AGRI Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE AND AGRI-FOOD

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE L'AGRICULTURE ET DE L'AGROALIMENTAIRE

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Tuesday, February 3, 1998

• 0903

[English]

The Chairman (Mr. Joe McGuire (Egmont, Lib.)): Good morning, everyone. We'll call this meeting to order.

Considering the events that have occurred since the last time we met, I felt it was appropriate to have a report on the situation as it exists today as it relates to the ice storm.

Before we get going, I'd like to introduce a new clerk. Santosh has retired to another committee and Georges Etoka has now been assigned to the agriculture committee.

J.-D. fell off a trampoline, so he's indisposed, with many pins and everything else in his body, trying to stick him back together again. He's going to be absent for a while.

June Dewetering is going to take Sonya's place. She is at another committee meeting this morning. She's going to be taking everybody else's place here to my right until things get back together.

Mr. Jay Hill (Prince George—Peace River, Ref.): Mr. Chairman, I just wondered if it would be appropriate for the committee to send Santosh a thank you for all the work she did before she moved on to hopefully better or greater things—just to show our appreciation.

The Chairman: I'll do that in your name.

[Translation]

Mr. Jean-Guy Chrétien (Frontenac—Mégantic, BQ): Mr. Chairman, will the government party always be as poorly represented in 1998 as it is here this morning? There is only one government member present, even though there are eight serving on the committee.

• 0905

[English]

The Chairman: You're saying there should be more people on my right, on the government side? Hopefully they'll appear.

We've got the quality here; the quantity will arrive, I imagine.

This morning we have, from Emergency Preparedness Canada, André Tremblay, director general. I think we should have a report from you first, Mr. Tremblay, and then we'll go to Mr. Hedley.

Mr. André Tremblay (Director General, Readiness and Operations, Emergency Preparedness Canada): Mr. Chairman, unfortunately Emergency Preparedness Canada has not prepared a briefing of any kind. But I brought with me fact sheets or feuilles de documentation, which are available here on the disaster financial assistance arrangements that work between the federal government and all of the provinces and territories. It is a means by which the federal government can contribute to the expenses a province has incurred in the case of major disasters.

Thank you, sir.

The Chairman: Could you tell us how that works, sir, what the arrangements are with the provinces?

Mr. André Tremblay: Briefly, sir, the principle is that the provinces have the responsibility to assume the assistance to their citizens, to their infrastructure in case of disasters, and whenever the cost of those disasters becomes somewhat heavy to bear by the province or territory, they may request at that moment, through the minister responsible for emergency preparedness, assistance through the financial arrangements.

The federal government usually answers yes and the province goes on assisting the citizens, resetting the municipalities and their own departments to the state at which they were before the disaster. They may intervene in any way they wish for repairs to take place. Once that is done the claims are presented to the federal government. A formula is used to indicate what share the federal government will pay to the provinces. Once that is done, payment is made by the federal government.

In very special cases advance payments may be made based on very solid estimates of provincial expenses or on actual expenses made by the provinces.

In the present case, for the ice storm, as you all know, on January 17 the federal government gave two advances, one to Quebec and one to Ontario, $50 million and $25 million, based on estimates of damages that the provinces had suffered and naturally based also on estimates of expenses that the provinces were to incur in a short period.

The Chairman: Mr. Chrétien, we now have the quantity here to go with the quality. Everything is fine now.

Mr. Hedley.

Mr. Doug Hedley (Director General, Industry Performance and Analysis Directorate, Policy Branch, Department of Agriculture and Agri-Food): Thank you, Chairman. Let me address two issues for you. First I want to talk about the activities immediately after the storm and the kinds of concerns and issues that came up. Secondly, I want to talk to you about the nature of losses that we've been able to identify throughout the region.

Immediately after the storm I think one of the things we did was begin to estimate the number of people affected. Our numbers would indicate—and they may be a little high because we have taken only the municipalities that we know were affected; some parts of the municipalities may not be—about 10,500 farms in Ontario and about 25,800 farms in Quebec. I do not have a number yet for New Brunswick. In the rural areas what we have is about 343,000 people in Ontario affected by the storm and about 861,000 people in Quebec.

Immediately after the storm our biggest concern was the power on farms, particularly dairy, but also hog and poultry. Through the—

• 0910

[Translation]

Mr. Jean-Guy Chrétien: Mr. Chairman, instead of reading his prepared statement, could the witness give us something in writing? Perhaps then we too could enjoy his brief.

[English]

Mr. Doug Hedley: Certainly we can provide that information to you. I'm just working from notes. I haven't written it up in any formal way.

The Chairman: Continue.

Mr. Doug Hedley: We worked through EPC in terms of trying to get generators into the area, particularly for farms. We offered some of our own from Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada to keep farms running and processing plants running. We moved generators out of southern Ontario, for example, working with both the ministry in Ontario and Quebec on generators. The real issue here is that a large number of farms throughout the region did have standby generators, but by and large they did not have the capacity to withstand the sustained use over quite a period of time.

Our second biggest concern was getting the processing sector back on line. The reason we were involved in that is that we could not get product off farms and into processing, and as a result we were starting to see losses at farm level. We moved inspectors into the region. We were working double shifts at the plants that were still operational—weekend shifts—to try to handle that. Throughout, our purpose was to assure the quality and safety of food emerging from that system.

On the weekend immediately following the storm, we also arranged for raw milk to go to the U.S., to Michigan, for processing and return of product to Canada. We also worked with the United States government and Revenue Canada to assure that needed supplies could get into Canada safely and quickly. I believe Quebec moved milk into New Brunswick and P.E.I. for processing, because such a high proportion of milk processing was down.

All of that effort in terms of processing is largely complete. We're returning to more normal operations. Most of the processing plants are at near or full capacity again.

The minister, over a five- or six-day period, visited a large number of the regions in eastern Ontario and Quebec to see the damage for himself and to assure that all possible things were being done to get the food and farm system back in order.

In terms of the milk moved out of the area, we moved about 1.35 million litres into Michigan for processing. In terms of losses on farms that we can identify, about 13.5 million litres of milk were dumped that could not be picked up and safely used.

Some chicken and hogs were moved out of the area for a very short period of time before processing came back on line.

Other things were happening. The Farm Credit Corporation immediately announced it would be working with its clients throughout the region where cashflow was a problem with their clients. The Canadian Bankers Association as well has indicated that their members throughout the region would be taking similar actions.

On the retail side, we find no reports of any shortages of retail food for consumers. I know we did contact many of the processors and distributors to assure that we would have continuity at retail level.

Under the chairmanship of Andrew and me, we met daily within the department to make sure we were doing everything we could.

Let me turn to simply a listing of the nature of losses that we can identify. Let me say at the beginning that this is not a list of compensation; it is simply the losses we can identify, and we cannot put numbers on them yet. It's going to be several months before we can get to that, and let me explain why.

• 0915

We did lose a lot of milk, as I indicated, on farms and we also lost some in processing plants. We're also going to see lower milk production through the remainder of the lactations throughout the affected region. I would note that both provinces have worked very well with their farmers, getting farm management information out and information on how to get a cow back into production.

We did lose quite a number of animals, and I would refer to Bob Ray for details there.

We had major losses throughout the maple industry. The maple industry in Canada is worth about $120 million. We've probably affected 60% to 70% of it. Some areas will return fairly quickly; others may never return. We also lost a very high proportion of pipelines in the maple system that will have to be replaced before use.

We're getting some reports of smothering or asphyxiation of bees, or freezing of bees, where they were in warmer areas with electricity keeping them warm. Again, we'll have to wait until spring to know how many of them survived.

We have a lot of broken fruit trees, berry bushes, raspberry canes, and again we're going to have to wait until spring. Our scientists are indicating to us that the ice may very well have damaged the leaf buds and the flower buds on some of the fruit trees. So until a tree blossoms we're not going to really know the extent of the damage.

There is some concern about small cereal seeds in the affected region. There are some varieties that are very highly specific to the area. It's very difficult to replace that seed. If it comes out of controlled atmosphere storage, you start to affect the germination fairly rapidly. Again, that's one we're going to have to assess over time.

In terms of the greenhouse industry—and this is primarily centred in Quebec—plantings normally take place in February for the spring market on the transplants and vegetables. Very few vegetables were planted in the greenhouses. The floriculture industry, on the other hand, did have a fair amount of product under way.

The damage is structural. It is because of the ice crushing them. Again, we're still trying to determine how we get over that and the extent of damage.

With that, I'm going to turn to Andrew Graham, who will talk about the actions we're taking.

Mr. Andrew Graham (Assistant Deputy Minister, Corporate Services Branch, Department of Agriculture and Agri-Food): Good morning, Mr. Chairman.

If I could, I'd just like to address the actions that we're taking in the sector to get back to normal, but I'd like to preface that with a couple of comments.

First of all, the situation is still fluid and ongoing. There are still people without power. While farms have adapted in the triangle, they are still virtually in a crisis mode. So any figures we have are tentative and for the most part are provided to us by the provincial authorities.

I think the other comment is that, as Mr. Tremblay said at the beginning, it's the provincial authorities who have to really manage the situation at the very front and in fact have to formulate the strategies they're going to follow.

Our role has been to provide the expertise if we can, to work with the organizations if we can, and in fact to share and transfer information, because we have obviously been engaged across the country in supporting other situations. The requirement for us to transfer knowledge to the provinces about issues, to raise issues, or to offer our expertise, whether it be an offer of a team of electricians, as we did at Saint-Joseph, to get out there and just repair generators continuously, through to our scientists monitoring oxygen levels below this horrible ice level that's on the fields, which I think people are underestimating as a possible outcome of this thing....

We've been doing this in support of various activities.

• 0920

Within a very few days of this we recognized the potential long-term implications and the need to track them. We also recognized that the assessment of damage will take some scientific expertise, which we are applying in this area, and it's very hasty at this point to form any final judgments about what the impacts are, both negatively and positively, because the sector is amazingly resilient in terms of its capacity to pull things back.

We've made and are continuing direct contact with provincial departments of agriculture in Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia, because all of those provinces were affected, to varying degrees obviously.

I could also point out that through our marketing and industry support branch, our regional offices in Montreal, Quebec, and Guelph are maintaining constant contact with OMAFRA in Ontario, the Ontario Ministry of Agriculture, and MAPAQ in Quebec, its counterpart.

A team from our department visited OMAFRA in Ontario twice and was in constant contact with Quebec. We have also visited New Brunswick once to provide them with information, both in terms of what we can provide and our experience and knowledge arising from previous disasters that have affected the sector. We have also been continuing with other meetings and telephone contact—it's been virtually constant since the storm—with officials in trying to clarify issues.

We took the lead with Emergency Preparedness Canada in interpreting the guidelines for this particular disaster in the agricultural sector, to assist the provinces in making decisions, because as Monsieur Tremblay has said, the province must make the decision that they have a disaster, that they are going to manage it in a certain way, and that they are going to be providing certain assistance. We certainly work with the provinces in letting them know what other provinces have done, what has happened in the past in terms of viable actions they could take, and to assure producers that many of the added costs they were experiencing could eventually be covered if the provinces decided to move in that direction. This resulted in a press release on January 21 outlining some of the damages that could be claimed under the DFAA guidelines if the province chose to cover them.

In general, as Dr. Hedley has said, the processing sector is largely back to normal so product can be processed in the region and in the processing plants as usual.

Access to farms and the delivery of products from farms to processors and/or markets is virtually back to normal. Most farms have power restored, with the exceptions I've already mentioned. Generators are now available with sustained capacity to manage situations where the power has yet to return, and in fact, as many of us experienced, the generators that flowed into Ontario moved on to Quebec. That system was really moving very quickly given the complications that arose, including, as I recall, one shipment from Georgia that had to move pretty quickly.

The remaining urgency and the one that of course we're very concerned about is the maple syrup crop, which will be the first clear indicator of extent of damage to plants, and that's going to start in two or three weeks. MAPAQ and OMAFRA are monitoring this very closely, and we are obviously trying to provide them with any information we can and indeed are monitoring it.

We would also like to underline the fact that Human Resources Development Canada very early announced the use of three of its programs for youth and employment to assist, among other things, producers and growers to gain access to these employment programs more quickly to assist in the clean-up.

We were quite heartened that virtually the first grant of money under this program was to a maple bush operator in Quebec, indicating where the clear priority was, to help in clearing the brush and the repair of the collection pipelines.

We're continuing to work with agricultural ministries in the affected provinces to determine the damages to assess what can be done.

The Chairman: Mr. Ray, do you have something to add?

Mr. Bob Ray (Vice-President, Public and Regulatory Affairs, Canadian Food Inspection Agency, Department of Agriculture and Agri-Food): Mindful of the time, I have just a couple of highlights about the Canadian Food Inspection Agency. Most of our work was early on, in the first two- or three-week period, obviously.

There were four major concerns. Number one was obviously the maintenance and the shifting around, if you will, of the food inspection system. We had over 12 abattoirs, probably 34 meat plants, and over 50 processing plants in total down. Dairy plants, both Ontario and Quebec.... We had not only the problem of getting to the milk and cooling it and storing it on farm, but there was also the processing sector.

• 0925

We diverted product to other plants. We ran about 1,000 hours of overtime—shift work, double time, and weekends. The disruption in the processing sector was actually quite minimal.

In the case of Quebec, they moved just over a million litres of milk down into Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and P.E.I. What happens with the milk is you cascade it. You don't want to truck milk 1,000 miles, so we were moving milk out of one area into another. Milk was going from Nova Scotia into P.E.I., from Quebec into Nova Scotia. You had a very short, or at least a shorter, travel time.

In Ontario the situation was both that we couldn't get to the milk and that we did not have processing capacity; hence the deal with the U.S. basically to move milk down in bond, bring it back after it had been processed into skim milk, butter, buttermilk, that sort of thing. That lasted for only a couple of days. Processing plants came back on, through generators for the most part. We had three big ones down on the dairy side in Ontario. We had one major factory in Quebec, Agropur, and in particular their plant at Granby, which processed over a million litres a day.

In other areas, Doug has mentioned the border. There were two concerns there. One was our import system. Like everybody else we were affected. We lost our headquarters here in Nepean for two days, and we had obviously the same situation with our computer systems. We moved our headquarters down to Guelph about 9:30 Thursday morning. We moved our import control systems out of Saint-Bernard-de-Lacolle over to Pearson airport; we do it electronically. One of the benefits of the import system is that we inspect not only in the country of origin at the border, but also at the import service centres and at destinations. So we have some flexibility there to move the critical control points.

In terms of exports, we kept our facility at Saint-Hyacinthe running on generator—exports, cattle as an example—to do blood serum tests to make sure the exports were not impacted in any major fashion.

There is one other area of the food safety side. We worked very closely with both MAPAQ and OMAFRA and with the public health authorities in terms of getting out the message for all, not only consumers who had lost their freezers, fridges, whatever, but also in terms of the plants that had product in storage. Many of the processing guys early on ran off generators, and for a lot of processing it's obviously key that you maintain a certain temperature during that processing and storage. Hence our inspectors—Monsieur Bertrand can speak about it much better than I can—paid special attention obviously to those plants that were running in a portable fashion, if you will.

Basically that's it. In terms of animal losses, these numbers change daily. I'll give you an example. We have about 140,000 trout. It's obviously difficult to count that many, so it's an estimate.

In terms of the actual animals themselves, we have about 140,000 chickens. We have less than 8,000 hogs and piglets. Just to put it in perspective, there are probably about 22 million poultry in the two affected areas. There are probably about, I would say, 4 million hogs, primarily in Quebec. Nonetheless, we're talking about very significant numbers of livestock that were impacted. It's a testament to the way these folks out there handled the situation. The milk side is very important. You have to milk them, water them, and feed them. In hogs and poultry, the heating and ventilation are very key. Obviously the folks on the ground did a hell of a job.

Those are the highlights, Mr. Chairman. The CFIA, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, is basically back to normal, I believe. We loaned a number of inspectors to the province of Quebec so that they could inspect in some of the provincial facilities. I believe they're back with us now. We continue to deal with whatever queries or questions that have come our way. But for the most part we're back to normal. Thank you.

The Chairman: Does the federal Department of Agriculture work directly with the provincial departments? Were committees set up between the two levels?

Mr. Bob Ray: The Canadian Food Inspection Agency clearly has the mandate for the federally inspected plants. In terms of actually helping the province, we have loaned staff; we have worked with staff—not only the inspectors but also the veterinarians we have on staff. So we work very closely through OMAFRA and through MAPAQ.

The Chairman: We'll go right to questions. Mr. Hill.

Mr. Jay Hill: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank all of you gentlemen for appearing this morning and giving us an update, bringing us up to speed on the disaster and how you view it.

• 0930

I don't think any of us in this room or across the country watched that ice storm unfold over the last number of weeks and wasn't touched by it—and I speak as well for the people who I'm pleased to represent up in the far northeastern corner of British Columbia. Certainly it was covered very extensively in the media, and there was a lot of empathy shown by the local residents. I suspect that's universal all across the country.

I would like to look at the criteria for the disaster financial assistance arrangements. I would be remiss if I didn't say at the outset that there has been a lot of hurt all across this country this year, not just with the ice storm in primarily Quebec, Ontario, and also the Atlantic provinces. We only have to look to the area that I represent, the Peace River country, where they've experienced two years of disastrous excessive moisture. Farmers have had virtually no income for two years in a row in British Columbia. In the southern part of British Columbia, we had potato growers who were virtually wiped out by excessive moisture and hail damage in the Okanagan. We had extreme drought in New Brunswick, and the aftermath of the flood along the Red River. It seems like it's been a succession of disasters. Hopefully it doesn't get any worse than the ice storm we've just experienced in eastern Canada.

As I said, I'm curious about the criteria for the disaster financial assistance arrangements, because when I speak to farmers, whether they're from New Brunswick or from the Peace River country, they're not really concerned about whether they fit into the box. All they see is that their farms are in serious financial jeopardy, as I'm sure a lot of these dairymen and maple producers in this area are. They want to look to both levels of government and ask what we are prepared to do for them.

I know you don't set the criteria, but I would like to hear your comments on them. Do you feel the present criteria for these disaster financial assistance arrangements are sufficient to address the very real needs, perhaps not just confined to the ice storm? Since that's the most recent disaster and the one we're discussing today, though, could you indicate whether you feel the criteria are sufficient?

The Chairman: Mr. Tremblay.

Mr. André Tremblay: Mr. Chairman, the criteria used by most provinces in providing financial assistance, especially to the farm areas, are geared directly to their estimation or to their evaluation of the needs of their own farmers. At that moment, the request is then made by the province to the federal government for disaster financial assistance through our arrangements. At that moment, we naturally do have some specific criteria by which the federal money will be fed back to the provinces.

I may simply highlight in general that the farm operations, if they are owner-operated—the owner draws the majority of his revenue from them—become automatically eligible for the technical damages they have suffered to buildings, equipment and so on. If they are considered as a large business or part-time business within the guidelines of the federal government, these are not recognized as being eligible.

This being said, I must also raise that for the Red River flood and the Saguenay flood, those cases have been reviewed and a negotiation has taken place between the provinces—Manitoba on one side and Quebec on the other—and in that moment we have provided a special arrangement in addition to the disaster financial arrangements. In these special arrangements, all businesses, both small and medium, were being considered as eligible under the new terms.

So first of all it's the province, having provided for its farm operations of all kinds so that the immediacy of the disaster is answered right away. From then on, when the provincial government requests further assistance or compensation for their expenses at that moment at the federal level if the DFAA is found to be non-sufficient, there is always room from government to government to negotiate additional arrangements.

Does that answer your questions?

Mr. Jay Hill: To follow up on that, I'm interested in the sense that after having read through this a few weeks ago when an announcement was made, my understanding is that one of the things that makes an expense for a farmer ineligible is if it could have been covered under insurance. The minister has been very clear on this in a number of statements that he's made—and not only about this disaster, as I say, but about a lot that preceded it.

• 0935

How are you going to evaluate whether...? I noticed that he said in his press release, “the cost of repairing any asset damaged by the ice storm, such as a barn”. Can a farmer buy insurance for snow load or ice, or is that an insurable loss? If it was insurable, why would we be covering it under the present criteria? I get back again to whether the criteria are sufficient to address the needs.

Mr. Andrew Graham: Well, I don't have a final answer on this one because we have already had cases where the insurance covered it and it went through, and cases where it didn't. I think we're going to have some shakedown on this particular issue because the conditions of the insurance contract, etc., were different in various cases. I mean, that has to be our first position, but we're already hearing stories, if you will, where insurance companies are saying no, that's not covered. This is the safety net that's provided.

In more general terms, like the other situations that you described so well and that are happening across the country, I think this is causing us to reflect on whether everything that's out there is adequately covered. What may or may not be emerging is a trend here. We're not sure it is a trend, but we're certainly are concerned about whether or not there is enough linkage between the global disaster versus the farm-specific kind of safety net programs, versus the insurance, versus the public insurance, the income support. This is a perfect time to ask that question because we're seeing glaring examples. I mean, you have even taken a few phone calls from farmers directly around the question of whether the insurance does cover it or doesn't cover it, right?

So that's not the best answer, but we're learning.

Mr. Jay Hill: Is the government going to be involved in trying to hold the insurance companies accountable? I guess that may be another side issue to this.

Mr. André Tremblay: In that specific case, the provincial governments would be the ones handling that aspect of things.

If I may just add something, Mr. Chairman, the guidelines under which we operate are somewhat flexible because, as we've noted across Canada, some areas are much more stringent in their rules and their applications than are other areas. For instance, what governs insurance companies to offer coverage into one area of Canada may not be the same as in the rest of Canada.

In a sense, we have to be careful about how we apply the guidelines and how we evaluate each disaster, and we have to be able to come to the best or the highest need of the moment. This is where our interface with the provincial governments and territorial governments comes into effect—to ensure as much as possible that the citizens do not have to suffer. Then, when the time comes to settle the accounts, it's at that moment we say that as a general term, if it is insurable, it's not eligible. On the other hand, if it's not insurable at reasonable rates, then we may want to look back at it.

There are also the other criteria that say, for instance, that it is not eligible if it is covered under another government program. Then again, if it is covered in one area of the country, does that mean the rest are not eligible? At that moment, we have to weigh that in for every case. This is why our relations with the provincial organizations are so important in dealing with this type of financial assistance.

[Translation]

Mr. Jean-Guy Chrétien: Mr. Chairman, if I may, I would like to congratulate the people who coordinated efforts to deal with this unprecedented crisis. I would invite my colleagues who are not from northern Ontario or from hard hit areas in Quebec and northern New Brunswick to come and view the damage firsthand. If you like, we could go out together on Thursday and I could show you some areas that look like war zones.

There is quite a bit to see along the highway, but if you go further inland, it is clear that we are dealing with an indescribable disaster. I cannot find the words to describe the havoc wreaked by the ice storm.

• 0940

This being the Agriculture Committee, I won't dwell on small and medium-sized businesses or on urban residents who were forced out of their homes for three weeks and, in some cases, even a month. For some, the crisis still isn't over. Instead, I would like to focus on farming operations in the Eastern Townships where I live. I've attended two meetings of two relatively large and vocal groups of maple syrup producers. I met with one group of 150 producers in Stornoway and with another group of 125 producers in Thetford Mines. I've seen men and women 50 and 55 years of age breaking into tears describing how overnight, they had been wiped out and lost everything they owned. They told me: We have a $75,000 payment due to the farm credit corporation next April 1, and we won't even be able to harvest the sap in 1998.

I had the opportunity, or rather the misfortune, as I would surely have passed on the experience, of visiting no fewer than 53 sugar bush operations. Of course, the list of invitations grew longer as producers got word that their member of Parliament was touring the area and had not stopped by their particular sugar bush. They would call and ask my to stop by because their sugar bush was in far worse shape than the others. I visited 53 sugar bushes in all, although the number of invitations I received was considerably higher. Some invitations were from producers outside the region that I normally oversee.

Mr. Chairman, I have a question and I hope that Mr. Graham can enlighten me. I toured the sugar bushes with the press release from Jean Lamoureux or Louise Mignault in hand. This release stated that maple syrup producers in particular would "possibly be compensated for the costs incurred to clean up their sugar bushes, including the costs associated with pruning maples and replacing tubing systems. I read these words to them in an effort to ease their concerns. I informed them that possibly they would be eligible for compensation. Maple syrup producers are straightforward individuals and they asked me rather pertinent questions. I made two or three phone calls and never received any straight answers. Therefore, I will put the questions to you.

If a producer has a tubing system that is 15 years old, will he be entitled to the same compensation as a producer with a system that is only one year old? As far as pruning is concerned, it's not simply a matter of going around in a truck equipped with a cherry picker and pruning the maples. If the top branches of the maple tree 8 or 10 metres off the ground have broken off but are still attached to the trunk, which occurs quite frequently, clearly those branches must be pruned. It will cost a fortune to comply with the statement contained in this press release if each tree in the sugar bush is pruned.

Another question I had concerned the productive capital. According to the experts, at the most severely affected sugar bush, 80 % of the trees sustained some damage. That operation is a virtual write-off. It was a rather old sugar bush, where the trees were on average 250 years old. We are talking about productive capital. This producer has sustained an incalculable loss. What happens to the productive capital?

Obviously, I have congratulated you a great deal. My colleague Jay Hill from British Columbia asked you a question earlier. He likely knows that maple syrup producers or farmers will have to wait two, three or four years before receiving any compensation.

• 0945

One must understand that most of these people do not necessarily live from day to day, but at least from year to year. If they have to wait three or four years before receiving any compensation, there will likely be some nervous breakdowns, suicides and, of course, a large number of personal bankruptcies.

My question then is how do we go about ensuring compliance with Mr. Vanclief's statement? I believe he made the comment about productive capital during a presentation to Canadian dairy producers in Vancouver.

[English]

Mr. Andrew Graham: I don't know where to start.

At the beginning I was responsible, with Mr. Hedley, for coordinating this, but I also was a farmer without power for eight days. This was a very emotional experience for all of us. The stories have been coming in continuously. So I thank you for your words.

I think one of the key principles—and there are a couple of key principles—is one that obviously Mr. Tremblay can speak to better than I. The federal role here is very much dependent on how quickly...or the determination by the province as to the seriousness of the disaster. They have to first declare a disaster. In some cases we may normally interpret it to be a disaster, but if the province doesn't declare it there's nothing we can do to invoke this assistance. In fact, the Government of Quebec invoked it very quickly.

The principle, as I certainly understand it, and as has been applied by the disaster assistance, is particularly problematic for maple sugar. There's no question about it. The principle is that assistance will be provided federally—and I want to get into this a little bit—to restore normal operations.

We all know normal operation for a maple tree that's totally destroyed is not just four years, as you said, but much longer than that. Just to plant a new tree to replace it.... Then the question of income becomes an issue, and the income loss. In fact, my understanding of the regulations is that income loss is not covered here federally.

So in many respects, the question of whether a 15-year-old pipeline is replaced by a brand-new one with no depreciation is one that the province has to decide. I don't like saying, by the way, that this is a provincial versus federal matter, but in fact we can't tell them what to do.

If I can interpret what Mr. Julien said in his press releases—which followed that one, by the way—and his more detailed, immediate-aid programs, which were announced by both Mr. Julien in Quebec and Mr. Villeneuve in Ontario, immediate cash was available to farmers to start the restoration program.

Major capitalization indeed still has to be dealt with. As Dr. Hedley said, within our own department our federal credit corporation is trying to build maximum flexibility to meet individual needs.

We do not have an easy answer for the question of the long-term restoration of the maple sugar bushes because, quite frankly, today we don't know. You've offered an extreme case of 80% full destruction, and that's obviously a horrible case, but we still don't know yet the full impact.

The Chairman: Very briefly, Mr. Chrétien.

[Translation]

Mr. Jean-Guy Chrétien: I want to know if I would be making a mistake or if I would be lying if I told maple syrup producers in my region that they will be compensated for the costs incurred for tree pruning. It's a very specific question. You are surely going to tell me that Quebec will handle all of that. I met with an official from the Department of Intergovernmental Affairs in Quebec City last week and he informed me that talks had been initiated with the federal government and that it was a rather arduous process.

These are nice words and when I pass them along to my maple syrup producers, they seem pleased. However, the Department of Intergovernmental Affairs says that this is a complex process.

Obviously the Quebec Government is prepared to compensate maple syrup producers for expenses incurred for tree pruning, given the 90-10 share. Obviously, the Quebec Government will not refuse to compensate them. What the government does appear to be saying is that the negotiations are a difficult process.

• 0950

Having said this, should I lie to my maple syrup producers and inform them that they will be compensated for expenses incurred for tree pruning and for the removal or replacement of collection pipelines damaged by the ice storm?

Mr. André Tremblay: With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to answer that question. You can go ahead and tell them that they will receive some compensation. The Quebec Government issued Order 7788 on January 26, 1998 announcing the establishment of a special program pursuant to which non-refundable advance payments will be provided, as well as the creation of a special financial assistance program to cover damages sustained by farming operations in general.

The order stipulates that a non-refundable advance payment of up to $3,000 can be issued to cover the following expenses: the rental of generators, the purchase of fuel to run the generators, repairs to damaged equipment vital to the immediate operations of a business, as well clean-up and pruning costs.

You mentioned the difficult talks under way between the Quebec and federal governments. I've been involved in these talks. When we discussed the costs relating to pruning, we talked about two possible courses of action for maple producers: on the one hand, there is the direct assistance program under which a maximum of $3,000 is available to maple producers from the province of Quebec to help them carry out immediate repairs on their collection pipelines along with a certain amount of compensation for pruning operations so that producers can open for the maple syrup season this year. On the other hand, the Government of Quebec has set up a special program to compensate producers for other types of damages sustained.

Another interesting option available to maple syrup producers is a Human Resources Development Canada Program under which producers can employ recent employment insurance recipients to assist them with pruning or clean-up operations.

Therefore, there are two programs currently available to maple syrup producers to help them deal with the immediate crisis and to get their operations up and running for this year's sugaring off season. In the long term, the governments of Canada and Quebec will pursue their discussions as needed with our farmers, the Privy Council Office as well as with the Quebec provincial cabinet to determine which programs will prove most effective.

[English]

The Chairman: Thank you very much.

Mr. McCormick.

Mr. Larry McCormick (Hastings—Frontenac—Lennox and Addington, Lib.): Yes, thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you for being here, gentlemen. I certainly congratulate all people who helped so much in this country, and even from the United States. We could talk for hours on the stories of the spirit that built this country, because it is certainly alive and well today. This is very evident in rural Canada, but on behalf of the people in eastern Ontario, I'd like to say our hearts still go out to those people in Quebec who are suffering so much today.

I have a couple of questions. I've heard from pretty good sources that certain groups, such as farmers, would not be eligible for the same compensation if the operation is a corporation. I've heard this from one of your departments sitting here at this table. Whether this is only because of provincial jurisdiction or not, it is a very serious concern.

We keep jumping back to the maple bush. In every bush in eastern Canada, the danger that lurks there is phenomenal. Widowmakers, as they're known, are in all the bushes. I'm glad to hear you say this will be discussed with the provinces, the Privy Council and everyone. We have a lot of great experts—and I'm not one—but when we see the canopies not totally destroyed but severely damaged in the tops of the trees, and when we see the saplings that are bent over and frozen to the ice, you know there's going to be a lot of cell damage and so on. Now, many of these trees, whether they're large ones or small ones, no doubt will be alive this August, but will they be alive in the fall of 1999? No one can answer that. We have to have an open program there.

• 0955

Again, on the maple bush, we have to find out what the assets are. But you say you're going to address that.

In eastern Ontario I'm hearing from several communities now who are meeting this week to discuss their emergency disaster plans, or to plan to have emergency disaster plans. They of course are asking whether there's any assistance available. In their eyes it might be a good investment to have something available to help them.

But I want to share my time, so I'll just leave that with you for now, and thank you.

Mr. André Tremblay: On the question of the clientele or the corporations or the owners of farm operations, in both provinces currently in terms of the ice storm in Ontario and Quebec they have made no qualifier as to the size of the operations for the eligibility under their programs.

Mr. Andrew Graham: Just to be absolutely clear here, the OMAFRA announcement said that you had to have a registered farm business number, which means that it's anybody with $7,000 gross income and above. No distinction was made on the basis of corporations.

We could follow up for you if there is any distinction—

Mr. Larry McCormick: Please do. We've heard it from within your department. I would like you to do that. It was a stressful time.

Thank you very much.

The Chairman: Mr. Calder.

Mr. Murray Calder (Dufferin—Peel—Wellington—Grey, Lib.): Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman.

Just for the record, out of our area alone, in the Mount Forest area, which is in central Ontario, we've sent about eight tractor-trailer loads of cordwood to the Winchester and Saint-Hyacinthe areas.

I've two concerns. I have a poultry farm in Ontario. I'll tell you, I was very thankful, when I walked past my generators, that they were capable of generating 100 kilowatts on our farm. But that's short term. After five days I'm going to start running into problems with fuels, armatures and gearboxes. I know that. But I've also spent an awful of money on wiring Durham switches at the poles and everything. I've heard about a lot of farms that didn't have standby power.

My first question would be, then, how are we monitoring back-feed out onto the grid? If somebody had a standby generator and the electrician wasn't going to be at the farm for the next three days, and they were looking at that standby generator, they may try to do it themselves. Maybe you can bring us up to date on that.

In terms of the maple bush, off our farm we sell veneer. Every eight to ten years we market about 100,000 to 150,000 board feet of veneer. Now, the maple industry probably is going to show a decline this year, but more markedly it's going to show a decline next spring and the spring after that. There are some badly damaged trees right now that will still be able to produce sap this spring but will be on a cordwood pile somewhere next spring or the spring after that.

How long are we going to monitor the damage that was done to the maple industry?

Mr. Doug Hedley: Quite frankly, in terms of the hydro, I've only read the same press reports you have. It's something we worry about, but really it's beyond anything we can deal with. Again, it's Ontario Hydro and Hydro-Québec that are going to have to work with that.

On the maple, first of all, again—and it's not a way out—it is up to the province here. We will go on working with them just as long as necessary. I'll be very honest; I think our scientists are going to watch this one for 20 years. It's going to take that long before we see the canopies return in many cases.

Mr. Andrew Graham: If I may, you've highlighted just one of many hydro issues that we want to.... We're still pulling out of the short-term response, but in the longer term we want to sit down, consistent with what Mr. Hill said, and look at the gaps that emerged here.

• 1000

From a purely farm perspective, there are hydro issues all over the place. One certainly is that some farmers did some major damage to their own animals trying to hook up generators. Then there is the feedback issue, the pushback issue into the grid that you alluded to. There are wild inconsistencies around who had generators and who didn't, some stories of large operations not having generator back-up, which you described that you have. We realize there's a gap inside the sector that we want to step back and identify, obviously with the organizations that are really monitoring this most closely, the agricultural federations and that sort of thing.

So we see it as an issue. We just don't have a snap answer to it, that's for sure.

Mr. Murray Calder: Okay. I have two quick follow-ups, Mr. Chairman.

One would be the debate as to whether or not—with all these repairs that are going on right now on the grid—the grid should start to be buried. Secondly, regarding the replacement stock for these maple bushes, where would they come from? Question number one, would nursery stock survive if it were put back out into a bush, or should we be developing a program where we're going out and getting natural stock to replace them with?

Mr. Andrew Graham: We've asked a couple of our scientists to look at that issue, because during the middle of one of these many things we were doing, we were asking ourselves about the viability of putting in nursery stock. We have yet to get a complete model of what's going on. With the loss of the canopy, putting in nursery stock may in fact be dysfunctional.

Mr. Murray Calder: That's right.

Mr. Andrew Graham: So we have yet to come up with.... There's no silver bullet on this; you know that too.

Mr. Murray Calder: Thank you very much.

The Chairman: Mr. Proctor.

Mr. Dick Proctor (Palliser, NDP): I wanted to come back to where Mr. McCormick was, in part on the question of eligibility. I heard your answer on the corporations and all that, but one of you mentioned in the answer something about $7,000—as long as the farm generates $7,000. Did I hear that right? Does that mean a farm that generates less than $7,000 is not eligible?

Mr. Andrew Graham: If I could, I said OMAFRA. The Ontario ministry said they would use their definition of a farmer, which is one who is registered. In Quebec the definition is different; it's $3,000, I believe. So what I'm saying is that the provinces are using their normal definition of a farmer in this regard.

Mr. Dick Proctor: And you're saying it has to be set by the province in terms of...that you will work with them depending on their eligibility. But under the DFAA, section 24, there's a section there about hobby farmers.

Mr. Andrew Graham: Yes.

Mr. Dick Proctor: As I read the regulations, that suggests that if the major family income doesn't come from the farm, that farm operation is considered to be hobby. Is that correct? Can you confirm that for me?

Mr. André Tremblay: Yes, sir. The hobby farms in our guidelines—the federal side—are not eligible. In the provincial orders in council, or provincial Ontario program, they are eligible if they are registered farms. At the moment, all it means is that farmers will get assistance from the provincial government, and when the provincial government brings the bill to Ottawa for compensation by the federal government, we'll strip out these areas for which the federal program does not compensate the province. But the farmers themselves will have had the assistance provided them by the province.

[Translation]

Mr. Jean-Guy Chrétien: Mr. Chairman, I would like to add something to that.

[English]

The Chairman: Yes, go ahead.

[Translation]

Mr. Jean-Guy Chrétien: In order to be eligible in Quebec, producers must have been registered with the MAPAQ prior to January 4, 1998.

Mr. André Tremblay: Yes, that's correct.

Mr. Jean-Guy Chrétien: In order to register with the MAPAQ, producers must market $10,000 worth of products, and not simply earn a net income of $10,000. If a gentleman farmer produces $10,000 or more of a product and is registered with the MAPAQ, he is eligible, even if this is not his primary source of income.

[English]

Mr. Dick Proctor: Let me try to be clear on this. I guess under your definition perhaps I grew up on a hobby farm, although I never thought it was much of a hobby. But my Dad did not make enough money to support the family and earned a lot of his income off the farm, and my brother and I did a lot of the milking of the cows, etc.

• 1005

An hon. member: And they weren't hobby cows.

Mr. Dick Proctor: No, they weren't hobby cows.

My question is, if this had occurred when I was growing up, would I have been covered, or would my dad and mom have been covered or not? What are you saying in that situation?

Mr. Andrew Graham: If I may, I'm going to try to help here a little bit.

There are two issues here. I was thinking as we were discussing it that if one of your constituents approached you and asked...the answer is that the provinces said they will cover this, period. That's the first issue, what's going to happen to me as a farmer, as an individual, and the province has said yes, we will do this.

The second issue is who is going to pay the bill. In this case the distinction lies in the difference between...the regulations under the disaster assistance say that the federal government will pay 90% of the cost for this category; below this category it's not covered. However, in the past—and I'll use the Saguenay as a good example, or I believe also Red River—the province approached the federal government in general, not under the disaster assistance, saying these people aren't covered and we'd like to do another arrangement, because the part-time farmer in fact is the emerging reality of life, except for the huge farmers. In fact, there were agreements reached in both of those cases and they were covered on a 50-50 basis.

So there are two questions, and it will depend on how the provinces wish to approach the federal government on this.

Mr. Dick Proctor: I think it was you, Mr. Graham, who mentioned the shakedown on insurance. There will be a shakedown. Can you elaborate on what you mean by that?

Mr. Andrew Graham: There's no shakedown. What we're saying is we have to shake down the information to find out what's going on, because it's really clear that the details of coverage.... I think I can give a really good example, and that's the greenhouses in Quebec. MAPAQ's initial assessment is that most of the damages are covered by their insurance policies. Most of their insurance policies absolutely require generator back-up. They wouldn't give them coverage unless they had generator back-up.

Those are a couple of elements that we're learning as we're trying to understand what's going on. Aside from that, we're just watching this one at this point, because it's a pretty complex field.

The Chairman: Mr. Hedley.

Mr. Doug Hedley: Very briefly, I've had a large number of calls from individual farmers in eastern Ontario, extending from Frontenac, Lanark, Leeds-Grenville, Dundas, Nepean, reporting to me that with structural damage to their barns, even though they thought it was covered under their insurance, the insurance company is telling them it is not covered. These are the kinds of holes Andrew is talking about that we need to find, so that we know how to deal with that as we put together the web of disaster assistance and safety nets and insurance and all the rest.

The Chairman: Thank you. Mr. Borotsik.

Mr. Rick Borotsik (Brandon—Souris, PC): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

To say the least, the issue is overwhelming. I would suspect that January 1998 will probably go down in your diaries as being one of the most interesting, if not the most difficult, that you've had to deal with. I'm going to thank you obviously for all the effort the federal government and your departments have put into it. I'm not going to congratulate you yet. I don't think the congratulations can come probably for another two or three years, until we work our way through this whole system.

I've had some experience with natural disasters myself, not from the farm side of it but from the municipal side with some floods, and I should tell you I understand the relationship between the province and the federal government.

I have a couple of questions and it ties into Mr. Hill's comments. My issue is one of consistency. What I've seen in the past...and I believe you mentioned two comments, Mr. Graham, one about special arrangements and one about additional arrangements that are made between the province and federal government. When you make those special arrangements or those additional arrangements, there's a perception that there is an inconsistency in the programs or the policies being followed that have been set out by the federal government. That's the danger, where in fact you have one particular loss covered in one area and not that same loss covered in another area.

My question to you, Mr. Graham, is in your opinion.... You had also talked about how, with negotiations between the province and the federal government, you can set rates. You talked about 50-50 coverage with respect to hobby farms as opposed to the 90-10 split, when in fact it's going to be a true cost recovery by the provinces for a farm or a corporate farm.

• 1010

In your opinion, is it better for the federal government to try to develop a well-thought-out, well-planned policy that will include these types of issues? You have lots of experience now, from over the last month, identifying these special arrangements and special interests and special conditions. In your opinion, would it be better for the federal government to outline a natural disaster policy that can be put on the table and such that you can say this is the policy and inconsistency will not flow from that policy?

A witness: I'm going to speak to this.

Mr. Rick Borotsik: First, let me just preface that. When I had my flood in 1995, we put forward our bills that were to be covered under the policies laid out by the federal government. Two and a half years later, we were still trying to collect on those criteria; and thank goodness a federal election was called. We got paid very quickly after that call. But there were some very grave difficulties in trying to collect on those criteria. So please, I would like to hear your opinion.

Mr. Andrew Graham: I can't possibly comment on that last comment.

Mr. Rick Borotsik: No, that's political. That was meant to be political.

Mr. Andrew Graham: Before Mr. Tremblay speaks, I just have to say Mother Nature isn't consistent. I often hark back to that horrible phrase out of Yes, Minister, “I can foresee all kinds of unforeseen circumstances”.

I've been involved in crisis management most of my career, and you're always either fixing the last one, without a notion of what is going to happen, or you're planning for things that never do happen. I'm sure we could all pull off contingency plans for things that never did happen. We've learned a lot in this one. We learned a lot in the flood.

Certainly—and I'm sure Mr. Tremblay would agree—the federal disaster assistance program can be improved, and it can be learned from. We can learn from this. There are continuous issues. In fact, we as a department advocate certain positions internal to the policy-making process, trying to fix things or trying to resolve them.

That being said, the nature of the so-called secondary agreements is in fact to accommodate those things that either were unforeseen or were so unique to the environment that they shouldn't show up otherwise, or they don't show up otherwise. My own view—and this is personal—is if this becomes a pattern, there's a message here to look at the total program. I think you would agree that's what you've attempted to do.

But unless you can accommodate these things, unless you have some way of reacting if there are infrastructure issues, if there are unique sets of circumstances, then you're dealing with an extremely.... As broad as this thing is, it still has boundaries. We often find—and the discussion around maple I think is a perfect example this morning—that the ability to accommodate that...we still don't know what to do, because we're not sure about the issues that have to be sorted out. We don't think they could ever have a policy that would accommodate that.

I guess here we're looking to have our cake and eat it too.

Mr. Rick Borotsik: I appreciate that there will be some differences between the province and the federal government. That's a given, and it's going to happen in circumstances like this. Or there will be differences between individuals and the provincial government as to what is covered, what is not covered, the insurance coverage. Is there an appeal process? Mr. Chrétien, for example, is going to have some very difficult situations where he believes very strongly it should be covered and the provincial or federal government believes it's not going to be covered. Is an appeal process available to these individuals?

Mr. André Tremblay: I guess I could take your last portion of the question as a first answer. The question of appeal is not provided for in our arrangements.

All this being said, may I go back over the operations of the disaster fund financial assistance arrangements and see how we process through the country on that?

First, let me say the guidelines, as I stated earlier, provide enough flexibility to satisfy most of the situations we have seen in Canada. They have been in effect since 1970. They have evolved through a number of reviews and revisions and currently they are under specific review. By a request from the federal government that dates back almost a year ago, they are currently under strong review. A consultation will be made as it becomes possible to do so for the next version of the financial arrangements.

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Now, the question of equitability is one that is overriding and overwhelming in disaster financial arrangements. We want to make sure any time a citizen in Canada anywhere suffers a disaster, he's treated equitably with anybody else elsewhere in Canada.

We have noted in the last two major disasters, the Saguenay and the Red River, the provisions in the financial assistance arrangements were not necessarily sufficiently detailed to cover all aspects of these major disasters. At that moment the provincial governments and the federal government came to the conclusion, through negotiation, that special programming was needed for areas that were not served well under the DFAA. In the case of the current disaster, we see that, for instance, because of the magnitude, because of the variety of persons or citizens who are touched by the disaster, we may end up having to intervene with special programming as well.

This being said, it remains that the guidelines of the DFAA have served us well since 1970. They cover the majority of the situations in Canada. They have provided the Government of Canada with a very stable, very equitable way of supporting the provinces in time of disaster. The review process will update and bring them to a new, modern look at disasters, but in time they will not be perfect again. So they will have to be continuously updated. This is one of the tasks Emergency Preparedness Canada has undertaken and is currently doing.

The Chairman: Mr. Coderre.

[Translation]

Mr. Denis Coderre (Bourassa, Lib.): Admittedly, we have encountered two disasters in Quebec: the ice storm and the Sécurité civile du Québec.

I'm inclined to agree somewhat with my colleague Mr. Chrétien. I think we must bring in specific programs to help maple syrup producers. I'm concerned, more so given that my friend Borotsik has acknowledged that there would be no appeal process. We are talking about human beings. Given our humanity and concern for fairness, we must allow an appeals process. Therefore, I would hope that we will give this matter some consideration.

As far as Emergency Preparedness Canada is concerned, it's obvious that you stepped in to help at the request of the provinces. Let's set aside for a moment the situation of maple syrup producers. Do you feel it would be better to initiate a new process? Does the current structure work well? As soon as Emergency Preparedness Canada has knowledge of a disaster in the making, instead of passing the buck to other officials and waiting for a call for help, shouldn't it step in immediately and play a much more specific role, although I recognize that this requires a collaborative effort?

Secondly, you referred to the difficult talks under way. It's clear that my colleague Mr. Chrétien is involved in a pre-election campaign in the province of Quebec and wants to help the Bouchard government. If the federal government fails to assume its share of the burden, he maintains, the situation will be grave indeed and the federal government will be to blame. I have a totally different view of the situation and I would like you to give me a status report on the state of the talks. What types of problems, if any, are you encountering? I will have another question for you later concerning maple syrup producers.

Mr. André Tremblay: Thank you. Emergency Preparedness Canada's role is to assist and support the Sécurité civile du Québec.

When the crisis began on January 6, our Canadian government coordination centre was notified of the situation. On January 7, even while I was in Toronto, my operations officers were already aware of exchanges between provincial authorities and our regional offices in Quebec City and Toronto. We already realized that the extent of the disaster would be such that we would need to mobilize much of our federal resources to assist the provinces. The order to mobilize had already been given at that point in time.

• 1020

The Canadian government coordination centre was up and running as of January 7. It worked around the clock throughout the crisis. The federal government's emergency operations centre is still operating 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and will continue to operate throughout the year. It coordinates any information that must be conveyed to and contacts with the provinces.

The Government of Canada has devised a national support planning framework. When a province experiences a disaster of some sort, we are immediately advised of their support requirements, either through the media, our own contacts or through our regional offices in each provincial capital. We have the ability to mobilize very quickly. That's what happened in this particular incident and in the majority of the crises that have struck the provinces in recent years, particularly in the last 10 years since the centre has been operating on a full-time basis.

As you so aptly stated, Emergency Preparedness Canada's job as a coordinator for federal departments is to lend support to the provinces. We must be ready to spring into action when a province requests our assistance.

For example, when the Quebec government made a direct request to the Department of Defence to call in the Armed Forces, National Defence did so immediately. Our regional offices were notified at the same time and confirmation was given. Everything proceeded very smoothly. Of course, the Canadian Armed Forces will remain on site as long as they are needed.

The last part of your question concerned talks currently under way with the Quebec government. With your indulgence, I would like to clarify something at this time.

Firstly, we are discussing with the Quebec and Ontario governments existing programs, and in particular the orders issued by the Quebec government. It's a good idea for us to be aware of the details of these programs and how they are applied. Similarly, we need to be aware of how the Ontario programs work.

At the same time, we discuss a number of points relating to the application of the financial assistance program in both provinces. Gradually, we will get some sense of the situation and the Quebec and Ontario governments will realize that we cannot cover all expenditures through existing programs. They will want to discuss special programs. This realization is dawning. Eventually, we will receive a formal request from the Quebec and Ontario governments to intervene in the negotiations with a view to setting up a special program.

Mr. Denis Coderre: Briefly, is Emergency Preparedness Canada in a position to handle a disaster like the one we have just experienced all on its own? I hear what you are saying about your organization, that it is a well-oiled machine and that it runs well. However, the reality is that there have been some obvious problems, particularly in terms of supplies and communications. It's all well and good to pass the buck, the fact remains that there wasn't only the dark triangle. There were also a number of forgotten triangles. One thing is certain, namely that ordinary citizens and farmers want answers quickly. Above all, steps must be taken to ward off other disasters in future.

Are there too many structures in place? Is there too much contact between these various structures? Would it not be better to have a single structure to oversee the situation directly?

Mr. André Tremblay: The immediate response structure for citizens, including farmers, is currently initiated by the provincial and territorial governments. Quite frankly, as the media reported, the Quebec government's response capability, through the Sécurité civile du Québec, was inadequate. Insufficient staff and expertise were available. At some point, the Quebec government will have to look at this situation and work to improve the quality of his resources so that it can respond to citizens' requests.

People have to understand that we have just come through a major, unprecedented crisis. This is the first time that we have experienced a disaster of this magnitude.

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I don't wish to cast blame on anyone, but it's clear that the Quebec government, that is the Sécurité civile, did not have the necessary resources to deal with a crisis of such proportions.

Mr. Denis Coderre: Mr. Tremblay, we saw the flooding that occurred in Manitoba and in the Saguenay—Lac-Saint-Jean region. Last year, in the Lanaudière and Basses-Laurentides region, there were some ice storms. There were more this year. At some point, we have to acknowledge that meteorologists are accurate in forecasting one disaster a year. As far as Emergency Preparedness is concerned, I think that we will have to...

Mr. André Tremblay: Under the federal support program, we mobilized all of our resources to assist the two provinces. We also realize that at times, we were run off our feet. Our employees worked long hours. However, we managed to get through the crisis.

Mr. Denis Coderre: Thank you.

[English]

The Chairman: Mr. Hill.

Mr. Jay Hill: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a couple of comments and a question.

I don't dispute what you're saying at all, that a lot of this falls on the provinces, and I guess if we're really to get an understanding of what is being done to address this very serious disaster we almost should ask the provinces to appear before the committee, because maybe we'd be able to get a better understanding of what is happening, in Quebec and in Ontario especially. It seemed to be your fallback position for a lot of the questions that we don't know yet because the province is the first line of defence, so to speak.

Certainly, I want to add my voice of concern about the time lines. I think Mr. Borotsik pointed that out. Obviously, something I've heard and I think everyone has heard about is the excessive delay in compensation reaching farmers when they're in very dire need. Mr. Chrétien also referred to it in his remarks. I'm sure the department, hopefully, will be doing all it can, once the package is in place, to ensure that the money reaches the farmers before they actually go bankrupt, so that it'll be of some assistance.

I want to get back to this issue of consistency and fairness that I brought up in my opening remarks. I speak not only for consistency and fairness in how government policies are administered across the land and to different regions that experience disaster, but also consistency within the disaster region itself.

I note in the minister's press release that came out of his address to the dairy producers in Vancouver.... I'll just throw out a couple of the items he listed in his press release and maybe get you to comment on them. Some of the things that could be covered or may be covered is the cost of renting generators, for example, and diesel fuel bills to run these generators, I assume. Then there is the loss of inventories because of power outages, and I wonder how you're going to administer something like this and be fair to all farmers. As you said, a lot of farmers had sort of prepared themselves, obviously not for something of this magnitude but for a power outage, and they had generators. Mr. Calder referred to the fact that on his farm he's taken this step.

In fairness to those farmers who do prepare for a disaster or for a power outage, what do you say to them now that you're going to compensate those who don't?

If I were a farmer sitting in that situation, I'd say why did I bother to self-insure, as it were, by purchasing this generator, having it installed, getting the grid set up properly so that it would operate, and my neighbour down the way didn't take these precautions. He's going to get a cheque from the government for renting his generator, for the diesel fuel for his generator, even for perhaps loss of inventories because of the power outage, whereas if he had taken those precautions he wouldn't have suffered the losses. This is where we get into the very delicate situation of consistency within the disaster region itself. How are you going to address that?

Mr. Andrew Graham: We've had discussions with both provinces in that regard. There's no magic formula, because at the end of the day, even if a farm is not well managed or if those precautions weren't taken, the disaster still had an impact on the farm. You're caught. I think we're caught in a dilemma here.

Mr. Jay Hill: Why this is so important to me is because I get back to my earlier opening comments about criteria, gentlemen, and the fact that.... Take an average producer in the Peace River district who's experienced two years of the worst documented disaster in 50 years of recorded history, excess moisture, and he can't get on his fields. The thrust of the federal government is that this was an insurable calamity, if you will, and he should have carried crop insurance.

• 1030

Now, never mind getting into a long debate about whether crop insurance does or doesn't work. As you said earlier, perhaps some things can be eligible if insurance isn't at a reasonable rate—whether crop insurance is reasonable. Whose definition of reasonable rate do you use? But never mind all that. The simple question is whether or not the criteria fit the needs of the individual farmers.

What I hear you saying is that you have to look at the individual farmer's loss. That's what I hear farmers in my area saying. As I said earlier, it's not that they don't have any empathy for the victims of this storm, this disaster. They do, they have a lot; they're fellow farmers who are hurt and in peril, so they have a lot of empathy for them. But they're saying they want to see consistency in how these programs are applied from Ontario and Quebec to British Columbia or southern Manitoba.

What they're saying is that just because their disaster is localized and isn't of the same magnitude doesn't mean that when you bring it down to the individual farm gate, the disaster and the hurt is not equal. That's what I hear you saying in how you're going to apply this program individually within the disaster regions in Ontario and Quebec. I don't disagree with that, but you have to look at it in the global sense as well.

That's how I get back to my original question. I want you to comment on the criteria. Are they sufficient to meet the needs of the individual farmers? I don't believe they are.

Mr. Andrew Graham: I hate to say this, but I think we're in a very grey area here about what is a disaster under this piece of legislation versus what's a disaster.... In this case and the cases you're talking about, it's interesting that the province has not declared a disaster per se, but there are other options available to do so.

Doug, did you have any comments on the Peace at all?

Mr. Doug Hedley: No.

The Chairman: You can say the same about the drought in Nova Scotia. To the farmer, it's a disaster. It may not be a disaster to the province or to a wide area, but he's going to suffer just as much as somebody in Quebec or eastern Ontario.

Mr. Jay Hill: Yes, that's what I'm saying: bring it down to the individual farmer. That's what I heard you saying when I asked how you are going to institute fairness between the farmer who purchased a generator, accepted that cost and had it set up on his farm, and the farmer who didn't. You're saying it's a difficult thing, and I agree it's a difficult thing to grapple with. But it's also difficult to say to the farmer in Nova Scotia or southern Manitoba or northeastern British Columbia that his disaster doesn't fit the criteria, doesn't fit in the box, and he's therefore out of luck, and if he loses his farm, well, that's too bad.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Mr. Desrochers.

[Translation]

Mr. Odina Desrochers (Lotbinière, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to respond briefly to the comments of my colleague Denis Coderre regarding the Sécurité civile du Québec. Like Emergency Preparedness Canada, the Sécurité civile du Québec assumes a coordination role. To my knowledge, each Quebec municipality had a role to play. Municipalities were responsible for drawing up an emergency plan.

I have to say that even after the catastrophic flooding in the Saguenay—Lac-Saint-Jean region two years ago, the majority of Quebeckers and even Ontarians who were affected by this ice storm were not prepared to deal with a disaster on this scale. In light of this situation, some partners may perhaps not have pulled their weight. Before blaming the Sécurité civile du Québec, perhaps a post mortem is in order.

The member is asking you to evaluate the 10 emergency preparedness agencies in each province. That would be a difficult undertaking. Even if you wanted to do it, you would be unable to.

People talk about climate change. I don't need to tell you that on the environmental scene, there are many things that we could be doing. Some ecologists, parties and individuals concerned about the environment have been saying that we were courting a climatic and ecological disaster. And that is what has happened.

Now for my question. When a disaster of this magnitude occurs, an initial assessment is done. Both the federal and provincial governments have made initial commitments. Now then, given the scope of the disaster, apparently a second assessment will be done. When will further measures be announced?

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What we must now do is make people feel secure. Both the Quebec and federal governments are taking steps to address emergency situations. Members are being asked when compensation measures will be announced. I think it's important to have that question answered.

Often, when disasters like this happen, lengthy delays are encountered and people are forced to borrow money and so on. This time around, is there reason for us to hope that the delays will be shorter and that the talks between the various levels of government will proceed more quickly? What can I say to people affected by the ice storm, particularly farmers and maple syrup producers, to give them some glimmer of hope?

Mr. André Tremblay: Mr. Chairman, first of all, I cannot presume to speak on behalf of the Sécurité civile du Québec or to describe what action it would take to improve the quality of its response and its support to municipalities.

However, I can discuss the status of the talks between the federal government and the Quebec government, particularly as regards the implementation of programs and financial assistance orders that the Quebec government has issued and the mutual support in the area of financial assistance arrangements.

Let me make a comparison for you. In the case of the Saguenay operations, similar exchanges took place. The first federal government assistance cheque was issued to the Quebec government approximately two months after the disaster. In this case, it was delivered less than two weeks after the ice storm.

In the case of the Saguenay flood, exchanges and discussions prompted the Quebec government to make a second request for financial assistance around December, that is six months after the flood and a second cheque was issued to the Quebec government in March, that is almost nine months after the flood.

In this particular case, the Quebec government is already talking about a second advance payment. In the coming weeks, it will submit the proper documentation in support of this request and the federal government will issue another cheque.

If we look at how we have responded, and in answer to the question, could we have acted more quickly, I have to say that it would have been hard for us to respond any faster than we did.

Mr. Odina Desrochers: I understand. As I said earlier, these were emergency measures taken in response to an initial assessment. I'm talking about the second phase. An on-site assessment has been conducted and the process has already been initiated. A further assessment will be done and from that point on, we will know more.

Mr. André Tremblay: Precisely.

Mr. Odina Desrochers: Will the advance payment be made during this second phase or do you think the federal government and the other provinces will take specific action to address these peoples' concerns?

[English]

Mr. Doug Hedley: Yes, there is urgency, and we share that view of getting assistance to farmers. Ontario and Quebec have done that. But we're also aware that it's going to take us at least a year to assess these kinds of damages.

So we have to be careful not to rush to finish. I think the damages are going to go on for a long time. We have to take the time to do it right, to get the evaluations right, and to deal with the consistency that Mr. Hill raised.

The Chairman: Mr. Bonwick.

Mr. Paul Bonwick (Simcoe—Grey, Lib.): I have a point, a question, and then a supplementary. One is with respect to Mr. Hill's comments. It's one I've heard from farmers in my riding as well.

Who's prepared? Who's not prepared? Are we compromised because we chose to invest several thousands of dollars to make sure we're prepared for a power outage or ice storm or whatever the case might be and the guy down the street did not do so, and thereby...?

I'm very concerned about the government getting into assessing who prepared themselves enough, because then we take it to the next level of structures. Did the person build the barn strong enough? No, he didn't. He spent only $100,000. Another spent $500,000. It just gets to the point where it's so grey. It is an emergency, a catastrophe, and in that respect I think the area is so grey you'll never determine who should have and who didn't. It's just a matter of helping out those who are in trouble.

• 1040

Reviewing your document on the breakdown of provincial versus federal dollars, I'm going to assume, based on the up-front moneys the federal government supplied, that it's going to get, certainly in Quebec and likely in Ontario, to that 90-10 distribution.

Mr. André Tremblay: Yes.

Mr. Paul Bonwick: If that is the case, are the provinces allowed to use in-kind services as part of their 10%, or are they actually having to put up hard cash as the federal government is?

Mr. André Tremblay: The answer to this question is yes. The provincial government must have paid out the money before it's considered eligible for federal compensation.

Mr. Paul Bonwick: So it's not in-kind services, it's cash.

Mr. André Tremblay: It has to be paid out either as salary—

Mr. Paul Bonwick: Which is in-kind service.

Mr. André Tremblay: —as rental equipment, or as compensation to municipalities or citizens.

Mr. Paul Bonwick: In effect, that is in-kind service. If you are paying out salaries to provincial employees, then—

Mr. André Tremblay: Incremental salaries only.

Mr. Paul Bonwick: Okay. About the moneys the federal and provincial governments are overseeing, the funds going into the provinces, are there any qualifiers with some of the things we're doing such that if we are giving x dollars, whether for hydro or for rebuilding whatever piece of infrastructure...we have qualifiers in there that you have to meet this type of standard, so if in the future something like this occurs again we are not going to be faced with the same situations? I'm referring to things such as possibly putting the lines underground, where there is more cost, building codes. There are many things we could touch on, I'm sure. You have to maintain a certain building code or you have to bury your hydro lines under water or something, so we can avert significant costs if something like this were to occur again. Are there any qualifiers in there for things like that?

Mr. André Tremblay: Only one: reconstruction must be done to the actual standards. For instance, for roads, bridges, structures, there are standards in Canada for all these types of construction. As long as the standards are met, we are satisfied.

Mr. Paul Bonwick: There is not a request for a revision or reviewing of these standards?

Mr. André Tremblay: No. In fact, we have no authority over that at all.

The Chairman: Paul.

Mr. Paul Steckle (Huron—Bruce, Lib.): First a comment about reforestation and the replenishing of trees. My own experience with forestry is that nature has a way of regeneration. My view would be that taking the old material and preparing for regeneration is probably the best way.

A supplementary to that would be this. Not only maple trees were affected by the ice storm but also other species. Have you recognized that? I'm sure you have. What are we doing for the people who had woodlots where maple was not perhaps the primary species?

On the issue of compensation, I realize the money has to come from somewhere. We realize various departments are affected. Defence has been affected pretty dramatically. Where is this money coming from? Is it coming out of contingency funds the government has set aside? I know governments always have contingency funds, but where is this general money for compensation from the federal sector coming from? We can't speak for the provincial side, because we don't know where that is coming from.

Mr. André Tremblay: About the source of funding for emergency operations in Canada, there are two avenues that may be taken by different departments. First, if the department is involved in emergency response or support, it must calculate or tabulate all its expenses into discrete accounts to make sure they have a very clear and precise picture of what it has cost. At that moment the department itself must look over the accounts and determine if it can absorb them within its own budgetary base or not.

If not, there is an order of the Treasury Board, 778820, which states that if a department has incurred major expenses because of emergencies it is possible to come back to the government with a submission to Treasury Board for replenishment under the supplementary estimates. This is what the Department of National Defence decided to do in the last week, and they have asked Treasury Board to replenish some $60 million of direct expenses due to the storms.

• 1045

The Chairman: Mr. McCormick and then Mr. Chrétien.

Mr. Larry McCormick: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I know Mr. Tremblay has said that all Canadians have the opportunity, hopefully, to be treated the same and fairly, and yet the provinces differ in the way they are funding.

Quebec, history shows, has had more experience in latter years with natural disasters. In Ontario, the province I reside in, they're asking the communities to fund-raise, the same communities that are war zones, struck by disaster. Then they say, after you raise a certain amount of money, we will give you more money at a ratio that we will decide at a future date.

Municipal governments have told me they've been assured by the federal ministers that they've spoken personally to provincial ministers, and the provincial ministers have said they realize there's a difference in their mandates. But it's a little scary when you expect people to raise funds within an area that's already been hit.

I would just like to give you another opportunity to speak to this. And the idea of inviting provincial people here sounds interesting.

Mr. André Tremblay: The Government of Ontario is suffering presently the first disaster that is of a magnitude sufficient to request financial assistance under the arrangements.

Up to now the Ontario disaster recovery assistance program has provided, as the member says, that for $1 raised in the community, the government will put in $1 to assist in recovery from the disaster. In this present case, the Government of Ontario—and I'm just citing here what is known publicly—Mr. Harris has declared that $50 million has been set aside to assist the disaster victims. Of this, one slice of $10 million has already been given to the local organizing committee without strings attached—that is, not having to raise the $1 to match—to assist. We were told that the whole $50 million is with no strings attached, that it will be provided to the municipalities and to the citizens in disaster financial assistance.

Naturally, the federal government also participated by giving the Province of Ontario $25 million, which we gave them on January 17. As to how the Province of Ontario will manage their program to support citizens and so on, I must say we're in a constant discussion with their officials. I do not like to use the term “hand-holding”, but we are providing them with all the documentation that it's felt is useful for them to achieve a proper, equitable program of assistance to their citizens.

The Chairman: What you're saying is that each province has its own agreement with you, and one province could get more money based on the negotiated agreement.

Mr. André Tremblay: On the way they manage their own program, yes. The principle was, as we stated a little earlier, that the province must have paid out the money before it becomes eligible under the federal program for reimbursement. So if Ontario does not pay out money to either citizens or municipalities, it doesn't count.

The Chairman: So a farmer in Quebec and one right alongside him, across the border in Ontario, could be getting two different compensation cheques.

Mr. André Tremblay: We're susceptible to see something like that happen, yes, sir.

Mr. Larry McCormick: If a farmer in Prescott-Russell gets $1 less than his neighbour and relative—in-law, outlaw—across the border in Quebec, it's not going to do a bit of good for the situation that exists in Canada, so I would ask all those involved to help steer our provincial Government of Ontario in the right direction.

Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Chrétien, and then we have Mr. Calder and Ms. Ur.

• 1050

[Translation]

Mr. Jean-Guy Chrétien: I have two questions, Mr. Chairman.

The first concerns the document entitled “General Principles Governing the DFAA”. On the next-to-last page, we find a series of examples of provincial/territorial costs of restoring public sector infrastructure that could be eligible for federal cost-sharing.

Line one refers to “repairs to government and public buildings and related equipment”. Line two refers to “repairs to public sewer, water and other utilities”.

I would like to talk about Hydro-Québec and Ontario Hydro. There is no question that Hydro-Québec sustained the heaviest financial losses during the ice storm because it had to build temporary lines to reconnect 1.25 million homes that had lost power.

Will the costs incurred by Hydro-Québec be eligible under this category?

Mr. André Tremblay: Two paragraphs in the guidelines could apply to Hydro-Québec's situation. First of all, federal or provincial Crown Corporations are not eligible for financial assistance. Nor for that matter are large corporations. In this particular instance, when we talk about repairs to public sewer, water and other utilities, we are talking primarily about essential municipal services, that is roadways, sewers and so forth.

Mr. Jean-Guy Chrétien: I'm not sure who will be able to answer my second question. It concerns Human Resource Development. Perhaps Mr. Graham would like to have a go at it.

In my riding, I have dealings with three farm unions. When it came to deciding how to divide the $25 million allocation to Quebec—and it's the same thing in the other provinces—, since no one official at Human Resources Development had any in-depth knowledge of the maple syrup production, we decided to resolve the issue by working together with the farm unions.

In my home town of Thetford, the heart of the region, some maple syrup producers belong to three different unions. Some had already begun 10 days earlier to hire staff for the first harvest of the sap scheduled to begin in three weeks' time, whereas another union had not even begun to sign any agreements. And yet, we're talking about the same Human Resources Development Canada office. In one municipality, producers living on one side of a concession road, the right side, had already been at work for 10 days, whereas those living on the left side were still not at work, because it was supposedly too dangerous or because the union was slow to sign agreements. Furthermore, even the wages paid differed from one union to the next. All of this is very surprising. Some producers were paying $35 a week for a chain saw. Some were provided with safety glasses and hats, while others were not. It was quite a mess.

I'm not saying this to be negative, quite the contrary. This is not the time for negativity since we must look to the future and make some very positive proposals, but I find all of this.... Fortunately, everyone is working this morning in the sugar bushes, but there was, nevertheless, a 10-day delay for some. The concession road appeared to be the dividing line.

[English]

Mr. Andrew Graham: Quite frankly, we have seen other stories of the same kind, where people were simply getting their act together or were getting the expertise. The question of going into the forests or going into the woods—having had to do it during the storm myself—is one that makes it really tough for us to say we're going to do this uniformly.

• 1055

More generally, we have witnessed a number of cases in which you had to get the expertise in the field very quickly. This unfortunately is an Ontario story—but it's the same thing—but I know OMAFRA had to move its people from southwestern Ontario into eastern Ontario in order to get the knowledge and expertise into the field. It's unfortunate. I think the good news is that it's been cleared up, but we've had other stories like that. We just have to get the right people in the room, make the decisions, and get on with it.

The question of the salary issue is certainly a new one to us.

The Chairman: Mr. Calder.

Mr. Murray Calder: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I'm going to end up with a question that will probably be very difficult to answer, but I'd like you to take a crack at it anyway. It's basically one word: fairness. The Atlantic area has experienced this ice storm, Quebec has, and Ontario has. Quebec had a disaster last year, so it's a little bit better prepared in terms of what's available to deal with the disaster in financial assistance. It's probably better prepared than Ontario is, because Ontario hasn't had a disaster of this magnitude.

From what I see here with DFAA, the fact is that basically the federal government is responding to the requests put out by the provinces and/or the territories. In other words, I'm inclined to think they've done the assessment of the damage. How do we check on their assessment to make sure it's a fair assessment? Maybe they've missed a few things that should have been added, when another province that knows the ins and outs of doing this assessment has already done so. How do we go back to check their assessments so that, to the perception of all concerned in this disaster, fairness has ruled all the way through in terms of the federal assistance?

Mr. André Tremblay: Mr. Chairman, there are two ways this is being done. The first is the action of our regional director who is on-site in the capital of the province and who deals on a day-to-day basis with the provincial organization. This person is knowledgeable in the application of the DFAA, and naturally has as a reference all the data banks that we have across Canada. He or she may, on the spur of the moment, interpret or help or assist the province in dealing with the preparation of its claim.

The second avenue is that when the provincial claim has been presented to the federal government, an auditor from Consulting and Audit Canada goes over the books and naturally ensures that everything is in accord. Here we're talking about both sides of the story. If the province has missed something in its books that should be added to the eligibility list, we will add it at that moment.

Mr. Andrew Graham: Parallel to that and in support of it, and obviously working both with the regional people and nationally—as we both indicated at the beginning—we recognized right at the outset that Ontario was at a knowledge disadvantage. In fact, we made people available, went down and talked to them about how, as Mr. Tremblay said, they're working in a framework totally different from Quebec's.

We made available people who had an agricultural orientation. Because we worked with Emergency Preparedness on the Saguenay and on the Red River, we had people there. We suggested that Ontario phone Manitoba, phone Quebec, that they share information. Meetings have in fact taken place, and we did conference calls down east to see what was happening in New Brunswick. You can't force things, because these are individual circumstances, but we did everything we could to give them information about what they could and could not do in order to try to open it up.

Mr. Murray Calder: How much time is going to be made available if in fact Ontario has to do a bit of a catch-up process in this just because they've never experienced this type of disaster before?

• 1100

Mr. André Tremblay: There is physically no time limit imposed on a province for presenting its claim. We try to assist them and ask them to be as rapid as possible, because money, naturally, is of the essence at this moment. Otherwise, they have all the time they need to formulate the claim and have it settled properly.

Mr. Andrew Graham: We've in fact encouraged them in some areas, such as maple and reforestation, not to jump to conclusions so that we can study and get.... That actually was one of the issues, because they thought it was timeframed.

The Chairman: Rose-Marie.

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur (Lambton—Kent—Middlesex, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mother Nature certainly has dealt a difficult but sensitive blow to the two provinces as well as to the maritimes. I guess I can attest to that. Although it certainly wasn't to this magnitude, even in my area of southwestern Ontario we had a significant ice storm about 15 years ago, and to this date our bush is still suffering. It wasn't a maple bush but a logging bush. That was not near the magnitude this covered.

Some of the questions I was going to ask have already been asked by our chair. I said “sensitive” because different provinces' allocations...whether it's Ontario or the province of Quebec and perhaps New Brunswick. So you're dealing with not only the disaster, the ice, but also the political side of it, or how it can be politicized. So it makes it very difficult.

With that in mind, what have we learned from this experience to this date? How could we have done something different? I know we can't change Mother Nature's path, but what have we learned from this? From every disaster you can learn something. What have we been able to assess at this time?

Mr. Jay Hill: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman, I'm sorry to interrupt, but I have to leave. I thought we were going to finish up at 11 a.m. It's not that I'm disputing the importance of the question, and hopefully the response, but I would like to follow up on something.

Mr. Hedley had used some numbers. Would those be made available to the committee as soon as possible? I recognize that they're just preliminary.

Mr. Doug Hedley: We can get those to you as soon as possible, yes.

Mr. Jay Hill: I'm sorry to interrupt. Thank you.

Mr. André Tremblay: The lesson we have learned is that we are human. We have the capacity to react in an organized fashion, but sentiments oftentimes take the best.... At that moment we must rely on the quality of our plans, the quality of our preparations, and the quality of our exercising them to make sure we do not forget anything.

In this case we see that the plans were followed quite well—not all the time and not to the full extent, but the first lesson we've learned is that, yes, the machine can work. It usually hiccups a bit on the way, but the results finally get there. We've done very well, as a country, to answer this major disaster.

Mr. Andrew Graham: If I may, from the sector's point of view we haven't come to any conclusions, but probably the biggest one looming over all of this is what is risk, and what is an acceptable level of risk? We've learned that we have to re-ask the question and rethink it. I'll give you the very specific example of whether it's right for a dairy operation that's grossing $500,000 a year to not have a generator back-up. What then do you do about that?

That's very specific, but if you expand that—and I think every disaster like this forces this question, but this one is of such a magnitude, affecting 10% of the population of the country, that you have to ask it—you would then ask, where is that line, and who sets it? Anybody who's farmed.... It's not bureaucrats who are going to set it. It's not one act. It's really a consensus. Even the insurance industry will participate in that discussion.

So that's the one that looms for me. We're still chasing generators. We're still at that stage. So you can't sit back and answer that question.

I don't think the ice storm you referred to in southwestern Ontario is the source of this, but a disaster in that area—and it may well be; we're trying to get the dates right—caused the entire replanting of the apple orchards there to totally different breeds that we were only developing at that time. That caused a fundamental shift. The trees got smaller. They got more harvestable. They got more storm-proof. Those are the kinds of things we're not going to be able to come to a conclusion on for another year.

• 1105

The Chairman: Thank you very much.

We realize that you people were the people on the spot during this disaster. From all reports you did very well. You served your country very well in responding to the disaster in the way in which you did.

We'll prorogue the meeting until next Thursday, when we'll be looking at the WTO ruling on the European Union hormone ban. We'll have a package to you before Thursday. We'll also have a steering committee meeting Thursday on future business.

We are adjourned.