day hearing conducting research, sending out detailed questionnaires, and sending out teams of auditors to verify the veracity of the information they receive. I'm told that it is a highly complex process. I'm sure some of the people around this room have more experience with it than I do, but I'm told the end result is that from the point of view of complexity and cost it is equally or more complex and costly than what we have here in Canada.

We do have a hearing that stretches on average from four days.... The average hearing for the CITT is four days. Some of our smaller cases are two and a half days or two days. As I'm saying, with these new procedures we're putting in place, we're hoping to keep the average oral hearing down to a period of two weeks.

That is necessary under our process, because we operate in a different legislative climate. We have to pay attention to the jurisprudence and the evolution of administrative law in Canada, to the principles of natural justice, and so on. These are things we have to bear in mind in the adjudicative process that we have. That explains why we have longer hearings than they have in Washington.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): Terry Collins-Williams.

Mr. Collins-Williams: Can I just add to that? The reason the Canadian system was designed as it was in terms of the CITT process is deliberately so that small businesses would have a chance to present their case in oral hearings themselves without having to engage extensive counsel. It was to allow them to state their own case before the tribunal members and not have to go through lengthy submissions prepared by teams of lawyers and accountants. It may be that our system and the complexity of our system has overtaken that, but there was a purpose originally of doing it that way.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): Do you have a second brief question, Mr. Cullen?

Mr. Cullen: With respect to Industry Canada, the public interest provision has been much discussed in previous testimony. You mentioned the need for criteria. Others have mentioned that. Is that the role for parliamentarians? Do you have any thoughts on the criteria you develop or the areas criteria would touch on?

Mr. Lancop: We've spoken in terms of economic welfare criteria primarily, and I guess we would be looking at increased costs, profits, employment, competition, and supply shortages to the downstream industries. These are basically the types....

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): I just wanted to tell my colleagues that we often get caught with the bells, and this is no exception. But I'm told that there's not yet a time posted, so until we're given that information, I shall continue. Otherwise, we could in fact be disbanding for naught.

Mr. Cullen, may I proceed now?

Mr. Graham. I haven't forgotten you, Mr. Grubel.

Mr. Graham (Rosedale): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was going to ask Mr. Eyton about the lesser duty determination, but I think your last answer, sir, helped us to understand the complexity of what that would require. But I wonder if you could just....

Having appeared before the tribunal years ago myself, I can see that recalling evidence on an issue like that could be quite difficult and very contentious - economists arguing among themselves.... Mr. Grubel, of course, would be upset by such a prospect, and Mr. Penson, who will shortly be at the WTO to straighten them out on this issue, would be equally so. In the end, would it really be the economists of the CITT who would establish that for you? Is that what you would have to do as a matter of practice?

Mr. Eyton: The members of the tribunal would certainly have the assistance of staff and our own staff economists. Our staff economists have given a great deal of thought to an appropriate model to estimate lesser duty. The problem with any model is that no one model is applicable to all situations, and every model is built on certain assumptions. Those assumptions are quite difficult.

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Even the simple question of what material injury is begs definition; it's a very difficult concept. A company can suffer injury for any number of reasons, including bad management, domestic market conditions or exchange rates. The notion is, I suppose, that by using our resources and our expertise we should somehow be able to estimate the amount of the injury that is caused by each of those different factors, including the dumped and subsidized imports. It's a very complex subject, and there's a great deal of subjectivity in it. I'm not sure that it's useful to introduce more subjectivity to the process than we already have.

Mr. Graham: Part of the problem is the cause in there as well, as it is in material injury. That would be the other issue that would be the subject matter of quite a bit of controversy.

Mr. Eyton: I would think so, and I would think that the counsel appearing before us representing the different parties would have a certain amount of difficulty in dealing with that as an additional concept in a section 42 proceeding.

Mr. Graham: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): Thank you, Mr. Graham.

Mr. Grubel, I believe you had a particularly esoteric, substantive, intellectually illuminating question. We're waiting.

Mr. Grubel: First of all, I would really like to share Mr. Campbell's remark on how impressed I am with the quality of the testimony given and the quality of the personnel here. I think Canada's interest is in very good hands indeed.

I have one request. As you know, we will have to write a report, and there will be a government report. We will be invited, as the Reform Party, to comment on it. We may have a minority report.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): We may not.

Mr. Grubel: We may or we may not.

Mr. Cullen: It's not a requirement.

Mr. Grubel: I'd like to have certain perspectives on issues that are based on empirical facts. I wonder how difficult it would be, among yourselves.... These data should be available. I would love to have a time series, maybe covering ten years, on the number of cases brought before the tribunal, the number of cases in which injury was found, the average length of time between them, and what the extremes were - the shortest and the longest. I would love to know then, to put this into perspective, what the value of trade affected by the decisions made by industry was, because I'm worried that this whole hearing was caused by a concentration of cases in one industry or two industries. I'd like to see a prospectus.

I have several other questions on these, relating to such things as the value of the extra duty collected, how big a percentage it was, and how big the industries are that were affected by these things. Finally, I would love to know whether there are any estimates on how much it costs to administer this whole system. This is just the old efficiency argument coming into my mind.

I have a question.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): I thought you had just asked two. I'm not following you.

Mr. Grubel: I wonder whether it would be possible for the collective group here to provide such background information to the clerk, who can then pass it on to us. I think it should even be in the front of the Liberal report on these hearings for background, for anybody who goes to it - industry, scholars, or whoever it might be.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): I would hope that it would be at the front of the committee's report. I'm an optimist, Mr. Grubel. We will certainly look at that possibility.

I have someone who wants to answer your points.

Mr. Grubel: It's not a point. It's just a question I asked - whether you could get those numbers.

I have a question that involves judgment - that nobody can do better than you people. We have heard here testimony that in order to get the Americans to behave better we should hit them with being nasty. As somebody put it, we want to make the road rougher on this side of the border as well, in order to bring the Americans around and behave and not harass us as much. What would your reaction be to someone...? What is the likelihood that the Americans will react in the way these people anticipated? Or may the Americans actually be nasty and hit us in some other way?

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): Just to make sure, Mr. Grubel, are you asking whether we should or should not get tougher with the Americans?

Mr. Grubel: No. I'm asking the people who are dealing daily with the Americans what their judgment is. It must be personal; it cannot be substantiated. I would just like to have a personal judgment as to whether such action would bring the desired results.

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The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): I'm going to go around the table very quickly. Do you have any comments? It's obviously up to you if you wish to comment or not.

Mr. Brimble: I guess our view on that is purely personal and related to the exposure we have had to this business over the years. We would not feel these types of activities would impact heavily on the question; impact heavily on the American administration. I think most of the corporations involved in cases involving anti-dumping and countervailing are prepared to play by the rules. In many cases the Americans have very complex rules, and they have a large legal contingent in the United States who are quite prepared to deal with that.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): Mr. Lancop.

Mr. Lancop: Our point of view would be that we should not be driven by what the Americans do but rather we should do what is in the best interests of the Canadian economy. To that extent we should not raise barriers that disadvantage Canadian business and lead to a downturn in economic activity.

I wonder, though, Mr. Chairman, if I could address a point made by Mr. Eyton earlier. I went to address it and I missed my opportunity.

Mr. Eyton made the comment that in his view adding lesser duty to the material injury stage would lead to more subjectivity in the law. Our view is quite the opposite. Our view is that it would be based more on factual evidence put before the tribunal. To the extent that it would obviate the need for a public interest proceeding, which is by its nature subjective, we think the law would be much clearer, it would be much more transparent, and to that extent it would be better understood by all parties and be more objective.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): Thank you. Mr. Collins-Williams.

Mr. Collins-Williams: In response to the question, I would observe that anti-dumping is deeply engrained in the American political system. There's a deep political commitment to their anti-dumping regime. I believe nothing is going to move them off their commitment to enforcing their anti-dumping regime -

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): So get tough or otherwise it isn't going to have an effect.

Mr. Collins-Williams: - other than the internal domestic pressure of other interest groups in the U.S., who over time will realize the cost imposed on their economy by their own anti-dumping regime. But until we can tap into that interest group in the U.S. I don't think we're going to have a realistic chance of overturning the attachment they have to their anti-dumping regime.

Mr. Grubel: The model presented by the steel workers and the Honourable Macdonald just two days ago was that if we really were tough with some American importers, they in turn would go to their legislators and say do something so we don't get harassed. This is the model. Is it realistic?

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): I did say I wanted to give everybody an opportunity. The bells are ringing. We're going to have to leave. I'm not going to be able to meet that commitment if we don't move on.

Mr. Eyton, in response to getting tough or not.

Mr. Eyton: I don't think it's appropriate for me to respond to that question. I preside over a quasi-judicial independent agency. I prefer to maintain my independence.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): Thank you. Next?

Mr. McNab: As I said in my remarks, Mr. Chairman, since we have decided in some cases to be a bit tougher, as I understand it, it remains to be seen what the effects of that are. I agree fully with Mr. Collins-Williams the impetus for change must come from within interested groups in the United States. That's what we're hoping to accomplish in anti-dumping in the longer term. But the Americans are very much used to quite a litigious way of sorting their affairs out, so they're used to playing it rough.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): Mr. Collins-Williams, I believe you had a reaction to some of the comments Mr. Grubel made in his preamble. I'm not necessarily trying to get you to respond. I thought I detected an interest in responding.

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Mr. Collins-Williams: A great deal of the information Mr. Grubel has requested is available and a considerable amount of analysis along those lines has been done by various of the agencies represented here. If we could be given a list of exactly what information is being requested, then I'm certain among all our agencies we will do our best to provide it.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): Thank you very much.

[Translation]

Mr. Bélisle, you have the floor.

Mr. Bélisle: Considering what Mr. Grubel was saying, should we be tougher towards the U.S. or not? I would like to know what you think and what the other witnesses think about this.

On the page 3 of Mr. McNab's statement, in paragraphs 3 and 4, I can read that:

it remains to be seen whether the «get tough»...

or the bully

...strategy will provide us with needed leverage with United States in terms of trade remedies.

If I understand correctly, you mean that, since we are facing a country whose economy is nine to ten times bigger than ours, we are in the position of David facing Goliath. I believe that the get tough strategy might not be the best one and that we should perhaps act in a more subtle manner, as you correctly suggest in the fourth paragraph.

You said that, as far as trade remedies are concerned, the Canadian government's approach is a multilateral one, within the WTO, as well as a bilateral one, with the NAFTA partners.

Have I understood correctly that Canada's strategy is more to try and find allies to face the U.S. as a group? Is that your position? This would be a much more subtle strategy when one faces a trade partner that is nine or ten times bigger than us.

[English]

Mr. McNab: Yes, I think that's an accurate assessment. It has probably been stated for quite some time that when we're so small and they're so big we have to rely on the rules perhaps a bit more and be very active in the formation of those rules. That certainly has been the position Canada has taken in GATT, the WTO, and the Uruguay Round negotiations, and as we discussed earlier, there have been some significant improvements in the trade remedies area in the WTO. Similarly, in the negotiation of the free trade agreement and NAFTA the reliance on rules that we think serve our national interest and bind our other partners as well...they have proven themselves to be in our interest. That's certainly the basis on which we're operating.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): We're in the process of finding out why the bells have stopped. I've been informed the vote will not be taken until 5:30 p.m. In the meantime, I have a bit of a problem here.

[Translation]

Mr. Bélisle: I find that very interesting. Canada's approach is to work with all our partners to improve the disciplines. This might be a more advisable method.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): One should not forget that David won the fight, did he not?

Mr. Bélisle: That is why I remain optimistic.

[English]

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): A brief question by Mr. Penson.

Mr. Penson: I'm not sure who wants to handle my question, or if several do. It concerns the fact that Revenue Canada gets involved at an early stage and does an interim position in terms of finding. I wonder if that's really necessary, if the CITT couldn't handle it all. It seems to me it would be more of a streamlined process, as compared with Revenue Canada taking it with very little information, making a preliminary finding, and then handing it off, and the CITT ending up picking it up and making the ultimate ruling.

Mr. Collins-Williams: The essential structure of our system is a bifurcated system in which Revenue Canada receives the initial complaint, determines that it's properly documented, initiates the investigation, and conducts the preliminary determination of both dumping and injury. At that stage the investigation is split and Revenue Canada continues its dumping investigation to a final determination, and the CITT, which has the expertise and the judicial or administrative authority to conduct public hearings, conducts the injury investigation. What has been proposed is bringing the CITT and its expertise on injury determination into the process earlier so that it conducts the whole of the preliminary injury, as well as the final injury determination. That is certainly a possible amendment to our existing process.

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Mr. Penson: I understand that better now, but I wonder about the wisdom of having any sort of preliminary finding. Why don't we leave it until the ultimate research is done and a decision is made there, rather than an interim decision.

Mr. Collins-Williams: Our system is structured to conform to the international rules as set out in the WTO. They provide for a preliminary determination of injury so that if there's no evidence of injury at all, you can end the case more quickly. On the other hand, if there is a clear indication of injury in dumping, as we are allowed under the WTO, we can apply interim duties at that point to stop the dumping practice and to stop its injurious effects while the investigation is completed. So it serves purposes on both sides.

Mr. Eyton: I also would like to clarify that in my earlier comments, in my opening statement, I suggested that it might be useful for these subcommittees to consider a more complete bifurcation, and that the tribunal should take responsibility for making the preliminary determination of injury, which Revenue Canada does right now. But I'm not suggesting a bifurcation that is as complete as what they have in the United States at the present time.

In my view, small or medium-sized companies will have a greater likelihood of using this legislation if Revenue Canada maintains its role as the gatekeeper at the front end of the process. Revenue Canada would continue to have responsibility for determining whether a complaint was properly documented and would continue, all on its own and without any input from the CITT, to make the decision as to whether or not to initiate a case. There are many cases that Revenue Canada feels are not properly documented or that do not give any reasonable evidence of injury, and they do not proceed with them, they do not initiate them.

It is only at the initiation stage that I would suggest that there might be some merit in your considering whether or not we should be involved at that stage. The CITT would then become involved and would solicit the information from the parties to determine whether or not there was sufficient evidence to prove that there should be a preliminary determination of injury.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): Thank you, Mr. Eyton.

Were there others who wanted to add some more? Yes, Mr. Brimble.

Mr. Brimble: I would really just like to reconfirm largely the points that were made by Mr. Eyton and Mr. Collins-Williams. It boils down to a question of costs to the complainants and potential complainants. We feel that costs are probably less in approaching the department on a less formal basis. Access to the department is simple because there is one single window for access on both questions. Thirdly, the department is in a position and is well known to have the capacity to be able to assist producers to understand the legislation and the requirements to get a case going in those instances where they need and seek protection.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): There's a certain percentage that don't go beyond the department. What would that be?

Mr. Brimble: There's a large percentage of inquiries that never proceed to cases. A much larger proportion of inquiries do not proceed to actual implementation initiation than we receive. I believe it's approximately one in four that actually proceed to an initiation.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): Thank you.

Did you have something on that same point, Mr. Graham? No? Then we'll go to Mr. Cullen before we proceed.

The bells have been deferred - some of you will know that. So what I would propose to do, unless I'm outvoted - and even then I would resist - is go to Mr. Cullen and Mr. Graham. I will then permit everyone to make a final brief statement on any of the points they would want to clarify or re-emphasize, or perhaps make points they did not get a chance to make. And I think I then have to wrap it up.

Mr. Cullen.

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Mr. Cullen: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I find the argument that we won't really win a battle with the U.S. by making our rules tougher quite persuasive. On the other hand, I'm not sure where the light is at the end of the tunnel, because I know members from the finance and trade departments talked about the business of trying to get to the consumers in the United States.

In the context of let's say softwood lumber - the one I'm familiar with - we all know that in all three countervails, the industry and the Government of Canada tried to reach the consumers to convince them that they were paying out $2,000 more for a home, or $3,000, or whatever the current number is. It just hasn't worked despite serious efforts that have escalated over the years. So I just wonder what the light at the end of the tunnel is.

To provide a counterpoint argument, if we can't make progress through our trading relationships by trying to get them to react to tougher rules here, and if we don't seem to be able to reach the end consumers on public interest, for example, how do we find our way out of this box?

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): So what do we do? Is someone going to resolve that problem? Mr. Collins-Williams.

Mr. Collins-Williams: We're certainly not going to resolve the problem, not today or tomorrow. But let me suggest that the issue of getting tougher with the United States isn't really the issue. Other witnesses, both today and on previous occasions before these subcommittees, have said that we need to have a trade remedy system that is appropriate to our economy and that serves the interest of our businesses and consumers.

It is a very high priority of the government to achieve reform and ultimately the elimination of the anti-dumping and countervailing regimes with the United States. That is being approached, as Mr. McNab said previously, on a number of tracks. One of them is in multilateral reform, primarily in the WTO, but also in certain regional groupings like Latin America, free trade with the South America, and APEC. We do have significant trading allies there who share our concerns about the U.S. anti-dumping system.

We have both the WTO and NAFTA dispute settlement procedures. They function differently, but both provide us with effective avenues to challenge American anti-dumping and countervail actions when they are taken. As Mr. Robertson said, the Americans haven't actually been using their law against us in the last couple of years. So the new rules that are imposed under the WTO in subsidies, countervail and anti-dumping haven't yet been tested, but they will be.

The third thing is the bilateral approach with the United States, and that has to be an evolutionary and long-term strategy. We have to convince a number of economic interests in the United States that their anti-dumping regime is not serving the larger national economic interests of the United States. It's interesting that groups in the U.S., like the Council of Economic Advisers, have drawn attention to the cost of the anti-dumping regime to the U.S.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): Mr. Graham, a final brief question to you, and then we'll summarize.

Mr. Graham: I hope it's a brief question, Mr. Chairman. It relates to international law, constitutional law and the corn case, and it's for the lawyers with us. It follows up on Mr. Penson's point about the integrity of our domestic system as it relates to the international system.

You'll recall that in the corn case, the Supreme Court of Canada said that if the tribunal or the Federal Court chooses to apply Canadian law in a way that is contrary to our obligations under the GATT, that's not their problem, it's a problem of the Government of Canada, and it has to be fought out at the GATT. The domestic tribunal just has to apply the local law.

Some of you may know that in the case of extradition cases, for example, the Extradition Act specifically provides that extradition treaties prevail over the provisions of the act itself. In order to ensure that our domestic law is in conformity with our international obligations, would it be advisable that there be a provision in this act saying that when applying the act, the tribunal and courts will take into consideration rulings of the new WTO panels to ensure that we don't get into another position like the corn case, where in corn and boneless beef we clearly were applying a Canadian law that was totally inconsistent with our international obligations?

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Mr. Collins-Williams: I think there are two aspects to the question. First, it is our constitutional practice that we implement international trade agreements by amendments to our domestic law. It is the domestic law that is therefore the authority for the implementation of our international obligations.

But in terms of a situation in which an inconsistency arises between, for instance, a ruling of a WTO panel and a decision of one of our administering authorities, we do now have provision in the WTO amendments that were made to SIMA that the government can make adjustments or direct adjustments to be made such that we would be in conformity with our international obligations.

So I'd have to take that under reference. I'll look into it.

Mr. Graham: Thank you very much.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): May I try to interpret that? As I understand what you've said, what Mr. Graham has asked is possible under the amendments introduced. Is that correct?

Mr. Collins-Williams: Yes, I'm advised that it's an amendment to section 76.1 of SIMA.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): Okay.

Are there other responses to that particular point? If not, I'd like to now go to summaries.

Mr. McNab, are you in the position to make a final comment or comments?

Mr. Grubel: [Inaudible - Editor].

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): I don't hear what I'm not supposed to hear, Mr. Grubel. I'm the chair.

Mr. McNab: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to say that we appreciated very much the opportunity to participate with our government colleagues in expressing our views to you, and were pleased to answer the questions. I'm delighted to see that there are questions beyond just the operation of the act itself, and questions that are of interest to members of the committee. We'll be following your deliberations with great interest.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): Mr. Eyton.

Mr. Eyton: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I guess I can only recommend to you and your colleagues to read my excellent presentation, which I only got halfway through.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): I feel very badly about that, and I promise you it will be read before I get back to the office tomorrow - both yours and Mr. Brimble's.

Mr. Eyton: The one point I wanted to make just very briefly was in the last half of my presentation, and it concerned the question of reviews. We at the tribunal, on reflecting upon our experience of the last eight years, would find it useful to have greater clarification as to the nature of the differences between interim reviews and sunset or expiry reviews.

It would also be helpful if we could be given the authority under the legislation to investigate, in a partial way, in the interim review process. In other words, when one class of goods is no longer being produced in Canada halfway through a five-year hearing, right now the importers and exporters have a rather difficult decision to make. They have to decide whether or not to come forward to ask us for an interim review, in which case we have to look at the entire class of goods, we have to look at the entire finding. And if we decide that there is still a threat of injury at that stage, then it goes in place for another five-year period.

So we think there's some tinkering that can be done in that area that would be helpful to Canadian industry, to Canadian producers, and it would make our life a little bit easier as well.

Thank you very much.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): Mr. Collins-Williams.

Mr. Collins-Williams: I want to thank you for the opportunity to present our views to the subcommittees, and say that if there is any further assistance that we can provide, we'd be very happy to do so.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): Mr. Lancop.

Mr. Lancop: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to make a brief comment to reiterate what we said in our presentation and in our written comments.

First of all, we believe strongly that we should have a made-in-Canada solution to this law. We believe it is most important for the law to promote competition and economic welfare. In doing so, it should strike a better balance between the interests of domestic producers, downstream users who rely so heavily on imported inputs for exports, and consumers. We believe this can best be achieved by a system that incorporates lesser duty in the material injury proceeding and that retains the public interest with elaborated criteria, including competition. We believe such a system would ensure administrative efficiency and result in greater transparency in the law and greater procedural fairness.

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Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to give our views.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): Mr. Brimble.

Mr. Brimble: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to make the points that I have raised.

Just to sum up, I would make the point that on the question of lesser duty, our concerns relate back to some of the general concerns that I raised earlier regarding complexity - complexity of administration and complexity for all parties involved - in trying to determine how to apply lesser duty rules. It is one matter to get a finding in place, and it is another matter to ensure that it is properly administered on an ongoing basis. I would urge the committee to consider the question of cost and complexity in that regard.

Similarly, on the question of bifurcation, I understand the incentives for the tribunal to enter into the process at an earlier date following the initiation of an investigation. That does not present any significant difficulties to me, but I would again caution consideration of the smaller to medium-sized businesses and the question of costs and complexities in the whole addressing of any revisions to the legislation.

Thank you.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Duhamel): Thank you.

[Translation]

Thank you to all the witnesses for their testimony that was very much appreciated.

[English]

I would invite all of those whose presentations were not fully introduced into the record orally to call me by noon tomorrow to ask me questions on those parts that were left out, in order to see whether or not I've honoured my commitment.

I want to say to you quite sincerely that I appreciated your patience with me. I dislike chairing meetings under such conditions when you're expecting a vote but you want to make sure that everyone gets an opportunity to make their main points, and when you want all of your colleagues to at least be able to pose the questions that are of greatest importance to them. You've been patient with me and I'm most appreciative.

You have important information to share, and clearly that's been recognized by all of us. As chair, I was flirting with the idea of perhaps going to the vote and then coming back because we could carry on the discussions. Rather than do that, because one never knows what happens when one goes to the House - we could be delayed somewhat and leave you waiting unnecessarily - we'll simply bring the meeting to an end. Please note, however, that we may have to contact you for some additional or further information. I simply wanted to tell you that.

[Translation]

Thank you and good night.

The meeting is adjourned.

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