[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Tuesday, April 25, 1995

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[English]

The Chair: Order. ``Punctuality is the politeness of princes'', as they say. I do not know where that quote comes from. I think it is from Jack Frazer, actually.

I welcome the minister and his officials on the estimates. Mr. Minister, we would like you to introduce your officials, as you wish. I presume that there will be an opening statement. Then we will proceed to questions.

We are dealing with the main estimates for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1996, National Defence, votes 1, 5, 10, 15 and 20. I am going into detail on this because at this meeting and in future meetings I will be as specific as I can for the transcript. As you all know, the transcript of the committees will be distributed in a different fashion in future. Effective this week, the committees will no longer contain issues, will no longer contain transcripts of the evidence, but they will be available electronically. I will identify those who are questioning, for the purposes of those who are recording, so that we will know who is asking the questions.

We know who is providing the answers, that is the minister, and we invite him to address us now.

Hon. David M. Collenette (Minister of National Defence and Minister of Veterans Affairs): Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I wish to start my presentation today by expressing my appreciation for the fine work the committee did with colleagues from the Senate in devising Canada's new defence policy. Your task was not an easy one. The schedule was gruelling, yet it produced one of the most useful documents on national defence the country has seen.

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I believe it is the first time Parliament has actually been actively engaged to this extent in the policy formulation process.

We studied it very carefully at defence and, as you know, we incorporated almost all of the substantive recommendations of the committee's report into the 1994 white paper.

I think you will agree that the new defence policy is entirely within keeping with the committee's report.

I am indebted to all members of the committee, many of whom are here today, for their fine work.

[Translation]

The special Joint Committee had not yet started its review when I appeared before you last year to introduce the 1994-1995 Defence estimates. However, the need to reduce overhead costs was already clearly evident.

I therefore outlined a number of plans to reduce infrastructure and personnel expenses. You may recall that I spoke specifically about the plan to close, reduce or consolidate 30 defence facilities, and to eliminate 16,100 military and civilian positions. These reductions were all part of the government's plan to reduce defence expenditures by $7 billion over the following five years.

I'm pleased to tell you today that the reductions are already well underway. More than half of the planned facility closures have already been implemented, and the remainder will be completed by the end of 1996.

As stated in the estimates, the combined regular force and civilian strength of the department will be 7,500 lower this year than it was in 1994. As noted in the White Paper, the department will have eliminated about 29,000 regular force and 17,000 civilian positions by the end of the decade.

The policy of reducing overhead and increasing efficiency remains a government priority. As you know, the 1994 defence white paper and the budget of February 17 of this year both introduced new measures to streamline the department's operations. The implementation of these measures is well under way and is reflected in the estimates now before you.

The new measures are significant and go somewhat further than was recommended in the defence review. However I am certain they will not impair the operational capability of the Canadian forces. On the contrary, I believe our capability will be improved because our resources will be targeted specifically at operational goals.

The challenge facing the department is to provide the personnel, training and equipment we need to perform the role spelled out in the white paper, that is to defend Canada, to cooperate with the United States in defence of North America and to contribute to international security.

At the same time, we must keep our expenses to the lowest practical level, and please note the word practical here. We do not intend to produce a toothless tiger. Rather, we want a tiger with healthy teeth that is at the same time lean and able to defend itself and its territory if the need should arise.

For this reason we have resisted suggestions that the Canadian forces should become a sort of constabulary force and have instead reaffirmed the need for multi-purpose, combat capable forces that can fight alongside the best, against the best, wherever they are required.

For the next few minutes I would like to talk in general terms about the changes reflected in this year's estimates, and then I will be pleased to answer questions.

First you will note that we are planning additional personnel cuts. Over the next four years the regular force will be reduced, consistent with the white paper, to about 60,000 and the civilian workforce to 20,000. Those totals combined are almost 12,000 lower than was envisaged last year. While cutting the numbers we should also be adjusting the balance of our sea, land and air forces so that resources will go where they are needed most. The most important move in this regard will be the increase of roughly 3,000 in the army's field force so that we can better support multilateral peace and stability operations.

The primary reserve will also be restructured to make it better able to provide trained personnel for unit augmentation. To that end, I have formed a special commission headed by the former Chief Justice of Canada, the Rt. Hon. Brian Dickson, to advise me on the restructuring. I have approved a new target strength of 23,000 personnel, some 6,400 fewer than the current authorized ceiling. I have made a commitment not to alter the organization, size or structure of the primary reserve until the study is complete. I have decided to refer this report, once I get it, to your committee, if that is your desire, so that you can review it and give me advice before we make some very tough decisions on the restructuring of the reserves.

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The estimates also reflect a number of steps that we are taking to reduce the operating costs of various aircraft fleets. The White Paper calls for a 25% reduction in the cost of fighter forces. To this end, we are retiring the CF-5, cutting the number of operational CF-18s from 72 to 60, and reducing the CF-18 flying rate. These reductions will enable us to extend the life of the CF-18 well into the next century.

We will also be streamlining other aircraft fleets. For example, when the replacement search-and-rescue helicopters enter service, we will retire the Buffalos. Similarly, we will soon retire the aging Boeing 707s, and thereafter, we will rely on the A-310 air bus fleet, suitably modified, for strategic air life.

[English]

Our attack on unnecessary administrative and support functions will continue unabated. One of the most significant moves in this regard will be the reduction in the resources devoted to various headquarters by at least one-third. By mid-1997 we will have eliminated the maritime, land and air force headquarters in Halifax, Saint-Hubert and Winnipeg, and redistributed their essential responsibilities to higher and lower levels of command. We will continue the reductions already under way at National Defence headquarters.

In the field of procurement - and this is particularly apt, given the questions I had today in the House - we will be cutting about $15 billion from the capital acquisition program over the next 15 years and we shall buy equipment off the shelf wherever feasible. We shall continue our efforts to work more closely with the private sector.

Many capital programs will not proceed. Others will be going ahead as planned. Included in the latter are the new armoured personnel carriers, the new ship borne helicopters and the replacement of the aging search and rescue helicopters. These are all high priority items that cannot be delayed, and you refer to these in your report.

These programs will continue to enable our troops to be sufficiently armed and protected to meet the kind of threat anticipated in their missions, as they have always been in the past.

We are also continuing to explore the option of replacing our submarines. Discussions with the British government are quite mature in that regard.

I assure the committee that the government will measure all new capital acquisition programs against the dual and exacting yardsticks of affordability and operational necessity.

We shall continue the process of reducing and consolidating our defence infrastructure by concentrating our resources at fewer sites, by restructuring our headquarters and by locating all basic training for officers and non-commissioned members at the Saint-Jean site of CFB Montreal. I underline that for my friends who represent constituencies in Quebec. We will be able to close the bases at Calgary and Chilliwack and the Saint-Hubert site of CFB Montreal. We shall also be closing detachments at Moncton, London, Toronto and Jericho Beach in Vancouver.

The total budget in 1995 savings over the next four years will be about $2.8 billion. By 1998 these initiatives will save the department about $1 billion a year. Our budget in 1998 will be approximately $1.6 billion lower than it was in 1994.

These reductions are in addition to roughly $1.5 billion in annual savings set out in the 1994 federal budget.

[Translation]

The personnel reductions will cause a disruption to many of our people. We will do everything feasible to ensure that the reductions are made in as orderly, fair and equitable a way as possible. The military reductions will occur mainly through attrition, restrictions on recruiting an encouraged release through the Forces reduction program.

Civilian reductions will be affected through the civilian reduction program, which will be harmonized with the government's new program for the most-affected departments. We shall be working closely with our civilian employees and their unions to keep hardship and disruption to a minimum.

[English]

We also recognize that the closure of defence establishments will have a negative impact on nearby local communities. As a result the government, although not able to alleviate that impact entirely, is prepared to work with community leaders and other levels of government to help develop and implement community adjustment plans.

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Similarly the cut in the capital program will obviously have an impact on Canadian industry.

We shall continue to work with other federal departments to harmonize industrial defence policies. We will do whatever we can to encourage defence conversion, industrial growth and the international competitiveness of Canadian firms. In very general terms that is how we intend to implement the measures contained in the white paper and the February budget.

You would have noted that the emphasis of the policy is more on international operations than in the past. I do not want you to be mistaken. We remain a fully committed member of the alliance. We will continue to have multi-purpose combat-capable forces that could operate in support of NATO at any time if the need should arise.

In current circumstances, however, the real need for military force is elsewhere, namely where instability threatens large populations or whole regions of the world. That is why we have made peacekeeping our current high priority. The change in emphasis does not detract in any way from our commitments to our allies and friends.

[Translation]

The new defense policy will produce smaller, more efficient, and in some ways effective armed forces. I think you will agree that the policy is entirely in keeping with the results of the defense policy review. It is realistic, it is affordable, and it is pragmatic. I have no doubt that we are following the right road.

And now, before getting to your questions, I want to add a brief word about another aspect of the report of the special joint committee - that dealing with the involvement of Parliament in defense policy. From the very beginning, this government has been committed to the idea that Parliament should play a greater role in determining defense policy. The creation of the special joint committee was a step in that direction.

[English]

Whenever defence matters of special national significance arise, the government will continue to schedule parliamentary debates like those already held on cruise missile testing and a number of peacekeeping issues.

In my view such debates are invaluable. They afford members of Parliament an opportunity to express their views and those of their constituents on matters of national importance. They are also able to give useful guidance to ministers for the government as a whole in the development of policy.

Another opportunity for parliamentary involvement is the new expenditure management system announced by the government. I expect to be meeting with you again in the near future to discuss the outlook document on program priorities and expenditures, which the department will be submitting to you in the month of May and on an annual basis thereafter. To conclude, I look forward to having your comments and constructive criticism.

We have a number of officials with us. I brought more uniforms today so I am well defended. With me today are the Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff, Lieutenant-General O'Donnell, who in effect is the chief operating officer in the forces and knows all the answers, I hope; Ken Calder, who is the Assistant Deputy Minister for Policy and Communications and is the acting deputy minister at the moment; Lieutenant-General Addy, who is the Assistant Deputy Minister, Personnel, who was at the committee last year and was very informative on matters pertaining to the linguistic balance in the Canadian Armed Forces; Lieutenant-General Fischer who is the Senior Assistant Deputy Minister, Materiél; and the Acting Assistant Deputy Minister of Finance and Corporate Service, Rear-Admiral Barry Keeler.

I should tell you from a structural point of view that the chief is in Brussels at a NATO meeting. Our deputy minister left in December to be named ambassador to the United Nations, and our Assistant Deputy Minister of Finance, John McLure, is the acting deputy minister but is away on annual leave. We have Admiral Keeler, who is filling in for him. That is why there are some changes at the table.

Finally, I should also draw your attention to the fact that the annual reorganization of the senior officers in the military was announced some weeks ago. It is called in departmental terms, ``the plot'', and is the only plot at the department. Obviously changes will be made after the month of July in the normal course of events.

The Chair: Just as an interpretation, is that plot in the sense of a story and not ground, not in the sense of cemetery?

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Mr. Collenette: That's right.

Anecdotally I should tell you that when I was a kid there was a TV series called The Naked City on ABC and it always ended with: ``There are eight million stories in the naked city and this is one of them''. Sometimes I could apply The Naked City to the Department of National Defence, because there are many stories and many of them come out in different ways. Unfortunately they have been misconstrued in a way harmful to the reputation of the forces and the department. I can only regret that.

It is a big organization. It is a highly professional organization. It is well run. The individuals I work with are probably the most professional I have ever served with, either in government or business.

That does not mean to say that we are able to get every single thing right. We try to do our best. We try to deal with all the problems as they come up. It is a big organization and went through what a lot of industries went through in the recession. I saw this personally before I came back to Parliament in 1993. When you are downsizing as rapidly and cutting budgets as rapidly as we have in the Department of National Defence, it is bound to cause some fallout and some dissension. I think that is mirrored in some of the things that have perhaps been publicized in recent months.

The Chair: We will now go to questions. We will follow our usual method of going from side to side of the table. I have two names on my list, Mr. Jacob and Mr. Proud. Then we will see where we go from there.

I assume we are following the procedure of 10 and 5 minutes because in estimates there are many have questions to ask and we want possible to participate.

We will begin with Mr. Jacob.

[Translation]

Mr. Jacob (Charlesbourg): Thank you Mr. Chairman. Welcome Minister, Generals and Deputy-Ministers.

To begin with, I have two short questions regarding some information, then I will move more specifically on to the estimates.

My first question is for the minister. Can you tell me what percentage of the Department of National Defence's expenditures outlined in the February 1995 budget will take place in Quebec?

[English]

Mr. Collenette: We can get that specifically for you in a few minutes.

On the question of expenditures generally - and I made this statement on a television program in Quebec a couple of weeks ago - the fact is that in terms of its infrastructure the Department of National Defence and the military have not always reflected the population base in various provinces because of the way the country has been served in the world wars. In some places there has been greater infrastructure. Nova Scotia is the largest, for example. In terms of infrastructure Quebec certainly has a lower share than its population. In terms of capital expenditures it more closely approximates the population base.

With respect to the actual figures forecast in this budget it appears that around 22% of federal expenditures on defence will be in the province of Quebec.

[Translation]

Mr. Jacob: You mean 22% in the 1995-1996 budget.

Mr. Collenette: Yes. Twenty-two percent. I must point out that it would be 33% if we took into account all of the investment projects.

[English]

Quebec's share of capital expenditure is 33%, but 22.1% of the overall total defence spending in the country is in Quebec. Obviously that means the infrastructure proportion is lower. That is where you get the middle figure of 22%.

[Translation]

Mr. Jacob: Thank you. You mentioned your appearance on the TV program entitled "Enjeux", which I personally saw. On several occasions, the Fowler report was mentioned. Through the research service, I requested a copy of the report. Your department replied that it did not have it or that the report did not exist. Could someone confirm that this report does exist, and if it does, would it be possible to obtain it?

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Is the Fowler report a report from the former deputy-minister?

Mr. Collenette: On what topic?

Mr. Jacob: On francophones in the armed forces, and the breakdown of francophone officers. This report was mentioned three or four times on the program you participated in.

Mr. Collenette: I do not know, but I would like to ask Lieutenant General Addy to comment on the proportion of francophones in the forces.

Mr. Jacob: I do not want an explanation from Lieutenant-General Addy, I want to know if the report exists and if it's possible to obtain it.

Lieutenant General Paddy O'Donnell (Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff): We have it. We have looked for it, but we have not yet found it.

Mr. Jacob: Thank you.

Mr. Collenette: This is another example of fiction.

Mr. Jacob: You think so? I would reply, Mr. Minister, that up until now, I have really had anything to do with fiction.

Regarding cuts, which were called for by both the opposition parties and the people, you mentioned earlier, the number of bases that will be closed and you also talked about reductions to military and civilian personnel.

In 1992 or 1994, the Auditor General, identified, on several occasions, administrative deficiencies within your department. Among others, he identified the possibility of saving more than $100 million in managing infrastructure, communications, etc.... However, these potential savings are not mentioned anywhere in the budget, nor in your presentation. You talked about cuts and the Department of National Defence has often been criticized for cutting blindly. I won't give you the College militaire royal de Saint-Jean as an example, but regarding certain bases, certain areas or certain capital projects, there are no management changes advocated, and that's often considered one of the obvious deficiencies within the Department of National Defence.

Mr. Collenette: You will note that in the White Paper, we announced reductions to the headquarters throughout the country and not only to the command headquarters in Saint-Hubert, Winnipeg and Halifax, but also to the headquarters here in Ottawa. There are currently 25 headquarters throughout the country and there will be cuts to their administrations.

We are now planning to set up a new command, control and communication system. This will entail a significant reduction in personnel and streamlining in areas such as information and communication systems. At present, we are identifying all of the savings. I will give the floor to the vice-chief because he is responsible for this study and he can perhaps provide you with more information than I can.

LGen O'Donnell: There will be at least a one-third reduction to management personnel.

[English]

We have set a target of a minimum of one-third of the resources dedicated to all headquarter staffs and structures. The target we are working toward is to reduce them by half. You will see a substantial reduction in what we call the administrative overhead. That, Mr. Jacob, is exactly the type of reduction you have been referring to as a basic necessity for us to channel the money into the operation.

[Translation]

Mr. Jacob: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you Mr. Jacob.

Mr. Jacob: I'm not finished. I could go on for several hours.

The Chair: Go ahead.

Mr. Jacob: Earlier, in his presentation, the minister mentioned that the acquisition of submarines, for which the negotiations with the British Government are already underway, depended on the financial situation.

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I would like the Minister to clarify the position of his colleague, Mr. Tobin, who declared that he could very well support the purchase of the submarines, and I would like the Minister to give us an update on the status of the negociations.

The Minister knows very well that during the defense policy review, the Bloc québécois was opposed to buying submarines, challenging, to a certain extent, how useful the three submarines we have now have been over the past 25 years. Moreover, I asked an admiral who is a politician to give me an example of their usefulness and he had trouble coming up with one.

So what is the status of the negociations? And while you say that it depends on available funding, do you plan, like your colleague, to purchase these famous used submarines without ever discussing modernizing them, which could be very costly?

Mr. Collenette: Mr. Jacob, you will recall that in your committee report, you recommend that the government look for new submarines, which we have done. We have identified the possibility of buying them from Great Britain. There are four submarines available.

We have spoken with the British authorities and an agreement is possible. However, I went on the record as saying that the decision to purchase the submarines would be made by Cabinet. The decision will be studied. I hope to have a Cabinet recommendation soon, but it is up to the Ministers to take a stand on the acquisition.

As regards the usefullness of the submarines, I know that your colleagues here support the acquisition. Submarines have a role in the Canadian Forces. As for repairing the old submarines, I believe that the budget contains an allocation for that purpose, but it would be very costly. I think it would perhaps be preferable to purchase the British submarines. But as Minister, I cannot take the decision alone; I can only make the recommendation. The decision will be taken by Cabinet, by my colleagues and by the Prime Minister.

Mr. Jacob: I have one last question on that topic. I remember the Secretary of State,Mr. Mifflin, mentioning that there was an agreement of roughly 400 million dollars for the submarines. But it has never been mentioned. I would like one of your generals or admirals to tell us whether the submarines that we're going to purchase under this agreement will have to undergo modifications in order to comply with Canadian marine requirements and whether the costs have been assessed.

[English]

LGen O'Donnell: I would initially make the observation from an operational perspective, both for the standard security and defence requirements and for perhaps future economic requirements, that the submarine is an extremely versatile surveillance vehicle. It is also extremely cheap to operate. We can operate a submarine for less than one-third the cost of one of our frigates.

All the expenses that would be associated with any modifications to the Upholder class submarines, which we are negotiating with the British to buy, would be included in the purchase price. The most significant modification would be that required to handle the Mark 48 torpedo. That is all included in the negotiating price for the submarines.

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Mr. Collenette: We have to underscore the fact that even while we have had very good discussions with the British and we think there may be an arrangement that might be satisfactory, once we conclude the discussions it has to go to cabinet. Whether or not we shall buy these submarines is still up in the air. If we do not buy the new ones, we really have to take a hard look at the existing ones and decide in the context of the financial requirements of the government and the department whether or not it makes sense to spend money on refurbishing the old ones.

Mr. Proud (Hillsborough): We were talking about our special joint committee report. One of the areas with which you did not agree was the number of the total size of the military. We laboured long and hard on this throughout the hearings, on the minimum numbers we had. You decided on smaller numbers. I wonder if you could explain that to us. I wonder if you could give us all the details.

The other question I have is on a personal matter. I want to ask you if some time I could get the number of capital projects that are not going to proceed. You said in your comments that they were not going to proceed. Does that mean they are off the board altogether?

The third point is a question and a comment. On page 5 of your statement you go into long detail about the role of Parliament in the process of defence policy and other issues. You know my feelings. You probably know what I am going to ask you.

Regarding the two commissions that are investigating two different parts of the military, we see the role that Parliament has said we have, that we are doing it differently. I wonder, for instance, if the work of the commission headed by former Chief Justice Dickson could not have been done by a committee such as the one we have here or a joint committee.

In my view, from travelling with the joint committee last year, there is a lot of expertise, excluding myself probably, around this table that I feel could do many of these things. I have asked several of the leaders within the government why more of these things cannot be done in house rather than outside.

Mr. Collenette: On the question of the capital projects, perhaps the vice-chief or General Fischer will address himself to that in a minute.

On the reserve commission, I think we have the best of both worlds. We have a dedicated, arm's-length group of well-regarded people: the former Chief Justice of Canada; the former commander of land forces, General Belzile, who has a high standing within both the regulars and the reserves; and historian Jack Granatstein. These three people are outstanding individuals and will be able to devote time very quickly. It will require a lot of work over the period of the summer.

Then I would like the committee - and it is up to you to do it - to study the recommendations and the evidence of the commission and come back and say whether or not you agree with it or where we could make improvements. Let us make sure that is underscored. We have the best of both worlds in that particular project.

Part of the problem over the summer is that people have commitments. Parliamentarians have commitments, personal and otherwise. The short time frame led me to believe, as well as having it really at arm's length from all political considerations, that we would have this group do the study.

With respect to the question of the levels of the forces, it is true this committee recommended a higher total number than the 60,000, but the problem we had was one of dealing not only with a formulation process on one track but also with a program review process on another.

In discussions with the Minister of Finance it became evident - and the Prime Minister supported that - that in a commitment to break the back of the deficit we had to squeeze our operations in government much more than we had anticipated, and of course that also meant national defence.

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The number of 60,000 is probably close to the floor of where we can go and still discharge the policy in the white paper. The policy you enunciated could be achieved within a certain parameter of military and civilian personnel. We have chosen for financial reasons to make it the lower end, but I believe we can discharge our obligations.

Now I will turn to the capital projects.

LGen O'Donnell: I would supplement your last observation, Mr. Minister.

It was fundamentally the economic reality that 50% of the budget costs were being dedicated to personnel or personnel related costs. There was not any way we could get the size of the reduction achieved without drawing down the personnel levels below what we had previously forecast.

I would hasten to add that we are simultaneously restructuring that personnel model to ensure that we actually have a much higher percentage of our personnel in the operational activities than heretofore. I am very confident we can deliver the operational capability as outlined in the white paper. It was a fine balance between the budget demands and being able to deliver that capability. We can meet the requirements.

At the same time as we were doing this personnel restructuring we also did an initial restructuring of the entire capital equipment program budget. We stripped about $15 billion from our capital program over our original forecast of a 12- to 15-year period. Since the budget we have accomplished the rebuilding of that capital equipment plan in accordance with the direction in which the white paper is taking us and in accordance with those operational priorities.

Therefore a lot of the programs we had originally put in that 15-year package will either be pushed to the right or will no longer have a high enough priority to have money actually spent on them. I do not have a list of those activities and those specific programs at my fingertips, but I could provide one to you, if you like. The key message is that we took the whole program apart, zero baseline, and rebuilt it based on what the future requirements will be.

Mr. Frazer (Saanich - Gulf Islands): I would like to stay with headquarters for a moment and follow up on Mr. Proud's question.

At the moment I am not convinced that 60,000 is sufficient to fulfil all our obligations. On the other hand I have never seen a Canadian forces that was properly structured in terms of headquarters. There have always been too many people. It is difficult to rationalize exactly how many people are needed to command an appropriate combat capable force.

One of the items I wanted to get to occurs on page 97 of the estimates. You have made no reference to it in your projections for reductions. We talked about reducing generals to a total of 70, which incidentally is substantially still too high. There has been no mention of reducing civilian equivalents. The estimates show 120 executive positions that roughly equate at the pay level indicated in the estimates to be in the major-general range. It seems to me that is far too many people and way more than required, but it has not been addressed. Could I please get some input on it?

Mr. Collenette: The Vice-Chief will talk about this study. We do have an answer.

LGen O'Donnell: We have put a specific target on the number of general officers we will have in the long term.

I would also make the observation that we are by no means as ``over-generalled'' as the common talk would have one believe. The statistics we have would suggest that in competition with our allies, particularly going down to the number 70, we would be about in the middle rank of that particular organization, of that particular thought.

We have provided a specific number in the generals reductions. We have not yet been able to determine what the civilian senior echelon reduction will actually be. We have set in place a committee, the management command and control re-engineering team, that is doing the preparatory work for this reduction of at least one-third but hopefully 50% in the resources we are dedicating to headquarters.

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First of all we will reconfirm what activities we will be engaged in. Then we will re-engineer the processes so that we are delivering those activities as efficiently as we can. Then we will put our superstructure, our command and control structure, on top of that.

We have not yet determined what senior staff will be required to run that future command and control structure. We have put a marker down that we will have a reduction in the civilian senior population as well as the military. We do not know what the numbers will be yet. Rest assured, however, that is a primary concern.

Mr. Collenette: The answer is yes. We will reduce the number of people at the ADM and senior level in the civil service, as well as the senior military people. We just have to do the paperwork and the study to find out the number of reductions.

Mr. Frazer: We are looking at a substantial reduction in the number of civilian personnel. What I am looking for is a commitment that we will also see an appropriate reduction in the senior rank levels in that, because obviously that is where a whole bunch of money is being spent.

LGen O'Donnell: And you have that commitment.

Mr. Frazer: The other thing is in regard to your number of generals, General O'Donnell. With 60,000 people we hardly need 70 generals or more than 1 general per 1,000 people. I understand we have international commitments and so on. There are acting while still employed ranks that are available for those types of things.

Also, in my previous life I found that in the attaché corps, regardless of the rank level, whether you are a major general or a major, you are a representative of your country and therefore you are recognized as the official spokesman for your country in that job.

Maybe we should look seriously at whether we really require the number of generals we are projecting.

LGen O'Donnell: I would make the observation that the number we have suggested now as the target, which is 70, was predicated on an assessment before we began this restructuring process. The final number will be determined by what that structure really does demand. Rest assured that it is our intention to drive down the numbers just as much as we practically can.

Mr. Collenette: In the period from 1991 the previous government started the reduction of senior officers. I think it was about 118 or 120 at the time. We are going down to 70 in 1997. Over a period of eight years we will have reduced the number of general officers by 30% or 40%. That does not mean to say we have to stop there.

One thing I have to caution Canadians on is that an institution can take only so many shocks rapidly and still do the job. On the one hand, everybody wants us to become more efficient and cut costs. We have a great willingness by the people at national defence to do that. On the other hand, they also want us to be there, to go to Rwanda or to Bosnia and Croatia, to do the internal missions and to fight forest fires. They ask why we do not have sandbanks for floods in Quebec and all the rest.

We have to operate the business at the same time as we are going through this big restructuring. It was tough for a lot of companies in the last few years to make sure that service didn't deteriorate while this was going on and it is certainly tough for us.

You have the commitment that we want to do things as efficiently as possible, even if that means more reductions.

Mr. Frazer: I did not mean to be critical in my comments. I just wanted to point out that at one point we had well over 120,000 people and we did not have anywhere near the number of generals that we are talking about. It can be done. I was looking for a commitment that we are to try to do it.

On page 95 - and it is not a lot of money - we are talking about travel costs having increased by $60,671,000. I am wondering how this happened.

Mr. Collenette: That may be related to the deployments overseas.

LGen O'Donnell: I do not know what is in that total package. Perhaps Admiral Keeler could respond.

Rear Admiral Barry Keeler (Acting Assistant Deputy Minister (Finance and Corporate Services), Department of National Defence): I would have to confirm for you, Mr. Frazer, but I think part of it is associated with the FRP-CRP relocation costs. I will get you that.

Mr. Frazer: Could you, please. It seems to be a rather substantial increase.

Jumping around a bit, Mr. Minister, I spoke to you before about military training assistance program costs. You rather dismissed me at the time, but I would like to go back to that. I very much support the program and the utility of that program because I have worked personally with it. I question, however, the wisdom of the Department of National Defence bearing the cost for what is essentially an external or a foreign affairs supportive program. It enhances relationships among the governments of the people concerned.

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We are talking about $395,000 here, again not a lot of money but I do think, as we said in the defence review, that defence dollars should be spent on defence and not on other aspects of it. I ask you to reconsider that.

Mr. Collenette: It is perhaps a case of semantics here. I would never dismiss you, Mr. Frazer, because you have lots of good ideas, but the fact is that these are military to military contacts. It would seem appropriate that they be borne by the Department of National Defence. There are some overlaps between the foreign affairs budget and the national defence budget. Sometimes I wonder why we are paying for certain things. It seems as if everyone in government thinks that we have the biggest pot and says: ``Put it over in defence''.

I have had some discussions with my colleagues about that and I have won some arguments. It is a fair point to make in general. Specifically on the MTAP it is probably reasonable that it stay in national defence.

Mr. Frazer: I would like to leap on costs incurred by national defence that are in support of other agencies. I am talking about support to DFO and the Solicitor General. These are costs borne by the military but of benefit to another department. Shouldn't those costs be identified and carried by the budget of those departments rather than by that of the Department of National Defence?

Mr. Collenette: It gets a bit blurry because there are memoranda of understanding between the various departments. For example, in the recent dispute that we had on turbot on the east coast, we have a memorandum of understanding with fisheries and oceans. We did have a ship in support within the 200-mile limit. At one point we transported people from St. John's and transferred them in the Atlantic to fisheries vessels within our 200-mile limit. Those are part of ongoing operations.

We have had incidents where the military has to support the RCMP and aid the civil power. That is essentially a military function.

I would rather focus on the actual expense and the use of the money in terms of the end product than whether or not we should hive it off. It is still coming out of the taxpayer's wallet.

Mr. Frazer: Unquestionably, but surely it should not come out of the national defence budget because defence dollars should be spent on defence. We are talking 125 ship days in support of DFO for the east coast; Cormorant for 30 days; maritime force in the Pacific, 30 ship days on the west coast; and maritime air group will provide 11,016 hours. That is a substantial amount of money coming out of the national defence budget. Yes, the defence department is flying the airplanes or sailing the ships, but the benefit of that is to the Department of Fisheries and Oceans or the Solicitor General.

I will give you the offset to that. When the military forces respond to a request for aid to the civil power, the province should bear the cost of it, not the federal government, despite the fact that a military organization is involved in providing that support.

Mr. Collenette: On the latter point, there are cost sharing arrangements between provinces and the federal government for aid to the civil power. Where there is a dispute, as there is right now with the outstanding expenses with respect to the Oka question, the auditor general looks at that and adjudicates.

Your question is really not so much for me as Minister of National Defence as it is for the President of the Treasury Board or public accounts. It is a question of how we apply the accounts.

I do not see too much of a problem in the examples you have given. Some things come across my desk - and Dr. Calder knows this very well - where I say: ``Foreign affairs should be paying for that. Why are we stuck with that bill?'' They go off to the Lester B. Pearson Building and make their case. Sometimes we win. You get these kinds of occurrences.

Mr. Frazer: What I am saying, Mr. Minister, is that if you do not make the pitch Treasury Board will never operate on it. All I am trying to do is ask you if it isn't logical that defence department expenditures in support of other departments should be borne by those departments.

Mr. Collenette: In the white paper one of the roles that we talked about was in support of environmental protection, sovereignty, et cetera.

Mr. Frazer: For sovereignty there is no question.

Mr. Collenette: In the case of the turbot war the other week or turbot skirmish, I should say, it was a question of sovereignty.

Mr. Frazer: I would not argue with that one, Mr. Minister.

Mr. Collenette: It was a question of conservation of stocks.

You make a good point but I must say that I do not want to get too involved in those arguments. I want to apply my energies to some of the other fights I have as minister.

Mr. Frazer: Mr. Minister, I think you could take Brian Tobin on at any time and win.

The Chair: Thank you very much. That was a very interesting line of questioning.

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Before I go to Mr. Mifflin, let me just remind you again that the transcripts of these committee hearings and all committee hearings that will be available from now on are electronic. I would ask you, please, to bear that in mind when you are asking your questions and when you are making your witty interventions, as Mr. Frazer did just a minute ago. As witty as they may be, they perhaps cause difficulty for the electronic reproduction of minutes. I ask you to bear that in mind.

Mr. Collenette: I think the vice-chief has a comment on Mr. Frazer's question.

LGen O'Donnell: May I make a supplementary observation, because I have been engaged in the development of some of these MOUs. The overall perspective that we have taken in the discussions I have been engaged in is quite simply that these are national interest activities that will eventually be costed to the taxpayer in any event. As the Canadian forces we get training value from the activities we provide. On balance this seems to be a reasonable approach to take.

We probably could develop some sort of a counting methodology whereby we could more closely identify the incremental costs that would be associated with this but in the final analysis, and for the national good, we have not really made much of a fuss about it.

Mr. Frazer: Could I ask a question? It will be brief.

The Chair: Be very brief.

Mr. Frazer: All I would point out is that the defence budget is the largest single item. People look at it and ask why we are spending all this money on defence. Why is it needed, particularly with the world situation the way it is? If you could provide substantiation that a whole bunch of this money is not actually spent on defence but on other things, I think it would strengthen your case.

Mr. Collenette: I do not think we are talking about big bucks, Mr. Frazer. The $10 billion or $11 billion is big, sure. It is perhaps tens of millions of dollars but it is not really a massive chunk of the budget, $5 billion or $6 billion.

Mr. Frazer: It might cut your budget from $9.9 billion to $9 billion though.

Mr. Mifflin (Bonavista - Trinity - Conception): I welcome the minister, the senior staff and other staff from national defence headquarters.

I have three questions and I will pose them all at once so that we can see where we are going. They are interrelated really, except maybe the last one. One is about equipment and the other two are personnel oriented.

The first one relates, Mr. Minister, to the recommendations we made and the follow-on in the white paper. Perhaps I could ask you and the staff to update us with respect to giving the committee a better direction in where we are heading with respect to Sea King and APC replacements, because they were a real concern to the committee.

The second one is related to peacekeeping and to an observation we made in our report. It is also related to subsequent questions from the opposition that quite frankly, without getting political, I think created the wrong impression. That was the rate of suicides in the Canadian forces which, if I understand the figures correctly, have not changed significantly but I want confirmation of that. I also want to relate it to the rotation of the army and soldiers in peacekeeping roles. I believe that now the basis is 18 months between rotations. Has that improved and how soon will it be improved?

The third question is also personnel related. It is really to address a lot of the media concern. I do not think the Canadian public is clear on this. Perhaps you could have somebody, maybe the ADM, Personnel, tell us precisely what is happening with respect to the gulf war syndrome.

We hear a lot. About every fortnight something appears in the paper and the impression is created that we have not buckled down and taken this one on. There does not seem to be very much knowledge about some of the things that may be happening in the department with respect to the department's concern with this issue, particularly with the concern that the public may have. It certainly has not been brought out in any of the articles that I have seen that the department has grasped this by the lower band and is doing something about it.

Mr. Collenette: Perhaps, Mr. Chairman, we will let General Addy answer the gulf war and suicide questions in a moment.

On the question of the procurements, we have been working at the officials level, both within the department and with other departments in government, to plan for the equipment purchases.

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This matter has not gone to cabinet and I cannot give you any timetable as to when it will be scheduled. That will be up to the Prime Minister and his officials in the Privy Council Office. I think we would certainly like to move sooner rather than later.

With respect to submarines, we have dealt with that. It is almost a separate item. It probably should be considered since it is a procurement but a different kind of procurement. It is really an optional one. We are committed to the others in the white paper.

On the armoured personnel carriers, there is some urgency to get that project under way so we can have new pieces of equipment onstream for our soldiers. The first deliveries will be in 1997. Perhaps General Fischer would like to talk about that in a minute.

I am mindful of the need to deal with search and rescue. We are throwing around a lot of innovative things on this. It seemed to me that we needed a mix of operations. Rather than having national defence operate this from top to bottom, we should emulate some of the things done in other countries where private operators have been brought in for the management, the operations and the maintenance. In some cases countries contract out the whole operation.

It would wise to keep the operation of search and rescue, the airlift, with the Canadian Armed Forces. I think they do it best. I would draw your attention to the program that Prime Time did a few months ago, which really showed the wonderful people we have and the hard work they do. Perhaps there is an opportunity in the servicing, maintenance and operation of the equipment, not the manning of it, for contracting out.

I have also asked officials to look at innovative ways to finance. We can get into different kinds of financial arrangements. We have a big bubble to overcome in the next few years to get the deficit down and hopefully balance the budget. If we apply this to our household economics it is better for you to spread out the cost for a car than to pay cash all at once. Of course you pay for that privilege but that might be better because it helps you over your short-term cash crunch. This is being looked at and may be an option my colleagues will wish to pursue.

On ship-borne helicopters it is quite conceivable and probably likely - and I stand to be corrected - that we are looking at a helicopter different from the search and rescue helicopter. The military application is obviously foremost.

We also want to refurbish the M113s. We do not have the money to replace the total APC fleet so we are taking two measures: replace a certain portion with new and then refurbish the M113s.

We are looking at bringing all these projects forward as a package to be considered by the government and will hopefully make these decisions in the next few months.

The last point is on rotations. It is true that we have been stretched but that is why we accepted the committee's recommendation to divert more people into the army end of things. We are taking people out of senior positions in the army, the air force and the navy and putting more people in at the sharp end. That is what the chief is doing with his whole process of re-engineering the administration.

LGen O'Donnell: That includes recruiting as well.

Mr. Collenette: Yes, it includes recruiting.

The disbanding of the airborne regiment gave us an opportunity to redeploy those people who had been used as a rapid action assault force. The chief announced a couple of weeks ago that airborne members would be applied to three different parachute companies with reduced numbers, 150 each, to be located in Edmonton, Valcartier and Petawawa. They may or may not be part of the existing infantry battalions. They may be part of other regiments. We want to complete the discussion on the reserve commission before we decide how we shall badge these people. In the short run they will wear the badges of the PPCLI, the Van Doos and the RCR. That brings those people into the sharp end operation and takes them away from a rapid assault force role into more of a light infantry role.

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The chief talked about the forming of light infantry battalions. I do not know how long it will take to staff up to the 3,000; two or three years. However it will give us nine full battalions to rotate on our peacekeeping missions. That will give us greater flexibility.

General Addy has some personnel issues.

Lieutenant General Paul Addy (Assistant Deputy Minister (Personnel), Department of National Defence): In light of your earlier question Mr. Mifflin once the increase in the army has been brought in essentially the rotation period between units will be 30 months for combat units and 24 months for support units.

On the question of suicides there has been a considerable amount of interest recently. I can confirm to you based on all the analyses we have done that the suicide rate in the regular force for males is one-half that of their equivalent age groups in the civilian domain.

That does not mean that we are happy about it. We think that one suicide is a waste. We have taken a lot of measures within the department and the forces to make sure that we reduce those particular factors or at least twig the leadership to be able to detect those people who may or may not be susceptible to suicide.

A lot of mileage has been made trying to link the rapid rotations with suicides. In the studies of all cases we look at the primary causes for suicides. In nearly 50% of the cases the cause is failed personal relationships. The second is alcohol.

Are any of those related to or caused by extended deployment? The indications are not necessarily. However we are having an epidemiological study done by a third party of all the cases we have on record and have statistics on since 1987 to see if there is any correlation. To date there is no correlation. In any event we will find out when the study is over.

On the question of the gulf war syndrome, the definition of syndrome is a malady for which there are no identifiable symptoms. We have been unable to find anything out there that has a pattern to it, neither we nor the Americans notwithstanding all the money we have spent on it.

That does not mean we do not have people out there who are sick. It means that they have to be looked after. When we look at most people who think they have gulf war syndrome they have something else.

Notwithstanding that and because we want to make sure we look after our people if there is something we to detect, we have taken several measures. The surgeon general has written letters to all veterans of the gulf war advising them that we have set up a special clinic at the NDMC and that if they or their doctors have any questions they can telephone a 1-800 number. We have set up a registry so that when we have collected all the data on the people who responded we will have another study done to find out what is going on.

We have published in The Canadian Medical Journal information for the doctors of Canadians who may have been in the forces in the gulf war. If anybody comes to them with these complaints they can telephone to get professional advice. If they have a case that they cannot understand, we are prepared to take them to the NDMC special clinic to have them looked at. That is what we have done.

The Chair: I just want to remind you that the bells will start ringing at 5:15 p.m. so I ask people to be as brief as they possibly can.

Mr. Mifflin: In that case, Mr. Chairman, I will rest my case.

[Translation]

Mr. Leroux (Shefford): Good afternoon Mr. Minister and Generals.

The first question I'd like to ask has to do with bilingualism in the Canadian Forces. According to the report by Mr Goldbloom, Commissioner of Official Languages, there should be some 13,000 bilingual positions in the Armed Forces. Have those positions been maintained? Would you like to hear all my questions?

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Mr. Collenette: Do you have other questions?

Mr. Leroux: Yes I have other questions. Are those people who are bilingual in these positions are they likely to keep the positions they're in? What will you do to fill the other positions? What does Defence plan to do about filling positions currently occupied by unilingual anglophones? My question therefore has three components.

Mr. Collenette: Thank you very much. I haven't yet had an opportunity to read the report by the commissioner of official languages, but I will study it in the next few days.

I think Lieutenant General Addy will give you a detailed answer, but I must point out,Mr. Leroux, that the Canadian Armed Forces are, in my opinion, the most bilingual of all the federal institutions in Canada. It has a proud tradition of promoting both official languages. Yes we do have problems, but I am very impressed by the efforts made by all members of the Armed Forces.

For example, I visited the Bagotville Air Base a few months ago, in fact in January. Quite frankly, I was astonished at the quality of French spoken by the anglophones in a very technical area. It was my impression that most discussions on the F18s on air bases would be in English, because all of the manuals and the operations relating to the aircraft are generally in English around the world. Frankly, I was very surprised at the quality of the French spoken.

I believe that, in the Canadian Forces, the attitude is that the two official languages are equal. Yes, there are problems from time to time, but we try to resolve them. General Addy will perhaps specific questions.

LGen Addy: Thank you very much, Mr. Minister.

First off, we have approximately 13,000 positions, and we are going to redefine the linguistic requirements of each of them. The minister has recently approved the redefining of the language testing system in the Canadian Forces. We will be using the Public Service system. By designating positions according to linguistic ability rather than a profile of linguistic ability, we will more readily be able to manage the available resources. Teaching and testing will cost less, enabling us to meet the needs of our employees.

You were asking whether incumbents were entitled to positions. Absolutely not, but for positions for which we have no qualified individuals, however in the case of positions for which we have no one qualified, we have an administrative arrangements. If the person in the position lacks the desired ability, someone's available in a neighbouring office, who meets the requirements.

The focus of the program ``Enjeux'' among others were the many individuals who are not bilingual and are in some of these positions. So we took the initiative of increasing the individual's qualifications. For years, the Auditor General has said that our system of designating positions by profile rather than by position requirements was too costly. We agree with him. This approach will enable us to target people in positions and to ensure they directly meet the requirements of the positions. It will also enable us to respond to need.

As to the question regarding the bilingualism priority, given that we are very short of resources, we are developing a system to allocate our resources on a priority basis, because the demand far exceeds the supply. In operational terms, our priority is for these units to be assigned operationally first, but this may not necessarily correspond to bilingualism priorities.

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For example, it is much more important, in certain instances, to have bilingual instructors rather than people who answer the phone. We are therefore taking a look at the staff of the units to ensure that we place our resources where they are most effective.

The Chair: Does that answer your questions?

Mr. Leroux: More or less, Mr. Chairman. I feel that they have told us a lot.

What concerns me is that officially, there are 13,000 bilingual positions. A little more than half of these 13,000 positions, perhaps, are occupied by people who are really bilingual. My question is the following: Are these people going to be protected during the changes or are they likely to lose their jobs, in which case the Armed Forces will be even less bilingual than it is at the moment?

LGen Addy: I will attempt to answer your questions. First, in the Armed Forces, no one is entitled to a specific position. Individuals are assigned where they are needed. If by your question you mean...

Mr. Leroux: Yes. But my general question is as follows: Are the Armed Forces going to end up being less and less bilingual or are the people who are bilingual going to keep their position so that Canada's Armed Forces become more and more bilingual?

LGen Addy: What you're asking me is whether, when we cut staff, we will lay-off people who are not bilingual. Is this your question?

Mr. Leroux: Are you going to lay off people who are bilingual?

LGen Addy: We will ask people to leave based on operational requirements. Some will be bilingual others will not. Will this have an impact on the bilingual capability of the rest of the Forces? Will this reduce the proportion? The answer is no.

Mr. Leroux: Fine. That means that the some 6,000 positions occupied by unilingual anglophones... Perhaps this figure is not entirely accurate, but it is about this number. Does this mean that the proportion might remain the same?

LGen Addy: It could remain the same without the efforts I described earlier. For example, in decentralized courses last year, 4,000 more people qualified.

Mr. Leroux: Very well. Mr. Chairman, in another vein, I would like to talk about the morale of the Forces. Mr. Minister, I would like to discuss this with you.

At the moment, the morale of Canadian Forces is at its lowest ebb for a number of reasons. We discussed this when we prepared our report. We only have to think of Somalia and other areas like Bosnia Herzegovina where we are currently marking time and do not seem to have much affect.

A while ago I spoke a bit about suicide. I would like to ask the minister what he thinks are the real causes of this malaise in the Canadian Forces.

Mr. Collenette: If we agree with your opinion that morale is at its lowest in the Canadian Forces, I must point out that the same problem may be found in the Public Service in general.

Mr. Leroux: It is true.

Mr. Collenette: It is a problem because staff is being cut back in the Public Service at the moment. Budgets are being cut. Too many changes are happening. For example, in the Department of National Defence I think there have been seven budget cuts in the past six or seven years. The budget has been cut by $24 billion. It is a huge figure. There are a lot of staff cuts, and naturally, this affects morale. There has also been a salary freeze in the Canadian Forces. In my opinion, there will always be difference in compensation between the Public Service and the military, but I think the difference has been heightened by the events in recent years.

We are in conversation with our colleagues at Treasury Board in an attempt to improve the situation, particularly in the lower ranks in the Forces: as concerns corporals, sergeants and all these people, because it is a problem. We admit there are salary problems.

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It is very difficult for young men with a wife and two or three children to fulfil all of their obligations. I think that it is one of the reasons, Mr. Leroux, why the morale is so low.

Mr. Leroux: Are there other reasons, Mr. Minister, why the morale is low? Can you think of other things? All the publicity there was in the press...

Mr. Collenette: Yes, I admit that the events in Somalia were trying for the Canadian Forces. As you know, we have established a commission that will look into all the decisions and actions of the commanders of the Canadian Forces and of the Department of National Defence. There were videotapes and other proofs of problems within the department.

I must also confess that some people weren't happy in the department and I think that information filters through once in a while. We have two or three men and women that are dead set on ruining the Canadian Forces reputation. They started a vendetta against people in the department like the Chief of Staff or the former Deputy-Minister... It is a difficult situation for us as those people have the right to give information to the media. But it is difficult for me as minister and for other officials of the department to respond. But I can assure you, Mr. Leroux, that the management of our department is generally very good. We have a devoted team that works really hard.

It is therefore difficult for the troops to learn other problems through the newspaper. When one visits military bases, and I visited the one in Val Cartier twice with Mr. Jacob, one realizes that in general, morale is very good. The troops are enthusiastic about our role in Bosnia and Croatia. Yes, there are concerns about the pay but, in general, I would say that everybody, the opposition and the government, the media and myself, can explain the good experiences of the Canadian Forces, and not only the bad ones.

Mr. Leroux: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[English]

Mr. Hopkins (Renfrew - Nipissing - Pembroke): Mr. Chairman, I have only 11 questions so I will pose them all at once.

The Chair: That gives me an opportunity to remind you again that we do have a vote and there are still people who want to ask questions. Please try to be brief with both questions and answers.

Mr. Collenette: Mr. Chairman, the questions are so well thought out and detailed that they require a detailed response.

The Chair: Would you please ask less well thought out questions.

Mr. Hopkins: Mr. Chairman, I was another one on the defence review committee who was quite surprised when the white paper came out and the forces were downsized to 60,000 because we had the understanding that it was to remain at 66,700. I note in your remarks, Mr. Minister, that you say the new defence policy will produce smaller, more efficient and in some ways more capable armed forces. I would like to hear the rationale for that vis-à-vis the new figure of 60,000.

On search and rescue helicopters and ship borne helicopters, will these be two separate contracts? I hope they will not be moulded into one in some way. It is a simple question. Will they be two separate contracts?

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On that same subject, will they simply be contracts bid on the product required without any other deals being mixed in with other equipment purchases from another country? In the case of submarines from Britain, will there be a special deal on the submarines if we buy helicopters? Or, are we to have a level playing field and buy the helicopters in two purchases?

I was interested in a broader explanation of the gulf war syndrome. What is being done now and how do we handle these people? Whom do we see? I have had an inquiry on the very same subject.

You mentioned the upgrading of armoured personnel carriers, the present equipment and the new purchases. In your statement you gave us a time frame for that. At what stage is the time frame right now? This would obviously mean the refitting will go out on one contract and the other one will be a clear-cut contract standing on its own as well. I assume that is what it will be.

Finally, what are we doing to maintain our expertise on tanks for the protection of infantry brigades? If we are to have nine infantry brigades, what expertise in tanks will we have if something happens?

Mr. Collenette: It is three brigades.

Mr. Hopkins: I am sorry, it is three brigades. What are we to have for their protection?

Is any consideration being given to the pay structure in the lower ranks? I know that is a sore point with some of the junior people in the forces.

The Chair: you. I think that is actually 12 questions.

Mr. Minister, could you give one full and complete answer to those 12 questions?

Mr. Collenette: We will be very quick, Mr. Chairman.

We addressed the issue of pay structure for the lower ranks in answer to Mr. Leroux.

We are engaging in discussions with people at the Treasury Board to see if there is anything we can do without undermining the general freeze that has gone on with public sector wages. It is true that the historic differential has grown inordinately over the last few years within the lower ranks, from sergeant down. It is something we really should address and we are dealing with the Treasury Board on. I hope to have a resolution.

LGen O'Donnell: We have already shortened the time it takes to get from private to corporal.

Mr. Collenette: That is true.

The vice-chief reminds me that we have shortened the time from private to corporal by about six months. That has enabled a number of people in the system who have been penalized by the freeze to go into the next pay level.

In January 1994 the basic recruit pay was an unbelievable $15,000 a year. As the freeze was announced there was a one-time increase of $4,000 to raise it to $19,000. That is at least some compensation.

Let's not forget that the people who earn the low wage are generally young men and in some cases young women who are 18, 19, 20 or 21 years of age. After spending three and a half years they go up to the next grade. A corporal starts at $33,000 or so a year and moves up.

It is not quite as bad as people envisage but it is tough for a number of them, especially those with young families.

I do not think we have any armoured people here to answer your question about tanks. Oh, we do. I am sorry, I thought your armour was only on personnel matters.

General Addy can deal with that and the gulf war syndrome in a minute.

On the question of the APC purchase, I would like to have all these purchases done soon, my cabinet colleagues focus on them and all these contracts let out. However that is not my decision. I can go forward with recommendations which would include the refurbishment of the M113s as well as the new APCs.

I should tell you that we installed additional armour on the M113s being used in Bosnia and Croatia. That has been helpful. There has been some criticism about those pieces of equipment but that certainly is a plus.

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Some people have alluded to this equipment as not being the best. It is doing the job. Things such as track breakage are not inordinately high compared with the use in comparable situations.

I want to jump quickly from APCs to the question of a smaller, more efficient army. Attaining that is not just management or just putting people at the lower end and streamlining the management of the command in control system. It is also doing things more efficiently and giving the troops better equipment. Contrary to some criticisms we have received, improvements have been made within the existing budgets in the last year or two: better flak jackets. We have the new helmets. They have been erroneously described as not having properties that can be painted. That is wrong, I understand.

We have night vision devices. We have upgrading of communications equipment that has gone on in former Yugoslavia. We have operating procedures for radios and repair facilities for peacekeepers. All those have been upgraded when they are in theatre. We have other initiatives such as distribution of ballistic blankets, armed liaison vehicles and a Bison ambulance fleet.

All of this is newer equipment and more efficient ways of doing business which will I think help us to be much more effective even though the numbers are reducing.

Finally, on the question of helicopters and the point you made about linkage between these projects and other countries, I do not really think that works. When we talk to the British we are talking about submarines and submarines only. The British have a company that is interested in helicopters, Westland that makes the Sea Kings. We are involved with the H-101 consortium. They can take their chances. That is not linked to any submarine arrangement.

Mr. Hopkins: I want to clarify that I wasn't speaking against it.

Mr. Collenette: I am not sure that is the kind of approach we will be using to link these projects. It becomes very difficult to start playing those kinds of games. We are talking about a number of suppliers. The availability of certain equipment off the shelf is also a determining factor.

On the question of the contracts for the helicopters, my feeling is that we will have two different helicopters: a heavier one for search and rescue and a smaller lighter one for the ships. Again no decision has been made but we are doing some thinking on it.

General Fischer, do you have anything to add?

Lieutenant General Robert Fischer (Senior Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiél)): Mr. Hopkins, I would only add to your question of whether they will be two separate contracts. We are certainly approaching them as two separate projects leading to two separate contracts. Ditto for the armoured personnel carriers, both the new vehicles and the refurbishment.

You were interested as well in the timetable. Our current plan would see, at the very earliest, the introduction of a new APC by late calendar year 1997. I remind you that very soon we will begin taking delivery of new APCs dedicated to the reconnaissance role. Those vehicles, 203 of them, are being manufactured in London, Ontario, at the diesel division of General Motors. That vehicle will certainly be well received by the army. It is a reconnaissance light armoured vehicle.

We hope to follow shortly after delivery of the last vehicle, if all goes well, with delivery of the new APCs. We expect there to be in the order of 600 to 700 of them, given the budget we are working with.

The Chair: General Addy has a brief comment he wants to make.

LGen Addy: I wanted to answer your question on the two 1-800 numbers. One belongs to the Association of Gulf War Syndrome 1-800-294-5581. We also have a DND number, 1-800-201-8598. They will give you all the information you need.

On the question of tanks, as far as I know there is a project within the department's program to look at an upgrade of the Leopards that are currently distributed to the brigades. There is a squadron for each one of the brigades. That will put the thermal imaging sights on them so they can actually see through the dark and hit stuff out there.

.1705

I know that is already there. That will be part of the grinding that is going to be done by the vice-chief as part of the new program within the envelope of money. At least there is a program out there to replace the Cougar which, after all, was bought as a training aid several years ago with a vehicle yet to be defined.

Mr. Hart (Okanagan - Similkameen - Merritt): I have a number of questions. I will just leave it as a suggestion that maybe we ask the minister to return at another date.

The Chair: I should have warned you, Mr. Minister, about raising the morale of the committee by telling them they had asked well thought out questions. They now want to have you back again so they can ask more well thought out questions.

Mr. Collenette: There is nothing I would love better than to come back.

The Chair: Good. We will arrange a time when the minister can return to the committee for general purposes, GP as it is known.

Mr. Collenette: You do have a session on the frigates, I think.

The Chair: Yes, on the frigates, but apart from that I think members have other questions they would like to raise with you. If you are agreeable, Mr. Minister, we will work with your excellent parliamentary secretary to arrange another time when we can do that.

Does that mean, Mr. Hart, that you have no further questions?

Mr. Hart: Yes, I have many questions. I want to talk about management practices in the Canadian Armed Forces and DND. I want to review some of the areas which perhaps require more explanation for parliamentarians and the Canadian people.

In February 1994 the land engineering and test establishment was closed. At a time when the Canadian Armed Forces plans to buy off the shelf, it would seem imperative to verify manufacturer specifications. I would like some details on how that will be accomplished now and if we will actually save any money in closing LETE.

The second area was the closure of Harvey Barracks at CFB Calgary that was actually announced in February 1994. At that time you indicated, Mr. Minister, that the one-time cost would be around $23 million. A year later you show the cost approaching $70 million. Access to information documentation has also said that the move would place great strain on the command and control structure.

In October 1994 management comes into question again with questions about renovations to the deputy minister's office. Then came the Somalia affair. Again we had management concerns there with the appointment of Anne-Marie Doyle, a one-time close friend, as a commissioner. At first you suggested you did not see it as a conflict of interest but some days later you accepted her resignation.

In January 1995 we have problems with the airborne division and the offensive hazing videos. You reacted very quickly by disbanding the regiment. It was an act of political expedience which contradicted the operational advice of your senior officers. Also you disregarded the military advice when resurrecting the airborne division as a mobile strike force, which in effect was the way it was prior to 1969. A DND report said in April 1994 that this option was not at all recommended. Again you went in a direction contrary to the advice of your senior officers.

Peacekeeping in the former Yugoslavia remains a problem. In October 1994 the government renewed the mandate for a six-month period. You said in the House that the decision was subject to review if the situation on the ground changes or if the political or military situation calls into question the safety of Canadian troops and the usefulness of the UNPROFOR mandate.

Within weeks Canadian troops were again held hostage and you did not take responsibility for your earlier statement. Instead you actually blamed the Reform Party for undermining the position of our troops.

Morale has already been addressed. So have suicides in the Canadian Armed Forces. The problems with Esprit de Corps magazine and apparently DND officials trying to persuade advertisers not to advertise in that publication are of concern.

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The last point I would like to make is the DND diversity questionnaire which has been circulated among the troops. I would like to know the cost of it, the reason for it, and if the military is moving toward a quota system in recruiting for the Canadian Armed Forces.

Mr. Collenette: On the diversity survey, the armed forces is not moving toward a quota system. That is something we are required to do to find out the number of aboriginals and visible minorities within our forces. It is strictly voluntary. In a minute General Addy might want to say some more about it.

On LETE, the land engineering and test establishment, General Fischer perhaps could answer that.

You basically look as if you have gone through all the news clippings of the last 18 months and put the worst spin on everything that has happened. I have countered some of these arguments but I want to put a couple of things on the record.

First of all about Bosnia and Croatia, this is a Government of Canada decision. It is based on our commitment to UNPROFOR. We believe that UNPROFOR has achieved a great deal in getting humanitarian aid to those who need it, in helping to keep the warring factions apart and in saving lives.

That does not mean to say that we find the present situation to be the best. We are concerned about the breakdown of the cease-fire. We are certainly concerned about our future engagement there, as are our major allies. We will not be there forever, but we have taken the renewal for the last couple of rotations. We believe that was the right course of action.

When you talk about those troops who were detained by one faction or another, while we regret that and we abhor that kind of behaviour on the part of one faction, Mr. Hart, you have to realize we are in a dangerous combat situation over there. We are kidding Canadians if we think there is not going to be danger and not going to be risk.

The point I made in the House is that when we have those people over there in difficult situations, let's not try to turn up the rhetoric in the House of Commons and undermine the effort, because those men and women are the people there who are facing bayonets and guns in difficult situations.

You made reference to the airborne question of political expediency. I am not going to get into that debate. We felt we did the right thing at the time. We think it was right for the forces, for the reasons I gave at the time. It has enabled us to give ourselves some flexibility in how we rearrange the infantry. I covered that a little earlier with the creation of the parachute companies in the context of three more light infantry battalions and I think the chief's statement has been well publicized. We can make that available to people here.

There was, as we seem to get in governments, a leak of a report that was given about a year ago by the commander of land forces who did not recommend the allocation of the airborne capability into three different geographic areas. That is not what we have done. The commander, once the airborne had been disbanded, recommended the course of action announced by the chief a couple of weeks ago as the best answer to the problem.

Part of the problem underlying your question - and I think it is quite prevalent - is the lack of understanding on the part of many people of an airborne capability as a rapid assault force and a parachute capability which is largely a means of rapid deployment of lightly armed troops into specific situations, not entirely war related but perhaps for domestic use.

About accepting or rejecting military advice, we have lots of discussions at national headquarters on a weekly basis. I would assume any minister as a civilian head of the armed forces is expected to question not only the public servants but also the military when they come forward with various recommendations. That is what you are there for: to act in the best interest of the Canadian public and discharge your mandate. I make no apologies for questioning the chief, the vice-chief or anybody else from time to time.

The only one time I have publicly disagreed with the judgment of the senior commanders was on the question of the airborne. I said it was a decision that we had the right to take as members of the government, because we had another dimension to consider in our day to day deliberations about the pure military decision.

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About Calgary, again I do not think we have the time, Mr. Chairman. We can discuss it later. I was out in Calgary a few weeks ago. I talked with the premier and the mayor. They are pretty well satisfied with the financial reasons for the consolidation of the bases.

I should say that the solution of creating a megabase in Edmonton was a military solution recommended to me by the chief and the vice-chief as part of the 1995 budget. It could have been at Chilliwack. It could have been at Calgary but the infrastructure and the cost made sense for it to done at Edmonton.

It will require about $230 million in costs for the three. Some of the costs that you referred to, the $23 million, were not complete publicly available costing last year. There have been refinements of numbers. There is avoidance of construction costs. It will take more than just five minutes for me to take you through it. I would be quite prepared - and I am sure the vice-chief will be - to spend a half an hour or an hour to take you through all the factors that led to this decision.

It is a sound decision militarily. It allows the army in western Canada to have the same benefits as the army in central Canada at Petawawa and at Valcartier. the critical mass. It is efficient and will save a lot of money. Unfortunately it means that we have to leave Chilliwack and we have to leave Calgary. I think I have covered just about everything of substance.

By the way, concerning your allegation about Esprit de Corps magazine and the department's role, we have refuted that time and time again. That is not true. I just want to point out for the record that the former editor of Esprit de Corps is now a researcher for the Reform Party, so perhaps that is where you get some of this particular interpretation.

I do not know, General Addy, if you have a comment on the questionnaire.

LGen Addy: No, other to than to say that although we are not required under the Employment Equity Act to conform with it, one of the things we have wanted to do as a question of policy was to be able to see whether or not we are, through no fault of our own, inhibiting access to the Canadian forces to visible minorities. One of the reasons we want to do this is to be able to have a database from which to work in the future. There is no question at all as the minister said of having quotas here.

LGen O'Donnell: As long as we are putting things on the record, I would like to put to bed once and for all a couple of observations that have been made.

First of all the recommendation to roll Chilliwack and Calgary into Edmonton was a recommendation that we made as the military for operational and economic sense. The $230 million is the total cost for all the clean-ups, the moves not only to Edmonton but also Gagetown, Saint-Jean and wherever else we have to build. It is the total cost package.

On the issue of the reformation of a parachute capability, I personally sat in with a great many other people in this room on all the discussions that led to the series of recommendations that came forward. It was another military recommendation fully led by the commander of the army. We have lost part of the big message, which is that these parachute companies are the vanguard of the stand up of three more light infantry battalions. That is part of the bigger message. All those were military decisions taken for operational reasons primarily but obviously for economic ones as well.

You had a question as well with respect to LETE. We will be setting in place whatever is required to ensure that we do get value for money and whatever quality assurance requirements are necessary. We did a very thorough analysis before LETE was closed to ensure we would have that capability and that we could do things more efficiently in the longer term than trying to run our own plant. That is the reason we shut LETE down. We demonstrated to ourselves that we could.

The Chair: If we are to have another session, I would suggest we might want to terminate here. I would also suggest you might let the chair know what topics we should cover in the next session so that the witnesses can come prepared, perhaps even with some statistics, slides and so on.

Mr. Collenette: Mr. Chairman, if there is no vote I am willing to stick around for a while. I do not know whether or not the House adjourned an hour ago.

The Chair: We will check that out. In the meantime we will stay here.

Mr. Hart has a very short question.

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Mr. Hart: On the diversity questionnaire, Mr. Minister, you said that it was voluntary. I do not understand how the military could get an accurate picture if you are saying it is voluntary unless you get everyone to fill out the questionnaire. Reports have said that it is not voluntary, that it is indeed ordered, and that people fill out this questionnaire with their name, rank and service number. They have to sign it. They want to know if you are a visible minority and which visible minority you belong to.

LGen Addy: In fact there are two parts. Part one is that you must fill in your name, rank and serial number. Part two is are you or are you not. You do not have to answer. That way we know whether or not everybody has been consulted. Whether or not the person answers is up to him. Under the law we cannot force a person to answer that question. I am talking about the law of the land, not the Canadian forces.

Mr. Hart: What is the cost of it?

LGen Addy: I can find that out for you. I do not know what it is.

Mr. Collenette: Mr. Chairman, I ran into this about 12 years ago in my former incarnation in multiculturalism with the question of quotas, targets and the like. What the armed forces tries to do, whether in audits on the linguistic duality of the country or the ethnocultural balance in the country, we try to be reflective of Canada as a whole.

The only way we know whether we should be encouraging more of one particular group or another to join the forces is to know the people we have. As the general said, it is up to them to decide whether or not to fill in I am black or I am of Asian origin or I am an aboriginal Canadian.

I can tell you there is no way this government will get into the quota business. It was rejected by the Trudeau government of which I was part. It was rejected by the Mulroney government. I am sure this will be the case with our government. We believe in trying to encourage any of our institutions to be reflective of the culture and the society at large and to adhere to the linguistic duality of Canada.

Mr. Frazer: I have a question, Mr. Chairman. On page 31 of the estimates, DND Training and Development Programs, it says that resources allocated for training and development programs are used extensively for employment equity purposes. For example, 47% of the $2.5 million in salaries are allocated to commands and groups for special initiatives supported employment equity activities; 82% of the $2.1 million reserved annually for corporate management development was also devoted to employment equity.

It would appear that there is an attempt to establish an affirmative action program in the department.

Mr. Collenette: Employment equity is covered by the law. That is the equality between genders. We have certain obligations and we are obliged under law to ensure employment equity. That is not what Mr. Hart was getting at, which is really racial quotas within the forces.

Mr. Frazer: No, but that is your interpretation, Mr. Minister. Employment equity can also apply to visible minorities.

LGen Addy: Yes, that is correct.

Mr. Frazer: Therefore is there an attempt -

Mr. Collenette: Absolutely not. There are no quotas.

Mr. Frazer: The only problem is a perception. By seeking input on how many visible minorities are around, where is that going to lead? What action will be taken when we find out that answer? Is there going to be an attempt to try to redress it if there is a deficiency in a specific area? This is what is bothering people and that is the kind of feedback we are getting.

Mr. Collenette: Mr. Frazer, any institution would like to know why a certain racial or ethnic group does not want, for example, to become a member of the armed forces. In my home town of Toronto, a very multicultural, multi-racial city, you find out why perhaps certain ethnic groups feel they do not want to be part of the police system or join the police. I do not think there is anything wrong with that. We want to try to make the institution as broad and as comprehensive as possible of the Canadian cultural mosaic. The only way you will find out where you are at is to ascertain the composition of the institution. But again you do not have to answer the question.

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Mr. Frazer: There is a perception within your organization that this will lead to affirmative action. I think people are concerned with that.

Mr. Collenette: I have given you my assurances. As long as I am around I will argue against that.

Mr. Frazer: Maybe I am not the one who needs the explanation.

Mr. Collenette: I am saying this publicly. I will argue against that at cabinet because I think it is fundamentally wrong.

[Translation]

Mr. Jacob: Mr. Minister, the issue of APCs has been raised a while ago. Are negotiations already under way between the department and various companies concerning those vehicles? If so, what are those companies? If not, will the Committee be informed as to the kind of vehicle that will be bought and the name of the company with which negotiations will take place?

Mr. Collenette: Mr. Chairman, it would not be appropriate for me to discuss contract matters before they are submitted to Cabinet. I said that discussions are under way between officials and different colleagues. But it would not be appropriate to make some information public before it is formally submitted to Cabinet.

Mr. Jacob: By the time you formally submit that information to Cabinet, will the decision concerning the acquisition of that equipment already have been made? Will parliamentarians and members of this Committee be faced with a done deal? Will everything be settled by then?

Mr. Collenette: I should stress the fact that the government's role is to govern the country.

Mr. Jacob: Of course.

Mr. Collenette: The Parliament's role is to scrutinize and criticize the government's decisions and to give advice, which you did during the exercise leading to the White Book. This Committee made recommendations, and we accepted almost all of them. But decisions are made by the government. You stated your points of view in the Committee's report, and we examined that report. We have accepted the recommendations that we buy APCs, helicopters and other equipment. It is now for the government to decide what to buy, at what price, and through what type of contract. I think General Fischer has something to add.

LGen O'Donnell: Are you talking about the APC?

Mr. Jacob: Yes.

LGen Fischer: If I may Mr. Jacob, I would like to confirm, further to the minister's answer, that no negotiations are under way at this time with any Canadian or foreign company on any project, including that of the armoured vehicle.

In the past few months, though, we have received a number of unsolicited bids from several interested parties. We acknowledged and examined those bids, but we will not negotiate with any company before the government makes its decision concerning the acquisition of new vehicles, and the context and strategy of such procurement.

Mr. Jacob: Thank you.

Mr. Minister, my question actually concerned the EH-101 helicopters. We now realize that there are economic costs involved and that we will have to repay a certain amount. I wanted to know what kind of equipment we would buy, and I wondered whether that equipment could be rejected later on for whatever reasons. I was making some kind of comparison with the EH-101 affair.

Mr. Collenette: I think it would be premature at this time to give the details.

Mr. Jacob: I agree. We will watch closely any new development.

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[English]

The Chair: I should point out that the last Parliament examined the helicopter question with the former government's Minister of National Defence.

Mr. Collenette: The point I wanted to make, Mr. Chairman, and not to insult my colleagues, is that we have consulted widely. We have consulted this group. We have accepted your recommendations. What helicopter is purchased, what APC is purchased or what regional industrial offsets there are, all those questions are rmatters for the government to decide. We will come forward with a package and we will be prepared to defend it. Certainly at that point, if the committee wants to look at our reasoning, I would be pleased to come back with officials and give it.

The Chair: Before we conclude, I want to let you know that there will be a steering committee meeting on Tuesday, May 2, at 11 a.m. in room 208 in the West Block.

Before the minister and his officials leave, I thank them very much for being so frank and for having their answers so well thought out. We look forward to seeing them back again.

The meeting is adjourned to the call of the chair.