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37th PARLIAMENT, 3rd SESSION

Standing Committee on Agriculture and Agri-Food

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Tuesday, March 30, 2004

1530

The Chair (Mr. Paul Steckle (Huron—Bruce, Lib.))

Mr. André Gravel (Executive Vice-President, Canadian Food Inspection Agency)

The Chair

Mr. Randy White (Langley—Abbotsford, CPC)

1535

Mr. André Gravel

1540

The Chair

Mr. Randy White

The Chair

Mr. André Gravel

The Chair

Mr. Louis Plamondon (Bas-Richelieu—Nicolet—Bécancour, BQ)

Mr. André Gravel

Mr. Louis Plamondon

M. André Gravel

Mr. Louis Plamondon

1545

Mr. André Gravel

Mr. Louis Plamondon

Mr. André Gravel

Mr. Louis Plamondon

Mr. André Gravel

Mr. Louis Plamondon

The Chair

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur (Lambton—Kent—Middlesex, Lib.)

Mr. André Gravel

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur

Mr. André Gravel

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur

1550

Mr. André Gravel

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur

Mr. André Gravel

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur

Mr. André Gravel

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur

Mr. André Gravel

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur

Mr. André Gravel

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur

Mr. André Gravel

Mr. Jim Clark (Network Chief, Animal Health and Production, Programs Branch, Canadian Food Inspection Agency)

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur

The Chair

Mr. Dick Proctor (Palliser, NDP)

Mr. André Gravel

Mr. Dick Proctor

Mr. André Gravel

Mr. Jim Clark

Mr. Dick Proctor

Mr. Jim Clark

Mr. Dick Proctor

Mr. Jim Clark

Mr. Dick Proctor

1555

Mr. André Gravel

Mr. Dick Proctor

Mr. André Gravel

Mr. Dick Proctor

Mr. André Gravel

Mr. Dick Proctor

Mr. André Gravel

Mr. Dick Proctor

Mr. André Gravel

Mr. Dick Proctor

Mr. André Gravel

Mr. Dick Proctor

The Chair

Hon. Mark Eyking (Sydney—Victoria, Lib.)

Mr. André Gravel

1600

The Chair

Mr. Randy White

Mr. André Gravel

Mr. Randy White

1605

Mr. André Gravel

Mr. Randy White

Mr. André Gravel

The Chair

Mr. Jim Clark

Mr. Randy White

Mr. Jim Clark

The Chair

1610

Hon. Wayne Easter (Malpeque, Lib.)

Mr. André Gravel

Hon. Wayne Easter

The Chair

Mr. André Gravel

Hon. Wayne Easter

Mr. André Gravel

1615

Hon. Wayne Easter

The Chair

Mr. Gilbert Barrette (Témiscamingue, Lib.)

Mr. André Gravel

Mr. Gilbert Barrette

Mr. André Gravel

Mr. Gilbert Barrette

Mr. André Gravel

Mr. Gilbert Barrette

The Chair

Mr. Claude Duplain (Portneuf, Lib.)

Mr. André Gravel

1620

Mr. Claude Duplain

Mr. André Gravel

Mr. Claude Duplain

Mr. André Gravel

Mr. Claude Duplain

Mr. André Gravel

Mr. Claude Duplain

Mr. André Gravel

The Chair

Mr. Jim Clark

The Chair

Mr. Jim Clark

The Chair

Mr. Randy White

Mr. André Gravel

Mr. Randy White

1625

Mr. André Gravel

The Chair

Mr. Jim Clark

The Chair

Mr. Jim Clark

Mr. Randy White

Mr. Jim Clark

Mr. Gerry Ritz (Battlefords—Lloydminster, CPC)

Mr. Jim Clark

Mr. Randy White

The Chair

Mr. Jim Clark

The Chair

Mr. Jim Clark

The Chair

Mr. Randy White

The Chair

Hon. Wayne Easter

1630

The Chair

Mr. Greg Farrant (Manager, Government Relations and Communications, Ontario Conservation Centre, Ontario Federation of Anglers and Hunters)

1645

1650

1655

The Chair

1700

Mr. Gerry Ritz

Mr. Greg Farrant

Mr. Gerry Ritz

Mr. Greg Farrant

Mr. Gerry Ritz

Mr. Greg Farrant

Mr. Gerry Ritz

Mr. Greg Farrant

Mr. Gerry Ritz

Mr. Greg Farrant

Mr. Gerry Ritz

Mr. Greg Farrant

Mr. Gerry Ritz

Mr. Greg Farrant

Mr. Gerry Ritz

Mr. Greg Farrant

Mr. Gerry Ritz

The Chair

Mr. Dick Proctor

1705

Mr. Greg Farrant

Mr. Dick Proctor

Mr. Greg Farrant

Mr. Dick Proctor

Mr. Greg Farrant

Mr. Dick Proctor

Mr. Greg Farrant

Mr. Dick Proctor

Mr. Greg Farrant

Mr. Dick Proctor

Mr. Greg Farrant

Mr. Dick Proctor

The Chair

Hon. Wayne Easter

Mr. Greg Farrant

1710

Hon. Wayne Easter

Mr. Greg Farrant

Hon. Wayne Easter

Mr. Greg Farrant

Hon. Wayne Easter

The Chair

Mr. Ken Epp (Elk Island, CPC)

1715

Mr. Greg Farrant

Mr. Ken Epp

Mr. Greg Farrant

Mr. Ken Epp

Mr. Greg Farrant

Mr. Ken Epp

Mr. Greg Farrant

Mr. Ken Epp

The Chair

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur

Mr. Greg Farrant

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur

1720

Mr. Greg Farrant

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur

Mr. Greg Farrant

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur

Mr. Greg Farrant

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur

Mr. Greg Farrant

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur

Mr. Greg Farrant

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur

The Chair

Hon. Wayne Easter

The Chair

Hon. Wayne Easter

The Chair

Mr. Ken Epp

Hon. Wayne Easter

Mr. Ken Epp

The Chair

1725

Mr. Ken Epp

The Chair

Mr. Greg Farrant

The Chair

Mr. Greg Farrant

The Chair

Mr. Greg Farrant

The Chair

Mr. Greg Farrant

Mr. Ken Epp

Mr. Greg Farrant

Mr. Ken Epp

Mr. Greg Farrant

Mr. Ken Epp

Mr. Greg Farrant

Mr. Ken Epp

Mr. Greg Farrant

The Chair

Mr. Greg Farrant

The Chair

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur

The Clerk of the Committee

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur

The Clerk

The Chair

CANADA

Standing Committee on Agriculture and Agri-Food

NUMBER 012

3rd SESSION

37th PARLIAMENT

EVIDENCE

Tuesday, March 30, 2004

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¹ (1530)

[English]

The Chair (Mr. Paul Steckle (Huron—Bruce, Lib.)): Ladies and gentlemen, we will begin our meeting. Today we are shifting gears, and rather than BSE, we're going to be looking at another one of those issues that we hadn't expected to be dealing with, but obviously we have to. That is the issue of avian flu.

This afternoon we have from the Canadian Food Inspection Agency--of course, no stranger to us--André Gravel, the executive vice-president; Doug Steadman, associate executive director, operations branch; and Jim Clark, network chief,animal health and production, programs branch.

Gentlemen, we're asking you to bring us up to speed within the hour on where we're at with this issue, something that is on the minds of a lot people, and how this is affecting not only the industry but consumers and Canadians alike.

The time is yours for the next 10 or 12 minutes, and then we'll begin the questioning. Thank you very much.

Mr. André Gravel (Executive Vice-President, Canadian Food Inspection Agency): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll be making a short introduction and then open the floor for questions.

I am pleased to appear before this committee to answer your questions concerning the recent outbreak of avian influenza in British Columbia.

[Translation]

As the committee is aware, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency is the Government of Canada regulator for food safety, animal health and plant protection. In the past years, much of our activity has been focused on strengthening our ability to respond to emergencies that threaten food safety and animal and plant health.

The agency is currently dealing with an animal health-related emergency—avian influenza in British Columbia. Avian influenza is a viral infection caused by the influenza virus type A. It can affect several species of food producing birds as well as pet birds and wild birds.

Some avian influenza is low pathogenic and causes little or no clinical signs in the infected birds. But some are capable of mutating into high pathogenic avian influenza. "High pathogenic" refers to how the virus behaves in birds. Although the outbreak in British Columbia is of the high pathogenic strain, it is not the same strain that currently exists in Asia.

[English]

In February, the CFIA began investigating a case of H7 influenza on a farm in the Fraser Valley in British Columbia. In March, the disease was found on four other farms in the area. A ministerial declaration was issued establishing a control area, which gives the CFIA the legal authority to initiate movement restrictions for birds, bird products, and bird by-products in British Columbia's Fraser Valley.

Within this control area there are further restrictions on a high-risk region and a surveillance region. The high-risk region lies within five kilometres surrounding the farm where diseased birds were first found. The five-kilometre extent is based on international standards.

[Translation]

Last Wednesday, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency announced its decision to depopulate the high-risk region. This action is intended to contain any further spread of the disease by eliminating the pool of infection in susceptible birds present in the high-risk region. We estimate that this depopulation will involve approximately 275,000 birds. All destroyed birds will be disposed of in accordance with provincial environmental regulations and international accepted disease control guidelines.

We will continue to sample birds in the flocks to be destroyed to gain additional information about the virus and the extent of its spread within the high-risk region. Once all birds have been removed from a farm, we will begin a rigorous decontamination program. This will involve cleaning and disinfecting these premises to eliminate any remaining infectious material.

Farms that have been depopulated will be eligible for restocking within a timeframe prescribed by international avian influenza management standards.

Depopulating poultry throughout an entire region is a severe measure. But this is a reasonable step to take in response to a contagious disease. It reflects internationally accepted strategies for animal disease management. The Netherlands took similar steps in dealing with this disease.

[English]

We will reassess the restrictions on the movement of poultry and poultry products that have been in place since March 11. We will reassess other biosecurity control measures as well.

We will also intensify our activities throughout the control area. This will include daily pickup and sampling of dead birds in the surveillance region that surrounds the high-risk region. We will investigate any premises where we suspect avian influenza is present. This will be based on high mortality rates or potential exposure to the virus.

Health Canada continues to emphasize that the risk to human health from this strain of avian influenza remains low. But as a precaution, local health authorities continue to check the health of those people who have been exposed to poultry in the high-risk region.

Mr. Chairman, this has been a quick overview of the Canadian Food Inspection Agency's work involving the outbreak of avian influenza in British Columbia. I welcome your questions.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Gravel.

We will begin our questioning. We have with us a new member to the committee today. He represents an area where this issue has been affecting certain persons. We welcome Randy White as our first intervener.

Mr. Randy White (Langley—Abbotsford, CPC): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Indeed, this started on a farm in my area. I live less than two kilometres from the five-kilometre zone. It's certainly having a very large impact in the lower mainland. Langley and Abbotsford are both in my riding, and both have very large numbers of processors and producers.

I have four specific questions for you, but I first want to give you some facts about the economic impact of this decision. These come from the producers and the processors themselves. In addition, the B.C. poultry industry has now created a potential liability in excess of $30 million by the end of March, as they have placed product in freezers in the lower mainland that cannot be shipped outside the control area. That's something I'm going to ask you about.

In addition to the lost revenue, the B.C. industry is now facing incremental costs of over $10 million for April: $2.6 million per week in costs associated with the culling of 600,000 to 800,000 healthy birds and hatching eggs per week, and $400,000 per month in carrying costs associated with product now in freezers. With the pending reduction in production, in excess of 1,000 jobs will be lost in the processing industry commencing next week, as production levels are scaled back to 50% of traditional levels. Many farms will face significant financial hardship, as owners will be unable to service the debt on their farms and equipment.

So you can see the impact in my area. It is a relatively hardworking area, and the income is from a large number of our dairy farms and chicken farms.

In British Columbia, this is about a $1.5 billion industry. The high-risk area is the five-kilometre zone, but I want to just focus a moment on the restriction of movement within the lower mainland. That's where it's starting to tie things up.

On what scientific basis did you pick such a large area as the lower mainland in which to restrict movement of goods, as opposed to the five-kilometre zone and maybe a ten-kilometre or twenty-kilometre zone around that? Therein lies a big part of the producers' and processors' problem. Can you tell me what generated that whole lower mainland delivery?

¹ (1535)

Mr. André Gravel: Thank you for the question.

Mr. Chairman, of course the agency is conscious that the decision it has made to limit the movement of poultry in the lower mainland represents significant economic costs to the industry. We basically follow international rules to deal with national emergencies such as avian influenza.

The establishment of the high-risk area is the first step in trying to understand how the disease is spreading from one farm to the other. Attached to this, another five-kilometre zone around that gives us an area where we're going to do surveillance, and essentially the larger control area allows us to act to prevent further spread of the disease.

In terms of international requirements, one of the main things that is hurting Canada beyond the direct cost, which you mentioned, to industry is the closure of international markets. There is a large number of poultry and poultry products, whether meat, or live birds, or hatching eggs, that are exported to foreign markets, and the agency is trying to, if you will, regionalize the outbreak. In other words, we have to demonstrate to the rest of the world that this outbreak is limited to a certain area and not Canada as a whole. In fact, our strategy has proven quite effective so far in that the U.S. is now recognizing that this is a localized problem.

We just heard this morning that the European Union, which is also a major buyer of Canadian products, has also recognized that the disease outbreak is limited to the control area itself. So from that standpoint we're on firm ground.

In terms of reducing the scope of our measures, we have to be assured that the transmission of the virus is actually stopped. We know that the main route of transmission of the virus is probably contact with the birds themselves, or with the manure of the birds, but there is a slight probability of contamination through fresh or frozen chicken. That's why we've established conditions under which certain categories of products can move rather freely outside the control area, and they include, as an example, cooked products. But we still have to maintain some area of control over fresh products because of the risk they may represent.

¹ (1540)

The Chair: I'm sorry to rush you, Randy. You have one and a half minutes.

Mr. Randy White: It's a short amount of time for some very big dollar issues.

I understand the government is going to reimburse the producers up to $33, but more likely $3. It depends on the situation. This doesn't cover, as I understand it, cost of cleanup, shipping contaminated material, loss of birds that have already died through the virus, loss of down days because of the waiting time from start-up to start-up, and losses because the processors are at maximum storage capacity. What remedy is there for these people? Surely we couldn't expect just a reimbursement of $3 a bird? These people will all go broke. There will be no farms in my area.

The Chair: We'll allow you to have the other two questions in the following round.

Mr. André Gravel: Thanks for the question.

The agency's mandate in this case is very limited. We're a regulatory agency and our role has to do with control and elimination of foreign animal disease. In this case our financial contribution has to do with the reimbursement of birds or animals of which we order the destruction.

As you mentioned, there is the cost of quarantine and all these other costs, which are real costs to producers, and we don't have any provisions in our act and regulations that allow us to provide compensation for that.

The Chair: Thanks very much. We'll get you in the next round, Mr. White.

Mr. Plamondon, seven minutes.

[Translation]

Mr. Louis Plamondon (Bas-Richelieu—Nicolet—Bécancour, BQ): Mr. Gravel, in 2000, there was a similar influenza case in Ontario. Did countries ban that poultry just as some countries are doing for American and Canadian poultry now? How long did those measures last?

Mr. André Gravel: Thank you for the question. Avian influenza or avian flu is a disease that is constantly evolving and trade restrictions are currently changing. The International Office of Epizootics, which is the international organization that sets animal health standards, is currently reviewing its code of practices for avian influenza. In the past, restrictions were only imposed if the avian influenza was of the high pathogenic type. The coming changes to the code will probably include other types of influenza that are less pathogenic for animals.

In this particular case, we have witnessed an avian influenza that began as low pathogenic but mutated into high pathogenic avian influenza. Therefore, I think that international organizations and countries in general are much stricter than they were in the past for these types of circumstances.

Mr. Louis Plamondon: But when this happened in Ontario, in 2000, there were no restrictions, no export bans?

M. André Gravel: I believe that the avian influenza in the year 2000 was of the low pathogenic type. Therefore, at that time the restrictions were much less severe.

Mr. Louis Plamondon: You said that the international standards are being revised. Is Canada participating in this? Is Canada an important actor or is it just waiting for the results?

¹ (1545)

Mr. André Gravel: Canada is a very important actor within the International Office of Epizootics. Canada has been actively participating for several years now. In fact, the last chair of the International Office of Epizootics was a Canadian, Dr. Norman Willis, and our chief veterinarian, Dr. Brian Evans, is the Canadian delegate; he also participates in administrative and technical commissions at the IOE. So we are proactive in this area, not only reactive.

Mr. Louis Plamondon: Can you briefly tell me about any interprovincial regulations that would apply to cases like this? Are there already any interprovincial regulations?

Mr. André Gravel: There are provincial regulations that deal with, for example, the inspection of food remaining in the provinces. There are provincial regulations, for example in Quebec, that provide for monitoring certain animal diseases. However, interprovincial trade is mainly covered by federal regulations. The Animal Protection Act is a federal law that covers international trade, imports, exports and interprovincial trade.

Mr. Louis Plamondon: When a case like this arises, poultry is prevented from leaving the province, is that the case?

Mr. André Gravel: In this particular case, our goal was to limit the damage by establishing a control zone, which is a part of British Columbia, but normally, when a serious animal disease is declared, we try to limit the movement of products that may be carrying that disease elsewhere. Once we are satisfied and once we have identified with precision where the disease is and how it spread, then we can consider removing the restrictions.

Mr. Louis Plamondon: That is all, Mr. Chairman.

[English]

The Chair: Mrs. Ur, seven minutes.

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur (Lambton—Kent—Middlesex, Lib.): I have several questions. I represent a riding in southwestern Ontario that certainly has a large feather industry, and they were aware that you would be presenting, so I have a few questions for you.

One of the concerns raised by the industry is that it took a long time for CFIA to let the industry know what was happening. Their health certificates were pulled, but then there was no one available to explain or discuss what was happening. Can someone respond to that, please?

Mr. André Gravel: I'm not aware, Mr. Chairman, of the specific situation the member is raising; however, I think CFIA at the very beginning of the outbreak had a suspicion that there was avian influenza involved. We wanted to have some assurance that this was what we were dealing with before actually communicating with industry to avoid a possible panic for nothing. We had to make sure we had our ducks lined up, that we knew what it was and we had it confirmed by our lab, and then inform the industry.

I think since then we have been very proactive in our communications. At the beginning we had daily phone calls with the industry to keep them up to date, and as soon as we have new information we normally bring the provinces and the industry in on what we know.

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur: Is it normal practice to revoke certificates, with no explanation as to what is happening?

Mr. André Gravel: Let me answer with a theoretical situation, where the agency would be issuing an export certificate for turkey hatching eggs for a foreign country, the shipment takes off, and then we find in transit that we have avian influenza. I think this would have represented very significant costs for the industry and also could have been embarrassing for Canada's reputation with its animal health program. So I think we wanted to be cautious and avoid problems that could have arisen. In fact, we were right in being cautious in this case.

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur: I'm not criticizing. These are questions put by the industry.

Why did it take so long, and why were there so many outbreaks before we decided to destroy the flocks in the high-risk area, given the precedents already set in Europe?

¹ (1550)

Mr. André Gravel: That's a good question too. In fact, the decision we made to take all birds out in the high-risk area is not one we made lightly, because of one of the factors, the economic impact, as was raised by Mr. White earlier. We want to make sure we're cautious, but at the same time we're taking measures that will limit the spread of the disease.

Normally, international standards dictate that after a certain number of outbreaks in a given high-risk area, it's more prudent to take the birds out. We were within a couple of outbreaks of that limit when we decided. So again, we were a little bit more cautious than we should have been in terms of taking the action we took.

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur: Are the policies you have in place to deal with disease outbreaks put in place with discussion within the industry as well? Are they some of the people who make the policy decisions?

Mr. André Gravel: The agency has emergency plans for animal diseases and specific plans for the major animal diseases. Foot-and-mouth disease is an example, and avian influenza is another.

At the time the outbreaks happened, the agency already had its plan in place. Some of the measures we take are non-negotiable; we have to do what we have to do. When the time comes to liberalize and change our policy, we are always open to getting industry's input, but there are certain things that as a regulator we have to do, and we do those first.

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur: I think you may have misunderstood my question. Did the policies that are already there come about with discussion with the industry before the policies were set? Who sets the policies for this?

Mr. André Gravel: Our experts set the policy, and they are normally guided by international standards.

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur: Okay.

Mr. André Gravel: There is industry consultation in this process, but....

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur: You say new regulations are coming out in May of this year, I believe, from the OIE, the reporting of all H5 and H7 cases?

Mr. André Gravel: There will be modification of OIE standards. The Office international des épizooties, the international organization that deals with animal disease, has an annual meeting, normally in Paris, in May. At this year's meeting they will be discussing some amendments to the influenza action plan standard.

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur: The current health certificates do not recognize the zoning of Canada for Newcastle and AI. Is CFIA negotiating to change these in the near future?

Mr. André Gravel: I'm sorry, I'm not sure I understand your question.

Mr. Jim Clark (Network Chief, Animal Health and Production, Programs Branch, Canadian Food Inspection Agency): There is an ongoing initiative to discuss regionalization at the international level with all member countries of the OIE. Each situation will depend on the individual disease outbreak at the time and the ability of Canada or any other nation to demonstrate effective control of the situation in order to have the regionalization recognized. That's a reactive mechanism.

The only other way to approach it would be to provide some form of ongoing division of the country at some established control point, such as the Ontario-Manitoba border, which would happen on a continuous basis, but it requires some ongoing and prohibitive costs associated with recognition of movement control between the two aspects of the country at that particular time.

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur: Thank you.

The Chair: Mr. Proctor.

Mr. Dick Proctor (Palliser, NDP): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, gentlemen.

In your presentation, Dr. Gravel, you say that a number of countries have restricted imports of North American chicken. Do you have a precise number?

Mr. André Gravel: As far as I remember, Mr. Chairman, there are 38 countries that have implemented some restrictions on the movement of product from Canada.

Mr. Dick Proctor: Okay. I suppose it's a little hard to guesstimate, but let me ask you in this way. In 2000, or when we had a previous outbreak—and I guess it was a low pathogenic strain at that time—how long did it take for borders to reopen? Did they close with the rapidity that we've seen in this instance?

Mr. André Gravel: Mr. Chairman, I may look old, but in fact I'm very young. I don't remember this. I'll ask Jim Clark to answer the question.

Mr. Jim Clark: As I understand, for the last incidence where we had an H7 isolation, there was no international response at that point in time.

Mr. Dick Proctor: Okay. For the borders, there was no....

Mr. Jim Clark: No. Maybe I could characterize it a little further. There wasn't a H5N1 massive pandemic going on in Southeast Asia at that point in time either. There are some sensitivities, from an international perspective, about the existence of avian influenza globally.

Mr. Dick Proctor: All right. People are responding accordingly to that concern.

Mr. Jim Clark: Yes.

Mr. Dick Proctor: Would you hazard a guess as to the amount of time it may take for the restrictions to be lifted for us to get back if this five-kilometre zone we're talking about is indeed it? Is this like the BSE issue on beef and other ruminants?

¹ (1555)

Mr. André Gravel: It will all depend on how quickly we can eliminate diseased birds. It also depends on the number of outbreaks that we will or will not find, ultimately. Normally, after 21 days without any outbreaks, and after everything has been cleaned and disinfected, you can start to open up a little bit more liberally.

Again, coming back to zoning or regionalization, it becomes a very important issue that some countries are now recognizing that this is a local issue and not an issue that affects Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan, but only part of B.C.

Mr. Dick Proctor: Did I understand you to say that there are ten flocks in this five-kilometre zone? Are there more than that?

I'm sorry, I'm working from memory.

Mr. André Gravel: There are 15 commercial ones.

Mr. Dick Proctor: I take it, from your previous answer, that not all of them have been depopulated at this point.

Mr. André Gravel: No, we estimate that we need approximately one more week to complete depopulation in the high-risk area.

Mr. Dick Proctor: Okay. You've indicated that you're going to be checking a number of the birds after they've been slaughtered. What percentage is that?

Mr. André Gravel: Mr. Chairman, we test all of the flocks before they are actually destroyed, because the end disposition of the flock will vary, whether the flock is infected or not infected. All flocks will be tested, and we take a representative sample of each of them. If they are negative, then the carcasses can be rendered and it destroys the virus. If they're positive, then these carcasses will be incinerated to eliminate the possibility of spreading the disease.

Mr. Dick Proctor: How much is the compensation you're paying per bird?

Mr. André Gravel: Mr. Chairman, the compensation is a reflection of the commercial value of the animals. There is a cap in the compensation for every animal species, whether they're cattle or horses. In the case of poultry, the cap is $33. It's up to $33, on the basis of an assessment on the value of the birds.

Mr. Dick Proctor: It's to a maximum of $33, depending on the condition, etc.

I assume there would be a number of employees who will be laid off at these fairly high-intensive operations. Are they eligible for any kind of benefit?

Mr. André Gravel: Mr. Chairman, I wish I could answer that question, but unfortunately I have limited knowledge of other programs in this area.

Mr. Dick Proctor: Thanks.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Proctor.

Mr. Eyking, five minutes.

Hon. Mark Eyking (Sydney—Victoria, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

My questions are more in the line of keeping the disease from spreading, and also getting these firms back in business, I guess.

My family has a large poultry operation. Over the last few years we've had biosecurity in effect, and I'm sure most poultry operations across Canada have that now. One of the big things we found on our farm was that having waterfowl around the buildings was always a no-no. I know the area we're talking about is a fly zone for a lot of waterfowl. So one question is, how are we dealing with that? Has there been testing of these birds, and are they close to the farms?

Also, as for the water supply for the birds, I know we have deep wells on our farm, but I was wondering how the water supply was for these farms. Could it spread through the drinking water of the birds?

My other two questions would be on the testing. I know you've ramped up the testing a bit. It says in part of this brief here that the testing depends on the mortality of the birds. I'm concerned. Are we waiting too long to go to some of these farms, or should we really be increasing the testing—and similarly on the wild birds?

The final part is, how long does it take to get the farm back into production? Does the whole zone have to be cleaned up before a farm can start producing again?

Mr. André Gravel: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

There were a lot of questions, and I'll try to be as brief as I can in my answers.

The issue of how the contamination or infection started is still the subject of our epidemiological investigation. As the member correctly pointed out, wild birds in general are carriers of the influenza virus. The main problem is that even though they're carriers of the virus, they don't show symptoms. They could be fully healthy birds, wild ducks or geese flying around, looking healthy but in fact are carrying the disease. So that is one way the disease can be transmitted.

This, and the water supply, and the feed supply, and all of these factors are going to be investigated. We need to find out how that disease is spreading from farm to farm. That's going to be the focus of our investigation. I don't have an answer for you yet, but all the things you raised are certainly very pertinent factors at the agency, which we'll be looking at.

On testing, testing in the high-risk area is different from the testing we do in other areas. In the high-risk area, every commercial farm will be tested. In the surveillance area, we thought that collecting dead birds would be a good indication of whether the disease has actually spread to the surveillance area, which so far has been free. It limits the scope of our testing and it also protects some of the lab resources we need to conduct our investigation.

The way we found out about the avian influenza in this case is that some dead birds were brought to a provincial lab and were identified as having avian influenza, and then we took over. We think it's a very adequate and appropriate way of making sure the outbreak hasn't spread outside the perimeter or the fence we established around the outbreak.

How long will the farms be out of business before they can be re-established? We need to satisfy ourselves and importers of Canadian products that there is no longer any active infection in the zone. Once we've had our last outbreak, the clock starts ticking. Then cleaning and disinfection have to take place, and 21 days after we think we have enough evidence to allow restocking of some of these poultry houses....

One of the main reasons why it's for 21 days is because virologists—specialists in animal virology—tell us that the incubation period of the virus could be up to 21 days. There's a safety margin involved in this.

º (1600)

The Chair: Thank you very much.

We'll move now to Mr. White.

Mr. Randy White: Thank you.

I do want to clarify a couple of things that have been said here. When you say $33 a bird, it sounds like the compensation is a lot of money. That's not typical compensation. It's really probably in the neighbourhood of $3 a bird. That is woefully inadequate, quite frankly, for the costs these people are incurring. These farmers cannot withstand that bill.

The second thing, just to clarify Mark's comment, is that it's really not going to be a 21-day waiting period. You're likely looking at September or October here, are you not?

Mr. André Gravel: Mr. Chairman, I'll make some comments about the compensation package first. The Health of Animals Act and regulations allow for some level of compensation, and it's a twofold thing. The first part is making sure diseases are reported to the agency, and the second one is a partial compensation for the destruction of animals. Our mandate as an agency does not extend beyond the boundaries of our activity.

I'm sorry, I didn't take note of your--

Mr. Randy White: It's about the length of time, but I do want to add this in before you answer that. We all have to balance the risk of the disease with the significant loss of income and that sort of thing, and I think that's what we have to reconcile in this particular issue.

I want to get back to the control area you originally talked about, in particular the restriction of movement from the lower mainland. The question that comes to mind is, do you have the same set of rules for high- and low-risk pathogens? If you do, how do you then establish that larger zone of the lower mainland if you have the difference in risk? How did you do that?

º (1605)

Mr. André Gravel: Mr. Chairman, the action the agency has taken is on the basis of high-pathogenic avian influenza. In the case of low-pathogenic avian influenza, it's clearly not the same situation. The boundaries of the control area are a reflection of how the agency, in cooperation with provincial players, can establish an area it has control over.

If you look at the map, you'll see what the control area encompasses: the Rocky Mountains on the one side, the Pacific Ocean on the other, the U.S. border on the third side, and a main highway coming out of the Fraser Valley on the fourth. This is an area where there is a possibility of establishing some control of movement. In one way it's large enough that it can be managed, but it's also possible to demonstrate that indeed there is control of the movement of product out of the zone.

Mr. Randy White: Do you consider this control area low-risk or high-risk?

Mr. André Gravel: The control area is a low-risk area. We have the high-risk area, where the farms that have the disease are situated. There's a surveillance area around it, and then there's a larger zone of control.

With your permission, Mr. Chair, Dr. Clark may want to add something on that.

The Chair: Any time any of you want to jump in, go right ahead.

Mr. Jim Clark: I'm not sure we aren't mixing the terms high-risk and low-risk and perhaps confusing the pathogenicity of the virus versus the control area itself. Low pathogenicity avian influenza virus would not stimulate this same response from the agency the highly pathogenic variety did. That's clear. The highly pathogenic variety requires this form of response according to an international standard and as what our trading partners recognize as effective movement control restrictions being put in place in order to deal with the spread of the disease.

I'm not sure that answers the member's question.

Mr. Randy White: I'm okay with that for a moment, but I do want the answer on the waiting period. If you look at the time, you'll see it's not 21 days from the time the disease was found and farm A cleans up its problem; it's that farm A has to wait for all the other farms.

By the way, I believe it is 10 farms plus 35 smaller flocks that are affected. How long can this actually go? We could be looking at August, September, or October, could we not?

Mr. Jim Clark: One of the factors that stimulated the decision, other than the disease control perspective on depopulating all the flocks in the high-risk region, was indeed the factor the member is mentioning. The international standards require that there be a 21-day period of time after the last infected flock is discovered and an effective cleaning and disinfection is done before we're able to remove the restrictions on the control area in general.

Those infected premises would remain under quarantine for another period of time--not the rest of the farms, just the ones we know the infection was on--when sentinel birds would be put back into that environment and there would be an observation period of another 21 days, which again is associated with the incubation period of the disease. If all of that was negative at that point in time, we would remove the restrictions on those infected premises as well.

From an international perspective on disease freedom, for Canada to be recognized as disease-free from highly pathogenic avian influenza, that's a six-month period of time. That's not including the fact that we could potentially regionalize, and we have been successful in doing that. Then the remainder of the country could continue to do business as normal with the impacts being felt only on the Fraser Valley or British Columbia.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Clark.

We'll move on to Mr. Easter, for five minutes.

º (1610)

Hon. Wayne Easter (Malpeque, Lib.): Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

We've had some experience in some of these restrictions in P.E.I. with PVYn. They can go on forever. In fact, we have people who are out of business now as a result of the restrictions and the cost. So I can certainly understand the concerns Mr. White is raising.

Randy mentioned that the freezers had been full. I want to follow up on that question. In terms of the freezers being full of product, how do they get emptied and how do some of these birds...? Can any birds be sold into the food market? If they can, how do you get them processed and how do you get them moved when the freezer is already full? Do we need another program in order to move that product? If we do, then we have to look at it.

Mr. André Gravel: Thank you for the question.

Mr. Chairman, the restrictions the agency has implemented on the movement of product, including fresh and frozen chicken, do not apply inside the control area itself. So product can move freely in there.

The issue of moving fresh and frozen poultry outside the control area and outside of British Columbia is the subject of current discussion. We certainly haven't implemented these restrictions on the basis of our own idea. We want to be reassured that by opening that area of trade we're not creating other problems of potentially spreading the disease further.

We're actually, almost as we speak, entertaining some suggestions from the industry to see how we can mitigate that problem. We don't take it lightly that good product for human consumption has to be destroyed because there's no storage space for it. So we're fully conscious of the problem.

Hon. Wayne Easter: I do think you ought to move quickly on that, because we've seen other industries...we learn a little every time we go through one of these experiences. Even if you have to move in refrigerated trucks or whatever, you do have to give the opportunity, both on the food end and on the economic return end for the farmers. We don't want to spread the disease, but you have to try to find some economy there, somewhere, if it's possible to do it.

I know you're restricted as CFIA in terms of what you can do. It may require a more overall government response, because you are looking at the farmers themselves. You're looking at the workers and their farms. You're looking at the indirect industries tied to that. So it's bigger than CFIA. You certainly have to do what you can and do it fast.

I'm concerned about the wild birds. I guess you're investigating it, but if these are a problem then they have to be eliminated too. How did the Netherlands handle it in terms of their case? What was their experience?

I know we'd run into some problems with some environmental groups, with the international animal welfare groups and so on, but if they're a problem, then you have to eliminate them.

So what are the thoughts on that area?

Mr. Chair, I know CFIA is doing all it can do, but what's crucial in a situation like this is the initial communication from CFIA to the public in terms of quelling fears. When the media get onto this, it's wildly blown out of proportion. Secondly, communication with the industry is crucial so that they know what to do quickly.

The Chair: Can we have a short answer, please?

Mr. André Gravel: Well, Mr. Chairman, on wild birds, unfortunately the hunting season is in the fall, so there can't be an option.

Hon. Wayne Easter: Oh, that can change if we want to change it.

Mr. André Gravel: More seriously, I think the issue can be somehow addressed through biosecurity. Wild birds are going to be flying. They are migrating birds. They're going to be around. With adequate biosecurity on the farms, and we're looking at it in industry, I think we can limit the risk.

I can't agree more on the comments you made about media and industry contact. We're trying to be as proactive as we can on this.

º (1615)

Hon. Wayne Easter: Thanks.

The Chair: Mr. Plamondon has agreed to waive his time. I'm going to go to Mr. Barrette.

We want to get in the two members. If we have a moment or two, then you guys can finish up.

Mr. Barrette, five minutes.

[Translation]

Mr. Gilbert Barrette (Témiscamingue, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Are there any preventive measures that would prevent the spread of this disease? If so, what measures are currently in place to control this virus or viruses?

Mr. André Gravel: Mr. Chairman, in terms of preventive measures, the first set of measures are those that the industry must impose on itself. We were in touch with some producers in that area who told us that they had already taken very strict biosafety measures by controlling the number of visitors to farms, controlling the people who were providing feed supplies and things like that. I think that when September 11^th occurred, the agency issued guidelines for the benefit of the industry, applying to the various sectors of agrifood production and providing the types of measures that should be established. That is one part.

Insofar as the agency is concerned, we have monitoring systems, animal health monitoring systems that put our labs in touch with provincial labs. Thus, when there are problems that arise, we have a system that can react very quickly. The measures that we took when this happened, when we found our first case of avian influenza, were in fact part of the agency's action plan, that is, to establish a high-risk zone where nothing would move and everything was under quarantine, as well as a surveillance region and a control perimeter. We hope, with these control measures, and with more testing, that we will be able to eradicate this disease.

Mr. Gilbert Barrette: Are any specific measures being taken for the transport of these fowl? I'm sure there must be.

Mr. André Gravel: Mr. Chairman, are you talking about the animals that have been eliminated in order to control the disease?

Mr. Gilbert Barrette: No, I'm talking about trade.

Mr. André Gravel: Obviously, for trade, the agency operates on the basis of permits within a control area, as it is commonly known, a surveillance zone and a high-risk zone. We are notified of all bird, poultry products, eggs, etc. movements; conditions governing the issuance of permits are very strictly defined . For example, for shell eggs and frozen poultry, there are requirements that industry must adhere to. Within the framework of our epidemiological study, that allows us to trace the movement of different products.

Mr. Gilbert Barrette: Thank you.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Mr. Duplain.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Duplain (Portneuf, Lib.): With respect to transportation and the possibility of transmission, I recall having met with representatives of a firm who talked about cage disinfection. I think this was even made public, at one point, following the problem of infected cages.

Are you aware of that? Could that very well be a cause of the spread of this disease? It is something that worries me.

Mr. André Gravel: Obviously, Mr. Chairman, in trying to understand how contamination spreads from one farm to another, the issue of the movement of poultry cages that are used to bring the animals to the slaughterhouse is important. The agency, through its inspection regulations for meat, has strict requirements with respect to the cleaning and disinfecting of cages used in slaughterhouses. Therefore, measures carried out by our local staff include insuring that the cages are well cleaned and sterilized before they are returned to the farms, because if contamination is spread through animal excrement, we must make sure that the cages are cleaned and disinfected in order to prevent contamination of other farms.

º (1620)

Mr. Claude Duplain: However, the company said that the cages which were cleaned were still very much infected. Slaughterhouses clean the cages. How do you check that? Is there a random inspection of a dozen or so cages? Certainly not all the cages are inspected.

In light of this company's statements, can you elaborate a bit on the current state of the situation?

Mr. André Gravel: Yes. Mr. Chairman, it is the industry's responsibility to make sure that the cages are well cleaned and disinfected. The agency has staff, veterinarians, and inspectors in each one of the slaughterhouses who are responsible for checking the cleanliness of cages. I cannot assure you that each one of the cages is inspected individually by an agency employee, but I can ensure you that one of their responsibilities is to make sure that the industry does so adequately.

Mr. Claude Duplain: With respect to the statements made about the market by this company, what do you think?

Mr. André Gravel: I am aware of this, I read about this situation in a few articles which appeared in Quebec newspapers in the month of February. Clearly, the agency intervened through its Quebec administrative region to make sure that the necessary checks were being made. To my knowledge, that was not a serious problem.

Mr. Claude Duplain: I did not understand what you said earlier. I think the difference is too big, and I did not understand what you said when you talked about a $30 compensation per animal, whereas the member across the way talked about a $3 compensation.

Can you explain to me the difference between these two statements?

Mr. André Gravel: Yes. The $33 for hens is a maximum. Therefore, in order to respect the standards for reaching this maximum, we must be dealing with a high-value bird. For example, flocks of purebred breeding hens can go for a very high price, but the commercial value of laying hens at the end of their careers, for example—if I can use that expression—is certainly lower than $33; it will probably be less than a dollar. Values are established by professional evaluators. This varies according to the type of bird.

Mr. Claude Duplain: For the farms, has an approximate average price been paid out, or has nothing yet been established?

Mr. André Gravel: Mr. Chairman, there is no average price. An individual assessment is carried out on each farm to establish the value of the birds or the animals involved.

[English]

The Chair: I wonder if I might enlarge on that a little bit, because I think it's a question that Mr. White raised first.

Let's be clear. A broiler would be worth $3 to use, because that's a bird. A laying hen might be worth $8. Then, of course, you have your breeders, where these birds could be worth considerably more. Am I in the ballpark?

I am a farmer, but values have changed since I used to be in the bird business.

Mr. Jim Clark: As a laying hen goes through its lifetime, it becomes significantly less valuable towards the end of its production cycle.

The Chair: I understand that. It would depreciate, in other words.

Mr. Jim Clark: Yes.

The Chair: Okay. Thank you very much.

Mr. White.

Mr. Randy White: I think we have to be clear on that because of the expectations out there.

I have one quick question and then another. Is there a formal appeal mechanism if the farmer is dissatisfied with the price that is offered?

Mr. André Gravel: Yes, there is. There is a formal process of appeal for a compensation level.

Mr. Randy White: Okay. Thank you.

I would like you to take the committee, all of us here, for our benefit, through a time scenario. I've broached this twice now and I'm still not clear. You're not being clear enough for me, quite frankly.

Let's take today, March 30, and say that under the best-case scenario we find no more virus. Would you tell me the process, month by month? When can we start shrinking the larger restricted zone, for instance?

º (1625)

Mr. André Gravel: Mr. Chairman, I certainly apologize for not being clear. It's not on purpose.

I will ask Dr. Clark to do it again. Maybe it's going to be a little clearer.

The Chair: I want you to understand that we're not going to hold you to that. This is the best-case scenario. I think it's a good question and it would add some clarity to this.

Mr. Jim Clark: Perhaps we can use the member's scenario as an illustration. If we found the last infected premises today, the next step in the process would be to do an effective cleaning and disinfection. That would basically be to remove any obvious presence of the virus on the property. Twenty-one days after the cleaning and disinfection has been done, if there have been no further cases anywhere within the control area, we would release the restrictions that were in place for the control area. In other words, everybody would go back to doing whatever they were doing prior to the introduction and the minister's declaration.

The farms that we know were infected would continue to be under restriction and would be quarantined. We would place sentinel birds--in other words, birds that we know--

The Chair: Let's go back a bit. I think you're talking about the outer restricted area first having the restrictions lifted. Now we're coming--

Mr. Jim Clark: I'm talking about the permit systems that we currently have and everything else. That requires a 21-day interval after the last farm we dealt with is cleaned and disinfected, nothing else.

Mr. Randy White: Then the last farm you're dealing with is not today, because there are some that you haven't dealt with yet.

Mr. Jim Clark: That's correct. We're still going through the depopulation of the flocks in the high-risk region, and we may find another flock in that high-risk region that indeed is infected. So we are not there yet. I'm using your example as the beginning of the time count, that's all. So 21 days later we can remove restrictions that are currently in place. That takes away the permit systems and other things.

The infected farms, the places where we know the virus existed, remain under quarantine for an additional 21 days. At the beginning of that 21-day interval, birds that we know do not have any evidence of avian influenza will be placed on those farms. If they have no evidence of disease during the 21-day period, then we remove the restrictions on those farms, and they can restock and get back into business.

In terms of international recognition of disease freedom, that's six months after the last infected farm is known. That's an international recognition. However, it doesn't have any impact on the country, other than those countries that will not do trade with us until they recognize us as disease free for a six-month period of time.

Mr. Gerry Ritz (Battlefords—Lloydminster, CPC): Is there a live test?

Mr. Jim Clark: Yes.

Mr. Randy White: So really it's 42 days. But you haven't even finished--

The Chair: Your question had to do with that scenario occurring today. I think you've answered that reasonably well.

Can eggs be infectious?

Mr. Jim Clark: Yes, if they are breeding eggs or fertilized eggs that you're going to hatch--

The Chair: But not edible eggs.

Mr. Jim Clark: Edible eggs can be infected. However, there is no risk of transmitting the disease to more poultry unless the infection is on the surface of the egg, and we can do cleaning and disinfection or treatment of the surface to remove the virus. Since we're not going to be producing any birds from the eggs, that's the end of the process.

The Chair: Our time has expired. I appreciate everyone trying to remain within the timeframe. Your answers were succinct.

Thank you very much. This is very timely. I think you've helped the cause of those who have concerns. Obviously, for some parts of the country it's of great concern. Thank you, gentlemen. We look forward to seeing you again, but hopefully not under these circumstances.

Mr. Randy White: I'd like to thank the committee for meeting on this issue. I did go through Gerry Ritz, and he talked to you. I'm sure the farmers in the Fraser Valley will be grateful for this information. Thank you.

The Chair: Thanks very much, Mr. White, for appearing today.

Hon. Wayne Easter: I wonder, Mr. Chair, if as a committee we should look at the broader implications. Having experienced this in another industry in another area, I know that people will go broke, and if there's a way to prevent that, we should do it. But it will require a broader strategy than what CFIA can do.

Perhaps Human Resources Development, through EI or special measures, can assist those workers affected, or the Government of Canada in other areas through other programming can assist with some of the indirect hurt as a result of this, or perhaps Farm Credit or somebody else can assist through their policies and by taking the principal on the front end and moving it to the back end of a loan.

Broader things need to be thought of and done. Perhaps we should have a session and look at that. It's not the fault of anyone, really. But I think if you had a look at it up front, you might be able to prevent some financial disasters from happening.

º (1630)

The Chair: That's a point well taken. As we look at future business, we will certainly be looking at that issue.

Thank you very much, gentlemen.

We will temporarily suspend until our next guest makes his way to the table. Given the age of this gentleman, it may take him a few moments to do that. So we'll just await his return.

º (1631)

º (1640)

The Chair: This afternoon we have with us Greg Farrant, who is with the Ontario Federation of Anglers and Hunters. We want to look at the whole issue of chronic wasting disease, and Greg is going to lead us through a series of pictures here. I suppose a commentary goes with it.

Is that what you're planning, or have you got another plan for us?

Mr. Greg Farrant (Manager, Government Relations and Communications, Ontario Conservation Centre, Ontario Federation of Anglers and Hunters): Mr. Chair, I don't.

Thank you very much for having us here this afternoon. I appreciate the opportunity to speak with you here today.

Chronic wasting disease is an ever-increasing problem that we have with our wildlife populations. You've heard about avian flu here today, and you are obviously well aware of BSE, given the impact it's had on the cattle industry in this country.

Chronic wasting disease is a fatal brain disease of ungulates or cervids, which are deer, mule deer, and elk. It may possibly affect moose as well, but we're not sure at this time. CWD is known as TSE, as opposed to BSE. The T stands for transmissible, because one animal infects. The S is for spongiform, because of the appearance of the brain cells that are affected by this. The E is for encephalopathy, because it's a disorder of the brain.

Wildlife scientists in this country have been concerned about CWD and its spread through deer and elk farms since the late 1980s, but little action has been taken to date. According to Statistics Canada, from 1996 to 2001 the number of deer and elk farms--or game farms, as they're also referred to sometimes--increased by 72% to over 1,900 farms. Over the same five-year period, the number of farmed deer and elk increased by 83% to 128,000 head. By 2003 there were 2,600 farms, with 810 elk farms in Saskatchewan and Alberta, home to 60,000 elk.

Since 1996, one or more cases of CWD have been confirmed in elk in 39 captive herds in Saskatchewan. Since the discovery of CWD on an Alberta elk farm in 2002, the Food Inspection Agency has ordered 8,000 infected elk killed, in addition to two confirmed cases of CWD in Alberta deer; 9,000 animals in Saskatchewan have been killed as a result of a CWD outbreak traced to one local game farm; and links have been established between every infected herd and a single herd source in the province that imported infected elk from a private South Dakota game farm in 1989.

Other TSEs you're familiar with are Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, BSE, and scrapie in sheep.

Essentially, the agent that causes CWD is an abnormal protein called a prion. You'll see in your packages the difference between a normal conformer and a rogue conformer in the brain. The next slide in your package shows why the term is spongiform. It shows the normal deer brain and the deer brain with CWD with the huge, spongy holes in it.

On the clinical signs of CWD, the animal becomes emaciated, with poor body condition, rough hair coat, droopy ears, behavioural changes, excessive salivation, excessive drinking, lethargy, and inevitably death, because CWD always leads to death, period. Animals that normally wouldn't let a human being within 100 yards of them become so lethargic that they'll let people walk up within five yards of them and shoot them. They'll just stand there and look at you.

º (1645)

You'll see other examples in your package of what some of these animals look like, both in the wild and in the farm situation.

CWD can be diagnosed in three different ways: by microscopic examination in the lab; by treating the obex, the tonsils, or the other lymph nodes; or by examining the lymph nodes with immunosorbent assays. The bottom line is that there is no live test for CWD; animals must be dead.

They are working on live tests, as we speak here, but it's still not available to us. So the animal must be killed first to be tested.

CWD is found in two ways, either surveillance by wildlife management groups or hunter surveillance. As you're probably aware, the Province of Ontario, for instance, started a testing program in their animals, where hunters were bringing in samples of the animals for testing.

CWD in Canada is basically present in Saskatchewan and Alberta at this time, although every province that we're aware of imports game-farmed animals from the United States. Certainly Nova Scotia does, and Ontario does. The primary focus of game farms is in Saskatchewan and Alberta, although they also exist across the country.

I won't belabour the issue about CWD and its transference to humans and to cattle. You can see from your packages that this is not a major concern. Although there was an example in Colorado where three hunters who had eaten infected deer died and there was a great deal of alarm spread at the time that this was due to CWD, it turned out subsequently that it was not. Two of them died from other reasons, and as for the third one, it could not be substantiated why he died.

Dr. David Suzuki has raised this issue recently, though, and sounded the alarm about the potential spread of CWD to humans, but as of yet, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration and other medical authorities suggest there is very little possibility that this can be transferred to humans. The same is true for cattle, because cattle have lived in proximity to CWD-infected animals and have not contracted the disease.

Concerning the key problems associated with deer and elk farms--or game farms, as the popular expression goes--the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, which you've already heard from here today, is responsible for investigating and eradicating CWD in farmed cervids. The agency is overworked, understaffed, and not equipped to handle its responsibilities--it sounds like I'm lobbying for a budget increase for them--and despite the priority this needs, their studies only allow for increased surveillance and testing for CWD as time and resources permit. Well, that's almost negligible, since they're already understaffed and overworked as it is, handling other issues, like BSE.

I might point out that the second example of BSE was somewhat delayed in being found because they were testing hundreds and hundreds examples in the far west laboratories for TSE or CWD. So they were stacked up with these cases before they could get to the BSE example.

Part of the problem is tracking these animals. I've cited an example here that imports to Canada are sold by the original importer and the U.S ear tags are removed and replaced with ones from the importing jurisdiction--that is, Saskatchewan or Alberta--making the ability to track these imports limited.

The lack of a credible tracking and reporting system is highlighted by a recent case where an elk was shot in Montana and found to have tags that traced it back to a game farm in Saskatchewan. Officials in Canada had never had any report of escapes coming from this farm, so there's the animal out running around loose and nobody knew it was gone. While this animal is still being tested for CWD and we don't know whether it has it or doesn't, this highlights the lack of controls over commercial operations with captive cervids and underscores the need for stringent efforts to control these, especially along the borders.

So too does a June 2003 case in which a herd of farmed elk was found abandoned and wandering on the Alberta-Saskatchewan border.

º (1650)

In contrast to free-ranging cervids, or deer and elk, native and exotic cervids held in captivity for commercial purposes represent significant potential sources of disease. Several conditions favour the establishment, propagation, and dissemination of diseases, including CWD, in commercial wildlife facilities. You see some of the things there--the lack of controls, the lack of surveillance, the lack of reporting, the relatively small number of producers and veterinarians in both the United States and Canada who actually understand enough about this disease--and scientists believe the infection rate of deer and elk in captive situations is 100 times that of adjacent and affected wild herds.

Primarily it's the close proximity of captive farmed animals, deer and elk, that fosters conditions that might lead to the transmission of these diseases, particularly CWD. Potential transmission routes include fence-line contact, nose to nose; the ingress and egress of free-ranging animals, either escapes from the farms out or animals from the wild in—and that happens both ways; environmental contamination of the land; and escape of captive infected animals. Since CWD is spread by feces, urine, or saliva, obviously nose-to-nose contact is important, and the egress and ingress of these animals back and forth across the fence is important for the same reason. This offers the greatest potential avenue for infection of wildlife populations.

The introduction of CWD into free-ranging animals obviously could explode in the populations, causing deaths that could decimate herds of wildlife across this country. Local populations could be diminished or lost completely. The overall health of herds will be affected. Populations are compromised. It limits options for resource management. And the introduction of certain diseases, like CWD, into native cervids impacts upon the suitability of land for other uses.

On environmental contamination, which I mentioned earlier, in Colorado and Wyoming, elk and mule deer in paddocks that once housed infected animals became infected themselves even though no animals were present on the premises at that time. This leads us to believe that it stays in the soil. For example, in Saskatchewan, where 3,000 infected elk are buried, the animals have been buried for two years, but the land is still off limits for another three years. It is considered to be highly contaminated. The problem is how do you stop wild animals from getting into these lands in the meantime? You don't, unless they are properly cordoned off.

Obviously, attempts to control disease problems in free-ranging cervids are costly, and unless they're paid for by the people responsible in the first place, i.e. the cervid farmers, they could divert funding from other sources.

What we know is that deer and elk, particularly deer, are more susceptible to CWD. In captive game farm situations it can be as many as 50% that can contract the disease. It takes very little of the disease to infect an animal. There is no live test. The transmission is horizontal as in adult to adult, rather than mother to offspring. All CWD animals will die. The infection is spread by feces, urine, or saliva, and environmental contamination can persist for anywhere from two to five years.

There are no dangers to other animals that we know of at this time, including cattle. It does not jump the species barrier.

What will happen in the future if we don't take action? It will continue to spread. There will be increased demand by hunters for diagnosis of their harvested animals. There will be increased culls and slaughters of wild animals. It will not, however, stop the spread of the disease.

If you want to see the impact of what this looks like you need look only as far as Wisconsin, where I believe now 125,000 have been slaughtered by hunters under state control. Believe me, the people involved in this process, the hunters themselves, are just sickened by having to do this. They're not keen to participate in this kind of mass slaughter, but it's the only way to stop it.

There are a number of recommendations we would make. First and foremost would be—and this is the most extreme of those recommendations—to ban game farms, with compensation. That is across the country. Now, obviously the game farm industry would take issue with that, but it needs to be understood that since the appearance of CWD the markets available to game farms have largely dried up, one of them being for antler velvet in the Far East. Now Korea prohibits the importation of that, and unfortunately Canada has the distinction of being the causation of the first CWD case in Korea, an infection imported from Canada.

º (1655)

The game farm industry has attempted to, I understand, open up new markets in China for antler velvet, but that has not been successful to date. What you have now is some game farms offering opportunities for people to come in and have canned hunts in order to survive. Well, we do not support high-fence hunting, we do not support canned hunts, and we do not support penned hunts or whatever you want to call them. In places like Texas, where you have game farms of 100,000 acres, it's one thing; when you have a game farm here that's 20 acres, there's very little sport in hunting an animal that's in such a small area.

We urge you at the very least to adopt a conservative approach and err on the side of caution in limiting the opportunities for interactions between captive and free-ranging cervids. Legal precedents in U.S. courts have given governments the right to guard against environmental risks even if they're not entirely understood and despite the possibility they may not be as widespread as first feared.

If you're not going to ban game farms to prevent cervids from introducing diseases into the wild population, the only sound wildlife management strategy available to the government at this time is the development of proactive programs and the introduction of regulations. This is particularly important since we have deer farmers in Wisconsin, the site of one of the hottest locales of CWD, who have reported doing business with 22 other states and the province of Ontario over the last three years. We have no idea whether CWD is in Ontario or not at this time. There have been no positive tests found, but that doesn't mean it's not here.

Obviously, the importation from states that are considered either states under emergency or states of highly infected sources of game-farmed animals needs to be controlled. There need to be prohibitions of importation of these animals, not only into Canada from the U.S. but also interprovincially. Manitoba has taken some steps to try to stop importation from western Canada through Manitoba into Ontario, but it has not been successful. We do know of farmed elk that have been imported to private game farms in Ontario despite Manitoba's attempts to stop it.

I'll stop there, Mr. Chair. I know I've gone a long time.

I appreciate your indulgence, but there is a need for action, and that action is either to ban these facilities entirely with compensation...and I might point out that the $1 billion package just announced by the government for cattle farmers includes compensation for game farms. Whether that includes compensation for their losses while allowing them to continue to operate or whether it compensates them for shutting them down, I'm not sure, but I do know that there is money within that package for game farms in Canada.

I'll leave it at that point.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Greg. This is a reasonably serious issue; we realize that.

We have six people around the table; at five minutes each, that gets us to the half-hour. If we have time and you want to go a little longer, we can come back again.

Would you start us off, Mr. Ritz?

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Mr. Gerry Ritz: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It's definitely an interesting package you've put together here, Greg. I would disagree with some of your facts and wonder where you got them.

I look at your five-point strategy for preventing disease, and basically four out of the five are already done or are in place. The only one not there is mandatory double fencing. A lot of the eight-foot-high fencing is in place now, and they're finding that works out fairly well.

I'd like to know where this 20-acre game farm is and who runs it. There isn't anyone in the game farm industry who allows that type of thing to go on. I do have a couple of hunt farms in my area. They're thousands of acres large and it is a challenge to be out there.

I highlighted quite a few things here. Five minutes doesn't even give me a start.

You're saying the percentage of captive deer and elk having CWD can be as high as 50%. Where do you get that number, sir?

Mr. Greg Farrant: I get that number from Dr. Terry Kreeger. Dr. Kreeger is the head of veterinary medicine and a forensic veterinary pathologist at the University of Wyoming.

Mr. Gerry Ritz: That's Wyoming; we're talking about Canada here. That is not fact. In Canada it's been two and a half years since there was a tested case on a game farm. We've had a couple of wild animals in my area; a couple of deer have shown up far and away from any farmed animals.

Mr. Greg Farrant: What area are we speaking of, sir?

Mr. Gerry Ritz: Battlefords--Lloydminster, Saskatchewan. You talk about the 3,000 animals buried in one pit and so on. I know where that it is; I've been there. It is fenced, it has surveillance, it is gated, there is no interaction between.... So it's been done properly, under the CFIA's guidance, I might add. I've seen that spot.

There's a lot of concern about putting animals back into that Colorado or Wyoming situation you've talked about. Since there's no live test for those animals, what percentage of those animals are already tainted? You know, there is an incubation period here. You also say it's five- to six-year-old animals that show up with it. What percentage of those animals were contaminated before they were put back into that ground?

Mr. Greg Farrant: I can't answer that question. I'm sorry.

Mr. Gerry Ritz: Yes, but that isn't said in here.

“Unregulated movement of captive cervids”. I'll tell you, there are huge transportation restrictions on any animal movement. You have to have all sorts of paperwork done and on hand at both point of origin and point of destination.

“Requirements for maintaining healthy captive herds oftenpoorly understood or ignored”. I'd like you to say that face to face to any elk farmer or deer farmer in my area. You'd probably end up with two black eyes.

“Scientists believe that the infection rate on deer and elkfarms is 100 times that in adjacent and affected wild herds”. That's not showing up, sir. The actual infection rates in the wild in my area are higher than what we're finding on the game farms, so I would dispute that point.

Mr. Greg Farrant: Well, you're free to dispute it. These are forensic pathologists, veterinarians, and wildlife biologists who are coming up with this data, sir.

Mr. Gerry Ritz: I'm very conversant with the CFIA in my area because that's where a lot of the so-called problem has been. We've seen it vastly overrated and pumped up out of proportion.

You have one side here. “Can humans contract CWD?” You said it's unlikely “but notimpossible”. Everything you've said on the page before says there's no evidence of transmission of CWD to humans, yet you're saying it's not impossible. Well, there's no scientific evidence that says it ever could happen, so one statement contradicts the other.

Mr. Greg Farrant: Unless you can scientifically prove it will not happen, you always have to hedge your bets, and--

Mr. Gerry Ritz: Well, according to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration--there are pretty good scientists there--there's no evidence of transmission of CWD to humans, period, at this point.

Mr. Greg Farrant: I believe I suggested that the likelihood of humans or other species over than cervids contracting CWD was very low, but you can't rule it out 1,000%. There is no such thing as 1,000% even in science.

Mr. Gerry Ritz: Oh, definitely not, and there's no percentage that says I'm not going to get run over by a car going home tonight.

Anyway, we're on the number of deer farms. You're saying the numbers were increasing as of 2003. Actually, they're decreasing. There are fewer farms with more animals on them. Again, I would question some of the stats--

Mr. Greg Farrant: Well, you can take umbrage with the facts, sir, but those are StatsCan's figures, not mine.

Mr. Gerry Ritz: You say 8,000 animals in Alberta and 9,000 in Saskatchewan have been put down. Actually, from the stats I've been running, it's more like 13,000 in total across the country.

Mr. Greg Farrant: Again, these are statistics that are in scientific papers. I'd be happy to share them with you, but these are the stats they're citing.

Mr. Gerry Ritz: I'd be grateful. Thank you.

I'm done.

The Chair: Mr. Proctor.

Mr. Dick Proctor: Thank you.

Mr. Farrant, how many provinces allow hunt farms?

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Mr. Greg Farrant: I'm not aware of any that don't, with the exception that I believe Premier Klein has suggested that game farms or at least penned hunting should be ceased in Alberta.

Mr. Dick Proctor: But aside from that, as far as you know--

Mr. Greg Farrant: I'm not aware of any province that has stopped the game farms entirely, no.

Mr. Dick Proctor: So why would the federal government as opposed to the provinces pay compensation to eliminate the game farms?

Mr. Greg Farrant: Oh, I'm not suggesting the provinces don't have some culpability here. We met with the Minister of Natural Resources of Ontario last week and raised this issue with him. We said the provinces needed to be working together. Not only natural resources ministries but also agricultural ministries across the country, both provincial and federal, need to have some sort of coordinated program put together to deal with this issue. As it is right now, there is no formal program either provincially or federally that deals with this situation.

Mr. Dick Proctor: Was there any indication in your meetings with the Ontario folk that they were contemplating banning hunt farms?

Mr. Greg Farrant: No. The Minister of Natural Resources, interestingly, has responsibility for game farms right now, although the game farm industry in Ontario is attempting to have the authority for their industry shifted to agriculture as we speak. They are certainly concerned about it. The Minister of Natural Resources indicated he would meet shortly with his counterpart in agriculture, Steve Peters, to try to talk about what they could do as a province, as well as talk to their federal counterparts.

Mr. Dick Proctor: I take it that despite Mr. Ritz's intervention, your rationale for arguing in favour of banning game farms is because you see that this is where the disease is spread.

Mr. Greg Farrant: That's where the disease has the greatest incubation, the highest incidence, irrespective of his comments to the contrary. Scientists have quite definitely determined that game farms are like an incubator for CWD.

Mr. Dick Proctor: You mentioned the state of Wisconsin and the hotspot there. Is that--

Mr. Greg Farrant: Wyoming, Colorado--it's exactly the same there. The head of the school of veterinary medicine at the University of Georgia spoke at a conference in Las Vegas that I attended last year. They are able now to pinpoint the one single deer at one single game farm that started it in the United States. They can bring it right back to the one animal.

Mr. Dick Proctor: That's it. Thanks.

The Chair: We'll go to Mr. Easter.

Hon. Wayne Easter: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Certainly we need to do all we can to prevent the problem from getting worse, but I really don't believe banning is in any way in the works. Your recommendations on the second-last page may make some sense, but I don't think banning is really realistic in these kinds of times we're in.

Going to the Wisconsin experience, and what we can learn from that, we were in Washington a little while ago and that fact came up in the huge cull that's taking place there in terms of the wild herd. From your perspective, what happened there that made us end up with that situation? Was it game farms? How did it get to that point? They're having a huge cull.

Mr. Greg Farrant: The incidence of this disease in Colorado, Wisconsin, Wyoming, and five other neighbouring states--the Dakotas--originated on a game farm and spread to the wild population, and once it's in the wild population, given the way it does spread, it takes off like wildfire.

It's also now a case where you have definitive evidence, according to officials at the University of Georgia, that they have had wild cervids that have mingled into game farm animals and brought the disease in with them, which then incubates in game farms and goes out again as these animals go in and out over the fence.

Perhaps I could address your earlier suggestion about the ban. We admit the ban is the most extreme measure possible. There's no doubt about that. Is that the only answer? No, definitively it is not the only answer. Double fencing, as has been pointed out here by your colleague and others, is certainly a start. It does help to prevent the transmission of the disease from game farm animals into the wild population. However, there has been a resistance on the part of the industry to double fencing. It is expensive. We have had some game farm operators in western Canada, with all deference to your colleague from Saskatchewan, who say, “If you make us double fence by bringing in regulations requiring double fencing, without compensation, we'll knock the fences down and turn them loose.” That's not a very responsible attitude on behalf of an industry.

So you have to wonder, without compensating these game farmers, is bringing in regulations without some sort of funding source going to solve the problem, or is it going to create another problem? In fact, there is some suspicion that the herd that was found wandering loose out there was from a game farmer who knocked the fences down and let them go, either because he was unable to make a living any more because of the markets closing or because of frustration with the industry--I don't know. They were obviously a farmed herd at one time and they were wandering loose for some reason, and that can't be allowed to happen.

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Hon. Wayne Easter: I'm certainly willing to look at your five points and see what can be done in that area. I do think Mr. Ritz is right that a lot of those points are in existence now. Is there a problem with them not being enforced, from your perspective?

Mr. Greg Farrant: I'm not aware of where you have a regulation that double fencing is required--

Hon. Wayne Easter: No, double fencing is not required, but there is a case, I think--

Mr. Greg Farrant: In terms of importation, which Mr. Ritz spoke to, with all due respect and deference to his knowledge of this--he is from an area where he would be very familiar with this--we do know of examples, in Ontario at least, of where animals have been imported here and they have not been tracked by the appropriate sources. They are now on game farms in Ontario. This is also the case in western Canada. There is an admittance on behalf of CFIA that they have not been able to track all of the animals imported here, and this despite the fact that you've needed an importation certificate since 1991.

It's not just the Ontario Federation of Anglers and Hunters all upset about this. The Alberta Fish and Game Association, for reasons known only to them, developed a recent alliance with the International Fund for Animal Welfare. The two of them are calling jointly for a ban on game farms. Two organizations that traditionally are at opposite ends of the pole are now in agreement that this is the action that needs to be taken.

So it's something that both the animal rights community and the outdoor community recognize as a problem, and in some cases they are willing to put aside traditional differences to come forward with suggestions.

Hon. Wayne Easter: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The Chair: Mr. Epp.

Mr. Ken Epp (Elk Island, CPC): Thank you.

I'm new on this committee, so pardon my ignorance, but the chairman here seems to know you as if you're old friends. Who are you, exactly? What's your connection here?

» (1715)

Mr. Greg Farrant: The Ontario Federation of Anglers and Hunters is the largest conservation-based group in Ontario and the second largest in Canada. We also head up a group known as the National Coalition of Provincial and Territorial Wildlife Federations, which represents, on certain national issues, all of the wildlife federations across Canada, including the territories.

Mr. Ken Epp: And you're the executive director or something of that nature?

Mr. Greg Farrant: I am the government relations and communications manager.

Mr. Ken Epp: Okay, good. Thank you. Sorry about that, but I enjoyed the presentation, and I kept wondering, “Who is this guy?”

I have a challenge for you. You seem to talk with disdain about the guy who cuts the fence and lets them run through. However, put yourself into the shoes of that individual. He has this farm, and he's put in a lot of investment. He's borrowed a lot of money, and has a lot of debt. The bank says no more money. He cannot sell his product because of the downturn due to this disease and other factors, so he has not enough income. If he were to sell his place, everything would go to the bank and he would have zero left. He probably would have to declare bankruptcy. He has no money even to buy bullets to shoot these animals. And even if he did, what would he do with the carcasses? Rendering plants used to buy the carcasses for $20, and they could get some money back out of them. They no longer want them. There's now a fee to get the rendering people down to pick up the dead animals. He's not permitted to get rid of them. So there is no solution for this guy.

How do you respond?

Mr. Greg Farrant: The scenario you paint is certainly a familiar one, and it is certainly not exclusive to the game farm industry. Obviously, we've seen it with the advent of BSE, and we've seen what that has done to cattle farmers in this country.

There's no doubt that desperate circumstances prevail on many of these farms. That is why we suggest that if there are measures taken, whether it be regulatory regimes brought in or the outright ban of game farms, there should be compensation for these farmers so that at least they're not wiped out completely. It could be on a per animal basis, or be much like the discussions that transpired earlier for the chickens and what not, the $3 per, or whatever the appropriate compensation is for those farmers. Certainly there needs to be some assistance for them.

The natural resources minister in Ontario, when we met with him last week, asked us, for instance, what about a ban on all future game farms? What about if we allow the ones that are already in existence to continue to operate under a regulatory regime that doesn't exist right now, but we ban the inception of any new farms?

So that is another possibility in terms of stopping the spread in the future, at least controlling the number of game farms there are in the country.

Mr. Ken Epp: I suspect you won't have too many guys getting into the business right now either. The economics are just not there.

Mr. Greg Farrant: No, probably not. Of course, if new markets, such as China, open up and they're willing to take products from Canada, that's a huge market, with huge potential. So you may indeed see that, but I don't know.

Obviously, compensation is part of any ban. Nobody in his right mind would expect...given the scenario that you quite correctly pointed out. These people have invested a lot of money, as most farmers do no matter what line of farming they're in. Some compensation would be in order. As to who it should be, again, it's back to the government--the government should do this and the government should do that. Unfortunately, in a case like this, where you have an industry that is country-wide, it's something the federal government needs to consider either on its own or to work with the provinces on, which means the provinces also would be involved in any compensation package.

Mr. Ken Epp: Okay, thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Epp.

Mrs. Ur.

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you for your presentation, Mr. Farrant.

In one of your slides, “Implications for Free Ranging Cervids”, I find it interesting where they said:

on two Saskatchewan farms where 3,000 elk are buried—the animals have been buried for two years but the landfill is still off limits—federal officials have declared the farm to be “highly contaminated”....

Did they know that going in? Did they know that if they had this big burial spot with these critters it would be deemed a contaminated site?

Mr. Greg Farrant: I don't think anybody had any anticipation at the beginning, when these animals were being slaughtered, that the CWD prion could possibly be transmitted through the soil to other animals. Now, I suppose it makes some sense. Obviously, the more intact the carcass is, the more likelihood there is going to be some transmission into the soil.

Was it first thought of? Apparently not, or else there would have been measures taken.

Your colleague suggests that this farm in question, which he's familiar with, is highly contained; therefore, it's not posing a risk to wild animals in this particular case. Obviously, the contaminants are such in the soil that you can't grow crops or raise livestock on those farms for anywhere from two to five years.

I don't think that was anticipated by anybody in the beginning. The fact that it is spread by feces, urine, and saliva, however, would give you an indication that it might be the case, because obviously at least two of those by-products are going to be in the soil.

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur: Exactly. I found that a little bit disturbing.

I'm not a hunting person. Presently, do hunters have to provide a head, or whatever, for testing if they shoot a deer?

» (1720)

Mr. Greg Farrant: No, they don't have to. It's not mandatory.

The Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources is doing pilot testing in different areas each season. It started a couple of years ago. They've had, I believe, two seasons now. So far, there has not been a CWD case in any of the wild deer that have been tested.

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur: You also stated earlier that while killing and culling deer would slow the process, it would not stop the spread of CWD. What options would there be?

Mr. Greg Farrant: The problem is you can't tell whether the animal is infected unless you kill it and test it.

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur: Like BSE?

Mr. Greg Farrant: Exactly. Once there's a live test, it may become easier to try to contain the disease when you can live test animals and not have to slaughter them to do so.

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur: Is the prion in CWD the same kind of prion that's in BSE?

Mr. Greg Farrant: It's similar, but not the same.

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur: Okay. Is it right to state that because of the increase in gaming farms, this subject matter has come forth? Because of such a close density of animals on game farming, has this promoted the CWD or enhanced it?

Mr. Greg Farrant: Well, it certainly has caused the disease. It's much like the case of chickens and turkeys that are raised in the thousands in very close proximity to one another. You get the incubation idea from that.

The same is true in the game farm situation where you get a lot of animals in a very confined space. Obviously, when it is passed by saliva, feces, and urine, the potential spread from animal to animal is extreme when they're in that kind of situation, as opposed to free-ranging cervids that are in a much larger environment.

Obviously, it serves as a bit of an incubator. Animals that are confined in an area of x by x at some point in time are going to come in contact with one another or the by-products that cause CWD or cause it to spread.

Obviously, it's almost a laboratory unto itself in the way this passes through the herd. That's why you get, in many herds, higher incidences of over 50%, where the animals, upon killing them, are found to test for CWD.

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur: It certainly is a serious situation.

Thank you for your presentation.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The Chair: Mr. Easter.

Hon. Wayne Easter: In this process, are we writing a report on this hearing?

I haven't been on the agriculture committee for four or five years.

The Chair: Well, this is not the first time we've looked at this issue. We've looked at this before. This is not our first intervention on CWD, but given the issue and its importance....

Hon. Wayne Easter: I don't support banning, but I think we need to ensure that there are decent regulations in place and that they are in fact being followed.

You're well aware of this too, Mr. Chair. It sounds awfully familiar to the dispute with fish farms in terms of double fencing, etc., the captive species versus the wild species.

There are problems, no question. You're right. When you get captive herds, you can get disease spreading. We need to ensure that it doesn't.

The Chair: In response to your question, is there going to be a report, yes, there will be a report—whenever that might be. We're not finished with this; we simply fitted this in today because it worked for us to do it.

Mr. Epp, have you anything further?

Mr. Ken Epp: I was going to ask a question even beyond that. We can do a report, and it will occupy some shelf somewhere in Ottawa and never be looked at again until 1,000 years from now when they dig it out and the archaeologists say, “This is the kind of a society they had here”.

Hon. Wayne Easter: Mr. Chair, that's not quite right.

We had a motion in the House the other night on a recommendation that came out of the fisheries report that the government reject it, and that motion passed the House of Commons.

The same thing happened in this case.

Mr. Ken Epp: Yes, there is the odd exception.

Obviously we'll see these pictures and see the effect on the industry. There's something here that perhaps would require some action. I'm just wondering whether that is contemplated in this case.

The Chair: We haven't, I think, come to that point yet. What I think we need to do at this point—

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Mr. Ken Epp: Yes, we need to think about that.

The Chair: --is further exploration. We've heard some good evidence today that there's a need for concern.

I noticed in some of the background work, which was done prior to us receiving some of the questions for today's meeting, that mule deer do not seem to be in the equation—although I do know that mule deer can contract it. Are mule deer less susceptible to it, or are they simply not in an area where these farms have a more noticeable or greater impact?

Mr. Greg Farrant: There are cases of mule deer infected in the U.S.

The Chair: In the U.S., yes.

Mr. Greg Farrant: Elk are much less susceptible to the disease than deer. Deer are much more susceptible, for whatever reasons, which I, as a non-wildlife biologist, can't describe to you. Mule deer are infected with CWD in Wyoming, Wisconsin, and Colorado; so the disease can be transmitted to them. It may simply be a case of less population. It may be a case of simple happenstance in the areas they inhabit.

The Chair: For the record, what about bison?

Mr. Greg Farrant: No.

The Chair: No, I didn't think so. But they can get BSE, of course. They would fall into the category of...

Mr. Greg Farrant: Bison can't get CWD.

Mr. Ken Epp: Could I have one more quick question? It's just a speculative question.

You said that all of the cases could be traced to one animal in the States.

Mr. Greg Farrant: That's correct.

Mr. Ken Epp: Where did it get it from?

Mr. Greg Farrant: That's a good question. I don't know.

Dr. John Fischer, who is the director of veterinary medicine at the University of Georgia, has the data tracing it back to that one animal. How that disease ever became known in that one animal, I don't know.

It's a very good question: where did it originate, and how did it originate?

Mr. Ken Epp: If it spontaneously originated with one animal, there could be another spontaneous creation of such a virus, or a hybrid of it, somewhere else some other time.

Mr. Greg Farrant: I guess any viral disease we deal with originates somewhere.

Mr. Ken Epp: AIDS is the same question in the human chain.

Mr. Greg Farrant: Yes, exactly.

I can't answer that question, but it's a very relevant question. Actually, I wouldn't mind talking with Dr. Fischer to try to find an answer for you. I'd be pleased to do that.

The Chair: Well, we don't understand mutations. These are things that are somewhat beyond my, and most people's, comprehension, and they'll continue.

Thank you very much, Mr. Farrant.

Mr. Greg Farrant: Thank you, Mr. Chair, and members of the committee. I appreciated very much your time.

The Chair: Ms. Ur.

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur: We presented our first interim report on BSE in November. As of the end of this month, it's been about 148 days. Have we heard anything in response? Is it a 150-day response time?

The Clerk of the Committee: I did calculate it, but I don't have the date with me. I can let you know tomorrow.

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur: I think it's by the end of the week that we should have a response.

The Clerk: This week.

The Chair: And by that time we'll have another report. We are very, very timely and very consistent.

Thank you very much, Mr. Farrant. We appreciate the input.

Thank you, members, for staying with us until the end.

We will consider the meeting concluded.