[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]
Thursday, February 6, 1997
.0948 
[English]
The Chair: We are meeting on the business of supply. Mr. Laurin is on his way but is delayed a little. I believe Mr. Loney is being dispatched here. We all seem to have conflicting committee obligations these days.
Based on the committee's discussion on Tuesday we have invited as witnesses Mr. Marleau, Clerk of the House, and Mr. Montpetit, the clerk assistant, to help us through the knotty problem of procedures, concurrence, amendments, committee reports and - totally unrelated to rules of procedure in the House of Commons - the issue of confidence.
You've had a chance to look at the sections of our report. Did you have anything to say before we start, Mr. Marleau?
Mr. Robert Marleau (Clerk of the House): Just by way of general comment, Madam Chair, few parliamentarians have ever devoted such energy and commitment to the supply process -
The Chair: Not for a few years.
Mr. Marleau: - and practitioners like us rejoice at reading some of your material. The body of evidence this committee has accumulated in toto, if nothing else, stands as an example of your commitment. I think it will be extremely useful to students of the parliamentary process for a long time to come.
The Chair: We hope it will be useful to parliamentarians, Mr. Marleau.
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Mr. Marleau: I was saying that if it does nothing else, it will certainly stand as a testament of the work you've done.
The Chair: Thank you.
To my two colleagues here and others who have joined us from time to time around this table, you're right - there aren't too many people who are excited by the business of supply.
Mr. Marleau: But it is very important. It's fundamental to our parliamentary system, as you well know.
I had no specific comments about the excerpts you provided to us.
The Chair: If you don't mind, maybe we could get a run-through of the procedures that relate to the business of supply.
Mr. Williams (St. Albert): I was just going to add, Madam Chair, that I appreciate these comments, but I am still very much a student of the situation.
The Chair: As we all are.
Mr. Marleau: If I may respond to your request, I could very briefly give you the evolution of the changes in the rules, a very broad brush to point out the rules as they are, as they might be used in what I detect as a trend in your thinking as to the body of evidence, and from there answer your questions about how you might want to look at those rules.
From 1867 to about 1913 there was really no change in supply. We always ask what the functions are of the House of Commons. They are to legislate and grant supply essentially, and to hold the government accountable and responsible. Those are the three basic principles, supply being the fundamental tenet of the British parliamentary system.
Until 1913 there was very little change. In 1913 the House bogged down in committee of supply for an eternity, and essentially it became the dominant part of the debate of the House. The rules were changed to try to advance that by altering the procedures concerning supply motions and notices around them and allowing considerable amendments thereto. I'll spare you the details.
The year 1955 was the other watershed when again the House seemed to be bogging down for long periods of time in the committee of supply. To try to accelerate this, a procedure came forward for a non-debatable procedure withdrawing some estimates from the committee of supply and referring them to standing committee. This tried to ease the pressure on the committee of supply to see if we could resolve some of the differences of opinion or provide two standing committees an opportunity for review.
The year 1968 is really the watershed in the modern era, if I can put it that way, of supply. All estimates were for the first time referred to standing committees. In the initial years, from 1968 to about 1972, committees didn't know quite what to do with them. I remember being a committee clerk in those days, and members wanted to do far more with the estimates than simply reduce them and negative them.
They began a series of reports to the House making recommendations thereon. In other words, they had the estimates, and while they couldn't really go beyond the Crown's sole responsibility for initiating expenditure, they developed the magic words: the committee recommends that the government consider the advisability of doing this or that, and then listing a series of recommendations pertinent to the estimates.
Several of those reports were tabled in the House in 1970 and 1971 until Speaker Lamoureux, when one of those reports came forward for concurrence since it had a substantive recommendation in it, ruled that all that had been transferred to the standing committees in the 1968 change were the old powers of the committee of supply. Essentially, committees were bound to just report the estimates, reduce them or negative them. They could not reallocate them. They could not increase them, obviously.
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Second, the speaker further ruled that all these substantive recommendations were out of order, and he ruled that particular report out of order. That put an end to this attempt by the committees to try to impress upon the government certain supply priorities. That's essentially where we are. Since Confederation - I think that's what my briefing material says - about 31 supply motions have been adopted that have impacted on the estimates in one way or another.
From reading your evidence, the rules as they are allow committees to reduce or negative the estimates, and when reported to the House those estimates are amended. If the government takes no initiative to reinstate those estimates - and it need not - when they are concurred in by the House they will be concurred in as amended.
Then, on the last supply day, the estimates are concurred in - or as reinstated or as amended - and when that order is adopted it becomes an order to bring in a supply bill, which is just another bill. That has three readings and a Committee of the Whole procedure on that day. It is one of the few bills now that goes back to the Committee of the Whole. At no later than 10 o'clock that day we must put all questions to dispose of the supply, depending on what period of the calendar we're in. The last allotted day in June is the date the government can count on getting the funds it requires to administer the Public Service of Canada.
The trade-off in 1968 was that for this cut-off date, for this guillotine, if I can put it that way, the opposition received 25 supply days where it could set the debate on the floor of the House.
Initially, some of these were deemed to be non-confidence motions. They were labelled as such in the Standing Orders, because the supply motions of old were treated as non-confidence motions. Therefore, when they were translated into a subject of debate, often those motions were drafted in terms that said, for example, ``We believe that the Government of Canada should pull out of NATO, and this House consequently, for the government's refusal not to pull out of NATO, has lost confidence in the government.'' The vote would be on those terms.
Later on - I believe it was the 1974-75 interim Standing Orders - the issue of non-confidence was removed from the Standing Orders for supply days. I believe Mitchell Sharp was government House leader at the time and he committed the government to vote for some of these motions the opposition would bring forward if they met the agreement of the government. Indeed, there were several that did and were voted by the majority of the House.
But those Standing Orders never translated into permanent Standing Orders. We returned to the old ones of pre-1974, restating that they were matters of confidence. Then, of course, there was the McGrath committee, which you're quite aware of from the material you've reviewed. That removed all motions of non-confidence out of the Standing Orders, and essentially that's where we stand today.
Speakers past - Speaker Lamoureux, Speaker Jerome, and I believe Speaker Sauvé also - when asked to interpret whether a motion was one of confidence or non-confidence, have always stayed away from making a determination of what was confidence. I think I've said to you that from my perspective confidence is in the eye of the government and the Speaker has no procedural grounds on which to rule whether a matter is one of confidence or not.
So even when there was a statement in the Standing Orders that a motion could be one of non-confidence in the government, the Speakers refused to interpret them one way or another depending on what the results of the vote might be.
In essence, the rules you have before you now do provide for treatment of the estimates. What has happened, however - and I'll try to close with this - is that prior to 1987 there was always a motion on the last supply day that was debated and ended in a vote. It could be a wheat farmers' issue...it doesn't matter; it was the issue of the day, usually a current issue. That debate would take place until the appointed hour for interruptions, at, say, 9:45 p.m., and we would put the vote on the motion.
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As a consequence, the concurrence of the estimates, the study of the supply bill - first reading, second reading, the Committee of the Whole, third reading, and final disposition of supply - was all done under the guillotine with no further debate. That essentially was the practice from 1968 until today - almost. In 1989 the Standing Orders provided that on the last allotted day in June there would be no motion. There was a thrust to try to create more interest on the last allotted day on focusing on the supply or the estimates of the government. Hence, the opposition cannot put down a motion on subjects of great variety. So you have the concurrence of the estimates being the first item up for debate.
Usually there's an opposed item. For example, we had one recently where we debated the estimates of the Senate all day. We talked about the Senate and Senate reform and the issues and how much and that type of thing. At 9:45 p.m. that question was put, estimates were concurred in, and then the supply bill was again done on the guillotine.
You may want to look at how you might want to change some of the rules to provide - if that's what you want to do - easier access to Committee of the Whole debate on that last supply day on the clauses of the supply bill that would provide for amendments to be moved in Committee of the Whole to the specific clauses and schedules of the bill, where you could move amendments to specific items in supply for reduction or to test the confidence, if that's what you want to do, or test the House on whether they should pass or not pass.
At that point, it's too late for the government to reinstate. The reinstatement of supply, of estimates, comes at the front end, before the supply bill. When it's come out of standing committees and you oppose an item as an opposition, the government confirms it by putting on the agenda the motion to concur or to reinstate, if it lost an estimate in committee. But once you're into the supply bill, we're into the final process.
All those clauses are debatable and amendable. The problem has been, since 1968, that you never get there. There's always another issue to debate, either before it, through a motion - except on the last allotted day - or on the opposed items in the estimates, which becomes the debate of the day rather than a process where you go through the supply.
I didn't want to go much longer. I'll leave it there for questions, Madam Chair.
The Chair: Mr. Pagtakhan.
Mr. Pagtakhan (Winnipeg North): Just on that last point, Mr. Marleau, why is that issue the focus for debate? Why is that? Is it something that is automatic or something that is imposed by the government or by the opposition? Why does something exist that can steal from the process of debates during the Committee of the Whole?
Mr. Marleau: I think I'd have to say that, short of the few members in this room, the actual debate on the content of supply is not as attractive to members, or timely at the time it comes. It could be that on that day,
[Translation]
in terms of newsworthiness, a debate on the Senate would be much more appealing than a debate on the estimates of the Department of the Environment or on the application of certain legislative clauses under specific circumstances.
[English]
So it's usually a question of current affairs that either drives the opposition parties to put down an issue they wish to debate, or in the case where the opposition may wish to debate a specific estimate or a series of estimates, the government, as part of the rules, can keep the debate going all day on the first item.
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Let's say the first item - because we have to take them seriatim - is ports in Nova Scotia and the second item is the secretariat free trade budget. Let's take that example and say that what you really want to get at in terms of supply is the budget of the secretariat for free trade. The first item can be kept going in debate all day by the government if it so wishes, which prevents you getting to the second item because you're under closure for that day.
So it's the dynamic of the debate and the politics of the day, I think, that cause the supply process to fall by the wayside in terms of a focus. Dare I say that opportunism, from time to time, also dictates that the opposition will bring a particular motion? And supply is the last thing in the focus of the House and in the focus of the politics of the day.
Mr. Pagtakhan: It can be used by either side.
Mr. Marleau: Yes.
Mr. Pagtakhan: There is no practical advice that you can give on how to thwart either side procedurally.
Mr. Marleau: Tactical procedural advice is something we really don't dispense, if I can put it that way, from the table. I think what you're looking for is a mechanism that might, either as a matter of course or from time to time, allow the House to get at the supply bill for debate for a reasonable amount of time in the day. What you might look at is...in terms of how to restructure those rules, I could come up with six or seven options for you that would allow that.
It could be that you just rewrite the rules for the last supply day in a particular supply period, like June, so that the main supply bill of the year gets some debate. Or maybe you just want to do it on supplementary estimates - supply-based, thereon - so that you really get at the issues as to why they went over budget or why new programs came forward, and guarantee that on the last supply day, when the supply bill's before the House, a certain amount of time in that guillotine day would be devoted to the bill for debate. In other words, you could say, for example, that once you get to, say, second reading of the supply bill, no less than one hour of debate shall be taken up in Committee of the Whole.
You can structure it any way you want, but if you're looking for a mechanism, rather than a tactic, I think that's where you have to focus on the rules as to how you might allow the House to get into the Committee of Supply, where you have far more liberty to debate the clauses.
Again, you could debate clause 1 for an hour in the Committee of the Whole. Maybe you want a mechanism that would allow the designation of a specific clause or clauses to be debated, rather than clause 1, because all you're going to do is translate what's happening onto the front end of concurrence of the estimates into the Committee of Supply and you'll have a debate on clause 1 for the hour.
I think you're looking for mechanisms that would allow the House to get at specific clauses of the bill for a certain amount of time. You can write that ten different ways. It's a matter of what you want to do and what you can sell, I suppose, through this process.
Mr. Pagtakhan: Here is my last question on this point, Madam Chair.
Based on your historical observation, what would be a reasonable period of time for debate on the supply bill so that debate would be sufficient and yet ensure that the balance is maintained between the competing interests of the government and the opposition so that one does not have an edge over the other? What would a Canadian citizen at large see as a reasonable time allotment for debate?
Mr. Marleau: I don't want to evade the question, Mr. Pagtakhan, but that's the subject, I think, of a paper in and of itself. I don't think you can just take that - the reasonable amount of time for debate in a Committee of the Whole on a supply bill - as the one element that would sort of balance all of this.
Let's not forget that the opposition has had 25 supply days in the calendar. However they may chose to use them - for political purposes or representational purposes - they have considerable freedom in the content of those motions for debate. I think you have to take those 25 days as part - it's 20 now and it was 25 post-1968; it's 20 now because of the reduced calendar. Those20 days represent a proportion, I think, of what you see as being reasonable debate on the government's intentions of supply. How the opposition uses it is up to them.
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It's difficult to say how much time in Committee of Supply when you've got one day on the last allotted day. I think it would be reasonable to give notice of a specific clause or clauses, and reasonable to give notice to the minister to be there in Committee of the Whole to explain. That, I think, is the first reasonableness test, so that you don't surprise the ministry or the House.
Second, you could be talking about a $5 billion item, or, as you well know politically, you could be talking about a $10,000 item. The test of reasonableness of that, I think, is hard to establish.
The Chair: Mr. Williams, and then Mr. Laurin.
Mr. Williams: Thank you, Madam Chair.
Thank you, Mr. Marleau, for again, we are always indebted to the body of knowledge that you have access to and the great insight you are able to give us into these matters.
What I'm wrestling with in my mind is how confidence and the business of supply have always been intertwined. The real business of the debate on the supply has become to some degree stylized and thwarted because confidence seems to have gained the upper hand.
On the motion to concur - which is tabled, or reinstated, or reintroduced, whichever it may be, by the minister - it comes to a vote before we move into the actual bill regarding supply. The government says that confidence applies onto the concurrence motion or the reintroduction or the reinstatement. When that motion is approved, to reverse their position on dealing with the bill regarding supply, which as a rule comes the same day, would be a perceived impossibility. If you vote for the concurrence, how can you vote against the bill when you're dealing with it in supply? The rules are stacked in favour of supporting confidence rather than allowing debate, recognizing that confidence is an integral part of the debate.
Do you see what I'm trying to say? The rules are written to support confidence rather than to ensure debate, recognizing confidence is in there. I'm looking for ways to allow a free and open exchange for people's opinions to be heard - and, if deemed appropriate, acted upon - while preserving confidence, because I recognize confidence is an integral and fundamental part of our system.
But what we've had since 1968 is that the weight of rules against achieving success are so onerous that people have turned their back on the business of supply. It has become at best a perfunctory process. In today's situation, where we spend so much money, have so much debt and so on, that we treat the business of supply as a perfunctory process is an affront to the Canadian people.
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It is to bring the rules into a new focus that allows an appropriate debate, with appropriate decisions to be carried through to finality - at the same time recognizing that the government needs to enjoy the confidence of the House.
I have focused on rule 81(3), which deals with the concurrence, reinstatement, and reintroduction. But you have explained how that works in tandem with the actual bill regarding supply.
First, if there is a motion to concur and the government deems that confidence, then do you agree that confidence therefore obviously would also apply in the bill regarding supply, and that therefore if you vote for concurrence you can't vote against the bill?
Mr. Marleau: Yes. Camille says it's either way.
As far as the issue of confidence being intertwined with supply, I'm not sure I'm in unison with you on the fact that the rules are written to support confidence. I would rather interpret it that the rules are written, are slanted, in favour of the majority of the government in order to guarantee that at the end of the day, whatever that is, the government can get its legislation through the House and its supply through the House. There's no doubt about that.
It's not a 50-50 split between government and minority on the rules. The government has a mandate, has been elected, and the rules provide for the minority to be heard. There's a time provided through the rules, and certain guarantees to the rules, and yet there are a couple of mechanisms so that when the government is in a hurry for whatever reasons - in the eye of the opposition sometimes legitimate or illegitimate - they can get around some of those rules and act faster. There is usually, at least in principle, a political cost for exercising that. That's how I would view the rules, rather than confidence.
The confidence issue is a political one. We've seen governments lose minor estimates, minor money bills, and an absolute demand from the media and the opposition of the day for resignation. We've seen taunts or offers from the opposition to let go the issue of confidence on big issues for what you imply being a more free vote by the House - party factions - with the sort of ``guarantee'' that they won't demand resignation. That is the political issue, I think, that is more difficult to resolve through the rules.
Mr. Williams: What we've found in the past is that there appears to have been a double standard in the fact that the government says confidence applies. However, we have seen instances where the government has lost that vote and then gone on to introduce an actual motion of confidence that they have enjoyed, therefore ignoring the original motion, which included confidence - a double standard.
What I would like to see is a situation where we allow amendments, and after these amendments are debated and voted upon we then have a motion of confidence - however worded - where the House can express its confidence in the government after we have dealt with the business of supply.
Is that an appropriate way to go? Would that allow a more open debate on the estimates process, the business of supply, because people would then know that at the end of the day they could still express their confidence or otherwise in the government?
Mr. Marleau: Procedurally, that's doable. Whether it would fit within the party discipline concepts that we have, whether you could allow the government backbenchers to freely vote on a series of estimates and then have the security of voting confidence in the government later on in the day - that is the dynamic you're setting into play there. It's hard for me to say it would work. It really falls back onto a party discipline issue. That's where I think confidence is entwined far more than it is with supply.
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It's not unusual in Britain for the government to lose a money bill, because we usually equate confidence with a money bill. That's the simplistic approach to it. If you lose a money bill in the House, you can't manage the House further. If you can't get any more money you should resign or seek a dissolution.
The British governments from time to time have lost major money bills and have returned to the House the next day and said: ``We need to test. We need to know whether we should resign. Can we get more money bills through this House? Therefore, we put a motion and we want to know whether we have the confidence of the House.'' In some cases they had it and in some cases they didn't.
It's far more of a political issue. You can set up a series of procedural methodologies to go through. Ultimately, I think you're into how confidence and party discipline is entwined. If a particular party interprets it in the absolute, another in the government may not.
It's a political issue that belongs to the government. It's really what it chooses to resign on or what it is forced to resign on because the public outcry is such that it's obvious it must seek a dissolution. That's the dynamic at play rather than the rules. I don't know how you get around that.
Mr. Williams: It's been found since 1968 that the rules have prevented people from feeling they can accomplish anything through debate. Therefore, they've turned their backs on the issue.
In my opinion, we should be relaxing the rules to encourage debate and opinion to be expressed on the estimates. When we find out we can only vote on 30% of the money this government spends because of discipline applied because it can invoke the threat of confidence, even one minor change cannot be tolerated.
The combination of confidence and discipline has strangled the legitimate process of Parliament to have this real debate in exchange and decision-making regarding the business of supply. That's why you're telling me it is doable to have one followed by the other, and the decision rests with the government whether or not it is prepared to amend the Standing Orders to recognize that and in essence put a more open, democratic government on the table, or it just wants to ensure its party discipline is maintained.
The Chair: Jim, I'm going to make this your last one so we can pass to Mr. Laurin. We'll come back to you.
Mr. Marleau: I would like to respond, because I think it's a fundamental issue thatMr. Williams raises. I want to be careful as an officer of the House not to be judgmental about what the House and various parties have done over the years.
I will now get right back to your specific point, but I need to put it in context. In the 1968 to 1972 period, committees studied estimates with a passion. For the first time committees were, if I can put it this way, unleashed.
Previously, a standing committee studied something only when it got an order of reference from the House. That is, every time the agriculture committee studied the price of wheat in the west or the shipping of wheat in the west it needed a specific order from the House; otherwise it had nothing to meet on.
All of a sudden, committees got all the estimates and studied them with a passion. They went into these recommendations I talked about with considerable thought.
If you go back to those days and see how deputy ministers and ministers were grilled on the estimates, there was some real work being done there. I would argue with you there was some real impact year over year, because when the minister had to come back the next year, there had to have been progress on the committee's views.
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By 1972 we were into a minority Parliament, and this wonderful experiment of the estimates in committee became far more complex. It was a minority Parliament from 1972 to 1974, and the threat of losing much of the estimates through the committee process was there. I think there was still passionate study of the estimates, and I would say responsible study of the estimates, in a minority situation. Of course, there's always the dynamic that in the first few months of a minority Parliament nobody wants an election right away and we need to let the dust settle.
By 1974, outside the minority Parliament the committees tired of the estimates study. They used it for an excuse to get at an issue. They had the estimates of the Department of Transport and were going to look at the Crow's Nest Pass issue, and that was the issue they wanted. They used the estimates as a body of substantive subject matter for research and study, and then the supply process.
That lasted until about 1985, when the McGrath committee said: ``This is crazy. We've had ten years of estimate study, hours and hours of estimate study, but nobody's talking about the estimates. We're talking about the issues, the current affairs of the day; therefore, let's give the committees a permanent mandate.'' The standing committees then got a permanent mandate, which is a body of law and review of government departments - I think it's Standing Order 108 in the committees - to free them from the control of government and give them the freedom to choose a study in a timely fashion.
The hope was - if you read some of the evidence on McGrath and the Huntington-Lachance report under the Lefebvre committee that preceded McGrath - that somehow we would get another focus on the supply process and maybe create a macro committee. Maybe if committees could get access to the issues they needed in a timely fashion, when they had the estimates before them they would do a good job. What happened? They were freed. Estimates study essentially is not as exciting as setting your own mandate to explore an impact on a government program or issue, be it child care or whatever.
I think that's the evolution of what happened. It's not so much the confidence convention and the party discipline hold-back that has tired members of studying the estimates or undermined the supply review process. Members are spenders. I know you've mentioned the deficit, but by and large members come to Ottawa to spend. I don't remember a member campaigning and saying he was going to review the Department of Transport and cut the rail line in his riding because he or she believed it was inefficient and cost a lot of money. In my 28 years here I've never heard that.
Members by nature are spenders, and it is a lot to ask parliamentarians to sit line by line through the estimates to find ways of cutting, unless you're in a crisis situation. That's why I think you're probably on the right track when you talk about reallocation.
The old citation in Beauchesne's that talks about the principles that determine the royal recommendations sets down not just the amount it's laying down once and for all but the object purposes, conditions, and qualifications. You're bound by those estimates. You cannot take this and put it to that object. You can't take this purpose and put it to that purpose. You can only reduce it. You can only negative it. You can't relax the conditions on this one so that maybe if it gets a little looser it will be more effective. You can't relax the qualifications imposed on a vote. It's either bound in the legislation or in the royal recommendation.
I think you're probably on the right track if you allow members to have a margin of reallocation without necessarily touching the confidence issue. A whole committee might unanimously say to a minister ``We're taking 1% of your budget, which you have decided to spend on tanks, and reallocating it to the peacekeeping reserve side of the department, and we're going to put that to the House of Commons for a test''.
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On the reallocation side, I think some progress is possible. On the confidence issue, I don't think you will ever be able to, through the rules, break the intertwined party discipline.
Madam Chair, I'm sorry if I went to any great length, but there was a context I wanted to explain.
The Chair: If I can just be permitted one side comment, I think the example you gave is very interesting. I think it would be appropriate that the committee that has undertaken a thorough review of defence policies should be able to put forward a recommendation saying something like ``Based on our work and our recommendations about how the armed forces need to function now and in the future, we think this is reasonable''. They would be able to justify that based on an in-depth look at the department that, other than the minister and those in the department, only the national defence committee will have done. I think that's an important point.
Mr. Marleau: If I may be so bold, Madam Chair, I'd say that I think you have to go beyond recommendation. I think you have to give the committee the power to do it. The House could reverse it because ultimately the House is the master. But if it's coming out of committee and if you have a majority committee or a unanimous committee, maybe you can see that the politics there are different than they would be with a recommendation. Right now, you have the power to reduce and negative an estimate, and when they come back to the House they're amended. It's not a recommendation; they're amended.
I think you should seek the possibility of making it a committee power. I think there would then be a little more of an impact on the House and on the ministry.
The Chair: Then the onus is on the government to say why it's not a reasonable recommendation and demonstrate that to the House.
Monsieur Laurin, my apologies.
[Translation]
Mr. Laurin (Joliette): I think we've just put our finger on the solution. The problem is not one of trust in Parliament or one of an insufficient number of opposition days in the House or one of being able to express oneself in the House. The problem, in my opinion, is party discipline. Wherever a member sits, he's always subject to party discipline, even in committee.
Usually in committees, the party in power has a majority. As soon as the party in power decides to impose party discipline, all those members who are not part of the government lose interest because they feel that whatever they do will be futile.
What is the point in considering a budget for 15 days in committee if we know that in the end, none of our recommendations will be accepted because we do not have a majority? Is it conceivable or even in order, under the current system, that a change be made so that party discipline could not be imposed in committee or so that there be equal representation of the parties, so that all members would be able to express themselves freely and put recommendations to a vote by committee members - who would not be subject to party discipline - that would then be sent on to the House? Then, if the government wanted to use party discipline during a vote on a committee's recommendation, it could do so, but it would have to justify its reasons. If a government was against a recommendation that had majority support within a committee, then the issue of trust might be raised. It might have to pass otherwise the issue of trust would be raised.
If party discipline is used every time we discuss something, then no member will feel they have any value in a committee unless they want to draw the attention of newspapers to an issue and go public with it and make the ideas known through this type of pressure. If we want members to truly carry out their responsibilities, then they have to have an opportunity to have their voices heard without having a sword of Damocles hanging over their head telling them to be careful because if they take a certain line that's against the party line then they will be subject to penalties.
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That applies to my party as well as to the others. The same rule should apply to all parties. There should be somewhere where members can express themselves without being bound by party discipline. I can even see the government imposing a certain amount of discipline and I would want the same if we were in power, but if we want members to be interested in their work, then they have to be given more importance than they are currently being given.
Do you think there would be any way to change the procedures or is this just a question of politics? Of course, it's always a question of politics but is there anything in the Constitution that would prevent us from doing this?
Mr. Marleau: In my opinion, there is nothing in the Constitution that would prevent us from doing this and there are many academics much more knowledgeable than myself who have written articles and whole chapters on the issue of party discipline within the Canadian parliamentary system.
I would point out however that it is almost impossible for parliamentary rules of procedure to guarantee what you are asking for; the Speaker would have to make all three whips go to confession every Friday to ensure that votes had truly been free votes and that the members had been able to express themselves freely in committee or elsewhere. I'm not saying that to be funny. You are a whip and you know that you're not always aware of what is happening within a caucus or a parliamentary wing. Freedom is sometimes greater on some days than on others. In some areas, it is almost impossible to know how much freedom there is all the time.
You are first and foremost a Member of Parliament. You are elected by your constituents. You chose a political party. You choose to stay with it or leave it. You choose to vote according to your conscience or to what you think your constituents want. That, then, is your first freedom. You have a fundamental choice to make as an MP every day you identify with your political party.
Mr. Laurin: I have my freedom, but my freedom is impinged the moment I become a member who is less important than another. If I'm less important because my party isn't in power, it's not because my constituents invested me with less power and less importance. When constituents send a member to Ottawa, no matter that member's political allegiance, that member should have a right to speak equal to that of all other members, at least in some areas.
If there's supposed to be equal representation in committees, then it won't matter if the whip says: "The members we're sending there are being sent because we know that they share whatever opinion." With equal representation, there are as many members from the government party as there are from the ranks of the opposition. Each member can then freely express an opinion even while submitting to party discipline, but party discipline would be limited because one isn't worth more than the other. It's something like in the caisses populaires. One person, one vote, no matter how much money is in the person's account.
So in committee, at least, we could have an exchange of opinions of equal value between parties even though the results of the debate in committee are subject to party discipline in the House. That way, we'd have a far better chance for the recommendations and opinions voiced by the members to be considered in the House.
Mr. Marleau: I don't want to engage in debate, Mr. Laurin, but I think what you have just raised is another matter entirely. Equal representation for both the government side and the opposition in committee would bring about a whole new set of dynamics that don't exist in our system presently. As you have said, the majority rules here and it can be very frustrating for a member to be part of the minority.
I'm not sure it would be desirable in the context of confidence or government. If the government were to exercise a kind of veto every time, it could lead to even more frustration for the members especially if there is parity.
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The dynamics we have are completely different. I don't think that parity or equal or proportional representation of the parties around the table would make your task easier or less frustrating especially when it comes to supply. For a while, members have been saying: "What I suggest in committee has no effect because the majority is going to win and the Minister won't budge because it's been made into a question of absolute confidence." That's what Mr. Williams was saying.
I think you're on the right track. If you trigger a procedure that would allow you not to become the government in committee, because in our parliamentary system we have a government in Parliament and not a government by Parliament, to do internal reallocations with the department's permission, then you would be putting the finger on a department's priorities and you might have an impact.
I don't think a parliamentary committee can substitute for a department, but to make it accountable through supply, you'd have an instrument that would force it to convince you of the mistake you're making by recommending a reallocation, whatever it may be.
Mr. Laurin: Even if we had that procedure in committee, the party in power always has the majority so even in committee if a Minister will allow a committee to examine his budget and proceed with certain reallocations, the reallocations that might be accepted would be accepted as a majority by the members who belong to the same party as the Minister.
How could another MP, even an independent one, hope to change anything in the budget, unless the argument was extremely obvious? An argument is rarely so obvious that 15 people around you have not realized it. You are rarely the only person to have thought of something. A stroke of genius happens from time to time, more often in opposition, but it is not the norm.
There again, will members feel that they are important and that they have the power to amend the budget?
Mr. Marleau: My colleague wants to add something, but I would say that if the majority on a committee had that kind of influence, you would be surprised to see how often they would take advantage of it.
Mr. Camille Montpetit (Clerk Assistant, House of Commons): A few moments ago, you asked what could be changed in the Standing Orders to prevent party discipline from having too much impact over a member's freedom of speech.
The Standing Orders in their present form assume that all members are equal. They contain no mention of party discipline. So I do not think that the Standing Orders need to be changed in that respect.
Like you said and in keeping with Mr. Marleau's comments, the problem seems to be that one party has a majority over the others. The same dynamics did not exist during the minority governments from 1972 to 1974 and in 1979. The committees had the same mandate, but the committee make-up was not the same. Obviously, no party had the majority, and during these minority governments, there were times when the opinion of the majority in committee, which was not necessarily in support of the government, prevailed and changes were made to the estimates.
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I for one remember, because I was a committee clerk at the time, that in 1979, during a minority government, the Standing Committee on Miscellaneous Estimates rejected the entire Treasury Board budget. The committee reported to the House, and the votes for Treasury Board were automatically subtracted from the estimates that were returned to the House. Several days later, the government was defeated and Parliament was dissolved. It was not followed up in the House. Of course the government would have tried to reinstate the Treasury Board money, but it would have been interesting to see what would have happened, because even in the House, it did not have a majority.
So the Standing Orders make no mention of party discipline, and we have already experienced what you are currently seeking during a minority government.
[English]
The Chair: Dr. Pagtakhan was next on my list, but it is 10:45 a.m. I think we should probably adjourn by about 10:55, because Procedure and House Affairs is coming in.
We should first decide where we're going, though, Rey, because I also have a few questions specifically on things that we might do with the Standing Orders that we have in front of us.
I think it's obvious that we're going to need Mr. Marleau and Mr. Montpetit back with us again. Mr. Marleau has said he could draw up several options for us. I'm not sure he would have enough guidance at this point from the committee.
Mr. Marleau: I was just speaking in a hypothetical context, but we could try to do whatever you direct us to do.
The Chair: So a couple of things could happen. We could just simply make sure that we have him back with us on Tuesday morning, but I think Procedure and House Affairs is meeting again and we'll only have an hour and a half. I think you all feel that I'm trying to reach a consensus report here, so perhaps I could therefore have a discussion with him before our meeting. I then wouldn't need to take some time today to see if there are things we can do that might try to find that middle ground.
I think the bottom line that we have to understand here is that the government is elected to govern. It has to be able to have the money to carry out its policies. As so many of our witnesses have said, confidence is in the minds of the government. It has to decide for itself whether an issue is so serious that it's a challenge to its policies, programs, and ability to govern. As Mr. Marleau said, the balance is always there to allow the government to govern. That's what it was elected to do, what the people of Canada chose it for. I'm very interested in getting more debate, however, and more accountability.
Mr. Williams: Can I just make a comment on your comment that the government was elected to govern and on Mr. Montpetit's point that there's no differentiation between members of Parliament in the Standing Orders?
The system has evolved into a tight party system in which a number of MPs coalesce around certain issues and from there we have parties. The Standing Orders treat every member of Parliament as an individual. Majority rules. The government has now taken that to the next point, at which you're saying the government has a mandate to govern. I don't know that it is actually true that the government has a mandate to govern. Government has a mandate to govern provided they enjoy the confidence of the House.
The Chair: Exactly.
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Mr. Williams: It's this confidence and the very tight party discipline that has evolved here in Canada. As Mr. Marleau has said, in other British parliamentary democracies - and he referred to Westminster - the party discipline is much looser. Perhaps it's this very rigid party discipline that has choked off dealing with the estimates in an open manner, more so than the confidence convention.
But perhaps we can debate that another day, Madam Chair.
The Chair: Okay.
I'm going to give Dr. Pagtakhan another few minutes, and then we'll adjourn at 10:55 a.m. and invite Mr. Marleau and Mr. Montpetit back on Tuesday.
Mr. Pagtakhan: This point is by way of comment. Party discipline may also be in the eyes of the people and in the eyes of the individual MP. I can vote freely each time. I can vote freely, and I have voted freely. When I vote with my party, it does not automatically mean that it is a consequence of party discipline.
I did a little survey of all the votes taken in the House in the second year of this mandate. The Reform Party was voting unanimously 96% of the time on any given issue. This is a party that claims it is doing voting on a free vote. The government party was voting about 99%. So if you see a 3% differential on a number of issues you're voting on at the same time, it does not hold that it is to be interpreted as a consequence of party discipline. Perhaps it is because the members belong to the same party and therefore you would expect them to have the same view on most issues.
Having said that -
Mr. Williams: I think Mr. Nunziata would have a different point of view, but we'll leave that for the moment.
Mr. Pagtakhan: That is why I say that party discipline is in the eyes of the beholder.
Mr. Williams: Perhaps more than that -
Mr. Pagtakhan: I'd just like to get a clarification from what was said about membership on the committees. Is it automatically that the government of the day has a fixed proportion on the committee or is it the number of seats the government of the day takes in any particular year?
Mr. Montpetit: The composition of committees is always established at the beginning of Parliament or in a session by the procedure and house affairs committee and through discussions between the whips.
Mr. Pagtakhan: How are the numbers arrived at?
Mr. Montpetit: Usually the numbers are arrived at in direct proportion to the membership of the House.
Mr. Pagtakhan: The House, yes, which is, of course, very democratic. In other words, to give an equal number to opposition and the government, when obviously most members sit on the government side, would to me also agree with the democracy of the individual members in itself. Having said that, I like that clarification.
On reallocation, which I am very seriously considering as a potential change, the ability of the committee to make reallocation... If we were to proceed with that as a possible mechanism, would there be merit in considering a limit to the amount you can reallocate, a percentage of the amount? Fearing that it could be so much that it could make no more sense, that it's no longer reallocation... Is there a merit to that point being considered?
Mr. Marleau: Yes, very much, Mr. Pagtakhan. I think you probably could come to agreement very quickly, as a committee, on the concept of reallocation. I think you will have much debate on what the amount might be. Obviously, I don't think it would be acceptable to have a free reallocation. One percent of the House of Commons budget, which is running at about $215 million, is over$1 million. One percent of the Department of National Defence budget is considerably more.
It will be the formula for reallocation upon which you will have lots of debate, and you may want to take more advice on it from -
The Chair: Can we leave it to the ``advice'' committee to decide?
Mr. Pagtakhan: Yes.
Mr. Marleau: What I'm saying is that I think you're on the right track when you're looking at relaxing the conditions, the objects, the purposes. Whether you translate it into a formula that is a percentage or another mechanism, that's a different issue.
I think you would have to come to an agreement on a ceiling of some kind, because, as I said to Mr. Laurin, we don't have government by parliament in our system. That's south of the border. To a large degree, it's separation of powers. We have government in parliament. They are accountable to the House. At one point, when you're talking about reallocation, you cannot and should not manage the department.
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In your accountability exercise of nudging them in a certain direction, reallocation is a possibility. You have absolute accountability in saying, bang, no money, or this much less money. I realize it's harder to achieve in a majority government, but, as my colleague has said, it has been achieved in minority government.
You probably could achieve reallocation in a more unanimous way, because I do feel that dynamic would get government members to look at things a little more... Let's not always assume that government backbenchers are necessarily dancing to the whip's every wish. Whether it's a Mr. Nunziata or another, we've had party splits in our history. The Social Credit became two parties overnight. The Bloc Québécois didn't exist before the last Parliament. It started as a faction from the government side, and today it's the official opposition. I think it is overstating it that, in the evolution of our Parliament, party discipline somehow became so static that it allows absolutely no change. This particular House probably stands as the best example of what change can be in terms of the impact on a political party.
I think there is something for government backbenchers in reallocation. There's at least an interest that your vote matters a little bit more under that kind of context than it does under the current context in which you're simply asked to reject and you therefore are simply asked to support. It would create a slightly different dynamic across the table.
I think you need a formula, a cap, a ceiling.
The Chair: The next committee is arriving, so I think we will adjourn at this point. We'll reconvene at 9:30 a.m. next Tuesday, and on Thursday morning. That will be our schedule for next week.
Are you going to have a replacement here, Mr. Williams?
Mr. Williams: I doubt it, Madam Chair. Before you adjourn, I would therefore move that I would accept quorum of this committee without a Reform member present.
The Chair: Thank you. I appreciate that. Does anybody disagree with that motion?
Motion agreed to
The Chair: If necessary, we will confer with you by phone if we get into some nubby problems.
I adjourn this meeting.