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EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Friday, April 11, 1997

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[English]

The Acting Co-Chairman (Mr. Michel Dupuy (Laval West, Lib.)): Colleagues, welcome to this joint meeting of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs.

[Translation]

Today we have the privilege of hosting the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, his Excellency Javier Solana.

We will proceed like we normally do.

[English]

I will invite His Excellency, the Secretary General, to say a few words.

We are, of course, keenly interested in NATO. The Foreign Affairs standing committee has spent a fair amount of time receiving witnesses and considering NATO affairs, focusing particularly on the future of NATO in the post-Cold War period. The enlargement of NATO is also a matter that we have considered. I should mention in passing, as background, that the foreign affairs committee of the House of Commons is looking at the question of reduction or elimination of nuclear weapons.

These are the three NATO-related subjects that we have considered. Without further ado,

[Translation]

Mr. Secretary General, you have the floor.

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His Excellency Javier Solana (Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is a great pleasure for me to address the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and National Defence.

I would like to briefly comment on the most important issues that we are currently working on at NATO. I think that the most important thing I can do this morning is to tell you about our program and the main challenges we have to resolve before the July summit in Madrid.

[English]

As you know very well, NATO, and in general the trend to security of the Euro-Atlantic region, is going through a very important and very exciting moment. We are about to produce a very profound adaptation, a very profound transformation, of the alliance in order to continue being an organization that is able to guarantee stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic region and therefore to guarantee prosperity in the Euro-Atlantic region. Sometimes we forget that the basic element for prosperity is to have a guarantee of stability and security.

Let me be more specific about the calendar and the challenges we have in front of us. As you know, in a few months, on July 8 and 9, we will have a very important summit of the alliance. I dare say that it will be one of the most important summits in the history of the alliance. It will be a summit in which we will try to address the following issues.

First, we would like to internally adapt the alliance to the new missions. The basic mission of the alliance will continue to be the security of its members. At the same time, we have decided to take up new responsibilities that have to do with the projection of stability even beyond the perimeter of the members of the alliance.

I don't have to tell you - you know very well - that the most important example where we can focus some of our attention is Bosnia. As you know, Bosnia is an operation that, in the terminology of NATO, is ``out of zone'' or out of area. It is an operation that is devoted to bringing peace and stability to a part of the European continent that is not included in the members on the perimeter of NATO.

To give you an example, that will be the type of mission - projecting stability - that we would like to undertake. In order to do that, we also have to adapt our military structure, which was conceived for the basic mission of security, for the defence of the 69 members. Now we are trying to set up a structure that will be adapted to the new times. That means it will have to be more flexible; it will have to be smaller; it will therefore have to be cheaper; and it will have to be prepared to be a stability-projecting force outside the borders of the countries that belong to NATO.

At the same time, talking about internal adaptation, I would like to underline an important idea, an important decision we took at a ministerial meeting in Berlin last summer. It has to do with the emergence in the alliance of what we call the European defence and security identity. That means the possibility of giving more importance to the European personality in the realm of security, but within NATO. We don't want to create two separate structures. We want to create one structure and make it possible for that military structure to act on a European basis for a particular operation, but returning after the operation is finished to the same military structure. We don't want to create two structures. Probably the best way to express this practically is to say we want to create a military structure that has the possibility of forces that are separable but not separated.

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We will have only one infrastructure with the possibility of separating part of it for a particular mission that is led by Europeans, with European control, political control with European assistance. But it will also have the possibility of using infrastructure or means that belong to NATO collectively.

The first line of action in the summit is to finalize a definition. It will be to describe the internal adaptation of the alliance.

The second vector or line of action that we would like to approve in the summit has to do with the external relations of the alliance. By that we mean the possibility of opening the alliance to new members, one of several, as we agreed at the ministerial meeting of December. It will be an historic event. NATO will invite one of several countries, countries that belonged to the ex-Marshall pact, to be members of the alliance. The dimension of this decision, the importance of this decision, is probably obvious to everybody.

We would also like to create a new structure around NATO. That will probably be under the heading of the Atlantic Partnership Council, in which we would like to put together two existing institutions that have been very successful in the few years they have been in existence.

I would like to mention PFP, Partnership for Peace, which is one of the most brilliant ideas ever put forward. You remember that the idea was put forward at the Brussels summit in January 1994. It is an institution or an idea that is very young. It is only three years old. It was born, as I said, in 1994, but in that short period of time it has borne very impressive fruit.

I dare say that without PFP the Bosnian operation, the operation of IFOR, would probably not have been possible. Let me remind you that in Bosnia we now have the most important coalition for peace ever built, a coalition for peace led by NATO, together with another 17 countries that participate on equal footing with the 16 countries of NATO. They are countries from Poland to the Baltics, to Ukraine and Morocco, to Malaysia and Russia.

We have been able to create a very impressive coalition for peace that is led by NATO. That has been possible because we have created PFP, Partnership for Peace. We have been working on that for three years in order to make it as supportable as possible from the military point of view of the armies of those countries that are not part of NATO but want to cooperate with NATO. That's the PFP idea. We would like to enhance it. We would like to give more content.

At the same time, we would like to give more content to NACC, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, which, as you remember, is the place where we get together with the countries that belong to the ex-Marshall pact or the ex-Soviet Union for political dialogue and political consultation.

Again, as you know, NACC is very young. We celebrated the fifth anniversary in December. We're trying to put these two young institutions together under one heading, the Atlantic Partnership Council, so that we can give more content and more substance to the military and to military cooperation than we do now through the PFP, along with the political dialogue, the political consultation that we do now do through the NACC.

With that we would like to give a very clear signal to all the countries that we do not want to create new divided lines in Europe. We would like to have an institution in which everybody sits around the NATO table and creates schemes for working both on the military to military cooperation and on the political consultation mechanism. This will be the second most important decision we will take at the summit.

Thirdly, the important vector has to be the bilateral relationship we would like to establish with Russia and also with Ukraine.

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On the Russia channel, I would like to tell you that we have already moved forward since the first round of negotiations that took place in Moscow in January. So far we have already had three rounds of negotiations. The fourth one will start next Tuesday, April 15, in Moscow. So I will be going to Moscow next week.

I want to tell you that things are moving. We're getting closer in some elements of this bilateral relationship, but there are parts of it where we're still very separated. So we have to continue to work and see if we can approach their position. We're still not close enough. But I have the impression that there's political will on both sides to try to strike a good agreement before the summit takes place.

Let me say a word to you also about Ukraine because I know you're interested. I know that is a country that is close to you. We started bilateral negotiations in Brussels not long ago. I will meet with Mr. Udovenko on April 23, two weeks from now, and I expect to go to Kiev during the week of May 7 to see if we can give an impulse to that bilateral relationship.

So as you can see, if all of these subjects I have mentioned to you come to reality in the span of time we have in mind before the summit takes place in July, we will really change profoundly the landscape of security in the Euro-Atlantic region. This is what we're trying to do, and we hope that with the cooperation of different countries...

I want to take the opportunity at this moment to thank your country not only for the support you have given in this complicated and important moment for the organization, but also for the engagement you have taken on so generously in Bosnia. You have over 1,000 troops deployed in Bosnia, and I would like to take this opportunity, now that I am talking to members of Parliament, to thank your country for these efforts, which I know are very important for you from the military point of view and also from the economic point of view. So thank you very much for that. It is something we will never forget.

This is more or less the agenda we have for the coming weeks and months. As you can see, it is very dense and very compact, but it will bring it to closure in due time and at the moment we have decided we have success.

As I said before, without any doubt we have to change the landscape of security in the Euro-Atlantic region in a very profound manner. We will probably be able to say at the end of that period of time that Yalta belongs to the past and the future belongs to us, in a better way. Let's hope this is done and that it is done properly in the short period of time we have in front of us. This is a wish, and towards that we work, if I may say, 24 hours out of 24. You can be sure that nobody in NATO, the representatives of our different countries, the international staff and military people, spares any single minute of the day so that we can make this impressive agenda come true in the time we have ahead of us. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[Translation]

Thank you very much.

The Acting Co-Chairman (Mr. Michel Dupuy): I would like to thank you,

[English]

particularly for the acknowledgement of Canada's role and interest in NATO. We were there right from the start, and we're still very much there.

[Translation]

Several people have asked for the floor. Mr. Leroux from the Bloc Québécois.

Mr. Jean H. Leroux (Shefford, B.Q.): Mr. Secretary General, it is a pleasure for me to welcome you on behalf of my party, the Bloc Québécois.

In Canada, we do not do things the way others do. Last week, I went to a NATO meeting in Ireland. I had the honour of presiding over the Canadian delegation even though I represent a sovereignist party.

The Acting Co-Chairman (Mr. Michel Dupuy): We are very democratic.

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Mr. Jean H. Leroux: Indeed. We addressed the issues we spoke about today. I have noticed that all the Spaniards I've met, including you, speak French, English and Spanish very well; that is what I was going to say. It would perhaps be a good idea for the Canadian government to organize Spanish classes for us. I think it is very important to speak several languages.

I would like to address the issue of new members and, more specifically, talk about the Czech Republic and Slovakia that, as we all know, were both part of the same country at one point. We have heard that the Czech Republic would be admitted during the first round and that Slovakia could be admitted during the second round.

I would like you to comment on that and explain why NATO is currently prepared to accept one part of the former country, which is new. It is not at all the same in Canada. We know that Quebec is independently part of NATO at present. So it would be different. I would like you to tell us why the Czech Republic would be favoured in the first round and you would be inclined to wait a little for Slovakia.

I would like to address another major issue. It is important for present and future NATO members not to have a veto to prevent other countries from joining. I won't name any countries, but we know that that could be a problem.

There is another issue you raised that is of utmost concern to me: the danger of isolating Russia. It is important to find a role for Russia at the time when countries will join NATO. I would like to hear your comments on these various points.

Mr. Solana: Thank you very much, sir. I will try to answer the three questions.

First of all, as regards future members, we have decided to make the final decision on this issue at the summit. So it is very difficult for me to answer your question, because I am not responsible for choosing members. The decision will be made by the heads of State at the summit. I do not think that the number of countries invited will be very high. I think it will be limited.

I cannot answer your question on Slovakia and the Czech Republic. We have to wait for the summit to answer your question. I will note your concern regarding this problem.

As for the veto, I fully agree with you. I think that future members of NATO, like current members, should not have a veto to prevent certain countries from joining. We did not use a veto for the countries that are candidates today. So the answer to the second question is clear. I truly believe that it is a sine qua non condition: the countries invited to join NATO during the first round must maintain the same state of mind and the same openness in relations with the countries that are not invited during the first round.

The third question is the most difficult and at the same time, the easiest. I fully agree with your position. I think that we all share your position. I think that the structure of security in Europe in the future, in the next century, must take into account the importance of Russia. That is why we are currently taking as much time as we need to build or reestablish strong and specific relations with our friends from the Russian federation. We must remember that Russia is a great and important country without which the structure of security in Europe would be impossible.

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We are currently establishing special and specific relations with Russia. Will we succeed? I hope so, but as you know, we have to succeed together. As you know, within NATO, we are currently preparing a very open and generous offer for relations with Russia. I believe that we will succeed. I truly believe that. But we have to wait to see if it will be possible to establish these relations.

Mr. Jean H. Leroux: I have a short question. Do you plan to use any mechanisms so as not to isolate Russia? I have attended international meetings, and I have noticed that the Russians often isolate themselves at these meetings. They have a somewhat difficult mentality. Are there any mechanisms, like acceptance treaties for new countries that join or something similar, which could give them a role and some dignity? We cannot afford to miss the boat.

Mr. Solana: I think that in the charter, in the document that we are currently discussing and that will I hope be signed, we are proposing a joint council to make joint decisions if possible, but also to set up a permanent consultation process on security problems in Europe.

So I think that NATO is very open in its position. We are very generous, I think that the Russian authorities fully understand the importance of the decision that we are in the process of making. Think about the... [Inaudible]... that we had around the table with NATO and Russia. It was something that was very difficult to imagine a few weeks ago. The step that we are taking is truly revolutionary.

I think that it will in the interest of Russia, NATO and security in Europe, but we will have to wait a little while to see whether we will succeed or not.

[English]

The Acting Co-Chairman (Mr. Dupuy): Mr. Martin, from the Reform Party.

Mr. Keith Martin (Esquimalt - Juan de Fuca, Ref.): Thank you once again, Mr. Secretary General. To have your ear twice in the same day is quite a privilege indeed.

Just as an extension of what you were speaking about earlier this morning - and I couldn't agree with you more - about developing economic and social links, particularly with Russia and the current members of NATO, when I speak with members from Russia they say a lot of the economic activity and promises so far have more value on paper as opposed to truly coming out in action.

I wonder whether or not you or representatives of NATO are actually trying to convince G-7 nations to bring in Russia as a part of G-7, to make it a full member; therefore, it would be G-8. Are the OSCE and the European Union actually trying to engage in economic and social links with Russia, to demonstrate to Russia that they are not going to be a military threat and that their individual security is intimately linked with others in their collective security?

I have a personal interest in conflict prevention. I think what we've been focusing on for so long is conflict management instead of conflict prevention. Bosnia and Albania are the two most recent European examples where, if this had been just a security issue and initiatives had been put forward early, perhaps some of the bloodshed would have been averted and the seeds of ethnic discontent would not have been sown.

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I wonder whether or not you see a role of the international financial institutions as being a tool for conflict prevention and peacemaking - through economic and social activities, through building bridges, and through defusing areas of tension that are quite obvious to even a casual observer.

Mr. Solana: Thank you very much. You have posed a very interesting question. Let me start by saying that I conceive today - by today I mean at the end of the 20th century and practically the beginning of the 21st century - the concept of security in a wider sense than classically. Security has not only a military component. Security and stability can also be constructed by other means.

You have pointed out one that is very important, which is the economy. Trade, for instance, without any doubt, will help the security and the stability of the world a lot, as much as through other means.

The links between nations, between countries, through trade, are very important. Therefore, with Russia we have to consider a relationship that is not only military - that is not only political in the sense of security, political security or politico-military aspects - but is also economic.

Let me underline that the European Union has signed with Russia the most complete, the most profound bilateral agreement in the economic relationship, within trade, and this is working very well. I can give you some figures that I have in mind, and I may make a mistake because I may not remember the figures exactly. If my memory doesn't fail, I think in 1996 the trade between the European Union and Russia increased by more than 16% in one year. If you look at the trade of Russia with all the different countries you will see that increased trade with the European Union is the most favoured.

I agree with you that trade is a very important mechanism - that the links you are able to create through trade, through the economy, are very important for stability and security, and in particular when we are talking about Russia.

Let me underline that when we listen to some of the statements by our Russian friends saying we don't want to be isolated, we don't want to be pushed to a quota - I mean, Russia is not isolated. Russia is not pushed to any corner. Russia has a very profound agreement with the European Union. Russia is a member of the Council of Europe, which is without any doubt the most classical institution, the most veteran institution of Europe. Russia is part of the G-7, and probably will be incorporated in a more profound manner. Russia has a relationship...not only a relationship, but it is a founder of the OSCE.

We want to construct a bilateral relationship with Russia through NATO. If you make a map of important institutions and the relations those institutions have with Russia, it would be very difficult to find a single institution - one - that does not have or has not constructed in the last year a bilateral relationship with Russia, or that Russia is not a part of.

We are trying to create, as I said this morning to you, so many links among the different nations, so many links in so many different fields, that it would be impossible to break - to create a dense net of relationships that it would be impossible to break it and therefore allow conflict to emerge.

This is our aim. This is what we are trying to construct, and to look not only to the coming year but also into the next century.

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I think that most intelligent people in the leadership of Russia do understand this approach. They see that this approach is an approach that contains a future. It is not an approach that contains the past or looks back. It's an approach that looks forward to the future.

I think this is the most important thing we can do, not only for us, a generation of leadership of the world today, but more importantly for the next generation of citizens of the Euro-Atlantic region.

The Acting Co-Chairman (Mr. Dupuy): Mr. Richardson.

Mr. John Richardson (Perth - Wellington - Waterloo, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'd certainly like to welcome you, Secretary General. It's a pleasure to see you here.

The events that have happened in the past three years have been remarkable. For the group at the table, would you share with us some of the basic factors under assessment that allowed NATO to make the deductions that flowed logically into NATO's plan of action to bring in new members? Could you go through that for the benefit of us at the table, because they're not all aware of the factors that you used in the selection, such as democratic elections and all those kinds of factors, that would help you in making the decision to allow new members? Could you just review that?

Mr. Solana: You mean the mechanism.

As you remember, in 1995 and 1996, we had all that dialogue with those countries that showed an interest in becoming members of NATO. The types of things we looked at, the types of things we have been arguing about to help them...it's a question of three different levels.

First, there's the internal democratic situation of these countries. I think we have to use this moment when we are going to open the doors of important institutions, the European Union and NATO, to force them to make an effort toward the democratization of the countries.

The second thing is very important in my mind. It concerns the relations with their neighbours. You know very well that this part of Europe in the past has had potential tensions related to border problems. We would like to have those problems solved before the decision is taken to invite them to join the alliance.

I would like to emphasize that this has worked very well. As you know, several of these countries in the last 12 to 15 months have been able to sign bilateral agreements, solving problems that were of historical dimension. Imagine Romania and Hungary, Romania and Ukraine - and there are so many others. This is another very important aspect.

The third aspect is of a military nature. They have to have, without any doubt, civilian control of their armed forces. This is absolutely basic. Then they need to have a certain degree of interoperability between their armies and the armies of NATO. This has been done in a very efficient manner in the last year and a half. In particular, the fact that they are in Bosnia has had a tremendous impact on that degree of interoperability between the different armies. It is very important. I would like to stress here that civilian control of the armed forces is sine qua non for inviting them to join the alliance. These are basically the criteria.

Let's say a word about costs. We think that in the present circumstances the process of opening up NATO can be done in a relaxed manner. Therefore, we should not be straining these countries too much economically. They have economic problems, and we do believe that they have to solve their economic problems as part of their stability, not only the stability of the country itself, but the regional stability. So we would not like to strain their economies too much in the process of opening the door to NATO.

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In the present circumstances of security, I think we can undertake the process of inviting them in, in a relaxed manner. We can take time so that we do not put too much pressure economically on either the actual member countries of NATO or on the new members of NATO.

Mr. John Richardson: Thank you very much for your answer. May I ask a follow-up question that builds on it?

We saw the East German absorption by West Germany, which may be the basis on which you took the gentle approach to absorption. There are a number of other factors. We had the French defence committee with us in the past year, and the German defence committee. A very interesting discussion flowed from that. The question of Slovenia came up as a strategic consideration, outside of the economic and military aspect. The strategic aspect was of particular interest to the Italians.

Is Slovenia's strategic position a factor in this? Would that be another consideration as a step? I do not have personal first-hand information on its capabilities as a democratic society. Its relations with its neighbours are good, particularly with Italy and Austria, but I don't know the rest of the story with Slovenia. It seems like a strategically good move to have that access through the south and into other areas if we want to think of it from the military aspect rather than the community of nations aspect. It has to be considered.

The other kind of consideration, difficult as it may be, is the difference between Slovakia and the Czech Republic. The uneasy border that Slovakia has with Russia may be working against it, and some of the other problems enter into this. For those of us on the outside, it makes for interesting speculation.

I followed this carefully as a young soldier. I served in 1955 when I went over with the Canadian Forces, and I was very proud of being part of the Canadian Forces and the British Army of the Rhine at the time. It's come a long way. The interoperability is there - our parts, our numbers, our code words. Our navies and air forces work together on the same procedures. Everything has advanced so much. It developed collegiality and trust.

I leave that with you. I just had the one concern about Slovenia. Is it part of your assessment? The other question would be about the strategic aspect of its location.

Mr. Solana: Without any doubt, the strategic component is taken into consideration. It will be taken into consideration by those who have the responsibility of choosing the members at the end of the day.

I'll say a word about Slovenia. It is a small country geographically. If I'm not mistaken, it is a country the size of Israel, and it has about two million people. It is a beautiful country. I have visited Ljubljana on several occasions. It is a country that has a very small army, as you can imagine, with most of it in mountain brigades. It is a country that has made a very important effort economically, and also politically. It is a country that will allow territorial continuity to Hungary. As neighbours of Hungary, there is a possibility that the only physical connection with NATO countries is through Slovenia or Slovakia.

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Slovenia is an important country today. There was a time when Ljubljana was one of the most important lines of communication in Europe, going from Moscow all the way down to Genoa, almost to the Mediterranean.

I would not like to elaborate any further because my opinion is not very important at this moment. I just wanted to give you an objective approach about Slovenia, which is a country I visited not long ago.

Mr. John Richardson: I only raised it because it was raised in the discussions with the two other countries as well.

[Translation]

The Acting Co-Chairman (Mr. Michel Dupuy): Thank you very much.

[English]

I'm afraid we're at the end of our time. It has passed terribly quickly, and we would like to spend much more time with you, Mr. Secretary General.

As you can see, we are concerned about the problem of enlargement. Some of us were in Russia a few months ago, and in talking to a lot of people - and not only to members of the government - what struck us was the fact that it was such an emotional issue. Emotions are always very difficult for diplomats to grapple with - not for politicians, but for diplomats. But this great negative emotion that we were able to sense has given us the most concern. Of course, it will be left for the Russian government itself to manage it, but we'll keep a close brief on developments.

Let me thank you once again for the time you have given us.

Mr. Solana: On the contrary, thank you very much for this invitation.

The Acting Co-Chairman (Mr. Michel Dupuy): I hope we'll have the opportunity to see you in Brussels and to perhaps host you again.

Mr. Solana: Thank you very much.

The Acting Co-Chairman (Mr. Michel Dupuy): The meeting is adjourned.

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