TRAN Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORT

LE COMITÉ PERMANENT DES TRANSPORTS

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Tuesday, June 8, 1999

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[English]

The Chairman (Mr. Raymond Bonin (Nickel Belt, Lib.)): Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. Today we are here, pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), to study the competitiveness of Canada's air transportation system. We will wait for the media to leave the room and proceed with our meeting.

A voice: They can stay. They just can't take pictures or record.

The Chairman: Yes. It's a House rule, I understand, that cameras are off. They are welcome to stay, but the cameras will have to be off.

We have with us today the president of the Canadian Air Traffic Control Association, David Lewis.

Welcome, Mr. Lewis. We appreciate your accepting to share with us your issues concerning competitiveness.

I'll explain to you the process we have. First of all, it's a very informal meeting. If you feel more comfortable without a jacket, we welcome that. That goes for anyone.

After your presentation, we'll have a series of questions and answers. The first round will be four minutes, and as I explain to other witnesses, it's four minutes for the question and the answer. Sometimes my colleagues want the full four minutes, but that means you have to squeeze your answer into another question. So everyone knows, and they've been very good. You will have an opportunity for closing statements after.

Welcome, Mr. Lewis. We're anticipating your input.

Mr. David Lewis (President, Canadian Air Traffic Control Association): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Good afternoon, members of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Transport, other members of Parliament, officials, and observers.

Please accept my thanks and that of the board of directors and members of the Canadian Air Traffic Control Association for the opportunity to address you today on the issue of the competitiveness of Canada's air transportation system.

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By way of introduction, I will touch briefly on who we are, what we do, and the essential role we play in the well-being of Canada's air transportation.

The Canadian Air Traffic Control Association is the union representing the 2,100 air traffic controllers who work for NAV CANADA and the nine who are still employed by Transport Canada. Because of activities centred on air navigation, it is to this aspect of air transportation that I will direct my remarks.

Our members are the backbone of civil air navigation in Canada. Their responsibility is to ensure that aircraft taxiing on the ground, taking off, and landing at Canada's 44 controlled airports or flying over Canadian-controlled airspace maintain adequate separation and thus avoid colliding with one another. Their job requires extensive theoretical, technical, and practical training and experience, as well as the rare combination of abilities to judge and coordinate the paths and destinations of objects moving at variable speeds in a three-dimensional grid, to concentrate and maintain a high degree of mental alertness for extended periods of time, and to make instantaneous life-and-death judgments affecting hundreds of people.

It is no wonder that only 10% of applicants pass the exams that would qualify them for training as air traffic controllers, or that only 30% to 35% of those individuals hired as trainees eventually earn their licences. It is also no wonder that air traffic controllers work under constant stress and suffer frequencies of job-related burnout that far exceed the Canadian workplace average.

To be truly competitive, Canada's air navigation system must be safe, efficient, and cost-effective. The responsibility for achieving this is shared among all stakeholders in air transport, including government, the airlines, as well as NAV CANADA's management, employees, and bargaining agents.

We at CATCA take this responsibility very seriously. We recognize that by advancing the interests of our members through collective bargaining, contract enforcement, and public advocacy for fair and equitable working conditions for air traffic controllers, we are at the same time promoting the safety, efficiency, and cost-effectiveness, and hence the competitiveness, of Canada's air navigation system.

In the past, the structure of Canada's civil air navigation system did not lend itself to optimum efficiency or competitiveness. Under the ownership of Transport Canada, the system fell under the rules, guidelines, and practices of the civil service, and as such, the government was unable to respond most effectively to circumstances and problems that were unique to air navigation. As a result, the federal purse was strained by a $200 million annual shortfall, the air navigation system was falling behind the rest of the world technologically because of federal spending restraints, and federal hiring freezes resulted in a severe staff shortage that still plagues us today.

Given these realities, CATCA actively supported the commercialization of civil air navigation in Canada and welcomed the advent of NAV CANADA as necessary steps towards revitalization and world competitiveness.

Three broad aspects of any business, including NAV CANADA's, contribute to competitiveness: revenue, expenditures, and productivity. I will address each of these individually, though briefly, and then try to answer any questions you might have.

As to balancing revenue and expenditures, NAV CANADA has done an admirable job, at least from an accounting perspective. The system is self-financing, it no longer relies on government subsidies, and it even generates a surplus. From this limited perspective at least, one could say without valid contradiction that civil air navigation under NAV CANADA's tutelage is indeed competitive.

In fact the user fees NAV CANADA charges foreign and domestic airlines flying through our controlled airspace or landing and taking off at any of our controlled airports are significantly lower than any other industrialized country's. The productivity of Canadian air traffic controllers is also the envy of every other jurisdiction. Our air navigation system handles more aircraft per controller than any other.

So if you were to take a snapshot of the world of civil air navigation in Canada as it stands today, you would have to conclude that its revenues, expenditures, and productivity make it the most competitive in the world. But that snapshot would be misleading.

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Air navigation, like all systems, is in constant flux. It is an ever-changing dynamic. An impression created by a still photo may not accurately reflect how the system is changing or how well it will meet current and future challenges. From this perspective, the competitiveness of Canada's civil air navigation system is anything but assured.

Our concerns focus on three main areas: technology, globalization, and human resources.

We are still reeling from the effects of spending cutbacks in the 1980s, when the need to reduce the federal deficit also meant cutting back on the system's ability to develop or acquire new technologies. NAV CANADA is aware of this problem and has allocated significant amounts of money to acquire new technology, but we have experienced serious growing pains.

Technologically advanced equipment has been introduced and older technologies withdrawn without proper testing or evaluation and without proper training of the air traffic controllers who will use the new equipment.

Perhaps the greatest flaw has been the failure of NAV CANADA to explore the views, needs, and wisdom of air traffic controllers. We need to establish open lines of communication, formal as well as informal, between air traffic controllers, who know and understand the system and what it can and is intended to achieve, and NAV CANADA's management.

Globalization is another vital link in the chain of worldwide competitiveness. Our air navigation system does not exist in a vacuum. It is not an isolated entity competing against other isolated entities. It must be part of an interwoven communications network that provides air traffic control services seamlessly and efficiently to any and all aircraft, regardless of their nationality, their point of origin, or their final destination.

To achieve this, we must ensure that the technologies and equipment used in our air navigation system are compatible with those used in other jurisdictions. Our system will not be efficient, it will not be safe, and it will not be competitive if flight decks of aircraft flying international routes must be equipped with different sets of instruments to accommodate the vagaries of various national air navigation systems. In the context of today's globalized air transport, uniformity is an essential aspect of competitiveness.

So how do we achieve this? The Government of Canada has already recognized the need and taken the first steps with its support of the International Civil Aviation Organization, a UN-sponsored body striving to bring about the coordinated development of worldwide aviation.

The main stumbling block to ICAO's success is the snail's pace of progress born of excessive bureaucracy. The International Civil Aviation Organization simply moves too slowly, and as a consequence, NAV CANADA and the bodies that own and operate air navigation in other jurisdictions move at their own faster pace. The danger of course is that worldwide air navigation will become splintered—a situation that will deny the seamless efficiency that true competitiveness demands.

With the pace of the development of new technology increasing rapidly, not only in aviation but in every human endeavour, we must act quickly. We therefore urge the Government of Canada to take the lead in establishing uniform and universal goals and standards for the coordinated development and implementation of new air navigation technologies.

I will conclude my remarks with a few words on human resources.

In the final analysis, a system is only as good as the people who operate it—Canada's 2,100 air traffic controllers. As the president of their union for the past six years and as a licensed air traffic controller myself, I can't say enough about the dedication, skill, and perseverance of the men and women who staff Canada's airport control towers and area control centres. But all the dedication, skill, and perseverance in the world will not enable Canada's air traffic controllers to overcome the denigrating effects of excessive overtime, short shift changes, heightened stress, and long shifts without sufficient time for relief breaks.

Many of these issues lie outside the sphere of government and must be resolved at the bargaining table. But there comes a point, which I believe we have already reached, where the public interest takes precedence over the parochial interests of an employer or a union.

We therefore call upon the government to prescribe mandatory relief breaks for air traffic controllers every two hours and to put a ceiling on the number of hours an air traffic controller may work in any given month. This requires no departure from long-established government policy and would place air traffic controllers in the same regulatory mould as airline pilots.

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Today the only legislated protection afforded air traffic controllers against excessive hours of work is the section of the Canada Labour Code that prohibits anyone from working more than an average of 48 hours per week in any given year. This is far from adequate.

Air traffic controllers are routinely scheduled to work 12-hour shifts, which are occasionally extended to 16 hours, before returning eight hours later to start a new shift. In some centres, controllers periodically work shifts on nine consecutive days and then return for another block after only a single day's rest. All of this is permissible under current legislation.

The high degree of stress inherent in the air traffic controller's job is unique. It exceeds that of virtually every other occupation and is certainly greater than that found in any other airline industry profession. Adding to the stress of course is the knowledge that any failure to perform at peak levels of efficiency will not only compromise the convenience of air traffic but may result in a horrendous tragedy.

It is incumbent upon the government to foster a workplace environment that promotes both safety and efficiency. This is not only a humanitarian imperative; it is good business as well.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Mr. Lewis, for an excellent presentation. I commend you on your professionalism for not taking advantage of the opportunity, considering the fact that negotiations are going on. I truly appreciate that you stuck to the script and were very professional about it. I commend you for that.

Mr. David Lewis: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: For the members, if there are questions that are tied in to the negotiations, I will rule them out of order. Mr. Lewis has set a good course for us, and we will follow it.

Mr. Cullen for four minutes.

Mr. Roy Cullen (Etobicoke North, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was just about to be very unprofessional.

Voices: Oh, oh!

The Chairman: And I know you won't be.

Mr. Roy Cullen: I wanted to ask the witness if he had anything to report on negotiations, but since the chair has so astutely said that will be out of order, I won't do that.

I'll go to another question then. Sir, we've heard from airlines about airport user fees. I can't remember the exact data—the researcher has it, and we'll be looking at it again later—but let's look at Pearson airport. I recollect that the airlines were saying the user fees are getting a bit out of line. I can't remember specifically the air navigation fees.

On page 3 of your brief, you say the system is self-financing, and from a limited perspective, one could say without valid contradiction that civil air navigation under NAV CANADA's tutelage is indeed competitive. You go on to say the user fees NAV CANADA charges foreign and domestic airlines are lower than those charged by many other countries, which seems to be at odds with some other information we've had. I wonder if you have any data you could supply to the committee, comparing the navigation fees in Canada's airports to the fees of other airports.

If the fees increase though—and they are competitive now—if the cost pressures are there to increase the fees, then that will presumably have an effect on the competitiveness of the airlines. I wonder if you could comment on that initially.

Mr. David Lewis: Yes, I will, Mr. Cullen.

First of all, we do have an analysis that was produced by Transport Canada in 1996. It's an illustrated analysis of user fees in those jurisdictions that had fees at that time. This is part of the Minister of Transport's study into the commercialization of the air navigation system in Canada. I'd be happy to provide that to the committee.

Generally speaking, I can tell you off the top of my head that the comparative fees in the U.S. for oceanic travel are 600% higher than what is charged by NAV CANADA, and for domestic they're 500% higher. The U.K., I believe, is 300% higher. Generally speaking, they are higher everywhere.

The comparison you're using with fees for the use of airports—that is, the fees charged by airport authorities—are separate and distinct from NAV CANADA and not related to the terminal fees or en route fees.

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Mr. Roy Cullen: Right, I understand. Thank you.

The hours that air traffic controllers work have been given much attention recently in the media. When you're in negotiation, of course you hear all sorts of things from different sides. You say air traffic controllers typically work 12- and sometimes 16-hour shifts. I've heard it said that air traffic controllers in Canada work shorter hours than air traffic controllers in other jurisdictions. I wonder if you have any data on that that you could share with the committee.

Mr. David Lewis: Yes, we do, and I can provide you with that data. An analysis has been done on the hours of work in other jurisdictions around the world as they compare to Canada.

Just by way of comment, I would say from a collective bargaining perspective, air traffic controllers in Canada since 1975 have worked a 34-hour work week, but that 34-hour work week is your straight-time work week. The fact of the matter is we've been operating so short for so long that the number of hours you work is far in excess of that. In fact we've had some people who have exceeded the Canada Labour Code maximum. Now the employer and we are working at keeping that down to a minimum.

It's interesting to note that prior to commercialization on November 1, 1996, one of the discussion points everyone agreed on was that government's legitimate role in air navigation was to be the legislator and the regulator, and that by commercializing the air navigation system, you set them at arm's length and allowed them to more legitimately perform that role. In most other countries around the world you will find that government has in fact regulated hours for air traffic controllers, much in the way the government here has regulated the hours for airline pilots and for cabin crews.

Mr. Roy Cullen: Do I have time?

The Chairman: No, you don't. I allowed the question on the time of work for two reasons: there's the cost factor for airlines—if it's lower, it allows them to be more competitive with other carriers—and there's safety, which I suspect would be addressed under those terms. That's why I allowed that to proceed.

Mr. Dromisky.

Mr. Stan Dromisky (Thunder Bay—Atikokan, Lib.): One of my questions was already answered, and I'm being prevented from going into some other areas I would love to go into. However—

The Chairman: Mr. Sekora.

Mr. Lou Sekora (Port Moody—Coquitlam—Port Coquitlam, Lib.): Thank you very much for allowing me to speak.

Voices: Oh, oh!

Mr. Stan Dromisky: Oh, did you say “Lou”?

The Chairman: I was kidding.

Mr. Stan Dromisky: Oh, all right.

The question of competitiveness I find interesting. Usually when we talk about competitiveness, we're competing against something or somebody or whatever. But here we have a situation where in essence the controllers, your association, have a monopoly. Who are you competing with?

Mr. David Lewis: That's an excellent question, sir. It's not in fact us who have the monopoly; it's NAV CANADA who has the monopoly.

Mr. Stan Dromisky: Yes, that's what I mean.

Mr. David Lewis: Yes, I think I understand your point.

The way I define it is as follows. When we studied commercialization for the Minister of Transport back in 1994 to 1995, we looked at how other air navigation systems around the world had commercialized. When we started the study, there were 33 commercial air navigation systems; there were 72 by the time we had finished.

There was every variation on the theme, but generally speaking, they had moved to what we call commercial crown corporations, or state-owned enterprises. There were some problems in different areas over how you regulate when you're still the employer, so that was one of the things we wanted to change. We set a brand-new model for Canada, and we think it works well.

It's critically important that the employers themselves have a monopoly in a safety-based system such as air navigation, because you need consistency throughout the application. You need a seamless application of technology. To have competing forces saying, “We're going to charge you less to land at this airport if you use our service” lends itself to a bottom-line mentality, which we wanted to avoid. That's why we took the not-for-profit approach, so that the system could concentrate on providing a safe and efficient system that is cost-effective.

The issue of competitiveness is a very difficult one to address, but my perspective on it is that air transportation and air navigation is probably one of the first truly globalized economies we have seen in the world. It affects everyone. We talk about globalization, but we don't see that many real, upfront examples of it.

Air navigation systems compete with air navigation systems in the provision of service. Eventually what you will see—and we're seeing examples of this in Europe and in Central America right now—are supranational systems and supranational legislation that deals with upper airspace for multiple countries.

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Mr. Stan Dromisky: That's an excellent answer. Thank you very much. I'll come back to you in the second round.

The Chairman: Mr. Sekora.

Mr. Lou Sekora: I have a couple of questions.

When you paint the air traffic controllers, you paint them all across Canada with one brush. I think there's a little difference there. We were talking about the backup at Vancouver airport, which I'm sure you're familiar with. I'll tell you, I fly out of there on a Sunday or a Monday on a 2.15 p.m. flight to Ottawa, and we're number 13, 14, or 15 on the runway. It's getting to be a joke when it takes you three-quarters of an hour to get off the ground, and yet the small planes that may be going to Victoria or Nanaimo are pushed ahead.

Is there any system you could work on to get the planes, let's say from Vancouver to Ottawa, or Vancouver to England, or Vancouver to somewhere else, off the ground a little faster, rather than delaying them for an hour or an hour and a half?

Mr. David Lewis: Mr. Sekora, there is a system in use. First of all, air traffic controllers are tasked with being safe, orderly, and expeditious, and in that exact order. Expeditious is the last priority. It has to be first of all safe and orderly.

What generally happens is your larger passenger-carrying jets use the full length of the runway; your smaller turbo-prop aircraft and smaller jet aircraft use less distance on the runway. So you wind up with multiple lineups on the runway. Then you complicate that with weather; wind; departure routes; noise abatement procedures; terrain, particularly in the Vancouver area; and weight turbulence separation criteria—when you let a heavy go, you have to wait five miles before you can let the next departure go behind him. So what controllers try to do is balance each one of the lines. While you may appear to be number 13 in this line, you may in fact be 26 overall.

It's a very complex problem, and the fact of the matter is, air traffic controllers are limited by the amount of concrete and parking space on the airport, more than anything else. That is one of the greatest limiting factors, and it's further compounded by weather and all of the other dynamics that come into play.

Mr. Lou Sekora: Second, I can understand when you talk about burnout at Vancouver airport or somewhere else, but surely you don't think there's burnout in Williams Lake, where there might be two planes landing a day. What would air traffic controllers there burn out from?

Mr. David Lewis: There are no air traffic controllers in Williams Lake, Mr. Sekora.

Mr. Lou Sekora: Okay, well, let's say Kelowna or Kamloops. It's the same.

Mr. David Lewis: Kelowna or Kamloops? There are none in Kamloops either. The federal government closed Kamloops some years ago, because they didn't feel it was busy enough. Kelowna has 727 flight craft running in and out of highly mountainous terrain in a river valley, mixed in with very light aircraft, single-engine and multiple-engine aircraft. Depending on the number of people you have in the course of a day...

Mr. Sekora, I will freely concede to you that there are times when it is not busy and it is not stressful, but they are interspersed with times when it is extremely stressful.

Mr. Lou Sekora: I have one last question, and it has nothing to do with any agreements; I just want to know for myself. What is an average salary for an air traffic controller? Is it different in the interior from what it is on the lower mainland?

Mr. David Lewis: Yes, it is.

The Chairman: I will rule that out of order. You can ask him after the meeting, though.

Mr. Lou Sekora: I just asked what money he's making today.

The Chairman: If we want a comparison with other countries—

Mr. Lou Sekora: I didn't want a comparison with other countries, just here.

Mr. David Lewis: I'm going to Victoria tower on July 1 to report for duty there. I'll tell you exactly what I'm making in the hallway later.

The Chairman: If you wish, you're free to, but it's not a question that will serve the study.

Mr. Lou Sekora: I think I should challenge the chair on this one.

The Chairman: Well, you're welcome to do it.

Mr. Murray Calder (Dufferin—Peel—Wellington—Grey, Lib.): You'd lose.

Mr. Lou Sekora: That's why I'm not asking.

Voices: Oh, oh!

The Chairman: Mr. Casey.

Mr. Bill Casey (Cumberland—Colchester, PC): Thank you.

You mentioned a minute ago that our international air traffic control charges are a lot less than in other places. You mentioned some jurisdictions are at 600% of our charges. First of all, how does NAV CANADA bill an airline for an aircraft that goes through our airspace but doesn't land here? It sounds to me as if we are discounting our international charges and subsidizing those with our local charges. Is that legitimate?

Mr. David Lewis: Air navigation fees and the formulas that stand behind them vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. They are fairly complex, and they are different depending on the manner in which the air navigation system is operated.

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An example I will give you is that the U.S. system is still owned and operated by the federal government, so in taking account of the costs of operating the system, they do it in much the same fashion as you do when you determine the costs for operating a department within government, which includes all costs right up to the minister's office, and they're all apportioned to it.

A commercial operation runs quite differently, and NAV CANADA runs quite differently. Some jurisdictions are taxed. Canada is not. The U.S. system is also a tax-based system. They only charge foreign carriers. They don't charge domestic carriers, and there has been an exception granted for Canada for the transborder flights, because we share flights cross-border. But with free trade, you probably know better than I do what that's ultimately going to result in.

As to how NAV CANADA charges, it's a formula based on weight and on distance flown, calculated on a great circle route from your point of entry to point of departure within the system, and on facilities used. En route traffic does not subsidize the terminal traffic and the local domestic traffic, because they use different systems. Terminal radars, for example, generally speaking, have a limited range and are used for fine, in-close, precision guidance. They're not used for en route aircraft that are travelling at 35,000 feet, 10 miles apart.

Mr. Bill Casey: When Transport Canada operated the air traffic control towers, they used to do operational reports. I don't know how regularly, but they used to do them. Does NAV CAN still do them, and how often are they done?

Mr. David Lewis: Are you talking, Mr. Casey, about site evaluations to determine whether they're performing up to standard?

Mr. Bill Casey: Yes.

Mr. David Lewis: Yes, NAV CANADA is required by virtue of its certificate to do regular reviews. I can get the exact time for you, but I believe that it's on an annual basis, that there are specialists from headquarters who go out and ensure that all of the policies are being adhered to. Additionally, they are required to have both site manuals and an operating manual, very similar to airlines that fall under the CARs, the civil aviation regulations. Also, they're reviewed again by the regulatory division of Transport Canada.

Mr. Bill Casey: So NAV CAN does it and then turns them over to Transport Canada.

I have another question. Now, with NAV CAN commercialized, what role should the federal government play that they're not playing now, in your opinion?

Mr. David Lewis: That's a very difficult question. We believed and still believe that the government has a legitimate role to play as the legislator and regulator.

In the regulatory role that the Government of Canada plays today, they have taken more of an auditing approach to the operation, that is, they monitor NAV CANADA's operation, and it's assessed on the basis of accidents per 1,000 hours flown, generally speaking. We believe that it should be more interventionist than that, that it does not work to simply sit back and say that as long as nothing happens the system must be running all right. It doesn't work in an air navigation system and it doesn't work in any safety-related transportation industry. It has to be more invasive, and you have to test the theories prior to them actually being put in place. We don't believe that it's invasive enough at this point.

Mr. Bill Casey: Should they be doing the on-site inspections?

Mr. David Lewis: There's probably a role for on-site inspections, but I'm not sure that it would necessarily have to be on a regular annual basis. It could be on a random basis to ensure that they are being done properly.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Mr. Asselin.

Mr. Gérard Asselin (Charlevoix, BQ): First of all, I'd like to welcome Mr. Lewis to the Standing Committee on Transport.

Mr. Lewis, as a committee member, I'm concerned about passenger safety as well as about the safety of air transportation services employees. As the MP for the riding of Charlevoix in Quebec, since NAV CANADA assumed responsibility for air traffic control, I can tell you that in the regions, safety is a concern. It's very expensive to fly to Montreal or Ottawa, and more expensive still to fly to Paris. Service is virtually nonexistent.

I'm sure you're aware of the airplane crash that occurred in Baie-Comeau on December 7 last. Unfortunately, there was some kind of communication problem because NAV CANADA wasn't even aware of the direction in which the plane had lifted off. Yet, during the 1970s, when the airport in Baie-Comeau was built, a landing strip was installed along with a control tower and several air traffic controllers and firefighters were hired.

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You stated in your presentation that NAV CANADA management had balanced its expenditures and revenues and was even generating additional revenues. However, I've been asking myself one question and I will put it to you as well: has the goal of financial self- sufficiency in the area of air traffic control and communications not been achieved at the expense of passenger safety and air services?

During the 1970s, Transport Canada managed its own air transportation service. Ever since this responsibility was handed over to NAV CANADA, chaos has reigned.

First of all, as you mentioned, working conditions and schedules are unacceptable. You stated at one point that 10 per cent of all candidates successfully passed the exam and that of this number, only 30 to 35 per cent received their license after undergoing training. These individuals work 15 or 16 hour days. Under these conditions, few people manage to get their license. Again, the organization is putting the safety of the public at risk.

[English]

Mr. David Lewis: Thank you, Mr. Asselin.

We became very concerned about the safety and integrity of the air navigation system starting probably in the early 1980s, when we saw a trend towards commercializing air navigation systems in other jurisdictions around the world and saw at the same time a philosophy in government that was dedicated to deficit reduction and not expending funds in an area that was experiencing huge growth and rapid technological change. We knew that we had to find some means to change. Otherwise, if we had stayed in government, we would have been faced with more closures, reductions in levels of service, and, ultimately, reductions in the level of safety, just as you are describing.

That's why we became one of the drivers to commercialize the air navigation system. We believed that by being self-funding it could focus first of all on safety and efficiency, but on a cost-effective basis.

The move to close control towers and reduce the levels of service, which ultimately does reduce the level of safety, started with Transport Canada. It continued with NAV CANADA, but with more onerous requirements for public consultation and for getting public agreement on reductions in levels of service.

But the converse to that is that they also need the same type of consultation and agreement in order to introduce new services. We believe that is the wrong approach. We believe that there should be set baselines for when there should be an air traffic control tower at a specific location. For example, when a certain level of traffic is reached, that is when an air traffic control tower should be put in, and if a certain level of traffic is reached that denotes closure, then close them at that time. It shouldn't be a matter of going out and having to market whether or not you're going to open a facility.

With regard to success rates, the historical success rates in air traffic control—30% to 35%—are the same as they were under Transport Canada. It's a very complex occupation, and things have to be changed that relate to the recruitment, training, and retention of air traffic controllers—again, technological acquisition, new instruction methodologies, those types of things.

The Chairman: Mr. Morrison.

Mr. Lee Morrison (Cypress Hills—Grasslands, Ref.): Just to pursue that same point, Mr. Lewis, what is the advantage—if any—of having an air traffic controller covering rather a small area, if you will, over having the FSS, which does the job very well for the immediate purposes of getting somebody into the airport? What advantage, if any, would there be, for example—because this is something we get all the time—of having an air traffic controller at Fredericton? I don't see what good it would do, but I'd like your opinion on that.

Mr. David Lewis: Mr. Morrison, there is a point at which... First of all, I should step back. The service that is performed by flight service specialists is highly specialized and does lend itself to an operation that is safer than simply allowing pilots to operate in and out of airports using the rules of right-of-way. There is another point at which it becomes less safe than having air traffic control.

• 1610

There's a very significant difference between air traffic control and FSS. Air traffic controllers sequence aircraft and clear them to land or take off. Flight service specialists do not do that. They cannot tell aircraft when to turn on final approach, they cannot space them out, and they cannot tell aircraft when and where to depart from. There are significant differences, but to the untrained eye, the jobs appear to be almost identical.

Mr. Lee Morrison: In the end, an FSS will tell somebody they are clear to land. They may not put them into the circuit, but they will take them out of the circuit. Is this not correct?

Mr. David Lewis: No, sir, it is not. They do not put them into the circuit, and by law they cannot clear them to land. Only an air traffic controller can issue an air traffic control clearance.

Mr. Lee Morrison: So you're up there, say, and the weather isn't that great and you would like a little bit of help from the ground. Do you have to rely on an air traffic controller who really doesn't have a very good handle on the local, immediate situation?

Mr. David Lewis: In the situation you describe, if I understand it, it's an uncontrolled airport where there is FSS on the airport during weather conditions that are, let's say, below limits.

Mr. Lee Morrison: Yes.

Mr. David Lewis: Okay. The pilot would rely on those air navigation aids, the equipment on his flight deck, and the radar or procedural air traffic controller located in the area control centre to establish him on final for the runway, and then he would continue the approach. If he continued the approach below limits, that's automatically illegal. It's a violation of CARs. But you know that in an emergency, in a low-fuel situation, when lives are at stake, any landing is prima facie proof. It's up to the pilot. He ultimately makes the decision.

Mr. Lee Morrison: But in many cases—and again I cite Fredericton—the pilot doesn't know for sure whether it's within ILS rules or not. He doesn't know.

Mr. David Lewis: He's provided with the weather at the site. Plus, on descent, sir, an ILS, generally speaking, is 250 feet. That's the limit. If you don't break cloud at 200 feet, the requirement, by law, is to go around.

Mr. Lee Morrison: The TSB said that they only had 100 feet at Fredericton and that was legal.

Mr. David Lewis: It may have been a different category approach, but generally speaking, a straightforward ILS category 1 approach is 250 feet. I can't speak specifically on Fredericton without an approach chart in front of me. I'm sorry, Mr. Morrison, but I would be more than happy to research it.

Mr. Lee Morrison: I'm not trying to badger you here. I'm trying to get information.

Mr. Chairman, do I have time for one more brief question?

The Chairman: Very brief.

Mr. Lee Morrison: What is the relationship between the functions of Transport Canada and NAV CANADA with respect to the training and certification of new controllers? There is a training program going on right now, I believe.

Mr. David Lewis: NAV CANADA provides the training to certify to a standard established by Transport Canada that conforms with the ICAO rules, the International Civil Aviation Organization rules.

Mr. Lee Morrison: Thank you.

The Chairman: Second round, four minutes, with Mr. Cullen, Mr. Casey, and Monsieur Asselin.

Mr. Roy Cullen: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'd like to switch gears a bit. I wonder if you could give us a description of flight paths. Pearson airport is right near my riding. In fact, all the planes fly right over my riding to land on the east-west runway. The airport noise has become an issue. The GTA has a noise centre that people often phone. People in my riding tell me that the flight paths have changed but that when you phone the GTA they say the flight paths haven't changed, but besides, if they have, that's the responsibility of NAV CANADA.

Anyway, the ball gets bounced back and forth among Transport Canada, GTA, and NAV CANADA. I wonder if you could describe the various roles of NAV CANADA, the GTA, and Transport Canada as to how they relate to whether the airport is going to use a certain runway, like the new north-south runway at Pearson. Could you describe what the flight path will be after takeoff? There's a relatively new 15% rule. Also, could you describe the slope of the takeoff or the landing, how quickly they get up there? That affects the noise levels. Can you describe who decides and what the interaction is between those different agencies?

Mr. David Lewis: Okay. I'll do my best, Mr. Cullen, but you can appreciate that Pearson is a fairly complex operation.

• 1615

When air traffic control first came into being... Airplanes, like birds, best land and take-off into wind. So the general rule of thumb was that if the wind was over five knots, he'd select the runway that is most closely aligned to wind, and that would be your landing and departure runway.

Mr. Roy Cullen: Who selects that?

Mr. David Lewis: The air traffic controller.

Now, as time has advanced and airports have become larger and residential areas have built up around them, we've got more and more complaints about noise. And aircraft, we've learned, can tolerate more than 15° of crosswind and certain speeds of wind. What has happened is that the manufacturers and the companies have published the crosswind components that aircraft can use, so now, generally speaking, you'll run crosswind runways up to 15 knots.

But what happens is that if you're running a single-runway operation, for example in Toronto, for two or three hours, the same area is getting all of the noise all of the time. So what they have a tendency to do is when the winds are light enough, and within the operating parameters of the aircraft, they switch runways routinely on a timed sequence. And that should have the effect of changing the noise pattern around the airport.

Mr. Roy Cullen: So in other words, they might use a runway for a while for landings and then they might use it for a while for takeoffs.

Mr. David Lewis: Yes.

Mr. Roy Cullen: And they actually consciously do that to sort of spread the noise around a bit.

Mr. David Lewis: Yes, up to the point where they're limited. Once you get up beyond 15 knots pretty well, then you get into these... if you look at turbo-prop aircraft, high-wing, that have long undercarriages, they can't tolerate crosswind as much as a jet with the lower...

Mr. Roy Cullen: Okay. But with respect to this 15°, the way it was described to me by the GTAA, if you're taking off on the runway and the flight path is straight, then obviously the next plane can't start up and take off as quickly. So they said if you get up to a certain point and you veer off 15°, that means that the plane can take off more quickly.

It would seem to me, if that's the case, to indicate that the flight paths have changed. When did that come in?

Mr. David Lewis: The flight paths have changed. I can't remember the exact dates, Mr. Cullen, but it was approximately two years ago that they did some experimentation and then implemented the assigned track guidance at Pearson.

Mr. Roy Cullen: And what about how the engines... I'm speaking in layman's terms because I don't know all the jargon, unlike Mr. Morrison, with the TSB and ILS. I'm very impressed here. But in regard to the slope, if you're taking off and you can just cool it for a while, then when you get up to a certain height, you rev it a little more. Is there any sort of discretion there, or is it that you just goose it from the minute you take off? How does that work?

Mr. David Lewis: No. There are restrictions on speed, angle of climb, and throttle settings on departures. But generally speaking, we have three categories or stages of aircraft. And simply enough, they're called stages one, two, and three. Stage three aircraft are your most recently developed high-bypass turbo fans like the 767 and A320, those types of aircraft that are utilizing high-technology engines, and Dash 8s, some of your smaller commuter jets. They're incredibly quiet aircraft, and if you look at the noise footprint on an airport, you'll find that for them the noise footprint is almost centred over the runway. When you get back to older Boeing 737 and 707 aircraft, the noise footprint is massive over the airport. So it depends on the type of aircraft, the technology of the engines.

The Chairman: Mr. Casey.

Mr. Bill Casey: Thank you.

I'm just wondering, when NAV CANADA was developed, was the Air Traffic Control Association involved when it was developed, and are you satisfied with the way it has unfolded, generally speaking?

Mr. David Lewis: Mr. Casey, we were involved to a very large degree. The Minister of Transport at the time, the Honourable Doug Young, instituted an advisory committee to the minister to investigate and report on the possibility of commercializing the air navigation system in Canada. We feel we played a very strong leadership role in that. We were pleased with the model.

The model, I would say once again, is unique not only in Canada but in the world. It's one of the only air navigation systems that were severed from that government umbilical cord, to get it truly separate from government. It operates on a not-for-profit basis. I would suggest to you that the model is still one of the best anywhere. I'm disappointed that it's not fulfilling its potential.

Mr. Bill Casey: What could it change to fulfil its potential?

Mr. David Lewis: I believe there is too much of a business mentality in the organization, and they have in fact looked too hard at the bottom line and not enough at the safety. More funds should be expended on safety and on the acquisition of new technology, and there should be more of a balancing.

Mr. Bill Casey: What particular issues on safety are you talking about?

• 1620

Mr. David Lewis: Part of it relates to the acquisition of new equipment. You'll notice that in the last 10 years we've had air traffic control towers closed in this country. We haven't had any opened. And there are airports that are becoming busier. No one is looking at things like that, Mr. Casey.

Mr. Bill Casey: In your presentation you referred to the vagaries of various national air navigation systems and the danger of establishing different criteria. Is that happening now? Are we experiencing that right now in the industry?

Mr. David Lewis: We're all aware of technological change today. We see it in our own offices. The computer on my desk today is more powerful than the computer that ran the entire Apollo moon shot program.

The technology on the flight deck of aircraft is advancing at a rapid pace. Most of you fly. If you ever have the opportunity to go up front in a 767 or an A320 and see the new glass cockpits, you'll find it is phenomenal what they can do. They use global positioning systems, satellite-based navigation systems totally free of the ground-based navigation system that has been in place and in use for so long. When they talk about the shortest distance between two points... when I first started learning navigation, that was called a great circle route. Now it's called a minimum time track. It's not even an arc. It can be an “S” shape. It can be all kinds of things, depending on wind, depending on weather, depending on the performance of the aircraft. And the problem is that you have all of that technology in all of those cockpits up there, but you don't have it in the ground-based air traffic control system.

The simplest example I can give you is that a pilot can ask for a direct routing anywhere in the Canadian system and we can't portray it on our radar map. In fact, in most of our locations where you're working with procedural control, you have to use a grease pencil on plexiglas over top of a map to draw the track. Now, if you had high-speed data link and computers that could transmit that data back and forth, the aircraft could tell you exactly what track it wants to fly. That's the type of technology we need. That's where the system is going.

Mr. Bill Casey: NAV CANADA just announced that they're going to have a $90 million rebate to their shareholders. Have you any ideas on how that money might be better invested?

Mr. David Lewis: Mr. Casey, I've a lot of ideas as to how the money might have been better invested.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Mr. Asselin.

Mr. Gérard Asselin: You stated earlier that Transport Canada had begun the process of eliminating jobs and that NAV CANADA had merely continued along the same course. I'm trying to recall the fuss that was made when jobs were eliminated. Did you alert the public to the fact that these cuts could pose a potential threat?

I don't recall air traffic controllers grumbling a lot about this. Perhaps they were offered a more attractive early retirement package which provided them with more security than other employees could hope to have, but I don't recall that much of a fuss was made. If Montreal is capable today of controlling air transportation in the surrounding regions, then what's to stop Toronto from becoming a large flight control center from which all airports in Canada could be controlled? Maybe that's the direction in which we are heading.

Through its flight service stations, Montreal is capable of controlling virtually all air traffic in Quebec. Why then couldn't Toronto or Ottawa take on this responsibility? A super center could be located either in Ottawa or Toronto. That would solve part of the personnel problem. There would be more information on flights and again, this could be an opportunity to cut jobs at the expense of passenger safety.

If I were an air traffic controller, I would be concerned. If Montreal is capable of handling services for all Quebec regions, why then couldn't Toronto or Ottawa do the same thing? All they would need to do is buy a shopping center no longer in use and turn it into a mega control center which would handle all air traffic in Canada. Has such an option ever been considered?

[English]

Mr. David Lewis: Thank you, Mr. Asselin.

First of all, CATCA did participate in all of the public consultations and lobbied members of Parliament and other interested aviation groups on the closure of any and all air traffic control towers. I participated in many of them myself.

• 1625

I can't tell you specifically about Baie Comeau, but I can tell you that our Quebec regional director actively participated in that. I know the members from that location very well, and they made good formal presentations. But they were not able to convince the local people to get enough support to keep the units open.

As to moving to one area control centre, the technology is there today. You could do all of the air traffic control, not only in Canada but in the world, from one building. But it wouldn't be a good idea. In New Zealand, they tried to reduce the number of area control centres down to three. And one night, Ohakea area control centre burned to the ground, and they were left without radar coverage, without the ability to provide a service in a critical area for an extended period of time.

One of the underlying philosophies in aviation safety has been duplication. You have two pilots in a cockpit because one checks the other one's work. You're better off from a technological perspective to have a number of area control centres so that, in the event that one fails, you can take over the air space and continue to provide the same level, or at least a very close level, of service. I can't tell you how many you need. From a technological perspective, we know that the technology is there.

But there are a number of dynamics that come into play, and one of them, I would suggest to you, is that once an operation gets beyond a certain size—and I can't tell you what size that is—it becomes so impersonal that it's almost virtually unmanageable. People don't have contact with each other. The comparison I would use is these large aircraft carriers that the U.S. has. They go to sea for six months at a time and they have people on the crews who never meet each other. The same thing would happen in an area control centre of that size.

With regard to flight information centres, it is generally a very good concept. It's been utilized in other jurisdictions very well. There are some very negative aspects to them, and one of them—the example that I will use—is the telephone weather service. In the situation described by Mr. Morrison at Fredericton, when an individual calls a location he gets somebody who has intimate knowledge of that location as it relates to weather. Flight information centres use a cascading telephone effect. So if you phone for information on the weather at Baie Comeau, you might, because the telephone lines are all busy, wind up with someone in another province, in another part of Canada, who doesn't have that same intimate on-site knowledge of the local vagaries and those types of things. So I think the concept is good, but it has to be properly implemented.

The Chairman: Mr. Dromisky.

Mr. Stan Dromisky: You've answered some of my questions already with previous statements. But what I'm really interested in is what your union is doing to promote safety, efficiency, and cost-effectiveness. You have addressed a few things sort of directly and indirectly pertaining to safety, but—

[Translation]

Mr. Gérard Asselin: These areas are covered in the collective agreement.

[English]

Mr. David Lewis: Some of the specific things we are doing... again, I will fall right back to when we were in Transport Canada. The Canadian Air Traffic Control Association is highly recognized as taking a professional approach to the provision of safety and efficiency in air traffic control. We had, when we were in government, and continue to have in NAV CANADA more joint committees with the employer than any other bargaining agent, always with the view to the acquisition of new tools, new technology, that will best provide for a safe and efficient system and assist controllers in performing the tasks that they perform.

To try to list for you today the number of areas that we work in would be very difficult. But one that I'm very proud of is the fact that we were a driving force behind the commercialization of the air navigation system in Canada. It was operating at an annual $200 million shortfall; it was a burden to the taxpayers. It is no longer that. It could be better administered, but the model is still good. Those are the types of initiatives that CATCA takes on.

Mr. Stan Dromisky: Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Morrison.

Mr. Lee Morrison: Mr. Lewis, in your response to Mr. Cullen about noise abatement, you indicated—if I'm not misinterpreting what you said or misquoting you—that up to a point this runway selection could be based more on considerations of noise abatement than on wind conditions. I also thought you said that under certain circumstances the cutting of power would depend not so much on what's happening in the cockpit but on the location of the aircraft over built-up areas. Now, both of those scenarios are a little scary to me, as a passenger. I'm wondering, did I get you right and should I be afraid?

• 1630

Mr. David Lewis: On your first point, Mr. Morrison, with regard to noise abatement taking precedence over wind, one of the new terms that has become prevalent in the 1990s is risk tolerance. Risk tolerance has driven new procedures to be implemented in order to cover things like noise complaints. When I first started in air traffic control, you didn't assign a runway that had a 15-knot crosswind. Now you do to certain aircraft, but it's published that the aircraft can take that crosswind. The pilot, however, ultimately can say, “No, we're not taking it today and we need a different runway.” So those things do drive runway selection and, ultimately, impact on safety.

With regard to my comments on cutting power, when I was speaking I was talking about power settings on departure. What are commonly used now are called reduced-thrust departures. This reduces noise and requires the aircraft to run longer over the ground until it reaches an appropriate departure speed. You've probably noticed that when you travel. If you travelled 15 years ago, an aircraft went to full thrust and you felt it get up and off the runway fairly quickly in a fairly steep rate of climb. It doesn't do that anymore. Nowadays, it runs virtually the whole length of the runway. You feel the speed. You feel the tires bouncing a little more. The nose comes off and you do a more gradual take-off. Those are for noise abatement purposes and for reduced fuel consumption.

Mr. Lee Morrison: And when you run out of runway, what then?

Mr. David Lewis: When you're running out of runway then you go to full power. In bad weather conditions pilots totally ignore those types of operations.

As far as arrivals go, the best arrival right now—and this is a really good example of how technology has advanced—the flight management system on a high-technology cockpit today can indicate to the pilot what they call top of descent. At top of descent the pilot can, with the runway selected for landing, retard the throttles to flight idle and he doesn't touch them again until he hits reverse on the runway. The savings are in the hundreds of thousands of dollars in fuel burned.

Mr. Lee Morrison: Thank you.

The Chairman: I had Mr. Cullen for another round. Does anyone else have a question? No. Therefore, we'll go to concluding remarks, if you have any, Mr. Lewis.

Mr. David Lewis: Mr. Chairman, in closing, I will simply thank you very much for this opportunity to appear once again before the Standing Committee on Transport. I've been before the committee before, but this is my last opportunity since I'm leaving office. I have always enjoyed the forthright manner in which the committee operates. We always consider it a great opportunity to be here. Thank you very much.

The Chairman: We wish to thank you very much for your contribution, your report. Your answers are excellent and your members are very well served and have been very well served by you. That's a matter of record. Thank you.

Mr. David Lewis: Thank you.

The Chairman: To members of the committee, tomorrow you will be getting a copy of the Department of Transport's annual report, which was tabled on May 28. They have included a questionnaire asking you to respond. You're on your own to do it or not. It supposes that you're going to read the book if you're going to answer the questionnaire, so I'll leave that up to you.

Tomorrow the meeting is at 3.15 p.m. It will end at 4.30 p.m.

I'd like to remind the converted that I asked the clerk to put out a memo to the effect that cell phones should not be turned on at our meetings. It has been requested by a member of the committee and we will honour that. Is there anything else for the good of the club? No. Thank you very much.

The meeting is adjourned.