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Summary: For the election of the Members of the Bundestag the German Federal Election Law implements a system of "proportional representation combined with an election of persons". In an attempt to adapt the underlying rationale to the Canadian polity we sketch a system for the election of the House of Commons aiming at "an election of persons combined with proportional representation". In view of the Canadian history the hypothetical system is termed "single-member plurality combined with proportional representation of parties" (SMP&PRP).

1. Introduction

A central theme in the Committee's inquiry into the system for the election of the Members of the House of Commons is the problem of proportional representation of political parties. Hitherto Members of Parliament are elected in single-seat constituencies. However, Parliament's daily work relies on party affiliation, not on regional provenance. This mismatch has been the cause of many debates and initiatives for electoral reform. Similar electoral issues have been encountered in German history. Based on the German experience we sketch some ideas that possibly aid in identifying feasible solutions for the Canadian problems.

In Section 2 we give a short review of the essentials of the electoral system for the German Bundestag, and discuss some of its merits and limitations. In Section 3 we turn to the Canadian House of Commons and sketch a hypothetical electoral system – tagged SMP&PRP – that we view to be a natural enhancement of the current single-member plurality system.

2. Proportional representation and the German Bundestag

I am very pleased to appear here as a witness and to introduce to you the main features of the German electoral system. The double vote system for the election of the Members of the Bundestag has become something like a democratic export hit. In contrast to German Diesel cars it has caused no considerable mischief but is held in high regard. But honesty demands that you should mention there are at least some precautions you should take when implementing the German system.

To explain the system as a whole would be a very demanding task, because the current German system is one of the most complicated systems in the world. At the beginning of this year the President of the German Bundestag, Norbert Lammert, trying to provoke a new reform debate, said that only a handful of MPs would be able to explain how the seats are distributed in the German Bundestag. I assume that this was rather an optimistic estimation. But the complex intricacies of the German system are mostly due to its federal structure and the specific way the German system is adapted to that. Although Canada is also a federal state, due to constitutional constraints, especially the fixed numbers of seats for every province, the one-to-one transfer of the German electoral system to the context of Canada is probably not possible. The only solution we could imagine therefore consists in the application of the system within each province separately. This is also more or less the way in which the Mixed Member proportional system works in Scotland and also the way it was used in the first German federal election in 1949. The separate application within each province makes things much easier. Therefore I will concentrate on the main features of the German electoral system only. I will focus especially on two aspects, which are important for the evaluation of the way the German system works. The first aspect refers to overhang seats, the second to the phenomenon of strategic voting. If you establish a Mixed Member proportional system, sooner or later you will be confronted with these problems.

In the literature, the German system is often referred to as a Mixed Member proportional system. The key point is its combination of two ballots which are used at two different tiers, the direct and personal election of candidates in single member districts and the voting for party lists in an upper tier, which is big enough to ensure that the proportional distribution of seats between the parties can be guaranteed. The intention was to maintain the proportional system of the Weimar Republic but to complement it with the advantages of directly elected local representatives to which the citizens could acquire a special "personal" relationship.

In the German electoral system each citizen has two votes. With the ‘first vote’ (Erststimme), the voter selects one of the candidates in his constituency. With the ‘second vote’ (Zweitstimme), the voter votes for a so-called Landesliste, which is a party list, valid for one of the sixteen Länder of the Federal Republic of Germany. For better understanding I will refer to the second vote in the following also as the party vote. One-half of the seats in the German Bundestag are constituency seats, which are attributed to the candidates who have won the plurality of first votes in their constituency. The second half are list seats. This mixture of distributing mechanisms sometimes tempts observers to ignore that the essential character of the German system is that of a proportional system.

Only those parties which have won more than five per cent of all valid second votes, or have won at least three constituency seats, are entitled to participate in the proportional distribution of seats according to the Sainte-Laguë procedure. We can skip for reasons of simplicity the

complex distribution of seats between the Länder. What's important is the fact that in the end each party is entitled in each Land to a certain number of seats according to its share of party votes. From that amount, the number of constituency seats that the party gained in that Land is subtracted. The remaining seats are distributed according to the ranks in the Landesliste. Persons on the list who have already won a constituency seat are not considered. Since nobody should be denied the constituency seat won personally as a candidate, it is possible that the number of constituency seats achieved in one Land is higher than the number to which the party list is entitled. Such seats are called surplus seats or overhang seats (Überhangmandate).

As long as there are no overhang seats, the distribution of seats between the parties is – depending on rounding effects and the effective threshold – more or less proportional. The linkage between the single member district tier and the upper tier (of the Land) guarantees that the whole number of seats of a party, including the constituency seats it has won, is covered by its second votes. Thus, usually the first votes are only important in regard to the personal occupation of seats. They are, with the exception of the emergence of surplus seats, irrelevant for the number of seats that a party gains. If you think of proportional systems as systems in which each party has to pay the same price in party votes for a seat, mixed member proportional systems are those – in contrast to so called mixed member majoritarian system – , in which ideally you have to pay the price for every seat in party votes. The only relevant currency for paying the price of a seat are the party votes. This is in principle also true for the constituency seats which are actually gained by a plurality of personal votes. At least this is the case when there are no overhang seats. The whole purpose of this linkage between the two tiers is to correct for violations of proportionality which occur in the course of the distribution of seats in the single member districts, which usually includes only the two biggest parties and provides an especially great advantage for the biggest party.

The situation is more complicated when overhang seats emerge. In most cases overhang seats are caused by the structure of the party system, so we can call them structurally induced overhang seats. When half of all seats are constituency seats, then every time a party gains a share of constituency seats of more than double its share of party votes, overhang seats will appear. So if a party with 40% of the party votes is successful in more than 80% of the constituencies, there will be overhang seats. Since the party system is the materialization of voter preferences and so has to be handled as given, structurally induced overhang seats can be abolished only by enhancing the size of Parliament till the overhang seats are covered by the proportionally distributed seat-contingents for the parties or by reducing the share of all seats, which are constituency seats.

The method of inflating the Parliament by so called adjustment seats in order to neutralize the effect of overhang seats is applied in all electoral laws of the German Bundesländer, which also have MMPs, and since 2012 it is also an element of the federal electoral law. This solution is

obviously not available if the size of Parliament is fixed. In this case restoring proportionality isn't possible, as long as the gain of a constituency seat is guaranteed. But it would certainly violate fundamental considerations of fairness to deny the winner of a plurality of first votes his constituency seat. So some deviations from perfect proportionality may be the necessary price for preserving the principle of direct representation by personally elected MPs in the single member districts. But at least this price should be not higher than is required by the wish to satisfy our taste for fairness. Now we have to deal with the complex matter of strategic voting.

To put it rather casually, we understand by strategic voting that a voter will not vote for his favourite party, that is, his highest preferred party. Typically the motive for strategic voting consists in avoiding a wasted vote. I will concentrate here on the case of avoiding a wasted first vote. Strategic voting in this case means that a voter will not give his first vote to a candidate who has ostensibly no chance of winning the constituency. The usual pattern here is that supporters of small parties such as the liberal FDP or the Greens will vote for the constituency candidate from a big party which is closest to their own party and the desired coalition partner. Whether this pattern of strategic voting is a desired or not desired kind of behavior depends on the electoral system. Sometimes the electoral system is designed intentionally to elicit strategic votes. In the first past the post system the design is intended to evoke this strategic behavior, because this is the functional requirement to guarantee that plurality systems can produce the desired "manufactured majorities" of a single party.

But the empirical consequences and the normative implications are totally different, when we look at the Mixed Member proportional system. Supporters of small parties who cast their personal vote for the candidate of a friendly big party are usually voting with their party vote for their really preferred party. But if their first votes help to create an overhang seat, they provide their friendly party with an additional seat for which the appropriate price in party votes is not payed. They influence the personal filling of seats and simultaneously detract the means by which these seats are funded. These strategically voting citizens effectively have a double voting weight.

Overhang seats which are caused by ticket-splitting can simply be avoided by abolishing the two-vote system. The voters have then only one vote, which they cast for candidates in their constituency. The party votes, which are the base for the proportional distribution of seats, are calculated by summing up all personal votes for constituency candidates. So all votes of a party come from votes the citizens gave candidates of the party. This would also have the nice advantage that parties have an especially strong incentive to nominate attractive candidates. Mr. Pukelsheim will now continue with the presentation.

3. Proportional representation and the Canadian House of Commons

Since Confederation in 1867 Members of the House of Commons have been elected using the "single-member plurality" (SMP) system. Parliament's agenda is set by the parties gaining parliamentary seats. However, the number of seats a party holds in the House visibly is at odds with the support the party enjoys in the electorate. We propose to rectify the representational mismatch by enhancing current provisions in the direction of a system implementing "single-member plurality combined with proportional representation of parties", SMP&PRP. We sketch a system of this type by illustrating it with the data from the last two elections.

The Canadian Constitution includes detailed rules (ss. 51, 51A, and 52) to determine how many members of the House of Commons are assigned to each province and territory. In electoral jargon these seat guarantees are referred to as "district magnitudes". In order to meet the constitutionally mandated district magnitudes, our hypothetical system allots seats separately per province and territory. Hence the system calls for thirteen separate seat apportionments.

The thirteen apportionment calculations are split into two categories. The first category assembles the districts whose population is too small for proportionality to take effect; the second comprises the other districts. The three territories belong to the first category because they command just one seat each. Evidently a single seat is insufficient to achieve any degree of proportionality whatsoever. For proportionality to function properly theoretical investigations recommend that the number of available seats should meet or exceed twice the number of participating parties.[1] Therefore we also place Prince Edward Island (four seats) in the first category, and Newfoundland and Labrador (seven seats). Whether to do so or not is a political decision. If so, the already large constituencies do not have to be enlarged yet further, which is good. On the other hand the votes that are not cast for constituency winners are wasted, which is bad. In summary first-category districts enjoy the same electoral system as ever.

For the eight provinces in the second category the old single-member plurality system is enhanced by proportional representation of parties. In order to set some seats aside for the system's proportionality component we propose to reduce the number of constituencies. Of course it is a genuinely political decision to fix the number of constituencies per province. As for our hypothetical model we choose to roughly halve the number of constituencies, for instance by merging two into one. Then about half the seats are filled by way of single-member constituencies, and the other half from party lists.[2]

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[1] See Section 7.9, page 104, in: F. Pukelsheim: *Proportional Representation – Apportionment Methods and Their Applications. With a Foreword by Andrew Duff MEP*. Springer International Publishing, 2014.

[2] In our illustrative evaluations we did not halve the district magnitudes to obtain the number of constituencies because we found it too haphazard then to estimate how many constituencies a party would win. Instead, we halved the number of constituencies actually won by the parties. E.g. 2015 in B.C., the tally was Lib. 17, CPC 10, NDP 14, GP 1. We halved these numbers into 8.5 i.e. 9, 5, 7, 0.5 i.e. 1, leading to 9+5+7+1=22 constituencies.

Specifically in the last two elections, our model uses the "divisor method with standard rounding", also known as "Sainte-Laguë method" (in NZ and Europe) and "Webster method" (in the US): A party's vote count is divided by an electoral key, the "divisor", and the ensuing quotient is rounded to yield the seat number. For example 2015 in B.C., every 56 000 votes justified roughly (i.e. up to rounding) one seat. All resulting seat numbers happen to meet or exceed the number of constituencies won by a party in a province. In every instance there are enough seats for the constituency winners. The seats left may be filled from closed party lists. Closed lists encourage parties to promote social cohesion and to include underrepresented groups.[3]

Generally the legal provisions should codify, not the ordinary divisor method with standard rounding, but its "direct-seat restricted variant".[4] The variant inhibits the occurrence of overhang seats and thereby ensures adherence to the constitutionally mandated district magnitudes. The direct-seat restricted variant imposes minimum restrictions which the ordinary method neglects. A party is allotted at least as many seats as are needed for its constituency winners. In cases when the minimum restriction becomes active the required seats are transferred from the competing parties to those parties that feature an excess number of constituency winners. That is, proportional representation is compromised in favor of constituency representation. It would seem to us that such cases would be very rare in Canada.

Finally we address the question of which vote pattern to use. The answer is as simple as can be: nothing changes. Voters are issued the ballot sheets they are accustomed to. Every voter casts a single vote that is a composite appreciation of eligibility of a person and preference for a party. Our proposal only changes the law's scheme of evaluating the information supplied. In second-category provinces, every vote is tallied twice: once for the candidate towards constituency plurality, and once for the party towards districtwide proportionality.[5] The essential novelty which people need to understand is that their votes are more carefully evaluated by lending particular weight to party affiliation. At this juncture every vote counts.

In the sequel we illustrate our hypothetically proposed system by applying it to the 41st General Election 2011 and to the 42nd General Election 2015. The hypothetical SMP&PRP system is seen to achieve more proportionality than the status quo. Due to its hybrid character it does not coincide with pure proportionality though, but preserves much of the charm of past traditions.

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[3] See pages 9, 32 in: *Report of the Electoral Commission on the Review of the MMP Voting System*, Electoral Commission of New Zealand, 29 October 2012.

[4] See Section 12.5, page 162, in Pukelsheim (note 2). The NZ report (note 3) also expresses preference for the direct-seat restricted variant; see Section 1.60, page 21. A similar direct-seat restricted variant (namely, the one belonging to the divisor method with downward rounding) is applied already in Scotland.

[5] This "doubly evaluated single vote" is an alternative to the double vote system that is popular in Germany and New Zealand. However, the latter enables the electorate to vote strategically in systems such as SMP&PRP that apportion seats by a direct-seat restricted variant of a divisor method.

*41st General Election, 2 May 2011, hypothetical evaluation SMP&PRP, using DivStd, by districts

*Electoral district 1: N.L.

Parties	Votes	SMP
"Lib."	82344	4
"NDP"	70868	2
"CPC"	61562	1
"GP"	1954	0
"BQ"	0	0
Sum	216728	7

*Electoral district 2: P.E.I.

Parties	Votes	SMP
"CPC"	32548	1
"Lib."	32380	3
"NDP"	12135	0
"GP"	1895	0
"BQ"	0	0
Sum	78958	4

*Electoral district 11: Y.T.

Parties	Votes	SMP
"CPC"	5422	1
"NDP"	2308	0
"Lib."	5290	0
"GP"	3037	0
"BQ"	0	0
Sum	16057	1

*Electoral district 12: N.W.T.

Parties	Votes	SMP
"NDP"	7140	1
"CPC"	5001	0
"Lib."	2872	0
"GP"	477	0
"BQ"	0	0
Sum	15490	1

*Electoral district 13: Nun.

Parties	Votes	SMP
"CPC"	3930	1
"Lib."	2260	0
"NDP"	1525	0
"GP"	160	0
"BQ"	0	0
Sum	7875	1

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*Electoral district 3: N.S.

Parties	Votes	SMP	Quotient	PRP
"CPC"	165818	2	4.4	4
"NDP"	136620	2	3.6	4
"Lib."	130577	2	3.4	3
"GP"	17808	0	0.47	0
"BQ"	0	0	0.0	0
Sum (Divisor)	450823	6	(38000)	11

*Electoral district 4: N.B.

Parties	Votes	SMP	Quotient	PRP
"CPC"	170420	4	4.6	5
"NDP"	115830	1	3.1	3
"Lib."	87871	1	2.4	2
"GP"	12317	0	0.3	0
"BQ"	0	0	0.0	0
Sum (Divisor)	386438	6	(37000)	10

*Electoral district 5: Que.

Parties	Votes	SMP	Quotient	PRP
"NDP"	1630865	30	32.2	32
"BQ"	891425	2	17.6	18
"CPC"	627961	3	12.4	12
"Lib."	538447	4	10.6	11
"GP"	80402	0	1.6	2
Sum (Divisor)	3769100	39	(50600)	75

*Electoral district 6: Ont.

Parties	Votes	SMP	Quotient	PRP
"CPC"	2457463	37	47.6	48
"NDP"	1417435	11	27.47	27
"Lib."	1400302	6	27.1	27
"GP"	207435	0	4.0	4
"BQ"	0	0	0.0	0
Sum (Divisor)	5482635	54	(51600)	106

*Electoral district 7: Man.

Parties	Votes	SMP	Quotient	PRP
"CPC"	262941	6	7.4	7
"NDP"	126639	1	3.6	4
"Lib."	81417	1	2.3	2
"GP"	17738	0	0.502	1
"BQ"	0	0	0.0	0
Sum (Divisor)	488735	8	(35300)	14

*Electoral district 8: Sask.

Parties	Votes	SMP	Quotient	PRP
"CPC"	256167	7	8.3	8
"NDP"	147214	0	4.7	5
"Lib."	38743	1	1.2	1
"GP"	12045	0	0.4	0
"BQ"	0	0	0.0	0
Sum (Divisor)	454169	8	(31000)	14

*Electoral district 9: Alta.

Parties	Votes	SMP	Quotient	PRP
"CPC"	932765	14	18.7	19
"NDP"	234730	1	4.7	5
"Lib."	129310	0	2.6	3
"GP"	73058	0	1.46	1
"BQ"	0	0	0.0	0
Sum (Divisor)	1369863	15	(50000)	28

*Electoral district 10: B.C.

Parties	Votes	SMP	Quotient	PRP
"CPC"	853272	11	16.4	16
"NDP"	609102	6	11.7	12
"Lib."	251263	1	4.8	5
"GP"	143769	1	2.8	3
"BQ"	0	0	0.0	0
Sum (Divisor)	1857406	19	(52000)	36

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*Summary of SMP&PRP appportionment, in 13 districts, with 169 ridings, using DivStd

	"CPC"	SMP	PRP	"NDP"	SMP	PRP	"Lib."	SMP	PRP	"BQ"	SMP	PRP	"GP"	SMP	PRP	Votes Sum	PRP Sum
N.L.	61562	1	1	70868	2	2	82344	4	4	0	0	0	1954	0	0	216728	7
P.E.I.	32548	1	1	12135	0	0	32380	3	3	0	0	0	1895	0	0	78958	4
N.S.	165818	2	4	136620	2	4	130577	2	3	0	0	0	17808	0	0	450823	11
N.B.	170420	4	5	115830	1	3	87871	1	2	0	0	0	12317	0	0	386438	10
Que.	627961	3	12	1630865	30	32	538447	4	11	891425	2	18	80402	0	2	3769100	75
Ont.	2457463	37	48	1417435	11	27	1400302	6	27	0	0	0	207435	0	4	5482635	106
Man.	262941	6	7	126639	1	4	81417	1	2	0	0	0	17738	0	1	488735	14
Sask.	256167	7	8	147214	0	5	38743	1	1	0	0	0	12045	0	0	454169	14
Alta.	932765	14	19	234730	1	5	129310	0	3	0	0	0	73058	0	1	1369863	28
B.C.	853272	11	16	609102	6	12	251263	1	5	0	0	0	143769	1	3	1857406	36
Y.T.	5422	1	1	2308	0	0	5290	0	0	0	0	0	3037	0	0	16057	1
N.W.T.	5001	0	0	7140	1	1	2872	0	0	0	0	0	477	0	0	15490	1
Nun.	3930	1	1	1525	0	0	2260	0	0	0	0	0	160	0	0	7875	1
Sum	5835270	88	123	4512411	55	95	2783076	23	61	891425	2	18	572095	1	11	14594277	308

*Comparison of three ways of allocating the 308 seats in the 41st House of Commens among parties

	Votes	%	Status quo	%	hypo. SMP&PRP	%	pure prop.: DivStd	%
"CPC"	5835270	40	166	54	123	40	123	40
"NDP"	4512411	31	103	33	95	31	95	31
"Lib."	2783076	19	34	11	61	20	59	19
"BQ"	891425	6	4	1	18	6	19	6
"GP"	572095	4	1	1	11	4	12	4
Sum	14594277	100	308	100	308	101	308	100

*Total of valid votes: 14723980. Twenty parties and indeps are left without seat.

*42nd General Election, 19 OCT 2015, hypothetical evaluation SMP&PRP, using DivStd, by 13 districts

*Electoral district 1: N.L.

Parties	Votes	SMP
"Lib."	165418	7
"NDP"	54120	0
"CPC"	26469	0
"GP"	2772	0
"BQ"	0	0
Sum	248779	7

*Electoral district 2: P.E.I.

Parties	Votes	SMP
"Lib."	51002	4
"CPC"	16900	0
"NDP"	14006	0
"GP"	5281	0
"BQ"	0	0
Sum	87189	4

*Electoral district 11: Y.T.

Parties	Votes	SMP
"Lib."	10887	1
"CPC"	4928	0
"NDP"	3943	0
"GP"	533	0
"BQ"	0	0
Sum	20291	1

*Electoral district 12: N.W.T.

Parties	Votes	SMP
"Lib."	9172	1
"NDP"	5783	0
"CPC"	3481	0
"GP"	537	0
"BQ"	0	0
Sum	18973	1

*Electoral district 13: Nun.

Parties	Votes	SMP
"Lib."	5619	1
"NDP"	3171	0
"CPC"	2956	0
"GP"	182	0
"BQ"	0	0
Sum	11928	1

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*Electoral district 3: N.S.

Parties	Votes	SMP	Quotient	PRP
"Lib."	324816	6	6.9	7
"CPC"	93697	0	2.0	2
"NDP"	85468	0	1.8	2
"GP"	17630	0	0.4	0
"BQ"	0	0	0.0	0
Sum (Divisor)	521611	6	(47000)	11

*Electoral district 4: N.B.

Parties	Votes	SMP	Quotient	PRP
"Lib."	227764	5	5.3	5
"CPC"	112070	0	2.6	3
"NDP"	81105	0	1.9	2
"GP"	20551	0	0.48	0
"BQ"	0	0	0.0	0
Sum (Divisor)	441490	5	(43000)	10

*Electoral district 5: Que.

Parties	Votes	SMP	Quotient	PRP
"Lib."	1515673	20	28.1	28
"NDP"	1075366	8	19.9	20
"BQ"	821144	5	15.2	15
"CPC"	709164	6	13.1	13
"GP"	95395	0	1.8	2
Sum (Divisor)	4216742	39	(54000)	78

*Electoral district 6: Ont.

Parties	Votes	SMP	Quotient	PRP
"Lib."	2929393	40	54.9	55
"CPC"	2293393	17	42.9	43
"NDP"	1085916	4	20.3	20
"GP"	185992	0	3.48	3
"BQ"	0	0	0.0	0
Sum (Divisor)	6494694	61	(53400)	121

*Electoral district 7: Man.

Parties	Votes	SMP	Quotient	PRP
"Lib."	268280	4	6.54	7
"CPC"	224527	3	5.48	5
"NDP"	81960	1	2.0	2
"GP"	18944	0	0.46	0
"BQ"	0	0	0.0	0
Sum (Divisor)	593711	8	(41000)	14

*Electoral district 8: Sask.

Parties	Votes	SMP	Quotient	PRP
"CPC"	267937	5	6.9	7
"NDP"	138574	2	3.6	4
"Lib."	131681	1	3.4	3
"GP"	11527	0	0.3	0
"BQ"	0	0	0.0	0
Sum (Divisor)	549719	8	(39000)	14

*Electoral district 9: Alta.

Parties	Votes	SMP	Quotient	PRP
"CPC"	1150101	15	20.54	21
"Lib."	473416	2	8.45	8
"NDP"	224800	1	4.0	4
"GP"	48742	0	0.9	1
"BQ"	0	0	0.0	0
Sum (Divisor)	1897059	18	(56000)	34

*Electoral district 10: B.C.

Parties	Votes	SMP	Quotient	PRP
"Lib."	829816	9	14.8	15
"CPC"	708010	5	12.6	13
"NDP"	615156	7	11.0	11
"GP"	194847	1	3.48	3
"BQ"	0	0	0.0	0
Sum (Divisor)	2347829	22	(56000)	42

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*Summary of SMP&PRP appportionment, in 13 districts, with 181 ridings, using DivStd

	"Lib."	SMP	PRP	"CPC"	SMP	PRP	"NDP"	SMP	PRP	"BQ"	SMP	PRP	"GP"	SMP	PRP	Votes Sum	PRP Sum
N.L.	165418	7	7	26469	0	0	54120	0	0	0	0	0	2772	0	0	248779	7
P.E.I.	51002	4	4	16900	0	0	14006	0	0	0	0	0	5281	0	0	87189	4
N.S.	324816	6	7	93697	0	2	85468	0	2	0	0	0	17630	0	0	521611	11
N.B.	227764	5	5	112070	0	3	81105	0	2	0	0	0	20551	0	0	441490	10
Que.	1515673	20	28	709164	6	13	1075366	8	20	821144	5	15	95395	0	2	4216742	78
Ont.	2929393	40	55	2293393	17	43	1085916	4	20	0	0	0	185992	0	3	6494694	121
Man.	268280	4	7	224527	3	5	81960	1	2	0	0	0	18944	0	0	593711	14
Sask.	131681	1	3	267937	5	7	138574	2	4	0	0	0	11527	0	0	549719	14
Alta.	473416	2	8	1150101	15	21	224800	1	4	0	0	0	48742	0	1	1897059	34
B.C.	829816	9	15	708010	5	13	615156	7	11	0	0	0	194847	1	3	2347829	42
Y.T.	10887	1	1	4928	0	0	3943	0	0	0	0	0	533	0	0	20291	1
N.W.T.	9172	1	1	3481	0	0	5783	0	0	0	0	0	537	0	0	18973	1
Nun.	5619	1	1	2956	0	0	3171	0	0	0	0	0	182	0	0	11928	1
Sum	6942937	101	142	5613633	51	107	3469368	23	65	821144	5	15	602933	1	9	17450015	338

*Comparison of three ways of allocating the 338 seats in the 42nd House of Commens among parties

	Votes	%	Status quo	%	hypo. SMP&PRP	%	pure prop.: DivStd	%
"Lib."	6942937	40	184	54	142	42	134	40
"CPC"	5613633	32	99	29	107	32	109	32
"NDP"	3469368	20	44	13	65	19	67	20
"BQ"	821144	5	10	3	15	4	16	5
"GP"	602933	3	1	1	9	3	12	4
Sum	17450015	100	338	100	338	100	338	101

*Total of valid votes: 17591468. Twenty parties and indeps are left without seat.

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