ENVI Committee Meeting

37th PARLIAMENT, 3rd SESSION

Standing Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Wednesday, March 31, 2004

º

1645

The Chair (Hon. Charles Caccia (Davenport, Lib.))

Mr. Barry Stemshorn (Assistant Deputy Minister, Environmental Protection Service, Department of the Environment)

º

1650

º

1655

The Chair

Mr. Barry Stemshorn

The Chair

Mr. Bernard Bigras (Rosemont—Petite-Patrie, BQ)

»

1700

Mr. Barry Stemshorn

Mr. Blair Coomber (Director General, International Trade Policy Directorate, Department of Agriculture and Agri-Food)

Mr. Bernard Bigras

»

1705

Mr. Barry Stemshorn

Mr. Blair Coomber

Mr. Bernard Bigras

Mr. Barry Stemshorn

Mr. Bernard Bigras

Mr. Blair Coomber

Mr. Bernard Bigras

Mr. Blair Coomber

The Chair

Hon. Stéphane Dion (Saint-Laurent—Cartierville, Lib.)

»

1710

Mr. Barry Stemshorn

Hon. Stéphane Dion

Mr. Barry Stemshorn

Hon. Stéphane Dion

Mr. Barry Stemshorn

Hon. Stéphane Dion

Mr. Barry Stemshorn

»

1715

Hon. Stéphane Dion

Mr. Barry Stemshorn

Hon. Stéphane Dion

Mr. Barry Stemshorn

Hon. Stéphane Dion

Mr. Barry Stemshorn

Hon. Stéphane Dion

Mr. Barry Stemshorn

The Chair

Mr. Barry Stemshorn

The Chair

Mr. Blair Coomber

The Chair

Mr. Blair Coomber

The Chair

Mr. Blair Coomber

»

1720

The Chair

Mr. Barry Stemshorn

The Chair

Mr. Barry Stemshorn

The Chair

Mr. Barry Stemshorn

The Chair

Mr. Barry Stemshorn

The Chair

Mr. Barry Stemshorn

Mr. Blair Coomber

The Chair

Mr. Blair Coomber

The Chair

Mr. Blair Coomber

The Chair

Mr. Blair Coomber

»

1725

The Chair

Mr. Barry Stemshorn

The Chair

Mr. Barry Stemshorn

The Chair

Mr. Barry Stemshorn

The Chair

Mr. Barry Stemshorn

The Chair

Mr. Barry Stemshorn

The Chair

Mr. Barry Stemshorn

The Chair

Mr. Barry Stemshorn

The Chair

Mr. Barry Stemshorn

The Chair

Mr. Barry Stemshorn

The Chair

Mr. Barry Stemshorn

The Chair

Mr. Barry Stemshorn

Mr. Blair Coomber

The Chair

Mr. Blair Coomber

The Chair

Mr. Blair Coomber

»

1730

The Chair

Mr. Paul Szabo (Mississauga South, Lib.)

Mr. Barry Stemshorn

Mr. Paul Szabo

Mr. Barry Stemshorn

Mr. Paul Szabo

Mr. Barry Stemshorn

Mr. Paul Szabo

Mr. Barry Stemshorn

Mr. Paul Szabo

Mr. Barry Stemshorn

Mr. Paul Szabo

Mr. Barry Stemshorn

Mr. Paul Szabo

Mr. Barry Stemshorn

Mr. Paul Szabo

Mr. Barry Stemshorn

Mr. Blair Coomber

Mr. Paul Szabo

Mr. Blair Coomber

»

1735

Mr. Paul Szabo

Mr. Barry Stemshorn

Mr. Paul Szabo

Mr. Barry Stemshorn

The Chair

Mr. Bernard Bigras

Mr. Barry Stemshorn

»

1740

Mr. Blair Coomber

Mr. Bernard Bigras

Mr. Barry Stemshorn

The Chair

Hon. Stéphane Dion

Mr. Barry Stemshorn

Hon. Stéphane Dion

Mr. Barry Stemshorn

Hon. Stéphane Dion

Mr. Barry Stemshorn

Mr. Blair Coomber

Mr. Barry Stemshorn

Hon. Stéphane Dion

Mr. Barry Stemshorn

»

1745

Hon. Stéphane Dion

Mr. Barry Stemshorn

Hon. Stéphane Dion

Mr. Barry Stemshorn

Hon. Stéphane Dion

Mr. Barry Stemshorn

Hon. Stéphane Dion

Mr. Barry Stemshorn

Mr. Blair Coomber

Hon. Stéphane Dion

Mr. Blair Coomber

Hon. Stéphane Dion

Mr. Blair Coomber

Mr. Barry Stemshorn

The Chair

»

1750

Mr. Barry Stemshorn

The Chair

Mr. Barry Stemshorn

The Chair

Mr. Barry Stemshorn

The Chair

Mr. Blair Coomber

The Chair

Mr. Blair Coomber

The Chair

Mr. Barry Stemshorn

The Chair

Hon. Serge Marcil (Beauharnois—Salaberry, Lib.)

M. Barry Stemshorn

»

1755

The Chair

Mr. Paul Szabo

The Chair

Hon. Stéphane Dion

Mr. Barry Stemshorn

Hon. Stéphane Dion

The Chair

---

CANADA

Standing Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development

---

NUMBER 010

l

3rd SESSION

l

37th PARLIAMENT

---

EVIDENCE

Wednesday, March 31, 2004

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

º  (1645)  

[Translation]

    The Chair (Hon. Charles Caccia (Davenport, Lib.)): At our meeting today, pursuant to Standing Order 108, we will be dealing with the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.

    We have with us Mr. Stemshorn, from the Department of the Environment, and Mr. Coomber, from the Department of Agriculture and Agri-Food. Welcome, we're going to begin immediately.

[English]

    In substance, what we want is to get some clarification as to what the Government of Canada is really planning to do in connection with this very important convention.

    To begin, the initiator of this motion is monsieur Bigras.

[Translation]

    We are going to begin with Mr. Stemshorn's statement, please.

    Mr. Barry Stemshorn (Assistant Deputy Minister, Environmental Protection Service, Department of the Environment): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    We have prepared some introductory remarks, and the clerk is going to distribute copies to you.

    Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I welcome the interest this committee has shown in the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol, recognizing the importance of our discussions today in shaping the next steps for Canada. Thank you for the opportunity to give you an overview of the first meeting of the parties to the Cartegena Protocol on Biosafety.

    This first meeting, in February, was a very important meeting for Canada. As you know, Canada signed the protocol in 2001. Canada's signature is a clear indication of our support for the protocol, but we were directed by ministers to seek clarity on a number of key issues before they considered a decision on ratification.

[English]

    What I would like to do today is give you a short overview, if you will bear with me, on the protocol, given that it's not necessarily a well understood document and it is a fairly complex story.

    The protocol, as you know, was developed under the Convention on Biological Diversity to minimize the potential for adverse effects on biological diversity from living modified organisms resulting from biotechnology. It's a multilateral environmental treaty that recognizes that trade and environment agreements should be mutually supportive to achieve sustainable development.

    The objective is to ensure adequate protection of biodiversity in importing countries from the risks that may be posed by transboundary movements of living modified organisms or LMOs, commonly referred to as genetically modified organisms, or GM organisms. These are ones that can grow and replicate.

    It provides this protection by building on and complementing domestic regulatory systems. Genetically modified grain, tree seedlings, or fish fry are examples of living modified organisms that can be planted, raised, grow to maturity, and replicate their modified genetic material.

    Conversely, dead items such as flour produced from genetically modified organisms, lumber from genetically modified trees, or food products such as fillets from genetically modified fish are not covered by the protocol.

    It's important that the protocol is not about food safety; it's about protecting biological diversity. The type of risk that could be envisaged and considered is the displacement by a living modified organism of local populations that have significant biological, social, or economic importance.

    If I turn to what the major elements of the protocol are, the first is conditions and requirements for advanced informed agreement. The most important element of the protocol is a requirement for exporters to obtain advanced informed agreement from a country of import before the first importation of a living modified organism to that country for intentional release into its environment. A common example would be genetically modified seeds that are intended for planting.

    It's important to understand that this requirement for advanced informed agreement does not apply to living modified organisms of a different category, those destined for food, feed, or processing, such as shipments for grain to be milled or processed into oils.

    The second element—and these elements all work together—is a requirement for documentation that any shipment of LMOs has to have. This documentation would identify that the shipment may or does contain living modified organisms when that's the intended content of the shipment, any specific requirements for handling the shipment, and the contact point for information in an emergency.

    The practical application and purpose of documentation requirements has been controversial, and it is not well understood, particularly as it applies to living modified organisms that are bulk commodities; that is, those living modified organisms destined for feed, food, or processing.

    Without getting into a lot of detail, a big challenge with the protocol is that it does not say whether or not documentation requirements apply to commodity shipments that contain only trace levels of LMOs—that is, unintended trace levels. Canada currently exports approximately 22 million tonnes of grains annually as bulk commodities, of which 80% are not intended to contain LMOs but may have trace levels. So this is an important issue for Canada.

    It is important to note that this documentation requirement is not an issue of labelling for food safety. It's documentation that applies to the shipment, not to individual packages that would be within a shipment.

    The third element that works in synchrony with the other two is the risk assessment and biosafety clearing-house provisions. This third element of the protocol provides a model risk assessment process and an information exchange system known as the biosafety clearing house.

    The clearing house will contain the decisions countries have made on imports, approvals, and risk assessments of living modified organisms under both their domestic and the protocol regimes. This will facilitate the ability of both exporters and importers to comply with the various government decisions governing domestic approval of living modified organisms.

º  (1650)  

    To expand on that and give an example, if Canada were to approve a new genetically modified crop for commercial production, countries that import this from Canada would be able to see that it's been approved for growing in Canada, look into the risk assessment, and decide if they wish to do their own assessment before approving the import of this commodity. In turn, Canadian exporters could use the clearing house to verify if the importing country allowed the entry of this genetically modified crop.

    A fourth element I should speak to, as it's an important one for us as well, is the compliance body. The protocol calls for the establishment of a compliance body to deal with cases of non-compliance with the requirements of the protocol and a possible four-year process to evaluate the need for a liability regime that would compensate for damage that could result from the release of a living modified organism.

    I'm going to deviate a wee bit from my text. There's a fifth item that I didn't include in the written text, but there is an important element of capacity building as well in the protocol to strengthen human and institutional capacity, particularly in developing countries. That is an important element of this regime.

    On the coming into force of the protocol, Canada's signing of the protocol, and the concerns that Canada had identified at that time and subsequently, I presented to you elements of the protocol, which took four years to negotiate. Since its adoption in 2000, there has been an intergovernmental process to prepare for its entry into force, leading to decisions that the first meeting of the parties would take to implement the protocol.

    The protocol entered into force last September and now has 89 parties. As I mentioned at the beginning, Canada signed the protocol in 2001, but because stakeholders identified several issues of concern and wanted additional clarity, Canada has not yet taken a decision on ratification.

    The protocol does not require changes to how Canada manages its imports and therefore doesn't affect the protection of Canadian biological diversity. Canada has, like other developed nations, a science-based regulatory system governing biotechnology, and while we're constantly improving it, we're keeping pace with the world. However, the protocol would place new obligations on Canadian exporters, particularly related to documentation that has areas of clarity that weren't spelled out in the protocol itself but have been left to the implementation phase.

    Our objective is to ensure that these obligations are consistent with the protocol's objectives for protecting biodiversity, but also that they are practical, scientifically sound, and implemented in a manner that respects international established rights and obligations for trade.

    That takes us to the Government of Canada's action plan prior to the first meeting of the parties.

º  (1655)  

    The Chair: Mr. Stemshorn, because of the late hour, I wonder if you could make an agile jump to page 6 and inform us...beginning with preparing for MOP 2.

    Mr. Barry Stemshorn: Okay.

    Preparing for MOP 2, there will be a second meeting of the parties in spring 2005, possibly in June, when more important decisions will be made, particularly on documentation. A meeting of the parties agreed that a technical expert group should meet before MOP 2 to consider these documentation issues and prepare for the decisions that will be made at the second meeting of the parties.

    Governments and other international organizations will provide views and technical information to be used by the technical expert group. If Canada were to be a party by that time, we would have an opportunity to provide strong leadership on the issues that will be addressed, by both the expert group and the second meeting of the parties.

    That's an overview of where we stand. I have skipped some of the issues that came from MOP 1--and you have the details before you. In brief, most of the points that Canada was seeking to clarify have been addressed, so we have a lot of the information we were seeking.

    That's a summary of what we say about the outcomes. We plan to continue to inform and seek the views of Canadians before giving our advice to ministers, so they can consider what all this means, given the importance of the protocol and its implications for Canada, particularly as an exporter of LMO products.

[Translation]

    Again, let me thank you for the opportunity to share this information with you, Mr. Chairman, and your colleagues. My colleague from Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada and I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have. We have with us a number of experts in specific fields and, if necessary, they can be asked questions too. Thank you.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Stemshorn.

    We are going to start with Mr. Bigras.

    Mr. Bernard Bigras (Rosemont—Petite-Patrie, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Before going straight to my question, I'd just like to comment on how Canada has been conducting itself so far in this area. I've always found it unacceptable, in terms of the Kyoto Protocol and the attitude of the United States, to negotiate and to seek to negotiate outside of the international consensus. It appears to me that the Canadian attitude internationally is going to use that very strategy, in an attempt to influence the application of the protocol from outside the international consensus. Since 2001, when Canada signed the protocol, I have been getting the sense that significant setbacks have been looming in terms of the application of the protocol, not to mention the fact that Canada—we mustn't forget—hasn't ratified the protocol.

    You indicated, in April 2001, in a paragraph from a press release that you provided us, that you were encouraging other countries to support Canada's opinion that:

... adventitious presence of LMOs in non-LMO shipments intended for food, feed and processing should not be a trigger for the application of the “may contain” provision of article 18(2)(a).

    In my opinion, adventitious presence may mean 0.9 per cent contamination, which is what Europe accepts. At the very most, 2 per cent could be considered adventitious presence. That's what you said in 2001. However, in October 2002, one year later, you signed a trilateral Canada-United States-Mexico agreement that sets the limit at 5 per cent for contamination of agricultural exports.

    How can you explain that in the space of one year, you have backed away from the plan in terms of the contamination limit and safety margin? Do you find it acceptable to back down from 1 per cent to 5 per cent in the space of one year?

»  (1700)  

    Mr. Barry Stemshorn: I'm going to answer in English, if you don't mind, because I can express myself more precisely in English.

[English]

    There are several things to clarify about the adventitious presence question.

[Translation]

    I believe that that's the translation of “contamination accidentelle d'un contenu”.

[English]

    The first point is that this is about adventitious presence-approved events, that is, presence of organisms that have been approved in the country of origin. This is not about the presence of things that have not been approved in the country of origin, for which there is zero tolerance. That's an important distinction to make at the outset.

    Second, adventitious material is something that is very widespread and would affect many countries because of the complexity of the distribution system, the size of the holds of ships, and so on--so the protocol itself. No country has come to grips with this challenge, including the European Union.

    The third point is on the trilateral agreement you mentioned. I'll turn to Mr. Coomber for more explanations here, to help me with this.

    As I understand it, the 5% envisaged there is for some very specific cases, so it's important to read that agreement closely. It's for cases that are rather limited, where there's an agreement between the buyer and the seller about an LMO-free category. These are niche markets. The vast bulk of the trade between those three countries would not fall under this provision.

    Blair, do you have anything to add on those points?

    Mr. Blair Coomber (Director General, International Trade Policy Directorate, Department of Agriculture and Agri-Food):

    First of all, let me state up front that the trilateral agreement is a marketing agreement; it's not a regulatory agreement. It was done primarily to give agricultural exporters and importers some clarity around the kind of documentation that could be used amongst the NAFTA countries on an interim basis until the documentation requirements become clear under the biosafety protocol, under the agreement that happens two years after it comes into force, and that's September 11, 2005.

    So there is this interim period where there is some lack of clarity under this protocol around the documentation requirements. The trilateral is a voluntary, non-binding agreement; it's not a regulatory agreement, and it was put in place to give importers and exporters some clarity as to when the “may contains” requirement should apply.

    On the 95%, I'd just say that it is a minimum standard that importers and exporters contractually define amongst themselves. Any importing country can at any time require a higher purity standard. All countries maintain their sovereign right to implement whatever thresholds or whatever import requirements or procedures they deem they need in order to protect their country.

[Translation]

    Mr. Bernard Bigras: Mr. Chairman, seeing that the recent report of the Canadian General Standards Board sets a safety margin of 5 per cent, it's quite clear that Canada is going to make full use of that 5 per cent margin. I understand that you're telling us that it could be 1 per cent, but the Canadian tendency, optics and approach are geared to a 5 per cent limit, and that's what I think is going to happen in this case.

    There is a preliminary report by the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation that was recently released, early this month, that says, in chapter 5, that:

If all or some maize transgenes are barred from Mexico, then maize imports need monitoring and whole or cracked maize imports from any country permitting use of transgenic maize would need to be prohibited.

    On the basis of the tripartite agreement that was signed, which naturally includes Mexico, and to the extent that there's a significant danger, and considering that the commission has even recommended monitoring, how can you assure us that this agreement will not result in an increased risk of contamination, particularly when it comes to genetically-modified crops and Mexican maize?

»  (1705)  

    Mr. Barry Stemshorn: My comment on that is to point out that this trilateral agreement stipulates that it must not interfere in any way with the ability of all three countries to set their own import standards.

[English]

    So it in no way interferes with Mexico's ability to respond to that CEC recommendation if Mexico should so choose. This does not mean that in any way they have signed away their authorities. So it still remains for Mexico to determine how they wish to handle the CEC recommendation.

    Mr. Blair Coomber: One thing I perhaps failed to point out is that the trilateral agreement among the three countries applies only to LMOs that are destined for food, feed, and processing. It does not apply to LMOs that are going to be released into the environment. The requirements around those are the ones in the protocol. This only deals with food, feed, and processing LMOs.

[Translation]

    Mr. Bernard Bigras: This is my last question, Mr. Chairman.

    I understand that by signing this agreement, you wanted to protect Canada's economic interests and also protect and promote trade in commodities. However, what guarantee can you provide in foreign markets that our commodities to be sold abroad aren't contaminated? The fact is, in the case of Roundup Ready wheat, that 85 per cent of our foreign customers say that if Canada approves Roundup Ready wheat, they will no longer do business with Canada. Don't you think that the agreement among the three parties creates uncertainty that threatens to lose us some foreign markets?

    Mr. Barry Stemshorn: When we entered into this trilateral agreement, our intention or hope was, and still is, for this to serve as an example and an experimental application of the requirements of the protocol, so that exporters might accept the protocol and learn how it works.

[English]

    It was seen as a way to move toward ratification by building experience. It's a very complicated business wherein one needs to learn how to do it as one goes. So that's been the effort, and the intent has been to try to figure out how to implement the protocol.

[Translation]

    Mr. Bernard Bigras: I have one last little question for you, I promise. Is the precautionary principle stated in the trilateral agreement?

[English]

    Mr. Blair Coomber: No. Anything that would be traded would have to go through the regulatory processes. All the trilateral agreement deals with is the documentation, so before any LMO can be shipped, it has to be approved in the country of import. If Mexico, for example, was importing Canadian LMOs, it would have to have approved that event or that LMO under their domestic regulatory regime in order to allow the product in.

[Translation]

    Mr. Bernard Bigras: Is the precautionary principle mentioned in the trilateral agreement?

[English]

    Mr. Blair Coomber: No, not in the trilateral.

    The Chair: That was to be expected.

[Translation]

    Mr. Dion, you have the floor.

    Hon. Stéphane Dion (Saint-Laurent—Cartierville, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Thank you for your presentation, but this text, albeit not paginated, seems to me a bit long. I mean you no disrespect, but I find it a bit evasive on the crucial topic, i.e., why isn't the protocol being ratified immediately? There may be the beginnings of an answer on the second-last page of your speaking notes:

At this point in time, there are only three countries who export LMOs for food, feed and processing: the United States, Argentina and Canada, none of which have ratified the Protocol. So the Parties, 87 at the time of MOP 1, are all non-exporters.

    Does that mean, just to make things clear, that the Carthagena Protocol—which could in fact be called the Montreal Protocol, because technically, it almost all happened here—places real constraints on only three countries?

»  (1710)  

    Mr. Barry Stemshorn: It entails obligations for a number of countries, but it puts exporting countries under special obligations. Canada is in the habit of living up to its international obligations; that is why we take the obligations that would flow from ratification very seriously.

[English]

    And these would require the implementation of regulations that would govern our exportations, which is a very significant thing. So that is a challenge for Canada. It is a challenge for the other exporting countries that are considering ratification.

    There are obligations for the importing countries, but that has not precluded a number of them from ratifying, although corridor discussions in the meeting of the parties indicate that most are wondering how they're going to implement it. So it is a challenge for them.

    Hon. Stéphane Dion: There is a challenge to ratify and there is a challenge to not ratify, because then you're vulnerable, since the other countries don't have the same constraints because they don't export as much as us. They may use the protocol as an argument to not accept our product.

    Mr. Barry Stemshorn: This is certainly a strategic question for the agricultural sector, in my view. The question is, what are the benefits of being a party in terms of having a stronger influence on the decision-making so that we do achieve a practical, workable protocol that, as I said, meets the intentions of Canada to protect biodiversity and have a practical, functioning protocol that operates on scientifically sound principles and is respectful of trade?

    Hon. Stéphane Dion: If we are ready to ratify and the U.S. and Argentina are not, it's a competitive advantage for us, but if Argentina or the U.S. does it before us, it's a competitive advantage for them and additional pressure on us to ratify.

    Despite this long text, it's still not clear in my mind where the problems are. You speak about documentation. Can you be more explicit as to why we don't ratify today or tomorrow morning?

    Mr. Barry Stemshorn: Well, it was only at the meeting of the parties that clarity was received on many of the issues that were uncertain, and at that meeting we did receive decisions that were needed on things like how the protocol bodies will make decisions. They will do it through consensus.

    We've received clarity on the obligations of Canada as a transit state. We've received clarity on the questions we had about the future compliance regimes.

    So most of the long list of questions we had are now answered.

    Hon. Stéphane Dion: They are solved.

    Speak about the ones that are not solved.

    Mr. Barry Stemshorn: One is on documentation. Indeed, in some respects, one could say we got more clarity than we wanted, or than some wanted, in that the meeting identified a number of additional pieces of information that parties are urged to require exporters to put on the documentation. That currently has a number of exporters quite worried. So that will be a point of controversy--the additional documentation recommendations.

    I repeat, the decision was that governments are urged to require things such as when you know what it is, you say that: you specify the genetic change that was made, you specify a unique identifier, if available--all of this on a shipping document. That's a lot of detail. It's normally detail that one would expect to find in the risk assessment through the website, through the biosafety clearing house. So the recommendation that it be included on the shipping information documentation is going to be a point of controversy.

»  (1715)  

    Hon. Stéphane Dion: This is the sole point.

    Mr. Barry Stemshorn: This is, I believe, the principle point. It is an interim decision, and it will be reviewed at the second meeting of the parties and taken into its final shape at that point.

    Hon. Stéphane Dion: So what is the deadline?

    Mr. Barry Stemshorn: The next meeting of the parties, as the paper indicates, is the spring of 2005, and there is a 90-day period between the time a government decides to ratify and becomes a party. So a decision to ratify in time to be a party at the next meeting in 2005 would probably be before the end of this calendar year, 90 days before the spring.

    Hon. Stéphane Dion: You've been discussing these documentation requirements since when?

    Mr. Barry Stemshorn: These are now clear since February, since the meeting of the parties. So we will be speaking now to the most interested stakeholders, the grain exporters. I'll be speaking to them next week--

    Hon. Stéphane Dion: In Canada.

    Mr. Barry Stemshorn: Yes, at a meeting in Winnipeg.

    But we need now to communicate this to Canadians, and we appreciate this chance to communicate to you some of the challenges that lie ahead and the questions that would be of concern.

    The Chair: Merci, monsieur Dion.

    Let me ask you a question here on this disturbing terminology that is used in the trilateral agreement.

    I understand that the arrangement is to clarify documentation requirements in the trilateral agreement, and the objective is to fulfil the scope of the convention without unnecessarily disrupting trade. What is meant by unnecessarily disrupting trade? Can you explain it to us?

    Mr. Barry Stemshorn: I'll turn to Blair, who is the director general of international trade policy at Agriculture Canada, but a vignette of some of the sorts of concerns that I've heard from the agricultural sector would be the risk, for example, if you have a very complex set of information on a document and it arrives in a port in a developing country where an inspector doesn't really quite know how to interpret all the scientific information if they haven't been prepared for that. You could wind up with a ship that has all its material perfectly in order not getting in. So there can be very costly disruptions.

    That would be a kind of unnecessary disruption we could avoid by bringing the system in, in an orderly and well-understood way. That would be one image I would have.

    Blair.

    The Chair: But isn't it also customary with other agreements? With this kind of distinction, isn't it a normal practice that you would find ways of not disrupting trade unnecessarily? Why does this have to become a major item in the trilateral agreement?

    Mr. Blair Coomber: First of all, I'll maybe just back up and say that the agrifood industry does support the environmental objectives of the biosafety protocol. Their objective is to try to find a way in which those could be made without unduly disrupting trade.

    The agrifood export industry of grains is important to the Canadian economy; it's $5.4 billion worth of exports every year. So the industry is very concerned, or wants to have very clear international trading rules and multilateral rules, so that they know exactly what they're dealing with. They don't want things, like Mr. Stemshorn has just described, of a shipment showing up at a border and not being allowed in. So they want to make sure they have that clarity well before the shipment leaves Canada.

    The Chair: But it doesn't take three or four years. I think the signature took place in the year 2002, right?

    Mr. Blair Coomber: Well, I think what they were looking at is perhaps—

    The Chair: Why is it so complex, and why is it dragging out over time?

    Mr. Blair Coomber: As I mentioned earlier, when the trilateral agreement was being developed, Mexico was about to become a party. So there would now then be trade between Canada as a non-party and Mexico as a party. Mexico will be subject to the obligations under the biosafety protocol, but the provisions around the documentation requirements weren't going to be developed until 2005. So the industry just wanted to have on that interim basis some clarity around what would be required on the document, what the tool would be, and whether it would be a commercial invoice, or whatever, to use on an interim basis until that further clarity was developed under the protocol. And it will be. It will be looked at by the technical working group that's being set up, and we'll be examining documentation and decisions will be taken.

»  (1720)  

    The Chair: Let's then perhaps make some inroads in here.

    According to your information, has the international community established the documentational requirements of the protocol as set out in article 18—or whatever the number is?

    In other words, why formalize agreements on documentation if the international community hasn't yet formalized the documentation requirement under the protocol?

    Mr. Barry Stemshorn: I think as of the last meeting of the parties we have an interim arrangement and a statement from the MOP that gives us that direction. It is not, as I understand it, incompatible with the trilateral—

    The Chair: So have the documentation requirements been established in detail?

    Mr. Barry Stemshorn: I come back to my message about there having been details where the terms of the meeting urged the parties to require.... If people know more than “may contain”, or they know what's in it, they are urged to “require” the details and the specific sorts of information identified.

    The Chair: There is a difference between urging to “require” and having established.

    Mr. Barry Stemshorn: Exactly.

    So it remains discretionary at this point, beyond the obligation of “may contain”. There, it's the trilateral agreement that has given us something to at least set up a working arrangement.

    The Chair: So have the documentation requirements been specified or not?

    Mr. Barry Stemshorn: Not beyond the language I just gave you. I need to pull up the full text of the decisions from the meeting of the parties, but there were a number of recommended inclusions, if people knew them.

    The Chair: So the question is still valid. Why would Canada want to formalize an agreement on documentation if the specifications on documentation have not yet been arrived at?

    Mr. Barry Stemshorn: At the time the agreement was set up, there was nothing in place, and yet the protocol was in force. So we were filling a vacuum because of lack of guidance from the meeting of the parties, which had not occurred at that time.

    Mr. Blair Coomber: I should also point out that when the trilateral accord was signed, it was recognized and agreed that as decisions came out of the MOP, the trilateral accord would be altered or adjusted to reflect the decisions of the MOP, as those decisions came. As I said, it's interim, so at some point when the requirements are clear and final, then the likely need for a trilateral agreement won't be there.

    So it's very much a living agreement that will evolve with decisions, and it's integral.

    The Chair: Going back to the earlier question, can you give us an example of when you would want to disrupt trade “necessarily”? We are dealing with “unnecessarily” disrupting trade, so can you give us an example of when trade is necessarily disrupted so we know the contrast between the two.

    Mr. Blair Coomber: I probably can't pull out a specific example, but I think the industry's concern, as with any multilateral agreement, is that they don't want the provisions under the agreement to be used as disguised barriers to trade. In some cases that happens when you're dealing with whatever international agreement, so that's why they're looking for clarity.

    The Chair: But can you give us an example of when trade must be disrupted under any agreement?

    Mr. Blair Coomber: Well, we always have a number of examples in agriculture, whether it's beans going into Mexico, potatoes, or whatever, where problems arise at the border, a shipment is not allowed in, and it requires quite a lot of work between the regulatory authorities of the trade departments to straighten out the problem. I'm not necessarily saying that's intentional; it could be a misunderstanding of whatever that prevents the officer at the border from allowing the shipment--

    The Chair: The assumption here is probably that it could be a frivolous requirement, but a frivolous request could apply to any type of agreement,.

    Mr. Blair Coomber: Clearly, there could be non-frivolous requirements too. That's why the word “unnecessarily” is there

»  (1725)  

    The Chair: Well, give us an example.

    Mr. Barry Stemshorn: There may well be situations where Canada would post something on its clearing house and an importing country would say no, given their genetic diversity they don't want that, and that would be entirely their right.

    The Chair: Such as?

    Mr. Barry Stemshorn: The article is not written to the effect that there shall be no disruption of trade. There is a qualification there that envisages and implies that yes, there may well be situations where the importing country doesn't want something for good and sound reasons.

    The Chair: Can you give us an example?

    Mr. Barry Stemshorn: Canada might decline the importation of genetically modified salmon for release because the Royal Society has told us that would be a very risky thing.

    The Chair: Then that would be within the scope of the protocol.

    Mr. Barry Stemshorn: That would also be within the scope of our domestic authorities.

    The Chair: What we have difficulty in understanding is why the “unnecessarily disrupting trade” clause is so important and takes up so much time.

    Do we understand correctly then from your presentation today, Mr. Stemshorn, that the next meeting will be in spring 2005?

    Mr. Barry Stemshorn: That is correct.

    The Chair: From that, therefore, would it be correct to conclude that there will be no ratification until then?

    Mr. Barry Stemshorn: I would not say that, no. I think there's a choice. It's a possible thing for Canada to become a party before then.

    The Chair: So what do you see as the preconditions for ratification before the meeting in spring 2005?

    Mr. Barry Stemshorn: I don't believe we've set conditions. I think this is a question for ministers to consider now that we have answers to many of the points that--

    The Chair: Are you saying it is a political decision?

    Mr. Barry Stemshorn: I think that would definitely be a government-type decision for the ministers to make.

    The Chair: Or is it a sectoral decision that is required by certain sectoral interests?

    Mr. Barry Stemshorn: The sectors will have views, other interest groups will have views, and the government will need to weigh those.

    The Chair: Which are the interested sectors?

    Mr. Barry Stemshorn: The most interested sector has been agriculture because of the significance of our grain trade.

    The Chair: Agriculture is a very broad--

    Mr. Barry Stemshorn: It's the grains sector, the seed industry.

    Blair, over to you.

    Mr. Blair Coomber: It's the grains sector. Because we have approved genetically modified canola, corn, and soybeans in Canada, their concern is primarily coming out of the grains sector.

    The Chair: Is there any other sector? So it's mainly seed?

    Mr. Blair Coomber: Yes, the seed growers to a certain extent, but then again it's--

    The Chair: Can you define for us what this sector has to lose by the ratification of the biodiversity convention?

    Mr. Blair Coomber: I don't think the sector is looking at what they lose; they just want to see some clarity. They understand they have to meet.... If the safety protocol didn't exist, any country could put in at any time any requirements it wanted on the movement of LMOs into their territory, and I think the sector realizes that. So if some country wanted to put on very strict requirements, if the industry wanted to export to that country, they would have to meet those requirements. But I think in that case they'd take a commercial look at it and say, well, we have to meet these requirements, this is the size of the market, so it may not be viable for us to go in there.

    They want that clarity around it so they can make those kinds of decisions around their marketing.

»  (1730)  

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Did Mr. Szabo have a question?

    Mr. Paul Szabo (Mississauga South, Lib.): Well, I guess the more we talk about this, the more questions will come up.

    I'm curious about the subject matter from the standpoint of safety. The protocol does not have mandatory scientific follow-up, I understand. Is that true?

    Mr. Barry Stemshorn: Mandatory scientific follow-up?

    Mr. Paul Szabo: This is a trilateral agreement. There is not mandatory scientific follow-up, but rather.... I'm going to leave it at that.

    Is there or is there not?

    Mr. Barry Stemshorn: I'm not aware of monitoring requirements under the protocol.

    Mr. Paul Szabo: What I understand is that it mentions only that it intends to maintain continuous exchange of scientific information.

    Mr. Barry Stemshorn: That was, as I understand it, an important element for Mexico, which was interested in capacity development to improve its regulatory system as a part of the accord.

    Mr. Paul Szabo: All right.

    When you're dealing in this area, there are risks, are there not? How serious are the risks? What kinds of risks might be involved?

    Mr. Barry Stemshorn: Those are risks that in Canada we evaluate through our risk assessment procedures. The scientists would ask themselves, from the information provided, whether there would be competition with native species, for example. If one were to introduce genetically modified salmon into streams and they were to grow faster and compete with native salmon, that would be the sort of risk one would be concerned about.

    Mr. Paul Szabo: So it's economic.

    Mr. Barry Stemshorn: No, this would be a biological risk, and it's one that the Royal Society, for example, has signalled as a high-profile risk in the introduction of genetically modified organisms.

    Mr. Paul Szabo: You said it would compete with other salmon.

    Mr. Barry Stemshorn: If they compete with native species, and thereby--

    Mr. Paul Szabo: You're not talking about competing economically. You're talking about competing--

    Mr. Barry Stemshorn: No, forcing them out of their ecological niche, competing in an ecological sense.

    Mr. Paul Szabo: All right.

    How does the 5% contamination level compare with what's been happening in other countries with regard to what's acceptable? I know there was a problem with Mexican corn. They don't have GMO corn, but the product was contaminated.

    Five percent seems like an awfully high threshold of contamination to be acceptable.

    Mr. Barry Stemshorn: I'm going to ask Blair to respond to this, but again, it's my understanding that this is not a 5% blanket allowance. It was envisioned for some very clear niche markets, so it's a bit of a special situation. It's not a 5% blanket, that everything is okay up to 5%.

    Mr. Blair Coomber: The first point I would make is that no country has set a threshold. That's an issue that still needs to be talked about in terms of the biosafety protocol.

    I would also point out that the trilateral agreement does not allow for unapproved events going into a country. Any shipment of any LMO must be approved in the country of import, particularly by domestic regulations.

    Mr. Paul Szabo: Even if you're not a party?

    Mr. Blair Coomber: Even if you're not a party.

    Canada, the United States, and Mexico all have a zero tolerance for unapproved events. If an unapproved thing shows up at our border, it's not allowed in.

    I might make a comment on the Mexican corn situation because my understanding was that it resulted from illegal shipments of genetically modified corn. I think it's important to note that even if the biosafety protocol was in full force, or whatever agreement was in full force, it still can't deal with illegal shipments of any product. Those illegal shipments have to be dealt with by the appropriate regulatory enforcement agencies within the country to make sure that illegal shipments don't happen.

»  (1735)  

    Mr. Paul Szabo: For my education, how much illegal activity would have to take place to undermine all of the work you've done, in terms of the percentage of total exporting activity?

    The Mexican corn has been contaminated. I guess that's the description. It's not that it's not usable, but it is now a GMO itself, I assume.

    How much does it have to happen before all the protections that you could ever put up are undermined simply because of illegal activity?

    Mr. Barry Stemshorn: It's pretty difficult to predict without using a specific case. There are a lot of unknowns.

    One could envisage a high-risk situation, as I mentioned, of genetically modified salmon that grow very quickly and might eat the food supply faster than the native salmon. Therefore, one illegal shipment could be a very dangerous thing.

    In the case of Mexico, I'm not sure, but there have been some reports that the introduction is gradually being diluted out by the native species, which is hardier and therefore replacing it.

    The impact may vary case by case, which is why scientists take a look at each instance and do a thorough assessment. It's that kind of scientific analysis that is posted on the websites of the countries, as genetically modified organisms are approved for release.

    The other countries can then look at how Canada did an assessment and determine whether that's adequate for them, or whether they have situations in their own countries that would mean more work would need to be done to interpret the information and apply it in context.

    It's very hard to give a blanket answer. There could be situations where one introduction could have a very high impact. There could be others where it would have a very minor impact and disappear over time.

    Mr. Paul Szabo: I'll finish it up, Mr. Chairman. Can you give me your assessment of what happens to the risks if we do not ratify an agreement? What good is the agreement? It should deal with risk, I assume.

    Mr. Barry Stemshorn: If Canada doesn't ratify, the agreement is in force. Most of our importing countries are parties, so we will need to respect these obligations, in any event, as importing countries set their requirements. There will be little difference there.

    The main distinction would be that once Canada ratifies, we would make respecting those a condition of Canadian regulations. There would be a Canadian law and obligation on an exporter, in addition to the market risk at the importing country. There would be a formal Canadian regulation obliging them. They'd be accountable under Canadian law, as well as under the international market rules. That would be the prime difference.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Monsieur Bigras.

[Translation]

    Mr. Bernard Bigras: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I'd like to come back to the trilateral agreement and see how it compares with the Biosafety Protocol that Canada signed in 2001. The trilateral agreement provides that the importer is responsible for receiving the invoice and keeping it after receipt. It seems to me that this goes against the polluter-pays principle.

    Don't you think that this means that the polluter transfers responsibility to the pollutee, whereas the letter and spirit of the Biosafety Protocol aim to make the polluter responsible for the damage? Don't you think that the trilateral agreement that you signed goes against the spirit of responsibility incorporated into the Carthagena Protocol?

[English]

    Mr. Barry Stemshorn: That's quite a strong interpretation.

    I had taken that as a fairly innocuous statement about who handles the invoice in terms of protecting and maintaining the records. I didn't sense it as a transfer of obligations in any respect. There was debate, but it's simple stuff like who's going to write this invoice, how is the information on the invoice, and who keeps it at the end of the day? I just saw that as administrative text.

    Blair, maybe I'm missing something?

»  (1740)  

    Mr. Blair Coomber: I'll add a bit to that.

    The reason it's there is because the exporter has the obligation to provide the invoice to the importer and provide the information that's required. But the Canadian exporter doesn't have any legal standing in Mexico, for example; if it's going to Mexico, the importer would be the one who would have the legal standing. That's why the importer is required to retain the documentation in the importing country, in case there is any need to go back and in case any kind of action is required as a result of the importation.

[Translation]

    Mr. Bernard Bigras: Three of the administrative provisions may have a far greater impact than mere administrative oversight.

    I'd like to ask you another question. Section 4(a) of the trilateral agreement reads as follows:

The  “may contain” documentation will be used for all transboundary movements of commodities intended for food or feed, or for processing...

    And it goes on. Don't you think that in order to correctly assess biosafety, it would be preferable for the documentation to be more complete and to involve, for example, different varieties? We know that for transgenic maize alone, there may be a lot of different varieties. If we want an accurate risk assessment, wouldn't it make sense for the different varieties to be included in the documentation provided?

    Mr. Barry Stemshorn: It's important to understand that the three parts of the protocol work together. The documentation accompanying shipments isn't what forms the basis of the risk assessment. The risk assessment, as you yourself said, is based on the varieties associated with genetic modification, but this information is available in the...

[English]

in the biosafety clearing house is where that risk assessment information resides.

    The decision to import should be done long before the shipment is made. The information accompanying the shipment is simply to signal what it is and which risk assessment applies. But it's not the basis for the risk assessment; it's so that you know which risk assessment is pertinent to a given shipment.

    The Chair: Monsieur Dion.

[Translation]

    Hon. Stéphane Dion: I'd like to come back to the reason why the protocol isn't being ratified immediately. I know that you can't provide all of the details on everything that we are discussing, but if I understand correctly, it's a matter of excessive paperwork requirements.

    What is to be done then? Should Canadian producers be asked whether they can produce this documentation when they export? I'd like to understand the process.

    Mr. Barry Stemshorn: It's not just a matter of heavy paperwork. We want the goal and the use of this information to be well understood, just like the discussion that we just had of the notion that the risk assessment is based on the information accompanying a ship. No, the risk assessment is done much more thoroughly beforehand.

[English]

    It's a concern that people won't know how to use this information and won't be prepared to use it, that one needs to learn how to get into this gradually. It's not just about the burden of information. I think it's about how the information will be used and how people will learn to use it.

    Hon. Stéphane Dion: How many “hows” do you have then? I want to know if it's a mountain of problems or--

    Mr. Barry Stemshorn: I'll know that better after further discussion with the agricultural sectors as we try to advance this question.

    Hon. Stéphane Dion: Are you optimistic?

    Mr. Barry Stemshorn: Blair, do you have a sense of how many “hows” we will be hearing about?

    Mr. Blair Coomber: How many what?

    Mr. Barry Stemshorn: This is our first discussion with Canadians about the results of the meetings so that we have this additional clarity. And we do need to discuss it with the agricultural sector. Certainly I hear there's lots of anxiety about this additional information, but I think there is a need for discussion so that people understand the situation.

    Hon. Stéphane Dion: But when you meet them, they're asking questions: What does that mean? What do I need to do? What kind of documentation do I need to provide? What will they do with that?

    Do you have the answers, or are you thinking about that question and you will find out the answers at the international level?

    Mr. Barry Stemshorn: We certainly have more information now than we did before the meeting. That information is just in the process of being communicated. However, it is interim information because it will not be until the meeting in spring 2005 that the final documentation requirements will be established, and of course the strategic question for Canada is, do we want to be a party at that key meeting in June 2005 or not? This is a decision that is pending that we need to think about.

»  (1745)  

    Hon. Stéphane Dion: And if we are not a party, what are the consequences?

    Mr. Barry Stemshorn: We will have much less influence as to how those decisions are made and what those requirements are. The other difference would be that we would not be making those requirements a subject of Canadian regulations. They would be applied because they are applied by the importing countries.

    Hon. Stéphane Dion: If we are a party, what are the problems?

    Mr. Barry Stemshorn: A concern that I anticipate hearing is we would be subject to these things under Canadian law. Is that a problem? Some will view it that way. Another concern is that the information requirements may be more than some feel is appropriate or feasible. But I'm predicting, anticipating, views that we have yet to confirm with others. You're asking me to speak for people I have yet to consult.

    Hon. Stéphane Dion: I think you see more advantages than disadvantages in being a party.

    Mr. Barry Stemshorn: I would think there's a strong case I could make for ratification, but I think this is something that ministers are going to need to weigh. We will advise them on the pros and cons. This is a call that ministers are going to need to make because of the implications for the government and Canadians as a whole.

    Hon. Stéphane Dion: Are you working with Argentina and the United States about the clarification of all these “hows”?

    Mr. Barry Stemshorn: We have worked with them in the preparations for the first meeting of the parties. I'm not aware of subsequent conversations.

    Mr. Blair Coomber: We've worked with a lot of countries, not just the United States and Argentina. We've had discussions with a number of countries--the European Union, for example. We had discussions around the concerns we saw and points in the protocol that we felt our sectors would like to see further clarification on. So there are ongoing discussions with a number of countries fairly regularly.

    Hon. Stéphane Dion: It looks like a very classical problem where countries agree, or provinces and the federal government in our country agree, about vague requirements and so on, and after you look at that you say, what does that mean?

    Are you optimistic? Do you think there are a mountain of problems, or is it something that may be solved? We need to know.

    Mr. Blair Coomber: I'm not going to express a personal view on whether I'm optimistic or not, but I think the objective of the industry has always been to find.... They support the protocol; they support the environmental objectives. It's not in their interest to ship products into other countries that the country doesn't want, or there will be a problem. They're interested in finding a way to implement the provisions of the protocol, but at the same time not have trade disrupted.

    The biosafety protocol was put in place to protect biological diversity. It wasn't intended ever to disrupt trade or to stop trade of LMOs. I think what the industry is working toward, and looking for, is to find that balance.

    Hon. Stéphane Dion: But you understand that they are vulnerable because their products may be stopped at the border one day.

    Mr. Blair Coomber: I think that could happen, but I think they understand, as Barry alluded to, that whether the protocol is ratified or not, the industry is still going to have to meet the import requirements of any country, parties or non-parties. I think they're prepared to do that. It's just that they want clarity on what those import requirements are going to be so that they can make that commercial decision.

    Mr. Barry Stemshorn: Based on the statements by international industry leaders near the closing of the meeting of the parties and preliminary comments I've heard--without having met with the grain industry, which we will be doing next week--I have signs that there's lots of angst in that community about the additional information requirements. So I expect there will be a lot of dialogue needed about this question.

    The Chair: Going back to the point made at the opening by Monsieur Bigras, there is a risk of the genetic stock becoming contaminated and as a consequence Canada losing export markets if we dilute our stock market further and further. There is an inherent danger in the prolongation of these discussions.

»  (1750)  

    Mr. Barry Stemshorn: But Canada doesn't control that international timetable. Irrespective of Canada's decision, there will be decisions taken by the international community in spring 2005 that will come into effect. The question is whether they will come into effect through Canadian law or through the requirements of our importing countries. We don't control that pace--we neither slow it nor speed it. That has a set timetable that we need to factor into how Canada makes its decisions.

    The Chair: But our market export countries will become less and less receptive to our products if the genetic stock deteriorates, in the meantime.

    Mr. Barry Stemshorn: That's certainly something for the agricultural community to weigh as they think about their future positions on this.

    The Chair: Is it then a matter of imports and exports versus agricultural communities that have conflicting goals? Why would a convention that is intended to protect the biological capital of the globe have to be slowed down by commercial interests to such an extent? Isn't that a dangerous path?

    Mr. Barry Stemshorn: The commercial interests have big economic impacts, obviously. But the smooth flow of food internationally is also an important element here.

    The Chair: Right now we don't have any impediments to the flow of food. Are there any impediments to the smooth flow of food at the present time?

    Mr. Blair Coomber: Well, you know....

    The Chair: The answer is no, obviously. So why create artificial impediments?

    Mr. Blair Coomber: When any international or multilateral agreement comes into play or into force, there is always the potential for impediments to develop and people to misinterpret rules or not apply them correctly.

    The Chair: Why don't we do what we do with other conventions? We say that from the moment the convention comes into force there will be a review within three years to correct and modify those aspects of the convention that don't seem to work, rather than dotting all the i's, crossing all the t's, and prolonging the misery.

    Mr. Barry Stemshorn: In a way we've been trying to do that by advocating a gradual approach to implementation, so we can learn as we go.

    The Chair: Monsieur Marcil, s'il vous plaît.

[Translation]

    Hon. Serge Marcil (Beauharnois—Salaberry, Lib.): According to what you're saying, it's for the minister to decide. But does the information currently available to you make such a decision possible? I find your explanations truly very complicated. It's like a protocol. It's virtually a statement of intent. There are no criteria: the countries are sovereign and may or may not agree, just as they may or may not apply their own rules. It makes you wonder.

    In order for a minister to make a decision, he or she needs to know both the pros and the cons. In this case, is all of the necessary information available so that the minister can make a decision?

    M. Barry Stemshorn: I think that we now have a lot more information than we had before the February meeting. Obviously, like you said, we will have to present the minister and his colleagues with the pros and cons of ratification.

    To do this, we are going to have to make sure that the implications of the February decisions are well understood by the agricultural sector. The agricultural sector is concerned about these issues and about its future. So we are going to have to hold consultations with the most affected sectors. This will produce information that ministers are going to have to take into account when they make a decision on these issues.

    I'm sorry that my presentation was so long, but it's a very complicated topic, and we've made an effort to present it to you in detail.

»  (1755)  

[English]

    The Chair: Mr. Stemshorn, your presentation was not long at all. Actually it was unusually concise and short. The only reason we asked you to keep it vague was because we started so late. You could have given gave us a presentation double that length and it still would have been very interesting and very important.

    To conclude, do you have one more question, Mr. Szabo?

    Mr. Paul Szabo: No.

    The Chair: Monsieur Dion.

[Translation]

    Hon. Stéphane Dion: Actually, this isn't a question, it's a comment. Maybe we were too optimistic. Personally, I was expecting you to tell us what all of the stumbling blocks were, but in your presentation, you told us in a few words that there were documentation problems. In addition, you told us that the subject was so complex and so comprehensive that you couldn't describe it. So I don't feel very useful: I can't give you any suggestions, given that I don't have the information I need.

    Mr. Barry Stemshorn: But I do think that you've understood that it has to do with the documentation issue. Because of the complexity of the subject, it's difficult to discuss it. That's why, in my view, we're going to have to hold in-depth discussions with the agricultural sector so that it fully understands what's at stake.

    Hon. Stéphane Dion: Thank you.

[English]

    The Chair: Thank you very much. This has certainly been most educational, and we'll go out of this room with a better understanding.

    We don't envy you. You will probably be telling your grandchildren about this and preparing them to complete the task you initiated for them, judging from the speed with which you are proceeding.

    We wish you luck and hope to see you again.

    The meeting is adjourned.