# Possible unintended consequences from changing the Canadian electoral system. 

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## Guiding Principles from Ministry website.

The Government is proposing five principles that would be used to guide the parliamentary committee's study and act as a framework for the Government's eventual policy decisions:

1. Restore the effectiveness and legitimacy of the voting system by reducing distortions and strengthening the link between voter intention and the electoral result;
2. Encourage greater engagement and participation in the democratic process, including by fostering civility and consensus building in politics and social cohesion;
3. Support accessibility and inclusiveness for all eligible voters, including by avoiding undue complexity in the voting process;
4. Safeguard the integrity of our voting system; and,
5. Take into consideration the accountability of local representation.

The principles do not prejudge an outcome but help encourage Canadians and parliamentarians to engage in a thoughtful, substantive debate on changes to our voting system.

All parties are vying to form government and set policy and it has been demonstrated that some will engage in criminal activity in order to win. Most of the systems work well when being described by its advocates.

The preferred electoral system would eliminate the possibility or incentive for manipulation of the voter's opportunity to vote and create a strong possibility of votes translating into representation.

When considering changes to the existing system it is essential therefore to consider the unintended consequences when the system fails to operate as planned or is subject to a deliberate attempt to benefit from any inherent opportunity to manipulate the rules.

The basic problem with predicting how people will choose to act, in the case of alternate choice systems, is that people are unpredictable.

How will people choose to vote in an election based on an alternative vote system cannot be forecast with any reasonable degree of accuracy. For example, it is common for the explanatory graphics to show all votes being redistributed until someone meets the quota.

Ireland has used an STV system since 1922 and yet in the recent election there are examples of people being elected, after the ninth count, without meeting the quota. Their law allows the quota to be ignored if it is clear that no more votes will be transferred to those leading for the available seats.
http://www.irishtimes.com/election-2016/dublin-fingal

How might the possible systems be open to manipulation resulting outcomes unintended by those who are trying to make the seat count reflect the votes received.

| OBJECTIVE | FPP and MMP | AV | STV Multi-member | PR multi-member |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Effective and legitimate, strengthening the link between voter intention and the electoral result; | FPP been the subject of proven, criminal attempts at voter suppression. MMP has same exposure | WILL BE GAMED BY THE MAJOR PARTIES | WILL BE GAMED BY THE MAJOR PARTIES | Would achieve the objective |
| Greater engagement by fostering civility and consensus | NO | NO | Coalition would  <br> produce some <br> degree of consensus  | Coalition will <br> produce some <br> degree of <br> consensus  <br>   |
| Avoid complexity | NOT COMPLEX | Some will <br> struggle with <br> more choice. <br> Avoid the <br> Donkey  <br> Vote  | Some will struggle with larger ballot and more choice Avoid the Donkey Vote | NOT COMPLEX but selection would be from a large choice of candidates |
| Safeguard integrity | Secure with paper ballot . internet not secure | Secure with paper ballot . internet not secure | Secure with paper ballot . internet not secure | Secure with paper ballot . internet not secure |
| Consider local representation | Local representation exists but can be partisan and unresponsive | Local representation would exist but could be partisan and unresponsive | Multi member riding allows greater possibility support from a candidate of your choice, if system has not been gamed. |  |

## Mississauga as a virtual multi-member riding

To get a feeling for STV, consider a virtual multi-member riding combining all current ridings in Mississauga into a single multi-member riding. This is something to which I can relate.

There would be 6 seats and 29 people listed on the ballot. (Same as the last election) The first 6 preferences would be counted but if electors chose to only make one choice, the result would likely have been the same as under FPP and none of them would have attained the quota!

I suggest that all parties will manipulate the system and encourage people to show preference for them with no alternates.

Assume the electors chose to follow such advice, everyone selected just one option and therefore no votes are available for transfer.

| SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE ELECTORAL SYTEM - SAMPLE BALLOT |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Ballot - Instructions: Rank candidates in the order of your preference by placing a number in the box to the right of each candidate's name. "1" shows your first choice, "2" your second choice, " 3 " your third choice, and so on. You must select at least one candidate and may rank up FIVE additional candidates. Alternates can be from any party. |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Omar Alghabra | Liberal |  |  | Farheen Khan | NDP |  |
| Peter Fonseca | Liberal |  |  | Ali Naqvi | NDP |  |
| Iqra Khalid | Liberal |  |  | Michelle Bilek | NDP |  |
| Sven Spengemann | Liberal |  |  | Eric Guerbilsky | NDP |  |
| Navdeep Bains | Liberal |  |  | Dianne Douglas | NDP |  |
| Gagan Sikand | Liberal |  |  | Fayaz Karim | NDP |  |
| Julius Tiangson | Conservative |  |  | Linh Nguyen | Green |  |
| Wladyslaw Lizon | Conservative |  |  | Jaymini Bhikha | Green |  |
| Bob Dechert ** | Conservative |  |  | Andrew Roblin | Green |  |
| Stella Ambler ** | Conservative |  |  | Ariana Burgener | Green |  |
| Brad Butt ** | Conservative |  |  | Heather Mercer | Green |  |
| Jagdish Grewal | Conservative |  |  | Chris Hill | Green |  |
| Paul Woodworth | Libertarian |  |  | Tim Sullivan | MarxistLeninist |  |
| Naresh Tharani | Independent |  |  | Dagmar Sullivan | MarxistLeninist |  |
| Yegor Tarazevich | Christian Heritage |  | - |  |  |  |

## Possible outcome using 2015 election results

## STV WITH EVERYONE CHOOSING TO SELECT ONLY ONE CANDIDATE AND THERFORE NO VOTES AVAILABE FOR TRANSFER

|  | Total votes cast |  |  | 318644 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | 6+1 | 45521 |
|  | Quota |  | plus 1 vote | 45522 |
| Number seats available | First count votes | Additional votes required to meet quota | Votes for  <br> transfer  |  |
| 6 | First count |  |  |  |
| Liberal | 28372 | 17150 | 0 but elected |  |
| Liberal | 28279 | 17243 | 0 but elected |  |
| Liberal | 28154 | 17368 | 0 but elected |  |
| Liberal | 27520 | 18002 | 0 but elected |  |
| Liberal | 26792 | 18730 | 0 but elected |  |
| Liberal | 26165 | 19357 | 0 but elected |  |

## ALL OF THE CANDIDATES WOULD BE ELECTED WITHOUT MEETING THE QUOTA

| Conservative | 24435 |  |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Conservative | 22621 |  |  |  |
| Conservative | 21716 |  |  |  |
| Conservative | 18353 |  |  |  |
| Conservative | 17431 |  |  |  |
| Conservative | 11701 |  |  |  |
| NDP | 5450 |  |  |  |
| NDP | 5206 |  |  |  |
| NDP | 5040 |  |  |  |
| NDP | 4920 |  |  |  |
| NDP | 4735 |  |  |  |
| NDP | 4481 |  |  |  |
| Green | 1397 |  |  |  |
| Green | 1293 |  |  |  |
| Green | 1129 |  |  |  |
| Green | 905 |  |  |  |
| Green | 766 |  |  |  |
| Green | 737 |  |  |  |
| Libertarian | 316 |  |  |  |
| Christian Heritage | 253 |  |  |  |
| Independent | 203 |  |  |  |
| Marxist Leninist | 163 |  |  |  |
| Marxist Leninist | 111 |  |  |  |

## ALTERNATIVE VOTE (AV)

In an election using Alternative Vote (AV) the ballot would only show the candidates in the existing riding structure. Votes would be transferred from the candidate with the least to the other candidates until one candidate has 50 percent plus one. Some parties will suggest their supporters only make one choice and many people will not find an acceptable alternate. The outcome would be the same as FPP.

| ALTERNATIVE VOTE | SAMPLE BALLOT |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Ballot - Instructions: Rank candidates in the order of your preference by placing a number in the <br> box to the right of each candidate's name. "1" shows your first choice, "2" your second choice, <br> "3" your third choice, and so on. You may rank as many candidates as you wish, from as many <br> parties as you wish, but You MUS RANK AT LEAST ONE. |  |  |  |  |  |
| Electoral <br> district | Candidate | Affiliation | First <br> preference | Alternate <br> preference 1 | Alternate <br> preference 2 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Mississauga <br> Centre | Omar Alghabra | Liberal |  |  |  |
|  | Julius Tiangson | Conservative |  |  |  |
|  | Farheen Khan | NDP-New <br> Democratic <br> Party |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Linh Nguyen | Green Party |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

We have no way of knowing how many people cast strategic or negative votes or would have indicated other than one choice but the example above is the worst case.

This problem applies to any system that allows choice or preference voting.
In Multi-member ridings it may be necessary to change the sequence of the candidates and maybe the party groupings on blocks of ballots to avoid the "donkey vote". This is done in some countries. The donkey vote describes the situation where an elector just chooses the first group on the ballot

## Proportional Representation in a multi-member riding.

If the candidates in this virtual multi-member riding had been elected by PR applied at the multimember riding level, instead of all Liberal MPs there would now be 3 Liberal, 2 Conservative and 1 NDP. At the 2011 election all seats were held by Conservatives.

The ballot would still have 29 names but you would only select one person and by default, the party they represent. The candidates would form an open list for each party and those who attracted the most votes for their party would be those elected. It may be necessary to change the sequence of the candidates and maybe the party groupings on blocks of ballots to avoid the "donkey vote". This is done in some countries.

|  |  | SAMPLE BALLOT |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Pure Proportional Representation based on a multi-member riding (using Mississauga 2015 as example.) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Ballot - Instructions: Select ONE candidate only. <br> By selecting the candidate you also select the party that they represent. <br> The total votes accumulated for all candidates for each party, as a proportion of the total votes cast, determine the number of candidates elected for each party. Candidates who attract the most votes for their party are awarded the seats |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Omar Alghabra | Liberal |  |  | Farheen Khan | NDP |  |
| Peter Fonseca | Liberal |  |  | Ali Naqvi | NDP |  |
| Iqra Khalid | Liberal |  |  | Michelle Bilek | NDP |  |
| Sven <br> Spengemann | Liberal |  |  | Eric Guerbilsky | NDP |  |
| Navdeep Bains | Liberal |  |  | Dianne Douglas | NDP |  |
| Gagan Sikand | Liberal |  |  | Fayaz Karim | NDP |  |
| Julius Tiangson | Conservative |  |  | Linh Nguyen | Green |  |
| Wladyslaw Lizon | Conservative |  |  | Jaymini Bhikha | Green |  |
| Bob Dechert ** | Conservative |  |  | Andrew Roblin | Green |  |
| Stella Ambler ** | Conservative |  |  | Ariana Burgener | Green |  |
| Brad Butt ** | Conservative |  |  | Heather Mercer | Green |  |
| Jagdish Grewal | Conservative |  |  | Chris Hill | Green |  |
| Paul <br> Woodworth | Libertarian |  |  | Tim Sullivan | MarxistLeninist |  |
| Naresh Tharani | Independent |  |  | Dagmar Sullivan | MarxistLeninist |  |
| Yegor <br> Tarazevich | Christian Heritage |  |  |  |  |  |


| 6 MEMBERS SELECTED FROM ACROSS THE WHOLE OF MISSISSAUGA |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| THE ONLY OFFICE SELECTED IN THIS MANNER IS THE MAYOR WHO IS SELECTED BY FPP |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Open <br> list PR |  |  |  |  |
|  | Liberal | Cons | NDP | Green |
|  | $\mathbf{2 8 3 7 2}$ | $\mathbf{1 7 4 3 1}$ | $\mathbf{5 4 5 0}$ | 1129 |
|  | $\mathbf{2 8 2 7 9}$ | $\mathbf{1 1 7 0 1}$ | 5206 | 766 |
|  | 28154 | 18353 | 5040 | 905 |
|  | 267520 | 21716 | 4920 | 1397 |
|  | 165282 | 22621 | 4735 | 737 |
|  |  | 24435 | 4481 | 1293 |
|  | $51.9 \%$ | $36.5 \%$ | $9.4 \%$ | $2.0 \%$ |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | 2 | 1 | 0 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |

Of the options shown, only PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION at the multi-member riding level avoids the possibility of voter manipulation while meeting the objectives stated by the Ministry.

