JUST Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE LA JUSTICE ET DES DROITS DE LA PERSONNE

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Thursday, March 16, 2000

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[English]

The Chair (Mr. Andy Scott (Fredericton, Lib.)): I'd like to call the meeting to order. We've all been waiting for the arrival of Ivan Grose. Thanks, Ivan. We're ready to go.

Once again we're hearing witnesses on Bill C-23, an act to modernize the statutes of Canada in relation to benefits and obligations.

We have today four groups of witnesses or individuals: from the academic community, in this case the Osgoode Hall Law School, Professor Bruce Ryder; the United Church of Canada; the Canadian Bar Association; and the Naskapi Nation of.... I'm sorry, could someone help me with the pronunciation?

Mr. Robert Pratt (Lawyer, Naskapi Nation of Kawawachikamach): Kawawachikamach.

The Chair: Kawawachikamach. Okay, thank you.

If there are other descriptions or introductions necessary, I would call on those representing the organizations to do so. As you are aware, each individual or organization has ten minutes, and I intend to protect that time to the best of my ability. Following that, there'll be discussion with members of the committee.

Without further ado, I would call on Professor Bruce Ryder for ten minutes.

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Professor Bruce Ryder (Osgoode Hall Law School): Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you, honourable members. It's a pleasure to be here today. I'd like to thank members of the committee for giving me the opportunity of appearing before you today to speak to the merits of Bill C-23, the Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act.

As a legal scholar, one of my interests is the points at which constitutional law and family law intersect. It's an area in which I have been teaching, researching, and writing since 1987.

Bill C-23, in my view, deserves the enthusiastic support of members of Parliament. The bill proposes important steps forward in recognizing the relationships and meeting the needs and expectations of common-law partners. Lesbian and gay couples and other persons living together in committed, loving relationships outside marriage are currently treated in a discriminatory manner in a wide range of federal statutes. Bill C-23 is thus consistent with Parliament's obligation to eliminate discrimination on the basis of marital status and sexual orientation in all federal laws and policies.

In fact this bill takes steps that are long overdue. Fifteen years ago, in 1985, the parliamentary committee on equality rights recommended that a consistent definition of common-law spouse be adopted and included in all federal legislation dealing with the rights and responsibilities of married spouses.

The courts have since confirmed that the parliamentary committee's view expressed back in 1985 was correct. Discrimination against cohabiting couples, whether the partners are of the same sex or opposite sexes, is prohibited by section 15 of the charter. Therefore the issue is not whether to make the changes that Bill C-23 proposes; rather, the issue is whether these changes will be made by the courts, piecemeal, through a time-consuming and expensive litigation process, or whether they will be made by our elected representatives in an accountable, comprehensive, and rational manner. In choosing the latter course, it is clear that the Government of Canada is making the right choice.

Bill C-23 thoroughly implements the principle of equal treatment of all committed adult conjugal relationships, with several important exceptions. Common-law partners are not included in the definitions of accompanying dependants or the family class in the Immigration Act and regulations. The special spousal evidentiary rules in the Canada Evidence Act will not be amended by this bill, nor will the definition of dependants entitled to bring a fatal accident claim pursuant to the Canada Shipping Act. I encourage the government to bring forward the promised amendments to these statutes so that the equal rights of same-sex and opposite-sex cohabitants are respected in all federal legislation.

Apart from Parliament's constitutional obligations to respect equality rights, another reason this bill deserves your support is that it promotes the accomplishment of a wide range of important government objectives. For example, many federal laws aimed to preserve and promote the integrity of committed adult relationships, to tailor financial benefits or penalties, to recognize the interdependence of persons living together in adult relationships, to provide compensation to family members for the death or injury of a loved one, or to take into account the shared economic interests of cohabitants in defining conflicts of interests for a wide range of federal laws—many of these laws are currently limited to married couples. By extending them to relationships that have the same functional attributes as marriage, economic and emotional interdependence, the changes proposed by Bill C-23 will lead to the accomplishment of federal legislative policies in a far more coherent and effective manner.

Bill C-23 does not change the definition of marriage. It does not define marriage, because there is no need to do so. The legal meaning of marriage is clearly established in court decisions as the union of a man and a woman. The Divorce Act therefore remains applicable only to married spouses.

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The package of federal legal rights and responsibilities that are possessed by husbands and wives will remain unchanged, with the exception that Bill C-23 repeals several inconsequential and anachronistic provisions, such as section 329 of the Criminal Code, which provides that spouses cannot steal from each other while living together.

The notion of a conjugal relationship is a central element of the definition of common-law partners employed by Bill C-23. It seems to me that the legal definition of conjugality is poorly understood. The reason for the confusion, I believe, is that the legal definition of the word “conjugal” is flexible, evolving, and distinct from the way conjugality is understood outside the law.

In defining conjugal relationships courts have focused on the existence of economic interdependence or dependence. They look at a range of factors, that being the principal one. Other factors they look at are whether a couple has expressed their commitment to each other and to their communities, whether they provide to each other mutual care and support, whether they have raised children, whether they are sexually or emotionally intimate, and whether they engage in social and recreational activities together.

The Supreme Court of Canada in M. v. H. stated clearly that no single factor is determinative. Justice Cory wrote that conjugal couples do not have to “fit precisely the traditional marital model”, and a couple can have a conjugal relationship without having sexual relations. The court stated that the approach to conjugality must be flexible, since the relationships of couples, whatever their marital status or sexual orientation, will vary widely.

Thus, the definition of common-law partners in Bill C-23 will be interpreted in a flexible, evolutionary, and contextual manner by the courts and other legal decision makers. When cohabiting couples' relationships have the functional attributes of economic and emotional interdependence relevant to the objectives of a particular legislative scheme, the courts are likely to conclude that they are conjugal.

One disadvantage of the definition of common-law partner is that its very flexibility gives rise to uncertainties in its application, uncertainties that may require intrusive inquiries into the intimate details of people's lives for their resolution. This is a disadvantage of any civil status that is imposed on couples through legislation.

It is a problem that can be alleviated by permitting a broader range of couples to formalize their relationships through public declarations or registration. This can be done by removing the opposite-sex requirement from the legal definition of marriage, as the Netherlands is planning to do, or by putting in place a new civil status parallel to marriage, as Denmark, Sweden, Iceland, Norway, the Netherlands, and Hawaii have done. A very good example is the civil unions bill currently before the Vermont legislature.

The government should give serious consideration to these possibilities, not as an alternative to Bill C-23, but as potential next steps, because they have much to offer in promoting the autonomy, the equality, and the privacy of adults living together in committed, loving relationships.

I look forward to answering any questions the committee may have. Thank you very much for your time.

The Chair: Thank you very much. Also, thank you very much for recognizing the time. That was very helpful.

Before we go on, we've heard some bells, and I think some people are checking into the possibility of votes. In case we're interrupted, I'll make our apologies in advance. It's the normal operation of this place.

We'll now turn to the United Church of Canada and Mr. Doyle for ten minutes.

Mr. William Doyle (Chair, Church and Society Coordination Group, United Church of Canada): Good morning. My name is Bill Doyle. I'm a volunteer with the United Church of Canada, from Winnipeg. My position is as one of the co-chairs of the Church and Society Coordinating Group of the mission in Canada. That committee in Toronto is responsible for coordinating on a national sphere the human rights and social justice work of the United Church.

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The structure of the United Church of Canada is such that the general council, which currently meets every three years, is the national governing body of the United Church. Decisions taken by people elected to the general council become the policy of the church in matters relevant to its internal life as well as the public policy issues with which it is involved.

Since the mid-1970s general councils of the church have spoken on the need to achieve equality rights for gays and lesbians within Canadian society. In October 1976 the Department of Church and Society of the United Church of Canada endorsed a submission to the Ontario Human Rights Commission that recommended that in areas covered by the Ontario Human Rights Code, provision should be made for prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. In 1977 the United Church made a similar recommendation during public hearings held in relation to the then proposed Canadian Human Rights Act.

In 1984 the general council held in Morden adopted a report and affirmations on human sexuality in which the United Church's support for the inclusion of sexual orientation and human rights legislation was reaffirmed.

In 1992, in response to petitions from within the United Church, the general council authorized the extension of health, dental, and pension benefits to the partners of gay and lesbian employees within the church.

In May 1996 the United Church appeared before the House of Commons human rights committee and at that time supported the amendment to the Canadian Human Rights Act to include sexual orientation as a prohibitive ground for discrimination.

In 1997 the general council passed a resolution that it go on record as supporting the amendments to the Income Tax Act to redefine the word “spouse” to treat same-sex spouses the same as opposite-sex spouses.

Certainly through the years regional conferences of the United Church have also been involved in pressing their provincial governments to include sexual orientation in provincial human rights codes.

We will not comment on the details of the legislation, but will instead offer a summary of the policies adopted by the general council that lead us to support the legislation.

The first policy ground upon which the church supports Bill C-23 is a commitment to the human rights affirmations by successive general councils that speak to equal treatment of gays and lesbians and to non-discrimination in areas of employment, services, and accommodation, the elements in which all Canadians are entitled to non-discrimination under human rights law. This focus on non-discrimination basically arises from our theological view of Jesus Christ and the life he led as representative of the New Testament in support of those within society who are outcast, marginalized, and the subject of discrimination.

As an employer, the United Church of Canada has for some years tried to ensure that the sexual orientation of its employees is irrelevant in the hiring processes as well as in the compensation plans we offer. For example, in 1992 the general council adopted policies that changed the church's health, dental, and pension benefits. It also, as I mentioned, adopted a policy in 1997 regarding the treatment of gays and lesbians in the Income Tax Act. The basic principle for these policies was equal benefit of employment for all employees, regardless of sexual orientation.

We have also had to respond to a lot of practical issues encountered by gays and lesbians in attempting to receive health, dental, and other benefits for same-sex partners. For example, the usual way within the church for employees to access these benefits is through the local congregation, in particular the treasurer of the congregation. However, often that is impossible because the individual employee is still in the closet as far as the individual congregation is concerned. So the church, in an awareness of this issue, has made provision so that individuals who are subject to this concern can make application through the national office of the church.

Our experience with these internal policies has been extremely positive. It has not been perceived as providing privileges to one group of employees over another. Rather, it has been perceived as fairness in the workplace.

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We understand that the impact of Bill C-23 would be to ensure that gays and lesbians could rely on law rather than on the goodwill of their individual employers or on the part of the country they happen to reside in, and we support this purpose. Prior to now, while the United Church in 1992 and many other employers have made the decision to extend pension survivor benefits to the partners of gay and lesbian employees, this right has continued to be denied to them because of the provision of the Income Tax Act that would result in the employer taking the risk of having its pension plan de-registered, with significant tax effects. We understand that with Bill C-23, gays and lesbians will receive equal treatment in relation to pension plans as well.

As I indicated, I'm a volunteer with the United Church. In my “real life”, I'm a lawyer in Winnipeg in private practice, with a substantial part of my practice being within the gay and lesbian community, and I can share with you that I have witnessed on a regular basis the inequities and the inequalities that have been suffered by gay and lesbian partners and couples who have come before me as clients.

Specifically, I've witnesses the inequity relating to the effect of death upon registered retirement savings plans and registered income funds. With opposite-sex spouses or partners, there has been the ability, on the death of one of the partners, to roll over the RRSP credit or the RRIF credit to the surviving spouse or partner without incurring taxes. This has not been the case with same-sex partners, and on the death of one of them, all of the credits have to be brought into income during the last taxation year of life, with serious tax consequences.

The second ground for the church's interest is its desire that legislation should reinforce an intention to permanence and fidelity in intimate relationships, regardless of the sexual orientation of the partners. In other words, the church's policy is to support lifelong monogamy and fidelity. These standards apply to both heterosexual and homosexual couples. Therefore legislation is helpful insofar as it creates a legal framework within which all Canadians can establish lifelong relationships that are recognized in society and in the law itself.

The United Church belongs to the part of the Christian tradition that does not regard marriage as a sacrament. Nevertheless, it places an extremely high value on the seriousness of vows taken before God and in the presence of witnesses. The general council has not agreed to use the word “marriage” to apply to relationships between people of the same gender. However, it has recognized that our gay and lesbian members want to make the same lifelong commitments that heterosexual members do and to make their solemn vows before witnesses who will support them in their commitments. It is because of this recognition that the 34th general council in 1992 asked the division of mission in Canada to produce liturgical and pastoral resources to assist same-gender partners in making their relationships permanent through same-gender covenants.

The third policy ground on which the church supports the legislative change is its balancing of rights and responsibilities when relationships break down. The general council has recognized that sometimes things go so far that it is not humanly possible for relationships to be permanent and lifelong. For those times, we believe the grace and mercy of God are available to us. The church does not condemn people who decide that divorce is the only path open to them and it urges congregations to help people avoid coming to that point through good marriage preparation in the case of heterosexual couples, and through good preparation for same-gender covenanting services in the case of gay and lesbian couples. It also offers counselling and enrichment courses. But in the end, if the couple cannot continue together, they will still receive the grace of God in the communion of the church.

A high view of intimate relationships and of mutual responsibility to one another leads the church to press for parties who separate, regardless of their sexual orientation, to be responsible for one another's welfare. Since they have been in an interdependent relationship, the parties to the relationship will still have some responsibility to look after each other's welfare even if the intimate relationship does not continue. Hence the argument that people who enter into same-gender relationships need to be as responsible as do people who enter into opposite-gender relationships, including support for both children and the partners with whom they have been in the long-term relationship. Now, obviously this requires further work by the provinces, as much of this is within provincial jurisdiction, so certainly the work will continue. However, in conclusion, the church's recommendation is that the legislation be supported and enacted forthwith.

Thank you.

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The Chair: Thank you very much.

Now the Canadian Bar Association.

Ms. Joan Bercovich (Senior Director, Legal and Government Affairs, Canadian Bar Association): Good morning. My name is Joan Bercovich, and I appear before you today with Terry Hancock on behalf of the Canadian Bar Association, which is an organization dedicated to improvement of the law and the administration of justice.

[Translation]

Our presentation today is consistent with these aims and objectives.

[English]

Ms. Hancock is a lawyer from Toronto who is also a volunteer member of our sexual orientation and gender identity conference. She'll present the brief and be happy to take any questions you might have.

Ms. Terry D. Hancock (Member, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Conference, Canadian Bar Association): Thank you, Ms. Bercovich.

I am pleased to be speaking in support of Bill C-23 today and proud to be advocating its passage on behalf of the Canadian Bar Association, which has been a leader in the equality rights of gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and transgendered people. The CBA is the first and to date the only professional organization to recognize its gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered members. They have done that through the creation of the national conference, the sexual orientation and gender identity conference, and they have supported provincial organizations in provincial branches in B.C., Alberta, Manitoba, Ontario, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia. I should point out that as a member of the Ontario group, it was the critical leadership of people like Kevin Carroll, who was president at the time, who helped create this organization to make it the first in Ontario.

The CBA has a proud history of supporting legislative reform. Three times in the past six years the CBA council, which represents members from across the country, has passed resolutions calling upon various governments to include gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered people and to end discrimination against them. The CBA has been involved in federal submissions on, for example, the amendments to the Canadian Human Rights Act as well the hate crimes legislation sentencing provisions. The CBA Alberta branch intervened to support Delwin Vriend, who was fired simply for being gay.

I'd like to start my submissions today by stating that the CBA unequivocally supports the introduction of Bill C-23 and urges this committee to approve it without substantive amendment. Bill C-23 recognizes that the exclusion of gay and lesbian couples from full benefits and responsibilities is neither fair nor tolerable. It affirms the dignity and self-worth of this community.

But Bill C-23 is catching up to the modern society. The jurisprudence under the charter has already prohibited discrimination based on sexual orientation. Other provincial and territorial governments, notably B.C., Ontario, Quebec, and, to a limited extent, the Yukon, have extended legislation to gay and lesbian couples. More importantly, the private sector voluntarily led the inclusion of gay and lesbian partners by providing same-sex spousal benefits well ahead of any government in the country.

My submissions will focus on the gay and lesbian couples inclusion simply because that is the constitutional impetus for Bill C-23, in my submission. I want to underscore, though, that the CBA also supports the inclusion of common-law heterosexual couples.

My submissions will focus on three things: first, I want to talk about human rights and charter jurisprudence and the meaning of “spouse”; secondly, I want to offer our technical assistance for Bill C-23; and third, I will touch briefly on the omissions in Bill C-23, and Professor Ryder has eloquently brought those to your attention.

I'll start with the human rights and charter jurisprudence and what is the meaning of the word “spouse”. The legal status of gays and lesbians in Canada has been litigated for over two decades on a piecemeal and ad hoc basis at great expense to the personal litigants and to the taxpayers who have funded the defences on behalf of the government. At first, the charter and human rights cases were not successful for lesbians and gays. They were excluded from interpretations of family status and marital status. In 1995, in the famous Egan case, the Supreme Court of Canada held that sexual orientation was an analogous ground under the charter, section 15, and that the exclusion of gays and lesbians from the definition of cohabitant or spouse in the Canada Pension Plan and the old age security legislation was discrimination, but it held that that discrimination was demonstrably justifiable under section 1 of the charter.

So the full inclusion of gay and lesbian couples in federal law did not begin in earnest until 1995 in the Rosenberg case at the Ontario Court of Appeal. The Ontario Court of Appeal read in same sex into the definition of spouse under subsection 252(4) of the Income Tax Act. In other words, pensions that included same-sex survivor benefits were allowed to be amended and registered under the Income Tax Act. I should add that the federal government did not appeal that case in the Supreme Court of Canada.

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In 1999, in the M. v. H. decision, a case I'm sure you've heard a lot about, the Supreme Court held that the opposite-sex definition of spouse for support divisions in the Ontario Family Law Act discriminated against gays and lesbians, but unlike in the Egan decision, the court held that it was not demonstrably justifiable under section 1.

Finally, in the Moore and Akerstrom cases the Federal Court trial division rejected the federal government's attempt to create the same-sex partner category as a way of resolving a human rights complaint, holding that the separate but equal scheme was a discriminatory practice under section 7 of the Canadian Human Rights Act.

These cases, along with numerous decisions of lower courts, demonstrate three things, members of the committee. First, the recognition of lesbian and gay relationships is a constitutional imperative. Secondly, governments must take the lead in legislating according to law. The piecemeal and ad hoc nature of litigation is costly and is not, in our submission, the appropriate mechanism for law reform. Third, the law under the charter has recognized that gays and lesbians are spouses and has rejected a separate but equal category based on sexual orientation. I highlight that in Rosenberg the court held, under section 52, in ordering a remedy, that the proper approach was to add and expand the definition of spouse to include same-sex spouses.

Use of the word “spouse” is at the heart of this debate, members of the committee. We cannot ignore the jurisprudence of Rosenberg, M. v. H., and Moore and Akerstrom. We can recognize that placing gay and lesbian couples under the rubric of common-law partner and not spouse is a political compromise.

The CBA urges the committee against any amendment that might weaken the existing legislation, in effect to exacerbate the compromise, or utilize language suggesting the superiority of heterosexual relationships.

I turn now to the technical assistance we offer for Bill C-23. We have highlighted two acts, which appear at page 7 of our brief. The first is the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the second is the section 145 transitional provisions of support payments under the Income Tax Act.

I'll start with the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act. There are two issues that have been raised through our bankruptcy and insolvency committee. First is a period of relatedness in bankruptcy proceedings. Married persons remain related until they're divorced. It appears that common-law partners lose their status of relatedness as soon as cohabitation ends.

So two issues arise from that. First, common-law partners can vote in a bankruptcy proceeding upon ending cohabitation, and secondly, the 12-month look-back period for married couples becomes a three-month look-back period for common-law partners. The CBA simply says the two should be the same.

Secondly, establishing a common-law relationship and achieving the anti-collusion goals of the Bankruptcy Act are also at issue. In a marriage you have a marriage licence to evidence a relationship. A concern has been raised about establishing a common-law relationship, and the CBA simply says that the indicia of relatedness are to be established by regulation and based on existing jurisprudence for conjugal relationships.

With reference to section 145 and support payments, there is a need to require some clarification because it appears not to distinguish between support payments that are being deducted currently under paragraphs 56(1)(b) and 60(b) of the Income Tax Act and those that will apply to gay and lesbian couples who prior to this legislation could not avail themselves of the benefits of the Income Tax Act provisions until 2001. It is unlikely, in our submission, that Bill C-23 intends to change the status quo of the current legislation. It simply needs clarification, in our respectful submission.

Briefly, in terms of the omissions from Bill C-23 and the ways forward, Professor Ryder has raised for you already the Immigration Act, the Evidence Act and spousal compellability, and marital exemption for age of consent under the Criminal Code, as well as the Shipping Act, which I appreciate you raising, Professor Ryder. I won't go over those, but I simply reiterate that we agree with Professor Ryder that they should be looked at and they are subject to review right now.

I do want to raise a separate issue, though, in terms of ways forward, about the issue of retroactivity. Although the bill is not retroactive, we urge the committee and the government to deal fairly with those lesbian and gay couples and others who have been excluded to date in violation of the charter.

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In closing, subject to the two technical issues identified—the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and clause 145—the CBA urges the passage of Bill C-23 without substantive amendments. Bill C-23 promotes the inclusion of lesbian and gay and heterosexual common-law couples in Canadian society. It's part of a growing trend across the country to legislate recognition of gay and lesbian couples and catches up with the private sector, in our respectful submission. The CBA therefore strongly supports the bill and the equality and dignity of Canadians who are gay, lesbian, bisexual, and trans-gendered.

Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Finally, Chief Einish.

Chief Philip Einish (Naskapi Nation of Kawawachikamach): [Witness speaks in his native language].

Good morning, Chair, and all parties involved in this discussion before the standing committee. My name is Philip Einish. I've been chief of the Naskapi Nation of Kawawachikamach, formerly the Naskapi Band of Quebec, since August 1997.

This morning I am accompanied by Mr. John Mameamskum, the nation's director general, and Mr. Robert Pratt, our legal counsel for so many years now.

The Naskapis have occupied large areas of northern Quebec and Labrador from time immemorial. On January 31, 1978, the Naskapis signed the Northeastern Quebec Agreement with the governments of Canada and Quebec and other parties. This land claims agreement, quite similar to the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement signed on November 11, 1975, with the James Bay Crees and the Inuit of Quebec, settled the aboriginal land claims with the Naskapis in and to land in the province of Quebec.

Under section 20 of the Northeastern Quebec Agreement, the Naskapis left a small reserve they shared with the Montagnais Indians of Schefferville in the town of Schefferville and relocated to their category IA-N lands at Lac Matemace, situated about 10 kilometres north of Schefferville, where they built the village of Kawawachikamach. We are now a community of approximately 750 Naskapis, with our own school and dispensary.

At this moment, I would like to give the table to our legal counsel, Mr. Robert Pratt.

Mr. Robert Pratt: Thank you.

Under section 7 of the Northeastern Quebec Agreement, Canada agreed to recommend to Parliament suitable legislation concerning local government for the Naskapis on category IA-N lands. Section 7 mirrors section 9 of the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement.

Subsection 7.1 gives a very rough outline of the elements to be covered by the legislation without providing any details. Subsection 7.2 of the Northeastern Quebec Agreement then stipulated:

Discussions shall take place forthwith upon the execution of the present Agreement between Canada and the council of the Naskapi band to determine, in accordance with paragraphs 7.1.1 to 7.1.16 inclusive, the terms of the legislative measures contemplated by this section to be so taken...

Subsection 9.02 of the James Bay agreement similarly provided for the James Bay Crees.

Over a period of four years, the Naskapis, the Crees, and Canada discussed the terms of the special local government legislation. There was extensive community consultation at every stage. The result was the Cree-Naskapi of Quebec Act, adopted by the Parliament of Canada as chapter 18 of the 1984 Statutes of Canada. We emphasize that pursuant to subsection 7.2 of the Northeastern Quebec Agreement, and section 9.02 of the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement, it was the Crees and Naskapis and Canada together who determined the content of the CNQA, the Cree-Naskapi of Quebec Act. Canada did not alone have the right to determine its content under the treaty.

The proposed amendments to the CNQA are set out in sections 89 and 90 of Bill C-23. The amendments, as they affect the Naskapis, consist in enlarging the definition of consorts in section 174 of the CNQA.

At present the term “consorts” in section 174 of the CNQA is defined to mean:

(a) a man and a woman who are married and whose marriage was solemnized in accordance with, or is recognized under, the laws of the Province (of Quebec), or

(b) an unmarried man and an unmarried woman who live together as husband and wife, taking into account...Naskapi custom

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The proposed amendments in Bill C-23 would enlarge the definition of consorts to include, in addition to persons now mentioned there, two individuals who are common-law partners of each other. Under a new definition to be introduced by subclause 89(2) of Bill C-23, a common-law partner, in relation to an individual, would be defined as a person who is cohabiting with the individual in a conjugal relationship, having so cohabited for a period of at least one year. It is not precisely clear what would be a conjugal relationship, but presumably it would be interpreted as meaning a relationship between persons who have sexual relations with each other.

These amendments affect the meaning of the following provisions in the CNQA: paragraphs 103(1)(b), 103(1)(c), 105(4)(b), and 105(4)(c), section 175, and paragraph 182(1)(a). The changes are illustrated in the table. I'll just very quickly give a resumé of the changes.

The change to paragraph 103(1)(b) would give a same-sex non-Naskapi consort, as defined, of a Naskapi and the consort's family in the first degree the right to reside on category IA-N land. This change to paragraphs l05(4)(b) and (c) would give a same-sex non-Naskapi consort, as defined, of a Naskapi and the consort's family in the first degree the right of access to category IA-N land. The change to section 175 would qualify a same-sex surviving consort, as defined, to be included as a lawful heir of a deceased Naskapi dying without a will. The change to paragraph 182(1)(a) would qualify a same-sex consort, as defined, to be included as a member of the family council of a deceased Naskapi for the purpose of deciding on the disposition of the traditional property of the deceased Naskapi.

The constitutional context: The Canadian government may claim that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the jurisprudence arising from the charter giving equal rights to same-sex common-law couples and different-sex common-law couples is sufficient justification to amend the Cree-Naskapi (of Quebec) Act in the manner contemplated in Bill C-23, because the Cree-Naskapi (of Quebec) Act and, by implication, the Northeastern Quebec Agreement are subject to the charter. However, in our view, the treaty rights of the Naskapis expressed in the Northeastern Quebec Agreement and in the CNQA are not subject to the charter.

Then the brief just sets out section 25, which of course I won't read, and section 35, which I'm sure everyone is familiar with. I remind people that section 25 simply says that the charter does not act to derogate from any aboriginal or treaty rights or freedoms.

We are aware that the Supreme Court of Canada has held that discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation is included within the scope of prohibited discrimination contemplated by subsection 15(1) of the Constitution Act. However, under section 25 of the Constitution Act, it is our view that the charter would not invalidate an aboriginal right or treaty right on the basis that it discriminated against a person by reason of his or her sexual orientation.

All the rights of the Naskapis found in the Cree-Naskapi of Quebec Act are rights either found directly in the treaty, the Northeastern Quebec Agreement, or arising from section 7 of the Northeastern Quebec Agreement. Such rights are therefore treaty rights constitutionally protected by section 25 and subsection 35(1) of the Constitution Act. On this basis, section 25 of the Constitution Act would immunize the effective provisions of the Cree-Naskapi of Quebec Act against the amendments contemplated in Bill C-23 unless and until the Naskapis agreed to such amendments.

We draw attention to subsection 35(4) of the Constitution Act, providing that aboriginal and treaty rights are guaranteed equally to male and female persons. This provision, together with subsection 35(3), was enacted in 1983 by an amendment to the Constitution Act, 1982. One can surmise that its purpose was to ensure that the immunity from the anti-discrimination features of the charter given to aboriginal and treaty rights under section 25 of the Constitution Act would not in any event be used to discriminate between men and women. Subsection 35(4) thus supports our interpretation that treaty rights are immune from the prohibition under the charter to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.

Our position is then essentially that the charter does not apply to our treaty rights expressed either in the NEQA or the CNQA, and further, that the Parliament of Canada has no constitutional authority to amend the NEQA or the CNQA without our consent.

I'll turn the table over to John Mameamskum, the director general of the nation.

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Mr. John Mameamskum (Director General, Naskapi Nation of Kawawachikamach): Thank you very much for your invitation.

Our position on same-sex couples is as follows. We have not conducted a systematic survey of Naskapi opinion, but opinion seems to be mixed within the Naskapi community on recognizing same-sex couples, in particular on modifying the Northeastern Quebec Agreement and the Cree-Naskapi of Quebec Act to recognize treaty-related rights for same-sex couples in the same manner as recognized for different-sex unmarried couples living together in accordance with Naskapi custom.

Many of our elders are deeply religious and oppose any condoning of same-sex relationships for biblical reasons, but some of our younger members may favour a more accepting attitude.

We recognize that many of the legislative reforms to be introduced by Bill C-23 will have an impact on individual Naskapis, as they will have on other Canadians, and fall outside the scope of Naskapi treaty rights.

What we are asking for is the opportunity to decide this important matter in relation to our treaty rights in our own way and by our own standards, which we believe is the constitutionally protected right we obtained twenty years ago. We are not anti-gay. We recognize that your society has the right to govern itself by your standards. We ask that you recognize that as regards our treaty rights, we have the same right.

In conclusion, we thank you for accepting our request to appear before this committee and for listening to our submission. We ask that the treaty rights of the Naskapi and the solemn treaty obligation of Canada be respected and that you recommend to Parliament that the proposed amendments to the CNQA affecting the Naskapi be deleted from Bill C-23.

Thank you very much. I'm at your disposal to answer any questions.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

I thank all the members of the panel.

We'll now turn to our questioning. Mr. Lowther will get the first seven minutes.

Mr. Eric Lowther (Calgary Centre, Ref.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to the witnesses. Obviously a lot of work has been done. I appreciate particularly the presentation from the Naskapi Nation, and I applaud the clerk for including you in the witness list. It kind of rounds out a dimension that we certainly wouldn't want to overlook, but we may have inadvertently done it if you hadn't been here. So I think it's great that you're here.

For my own part, I wish there were something I had that would immunize me from the effects of this bill, as the Naskapi Nation seems to have. Unfortunately, as a Canadian I seem not to have the immunization protection that you have from this bill.

My first question would be to Mr. Doyle of the United Church. I was interested to hear that the United Church is respecting the petitions of its members. When you referred to petitions that called for benefits to be extended to people in homosexual relationships in the church that are employees of the church, I seem to remember back in 1986-87, when there were about 1,800 petitions in the United Church that were launched from parishioners across the country saying that they weren't in favour of the ordination of self-professed homosexuals. There were 300 petitions in favour of it and 1,800 that were not in favour of it. As I recall—and maybe you can correct me if I'm wrong—the church's decision at that time was not to respect those 1,800 petitions and in fact to proceed with a policy that had no problem with the ordination of self-professed homosexuals. Is that the current policy of the church, that you do ordain self-professed homosexuals?

Mr. William Doyle: That certainly is the policy within the church.

My understanding as to what happened at that time is that various petitions came forward to the general council in Victoria from across the country. The way the general council operates is that there are sessional committees relating to various subject areas relating to the issues that come to the general council. All of the petitions, both pro and con, would have gone to that sessional committee, which is comprised of members of the United Church right from across the country who are interested and knowledgeable in relation to the particular issue. That committee does its work within the week-and-a-half or two-week period to try to achieve some sort of consensus among the members of that committee as to what position should be recommended to the members of the general council.

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My understanding is that the committee comprised members that were both in favour of the ordination of self-proclaimed lesbian and gay people and also opposed. The compromise that was recommended to the floor of the general council had the support of all of the members of that committee.

That's the process the United Church uses, and that's the process the United Church used at that time. They don't specifically go based upon numbers in support or numbers against, but the numbers of the people who are at the general council who are in favour of or opposed to a particular decision.

Mr. Eric Lowther: So the committee basically decided, and the petitions were considered in the mix, but they weren't the guiding....

Mr. William Doyle: That's right. As I say, the committee was representative of the various viewpoints, and those viewpoints reached a consensus to make a recommendation to the floor of the general council.

Mr. Eric Lowther: Is it the position of the United Church that Jesus Christ would be supportive of gay marriage?

Mr. William Doyle: The United Church, as I said in my presentation, hasn't taken a position in that respect. The United Church is very diverse in its opinions relating to almost any issue, and particularly also in relation to the issues relating to theology. Certainly out in the media, within the last year and a half, have been the theological opinions of the moderator. Certainly those opinions reflect a good portion of the United Church, and those opinions are directly the opposite of a good portion of the members in adherence to the United Church. So until general council reaches a decision in relation to that particular issue, I can't tell you what the United Church's position is.

Mr. Eric Lowther: Okay. I appreciate that.

I guess hearing the testimony from the legal profession here—a lot of lawyers around the table, which we had yesterday as well, as a lot of lawyers seem very interested in this—I find it interesting that there is a lot of talk that this is not about marriage, that marriage is not touched by Bill C-23. Yet we have another example where the direction has been given by the courts. We had Parliament, about nine months ago, say that we'd like to see marriage protected and upheld in law in every way possible. Yet this legislation again avoids defining marriage in legislation. It's a common-law concept today.

This legislation gives every single benefit, every single obligation, with the exception of a few, which I appreciate the legal profession pointing out here. Item C on page 10 of the document provided by the Canadian Bar Association points out that there is a higher age of consent for anal intercourse between unmarried persons, and maybe we need to fix this in order to address one of the exemptions that has been overlooked in Bill C-23. I guess that means we need to lower the age for that so that it wouldn't be a problem in same-sex relationships for that type of activity.

Ultimately, there seems to be no difference, beyond these few points, between how marriage would be treated in law after Bill C-23 and how a homosexual relationship would be treated.

Additionally to that, there is some discussion presented by the witnesses on what's conjugal and what isn't conjugal. Some feel quite comfortable with leaving that as a loose concept within the Supreme Court, a suite of criteria that the court could decide. Yet no one seems too keen at actually.... I think there was maybe one witness here today who said maybe that should be a little clearer. I think it was actually the Naskapi Nation that did call for that to be more clearly defined and actually included in the legislation in some clear definition.

We still haven't got in front of all these witnesses a good idea of who would be left out—who wouldn't have access to the benefits and who would have access to the benefits. Some say sex isn't a requirement, and some say sex would be a requirement. At the end of the day, the only way anybody would be able to find out is I guess to go to court and have your personal relationship with another person examined by the state. The state would then decide: well, yes, you're doing enough things to convince us it's conjugal. But somebody going into it.... You'd always be at risk of being ruled outside of the relationship, the way the bill is structured right now. And that seems to be inappropriate to me, especially when we're saying that this bill won't cost anything, when we don't know who actually qualifies. With conjugality being so loose, it's hard for me to understand how we can be sure it's not going to cost anything, because we don't even know who's in it right now.

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The Vice-Chair (Mr. Ivan Grose (Oshawa, Lib.)): Mr. Lowther, could you form a question?

Mr. Eric Lowther: Sure. This is just background for my question. Thank you, Mr. Grose.

It's also interesting to me when we say it's not going to cost anything that we're extending every benefit and privilege given to marriage and family today to people who choose to participate in a homosexual lifestyle. Is that saying, then, that the Liberal federal government today doesn't incur any cost for the benefits and obligations they extend to families and marriages? All the same suite of benefits are there.

It seems to me to be a tragic thing, when we know that statistically even the government's own longitudinal study points out that a committed marriage with children has proven to be the best environment for the rearing of children. Stable relationships where children have access to both genders has proven to provide citizens that are good long-term, responsible citizens, as a general rule. I'm not saying it always works, but as a general rule that seems to be the case, which is empirically supported. You'd think government policy would want to provide incentives toward things that work and toward things that actually contribute to good public policy.

I'm having trouble, Mr. Chairman—

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Ivan Grose): I'm having trouble as well.

Mr. Eric Lowther: I'm leading right up to my question.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Ivan Grose): You're making a statement.

Mr. Eric Lowther: I'm trying to determine in all of this where the public interest is being served by extending public benefits to people who choose to live together for one year and participate in some sort of conjugal and I would say sexual relationship, because I can't see any other definition. When I look it up in the dictionary, “conjugal” means sex—sexual like a married relationship. So unless it's defined in the legislation, I don't know what else it could be. And it's not defined in the legislation. How is the public interest being served in extending that?

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Ivan Grose): That's a question. I'll cut you off with that and we'll get an answer to that question.

Mr. Eric Lowther: Okay. I have more questions.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Ivan Grose): We're only four of us. I'm sure there'll be quite enough time.

Mr. Eric Lowther: Okay, good.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Ivan Grose): Anyone?

Prof. Bruce Ryder: I'd be happy to respond to Mr. Lowther's comments.

I think the public interest, as I described in my presentation, is served in many ways in fulfilling the charter's commitment to equality and better accomplishing a range of state objectives. I think the concern expressed about a sexual relationship being necessary here, and the lack of clarity about that.... When the Supreme Court of Canada says it is not necessary, then that binds the courts. I don't think there's any lack of clarity about that.

When you think about the threat to marriage that people seem to be so concerned about, where does it come from? It comes from the fact that we have a discriminatory legal situation. So one huge benefit of this bill for those of us who are living in traditional marriages, and for everyone else as well, is that it removes the discriminatory features of that institution. I think that is a huge benefit, because Canadians are committed to equality; they're committed to removing discrimination wherever it exists in federal laws and legislation. I don't think Canadians are interested in living within discriminatory institutions or living in a society that denies access to fundamental social institutions on the basis of a prohibited ground of discrimination.

It seems to me that one of the obvious answers to the concerns Mr. Lowther has raised is that there's a huge social benefit in removing the large gap that exists currently between married people and other persons living in functionally equivalent relationships. And by closing that gap, it makes it far less likely that marriage is going to be struck down by the courts as a violation of section 15.

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It seems to me that by removing the discriminatory effects of marriage and fulfilling our commitment to equality, there is much to be said about the bill.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Ivan Grose): Thank you, Mr. Ryder.

Mr. Ménard, you have seven minutes. Since there are only four of us, I will be generous, but don't push me too hard.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard (Hochelaga—Maisonneuve, BQ): Mr. Chairman, you know that discipline is a great virtue of mine and I intend to be disciplined here this morning, unlike my predecessor.

I have three questions for our witnesses. The first has to do with the very interesting testimony presented by the representative of the Naskapi nation. I have retained two or three things from your testimony. You stated that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms does not apply to treaty rights and hence, would not apply to some of the provisions in the bill.

Moreover, you say that you support equal rights, but that for religious reasons, the elders and some of the younger members of your communities are divided on this issue.

When the Minister appeared before the committee, I asked her a question that had been brought to my attention by my colleague Claude Bachand, who is well versed in aboriginal affairs. The Minister of Justice informed me that any provisions respecting First Nations would not apply until such time as First Nations had been consulted on the issue.

Are you aware of the Minister's position that the provisions in the bill that concern you will not apply until consultations are held? That's my first question.

Secondly, do you feel that if this matter is left in your hands, you will work to ensure that all legislation recognizes same-sex couples, given that the issue here is the right to equality?

I'd appreciate an answer to my first question. I'll come back to the second one later.

[English]

Mr. John Mameamskum: First of all, the only reason we came here is to protect what flows from the agreements and the Constitution. This is being forced on the Naskapis without any amendments and without Naskapi consent. Number two, we are in support of the bill to give equal rights to same-sex couples, if that answers your question. This was a constitutional obligation the Government of Canada gave to the Naskapi under the terms of the agreement. Any changes would require our consent.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: However, when we, the members of the Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs, proceed to a clause-by- clause vote and focus on these particular provisions, either we can hold off on them in deference to your various treaty rights, notably your right to deal with these matters on your own, or we can hold off until such time as the minister has consulted with you, as she indicated she would do, or we can hold off, confident that you subscribe to the principle of equality for all people, a principle to which your nation also subscribes. That's how I understand things.

[English]

Mr. John Mameamskum: We asked for a commitment from the minister before any amendments affecting the Naskapis were put forth by the government, and we're still waiting for the minister's response to that.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: I will ask the chair.

Mr. Chairman, I clearly recall that when she testified before our committee, Minister McLellan - I can still see her in her gray suit, with a smile on her face - said that no provision affecting First Nations would take effect until consultations had been held. Do you recall her saying that, Mr. Chairman?

[English]

Do you remember that?

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Ivan Grose): That's roughly my memory of it.

Mr. Réal Ménard: You want to be glad about that.

Mr. Robert Pratt: I'd like to respond to that.

The Naskapis have specifically requested of the minister that she not agree to put into force any of those amendments without the consent of the Naskapis, and that commitment has not been received yet.

We find it very difficult to see, in fact, that there is enough latitude in the way the legislation is expressed to have the provisions modified to the satisfaction necessarily of the Naskapis. We would prefer that the provisions be withdrawn and that there be a decision jointly made by the Naskapis and Canada as to how the act would be amended.

There are many other amendments the Naskapis would like to make to the legislation. There was absolutely no consultation with the Naskapis. We learned of the proposed amendments when they were put before Parliament. There was no prior consultation.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: I'd like to continue, Mr. Chairman.

Obviously, there is a little bit of squabbling taking place in the Liberal ranks, but let's wait until after the weekend. I'm certain the Justice Minister will return. We received some assurances in committee that the minister intends to hold consultations. Of course, we'll have to see what kind of consultations are held. I understand that you subscribe to the principle that all persons are equal, but that because of certain constitutional requirements, you must be consulted in advance of any changes. If ever the government fails to comply with these obligations, you can rest assured that the Bloc Québécois and other parliamentarians, I would imagine, will see to it that these obligations are met. We understand that you have a very specific role to play in this process.

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I would now like to talk a little with the United Church of Canada officials. Their presentation was very refreshing. On listening to it, the following thought came to mind: churches follow a similar path, but they do not resemble one another very much. I believe they offer something to everyone.

As I understand it, you support Bill C-23 because in your view, it will acknowledge the permanent nature of unions or bring greater stability to partnerships. You believe that homosexual couples can sustain stable relationships. Is that what you're saying?

[English]

Mr. William Doyle: Yes, that's certainly true. In the past one of the complaints in relation to the gay and lesbian community has been the stereotype that the relationships are fleeting and that sort of thing, but the fact is that there have been no supports within society as a whole for those relationships to stay together. Of course in spite of that there are many gay and lesbian relationships that have subsisted for thirty or forty years. But the fact is that there has been no government or public support of that. This will change that entirely.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: One last brief question. Religion is obviously a personal matter, but I would like to see certain members of the Reform Party join the United Church of Canada. I think this would bring some diversity of opinion to and enrich our proceedings.

I also have some questions for the Canadian Bar Association. Some lawyers who testified before the committee suggested to us that we include in the bill's preamble a reference to the discrimination that members of the gay and lesbian communities suffered in the past. I believe the National Action Committee also made this suggestion. It's an interesting proposal from the standpoint of how it might be interpreted by the courts. Perhaps Mr. Ryder would like to comment.

Ms. Terry Hancock: I'm sorry, Mr. Ménard, but I will have to field your question in English. I haven't spoken French in quite a while.

[English]

Your question is about the interpretation of a preamble, and I think Professor Ryder will confirm this. As much as we would like to see a preamble that speaks of the high and laudable goal of no discrimination against gays and lesbians, as an interpretive tool it is not a paramount issue. Putting a preamble in a bill doesn't necessarily mean that the entire bill is interpreted with regard to the preamble. Its legal effect is of minimal value. Its symbolic effect is quite substantial.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: I see. Perhaps Mr. Ryder would like to share his views on the subject with us.

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Ivan Grose): Mr. Ménard, if you limit your questions to this last one, you'll gain my favour. I'll look with favour on you.

Mr. Réal Ménard: This is the last one. I'm leaving afterwards, and you're going to be sad.

Prof. Bruce Ryder: It's an interesting idea. A preamble does just have interpretive weight. All legislation already is subject to the requirement that it be interpreted in a manner consistent with the equality rights and other rights in the Constitution, so I'm not sure that it would add much. But it may be worth considering just for greater certainty. It's also possible, of course, to put an interpretive provision within the body of the statute itself, perhaps as an amendment to the Interpretation Act.

The Vermont bill I mentioned, which is currently before the legislature in that state, has an interpretive provision right in the body of the legislation directing the courts to interpret civil union status, the parallel status that has been set up alongside marriage, as conferring the exact same rights and responsibilities that are conferred on married spouses. Perhaps it would be useful for Parliament to include that sort of direction as well within Bill C-23.

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I think the value of saying that may not be so much in its interpretive impact, because I don't think it will add much to what section 15 already requires, but it may be very valuable symbolically to make it clear that this bill originates in and is an attempt to fulfil a commitment to equality and to treating gay and lesbian couples with equal concern and respect.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Ivan Grose): Thank you, Mr. Ménard.

Mr. John McKay, you have seven minutes or thereabouts.

Mr. John McKay (Scarborough East, Lib.): I wanted to discuss this issue of conjugal, because it obviously is a key interpretive element of the bill.

I'm taking the Canadian Bar Association's footnote at page 8 as a fairly accurate representation of what conjugal means for the purposes of law. For the purposes of the record, I'll just read it in.

This draws upon the test for a conjugal relationship approved by the Supreme Court of Canada in M. v. H., supra, taken from Molodowich v. Penttinen.... The Supreme Court recognizes that these elements may be present in varying degrees and not all are necessary for a determination that the relationship is conjugal. The weight to be given each factor will depend on the circumstances of each case.

In the body of the text it refers to elements to be considered.

This would include such matters as cohabitation, joint assets, sexual and personal behaviour, children, economic support, and social perception of the couple.

So the essence of the question, first to Professor Ryder, then to Mr. Doyle and Ms. Hancock, is whether sexual activity is a sine qua non of conjugal.

Prof. Bruce Ryder: No, it's not. The courts have treated as the most important factor in determining whether a couple qualifies as conjugal as whether their lives reflect a high degree of economic interdependence or dependence. That has been the primary focus. With that as the focus, economic interdependence and also emotional interdependence, all the other factors are designed to assist the courts in determining whether those functional attributes exist, whether we have committed, long-term, mutually supportive, interdependent relationships. Having an intimate sexual relationship is one indication that's the case, but it's not necessary.

As I said, when the Supreme Court of Canada says it's not necessary, no one factor is determinative, then it's clear that it's not necessary. Now, I would suspect that the vast majority of conjugal relationships do involve a sexual component, but there are also going to be conjugal relationships that do not. There are many marriages that do not.

Mr. John McKay: I'm assuming that Mr. Doyle and Ms. Hancock would adopt that answer. Is that reasonable to say?

Ms. Terry Hancock: Absolutely.

Mr. John McKay: Given that, let's say that on the day after this bill passes someone walks into Mr. Doyle's office who wants to access the rights and benefits of Bill C-23 and says quite explicitly, we have all the indicia, but we do not have a sexual relationship. I'm assuming that Mr. Doyle would take that case and plead it. Is that fair to say?

Mr. William Doyle: I don't think there's any doubt about that. I think as it would relate to same-sex couples, it would be the same as it relates to opposite-sex couples now. The individuals make a declaration statutorily or a statement under the Income Tax Act that that's the case, and that statement is accepted. There's no reason that statement shouldn't be accepted for a same-sex couple as well.

Mr. John McKay: The way this bill has been sold by the government—bear in mind that I'm a government member—the primary selling point has been that this simply brings common-law homosexual into line with common-law heterosexual. There has been no statement here to date that in fact sexuality may have nothing to do with conjugality—the practice of sex has nothing to do with conjugality or is not a necessary element of conjugality. Now, to my mind, that changes the character of the bill entirely, because that opens it up to all kinds of other dependent and interdependent relationships. Is that a fair statement?

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Prof. Bruce Ryder: I think it is a fair statement, especially if you look at the trend in the case law interpreting “conjugality” over the last few decades. And there's quite a significant body of case law now, because provinces added definitions of common-law spouse to many of their statutes, especially from the 1970s. It's clear that it's an evolutionary concept. I think we could find examples from the past where conjugality was something that could only happen within a marriage, as probably the dominant understanding.

Mr. John McKay: Historically, that's true.

Prof. Bruce Ryder: And then it became marriage-like, not exclusively limited to marriage.

I think we're evolving—and M. v. H. crystallizes that evolution—to a point where we see it almost as like marriage-like, and a little bit further distant from old historical understandings of what marriage is about. So the Supreme Court of Canada says in M. v. H. that sexuality or sexual relationship is not a necessary condition. Now, it is, as you point out, Mr. McKay, a component of the definition—

Mr. John McKay: Yes.

Prof. Bruce Ryder: —but it's not necessary to it.

I think this all reflects shifts more broadly in our understandings about what is important in adult personal relationships and what is essential about marriage. It used to be that marriage's role in procreation and in continuing family lines and so on was the dominant rationale of marriage. Now we think in modern liberal democracies that the dominant rationales for marriage are about the quality of emotional and economic support couples provide to each other.

Mr. John McKay: The significant public policy issue, from the government standpoint, is that if conjugality has a sexual activity—i.e., it is the common-law homosexual equals common-law heterosexual—for government purposes, that's a $10 million item. If in fact it is other dependent relationships, it is very much more than a $10 million item. The guess is—and truly it is a guess—it is something in the order of a $300 million item.

In effect, by not defining “conjugality” with a sexual component as a sine qua non of the definition, you are allowing the courts to define what conjugality might mean for any given relationship. To use Mr. Doyle's example of tax-free rollovers, what you would presumably have in Mr. Doyle's office is a dependent relationship of any description wanting to do a marriage-like tax-free rollover of an RSP, or whatever.

Would it be your view that the government should come out of the closet and say that conjugality has, as a definition, a sexual component, that sexuality is a sine qua non of conjugality?

Prof. Bruce Ryder: In other words, make that explicit, Mr. McKay, in the legislation?

Mr. John McKay: Exactly, explicit.

Prof. Bruce Ryder: Personally, I don't think that's the right way to go, because I think when you examine the full range of federal statutes dealing with matters such as conflict of interest, dealing with pension benefits, dealing with entitlements under the Old Age Security Act and so on, if you look at what the rationale is of those purposes, typically it's to respond to the consequences that flow from economic and emotionally interdependent relationships. They're not dealing with consequences that are distinct to sexual relationships.

To a large extent, I think the argument can be made that whether there's a sexual component or not is completely irrelevant, and therefore should only be relevant to the extent that it helps us decide that the relationships have the qualitative attributes of economic and emotional interdependence that are relevant to federal legislative policy objectives.

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I would also just briefly respond to your concern about the cost. I don't think at this point in time that the implications are so huge—that is, the implications flowing from the flexibility and evolutionary nature of this legal understanding of conjugal. There are a couple of reasons why that's the case. Of course Bill C-23 deals with benefits and obligations. There are many ways in which it will lead to entitlement to benefits, but there are also many ways in which it will lead to a disentitlement to benefits—for example, if groups of individuals living together have to include their combined income for the purposes of say eligibility for the guaranteed income supplement under the Old Age Security Act.

So I don't think the financial implications of inclusion in this full package are huge. In any case, as I mentioned earlier, there's a gap between this evolving legal understanding of conjugality and the social understanding. I think for most people outside the legal debate, conjugality does mean a sexual relationship. I don't think there are really all that many couples out there living in non-sexual relationships who want to start announcing that they're common-law partners, because for them that means presenting themselves as sexual partners as well.

Now, that may change in the future, but I think at the moment there's a gap between the social meaning of conjugality and what a common-law spouse or common-law partner means in the legal definition. So I don't imagine we're going to see a flood of people presenting themselves outside of sexual relationships.

Mr. John McKay: I'm prepared to accept your evidence as far as the legal implications. As to the financial implications, I'm a little less prepared.

Prof. Bruce Ryder: Fair enough.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Ivan Grose): Thank you, Mr. McKay.

Mr. Lowther, three minutes.

Mr. Eric Lowther: Just to follow on the same theme for a moment, it's interesting that Mr. Ryder says that these relationships could have a component of economic interdependency. It seems to be directly out of step with where the justice minister is at on this particular bill. The justice minister made clear in a statement—I believe it was before this committee—that the current bill isn't about dependency. She said this is about conjugal relationships between same-sex and opposite-sex couples. Then in the Vancouver Sun she was quoted as acknowledging that the bill dealt with couples where there was a conjugal relationship. She went on to say that the dependency relationship is one that is very complex and potentially very wrought with major implications and that this bill wasn't addressing those; it only had to do with conjugal relationships.

Again, it seems to suggest that only if there's.... To me it's still obscure. Most people would assume it's got a sexual component to it and not a dependent component. Dependency is not it—those are her words: this current bill isn't about dependency. So if it isn't about dependency, it seems to me it's about sexuality. We're granting benefits based on private sexual activity, period. I'm not sure that's where Canadians want to be.

I think the Naskapi Nation makes a very good point: their approach to this would be one in which they'd like to be counselled on it before it's presented to them as perhaps impacting their treaty agreements and everything else. I think that's probably consistent with where a lot of Canadians are at. That's really where Reform is at, the party I represent.

We talk about fairness in this bill. It seems to me it would be fair to follow the Naskapi suggestion here, that the citizens be allowed to have input to this before it's presented to them. We have five lawyers around the table here. I'm not a lawyer, just a lay person. Mr. McKay's a lawyer, and he asks better questions than I do on these kinds of things. But I think it would be fair to allow Canadians to be heard.

It would be fair in fact for the government to allow a free vote on this issue. I understand that it's not going to be a free vote, that government members are going to be required to vote for it whether they agree with it or not. To the credit of those who have said no, their constituents wouldn't support this, some have elected to go against that whipped vote and vote the will of their constituents. I applaud them for doing so.

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It would be fair, I think, to allow Parliament to more properly debate this issue. We've debated for four and half hours, closure was invoked, and it's been shut down.

I also suggest it would be fair for the people who want to come before this committee, but because of compressed timeframes we're not going to be able to hear a number of voices like that of the Naskapi Nation, which would give us a different perspective.

I suggest it's not fair, though, that we're leaving some relationships out, as it appears to me. The justice minister is saying this is not about dependency. Mr. Ryder says an economic dependency would somehow qualify, in his mind. Well, in the justice minister's mind it doesn't qualify. So we're going to extend the suite of benefits to marriage and family to two people of the same sex because of a sexual activity, but others who don't have it, who buy gifts and do other things, have a question mark around them. Do they qualify? Apparently they don't, according to the justice minister, and that, to me, doesn't seem fair. That's discrimination if ever there was discrimination.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Ivan Grose): Mr. Lowther, your question, please.

Mr. Eric Lowther: To the Naskapi Nation, if this had come to you the way you've talked about—that is, consultation, government coming to you, your people having input—do you think, knowing your people, they would have landed with this kind of legislation, saying let's consider same-sex, homosexual relationships the same as married and common-law heterosexual?

Thank you.

Mr. John Mameamskum: As we said, we haven't done much consultation on this one. The thing is, it would have ended up being a referendum, first of all. We have a right to hold referendums—

Mr. Eric Lowther: Good idea.

Mr. John Mameamskum: —under the Cree-Naskapi Act. On top of that, our biggest concern is the amendments going through without our consent. That is the principal reason we're appearing before the committee.

Mr. Eric Lowther: Thank you very much. That's great.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Ivan Grose): I might make the point here that it's my understanding of committees and how they work that this is the consultation stage. That's why we're listening to witnesses. We've had many, many witnesses, and the legislation is still open to amendment. So there is consultation being carried on.

Mr. DeVillers, three minutes.

With the approval of the last three remaining members, inasmuch as we seem to have enough time, I don't think three minutes is enough time. Let's go back to seven minutes for one round and try to wind this up. Is that okay with everyone?

Some hon. members: Agreed.

Mr. Paul DeVillers (Simcoe North, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair. I just have the one question, and then I'll give the rest of the seven minutes to Mr. McKay.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Ivan Grose): No, you have only three minutes. It's after you that we'll start.

Mr. Paul DeVillers: Okay. I'm sorry.

I'd like to go back to Professor Ryder's definition of conjugal, that sexual relations is only one of the indicia for that definition.

Specifically, I wonder whether mother-daughter or the roommates-without-sex situation would in your opinion constitute a conjugal relationship in the context of this proposed legislation.

Prof. Bruce Ryder: As I said earlier, it's really going to be context specific and depend on the particular statute at issue, because legislative definitions are always given a purposive interpretation—that is, they will be interpreted in light of the purposes of this statute. But what courts are typically looking for is a sign that this is a committed, loving relationship in which people have intermingled their economic and emotional lives. If that's the case, then there are consequences that are relevant to a range of federal statutes and are likely to be included.

I think it's very difficult to speak by reference to categories of relationships—siblings, roommates, friends. It's a far more specific inquiry. We can't make generalizations. It will depend on the qualitative attributes of the relationship and whether we can say there's a long-term commitment, whether we can say they hold themselves out as people who have a long-term commitment to supporting each other emotionally and economically and living their lives together. If that's the case, then my guess is that courts will be likely to say that falls within the definition of conjugal because that's relevant to the purpose of this particular statute.

I mentioned the GIS provisions. The level of entitlement to a supplement under the Old Age Security Act depends on, in essence, household needs and resources. It makes sense, then, if people are sharing their lives together and intend to continue doing so, that we take into account the income of the people in that home.

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I think when we talk about these issues in the abstract it can sound quite peculiar, but if you look at them concretely, as judges and other decision-makers will have to do, and think about a particular statute—for instance, whether these people are in a close enough relationship that they should be included within conflict of interest guidelines—it's much easier to answer, I think.

Mr. Paul DeVillers: Well, in the abstract, I'm not sure if it's a “definite could be” or a “possible maybe”. I'm still confused.

Thank you.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Ivan Grose): Thank you, Mr. Devillers.

We'll now go to seven minutes so that you can complete your thought, your statement, or your question, whichever.

It's Mr. Lowther's turn.

Mr. Eric Lowther: If it's okay with the chair, I'd like to follow Mr. McKay. I'd appreciate it, Mr. Chair.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Ivan Grose): Certainly—as you wish. This is a democratic committee.

Mr. John McKay: I want to go back to the imprecision you've highlighted, that the context will determine everything for conjugality, and anticipate where the challenges to this bill will lie. They will likely be in Mr. Doyle's office.

Is it not unreasonable to expect that a 20-year committed relationship, one that has everything that will constitute conjugality except sex, will not be entitled to the rights, benefits, and obligations of this particular bill, but a one-year relationship of conjugality that has everything, including sex, will, which in some respects will set up a discriminatory regime that in effect creates another level of discrimination?

In other words, the bill tries to solve one level of discrimination and creates another. Is that a fair interpretation of the potential impact of this bill?

Prof. Bruce Ryder: It's possible, I suppose, that the judges could interpret conjugal in a manner that some of us might consider discriminatory. But if that occurs in lower courts, for example, what will happen at the end of the day, given that the Supreme Court of Canada has said that the word “conjugal” is extremely flexible, is that they won't end up striking down these definitions; they'll end up interpreting them in a manner that is consistent with equality rights. What they'll end up saying is that to exclude those relationships is discriminatory, because including those relationships is equally relevant to the purposes of this particular legislative scheme.

You know, as I said earlier, I think what we're talking about.... I want to emphasize that it's easy to critique this definition. It does give rise to uncertainties, and it's unfortunate. It's far more difficult to draft a better one.

My view is that even with the best legal minds directed to trying to draft a definition of couples that ought to be included in the range of federal statutes, it's very challenging, and uncertainties will be created. That's why I wanted to urge all committee members and the government as well that the best way around these difficulties—the difficulties you've raised, Mr. Lowther, and the difficulties other members of the committee have raised—is to make it possible for a wider range of people to register their relationships and say, okay, we want to be included in this full range of statutes. We don't want to live with the uncertainty of this definition. We don't want to live with the possibility of state-sponsored intrusions into the details of our personal lives. Give us the opportunity to marry or to register in a new civil status parallel to marriage.

There are many advantages to such a step, and I hope the government will consider it seriously.

Mr. John McKay: So in some respects the government has it backwards. They should have dealt with the issue of domestic partnerships of some kind or another. You'd have to have a scheme of registered but also in effect unregistered domestic partnerships. Once you've done that, you've then defined the universe of dependency, and that takes the steam right out of the issue. You miss out completely on the privacy issues, because those who wish to, will, and those who don't, won't.

In effect, then, by this bill we're setting up an additional intrusive discriminatory scheme.

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Prof. Bruce Ryder: I don't believe it's a discriminatory scheme. I think it's capable of being interpreted in a manner that's consistent with the equality rights in the charter, and our courts will interpret in a manner that's consistent with the charter.

These sorts of definitions do involve invasions of privacy in their administration, to some degree. We know that from the administration of social welfare schemes at the provincial level, and we could probably think of examples at the federal level, as well. But I don't think it's a fair option to suggest that we don't need definitions, in addition to marriage or in addition to a registered partnership scheme.

The problem is—and this is the reason why we have definitions of common-law spouses in various provincial family law statutes—there will always be some people who will choose not to register, or will want to register but their partner won't, who have the intention of living permanently in their primary unions. If we don't include them, we risk leaving them vulnerable to economic exploitation, and without access to a range of quite fundamental federal statutes. So I think we need both.

Mr. John McKay: You and I wouldn't disagree on that point. That's why I would see a registered regime and an unregistered regime as parallel schemes. You would simply have similar sets of rights and obligations, but the people in the unregistered regime would have to, on the balance of probabilities, prove a dependency relationship. It seems to me it would take you out of a lot of problems.

I have a couple of minutes left. Could you just outline for the committee what Vermont did when faced with a similar problem?

Prof. Bruce Ryder: I'd be happy to, Mr. McKay.

I presume members of the committee are aware there was a decision called Baker v. State that was released by the top court in Vermont in December 1999, I believe. It declared the definition of marriage in the state to be a violation in the Constitution, and said that gay and lesbian couples in the state of Vermont were entitled to equal benefits and equal rights under all Vermont's statutes. That could be satisfied by either changing the definition of marriage to permit same-sex marriage, or by setting up a parallel status—a domestic partnership scheme or some other statutory alternative.

As I understand it, the deliberations that have been going on in the Vermont legislature over the past several months have led to the choice of the latter alternative—to leave the definition of marriage intact, but to set up a parallel status they've called “civil unions”. The bill is very simple. It's coming out of their House judiciary committee and it's on its way to the House and Senate in Vermont.

It just establishes a registration scheme in the same offices in which marriage licences are handled. It's open only to same-sex couples, who both have to be adults and outside the prohibited degrees. It leads to the equivalent set of rights and obligations in Vermont statutes as are currently possessed by married spouses.

Mr. John McKay: What does it do with common-law heterosexual couples?

Prof. Bruce Ryder: It doesn't address the issue of unmarried or unregistered cohabitants.

I think committee members may also be aware that Canada is much further ahead than the United States, and in fact many European jurisdictions as well, in recognizing the rights of common-law cohabitants generally. Vermont hasn't specifically addressed that issue in this bill.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Ryder.

Mr. Lowther, for seven minutes.

Mr. Eric Lowther: I think this will be my last round. I appreciate the patience of the witnesses. We don't need to go forever on this, but I think we've made some progress here today.

Certainly the legal profession here and the witnesses that came forward, perhaps with the exception of the Naskapi Nation, have been saying “No amendments to this bill, don't change this bill, we like this bill”. Now I'm hearing some recognition that the way this thing is structured will be intrusive. That was the word Mr. Ryder used, and I agree with him.

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I agree that when people are trying to determine whether or not they meet the criteria, they're required to go into the courts to find out. Now the state is going to be intruding into private relationships, to determine whether or not you qualify. I think that's an inappropriate place for the state to go.

Our position would be much more in favour of some instrument that parties could enter into and exit from that would preclude the intrusive nature of the state, in assessing the qualitative aspects of a personal relationship. Unfortunately, this bill doesn't do that. I would invite the witnesses to rethink their positions and suggest amendments that would take us in a direction that was far less intrusive to the personal relationships of people and not tied to their personal intimacies, as well—probably inappropriate.

Even beyond that, I think it's incumbent upon members.... Certainly in this House there's a lot of rhetoric around the importance of children and the best interests of children. I guess that's where I'd like to explore for a moment, and lead up to a question, of course.

We have a lot of good information from Statistics Canada in the national longitudinal survey of children. It brings out some very interesting information. You'd think we'd want government policy to provide incentives, direction, or endorsement of those things that we know work.

Here are some of the things they've found. They say that children born to parents who are married and have not lived common law beforehand are approximately three times less likely to experience family breakdown than those children whose parents are living in a common-law unit when they are born and do not subsequently marry. So they are three times less likely to experience family breakdown if they're married. Children born to traditional marriages with no prior common-law union are the least likely, at 13.6%, to experience family breakdown before the age of 10.

Let's compare that with what we want to give every single benefit to. The figures—this is from a federal government study—for children from common-law unions are by far the most spectacular. By the age of 10, 63%—it's 14% for married—of these children have experienced family breakdown, confirming the short-lived nature of these relationships, even when there are children. Although we'd like to maybe ignore the facts, same-sex couples can't naturally have children. It might be a revelation to some, but it just doesn't work. The fact is that a mother and a father who are married and in a committed relationship is proven to work.

It seems to me it would be reasonable for government policy to recognize that it works and provide some sort of public policy benefit because of the contribution these relationships make in bringing forward the next generation, imparting values, and training them to be responsible citizens. It's proven to work. It's empirically verified.

I cannot for the life of me see where the public policy benefit—the contribution back to society—is there for extending familial benefits to two men or two women who decide to live together for one year and have some sort of sexual stimulation going on, because in fact they can't have intercourse. It's biologically impossible when they're the same sex.

Again, I don't really want to go into these arenas, but these are the facts. We have to look at that.

We talk about equality and fairness, but we've ignored the fact that public policy should be there to provide for the public good. I can't see where these relationships are actually providing for the public good. That's another area of concern of ours in this particular piece of legislation.

I'd like anybody from the Naskapi Nation to speak to that.

Mr. Robert Pratt: Our brief informs the committee what our position is on the purpose of the legislation. But as both the other witnesses from the Naskapi Nation have said, there has been no real consultation.

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The point of our brief is that the treaty rights of the Naskapis are not subject to the charter. It is not necessary for the government to amend the Cree-Naskapi Act, because it is not subject to the charter insofar as treaty rights are concerned. We're asking the government, if it feels that it wants to amend the treaty as expressed in the Cree-Naskapi Act, to come and discuss it with the Naskapis. That's a treaty right. You couldn't amend the treaty and you can't amend the local government legislation that arises directly from the treaty. We're willing to discuss with you the substance of the Bill C-23, but you have to talk to us. It's a treaty right. And that's as far as we're going, at this point.

Thank you.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Ivan Grose): Thank you, Mr. Pratt.

Mr. Lowther? Ms. Carroll. We took advantage of the fact that you were away for a little while and we changed the rules. So you get seven minutes.

Ms. Aileen Carroll (Barrie—Simcoe—Bradford, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair. This really is close to St. Patrick's Day.

I apologize for leaving; it's just the lifestyle up here. But because I did miss that section and I am capable of reading the blues—and always do—which is a replica of exactly what was said, I won't be offended if the matter I wish to bring to the attention primarily of the Bar Association, but also Professor Ryder, has been dealt with. So please say “We dealt with it, it's on record.”

We had testimony before the committee yesterday from a Professor Holland from University of Western Ontario, and the week before break, I think, we had testimony from a female professor from Queen's whose name eludes me. Both of the law professors—and as my pals from the Canadian bar know, my law degree is strictly through osmosis, so I'm going to leave this to you people entirely—have said that this particular piece of legislation may in fact trigger more legislation based on charter arguments. This gives me some concern, and I want to hear you all on that issue and get it on record.

If I can just quote Professor Holland from yesterday—having to go back did mean I got to grab a piece of paper I had forgotten—she said that the creation of a new common-law partnership was in fact going down another road from where jurisprudence has been taking us, and that in fact what has been happening within Canadian jurisprudence is—I have her words here—“an assimilation of marriage and cohabitation”. She said this new category is unnecessary and it runs, as I've said, counter to the current jurisprudential process or flow.

Now, I would really appreciate having your comments, Professor Ryder, and also Ms. Hancock's or Ms. Bercovich's, whichever. Has that been discussed in my absence, Mr. Chair?

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Ivan Grose): No.

Ms. Terry Hancock: No, it hasn't.

Ms. Aileen Carroll: Okay. Thank you.

Ms. Terry Hancock: I'd like to respond, because this certainly is a major portion of the Canadian Bar Association's assistance in this process.

As I said in my submission, the courts have already expanded the definition of spouse. By creating a separate category, you run down the road of semantic differentiation, and words mean something to lawyers. There is the possibility, the potential that Professor Winifred Holland has raised, that by creating a different word, you invite litigation. And that's the separate but equal treatment that was rejected in Moore and Akerstrom because it created a separate category based on sexual orientation. We don't know, for example, if there was a charter application saying that a common-law partner who has the rights and benefits of married couples...whether the court would consider the difference in words a potential violation of the charter.

I think the point to be made is that it's a political compromise. Many members of the lesbian and gay community would like to be called spouses. Their relationships have every quality of every heterosexual married couple's relationship. The courts have gone along that road for 20 years' worth of litigation. We have gotten to the point in the last five years where the courts have expanded, not contracted, the definition.

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In Rosenberg in particular, the court said section 52 of the charter—that's the paramountcy clause in the charter—required that the term “spouse” under the Income Tax Act, section 252, had to be extended to include same-sex spouses. And that's the issue where, yes, you may be inviting further litigation, and yes, there'll be a debate about political compromises. I think people like Professor Holland—and I take it Professor Bailey discussed that at her evidence as well—are probably alerting the committee that that is an issue.

Prof. Bruce Ryder: I think it's important to distinguish between the substantive issue and the symbolic issue, because substantively Bill C-23 goes down the road you described; that is, it follows the trend towards assimilation of married and unmarried spouses in terms of the content of their rights and obligations. But of course, as Terry was just addressing, I think it does create an issue of symbolic concern in the language it employs.

Bill 5, the bill that was passed by the Ontario government last fall in response to the decision in M. v. H., raised the same issue, because the Government of Ontario chose to reserve the word “spouse” for heterosexual couples and created new statutory language that included same-sex partners, not spouses, and emphasized that it was doing so to preserve traditional understandings of family. Of course Bill C-23 makes a different choice, and in my view it's not nearly as discriminatory a choice as the Ontario government made.

I think the question a court would ask with respect to Bill 5, the Ontario bill, is what was the reason? Was there a good reason for choosing to create a separate legal status? And the answer the government gave was that it was to preserve the traditional family, meaning that gas and lesbian families.... The rhetoric all suggested that gay and lesbian families were less valuable.

I think what we have here is a different situation. The word “spouse” is now being reserved in federal statutes for husbands and wives, and the words “common-law partner” have been added and include all common-law couples, heterosexual or homosexual. So you don't have discrimination within the category of common-law partner, but you still have some discrimination between the category of spouse and partner, because the category of spouse, which apparently has great significance to many people and to the Ontario government and perhaps other governments, is still not open to lesbian or gay couples.

But I think what that speaks to at the end of the day is the fact that the definition of marriage is discriminatory. If the government is interested in eliminating all discrimination in federal statutes, then as I've suggested, it has to either change the definition of marriage to remove the opposite sex requirement or choose the path that the Vermont legislature is currently considering and set up a parallel status that has all of the same rights and obligations as married couples have.

Ms. Aileen Carroll: I was here when you discussed the Vermont route, so I appreciate that, and as I said, we have the blues as well. I appreciate that. I think it is important to get your views on the record, since those were legal proponents and people speaking from the legal teaching community. Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Mr. Saada, is there something...? No.

Okay, if that's the case, Mr. Grose.

Mr. Ivan Grose: I might say something that I had intended to say if I were still sitting there. I would like to especially thank the Naskapi people who brought this submission to us a couple of days in advance. As a result, I could use it for bedtime reading last night. If I hadn't had that, I'd probably have had to read something more stimulating but less productive. But in any case, it is appreciated when we do get evidence beforehand, because we come prepared then. Thank you.

[Translation]

Mr. Jacques Saada (Brossard—La Prairie, Lib.): I just realized that my answer could create some confusion. Let me clear things up. I don't feel qualified to ask you very concrete or specific questions, or intelligent ones for that matter, since I was retained in the House while you made your presentation. I look forward to reading your reports. This subject interests me and I wouldn't want to be misunderstood. Therefore, I have no questions for you at this time.

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[English]

The Chair: Thank you, everyone. Again, I apologize for the fact that I had to leave. Many of us sit on committees that compete, but thank you very much for your interventions.

I'm advised by colleagues that I should in fact pay particular attention to the transcripts on the basis of the fact that your interventions were particularly interesting. I guess that's a rave review.

Thank you very much.

The meeting is adjourned.