[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]
Tuesday, December 10, 1996
.1613 
[English]
The Vice-Chairman (Mr. English): I would like to reconvene this meeting. We're pleased to have several witnesses here from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and from the Department of National Defence. I'd like to introduce them. From the Department of National Defence we have Roman Jakobow and Admiral King, whom we met two weeks ago. We also have Michael Bell from the Department of Foreign Affairs, and Louis-Robert Daigle from the North American and Euro-Atlantic Security and Defence Relations Division of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.
We are, as the witnesses know, undergoing in this committee an examination of NATO expansion and its meaning for Canada, and we welcome you here today to speak to us on this subject.
I must apologize for keeping you late; we had two other matters that came up unexpectedly for this committee. I know you're busy men and I apologize that we kept you waiting in the hallway. I hope there was coffee there and suitable accommodation. We do apologize for this delay.
Mr. Bergeron.
[Translation]
M. Bergeron (Verchères): Mr. Chairman, I would just like to set things straight. At our last meeting, we had not agreed to hear witnesses today. Will the witnesses first make a presentation that will be followed by a discussion, or are we basically holding a round table today with our witnesses and discuss the matter at a later meeting, perhaps Thursday?
.1615
That was my first question. As a corollary, I would say that the matter is so important that we do not have enough time now to both hear witnesses and have a discussion, especially since we have already taken up a few minutes to deal with two other items on today's agenda.
Ms Hilchie could perhaps tell us whether we could have a round table with our witnesses today and discuss the matter Thursday or whether it is virtually impossible in terms of availability.
[English]
The Vice-Chairman (Mr. English): I'll repeat what she said. We are sitting all morning on Thursday. We can, if the members agree, sit in the afternoon.
[Translation]
Mr. Bergeron: I firmly believe we should end this session with a resolution for the government, because over the next few months, the government must indicate its position on the enlargement of NATO. So it would be best to settle this matter before February and go through the entire process and submit a resolution to the government before the end of the session. What do you think of that, Francis?
[English]
The Vice-Chairman (Mr. English): Mr. LeBlanc, would you like to respond to this?
[Translation]
Mr. LeBlanc (Cap-Breton Highlands - Canso): Could you clarify what you are suggesting?
Mr. Bergeron: Since we have a little less time because we dealt with the two items on the agenda and we had planned to hear our witnesses' presentations, I was wondering if we shouldn't turn this meeting into a round table with the panel and then have a discussion among ourselves so that we can come up with a resolution.
I therefore suggest we have a panel discussion with our witnesses and discuss the matter among ourselves on Thursday, probably in the afternoon. I favour that option, because I think we should end this session with a resolution for the government, unless we can deal with this again in February.
Could you tell us whether the government needs the committee's resolution before the Christmas break or whether we can discuss the expansion of NATO when we come back in February?
Mr. LeBlanc: I do not think the resolution has to be passed before the adjournment. The matter will be reviewed next year and so I do not see the need to draft a resolution tomorrow or Thursday.
Mr. Bergeron: Mr. Chairman, perhaps you would like to ask members whether they would like us to discuss the enlargement of NATO on Thursday or whether they would prefer to wait and put it on the agenda for February.
Mr. Dupuy (Laval West): One of the major points to keep in mind when making our decision is the date NATO plans to make a decision on the expansion. If NATO has to make a decision very soon, obviously we should speed up the process. If the decision is to be made at the NATO summit, the date of which has not yet been set, I do not think we need to act so quickly. Ambassador Bell is probably the best person to answer that question.
[English]
The Vice-Chairman (Mr. English): I think the point that has been raised about the possibility of a declaration being needed because of the agenda having specific dates on it has been clarified by Mr. Dupuy's comment. The witnesses can help us with these questions.
Would it be advantageous to have a resolution from this committee as advice to the government on this question? What are the kinds of deadlines we face? I think the best way would be to begin with our witnesses today. If we could just open it up to discussion, perhaps one or more of the witnesses would like to respond to these questions we've been discussing.
.1620
Mr. Michael Bell (Special Representative for NATO Enlargement, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade): Mr. Chairman, I have a short statement, if you wish, and I hope we can address the questions.
The Vice-Chairman (Mr. English): Certainly, go ahead.
Mr. Bell: It's a pleasure to be with you again today, which incidentally coincides with the just-concluded meeting in Brussels of the North Atlantic Council and ministerial session. I'd like to bring you up to date with what happened there.
First of all, I'm happy to hand over to you a copy of the text - I think it has been distributed to you - of the statement that the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy delivered at the opening of the meeting in his capacity as this year's président d'honneur. You will also find the text of the official communiqué released at the end of the meeting. There is an additional communiqué dealing with Bosnia, which we had not received in time to bring to you.
[Translation]
This meeting is critical for the future of the alliance. In fact, ministers have said they would recommend to their heads of state and governments that the summit be held on July 8 and 9 in Madrid, Spain, during which some countries from central and eastern Europe will be invited to start negotiations to become members of NATO.
Ministers have also agreed that at the summit next summer, they will recommend implementing a mechanism to tighten political and military relations between an enlarged alliance and its partners. Minister Axworthy has insisted on the need to pay particular attention to Ukraine and the Baltic countries.
[English]
Tomorrow morning allied foreign ministers will hold, in the context of the so-called 16 plus 1 formula, their regular meeting with their Russian counterpart, Mr. Primakov. As you know, the development of closer relations with Russia is important to the alliance. While we all know of strong Russian reservations about NATO enlargement, it is my hope the continuing dialogue will lead to a better mutual understanding of and constructive approach to the new security environment in Europe. Ministers have also asked that the ongoing work on the adaptation of NATO structures be finalized at the time of the next year's summit.
The Vice-Chairman (Mr. English): Did you want to make some comments?
Rear Admiral J. King (Associate Assistant Deputy Minister, Policy, Department of National Defence): No, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think Ambassador Bell has spelled out quite clearly....
The Vice-Chairman (Mr. English): Thank you, Ambassador. Thank you, Admiral.
I will open it up to the floor for members to ask any questions.
[Translation]
Mr. Bergeron: Mr. Chairman, before moving on to questions, I would like to say that we have not really settled the matter I brought to the committee's attention. I think we should respond to the minister's request and give him our opinion. Should we do so prior to the Christmas adjournment? Perhaps I should ask our witnesses that question.
Is it imperative that the committee draft its comments and suggestions for the minister prior to the Christmas break, or can we deal with this matter later? I think that for now we should just have a type of briefing session and, at a later date, we can have an official discussion among ourselves on the very critical question of the expansion of NATO, just as we did for Haiti.
[English]
The Vice-Chairman (Mr. English): Ambassador Bell, would you like to comment onMr. Bergeron's observations?
Mr. Bell: Yes, I would like to say, first of all, that the minister, of course, is very keen on consulting with the members on questions as important as the one of enlargement. At the same time, I don't think he sees a particular necessity for a resolution. It is entirely up to the committee if they wish to proceed with the resolution.
In terms of timing, with the passage of the meeting in Brussels today and tomorrow, I think the urgency of advice would have gone out of the issue until the spring, when the next ministerial meeting will be held.
The Vice-Chairman (Mr. English): Mr. Mills, do you have a question?
Mr. Mills (Red Deer): I don't have questions about the planning; I have questions about the whole process. Are we on to that? I guess the obvious question is in terms of Russia and solving the problem of their concerns. We've all heard of all the concerns they have. First of all, it's rather difficult to really understand how stable and how long term the leadership there might be. It does give the nationalist part of the opposition a very major plank to damage the leadership. How seriously have we looked at what the repercussions might be? Could you give us some insight into what might be the ``if'' of the equation?
.1625
Mr. Bell: First of all, there's a danger in talking in terms of possibilities as opposed to probabilities. In terms of possibilities, we can imagine any number of horrifying scenarios. We need to deal more with the probabilities of dealing with Russia at this time. Those suggest to us that the Russians are gradually coming around to accepting that there will be an enlargement. They are speaking more constructively in closed sessions with members of the alliance than they are in the press. We believe they are preparing their own negotiating position in terms of the agreement they want to have with the west.
Do you want to add anything more from your contacts with the military, Admiral?
RAdm King: From the military point of view, it's useful to point out, in the broadest sense possible, where they seem to be coming from. Certainly my contacts with a number of Russian generals have indicated they are very mindful of their history. They have been attacked by virtually every neighbour they've ever had on every frontier they've ever had.
Secondly, their geography is extremely important to them. It's a strategic consideration in two ways. As one general said to me, the missiles that used to be tactical are now of strategic significance once you do away with the Warsaw Pact buffer zone. But at the same time, the Russians always saw NATO's greatest weakness as being its lack of defence and depth from a geographical sense, whereas they saw the distance of Moscow from their furthest borders as one of their greatest strengths. Again, the importance of strategic depth and the potential for it to be slowly chipped away with a NATO enlargement is a concern.
A third point I would make is that the Russian military tends to be very defensive-minded. They're not imperialists. Their whole approach is the defence of the motherland and what that entails. Provided one can satisfy those requirements, but being cognizant all the time of that historical, geographical mentality and background, you can talk seriously to the Russians. From the military point of view, you must understand that this is where they're starting from - a long experience and a deep suspicion.
Mr. Mills: Just taking on the point that they are very defensive, I can accept that this is how they were, but it seems to me that with the breakdown of the Soviet Union there is a fair political movement that would like to see that returned. That has the potential to get stronger. Who the leader might be is a little difficult to tell, but if that were the case, this would give them a handle to hang on to. They would say, look what happens if you don't have a strong union. It would seem to me that they might be able to rally the troops around that sort of an argument.
Have we thought about that? Have we thought about how we counter that with the Russians, politically?
RAdm King: We have certainly thought about it. It's of great concern. Our military and many other militaries have annual staff talks with the Russians. We have extremely frank, honest exchanges of information. But one has to see NATO enlargement from a military sense in the overall security environment that has been developed particularly in the last 20 years and certainly since the fall of the wall with the OSCE, the development of the CFE treaty, the Vienna document, the whole series of confidence-building measures that have been developed by the west, in conjunction with the Russians, and of course with all the other states of eastern Europe.
.1630
Add on to this all of the START negotiations that went on. This is essentially a framework in which the Russians have certainly given up an awful lot. But so has the west. So it generally can be seen as favourable to them, because in the end it will, one, reduce the number of weapon systems, both nuclear and conventional, that are arrayed against them. Two, it provides a very basic framework to look at issues like NATO enlargement. In other words, it provides a basis upon which to say we will limit further weapons both of a conventional and a nuclear type in the future. Most of the Russian military I talked to are very supportive of those treaties.
Mr. Bell: Perhaps I could add to that. It's important that NATO's enlargement flows from NATO's new role and not from Russia's old threat. It's recognized that Russia is not a military threat to the west today, and it's not likely to be for a very long time. In fact, it remains a special problem to Europe now, not because of its ability to shape events, but rather because of the instability in Russia today. If there's a danger, the danger is that the isolation of Russia at this time would exacerbate the problem of instability. Therefore, it's vital we bring the Russians together with NATO and forge an agreement. That is difficult at the moment. We have been unable to get the Russians to engage in this.
What is ultimately required for Russia is a place of respect and of legitimate influence in a new Europe. What is necessary for the west and the rest of Europe is a place of permanent dialogue and cooperation with the Russians and with the elite of Russia who are dominating the discussion on which direction the relationship should go.
The Vice-Chairman (Mr. English): Thank you, Ambassador.
Mr. Assadourian.
Mr. Assadourian (Don Valley North): Thank you for appearing at this committee. This briefing note from the NATO summit - I'm sure you are familiar with it - says that chances are good that Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary will join the first expansion of NATO. It says that France is also pushing Romania. I assume these three countries meet the requirements set forth by the Minister of Foreign Affairs on October 10 on the east coast. They said there should not be territorial claims of one country against the other. At the same time, when we talk about Russia joining NATO - and correct me if I'm wrong - Russia has territorial claims in China and in Japan. Just in case next week or next month or next year Russia joins NATO, are we to defend Russia against a Chinese attack? Is that how we take it, or have I missed something? What's the story? Or Japan for that matter...? I'm thinking of Sakhalin Island.
Mr. Bell: I don't think there's any question of Russia joining NATO at this time. It would probably put the whole organization into gridlock if it were to try to reach that far. There are some that have suggested to me in my visits in Europe that perhaps we should be dealing with an expansion of one country, Russia, and taking Russia in first. But the decision has been taken within NATO that we should look at an enlargement with eastern and central Europe first and try to forge an agreement with Russia that would engage Russia in the development of the security architecture of the new Europe, without involving them directly as members.
Mr. Assadourian: At some point in the future, when we agree that Russia has to join at the same time, our expectation is that they will meet the requirements set forth by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. These are, basically, human rights, transparency, budget, army, civilian control, and no territorial claim against any other government.
Mr. Bell: Obviously, the criteria are essential. The minister has made that point here and he has reinforced it in his statement at NATO in Brussels, at the NACC this morning. One of those points is the respect for borders and the lack of unsettling issues with neighbours.
.1635
The Vice-Chairman (Mr. English): Mr. Flis.
Mr. Flis (Parkdale - High Park): I would like to ask a supplementary question along the same line. The minister again outlined the four criteria that Canada is using to accept new countries to NATO. One of the criteria is durable settlements to any disputes with neighbouring countries in full effect.
Are there any outstanding disputes between Estonia and Russia, for example, and other countries? If that's the case, is this going to hold up the acceptance of the three Baltic states, even though the disputes may not be their fault, but the disputes are still there?
My other question is whether the other NATO countries have accepted Canada's basic criteria that the minister keeps spelling out.
Mr. Bell: The criteria are obviously important, but the decisive matter is not alone the question of how the countries or which countries meet the criteria, but also which country's membership in NATO will facilitate or complicate NATO's stability objectives. In that respect, countries that may largely meet the criteria may also not be chosen to join NATO in a first round of expansion or enlargement.
Mr. Flis: Are there any outstanding border disputes between Russia and Estonia and any others?
Mr. Bell: There are no border disputes to my knowledge. There are still some questions being discussed between Russia and the Baltic states. The Russians have expressed a concern about the treatment of minorities in Estonia, for example, which is one of the countries you mentioned. They have attempted, in fact, to bring the case before the UN.
We are satisfied ourselves that the investigations done by Mr. van der Stoel, the national minorities person in the OSCE, express reasonable satisfaction with the progress, albeit slow, that the Baltic states are making on these issues.
But, yes, there remain some issues between Russia and the Baltic states.
Mr. Roman Jakobow (Director, Strategic Analysis, Department of National Defence): I would like to add one point related to the criteria or guidelines, as I prefer to look at them, for membership. Those guidelines, particularly relating to the settlement of regional disputes and the treatment of minorities, have served as a catalyst for very positive developments in the region.
Many of the potential candidates for NATO membership have in fact moved a great distance forward in settling potential border disputes and in arriving at mutually agreeable arrangements concerning their treatment of minorities.
So the guidelines are already a factor in promoting increased stability and security in the region.
Mr. Assadourian: I have one small point. On the same sheet again, in the first column of the last paragraph it says that Turkey, for example, is resentful of seeing former Warsaw Pact countries about to join the alliance and likely to overtake its entry into the European Union. Who else is upset about this besides Turkey?
Mr. Bell: Turkey's concern is very specific and relates to Turkey's non-membership in the European Union. No other members, to my knowledge, express anything similar to that.
.1640
Mr. Assadourian: It says, for example, Turkey. I assume there is more than one country opposing it besides Turkey.
Mr. Bell: Turkey is not opposing enlargement.
Mr. Assadourian: It says, ``worried about former Warsaw Pact countries joining NATO''.
Mr. Bell: Turkey has expressed its wish that its membership application for NATO, for the EU and the WEU, be considered before it grants its approval on the enlargement of NATO.
Mr. Assadourian: So far, Turkey is the only country that has any objection to it?
Mr. Bell: Yes.
The Vice-Chairman (Mr. English): Thank you, Mr. Assadourian.
Seeing no questions, I'll just ask a question then.
Oh, Mr. Morrison, I'm sorry. I was going to refer to you in my question, so I'll let you ask the question yourself.
I was going to refer to Mr. Morrison's comments to me about NATO enlargement, so I'll let him make the point himself. He is being uncustomarily shy.
Mr. Morrison (Swift Current - Maple Creek - Assiniboia): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I attended the North Atlantic conference in October. What I walked away with was that there were a lot of details being discussed as to who should enter, and when and how, but also that events had sort of overtaken us. There was very little discussion of why. Why do we want to expand NATO? I can understand thoroughly why Poland, Slovenia, the Czech Republic or Slovakia might want to get in. It makes sense from their point of view. I can understand why the United States might want enlargement, because they can then relieve their commitments to Europe, which are very big dollar items to them. But I really don't see any upside specifically for Canada.
We as a committee should be looking at this from the Canadian point of view. Why do we want to expand NATO? Who are we expanding against? Belarus? Ukraine? You don't expand a military alliance just to amuse yourself. You have to have an objective, an enemy. We're not talking an economical answer. We're talking a military treaty, basically with article 5 hanging over your head.
In as few or as many words as you may wish to take to enlighten me, why do we want to irritate our new friends in Russia, who would dearly love to have only two frontiers to worry about instead of three? Why do we want to do this? What is the point?
RAdm King: Perhaps I can just start off by saying that certainly from a military point of view, while recognizing that we do need to be very careful about Russia - as the ambassador said, we need to always be cognizant of where they're going and what their concerns are - at the same time we need to consider all those other countries, many of whom want a democratic way of life, many of whom want the security that comes with belonging to NATO. It is difficult to see them integrating into western Europe and the European Union without some sort of security guarantee.
Secondly, another advantage of enlargement that we see as very important - and with all of these, I take it as an assumption that increased European security is something that Canada has a vested interest in - is that this is a great way to prevent the re-nationalization of these militaries in these various countries. Without joining NATO, all of them will have to seek some sort of national security guarantee on their own.
Thirdly, I think it will strengthen the outstanding framework of security that we have built in Europe. Whereas I mentioned before the confidence and security-building measures, we've laid down a framework and we're building up armed forces and security apparatuses for the future. These are more people to join that framework and to ultimately prevent the sort of power vacuum that I think Russians - and certainly western Europeans - would want to avoid. It's something that's plagued us in the past.
I think the last point I'd make is that, as Dr. Jakobow mentioned, the settling of disputes that has come about both as a result of nations attempting to show their eligibility to join NATO, and also just as a by-product of this whole aspect of trying to get more and more nations together in one security alliance...those settling of disputes are very important and should prevent further outbreaks of conflict in the area in the future.
.1645
The Vice-Chairman (Mr. English): Mr. Morrison, does that answer your question, or do you want further clarification?
Mr. Morrison: A little bit. I did make peripheral reference to the question of Belarus and the Ukraine.
Do you gentlemen regard those countries as threats in any way because of their instability to the other eastern European countries, the ones we're considering taking in now?
Mr. Bell: Let me comment first on your opening question. The westward push of the central and eastern European countries I think owes as much to cultural affinity with the west as it does to the long and painful experience they had under Soviet control or with the hope of finding economic prosperity in the west. In a sense, what we are trying to do with enlargement is to build a network of reassurance in Europe to extend the network of reassurance from western Europe into central and eastern Europe.
You raised the question of Belarus and Ukraine. First of all, I think it needs to be stated that they are two very different cases. Belarus is going through a very difficult period and appears to be reorienting itself into a closer relationship with Russia. That is their decision. There is a good possibility, I think, that we will see some instability in that country over the next couple of years ahead.
The Ukraine is a country greatly concerned about its relationship with Russia. When I met with the Ukrainians in Kiev it was evident that there were two things they wanted most to do. First of all, they wanted to reorient themselves to western Europe. Secondly, they wanted to focus the attention of western Europe, of the NATO alliance, on their relationship with Russia so that the events in which Russia periodically brings pressures to bear on them are very clearly highlighted and they feel a greater sense of security.
I think this is behind Canada's insistence. The minister has mentioned it here in his meetings with you. He mentioned it again in Brussels this morning that it was extremely important for the alliance to build a special relationship with Ukraine in terms of the whole process of enlargement, not anticipating that Ukraine would become a member in any foreseeable future but that it would be very closely allied with NATO as it enlarges and moves in that direction.
Mr. Morrison: I gather from what you're saying that you personally don't feel that they threaten Poland or Slovenia or Hungary. But do those three countries feel threatened by these two unstable giants beside them?
Mr. Bell: I have asked the Poles about that. They do not feel particularly threatened. I think you were actually referring to Slovakia.
Mr. Morrison: Yes, I'm sorry. I said Slovenia but meant Slovakia.
Mr. Bell: At the time I met with the Slovaks, this latest development in Belarus hadn't taken place. But I think all of these countries feel nervous whenever there is the development of change of the kind we're seeing in Belarus, which suggests that instability is still possible in the area.
I think Ukraine - to return to that country - is an example where the west, by focusing its attention and trying to stabilize the situation, internally through its assistance and externally through its focus on the relationship with neighbours, can have a very stabilizing hand.
We have not been able to do that yet in the case of Belarus. We don't have a relationship with Belarus of the kind that would enable us to assist. Perhaps that is a direction we should be going in. I would argue even for NATO exploring the beginning of a relationship with Belarus, as preliminary as that would have to be at this time.
.1650
Mr. Morrison: Okay. Thank you.
The Vice-Chairman (Mr. English): Mr. Bergeron, would you like to start?
[Translation]
Mr. Bergeron: I would like to go back to the question raised by my colleague, Bob Mills, on the strategic and tactical consideration and their relationship with the impression Russians have of the impact of a NATO enlargement.
Some of my committee colleagues and I were in Germany a few days ago, and we heard Germans say a few times that Russians were somewhat opposed to the idea, but at the end of the day, they would go along with it. They think the Russians are doing some bargaining by strongly opposing NATO's enlargement and are trying to get something in return. They say it's a matter of seeing what can be bargained with the Russians to get their final consent.
That is one interpretation and perhaps you could tell me what you think of it. Perhaps I am naive, but when I was in Russia, with everyone we met, whether they were from municipal, academic, federal, political or administrative milieus, I sensed a vehement objection to the enlargement of NATO. Nearly everyone was against it.
We were often asked how we would react if missiles were deployed just a few kilometres from our borders that were directly headed towards us. We invariably answered by asking what difference it made if the missiles were 100, 200, 400 or 500 kilometres from the borders or right on the borders. Missiles have such a huge firing range that their geographic location is somewhat irrelevant.
I also answered that it was important to have a trusting relationship between stakeholders to alleviate any concern about neighbours who might have missiles. As Canadians and Quebeckers, we could certainly say that south of our border are many missiles that could potentially be headed towards us. That argument came up repeatedly and was a major, basic objection to the enlargement of NATO.
First of all, what do you think of the Germans openly saying that the Russians are against it simply because they want to get something in return, and secondly, what do you think of their vehement objection for strategic reasons, namely the proximity of the missiles to Russian borders?
Mr. Bell: Basically, we also think the Russians are taking a bargaining position, even though the Russians often claim that that is not the case.
As for your question on the missiles, I would like to read to you an excerpt from a statement NATO made this morning:
[English]
- We reaffirm that the nuclear forces of the Allies continue to play a unique and essential role in
the Alliance's strategy of war prevention. New members, who will be full members of the
Alliance in all respects, will be expected to support the concept of deterrence and the essential
role nuclear weapons play in the Alliance's strategy. Enlarging the Alliance will not require a
change in NATO's current nuclear posture and therefore, NATO countries have no intention,
no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members nor any need
to change any aspect of NATO's nuclear posture or nuclear policy - and we do not foresee any
future need to do so.
The Vice-Chairman (Mr. English): What about NATO's policy of possible first use, to which the Soviets have historically objected? Is there any chance of changing that with the enlargement of the alliance?
RAdm King: I understand there are some who are examining that policy, but I do not believe that's being discussed at the highest levels of NATO at this time, and not in the context of this particular issue of NATO enlargement.
The ambassador's point, and what I mentioned before, is that in the overall framework of START, the CFE treaty, the Vienna Document and ultimately Open Skies, if we have it ratified as well, we're trying to build a regime whereby we instil confidence in this country.
Incidentally, there are no missiles right now. Of course the intermediate-range missiles were taken out previously by Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Reagan, so we're really talking about artillery with nuclear shells and combat aircraft. That's primarily it - combat aircraft and nuclear artillery.
I guess what I should say is while I understand the question, the two are not opposed. The military on one hand see the real situation and believe they ultimately will have to accept NATO enlargement, because almost certainly it appears we're going that way, and I believe they are prepared to bargain to a certain extent for it, to use it as a bargaining chip. But the visceral or gut reaction the deputy talks about is something a lot of Russians do feel, simply because they see it as a loss of power, a loss of influence and something to be concerned about.
The Vice-Chairman (Mr. English): I have Mr. Flis, Mr. Mills and Mr. Dupuy.
[Translation]
Mr. Bergeron: Has my time run out?
The Vice-Chairman (Mr. English): Yes.
Mr. Bergeron: Fine, I will come back to it.
[English]
Mr. Flis: I might give a partial answer to Lee Morrison's intervention yesterday and today.
The Baltic Business Council is hosting its second annual Baltic Connections Trade Fair and Conference in Toronto, and they asked me to speak to them yesterday. They didn't ask me to speak on trade and investment; they asked me to speak on Canada's position on NATO enlargement as it affects the Baltic states.
Canadians of Baltic origin and of non-Baltic origin who are interested in investing in that region would feel more comfortable if they knew those countries were part of the European Union and NATO. I thought that was interesting.
We talked about a special arrangement with Ukraine. What kind of special arrangement are we talking about? Is it going to be the kind of arrangement we have with Russia, or is it going to be military arrangements where Ukraine and these new members that have entered NATO might have military manoeuvres together, etc.?
The minister says over and over that we have to develop a special arrangement with Ukraine, but we really don't have many details on that.
Mr. Bell: The Ukrainians have put forward a number of things they wish to have, some of which it seems will be possible and some of which are more difficult.
To start with one of the more difficult ones, they would like to have a legally binding agreement with NATO, and at the moment this is not considered possible to do.
They want to have closer consultative arrangements with NATO, more exercises with NATO and an exchange of missions with NATO. In essence they want to see, both with NATO and bilaterally with the members of NATO, more presence of the west in Kiev on a regular basis to reinforce what I referred to earlier as the westward turning of Ukraine - the close relationship Ukraine wants to have with the west.
.1700
All of these are building blocks, in addition to the things that flowed from the PfP and from the enhanced dialogue we've had between NATO and Ukraine in terms of training for their military and the development of other training programs. All of these are building blocks.
Mr. Flis: But the more building blocks we build between NATO and Ukraine, the more we make Russia nervous and the more they object to NATO enlargement, right?
Mr. Bell: First of all, a great deal has been done already, and it is done in a non-threatening way. There are undoubtedly some people in Russia who would prefer to see no contacts. There are undoubtedly some people in Russia - and I can personally remember some - who would prefer that Ukraine had never left Mother Russia.
But under President Yeltsin - and I think it's important that we reflect and thank our lucky stars that President Yeltsin has returned to good health after his operation - we see a fairly stabilizing hand. We hope that once he is fully back in control, we will see the beginnings of renewed movement toward engagement in the discussion of the question of the relationship with the west and Russia's role in the new security architecture.
The Acting Chairman (Mr. Bergeron): Mr. Mills.
Mr. Mills: I'll try to make this question as brief as I can.
The U.S. basically is NATO. They provide the muscle, the leadership and a lot of what NATO really is. The other members are part of it and pretty much go along with that.
When we visited Germany, as Mr. Bergeron mentioned, we became very aware of the EU's plan, and Germany's position in that EU plan is a very major one. Napoleon and Hitler might have tried to do it with force, but this is now happening by political means. They really believe in the union of Europe as an economic bloc. They talked about a Euro-force, where they would have a common military. They talked about the Euro-dollar, which comes into effect, and they're all working toward that. They're talking about a major force.
If I were an American looking at that, a red flag would be going up. I would say, ``Wow! This is becoming a force that's going to challenge NATO. This will become more important than NATO, and our control of that will then diminish.''
So the growing of NATO obviously would be to the U.S.'s advantage, to help get more partners on board who are not part of the EU. They all want to be parts of the EU, though.
Is there any validity to that sort of hypothesis? Again, maybe I'm forcing you into a situation of ``what if'', but it seems to me a reality. We know how the U.S. likes to control things. They want to control the UN, and they certainly, I think, are in control of NATO.
Mr. Bell: I can remember one of Jimmy Carter's foreign policy advisers telling me of the first day Carter took over the presidency. He asked a number of his advisers about the whole concept of European Union and said, ``Is this in America's interests? Should we support it?'' Very quickly and with a very short discussion, they came to the conclusion that a stronger and more stable Europe was very much in America's interests, and I think that continues today.
From what I've heard in talking with them, I think that, notwithstanding the concerns some of the Americans have about the difficulties Europe is having in developing its own ability to operate as a union - and I think it was Kissinger who asked the question, ``If I want to talk to Europe, who do I phone?'' We certainly support the efforts to develop a European identity.
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There's no doubt that this is very clearly in the minutes of the meetings that were held today in Brussels. It's clear from the objectives that have been set out in the communiqué that it's very high on the list:
- finalising, to the satisfaction of all Allies, all the necessary arrangements for the European
Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within NATO, which will allow for the preparation and
conduct of WEU-led operations with the participation of all European Allies if they were so to
choose;
RAdm King: I would say from the military side that I think it's exactly the same. The United States has cut its forces by some 30%. Certainly in the talks we've had with the United States, they have always indicated that they need the assistance of their allies not just for significant military high-level-conflict type of operations, but for the normal type of operations going on now.
We certainly see that in Bosnia where, yes, the Americans take a leading role, but they are also very strongly supported by the British, French, and most of the nations, including ours.
From a straight, practical point of view, the Americans have their own real problems in ensuring that they have the forces necessary to do the things that have to be done. Yes, they are the leaders in NATO, and NATO does go along with the larger partners, not just the United States. There is generally, I think, a good sense of consensus in the alliance. I think it's one that's underwritten primarily by the article 5 guarantee, which is extremely important, and the fact that there is a basic commitment that nations make there.
I wouldn't support your hypothesis at all, Mr. Mills. I can see why one might think that way, but I believe, as Ambassador Bell said, that strengthening European security, the European pillar, while maintaining the trans-Atlantic link, is in the best interests of everybody in the alliance.
Mr. Dupuy: I would like to start from the wording of the final communiqué, which was issued on December 10. This is the NATO communiqué indicating quite clearly that the enlargement of NATO is envisaged as a way of strengthening a truly cooperative security structure in Europe. I presume this truly cooperative security structure would consolidate Euro-Atlantic security.
If one looks at the policies that the members of the alliance have pursued toward that objective, these have been three-pronged.
The first prong was a set of economic measures that we pursued over a number of years to facilitate the transition of these countries to a free market economy. What I find attractive with this first prong is that all interests converge between Europe, America, the eastern European countries and Russia. This seems to me to be a very solid policy with a great deal of cooperation developing.
The second prong concerns disarmament measures to the extent that SALT I is implemented, SALT II, although it's not ratified, is implemented, and if one looks forward, there's SALT III. These actually would bring down the level of the nuclear balance. We would have a safe world. No doubt we would work toward a truly cooperative security structure in Europe.
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Incidentally - and you may or may not wish to answer this - I wonder whether there are still nuclear weapons in Europe and in Russia targeted against each other's territory. If that were the case, it would indicate that we still have a reciprocal perception of threat. But let's leave that aside for a minute.
The third prong is NATO enlargement. What troubles me there is that there is much more confusion. One may wonder to what extent the interests that are so convergent in the first two chapters are convergent here. Let's look quickly at the convergence or non-convergence or lack of convergence of interests.
Obviously, ``NATO expansion'' is a very generic term. Much will depend in fact on who are the countries that are going to join NATO. The communiqué is very mysterious about that. It refers to ``one or more'' countries. More will be invited, but we'll start with one or more. Depending, of course, on what ``more'' means, you may have a huge operation or a small operation. The timing is also very important, because timing is related to the evolution of policy in Russia.
These are things that should be sorted out, not blurred, as we look at the issue of NATO enlargement.
Where are the interests? Obviously, the candidates for membership have a very good interest in joining NATO. Traditionally, if one looks at history, they were living in the shadow of two large powers, Russia, subsequently the U.S.S.R., and Germany. It is in their interests to join a collective security system.
The admiral used terms that gave me a bit a trepidation. He talked about areas of ``power vacuum'', which is true, but he implied that we should let NATO move into a power vacuum. Now, history has demonstrated many times that when there is a power vacuum and one of the contenders is entering the vacuum, you bring the basis, provide the foundation, for future conflicts. So that gives me some concern.
The applicants, then, will be well served from the security viewpoint. This completes their interest in the economic side.
But what about NATO? We take over very significant commitments in what is still a fairly unstable part of the world. Do we mean, when we say ``improve strong security partnerships'', that NATO will feel able to intervene internally in these countries to ensure stability?
We should remember that this is exactly what the U.S.S.R. did when they were intervening in these countries, allegedly to maintain stability. So this is a somewhat questionable view. I'm not saying this is the view that is prevalent in NATO, but it is a somewhat questionable view. If Yugoslavia is used as a model for expansion of NATO in the maintenance of internal peace, it's an even more questionable view. So I have some difficulties from that viewpoint.
As to the situation with Russia, I can only confirm what Mr. Bergeron was saying. Are we going to improve NATO security by enlargement, taking over an important new responsibility to the detriment of the Russian relationship? If there is anyplace where we can still think of a threat in that part of the world, it's Russia. Have we got our priorities right? Should we not be worried about European security and the consolidating Euro-Atlantic security in terms of improving our relationship with Russia, rather than in terms of the enlargement of NATO, which may work to the detriment of whatever the Russian negotiating position could be?
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Finally, these things must have been perceived about Russia, because the community also says that building a strong security partnership with Russia is part of the action. How do you reconcile the extension of NATO commitment to some of these eastern European countries and at the same time strengthen the security partnership with Russia?
So as you can see, I've sort of approached the issue from a variety of angles, but I wish I had satisfactory answers to all of these questions. I don't expect you to cover them all, but I would like to have your reaction to this analysis.
The Vice-Chairman (Mr. English): We have approximately 12 or 13 minutes until the bell. Mr. LeBlanc wants to speak as well.
RAdm King: In response to Mr. Dupuy, I used power vacuum to point out the fact that you had a large area of uncertainty, a lack of stability and a concern for the future in that area. That was my reference there. It was not to suggest that the power vacuum should be taken over by one or the other but that we should reduce any area of uncertainty with regard to relationships. The only other thing I would add with regard to Russia considerations is that we have a significant program in Partnership for Peace. Canada makes a large contribution to that in terms of improving relations, not only with Russia but also with the other Partnership for Peace nations.
At the same time, we have the practical application. Here we're talking about the concern about Russia, but right now in IFOR in Bosnia we have 2,000 Russian troops who are carrying out patrols with Americans in the same sector. It's an extremely successful military operation that looks like it will be extended into a stabilization force for another significant period of time. We see that as something we can practically build on to make the Russians realize that while on the one hand we are enlarging, on the other hand we are including them not only in our discussions but in our daily operations. Just to reinforce that, we carry out a series of exercises that are increasing in size and intensity every year.
So from that point of view real, practical steps are being taken to bring the Russians close to us in NATO, but without actually having them join.
The Vice-Chairman (Mr. English): Ambassador Bell, we have less time than I predicted, I'm afraid.
Mr. Bell: It's a reasonable postulation that if the NATO countries want to do their part to extend the western European structures of stability to the whole of the continent, they have to start with the question of how to fit Russia into the security structure. I think it's reasonable to ask whether we have done it yet. From the fact that we're having difficulty getting Russians to engage at this time, the answer is no, we don't have it nailed down.
It is the judgment of the alliance, and by that I'm referring to ministers of foreign affairs and defence and chiefs of staff who have met with their counterparts in Russia, that we are on track, that there is movement, and that we are actually in a negotiation at this stage that will work out. We have repeatedly emphasized to the Russians that we want to do it in parallel with the enlargement, and we believe they understand that they lose a certain amount of their negotiating room if enlargement goes ahead without them having come to an agreement with the west on their role and how they play it.
Are we strengthening NATO with enlargement? Part of the answer to that lies in the question of who gets in, how many countries we let in. I think that will be an essential factor in the final decision of how many countries are ultimately admitted in a first round of entry.
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Others of you have talked about the Baltics and different members that are seeking admittance at this time. I think we consider most, if not all, of the applicants to be fully eligible to become members of NATO, but the desire to retain the effectiveness of NATO may not permit us to take in more than a small number at this time. We want to see how much complication there is in absorbing that smaller number.
Some alliance members believe that smaller number should be as small as three in order to be sure of a fairly quick second round of enlargement. I don't know how that will work out. Undoubtedly there will be discussions among the NATO ambassadors in the months leading up to the next round of NACC ministerials, and at that time I think we will begin to get a final idea of how many countries and who will finally get in.
The Vice-Chairman (Mr. English): Thank you, Ambassador.
We have time for two quick questions.
Mr. Bergeron and Mr. LeBlanc.
[Translation]
Mr. Bergeron: Obviously, I would like you to be with us when we discuss this so that you can clarify the last obscure points we might think of.
I would like to go back to the question I asked earlier about the Russians, who seem to be objecting just because they want to bargain. I would just like to ask you whether there is something we could negotiate with the Russians or give to them. If so, what might that be? More specifically, I could ask you what the Russians hope to get by being so vehemently opposed to the enlargement of NATO. What do they want to get in return and what might we be willing to give them?
[English]
The Vice-Chairman (Mr. English): Mr. LeBlanc, could you ask your question very quickly? If we could just have a response in a couple of minutes, we should probably go.
Mr. LeBlanc: Mine is a very practical question. I've been looking through this declaration to see if there's any mention of criteria for membership, which was part of the minister's position. Has there been acceptance of the notion of criteria for membership in an expanded NATO? If it's not referred to in the communiqué, is that being considered?
The Vice-Chairman (Mr. English): Ambassador Bell, would you like to respond to those two interventions?
Mr. Bell: The Russians undoubtedly wish to have a relationship with any European security structure that reflects the importance they see themselves having in Europe. They want respect and influence, and those two things will guide them in terms of the specifics they want. They have also said they want to have a legally binding agreement with NATO. One of the difficulties that suggests is that it would require ratification, and this creates problems for NATO.
The details of what the Russians want is uncertain. They don't play their cards straight out to us. We know they wanted things like that. We know that one of their first efforts was to obtain the OSCE as the dominant institution of security, with NATO underneath it. That was unacceptable to the west. We may learn more in the meeting of the 16 plus 1 with Mr. Primakov tomorrow. We hope we will learn more over the months leading up to the spring meetings. Each time we have a meeting....
Mr. Rodionov was supposed to be in Washington earlier in December. The meeting was postponed, but those sorts of meetings all add something to the mill in terms of understanding what the Russian position is and how we can respond to it.
We know we have put most things on the table. We have a negotiating position ready from NATO's point of view, but you don't want to place everything on the table because the Russians take that as a starting point.
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The Vice-Chairman (Mr. English): I think we had better take this as a starting point, because we have five minutes left to get to the House of Commons.
Mr. Bell: The study for enlargement that NATO issued had the criteria in them, and those form the basis for all of the negotiations.
The Vice-Chairman (Mr. English): Thank you to all of the witnesses.
Mr. LeBlanc: Mr. Chairman, I have a brief point of order.
The Vice-Chairman (Mr. English): I don't think we have a quorum.
Thank you, Mr. LeBlanc.
I'm sorry, but the bell came somewhat earlier than we expected. Thank you for your testimony today, which was invaluable to our work. We look forward...because we'll probably see you again when we're doing this work.
This meeting is adjourned.